

HISTORY OF CIVILIZATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA

Volume VI

Towards the contemporary period:
from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century



U N E S C O P u b l i s h i n g

History of Civilizations of Central Asia

Towards the contemporary period: from the
mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth
century

Volume VI

President: Chahryar Adle
Co-Editors: Madhavan K. Palat and Anara Tabyshalieva

Multiple History Series
UNESCO Publishing

The authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this book and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization.

The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Coordinated by I . Iskender-Mochiri

English text edited by Jana Gough

Composed by Desk (France)

Printed by Estudios Gráficos ZURE, Bilbao (Spain)

Published in 2005 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization 7 place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP

ISBN 92-3-103985-7

© UNESCO 2005

Contents

PREFACE OF THE DIRECTOR - GENERAL OF UNESCO	12
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT	14
MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE (from 1980 to 1993)	17
MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE (since 1993)	18
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS	19
INTRODUCTION	24
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE	28
1 THE STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA	29
Introduction	30
The new political and strategic situation	32
The emirate of Bukhara	36
The khanate of Khiva	37
The khanate of Kokand	37
The principalities	38
The parameters of Russian expansion	40
The fate of Tashkent	44
The end of the campaigns	44
The campaign against Khiva	46
British reactions to the Khiva expedition	46

The end of the Kokand protectorate	47
Campaigns against the Turkmens	47
The surrender of Merv and the Afghan question	48
2 TRADE AND THE ECONOMY(SECOND HALF OF NINETEENTH CENTURY TO EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY)	51
Introduction	51
The agrarian question	56
Infrastructure	61
Manufacturing and trade	68
Transforming societies	73
Conclusion	76
3 SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN CENTRAL ASIA	78
Settled populations in the oases	81
The nomadic population	84
Impact of Russian rule	88
The religious establishment	94
Water administrators	97
Artisans	97
Slaves	98
4 THE BRITISH IN CENTRAL ASIA	99
FROM THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1918	99
Iran	100
Afghanistan	103
Kashgharia	107
FROM 1918 TO THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY	109
The strategic context	109
5 TSARIST RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA	121
Administration	127
Economic development	136
Banking and foreign capital	140
Relations with Islam	142
Scientific interest in Central Asia	145
Jadidism	147

6 ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA (1917 – 24)	149
7 INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL FERMENT	180
The role of religion	181
Intellectuals and poets among the nomadic peoples	182
Intellectuals and poets among the oasis peoples	185
The new generation of Jadids	190
Pan-Turkism	199
Impact of the Jadids	201
 POLITICAL CHANGES AND STATE FORMATION	 206
8 THE EVOLUTION OF NATION-STATES	207
From the 1850s to the 1920s	207
From the 1920s to the 1990s	212
Conclusion	218
9 UZBEKISTAN	219
Soviet Uzbekistan	219
Independent Uzbekistan	236
10 KAZAKHSTAN	241
The tsarist period	241
The Alash movement	247
Soviet history	250
Prior to independence	255
Independence	257
11 KYRGYZSTAN	258
The Kyrgyz under Russian colonial rule (1850–1917)	258
Soviet Kyrgyzstan (1917–91)	265
Economic developments	271
Population and social developments	274
Afterword	280
12 TAJIKISTAN	282
Political history	282

Economic and social development	286
Culture and science	294
Independence	295
13 TURKMENISTAN	297
Political developments (1850–60)	301
The Russian conquest	307
The Soviet era	310
14 THE SAYAN - ALTAI MOUNTAIN REGION AND SOUTH- EASTERN SIBERIA	319
Khakassia	319
Tuva	323
Altai	328
Buriatia	332
15 MONGOLIA	336
MONGOLIA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TO 1919	337
The rise of the Qing empire and the dissolution of the world of Central Eurasia	337
Qing rule over the Mongols: organization and institutions	339
Mongol society in decline (from the mid-nineteenth century)	341
Mongolia in Russo-Qing relations (from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century)	343
Mongolia during the final years of the Qing	345
The 1911 Mongol declaration of independence and international relations	348
THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION OF 1921 AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1924–46)	353
The birth of the People's Republic	353
The suppression of Buddhism	356
Soviet purges in Mongolia	358
The MPR during the Second World War	359
THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	361
On the path to democratization and the free market	366
16 WESTERN CHINA (XINJIANG)	368
From the mid-nineteenth century to 1911 revolution	369
The republican period (1912–49)	376

A new chapter in Xinjiang's history (October 1949 to 1990)	388
17 NORTH INDIA (EXCLUDING PAKISTAN AFTER 1947)	394
Early colonial rule	394
The revolt of 1857	395
After 1857	396
Early nationalism	398
Nationalism and Indian capitalists	401
The coming of Gandhi	402
Mass mobilization, independence and partition	403
Independent India	407
18 PAKISTAN (SINCE 1947)	411
The Ayub Khan era	414
The Yahya Khan regime	416
The Bhutto era	418
The Zia era	420
The democratic era	423
19 AFGHANISTAN	426
AFGHANISTAN FROM 1850 TO 1919	426
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN	435
20 IRAN AND ITS EASTERN REGIONS (1848 – 1989)	449
The last Qajar kings (1848–1925)	449
The Pahlavi dynasty (1925–79)	467
The Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini (1979–89)	476
ENVIRONMENT, SOCIETY AND CULTURE	479
21 THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA	480
Overview	480
South Asian landscapes	492
South-West Asia	494
22 THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1917–90)	515
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN CENTRAL ASIA	515

WOMEN's MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN	525
Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran	525
Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	531
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN	535
India	535
Pakistan	545
23 EDUCATION, THE PRESS AND PUBLIC HEALTH	548
Education	549
The press	557
Public health	562
Conclusion	567
Appendix	569
24 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY	572
Afghanistan	575
Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran	578
Kazakhstan	580
Kyrgyzstan	583
Mongolia	585
North India	589
Pakistan	593
Tajikistan	597
Turkmenistan	600
Uzbekistan	602
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region	604
25 THE ART OF THE NORTHERN REGIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA	608
The overall cultural situation	608
Pottery	610
Copper embossing	614
Jewellery	616
Felt products	624
Carpet-making	628
Artistic fabrics	637
Printed cloth	641

Embroidery	642
Leather goods	650
Bone carving	651
Wood painting	655
Miniatures and other arts	655
Modern fine arts: painting in the twentieth century	658
Conclusion	674
26 THE ARTS IN EASTERN CENTRAL ASIA	675
THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF XINJIANG	676
The late Qing period (1850–1912)	676
The Republican period (1912–49)	689
The modern period (1949–90)	692
UIGHUR VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE	700
The Uighur house	702
THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF MONGOLIA	711
Introduction	711
Fine arts from the ‘second conversion’ to 1900	712
Buddhist architecture to 1900	716
Architecture and the fine arts in the early twentieth century	719
Fine arts, 1921–90	724
Architecture, 1921–90	731
The contemporary art scene	732
27 THE ARTS IN WESTERN AND SOUTHERN CENTRAL ASIA	735
IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN	736
INDIA AND PAKISTAN	771
28 CINEMA AND THEATRE	785
The tsarist colonial period	785
The Soviet period	786
The post-Soviet era	792
29 ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN PLANNING IN NORTHERN CENTRAL ASIA FROM THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST TO THE SOVIET PERIOD (1865–1990)	795
Introduction	795

Architecture and urban planning during the tsarist period (nineteenth and early twentieth centuries)	797
Architecture and urban planning during the Soviet period (1920s–90s)	807
Conclusion	832
30 LITERATURE IN PERSIAN AND OTHER INDO - IRANIAN LANGUAGES	833
LITERATURE IN PERSIAN	834
Neoclassicism (the Bazgasht school)	835
The dawn of enlightenment: the pre-constitutional period	837
The constitutional period: the outburst of social and political literature	838
The reign of Reza Shah and the beginnings of modern poetry	841
Breaking traditions: new poetry (she‘r-e now)	843
Fiction in modern Persian literature	846
LITERATURE IN DARI	851
Classical literature	851
Modern prose and journalism	852
Literature of resistance	854
Literary studies and novels	854
The post-communist period	856
LITERATURE IN TAJIK	859
LITERATURE IN OTHER INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES	863
Kashmiri	863
Punjabi	867
Sindhi	874
Urdu	879
31 LITERATURE IN TURKIC AND MONGOLIAN	888
LITERATURE IN TURKIC	888
Urban literature	889
The literature of the steppe and mountains	893
Conclusion	896
LITERATURE IN MONGOLIAN	897
Inner Mongolia and Dzungaria	907
Kalmukia	909
Buriatia	910
CONCLUSION	914

MAPS*	917
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES	927
INDEX	973
History of civilizations of Central Asia	992

PREFACE OF THE DIRECTOR - GENERAL OF UNESCO


The preparation of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* undertaken by the International Scientific Committee began in 1980. This scholarly team, composed of 19 members until 1991 and just 16 members after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, comes from the region of Central Asia (as defined by UNESCO) and from other parts of the world. They are responsible for the preparation of this six-volume work, which covers the period from the dawn of civilization to the present day.

More than three hundred scholars, mostly from the Central Asian region, have contributed to this major work, which is now completed with the publication of the present volume. For each scholar who has invested his or her knowledge and expertise in this great undertaking, the work on this *History* has been a difficult task since Central Asia is a complex region, composed of a variety of cultural entities and influences that have undergone major changes over the centuries.

Today, in an era of rapid globalization, it is increasingly vital to find ways to respect the world's human values. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted by the General Conference at its thirty-first session is a major step towards finding avenues of dialogue between peoples living on our planet. We know that human beings forge their identity through the cultures which have enriched them. Their sense of worth and personal dignity very much lies in the recognition by the other of the special contribution that each and all – women and men, majorities and minorities – have made to weaving the rich tapestry of the world's civilization. Indeed, civilizations are fertile mixtures and all borrowed from one another well before the advent of our age of electronic communications. The term 'civilization' must denote a universal, plural and non-hierarchical phenomenon, since every civilization has been enriched by contact and exchange with others. History is a shared experience.

The historical relationship existing between nomadic and sedentary peoples, living in quite different environments – steppes and oases – played a key part in shaping the cultural diversity of Central Asia and made an important contribution to its originality. To what

extent and in what ways did the same influences affect different societies and fulfil different functions in extremely varied environments? In this work, we find numerous examples of diverse cultures living together, distinguishable but nevertheless sharing a common heritage. Therefore, this work strongly attests that each and every culture has made its own distinct contribution to the common heritage of humankind, as recalled in the words of the great Iranian poet and philosopher Saadi Shirazi several hundred years ago: 'All human beings are like organs of a body; when one organ is afflicted with pain, others cannot rest in peace.' The *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* illustrates perfectly the wealth of diversity and the foundation it provides of a shared future. Today, we are faced with a new challenge: to make of that diversity an instrument for dialogue and mutual understanding.



Koïchiro Matsuura

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

M. S. Asimov

The General Conference of UNESCO, at its nineteenth session (Nairobi, October, November 1976), adopted the resolution which authorized the Director-General to undertake, among other activities aimed at promoting appreciation and respect for cultural identity, a new project on the preparation of a *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*. This project was a natural consequence of a pilot project on the study of Central Asia which was approved during the fourteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference in November 1966.

The purpose of this pilot project, as it was formulated in the UNESCO programme, was to make better known the civilizations of the peoples living in the regions of Central Asia through studies of their archaeology, history, languages and literature. At its initial stage, the participating Member States included Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and the former Soviet Union. Later, Mongolia and China joined the UNESCO Central Asian project, thus enlarging the area to cover the cultures of Mongolia and the western regions of China.

In this work, Central Asia should be understood as a cultural entity developed in the course of the long history of civilizations of peoples of the region and the above delimitation should not be taken as rigid boundaries either now or in the future.

In the absence of any existing survey of such large scope which could have served as a model, UNESCO has had to proceed by stages in this difficult task of presenting an integrated narrative of complex historical events from earliest times to the present day.

The first stage was designed to obtain better knowledge of the civilizations of Central Asia by encouraging archaeological and historical research and the study of literature and the history of science. A new project was therefore launched to promote studies in five major domains: the archaeology and the history of the Kushan empire, the history of the arts of Central Asia, the contribution of the peoples of Central Asia to the development of science, the history of ideas and philosophy, and the literatures of Central Asia.

An International Association for the Study of Cultures of Central Asia (IASCCA), a non-governmental scholarly organization, was founded on the initiative of the Tajik scholar

B. Gafurov in 1973, assembling scholars of the area for the coordination of interdisciplinary studies of their own cultures and the promotion of regional and international cooperation.

Created under the auspices of UNESCO, the new Association became, from the very beginning of its activity, the principal consultative body of UNESCO in the implementation of its programme on the study of Central Asian cultures and the preparation of a *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*.

The second stage concentrated on the modern aspects of Central Asian civilizations and the eastward extension of the geographical boundaries of research in the new programme. A series of international scholarly conferences and symposia were organized in the countries of the area to promote studies on Central Asian cultures.

Two meetings of experts, held in 1978 and 1979 at UNESCO Headquarters, concluded that the project launched in 1967 for the study of cultures of Central Asia had led to considerable progress in research and contributed to strengthening existing institutions in the countries of the region. The experts consequently advised the Secretariat on the methodology and the preparation of the *History*. On the basis of its recommendations it was decided that this publication should consist of six volumes covering chronologically the whole history of Central Asian civilizations ranging from their very inception up to the present. Furthermore, the experts recommended that the experience acquired by UNESCO during the preparation of the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind* and of the *General History of Africa* should also be taken into account by those responsible for the drafting of the *History*. As to its presentation, they supported the opinion expressed by the UNESCO Secretariat that the publication, while being a scholarly work, should be accessible to a general readership.

Since history constitutes an uninterrupted sequence of events, it was decided not to give undue emphasis to any specific date. Events preceding or subsequent to those indicated here are dealt with in each volume whenever their inclusion is justified by the requirements of scholarship.

The third and final stage consisted of setting up in August 1980 an International Scientific Committee of nineteen members, who sat in a personal capacity, to take responsibility for the preparation of the *History*. The Committee thus created included two scholars from each of the seven Central Asian countries – the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, China, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia and what was then the USSR – and five experts from other countries – Hungary, Japan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The Committee's first session was held at UNESCO Headquarters in December 1980. Real work on the preparation of the publication of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* started, in fact, in 1981. It was decided that scholars selected by virtue of their qualifications and achievements relating to Central Asian history and culture should ensure the objective presentation, and also the high scientific and intellectual standard, of this *History*.

Members of the International Scientific Committee decided that the new project should correspond to the noble aims and principles of UNESCO and thereby should contribute to the promotion of mutual understanding and peace between nations. The Committee followed the recommendation of the experts delineating for the purpose of this work the geographical area of Central Asia to reflect the common historical and cultural experience.

The first session of the International Committee decided most of the principal matters concerning the implementation of this complex project, beginning with the drafting of plans and defining the objectives and methods of work of the Committee itself.

The Bureau of the International Scientific Committee consists of a president, four vice-presidents and a rapporteur. The Bureau's task is to supervise the execution of the project between the sessions of the International Scientific Committee. The reading committee, consisting of four members, was created in 1986 to revise and finalize the manuscripts after editing Volumes I and II. Another reading committee was constituted in 1989 for Volumes III and IV.

The authors and editors are scholars from the present twelve countries of Central Asia and experts from other regions. Thus, this work is the result of the regional and of the international collaboration of scholars within the framework of the programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The International Scientific Committee and myself express particular gratitude to Mrs Irene Iskender-Mochiri for her arduous and selfless work in preparing the volumes for the press.

It is our sincere hope that the publication of this last volume (Volume VI) of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* will be a further step towards the promotion of the cultural identity of the peoples of Central Asia, strengthening their common cultural heritage, and, consequently, will foster a better understanding among the peoples of the world.

MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE (from 1980 to 1993)

Dr F. R. ALLCHIN (United Kingdom)

† Professor M. S. ASIMOV (Tajikistan)

President

Editor of Volume IV (Parts One and Two)

Dr N. A. BALOCH (Pakistan)

Professor M. BASTANI PARIZI
(Islamic Republic of Iran)

Professor Sh. BIRA (Mongolia)

Professor A. H. DANI (Pakistan)
Editor of Volume I

† Professor K. ENOKI (Japan)

Professor G. F. ETEMADI (Afghanistan)
Co-editor of Volume II

Professor J. HARMATTA (Hungary)
Editor of Volume II

Professor LIU CUNKUAN
(People's Republic of China)

Dr L. I. MIROSHNIKOV
(Russian Federation)

Professor S. NATSAGDORJ (Mongolia)

† Professor B. N. PURI (India)
Co-editor of Volume II

Professor M. H. Z. SAFI (Afghanistan)

Professor A. SAYILI (Turkey)

Dr R. SHABANI SAMGHABADI
(Islamic Republic of Iran)
Co-editor of Volume III

Professor D. SINOR
(United States of America)

† Professor B. K. THAPAR (India)

Professor ZHANG GUANG-DA
(People's Republic of China)

Co-editor of Volume III

MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE (since 1993)

Professor C. ADLE
(Islamic Republic of Iran)
President and Editor of Volume V

Professor D. A. ALIMOVA (Uzbekistan)

Professor M. ANNANEPESOV
(Turkmenistan)

Professor K. M. BAIPAKOV (Kazakhstan)
Co-editor of Volume V

Professor Sh. BIRA (Mongolia)

Professor A. H. DANI (Pakistan)
Editor of Volume I

Professor M. DINORSHOEV (Tajikistan)

Professor R. FARHADI (Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan)

Professor H.-P. FRANCFORT (France)

Professor Irfan HABIB (India)
Editor of Volume V

Dr L. MIROSHNIKOV (Russian Federation)

Professor D. SINOR (United States of
America)

Dr A. TABYSHALIEVA (Kyrgyzstan)
Co-Editor of Volume VI

Professor İ. TOGAN (Turkey)

Professor H. UMEMURA (Japan)

Professor WU YUNGUI (People's Republic
of China)

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

N. A. ABDURAKHIMOVA

Professor

Department of Historical Sciences

College of History

National University

Tashkent

Uzbekistan

L. L. ADAMS

Research Fellow

Princeton Institute for International
and Regional Studies

013 Bendheim Hall

Princeton University

Princeton, N.J.

USA

C. ADLE

Director of Research

Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique (CNRS)

19, rue C  pr  

75015 Paris

France

R. AFZAL

Qaid-i Azam University

Department of History

Islamabad 44000

Pakistan

A. ALIMARDONOV

Tajik Academy of Sciences

33 Rudaki Avenue

Dushanbe

Tajikistan

D. A. ALIMOVA

Director

Institute of History

Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan

Tashkent

Uzbekistan

M. ANNANEPESOV

Professor of History

University of Turkmenistan

Ashgabat

Turkmenistan

G. ASHUROV

Professor

Institute of Philosophy and Law

Tajik Academy of Sciences

33 Rudaki Avenue

Dushanbe

Tajikistan

C. ATWOOD
Associate Professor
Central Eurasian Studies Department
Indiana University
Goodbody Hall 157
1011 East 3rd Street
Bloomington, Ind., 47405-7005
USA

M. AZZOUT
Architect
DPLG and Member of CRESPPA
(Research Centre in Sociology and Politics
of Paris), MR 7112 of CNRS/CSU
(Cultures and Urban Societies),
France

Ts. BATBAYAR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
7A Enkh Taivny Gudami
Ulaanbaatar
Mongolia

J. BOLDBAATAR
Professor
2 Zaluuchudiin Gudami
Room No. 263, Num Building No. 2
Ulaanbataar
Mongolia

M. DINORSHOEV
Director
Institute of Philosophy and Law
Tajik Academy of Sciences
33 Rudaki Avenue
Dushanbe
Tajikistan

R. DOR
Director
Institut Français d'Études sur
l'Asie Centrale (IFEAC)
18A, Rakatboshi Street
700031 Tashkent
Uzbekistan

W. FLOOR
6412 Dahlonga Road
Bethesda, MD 20816
USA

V. FOURNIAU
Professor
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales (EHESS)
54, Bd Raspail
75006 Paris
France

A. A. GOLOVANOV
Professor
Department of Independent
Uzbekistan History
Institute of History
Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan
Tashkent
Uzbekistan

I. HASNAIN
Professor
Department of Linguistics
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh 202 002
India

H. JAVADI
5516 Westbard Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20816
USA

G. KARA
ELTE University of Budapest
1378 Budapest
Hungary

and
Indiana University
Goodbody Hall 142
Bloomington, IN 47405
USA

A. KHAKIMOV
Vice-President
Academy of Fine Arts
Tashkent
Uzbekistan

Iqtidar A. KHAN
Professor of History (retired)
Department of History
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh 202 002
India

A. KIAN-THIÉBAUT
CNRS-Monde Iranien
27, rue Paul Bert
94204 Ivry-sur-Seine
France

LI SHENG
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
5 Jianguomennei Street
100732 Beijing
China

W. MALEY
Professor
Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200
Australia

S. MOOSVI
Professor of History
Department of History
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh 202 002
India

M. MOSHEV
Professor of History
University of Turkmenistan
Ashgabat
Turkmenistan

T. NAKAMI
Professor
Research Institute for Languages and
Cultures of Asia and Africa
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
11-1, Asahi-cho 1, Huchu-shi
Tokyo 183-8534
Japan

N. NASIRI-MOGHADDAM
28, rue Vicq d'Azir
75010 Paris
France

C. NOELLE-KARIMI

Professor

University of Bamberg

Lehrstuhl für Iranistik

Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg

96045 Bamberg

Germany

K. NURPEIS

Professor

Institute of History and Ethnology

Almaty

Kazakhstan

Madhavan K. PALAT

Professor of History

Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts

Panpath

110 001 New Delhi

India

A. K. PATNAIK

Professor

Centre for Soviet and East European
Studies

School of International Studies

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi 110067

India

C. POUJOL

Professor

History and Cultures of Central Asia

Institut National des Langues

et Civilisations Orientales

(INALCO)

2, rue de Lille

75007 Paris

France

QIN HUIBIN

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

5 Jianguomennei Street

100732 Beijing

China

R. Y. RADJAPOVA

Institute of History of Uzbekistan

Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan

Tashkent

Uzbekistan

R. G. ROZI

5 Biran Court Reservoir

Victoria 3073

Australia

A. SAIKAL

Director

Centre for Arab & Islamic Studies
(The Middle East & Central Asia)

Faculty of Arts

Australian National University

Canberra ACT 0200

Australia

E. SHUKUROV

Professor of Ecology

137, Sovetskaia Street, apt. 7

Bishkek

Kyrgyz Republic, 720021

A. TABYSHALIEVA

Institute for Regional Studies

P.O. Box 1880

Bishkek

Kyrgyz Republic, 720000

D. VASILEV

Vice-President

National Association of Russian

Orientalists

and

Professor

Oriental History Department

Institute of Oriental Studies

Russian Academy of Sciences

Rozhdestvenka Street 12

103753 Moscow

Russian Federation

S. P. VERMA

Professor of History

Centre of Advanced Study

Department of History

Aligarh Muslim University

Aligarh 202 002

India

XU JIANYING

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

5 Jianguomennei Street

100732 Beijing

China

Other collaborating specialists:

M. ANWAR KHAN (Pakistan)

A. K. AUEZKHAN (Kazakhstan)

L. BATCHULUUN (Mongolia)

G. KRONGARDT (Kyrgyzstan)

L. I. MIROSHNIKOV (Russian Federation)

D. TSEDEV (Mongolia)

INTRODUCTION

C. Adle
President of the International Scientific Committee

This sixth and final volume of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*¹ successfully brings the publication of this series to an end. The pioneers who undertook this immense task wished to contribute to fulfilling one of the main goals proclaimed in UNESCO's Constitution, which aims 'to develop and to increase the means of communication between ... peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives'.² As a further means of achieving that goal, UNESCO had already published in 1968 the *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind*. The Organization had also undertaken the publication of a series of books on the history and civilizations of areas on which studies were non-existent, scarce, outdated or biased. These series included, for instance, the *General History of Africa*, the *General History of Latin America*, the present *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, etc.³ It is worth noticing that for the latter region, the only extant publication which roughly covered the Central Asian lands was about a century old and dealt only with political history. Entitled *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century*, this valuable book was written by a single man, Henry H. Howorth, at a time when the Russians and the British were playing the 'Great Game' in Central Asian lands.⁴

The resolution authorizing the Director-General of UNESCO to launch the project of the publication of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* was adopted by the General

¹ The meaning of the term 'Central Asia' as it is defined in these volumes is explained in an appendix by Dr L. I. Miroshnikov at the end of Vol. I, pp. 477–80.

² Cited by Federico Mayor, then the Director-General of UNESCO, in his Preface to Vol. I of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*.

³ *General History of Africa*, English ed., Paris, 1981–93, 8 vols.; *General History of Latin America*, Spanish ed., Paris, 1999–2004, 9 vols. (6 published). The other series include the *General History of the Caribbean*, English ed., Paris, 1997–2005, 6 vols. (5 published) and *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*, English and French eds., Paris, 1994–2003, 6 vols. (3 published in each language).

⁴ First published in London from 1876 to 1888 with an additional part issued in 1927; reprinted in 4 vols. in New York in 1970.

Conference of UNESCO held in Nairobi in October and November 1976. The scheme was a consequence of a pilot project on the study of Central Asia approved ten years earlier during the fourteenth session of UNESCO's General Conference in November 1966. The project aimed to make better known the civilizations of Central Asian peoples through the study of their archaeology, history, languages and literature. The first meeting of the International Scientific Committee in charge of planning the project in all its scientific aspects was held in Paris in December 1980. In the initial stage, the countries involved were Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and the Soviet Union. In spite of observations made by some scholars, the geopolitical situation in the world at the time did not yet favour the extension of the cultural area under consideration towards more eastern regions of Asia. However, China and Mongolia were later included within the circle of countries participating in the preparation of the publication. Other countries from different parts of the world in which Central Asiatic studies were highly developed were also included in the International Scientific Committee. The experts were from France, Hungary, Japan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The Central Asian landscape had changed again by the end of 1991, this time dramatically, with the transformation of the Soviet Union which gave birth to the Russian Federation, and in Asia to the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The event was so significant that it provided the *terminus ad quem* for the volumes, which had the pre-historic period as their starting point. The end date was, however, to be understood approximately as it did not have the same value everywhere: the collapse of the imperial regime in Iran in 1979, for instance, or the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 were far more important for these countries than the changes in the former USSR.

The *History*, arranged chronologically in six volumes (all now published), was conceived as follows:

Volume I: *The Dawn of Civilization: Earliest Times to 700 B.C.*, eds. A. H. Dani and V. M. Masson (Paris, 1992).

Volume II: *The Development of Sedentary and Nomadic Civilizations: 700 B.C. to A.D. 250*, ed. János Harmatta, co-eds. B. N. Puri and G. F. Etemadi (Paris, 1994).

Volume III: *The Crossroads of Civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750*, ed. B. A. Litvinsky, co-eds. Zhang Guang-da and R. Shabani Samghabadi (Paris, 1996).

Volume IV: *The Age of Achievement: A.D. 750 to the End of the Fifteenth Century*, 2 vols., eds. M. S. Asimov and C. E. Bosworth (Part One, Paris, 1998; Part Two, Paris, 2000).

Volume V: *Development in Contrast: From the Sixteenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, eds. Chahryar Adle and Irfan Habib, co-ed. Karl M. Baipakov (Paris, 2003).

Volume VI: *Towards the Contemporary Period: From the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century*, co-eds. Madhavan K. Palat and Anara Tabyshalieva (Paris, 2005).

Among these volumes, the most problematic and thorny to prepare was Volume VI, which deals with the present time with all its geopolitical complexity. The difficulties in preparing and publishing this study proved so insuperable that the Editor finally resigned. Within the limited time left until the submission of the final manuscript, no satisfactory substitute could be found and the Co-Editors, the Assistant to the publication (Mrs Iskender-Mochiri) and the President thus had to assume responsibility for compiling and editing the volume. Shortcomings were often inevitable as, due to the strict publication deadline, the competent scholars were sometimes not available. Significant weaknesses, such as the lack of notices on contemporary architecture in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran or Pakistan, as well as on other subjects, are thus evident. In spite of these lacunae, it is nevertheless hoped that readers will either find directly in this volume some hints as to their desired subjects or that the references provided will lead them to the relevant specialist publications.

To mention all of those who have taken part in the preparation and publication of these volumes would be an impossible task, but it is essential to single out here the continuous support of UNESCO, without which the series would never have been conceived, prepared and published. It is also necessary to pay tribute to the late Professor and Academician B. G. Gafurov, the President of the International Association for the Study of the Cultures of Central Asia. With the assistance of Dr L. I. Miroshnikov as the Rapporteur to that association, and the collaboration of other academics, these scholars indeed prepared the way for the launching of the final project of the publication of this *History*. Among those initiators were Professors Sh. Bira, A. H. Dani, J. Harmatta, and last but not least Professor D. Sinor. As Vice-Directors and Rapporteurs at the first gatherings of the International Scientific Committee in charge of the project for the publication of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, they greatly contributed to its conception, its launching and later its continuation. Their ground-breaking activities were supported and sustained by my predecessor, the late Professor Mohammad S. Asimov, the first President of the International Scientific Committee, who took up his responsibility in 1980 and kept it until his mysterious assassination in 1996. Equally vital to the success of this major collaborative enterprise has been the scientific and editorial work of the Directors and Co-Directors of this

series; their names are mentioned at the beginning of each volume and also in the list of volumes given above. Some of these eminent scholars, such as Professors C. E. Bosworth and Irfan Habib, not only undertook their own specific commitments, but also helped the Committee as highly valued advisors.

The series also owes greatly to Mrs Irene Iskender-Mochiri, who has overseen the publishing project on behalf of UNESCO and acted as coordinator between the authors, the translators and the Editors. In editorial matters, Mrs Mochiri has benefited from a close and fruitful collaboration with Jana Gough. Thanks are also due to many in the UNESCO English Translation Unit and the translators themselves, who have on several occasions gone beyond their usual obligations in order to improve the quality of the translated texts.

Now the arduous task of the publication of this *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* has reached completion. No doubt, the advance of knowledge and development in research methods will impose sooner rather than later if not a rewriting then at least a substantial revision of its contents, but all those who have collaborated to create this series will be satisfied if their readers conclude that in some measure light has been thrown on a complex and hitherto little-known subject.

Part I:

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

THE STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA (SECOND HALF OF NINETEENTH CENTURY TO EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY)*

V. Fourniau and C. Poujol

Contents

Introduction	30
The new political and strategic situation	32
The emirate of Bukhara	36
The khanate of Khiva	37
The khanate of Kokand	37
The principalities	38
The parameters of Russian expansion	40
The fate of Tashkent	44
The end of the campaigns	44
The campaign against Khiva	46
British reactions to the Khiva expedition	46
The end of the Kokand protectorate	47
Campaigns against the Turkmens	47
The surrender of Merv and the Afghan question	48

* See Map 1.

Introduction

The second half of the nineteenth century was a watershed in the history of Central Asia, as the period's great empires extended their influence or protection over the various political units of the region. Three main players, Russia, China and Great Britain, established or strengthened protectorate treaties and direct colonization.

A particular feature of Central Asia is that it is both a geographical concept and a cultural region, albeit one whose different components have never been brought together into a single political entity. Central Asia has thus never been a single state. Parts of its territory have in turn become the provinces of empires whose centres lay outside Central Asia (for example, the empire of Alexander the Great, and the Mongol, Chinese and Russian empires). After these empires collapsed, the region frequently divided into smaller political units (the Kazakh and Uzbek khanates, and so on). The expression 'Central Asia' thus defines a vast historical configuration consisting of several entities (khanates, emirates, etc.) and covering many different political, economic and cultural situations, ethnic groups and identities.

After the dismemberment of the Mongol empire, politics and culture in the immensity of Central Asia developed within independent entities until the end of the eighteenth century, or even into the nineteenth depending on the area. A new period then began, bringing many changes that continue to mark the geopolitics of the region, whose position at the confluence of considerable geopolitical and economic interests has become enormously significant.

Although the historical importance of Central Asia has long been acknowledged, this is not reflected in social science studies of the area. One of the problems is that it has been shaped not only by the identity of each of its components and that of the region as a whole, but also by both local and global factors. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the world's major powers became aware of the importance of controlling, or even possessing Central Asia. All of the protagonists (Britain and Russia, and to some extent China) built up their own body of knowledge about the region.

The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the completion of the systems of dominion over Central Asia, and also an unprecedented flourishing of analysis, information-gathering and publications about the region. The sources for the study of Central Asia in the latter half of the nineteenth century reflect this and are numerous and diverse. They come from contemporary outside observers, politicians, visionary strategists and geographers, and Western and Eastern travellers. They also include little-known documents from the chanceries of various Central Asian sovereigns, such as the dynastic chronologies

composed at the courts of local rulers up to the early twentieth century. They illustrate the diversity of attitudes and the many views (exogenous, endogenous) and assessments of the situation according to the position of the protagonists, both the conquerors and the conquered.

Research into the history of the states or state structures of Central Asia in the latter half of the nineteenth century was conducted at the intersection of these exogenous and endogenous historiographic traditions – Russian,¹ British and Chinese on the one hand, and Bukharan, Khivan, Kokandi, Kazakh, Afghan and Iranian on the other. The powers with interests in Central Asia developed very different traditions of knowledge from each other, and the abundance of documentation is a clear departure from the preceding period (the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), in which local sources predominated, since the future conquering empires of Central Asia knew little or nothing of the region.

However, owing to their nearness in time, their volume, the quality of the information, and their variety and accuracy, the different exogenous traditions continue to influence current knowledge about Central Asia – this is true both in the different countries of the region and outside. There are, as a result, a number of historiographic myths marking each of these traditions. The Western tradition has many such, including the idea that current state borders in Central Asia are only the product of the ‘Great Game’ (see below). It would be more accurate to say that the empires accelerated endogenous trends relating to borders between the states in the region and attributed them to their policy of expansion. In fact, many pre-colonial endogenous trends are reflected in current borders, and territorial relations between Persia and Khiva, Afghanistan and Bukhara, and the Qing empire of China and Kokand should also be taken into account in analysing this particular era. One of the main advantages of the current period is that it affords the opportunity to address all the documentation simultaneously, both local and exogenous, Eastern as well as Western.

Lastly, it should be noted that, at the end of the eighteenth century and particularly in the first half of the nineteenth century, the expression ‘Central Asia’ replaced the expression ‘Tartary’ in Western and Russian knowledge traditions. ‘Central Asia’ was thus the most common expression in the second half of the nineteenth century, with its numerous variant forms in Russian, English, French and other languages. Its use has continued to spread, owing in particular to its adoption by the countries of the region.

¹ Including orientalism: see Lunin, [1965](#); Lunin, [1979](#).

The new political and strategic situation in the second half of the nineteenth century: the steppes–oasis equation under colonial pressure

The nineteenth century confirmed the development of a new overall geopolitical situation in the vastness of Central Asia. Lord Curzon, viceroy of India from 1899 to 1906, put it rather eloquently in *Persia and the Persian Question*:

Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia – to many these names breathe only a sense of utter remoteness or a memory of strange vicissitudes and of moribund romance. To me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the domination of the world.²

This reflection, delivered at the height of British-Russian rivalry – or the ‘Great Game’ in the expression of the British agent Arthur Conolly, executed as a spy in Bukhara in 1842, and taken up by Rudyard Kipling in 1901 – sheds light on more than a century of confrontation between two imperialist powers for whom Central Asia was an immense arena of struggle for domination of the ‘pivot of the world’,³ with, on the Russian side at least, the additional justification of a messianic quest for the ‘cradle of the Aryans’.⁴ It was during the second half of that century, throughout which expansionist and ‘civilizing’ forces took shape, that new spheres of influence were formed after many incidents, wars, alliances and changes in alliances.

The issue must then be addressed of the consequences of the three types of domination (namely, Chinese, British and Russian) on Central Asia’s nomadic and sedentary societies and cultures. The history of these societies became entwined with the major colonial, economic and messianic issues and concerns of which they were the subject. During this period, most of Central Asia gradually came under Russian sway, leading to a series of breaks in political and cultural continuity, the main pillars of which were Islam on the one hand and Chingissid legitimacy on the other.

Russia formed an empire consisting of a continuous land-mass. However, tsarist domination, which provoked an intense debate within Russia itself,⁵ spread at very different rates, in different ways and in very varied international contexts: the world balance of power in 1732, when direct political influence started to take hold in Kazakh terrain, was

² Curzon, 1892.

³ According to the theory of the geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861–1943), formulated in 1904 in *The Geographical Pivot of History* and amplified by Nicholas John Spykman (1893–1943), which states that ‘Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world,’ the Rimland being a vast area of conflict between maritime and continental powers.

⁴ See Laruelle, 2004.

⁵ See Martens, 1880; Venzhukov, 1877; Riazanovsky, 1972, pp. 3–29; Sahni, 1997.

not the same as that in 1885, when Russia took Merv. In the Kazakh lands, Russia took 150 years first to exert political pressure and then to establish direct dominion. Thereafter, it conquered the Uzbek khanates in 20 years and in another 20 years the rest of Central Asia.

Another continuous land-mass was the Chinese empire. The strategy of the Manchu dynasty in the nineteenth century was designed to counter the influence of Russia and of British agents, who were particularly active in Xinjiang.⁶ This followed a period when a much more offensive policy was pursued, in the second half of the eighteenth century in particular, when the Manchus eliminated the Dzungar empire on their western flank.⁷

In order to complete its colonization of India, Britain was concerned to stall Russian expansionism by securing that part of the Indian border exposed to threat by land, the North-West Frontier, the real 'Achilles heel' of the British possessions. Britain thus adopted a policy of direct intervention in Afghanistan and indirect in Iran.

THE KAZAKH KHANATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The fall of Ak Masjid (the forward fortress of the Kokand khanate on the lower reaches of the Syr Darya) to the Russian army in the summer of 1853 concluded the Russian conquest of most of the Kazakh lands. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia had conducted a policy of influence and then of domination that can be divided into three main phases: 1731–1822, 1822–50 and 1850–1914. The context that gave rise to a 'Kazakh'⁸ policy was basically a combination of past and future: first, the collapse of the last steppe empires, and secondly, Russia's imperial ambitions.

During the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the geopolitical situation on the steppe underwent a radical change. Although for several centuries the Kazakh khanate had been under pressure from the Uzbek states to the south and the Bashkir tribes to the north, the most serious threat came from the east, from Dzungaria. The Dzungar empire was eliminated by the Qing conquest in 1757, which brought China into direct contact with the Kazakh and Uzbek khanates for the first time in their history, engendering new relations, in particular with the Great or Elder Horde (*Zhuz*) of the Kazakhs.

The Kazakh khan Abu'l Khayr (1710–48) appealed for Russian protection from the military pressure exerted by the Dzungar empire and agreed on new ties with Russia, expressed

⁶ See works by Hopkirk, 1990; Morgan, 1981; Rawlinson, 1875.

⁷ See Miyawaki, 2003.

⁸ The Kazakhs, that is almost 1 million people in the eighteenth century, were referred to as 'Kyrgyz', or 'Kyrgyz-Kaisaks' in Russian sources from the 1730s until the beginning of the Soviet period. In the previous period, i.e. from the time of the first contacts between them and Russia until the 1730s, they were called 'Kazakhs'.

in a formal treaty of allegiance (*poddanstvo*) in 1731. Abu'l Khayr signed the *poddanstvo* as the Ulug Khan (great khan) of the Kazakhs, and not only as the ruler of one (the Little or Younger) among the three Kazakh Hordes.⁹ Needless to say, Abu'l Khayr's and Russia's understanding of, and expectations from, the *poddanstvo* were very different, but the year 1731 undoubtedly marks the beginning of Russian influence in Kazakh affairs. During most of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries, it was common for several khans to rule concurrently over the different Hordes, thus increasing the internal political confusion. Russian military fortifications (the Orenburg line, the Ishim line, and so on) were rapidly constructed following the foundation of the towns of Orsk (1733) and Orenburg (1743). The ambition to gain access to the southern seas was to become a lasting feature of the expansionist doctrine of the Russian state, which sought access to the warm waters and mythical treasures of India.¹⁰

Half a century after the treaty of allegiance was signed in 1731, the Russian presence did not extend much beyond the borders of Kazakh territory, yet Russian influence on the Kazakh political system was already considerable. The eighteenth century was marked above all by intense activity in the political (e.g., the renewal of the *poddanstvo* with new Russian rulers), commercial and military spheres. The experience also set the scene for the preparation of new administrative projects, such as Russia's abolition of the position of khan, and paved the way for the next phase, the transition from influence to domination.

The 1820s were a defining moment. The first step was taken in 1822 with the abolition of the position of khan in the Little or Younger Horde, which then led to administrative and territorial reforms, the first being the 'Regulations Governing the Siberian Kyrgyz', known as the Speransky reforms after Mikhail Speransky (1772–1839), governor-general of Siberia. In this way, the regions of 'Eastern Siberia', with Irkutsk as its centre, and 'Western Siberia', with Tobolsk as regional capital, and from 1839, Omsk were formed. Most of the pastureland of the Little and Middle Kazakh Hordes was added to Western Siberia under the name, 'Region of the Siberian Kyrgyz'. Other regulations (*polozhenie*) in 1838 and 1854 completed the Russian administrative structure, of which the border commission, which co-opted the local Kazakh elites, was an important part.

There were numerous uprisings during the consolidation of the new political, economic and cultural order that came into being in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly among the Little and Middle Hordes, whose territories and populations were the first to be exposed to Russian pressure. These movements have not yet been studied

⁹ Erofeeva, 1999.

¹⁰ Poujol, 1985.

systematically, and some of them, such as that led by Batyr Srym Datov (1783–97)¹¹ in the Little Horde, and Kenesary Kasymov in the Middle Horde, are better known than others. Sultan Kenesary Kasymov (1802–47), a descendant of Ablai Khan, led an uprising from 1837 to 1847.

THE UZBEK KHANATES ON THE EVE OF THEIR CONQUEST BY THE 'WHITE TSAR'¹²

The history of Central Asia is better known in the periods when the region was part of a great empire than in the periods when independent entities developed there. For instance, the centuries after the Timurids are often considered to be a period of contraction, or even decline in several knowledge traditions (Iranian, Russian and Western). However, as a result of the pioneering work of V. V. Barthold and many subsequent academics and researchers, the period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century can no longer be viewed as a phase of constant and irreversible political and cultural decline. Indeed, a study of the contacts in the history of Central Asia – in particular, contacts between nomadic and sedentary populations¹³ – enables us to place widespread ideas regarding the inevitable cultural decadence arising from the capture by the Turkic-speaking nomads of the ancient centres of Iranian civilization in Trans-oxania in their proper political and intellectual context.¹⁴

Barthold was one of the first to associate an abundance of sources with a period described as one of decline or at least contraction. Thereafter P. P. Ivanov¹⁵ challenged the idea of a documentary vacuum in Central Asia and defended the theory that there was a profusion of sources that had not yet been studied, which would explain the lack of knowledge of that aspect of its history.¹⁶

The states of Central Asia have always depended on land-based lines of communication, especially when they remained land-locked, as was the case in the post-Timurid era. Thus the destabilization of political and economic circuits in the wake of the new global balance of power¹⁷ after the great European maritime adventures was clearly felt in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries.

¹¹ See Vyatkin, 2002.

¹² Translation of the expression *ak pādishāh*, commonly used to designate the Russian tsar in the Uzbek and Kazakh khanates.

¹³ Fourniau, 2000.

¹⁴ E. Allworth refers to the period from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries in Bukhara in a sub-chapter entitled 'Historiography of the Decline': see Allworth, 1990, p. 107.

¹⁵ Ivanov, 1958, p. 12.

¹⁶ Kazakov, 1999.

¹⁷ Steensgaard, 1973.

Nevertheless, a new dynamism emerged in the following period and continued until Russian power was established in the region, despite endemic warfare between Bukhara and Khiva. This development took the form of the strengthening of central authority under Uzbek clans who installed a new dynasty – the Manghits, who were not Chingissids – in Bukhara, which then became an emirate;¹⁸ the Kungrats in Khiva (pseudo-Chingissids); and the Ming in the Ferghana valley, founders of the khanate of Kokand, which carved out a large place for itself on the political and cultural chessboard of the region.

Cultural progress is the least-known aspect of the second period, which saw the end of the decline of urban life; the reactivation of work to improve and maintain irrigation canals, in particular in the khanate of Kokand; the development of economic ties with neighbouring countries, chiefly Russia; and the development of cultural life in the centres of power, Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand.¹⁹ The archives of the khanates of Khiva and Kokand illustrate the complexity of the legal and administrative system,²⁰ run by a multitude of civil servants, particularly in Bukhara.

The emirate of Bukhara

By the end of the nineteenth century, the emirate of Bukhara was the largest and most highly populated of the Uzbek states. It included some 20 oasis towns, the centres of its administrative divisions (*beyliks* or *vilayets*) and peripheral, semi-independent regions. Different communities lived side by side. Baron von Meyendorff, who accompanied the Russian Negri mission to Bukhara in 1820, estimated their number at about 2.5 million.²¹

Under the Manghits, as under the Astarkhanids, the language of administration and the court remained Persian. Many Shi‘ite captives occupied administrative and other posts despite the pre-eminence of dignitaries of Uzbek stock who held positions of civil and military power. Baron von Meyendorff was among several pre-colonial Russian observers to provide valuable eye-witness accounts of the power structure in Bukhara in the last decades before Russian colonization.²² He was one of the rare travellers who sought to establish the titles and duties of Bukhara’s main dignitaries. However, his assessment of the supreme authority in the emirate was harsh and clearly reflected his opinion that a civilizing

¹⁸ This is a reference to the lineage of Chinggis Khan, the only attribute conferring eligibility on those seeking the legitimacy of power in the Uzbek khanates, with the title of khan.

¹⁹ Qayumov, 1961.

²⁰ Bregel, 1967; Troitskaya, 1968.

²¹ Uzbeks (1.5 million), Tajiks (650,000), Turcomans (200,000), Arabs (50,000), Persians (40,000), Kalmyks (20,000), Kyrgyz and Karakalpaks (6,000), Jews (4,000), Afghans (4,000), Lesghiz (2,000) and Bohemians (2,000): see Meyendorff, 1826.

²² Meyendorff, 1826.

power such as Russia should ‘restore to Asia the wisdom it once conferred on others’. He took an interest in life at court, the state, the economy and in particular irrigation, and in the emirate’s international relations.

The khanate of Khiva

Khwarazm’s geographical remoteness has always given it a special quality. Through contact with the great transcontinental trade caravans, it managed to overcome its isolation and participate in the movement of political renewal that reached the Uzbek khanates during the last period of independence.

The population of the khanate, which numbered about 1 million at the end of the nineteenth century, was made up of Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, Kazakhs and a large number of Turkmens.²³ When Khwarazm had the military strength and political will to expand, it traditionally moved north, towards the Kazakh lands, and above all south, to the Murghab and Tejen basins and the southern oases inhabited by Turkmens, as far as neighbouring Persia.

The language of administration was Chaghatay Turki, the language used by two famous *mirāb*-chroniclers of the khanate, Mu’nis (1778–1829) and his nephew Agahi (1809–74), to compile the history of the dynasty. Agahi lived under six khans, from Muhammad Rahim I (1806–25) to Muhammad Rahim II (1864–1910).

The khanate of Kokand

Centred on the Ferghana valley, the khanate of Kokand was the most recent and dynamic of the Uzbek states, with over 2 million inhabitants at the end of the nineteenth century, 500,000 of them nomads. Seven rulers belonging to the Uzbek Ming dynasty succeeded each other in the course of a century, from the khanate’s founder, ‘Alim Khan (1798–1810), to Khudayar Khan (1845–58; 1865–75). They implemented a policy of territorial expansion towards the emirate of Bukhara (Khujand, Tashkent and Ura-tepe were taken by ‘Alim Khan in 1809), the Kazakh lands to the north and the Kyrgyz lands to the south.²⁴ The increase in irrigated land and the cultural renaissance impressed even the most powerful of Kokand’s neighbours.

It was in the reign of Madali Khan (1831–9) that the khanate reached its apogee before being invaded for a short period by the emir of Bukhara, Nasrullah Khan, in 1842. Thereafter, the khanate was prey to incessant rivalries between nomadic and sedentary

²³ According to the 1897 census, there were 450,000 Turkmens in the whole of Turkistan, 248,000 of whom were in the province of Transcaspia.

²⁴ Bregel, 2003, map 30, pp. 61, 31 and 63.

communities, Uzbek clans and Bukharan claimants. This final period gave the Russians an excellent opportunity to start their military campaign in Turkistan.

Kokand shared borders with China, the Kazakh Great Horde, Russia and the emirate of Bukhara but it was with the latter that political contacts were the most tense throughout the khanate's existence. However, it was careful to secure its northern border by building a series of forts along the course of the Syr Darya: Suzak, Aulie-Ata, Pishpek and Ak-Mechet, the latter being particularly important because of its situation at the intersection of the Orenburg–Tashkent and Petropavlovsk–Bukhara caravan axes.

The principalities

Lastly, there were principalities, sometimes independent of Bukhara, or disputed by Bukhara and Kokand and de facto independent, in particular Ura-tepe²⁵ and Shahr-i Sabz.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN MAELSTROM

The death of the Persian conqueror Nader Shah (1688–1747) created conditions for the emergence of an Afghan kingdom as Ahmad Shah Abdali of the Durrani tribe unified his principalities into a state around the city of Kandahar.

Since antiquity, Afghanistan has been a zone of passage between China, Xinjiang, India, Central Asia, the Iranian plateau and, beyond that, the Middle East. With a network of caravan routes, Afghanistan is a mosaic of peoples, speaking some 30 different languages, all held together by Islam save for rare exceptions (in Kafiristan, later Nuristan) and deeply committed to their traditions and independence. The wide gaps between human settlements explain the trend towards regional polarization of each inhabited sub-unit.

The link between state and territory has been decisive in the political consciousness of Central Asia. The durability of the state depends on the nature of that link, and on the set of representations that constitute its political mythology. In the context of Afghanistan, several political mythologies confront each other, or exist side by side, corresponding to the historical and cultural models of nomadic and settled populations. The Afghan state found it hard to assert its sovereignty over all of the political-territorial units making up the country.

The foundation of the Afghan state coincided with a brief period of expansion²⁶ during which Ahmad Shah (1747–72) established his authority in the east of Khurasan, the regions to the south of the Amu Darya and the Indus basin. It heralded the end of the control exerted

²⁵ Mukhtarov, 1963.

²⁶ Bregel, 2003, map 30, p. 61.

by Bukhara over the plains between the Amu Darya and the Hindu Kush, and in particular its withdrawal from the city of Balkh.²⁷ After Ahmad Shah's reign, the country was again plunged into turmoil with the accession to the throne of his son, Timur (1772–93), even though he moved the capital to Kabul in 1776 to escape the power of the clans.

The coming to power of Dost Muhammad (1826–63), a member of the dominant Dur-rani tribe, led to the partial reconstruction of an Afghan state. Other than the Qajar claims on Herat and those of the Uzbeks to the north, the greatest danger came from India, when the Sikhs took Peshawar under the leadership of Ranjit Singh (1799–1839) from the Punjab base he had acquired in 1799. This action drew the attention of both the British and the Russians.

At a time when the Russian determination to expand southwards was growing, the Ottoman empire was weakened and the Safavid dynasty in Persia was replaced by the Qajars, who established Tehran as their capital in 1786. The British empire, with its growing supremacy in the Indian subcontinent, sought to consolidate its foundations and opted for a strategy of 'buffer states', in which Iran and Afghanistan were to be key elements. Seizing the opportunity afforded by a difficult succession to the Afghan throne, the British, under the command of Sir Alexander Burnes, installed themselves in Kabul in 1839, but were driven out in 1842. The first Anglo-Afghan war, like the massacre of the Perovsky expedition in Khiva in 1839, revealed the limits to European power at that time in Central Asia.

XINJIANG AND MONGOLIA²⁸

Conquered by China for the fourth time in its history in 1757–9, by the Manchu dynasty, Xinjiang (also known as Chinese Turkistan) has always been divided between east and west, China and the rest of Central Asia. It is one of the main regions of the west, the Xi Yu of Chinese geography. Only rarely has it formed a homogeneous political entity, being more of a march-land, a buffer zone and an area of transition of great strategic importance. In the nineteenth century Xinjiang experienced fervent political and social agitation, instigated by the Russian empire and the khanate of Kokand.

With a majority of Muslim Turkic-speakers close to the populations of neighbouring western Turkistan, Xinjiang's culture and history brought it closer to the Turkic Muslim area (of which it could be considered the eastern extremity, a 'reflection' of the oases of Transoxania) than to the Chinese sphere.

²⁷ Balkh was one of the prime Bukharan appanages reserved for the heir to the throne: see McChesney, 1991.

²⁸ See Ma Dazheng, 2003; Ishjamts, 2003.

In the eighteenth century, Xinjiang and Mongolia were once again brought under Chinese domination. It should be noted that the 1757 Qing territorial expansion towards the Dzungar empire took place well before there was an effective Russian presence in the Tian Shan, and thus before the era of the 'Great Game'.

The parameters of Russian expansion: from opportunistic colonization to 'armed status quo'

The Turkistan campaign was initially intended to enable the Russian empire to regain its prestige after the signature of the treaty of Paris (30 March 1856), which brought an end to the Crimean war. It is noteworthy because of the debate surrounding it within Russian government circles, between supporters of a Christian 'civilizing mission' in Central Asia and opponents of an adventure that was already seen as too expensive, particularly by the minister of finance, Reutern. In addition to the differences of opinion between the main political protagonists, the campaign revealed a lack of consensus as to its organization and conduct, and a rivalry between the chiefs of the general staff and their frequently unsatisfied lust for power and recognition. The Russian conquests were not costly in terms of Russian lives and were completed within a few decades, ending between 1840 and 1880. They brought about a lasting break in the 'political and cultural continuum' of local communities.

CONCLUDING THE CONQUEST OF THE STEPPES

The construction in the south of Kazakh territory of the fortresses of the Syr Darya line – a series of fortifications including Aktau, Alatau, Kapal and Lepsinsk – completed the process of 'sealing off' the steppes. The whole of Kazakh territory was thus effectively incorporated into Russia's strategic sphere by the mid-nineteenth century, a sphere which was demarcated in the north and the south by military bases operational within the territory and ready to embark upon new operations beyond.

The Russian empire had by that time placed all of the Kazakh lands under its control by moving lines of fortifications and creating Cossack settlements. Constant administrative reorganization over the course of a century reflected the tightening of the Russian grip.²⁹ The last territorial gains were sanctioned by agreements with the Chinese empire, including

²⁹ For example, following the regulations governing the Siberian Kyrgyz, Omsk *oblast'* was created in Western Siberia in 1824, covering the northern steppe of today's Kazakhstan. In 1838 it became the *oblast'* of the Kyrgyz of Siberia, from which Semipalatinsk *oblast'* was created in 1854. See Erofeeva, 2000, p. 209.

the 1881 treaty of St Petersburg,³⁰ which attributed territories in the Altai and Black Irtysh region to Russia. In what is today the Republic of Kazakhstan, the last regions to come under Russian control at the end of the 1870s and beginning of the 1880s were: in the west, the Ustyurt and Mangystau (ex-Mangishlaq) peninsula area, which was not under Russian control until the fall of the khanate of Khiva; and in the north-east, the Altai, north of Ust-Kamenogorsk.

From the historical perspective of population movements in the Kazakh steppes, the Cossack settlements formed the majority of the non-indigenous population until the mid-nineteenth century. In the latter part of the century, the years 1881–9 were a turning-point with regard to the agrarian question. The abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861 accelerated Russia's settlement policy. The texts of 1881 and the law of 1889 authorized the free settlement of peasants on state-owned land and, as a result, hundreds of thousands of settlers moved to the north of Kazakh territory. The central Kazakh lands and Turkistan nevertheless remained closed to colonization without specific authorization. The reforms introduced in 1906–7 under the government of Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin (1906–11) opened up all these areas to the free settlement of colonists.

The settlers were made up of various communities: peasants and town-dwellers, artisans and merchants, Russians, Germans, Tatars, and so on, with Russians being by far the most numerous. Although they were not a majority, the largest single group were the peasants (40 per cent), with the Cossacks still representing 33 per cent at the beginning of the twentieth century. In all, more than 1 million Slav peasants were settled on the steppes by 1914 on land taken from Kazakh nomads: between 1853 and 1905, 40 million *desiatinas* (1 *desiatina* = 1.09 ha) of land were taken from Kazakh pastures, representing 20 per cent of the surface area of present-day Kazakhstan.

Likewise, a policy of forced settlement in most of the Kazakh lands brought about a genuine upheaval in the social organization of the Kazakh nomads. According to the Russian census of 1897, the population of the steppes had reached 4,147,800, of whom 3,392,700 were Kazakhs (that is, 81 per cent). In 1914 the total figure was 5,910,000, with Kazakhs only constituting 65.1 per cent (that is, 3,825,000 individuals). This was the beginning of a trend that would become more marked in the first half of the twentieth century.

The aggravation of the agrarian question led to rising tensions. The southern region of the Kazakh steppes between Chimkent and Pishpek was the scene of Kyrgyz and Kazakh tribal insurrections against the khanate of Kokand, in its final decade, and against Russia.

³⁰ The agreement contained, in addition to an important economic section, provisions for the settlement of communities from Xinjiang following the crushing of their rebellion by the Qing in that region (see below).

The years 1867–70 were marked by new revolts (the revolt of S. Turkebaev and B. Uspanov in 1868 in the region of the Urals and Torghay; and the revolt of the Adai tribe in 1870 in Mangystau) and new administrative reforms in the regions. (For more details on the colonial economy of the steppe area, see Chapter 22 below.) The frustrations generated by the settlements inevitably had an effect on Kazakh society and culture. The major uprising of 1916 was a turning-point, reflecting the complexity of the situation in the different parts of the Russian empire on its entry into the First World War.

Kazakh territory was divided into three governor-generalships: those of Turkistan, Orenburg and Western Siberia, until the creation on 25 March 1882 of Steppe governor-generalship, bordering that of Turkistan to the north and completing the legal and administrative system of domination that had started over a century earlier.³¹

THE TURKISTAN CAMPAIGNS

This is one of the best-documented periods in the history of Central Asia, as we have many contemporary accounts, not only from the point of view of the colonial powers, but also from that of the indigenous peoples. There is also an abundant historiography on this brief period. The Russian sources can be divided into several categories: the accounts of travellers and diplomats, and of soldiers who took part in expeditions; monographs by military historians of Turkistan; and various archive documents on the administration of the newly conquered territories.³²

The local sources consist of historical monographs written at the courts of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva and by the scholars of the period.³³ It was the first time that the Russians receive frequent mentions in the history of Turkistan. These sources deserve to be more widely known. For example, *Tarikh-i jadida-i Toshkend*, by Muhammad Salih Karahoja ogli Toshkandi, provides details of the Russian conquest, such as the capture of Tashkent, Mar-ghilan, Andijan, Namangan and Samarkand, and resistance by the inhabitants. Another important source is *Tārikh-i Shāhrukhi* by Niyaz Muhammad b. Asur Muhammad, or ‘Niyazi’. This author, from a family of soldiers in the service of the khans of Kokand, was himself in the army. He paid great attention to battle scenes (particularly between the army of Kokand and the Russian army), as both witness and participant. He also states that ‘Alim Khan had no enemies other than the Russian infidels, and that was

³¹ The system also established the legal status of the communities of the empire according to their origin, the Muslims of Central Asia being *inorodtsy* (lit. people of different birth; indigenous people) and subject to special legislation.

³² See Masal'skiy 1913.

³³ See Vahidov and Erkinov, 1999.

why he decided to launch a holy war against them.³⁴ As the work was written in 1871–2, the author gives a detailed description of the first years of the Russian conquest of Central Asia. A further valuable source is '*Alim Qul jang nāmesi va qorbat nāme*, by Mulla Khalbek b. Mulla Musa, who took part in the Pulat Khan uprising of 1875 and the *gazavat* (holy war) against the Russians in Marghilan,³⁵ after which he was arrested by the Russians and sent to prison in Russia. Other important works are those by Sadriddin Aini, Mirza 'Abdul Asim Sami and Mirza Salim Bek ('Salimi'). Documents in the Khiva archives concern directly the beginning of the Russian campaign against Khiva in 1873.³⁶

MILITARY EVENTS

Russia's advance towards the Amu Darya exacerbated the decades-old rivalry with Britain, bringing the two powers into dangerous proximity. One feature of the wars between Russia and Kokand, and then between Russia and Bukhara (as the local sources refer to them), was the apparent disorder in the Russian general staff as to the timetable, the resources to be committed and the leading figures involved in the campaigns. This resulted in a frantic race for the post of next governor-general, the *yarim pādishāh* (viceroy for the tsarist administration), as the population often referred to him. Military operations were led by two columns with very different objectives and commands, one from Orenburg moving towards the estuary of the Syr Darya and Tashkent, and the other from Siberia heading for Semirechye (the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Cossack regiments).

The Russian governor, V. A. Perovsky, who had for years conducted diplomatic and economic relations between Russia and Central Asia from his base in Orenburg, opened the Turkistan campaign. In 1853 he took the fortress of Ak-Mechet in Kokand, subsequently renamed after him (Fort Perovsk). The following year, a Russian detachment led by Major Peremyshevsky built the fortress of Verny (Vernoye, i.e. Faithful), now Almaty.

By 1860 the Russians had won fresh military victories over the khanate of Kokand with the submission of Tokmak and Pishpek in Semirechye. All the towns north of Tashkent were taken by different Russian generals. Between 1861 and 1863, the fall of Yanikurgan and Julek on the Syr Darya led to an urgent need to organize the region. In 1864 General Verevkin took the town of Turkestan and General M. G. Chernyayev (1828–98) took Aulie-Ata and Chimkent, although he failed to take Tashkent on this occasion.

³⁴ Beysembiev, 1987, p. 98.

³⁵ *Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR*, 1956, pp. 94–6.

³⁶ Bregel, 1967, p. 75.

The fate of Tashkent

The following year the *oblast* (province) of Turkistan was created, under Orenburg governor-generalship and placed under the military command of General Chernyayev, who, on 15 June 1865, appeared before Tashkent (a city of 100,000 inhabitants and 30,000 soldiers) with 1,950 men. The first to enter the city, whose keys were handed over with scarcely any resistance, was a Russian Orthodox priest, cross in hand, a potent symbol of the Russian quest for messianic and civilizing legitimacy. Although General Chernyayev, known as the ‘Lion of Tashkent’, was considered to be the most zealous of the colonizers, he initially presented himself as the city’s liberator from the grip of Kokand. He would even have left the city independent for a time had he not been persuaded by the *aqsaqal*³⁷ Abdu-razak Manbekov, head of the pro-Russian party there, of the inevitability of an uprising.³⁸

In 1866 heavy losses were inflicted on the emir of Bukhara, Muzzafar al-Din (1860–85), at the hamlet of Irdjar by the Russian Syr Darya flotilla. In the same year the cities of Khujand, Ura-tepe and Jizak, belonging to Kokand, were subdued and a new defeat inflicted on Bukhara’s army between Samarkand and Jizak.

In 1867 Turkistan governor-generalship was formed from the territories taken from the Kyrgyz after 1847 and regions of the Syr Darya and Semirechye belonging to Kokand. Tashkent was chosen as its capital and General K. P. von Kaufman (1818–82) was appointed governor-general (1867–81) (Fig. 1).

The end of the campaigns against Kokand and Bukhara

Von Kaufman decided to attack Samarkand, which he subdued on 2 May 1868 with 3,500 soldiers. General N. N. Golovayev, with most of the Russian troops, then headed for the fortress of Kattakurgan. The decisive clash took place at Zirabulak and turned in favour of the Russian soldiers despite the fierce attacks by the Bukharan emir’s soldiers.

On 29 January 1868 Russia imposed a protectorate treaty on Khudayar Khan of Kokand: the Kazakh territories previously included in the khanate were henceforth to be part of the Russian empire. On 18 June, it was the turn of Emir Muzaffar al-Din of Bukhara to

³⁷ *Aqsaqal* (literally, ‘white beard’ in the Turkic languages of Central Asia) is an expression to designate the elders, sages who could fill the informal or more formally codified functions of advisers or mediators.

³⁸ Only a few days before the fall of Tashkent, the governor-general of Orenburg was convinced, as was part of the tsarist government, of the need to preserve the independence of Tashkent from Kokand: see Serebryannikov, 1914, Vol. 1, pp. 192, 83. He disagreed with M. G. Galkin for whom ‘Russia has the right to take these cities,’ given that Tashkent had been possessed by Kazakh khans until the eighteenth century whom Russia had subdued in the middle of the nineteenth century: see Galkin, 1865, Vol. 58, p. 737.



FIG. 1. Tashkent. Monument of General von Kaufman. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

capitulate and cede Samarkand and Kattakurgan to Russia, while also having to make a substantial financial contribution. The realist military painter, V. V. Vereshchagin (1842–1905), who followed the advance of the Russian troops at the invitation of General von Kaufman, is a valuable witness to the battles fought during those years.

The district of Zerafshan was then established, with General Abramov at its head. Katta-tura, the son of the emir of Bukhara, attempted an uprising as did the *beg* of Shahr-i Sabz and some of the small semi-independent possessions of the upper Zerafshan (Falgar, Matsha, Kshtut, Magian, and so on). What is known as the Shahr-i Sabz expedition (during which Kitab and Chaar were subdued), and the expedition to Iskander-Kul in 1870 in Little Bukhara, led to the total integration of these territories into the district of Zerafshan.

Subdued in 1868 and having lost a great part of its territory, Bukhara became a Russian protectorate in 1873.³⁹ The emir lost control over foreign policy. The valleys of the peoples of the Pamirs, such as the Shughnanis and the Roshanis, and the inhabitants of Darwaz and Karategin (who were for some time subject to the kingdom of Kunduz, then Badakhshan), were transferred to the protectorate of Bukhara, as was the former *beylik* of Hisar (regions which formed what was known as Little Bukhara), thus enabling Russia to dominate several strategic passes in the Pamirs.

The campaign against Khiva

As the Dungan rebellion spread in Xinjiang, attracting Russian intervention in Kuldja in 1871 (see below), on the other side of Central Asia the khanate of Khiva was strengthened by its invincible geographical position. Despite the treaty recognizing British influence in Afghanistan (including Badakhshan) and an undertaking not to become involved in Khwarazm, Russia launched an expedition against Khiva in 1873 under General von Kaufman.

Five columns (from Kazalinsk, Orenburg, Jizak, Mangystau and Krasnovodsk, the only one that had to turn back) encircled the capital, which was forced to surrender. On 12 August 1873 a peace was signed, together with a protectorate treaty (24 August 1873) similar to the one signed with Bukhara that same year, containing 12 clauses. The khanate ceded the right bank of the Amu Darya to Russia and also had to pay a substantial financial contribution. The submission of Khiva led to the creation of the Transcaspia military district under the authority of regiments moved from the Caucasus.

British reactions to the Khiva expedition

Britain's response was immediate: before the protectorate treaty had even been signed, the British ambassador in St Petersburg was instructed to warn the tsar that the conquest endangered relations between the two powers. Britain feared that the Turkmen tribes (neighbours of Khiva), fleeing the Russian advance, would seek refuge in Afghan territory. It urged Russia to recognize Afghanistan's independence. The response of the Russian Government was intended to reassure Britain: A. M. Gorchakov (1798–1883), minister of foreign affairs from 1856 to 1882, confirmed that Afghanistan was not in Russia's sphere of influence, but asked the British not to intervene in Russia's relations with the Turkmens. A formal accord was signed between Russia and Britain in 1873, making the Amu Darya the

³⁹ See Becker, [1968](#).

demarcation line between the Russian and British spheres of influence: it was considered to be ‘one of the finest triumphs of the Gladstone cabinet’s colonial policy’.⁴⁰

The end of the Kokand protectorate

A major uprising took place in 1875 in the protectorate of Kokand instigated by the Kipchak ‘Abdurrahman Avtobachi, son of the religious leader Musulman Qul, who had been sentenced to death by Khudayar Khan. When the ruler fled, he was succeeded by his oldest son, Nasruddin, who was unable to oppose the proclamation of a *gazavat* against the Russians throughout the Ferghana valley and beyond. M. D. Skobelev (1843–82) won the battle of Makhram against 50,000 Kokandis. He also put down the Kipchak and Kyrgyz insurrections in the eastern part of the Ferghana valley and consolidated Russia’s hold through the submission of Andijan, Namangan, Marghilan and Kokand. These successive victories earned him the post of military governor of Ferghana *oblast’*, the title of general and the right to found a garrison town named after himself which became the regional capital, present-day Ferghana. On 19 February 1876 the khanate was abolished and simply annexed to Ferghana *oblast’*.

Campaigns against the Turkmen

The Turkmen tribes (all to varying degrees under the authority of Khiva or Bukhara) were at that time among the last groups to be subdued by Russia, particularly the most numerous, the Tekes. The taking of Kyzyl Arvat in spring 1877 was a first Russian advance into Teke territory. General Lazarev attempted an expedition into the interior of the oasis, but was forced to withdraw in the face of unexpected resistance from the fortress of Geok-tepe.

This was Russia’s first defeat for many years and had serious consequences for its reputation for invincibility. It led to a crisis within the Russian Government, resulting in the decision to send men to the area to build a strategic railway. This was the beginning of the Transcaspian railway line, started in 1880 (see Chapter 2 of the present volume).

Nevertheless, military operations in the region were over before work on the railway was completed. Another expedition was planned for 12 January 1881 under General Skobelev who, at the head of 11,000 men, stormed the fortress where 40,000 Turkmen had sought refuge at the call of a powerful shaykh from the Yasawiyya Sufi brotherhood, who had urged them to engage in a *gazavat* against the ‘infidels’. In the Turkmen ranks there were 6,000 dead, half of them women and children, and 500 Persian captives. Continuing their conquests in Turkmen territory, the Russian soldiers, led by Lieutenant Kuropatkin,

⁴⁰ Rouire, 1908, p. 123.

took the area of Ashkhabad (which surrendered without a fight on 15 January) and the territory of the Salor and Saryk tribes. On 6 May 1881 Transcaspia *oblast'* was created from the districts of Mangystau, Krasnovodsk and Akhal Teke.

The surrender of Merv and the Afghan question

Until 1884, the oasis of Merv was the only strategic area in Transoxania that had not been subjugated by Russia, Persia or Afghanistan. Freed for a decade from the hold of Bukhara and Khiva by their submission to the Russian empire, the inhabitants of Merv negotiated their surrender after contacts between the Russians and an influential Turkmen woman of the Teke tribe, Guljemal Khan.

Realizing that resistance was futile, the oasis of Merv surrendered without a fight on 6 March 1884. The loss of this strategic point greatly alarmed the British, who considered that the previous agreements on the sharing of influence had been broken. The following year, the tsarist government tried to establish an Anglo-Russian border commission to define the border with Afghanistan. Using diplomatic procrastination to their advantage, the British general staff, who were solidly entrenched in Afghanistan, prepared the defence of Herat and secretly encouraged Afghan intervention in the Turkmen zone south of Merv, in the oasis of Panjdeh, at the hamlet of Tash-Kepri. On 18 March 1886 General Komarov defeated the Afghan army led by Kovsuddin Khan and British officers.

In spite of the serious deterioration in Russo-British relations, the agreement on Afghanistan's border was nonetheless signed in 1887, preserving for the Russians a vast territory between the Murghab and Kuchka rivers. Given the impossibility of preventing a Russian presence in the north of Afghanistan, Britain turned its attention to the plateaux of the Pamirs, dispatching many agents and intelligence officers there.⁴¹

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Afghanistan was increasingly open to outside contacts. At the crossroads of trade and civilizations, it was paradoxically a landlocked country, almost a 'fortress', and at the same time, one of the keys to its northern neighbour's (i.e. Russia's) own landlocked state. This new interest in the outlying regions drew the attention of the Russian general staff: the conflict between the Chinese and the Afghans, supported by the British, could have turned to Russia's disadvantage, confirming their eviction from the buffer zone of the Hindu Kush. This fear was the reason for the Russian expedition to the Pamirs, which lasted several years.

In the strategy of establishing buffer states between the British and Russian empires (Lord Curzon's strategy), one of the keys to British-Russian rivalry was control over the

⁴¹ Hopkirk, 1990.

patchwork of semi-independent principalities which constituted Afghan Turkistan and had some 950,000 inhabitants at the end of the nineteenth century.⁴² From east to west, there was Wakhan, located at the eastern end of the Amu Darya basin; Badakhshan, 20,000 km² on either side of the Panj; Kunduz, of about 30,000 km²; Khulm, which was the centre of ancient Bactria; and Maimaneh. These principalities, peopled mostly by Uzbeks and Tajiks (except for Wakhan), returned to Afghan domination in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Only the principality of Andkhoy (with about 60,000 inhabitants) remained semi-independent in the 1880s.

The Russian Pamirs expedition ended with the signing of the Russo-British Pamirs border agreement of 27 February 1895, which stipulated that the territories on the left bank of the Panj (part of Darwaz) belonged to Afghanistan and those on the right bank (Roshan, Shughnan and part of Wakhan) to the protectorate of Bukhara. The other part of Wakhan was a narrow corridor attributed to Afghanistan in order to separate the Russian empire from British India. On 18 August 1907 Russia recognized Afghanistan as being outside its sphere of influence and, for many decades, desisted from a continuation of its expansionist policy in Central Asia.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN XINJIANG

From the middle of the nineteenth century, Chinese policy was defensive, given the need to counter the growing influence of Russia and Britain. Relations between the local authorities in Xinjiang and Beijing were politicized and violent uprisings broke out, often backed by the powers active in the region.

In the early 1860s Xinjiang was the scene of major rebellions. The Hui, also known as the Dungans (Chinese Muslims), and the Taranchis rebelled against the Chinese authorities, whom they expelled from Kuldja with the assistance of other indigenous peoples, the Kyrgyz and the Sarts. An independent entity was formed under the auspices of the Khoja dynasty. The Taranchis initially enjoyed a certain prosperity before becoming the target of increasingly frequent military requisitions by the Manchus which kept pace with Muslim insurrections in Xinjiang. These requisitions peaked in 1863, bringing them into conflict not only with the Chinese authorities (in particular, General Tso Tsungtang, 1812–85) but also with their Dungan neighbours. The political fortunes of the Taranchis crystallized for a brief period in parallel with the venture of the Kokandi Yakub Beg in Kashghar.⁴³ Under

⁴² Badakhshan: 158,000 inhabitants; Wakhan: 3,000; Kunduz: 400,000; Andhkoy: 60,000; Balkh: 64,000; Maimaneh: 270,000; Darzab: 5,000. Total: 960,000 inhabitants according to the *Voenniy Sbornik* (Military Handbook) cited by Reclus, 1881, p. 490. See also Luzhetskaya, 1986.

⁴³ Boulger, 1879.

the authority of Sultan Ala'a Khan (Abu'l Ala'), they established in 1865 (declared to be Year 1 of an 'Islamic era', or *tārikh-i Islām*, which was to last seven years) the independent or sultanate of Kuldja.

The Russian general staff could not ignore the new situation that had arisen so close to the newly subjected Kyrgyz. The territory was conquered and temporarily administered by the Russian empire from 1871 to 1882 as the 'district of Kuldja'. After its return to the Chinese authorities (by the treaty of St Petersburg of 12 February 1881, under which the Russians retained certain privileges, including trade agreements and consulates), 45,373 Taranchis moved into the Russian zone, where they were settled in Semirechye *oblast'*,⁴⁴ mainly in Jarkent, founded for that purpose in 1882, and in Verny (Almaty) and the Transcaspian region around Bayram Ali. Moved on several times as new Cossack settlements were created, there were 70,000 Taranchis in Turkistan according to the 1897 Russian census, including 55,999 in the Semirechye region, making up 5.87 per cent of the total population.⁴⁵ The Russian influence in East Turkistan was one facet of the 'Great Game', which brought the Russian and British empires face to face with the Chinese empire. This influence lasted from 1884 (date of the establishment by Beijing of the province of Xinjiang) to 1962 (date of the closure of the Soviet consulates).

The history of the different areas of Central Asia diverged to a far greater extent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than in the period preceding the colonial expansion. To the north, the political and cultural impact of Russian power was confirmed before being transformed by the Soviet experience. Since the nineteenth century, the societies of Central Asia have lived through a period in which the features that unite and divide them have been radically reconfigured. This long-term process, marrying unity and diversity in the region's history, Muslim societies all experienced the idea of the reform of Islam (*islāh*) as a global response to the new systems of domination imposed on them, and yet they developed this idea in very varied contexts (Iran, British India, Russian Asia, Chinese Turkistan). This led to experiments in political participation corresponding to the different situations (Muslim deputies in the Russian Duma, the Iranian constitutional revolution of 1905–11, and so on), which are described in other chapters of this volume. At the same time, a new form of exploration of the unity and diversity of Central Asia emerged during this period, namely the academic study of the region in all the human and social sciences, drawing on all knowledge traditions. This is a legacy which has continued to strengthen up to the present day.

⁴⁴ The settlement of 5,000 Dungans was authorized in Semirechye and north of the Kyrgyz areas: see Baratova, 2000.

⁴⁵ Masal'skiy, 1913, p. 404.

2

TRADE AND THE ECONOMY (SECOND HALF OF NINETEENTH CENTURY TO EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY)*

C. Poujol and V. Fourniau

Contents

Introduction	51
The agrarian question	56
Infrastructure	61
Manufacturing and trade	68
Transforming societies	73
Conclusion	76

Introduction

Russian colonization in Central Asia may have been the last phase of an expansion of the Russian state that had begun centuries earlier. However, in terms of area, it represented the largest extent of non-Russian lands to fall under Russian control, and in a rather short period: between 1820 (the year of major political and administrative decisions aimed at the Little and Middle Kazakh Hordes, or *Zhuzs*) and 1885 (the year of the capture of Merv). The conquest of Central Asia also brought into the Russian empire the largest non-Russian population in an equally short time. The population of Central Asia (Steppe and Turkistan regions, including the territories that were to have protectorate status forced on them) was 9–10 million in the mid-nineteenth century.

* See Map 1.

Although the motivations of the Russian empire in conquering these vast territories were essentially strategic and political, they quickly assumed a major economic dimension. They combined all the functions attributed by colonial powers to colonies while being closely connected to the European motherland. Consequently, while tsarist Russia came to involve itself in the history of Central Asia, the subjection of the area in turn profoundly altered the history of the Soviet Union, and subsequently of contemporary Russia.

The formation of new ethno-political entities in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, with the Kazakh khanate, the Uzbek khanates, Safavid Iran, Mughal India and the *khoja* power in East Turkistan, redrew the political, economic and cultural map of this vast area of Central Asia. As transcontinental economic flows largely dried up, Russia's growing interest in Central Asia and its geo-strategic significance increased, leading, over much of the nineteenth century, to its direct subjugation and conquest. By the late eighteenth century, Russian frontier forts had become centres of economic exchange, through a dense network of fairs and barter markets. As a result, the economy of the region became oriented towards Russia.

Although it was part of the long history of the expansion of the Russian state, the colonization of Central Asia stands out from it in several ways, the most important of which (the brevity of the conquest, the direct control of the land and its peoples, the significant numbers of these latter, multiple roles in the Russian empire) are discussed in the first chapter of this volume. Yet we still lack consolidated accounts to provide a rounded overview of this colonization. There is, in particular, a lack of soundly based general writings covering the whole history of the expansion of the Russian empire and comparing its different phases. There is also a lack of comparative analyses of Russian and other European expansionist policies.

In 1870, 89 per cent of the population of the Russian empire was rural, and there were only 4 cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. However, an industrial revolution and a capitalistic expansion took place in the last decades of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. From 1870 to 1913, the total population of the Russian empire rose from 80 to 170 million inhabitants. The population of Turkistan governor-generalship was 6.8 million in 1911, and about 5 million in the same year in Steppe governor-generalship. In Turkistan, 1 million out of the total population of 6.8 million was urban.¹ In only 10 years, for example, between 1890 and 1900, the production of the empire more than doubled, and a workers' movement started in 1885.

In 1897 the rural population still accounted for some 87.5 per cent of the entire population of the empire (79 per cent, poor people) and 83 per cent in 1906. The economic crisis

¹ Masal'skiy, 1913, p. 857.

of 1903–6 and the political crisis of 1905–6 must also be noted. This overall setting of the Russian empire is important in order to analyse the transformation of the Central Asian region during the extension of the new Russian political and economic order.

The colonial infrastructure clearly shows that strategic and economic aims were closely connected in the decision-making processes, and this largely explains the geography of colonization. Indeed, if its aftermath was considerable in all economic spheres and to all local Central Asian communities, the main strategic and economic transformations were concentrated in a few sectors and in a few regions.

In the steppes, the main regions of economic and strategic significance were the eastern and western ‘flanks’: in the west, the axis linking the Aral Sea to Orenburg, in addition to the region between the Ural river and the Caspian Sea; in the east, the basin of the Irtysh river. The region of Semirechye and the basin of the Syr Darya river, which both served as links between the steppes and Transoxania, were also an important axis of the colonial presence. In the southern part of Russian Central Asia, the valley of the Zerafshan, the Ferghana region, the valley of the Amu Darya and the Persian boundary were the main areas of colonial activity. Russian Central Asia was composed of two governor-generalships (after 1882), but economically speaking, all these regions were closely linked – as they had been in the pre-colonial past – and this was reinforced by the economic colonization, due to the polarization towards the Russian economy, and the territorial continuity between Russia and Central Asia.

With Russian colonization, Central Asia entered the age of state statistics. The new colonial government collected an impressive amount of data concerning the relief, river flows, populations, crops, flocks, manufacturing output and trade; these were published in a wide range of forms (reports, books, articles, yearbooks), circulated widely in the Western world. Each *oblast’* had its own Statistical Committee which published yearbooks, such as, for example, the yearbook of Ferghana *oblast’* published from September 1901.² The ministry of agriculture had a resettlement administration (*pereselencheskoe upravlenie*) which published numerous monographs, and reports on Semirechye *oblast’* and Kazakh

² Among the articles appearing in *Ezhegodnik Ferganskoy oblasti*, 1902, pp. 41–65, was a long article by N. Fedorov describing exchanges with China across the borders of the *oblast’* between 1888 and 1900.

agriculture (*Materialy po Kirgizskomu zemledeliyu*) edited by P. P. Rumiantsev.³ The colonial administration made a special effort to establish archives and collections of documents.⁴

Trade and the economy are two fields that clearly reveal the workings of colonial rule. The production and circulation of consumer goods is a rich field for historical analysis, but it has not always received the scientific and institutional interest it deserves.⁵ Economic history is one of the least developed topics in the field of Central Asian studies, in both Russian (subsequently Soviet) and Western sources. There are still no comprehensive studies based on archive materials which encompass the entire area.

Consequently, the scarce literature mostly includes non-comparative studies that are based on material of regional significance. Indeed, 'Central Asia' was never an administrative unit, and neither in Steppe and Turkistan governor-generalships until 1917, nor in the five republics afterwards, has research been conducted with the aim of cross-questioning topics or data. There is still a lack of studies providing a balanced treatment of the various aspects of Russian colonization (conquest, administration, populations, economy and trade, for example) throughout the region.

Finally, one might note that despite the claim for new historiographical orientations in the independent countries of Central Asia, the economic history of the colonial exploitation of their lands and the transformation of their economies into colonial ones is not a topic of academic publications and research. Enormous advances still need to be made in this field.

From the end of the Crimean war to the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian empire experienced one of the periods in its history when it was most in contact with the outside world, particularly the West. The territories of Central Asia were inevitably affected by these contacts.

As far as the military conquest, the establishing of boundaries with neighbours, the changes in economy, trade, infrastructure and laws, and the response from the local communities are concerned, this period is clearly divided into two parts by the 'watershed decade' of the 1880s. This applies to the whole of Russian Central Asia, both Steppe and Turkistan regions. The military conquest came to an end during the 1880s, a decade

³ For example, Chs. 1 and 4 of the 1912 volume on Perovsk *uezd* in Syr Darya *oblast'* deal with 'The general state of the economy of the Kazakhs' inspectorate of Perovsk *uezd*'. This volume contains 127 pages of tables setting out figures by Kazakh village (*aul*) on the administrative name, water use, population, agriculture, stock-raising, hay and lucerne harvest and craft production.

⁴ In 1876, for example, General von Kaufman, the first governor-general of Turkistan, handed over the archives of Khiva (which had come into his possession after the fall of the khanate) to the Saltykov-Schedrin public library in St Petersburg, where they became mixed up with documents from the Ferghana valley.

⁵ The bulk of studies on Central Asia were published during the Soviet period but, contrary to what the primacy of economics in Soviet ideology might lead one to expect, works on economic history are far outnumbered by those on archaeology or ethno-history, and, indeed, writings on heritage, culture and identity.

during which Russia signed a border agreement with China, adopted laws on population settlement in Central Asia, implemented a new fiscal system, decided on the construction of railways, imported new species of cotton, started a large-scale exploitation of the resources of Central Asia and began to face unrest from local communities, as well as the intellectual and ideological response of many native educated people.

After the 1880s, the Central Asian economy came gradually under the control of Russian, or foreign, capital. Central Asia already had active economic relations with Russia, and for centuries, thousands of camels carrying tonnes of goods crossed the steppes every year, and there was already some specialization and interdependency (Fig. 1). The active presence of Bukharan merchants in Russia and Siberia in the seventeenth century is a vivid testimony of this trend.⁶ The main changes after the 1880s were the rapid development of new economic activities (mining and the oil industry, for example) and the concentration of Russian, or foreign, investment in a few leading sectors (cotton and the railways, for example). This had a strong impact on the local and regional markets, and consequently transformed the local economy into a colonial economy, dependent on the global political and economic agendas of the Russian empire. These changes were to affect the large majority of the inhabitants of Central Asia, whether directly or indirectly, at very different levels and in many different ways.



FIG. 1. Tashkent. Camel caravan going to Verny (modern Almaty). G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

⁶ Burton, 2003, pp. 407–25.

The agrarian question

Until 1914 the population of the Russian empire (and of Central Asia) was predominantly rural. It was therefore in the agrarian sector (production, populations, commercialization) that the impact of Russian rule was greatest. The various regions of Central Asia were opened up to settlement at different dates by the Russian tsarist administration, but the agrarian question arose everywhere.

In the steppes, Russian colonization transformed land use and population distribution, with long-term consequences. In the previous chapter, some figures were given demonstrating the scale of colonization during a period of barely 30 years before the Soviet revolution. Among the colonial empires of that time, Russia had one of the highest numbers of settlers moving into the newly colonized territories.

In Turkistan, Russian colonization also precipitated changes in the population through the settlement of colonists, but in much smaller numbers than in the steppes. The farming techniques that were introduced made use of existing methods, with some degree of technical modernization and a sharp increase in the share of cotton among the region's crops.

The 60–70 years of the period under review (1850–1917) were thus the framework for fundamental changes in the steppes and changes on a lesser scale in Turkistan.

IRRIGATION

Artificial irrigation, by definition, makes it possible to establish sedentary life in a natural environment that is arid or semi-arid, where the ecological niche of rain-dependent agriculture is very restricted. Only the hills are well watered in Central Asia (although there are a few high-altitude deserts), but the relief and the mountain climate impose constraints on agriculture that are harder to overcome than the aridity of the low-lying areas.⁷

Irrigation occurs in the basin of the Syr Darya, the Amu Darya and the large region of Transoxania which lies between the two rivers. This means that irrigation is also common slightly to the north of Transoxania, in what is now southern Kazakhstan (which is part of the Syr Darya basin), as well as in southern Kyrgyzstan and south-west Turkmenistan. The traditional picture of Central Asia erroneously attributes the main characteristics of

⁷ The Tajiks of the western Pamirs, or Badakhshan, live in the valleys of the Pamir and Wakhan Darya rivers, two right-bank tributaries of the Panj. Traditionally, they cultivated very small fields there, rarely more than 80 m², at altitudes up to or above 3,000 m (like the village of Lyangar): see Mukhiddinov, [1975](#), pp. 5–6.

Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen nomadic-pastoral culture to the whole territory of those republics, whereas they are also the site of ancient irrigation systems and oasis cities.

The particular feature of the peak flows of the rivers and streams of Central Asia (the Amu Darya, the Zerafshan, the Syr Darya, the Sokh, etc.) is that they occur in the hot period, which corresponds throughout Central Asia to the dry season. The reason for this is the presence of very high mountain ranges all along the southern and eastern edge of this region, and a continental climate which causes the accumulation of snow and ice in these mountains in winter, and then their melting in spring and summer until the middle of the hot season. Thus, during the first half of the growing season, the level of the rivers that feed irrigation continues to rise. Moreover, most of the cultivated crops, and in particular cereals, ripen before the water level falls, which occurs in autumn.

In the area between the Aral and the Caspian seas, the improvement in the humidity level in the mountains, apart from a few high-altitude deserts, in contrast to the worsening of the thermal conditions, means that the highlands of Central Asia are only suitable for rain-dependent agriculture in small plots. Conversely, in the lowlands of Transoxania, significant regional differences are caused not by the latitude, but rather by the proximity to a watercourse that can be diverted for irrigation.

Of all the forms of irrigation practised in Central Asia, diversion by harnessing a surface flow into a network of artificial canals in order to water farming plots is by far the most widespread. It is also the most diversified. It can be done equally well from large rivers and from small streams with intermittent flows,⁸ lakes, springs and even reservoirs collecting rainwater.⁹ There are canals in the mountains, as well as at low altitudes, in regions receiving 500 mm of rainfall a year and more, which would allow a rain-dependent agriculture, as in deserts or the very dry steppes crossed by the 50 mm isohyet.¹⁰ Diversion using the natural flow, supplemented by water-lifting devices if necessary (like the *chigir*, or water pump), is the most important feature of regular intensive agriculture throughout this arid zone.¹¹

In addition to this physical diversity, there is a wide range of economic situations associated with artificial irrigation, since this is practised by widely differing communities – from

⁸ The Amu Darya, with its flows of up to more than 9,000 m³/s contrasts starkly with the little River Sargun, with an average flow of 0.91 m³/s, or the fast mountain streams of the Kopet Dag.

⁹ Lakes in the region of the Aral Sea, springs in the mountains and *khāks* (reservoirs) in the Kara Kum desert feed a few small canals.

¹⁰ There are significant variations in the degree of aridity in Central Asia: the north-west part of Ferghana, with an annual average rainfall of 50 mm, contrasts sharply with the Panjikent oasis, not far from there, which receives an annual average rainfall of 400 mm.

¹¹ The issue of the *kārez/ qanāt*, which is not a very common irrigation method in Central Asia, is not dealt with here.

groups consisting entirely of settled farmers to nomads engaging in a little agriculture who have dug a few *ariqs* (irrigation canals) in a steppe. There are exclusively sedentary communities settled around large-scale irrigation systems as well as small isolated systems, in conditions of extreme aridity as well as on well-watered foothills. The agro-pastoral communities of Central Asia vary just as greatly in their use of water for farming.

COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND NEW RUSSIAN PROJECTS

The amount of lands opened to cultivation with new irrigation projects remained quite low during the decades of tsarist rule. In this respect, there is a sharp contrast between the boom in trade (see below) and the mere increase in irrigated land under cultivation. Traditional techniques continued to prevail as did the geography of irrigation. New large-scale irrigation projects in Transoxania, as well as in the southern regions of present-day Kazakhstan, only started during the Soviet period.

The increase in irrigated lands was obtained by extending the existing canals, digging new systems and building new dams. New systems were created in particular in the 'hungry steppe'. The creation of the Nicolas I Canal on the Syr Darya, one of the main constructions dating from this period, irrigated 12,000 *desiatinas* of land (1 *desiatina* = 1.09 ha).¹² The canal was finished in 1898. Dams were also built in Transcaspia *oblast'*, on the Murghab river, creating reservoirs which fed large canals irrigating a few thousand *desiatinas* each. New dams were created, like the Hindu Kush dam, or old ones were repaired.

Among all the crops of Central Asia, tsarist Russia put a particular emphasis on cotton: Turkistan governor-generalship was the only region of the empire where it was possible to develop this culture on a large scale, mostly for climatic reasons. The Turkistan species (*Gossypium herbaceum*) gave low yields, however, and it was decided just after the conquest to encourage more profitable American species of cotton, among which was Upland'a (*Gossypium hirsutum*).¹³

American cotton-seeds were therefore distributed to indigenous farmers in Transcaspia from 1880.¹⁴ Booklets explaining how to cultivate this new cotton were printed in local languages,¹⁵ helping to lay the groundwork for the increase in cotton production and linking it to the market. The surfaces under cultivation of American cotton grew very quickly, as did most of the new economic trends during this period: from 300 *desiatinas* in 1884 in Turkistan to 12,000 in 1886, then 37,000 in 1887, 58,000 in 1890, etc.¹⁶ However, the

¹² Masal'skiy, 1913, p. 430.

¹³ Ibid., p. 457.

¹⁴ Lavrov, 1916, p. 169.

¹⁵ Masal'skiy, 1913, p. 456.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 458.

Turkistan species also continued to be cultivated, and the overall surfaces under cotton cultivation amounted to 380,000 *desiatinas* in 1910 in four out of the five *oblasts* of Turkistan governor-generalship (the Semirechye region was not yet a successful area for cotton cultivation). Ferghana *oblasts* was by far the most important, since 300,000 out of the 380,000 *desiatinas* under cotton cultivation were located in this region. In the Ferghana valley, 50–75 per cent (and even up to 80–90 per cent in some places) of the agricultural surfaces were already under cotton cultivation before the First World War.¹⁷ In the protectorate of Bukhara, the surfaces under cotton cultivation were estimated at 100,000 *desiatinas*, and at 50,000 *desiatinas* in the protectorate of Khiva. The total cotton production of Turkistan and the two protectorates was 10–11 million *poods* (1 *pood* = 16.38 kg) of clean fibre, out of which more than 8 million were produced in the governor-generalship.¹⁸ St Petersburg maintained a low freight rate on grain shipped to Turkistan to encourage the cultivation of cotton.

In 1909 the Russian Government set up the Turkistan hydrological service,¹⁹ to meet a growing need for improved techniques of artificial irrigation for the cash crops that Russian entrepreneurs were hoping to develop, especially cotton. Cotton was also the leading export of the Khiva protectorate, with 10,000 tonnes a year.²⁰ The cotton trade to the factories of Russia was a major sector of activity, where Russian as well as local firms took advantage of the rapid growth in production and trade.

The new commercial networks and trading outlets were also the cause of the increase in rice cultivation. In 1869 there were 11,000 ha of rice-fields in the districts of Samarkand and Kattakurgan; in 1875 there were 20,000 ha; and in 1900, in the district of Samarkand alone, this figure reached 43,000 ha.²¹

By 1909, wheat was the leading crop in the provinces of Syr Darya, Ferghana, Samarkand and Transcaspia (394,000, 188,000, 227,000 and 75,000 tonnes a year respectively). The advance of cotton was also very marked, since in those same provinces at the same date, the annual tonnage of raw cotton harvested was 20,000, 187,900, 12,000 and 23,000 tonnes respectively, for a total of 884,000 tonnes of wheat obtained from 1,326,000 ha and 242,000 tonnes of cotton from 297,000 ha.²² As these figures show, Ferghana had become the leading cotton-producing area in tsarist Central Asia. Woeikof stresses the fact that the increase in the share of new crops:

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 463.

¹⁸ Masal'skiy, 1913, p. 464.

¹⁹ Woeikof, 1914, p. 310.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 220.

²¹ Ibid., p. 230.

²² Ibid., p. 248.

contributed to the destruction of the old order that prevailed in the distribution of water. . . [as] rice-growing, according to the old customs, was allowed only on marshy ground and rice-fields received water from irrigation canals only after the other main crops.²³

Thus, whereas in the steppes the Russian Government directly seized a large proportion of nomads' lands to distribute them to colonists, in Turkistan colonial pressure on the land largely operated through the market.

Livestock-breeding was the basis of the traditional economy among the Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmens, and it was also a traditional economic pattern among the sedentary populations in the oases. A pattern of trade and specialization in Steppe *oblast'* arose as this region turned to stockbreeding for the Russian market. A trend towards the concentration of livestock among the richest Kazakhs was also evident during this period. In some areas of northern Kazakhstan, for example, about 30 per cent of the horses were concentrated in the hands of those owning more than 50 horses.²⁴ Just as stockbreeding was common among sedentary communities, some forms of agriculture were not unknown among the nomads, but this trend increased under the colonial economy. However, even if some agricultural activity was found among the Kazakhs, this does not mean that they became sedentary, as the figures clearly show.²⁵ Overall, the cultivated area amounted to 8 or 9 per cent of Steppe *oblast'* on the eve of the First World War. In 1916, on an area covering present-day Kazakhstan, there were 18 million sheep and goats, 5 million cattle and 4.5 million horses.

LAND TENURE AND TAX REFORM

The situation regarding land tenure and land use was complex because of the principle according to which all land belonged to the ruler (in sedentary societies) or to the community (among the nomads), frequently in the absence of pertinent legal documents. Land-tenure rules were governed by the *sharī'a* (Islamic law) and by *'ādat* (customary law or local customs).²⁶

When tsarist law was extended to the land-tenure rules, in parallel to the traditional ones, individuals could buy private land. However, after 1822, the principle according to which the Kazakh lands were declared possessions of the Russian state was constantly reassessed (in 1868, and then again in 1891). The same contradictory legal situation obtained in the area of personal status, as is demonstrated by the example of the few hundred Kazakhs

²³ Ibid., p. 229.

²⁴ Masanov, 1995, p. 255.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 260.

²⁶ For a good presentation of the traditional land uses in sedentary Central Asia, see Carrère d'Encausse, 1966, and among the nomads of the steppes, see Masanov, 1995.

who were accepted into the Russian aristocracy but who were at the same time registered as *inorodtsy* (lit. ‘people of different birth’, i.e. indigenous people).²⁷ This juxtaposition of several customs and uses was characteristic of the tsarist period in Central Asia, as well as many other colonial orders.

Old and new taxes were also typical of this period. However, the consequences of the new fiscal policy were particularly noticeable in the steppes. In the reforms of 1867–8, taxes were standardized and collected in cash. Each *kibitka* (‘tent’) had to pay a tax in cash, a very new concept for many poor nomads. The new tax was increased to 4.5 roubles and extended to all types of Kazakh housing in the reforms of 1886–91. Thus many poor Kazakhs, particularly the nomads, were forced to pay their taxes through intermediaries. This led to the formation of new social groups of Kazakh intermediaries and the appearance of new forms of economic and social dependency in the steppes as well as in Turkistan.

Infrastructure

Although several features of the Russian colonization of Central Asia and its impact on the region were peculiar to the Russian empire, there were also many points that are reminiscent of other colonial empires. The clash between traditionally agrarian or pastoral societies and technological modernity is one such similarity. In the steppes above all, Russia built towns, and in Turkistan the Transcaspian railway was a major source of transformation (Fig. 2).

TOWNS

The creation of towns is one aspect of the colonial infrastructure. It was more marked from the very beginning of the Russian expansion than, for example, in the case of the colonization of Indochina. There was also a sharp contrast between the lands formerly subject to nomadic pastoralism (where Russia settled new populations and built towns not only in the steppes but also on the desert fringes) and the heart of the irrigated lands, which, with their dense ancient urban network, saw the construction of European quarters in already existing towns. A new urbanism was created through colonialism, which contrasted with the older one and merged with it. This urban development was of great military, administrative, economic and cultural significance. Dozens of towns were set up in the steppes, following a similar process: first there would be a military outpost, followed by growth, then the arrival shortly afterwards of colonists, and then integration into the regional economy and the economy of the Russian empire, a pattern to be found in town after town.

²⁷ Kappeler, 1994, pp. 148, 341.



FIG. 2. Turkistan. Monument (dated 1913) on the bank of the Romanov canal. A railway is seen behind. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

Astana (present capital of Kazakhstan)

The garrison post of Akmola was established in 1830 and it was granted the status of a town in 1862. In 1869 the town became the centre of the *uezd* and *oblast'* of the same name, which was much larger than the present-day *oblast'* of Astana. In 1916 the total population of the *oblast'* reached 1.5 million, largely made up of European (mainly Russian) settlers, and it grew from 276,000 Russians in 1897 to 835,000 in 1911.²⁸

Almaty (ex-capital of Kazakhstan)

The town grew up around a fort in the Trans-Ili (*Zailiyskiy*) line of forts built in 1854. The little settlement took the name of Verny, and then the town was renamed Alma-Ata (in

²⁸ By comparison, there were never more than 25,000 French nationals living in the whole of Indochina (estimate just before the Second World War), and the majority of them were civil servants on temporary postings who worked there only for periods of a few years, after which they would return home, or were assigned to other colonies.

Russian; in Kazakh, Almaty) in 1921. Its population was 22,800 in 1897, and 36,000 in 1910.²⁹

Ashgabat (present capital of Turkmenistan)

The Kese-Arkash plain was a place with settlements of tents; there was no city before the creation of Transcaspia *oblast'* in May 1881. Being the centre of Transcaspia *oblast'*, the city grew up around a military fortress under the name of Askhabad, until 1919. It was called Poltoratsk between 1919 and 1927, and then Ashkhabad. Its population was about 10,000 inhabitants in 1886, and 43,000 in 1911.

Bishkek (present capital of Kyrgyzstan)

The Kokand fortress of Pishpek was taken by Russia in 1860 and destroyed. Then, over the next decade, a fixed point of settlement grew up there around the Cossack garrison and a staging post on the mail route between Verny and Tashkent; it became the centre of the *uezd* in 1878. The population (which was overwhelmingly non-Kyrgyz) rose from 2,100 in 1882 to 6,600 in 1897 and 18,500 in 1913.³⁰

Dushanbe (present capital of Tajikistan)

The existing settlement in Dushanbe prior to colonization only became a town in 1923. Dushanbe was located in the territory of eastern Bukhara, which was attributed to the emirate of Bukhara after the signature of the status of protectorate. Therefore, among the present-day capitals of the Central Asian countries, Dushanbe is the only one not to have been exposed to the new urbanism of the tsarist period.

Tashkent (present capital of Uzbekistan)

Tashkent is a very ancient oasis, whose population rose from *c.* 60,000 to 80,000 inhabitants in 1865, 156,000 in 1897 and 271,000 in 1914. The construction of the Tashkent–Orenburg railway in 1906 (see below) boosted the imports and exports through the city: by 1912, this line was hauling more freight than the Transcaspian one.³¹

New towns, particularly in the steppes, had a strong influence on the history of the region, yet their population was still relatively low. In 1903, Aktyubinsk had a population of 4,300; Kokchetav, of 6,000; Pavlodar, of 7,500; Akmolinsk, of 8,800; Guriev, of 9,600;

²⁹ Masal'skiy, 1913, p. 348.

³⁰ Frunze. *Entsiklopedia*, 1984, p. 18.

³¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR*, 1956, p. 210.

Ust-Kamenogorsk, of 10,000; Petropavlovsk, of 21,700; Semipalatinsk, of 31,000; and Uralsk, of 39,000.³² Omsk, the capital of Steppe governor-generalship, had a population of 128,000 in 1911.

The fortress of Krasnovodsk, founded in 1869 on the Caspian, received the status of town in 1896. Its population reached 8,000 according to M. V. Lavrov, and 20,000 according to A. Woeikof in 1912.³³ Krasnovodsk is a good example of a town that was founded due to the growing utilization of the Caspian. However, after a dramatic increase of trade through the city, the construction of the Tashkent–Orenburg railway led to a fall in trade.³⁴

Turtkul is another example of a town founded in the desert of Turkistan, while the town of Ferghana was founded (under the name of Skobelev) in a highly urbanized environment, which was quite unusual. Skobelev had a population of 16,000 in 1912.

The Russian quarters in already existing towns were home to significant numbers of people. Russian Tashkent had 55,000 inhabitants in 1909, or a quarter of the total population of the town at that time, which was 202,000.

In the protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva, where the changes were not so marked, the urban centres traditionally had large populations: Bukhara, 80–100,000; Karshi, 60–70,000; Guzar, 20,000; and Khiva, *c.* 20,000.³⁵ Russian civilians and the military in the emirate mostly lived in the new city of Kagan, 15 km from Bukhara, under the resident-general. The capital of the previous Uzbek khanate of Kokand had a population of 120,000 in 1914.

RIVER TRANSPORT

Prior to the conquest of Central Asia, its rivers were of fundamental significance to the life of the area. During the second half of the nineteenth century, however, their role in the economy and strategic policies of the empire diminished. Initially, Peter the Great's dream had been to link Russia with India via the rivers. However, the geography of Central Asia, with mainly land-locked rivers, and the fact that many of them are barely navigable, prevented a wide economic use of fleets. Nevertheless, Russia displayed a strategic approach to the question and created regional flotillas:

Between 1850 and 1869, at the cost of vast efforts, Russia caused to be brought from Orenburg to the Aral Sea several vessels built in Sweden, England and Belgium, in the hope of creating a fleet intended for the movement of military hardware with the idea of enlarging it later to foster trade in Central Asia.³⁶

³² *Kirgizkiy kray*, 1903, pp. 180–1.

³³ Lavrov, 1916, p. 177; Woeikof, 1914.

³⁴ *Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR*, 1956, Vol. 1, p. 210.

³⁵ Masal'skiy, 1913, p. 349.

³⁶ Moser, 1885, p. 58.

The attempts made on the Syr Darya were less successful. The commercial fleet on the Amu Darya was of some importance, but the construction of the railways, particularly the Orenburg–Tashkent railroad in 1906, lessened the role of river transport.

By far the most active river trade in the whole of Central Asia was on the Irtysh. The establishing of a secure frontier with China at the beginning of the 1880s led to an increase in trade with China and Mongolia due to the river. Therefore, the trade on the Irtysh was significant for Russia in its exploitation of Central Asia as well as in its international relations with important neighbours.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE TRANSCASPIAN RAILWAY AND ITS IMPACT

The introduction of the railway was a major innovation in Central Asia and was a direct consequence of the policy of making the colonies profitable. Preparations needed to be made for possible military operations southwards, to guarantee the internal and external security of the territory, and to make it profitable for the colonial power. Russia was quite late in constructing railways; however, its network increased very rapidly after 1865. By 1880, just before the construction of the Transcaspian railway, Russia had built 21,000 km of railways, and 70,000 km of railways were built in 1906.

Transport by camel, horse, donkey or yak, which had been used for centuries, was suddenly largely replaced by the Transcaspian railway. The construction of this railway was a triumph of technology. Construction of the Transcaspian was commissioned and brought to completion by the Russian General Annenkov. There were many disputes over the final trajectory of the track. More than 40 projects had been submitted, including one by Ferdinand de Lesseps, the ‘Asian Grand Central’.

Its origin lay in a decision by the military in 1879, when the first Russian defeat in Central Asia (against the Turkmen Tekes) called for a spectacular gesture to wipe out the affront to tsarist omnipotence and facilitate access to the Turkmen fortress of Geok-tepe, which had to be captured (Fig. 3). The railway was to serve to move both troops and military hardware. The battle against the Tekes resumed even before the section of railway line was finished. On 1 January 1881 a new battle gave victory to the Russians, causing more than 6,000 deaths on the Turkmen side. But it was in June 1881 that Ashgabat finally came under Russian rule. In 1885 the station of Kushka became the most forward point of the railway towards Afghanistan and hence towards the British.

The technical achievement is remarkable: 474 km of track were laid in less than 11 months, with the line growing by 1 or 2 km a day. In summer, work went on from 5 a.m. to midday, the sun making it impossible to work in the afternoon. Annenkov recruited some 20,000 Turkmens to speed up completion of the project. The work of extending it



FIG. 3. Geok-tepe. Fortress and the historical war museum. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

resumed after the annexation in 1885 of the Merv oasis, which surrendered without resistance, much to the dismay of the British. On the Amu Darya, a wooden bridge was built, which was specially designed to be flexible enough to withstand the river in flood.

The engineers and most of the workers were Russians. They were the ones who ensured both security and maintenance. Each new halt or new technical construction was inaugurated in style and with military fanfares. In 1888 the railway passed 12 km from Bukhara, but without entering it, at the Kagan halt. The reason was that the building of the railway was held to be a creation of the Devil, and the mullahs in Bukhara, who represented the religious centre of the region, opposed its entry into the emirate's capital. Russian engineers were threatened with having their throats cut if the train entered the city. On 15 May of the same year, the station of Samarkand was opened. A section was begun in 1898 in the direction of the Ferghana valley. In 1899 Tashkent station opened. The Transcaspian now ran on a line from the Caspian to the Ferghana valley.

This line symbolized Russian colonization in Central Asia, whence the need to guarantee the railway's security. Garrisons were posted along the right of way, in the main towns. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, administration of this railway was in the hands of the military. The Turkmens were the first to be affected by the railway, followed by the populations of the other regions of Turkistan crossed by it.

The introduction of the railway had major consequences for the local economy. At first the passengers were mostly traders, above all Russians and Armenians. The Turkmens, on the other hand, settled in the stations to sell their products when the trains stopped.



FIG. 4. Samarkand. Carriages (*arbas*) of the Sarts. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

Initially, there were only as many passengers as there were carriages. Annenkov then did some ‘advertising’ for his train, vaunting the merits of cheap, fast transport for pilgrims who wanted to visit the holy places. It was a great success and the pilgrims were carried in special carriages. Some occupations associated with the caravan trade (muleteers, guides, etc.) inevitably disappeared. Train prices were extremely competitive (Figs. 4 and 5). In 1876 to go from Tashkent to Bukhara took 26 days by camel: the train did the same journey in a quarter of the time at three-quarters of the price.

In addition, the role of the railway was obvious: to check any rebellion in the shortest possible time, to maintain a military presence, to counter British power, to introduce Russian manufactured goods into local markets, to strengthen the Russian presence in the region and to turn the region into a source of raw materials (cotton) for Russian industries. In 1894 the customs barrier between Russia and Bukhara was set up. Russian customs officials were also posted along the Afghan frontier, thus halting the inflow of British Indian goods.

Drawn by the need to maintain the track, the numbers of Russians swelled along the railway line. After 50 years, 250,000 Russians were living along this line in the countryside, while 250,000 others were living in the towns. Businesses were set up, all within 10 km of the railway. Passenger traffic was also rising all the time: between Tashkent and Orenburg, the annual number of passengers rose from 442,000 in 1899, 2.5 million in 1908, 3.4 million in 1910 to 4.25 million in 1912.



FIG. 5. Tashkent. Tramway on Romanov Street. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

FROM STRATEGIC TO ECONOMIC PRIORITIES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS IN THE STEPPES

The Kazakh steppes were first linked to railway networks in their northern fringe, to the city of Uralsk by 1894, in an extension of the line linking this region with Saratov, Riazan and Moscow, and also to the Trans-Siberian (whose construction was decided in 1891) in the region of Omsk and Petropavlovsk. Next, the Transcaspian railway was linked to Orenburg and the European network through the western part of the steppes. Construction of the Tashkent–Orenburg line started in 1900; it began to operate in 1905 and was fully operational by the following year. Its total length was 1,660 km (1,936 *versts*).

Manufacturing and trade

The first region to be developed industrially was Steppe *kray*, due to the discovery of important minerals, the development of mining, and the concentration on cotton in the colonial exploitation of the southern parts of Central Asia.

THE COTTON TRADE AND THE RAILWAY

Trade was transformed by the railway: it is still difficult to connect the abundant but scattered information about the multifaceted new dimensions of trade after the 1880s. Every element of the new modernity of the period under review had its impact on the local society: taking the train for the pilgrimage to Mecca, which meant accepting a seat in this



FIG. 6. Kokand. Pot-maker in the old town. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

‘*shaytan arba*’ (Devil’s carriage), buying a Russian stove or using Russian bricks to build a home, etc. Many occupations suffered or even disappeared to the benefit of Russian producers, for example pot-making, shoemaking, domestic utensil-making, etc. (Fig. 6). The numerous advertisements for Russian banks in Central Asia, Singer sewing machines and French perfumes found in contemporary publications (such as in Dmitriev-Mamonov’s book),³⁷ the many pictures of colonial Turkistan published in recent books³⁸ and the large areas of colonial architecture still found in Samarkand and Termez today, as well as in many other cities of the five independent republics, are contrasted with the credo of the Jadids, who wanted to awake their dormant society. These two trends coexisted in Central Asia until the end of the tsarist period.

Cotton was very important for the Russian textile industry, and the share of cotton from Turkistan rose from about 30 per cent to more than 60 per cent in a very short period (from 1908 to 1912).³⁹ In 1915 more than 350,000 tonnes of cotton were shipped to Russia, compared to 11,000 tonnes by 1877, that is before the construction of the railway and the introduction of American species of cotton.⁴⁰ The processing of cotton was partially done in Turkistan itself. The first cotton gins were installed in the 1880s, and Turkistan had about 160 ginning plants by 1914. Processing cotton was the only industrial activity that led to

³⁷ Dmitriev-Mamonov, 1903.

³⁸ For example, in Golender, 2002.

³⁹ Suvorov, 1962, p. 72.

⁴⁰ Kostenko, 1890, p. 221.

the creation of dozens of small factories throughout Turkistan. There were a few dozen small factories processing pelts in the steppes.⁴¹

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

The few decades of strong Russian economic involvement in Central Asia were also a period of rapidly growing foreign investment in the Russian economy in general: foreign capital amounted to 26.5 million roubles in 1870; 215 million roubles in 1890; and 911 million roubles in 1900.⁴² Foreign investment in Central Asia was concentrated in the railways, the cotton industry, the oil sector and the mining industry. (In 1900, 70 per cent of all foreign investment in the Russian economy was still concentrated in the mining industry.) The Spassky Copper Mine, Ltd and the Atbasar Copper Fields, Ltd (in the region of present-day Karaganda) and the Altai District Mining Company (in the Altai) are examples of companies that exploited a number of mines scattered over a large territory with a rapidly rising production. The Ekibastuz mines (north-east of present-day Karaganda) produced 5 million *poods* of coal in 1915, 10 million in 1916 and 17 million in 1917.⁴³

In 1895 total Russian oil production amounted to 426 million *poods*, out of which 396 million were produced in Baku and 29 million in the region of Grozniy.⁴⁴ The oil industry only really started in Central Asia in the early twentieth century. However, the sector grew extremely fast, and in 1912 the West Ural Petroleum Company and the Central Ural Caspian Company (with British investment) were created in the region of the Emba river. Oil production in this region was concentrated in two sites, Dossor and Makat.⁴⁵ In Turkistan, oil had already been discovered near Namangan before the colonial conquest. Industrial production of oil started (on a rudimentary scale) at the end of the 1860s and at the beginning of the 1870s. Another oil field was exploited near Skobelev, and a small refinery was built in 1907.⁴⁶

This Western participation in the economy of colonial Central Asia attracted a handful of foreigners to the region. This was a new phenomenon for Central Asia, a region where representatives of Western powers had never lived in the past (contrary to the situation in China, Persia and the Ottoman empire). Russian law forbade foreigners from owning land or other property in Turkistan, although there were ways of getting round the rules,

⁴¹ Dil'mukhamedov and Malikov, 1963, p. 22.

⁴² Fridman, 1960, p. 13.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 39.

⁴⁴ Brockgauz, 1897, Vol. 40, p. 943.

⁴⁵ Dossor produced 16,000 tonnes in 1911, 117,700 tonnes in 1913, 270,000 tonnes in 1915, and 240,000 tonnes in 1916. Makat produced 1,500 tonnes in 1915, and 14,500 tonnes in 1916. See Fridman, 1960, p. 81.

⁴⁶ *Aziatskaya Rossiya*, 1914, Vol. 2, p. 523.

particularly by taking Russian nationality. Thousands of foreigners, Westerners for the most part, came for longer or shorter periods or settled in Central Asia. Thus Moser met ‘an Italian seedman who had come to Tashkent to produce silkworm eggs, which he wanted to import into Italy, where disease had decimated these valuable insects’.⁴⁷

In the main industrial regions with a strong foreign investment in the steppes, Fridman reports the presence of 19 British, 3 Americans, 3 Swedes, 3 Austrians and 1 Dane working for various companies at the beginning of the twentieth century.⁴⁸ However, there were also foreigners outside the companies in colonial Central Asia: Western merchants, travellers, nannies for wealthy Russian families of Tashkent,⁴⁹ as well as the first scholars, for example the British archaeologist Aurel Stein in the Pamirs, the French Joseph Castagné in Steppe and Turkistan regions, and the American Raphael Pumpelly at Merv and Anau. Non-Western foreign communities were small in number; however, Hindu merchants were not uncommon at that time in Central Asia.

A LOCAL PROLETARIAT

The birth of a working class is part of the overall changes brought about by the colonial economy. Despite the efforts of Soviet historians to attribute an important social and political role to this nascent working class (which is not demonstrated by the history of Central Asia much before 1916), some mention must be made of the formation of a new social group: factory workers. Their numbers were never large: Fridman reports a total of 7,000 workers on the whole Ekibastuz territory in the steppes. From the work of Dil’ mukhamedov and Malikov, it is clear that workers in the various industrial sectors did not exceed a few thousands, among whom were numerous Kazakhs.⁵⁰ The emergence of a mixed Russian and local proletariat exposed the local workers to revolutionary ideas – and to the first social movements, such as strikes.

PRODUCTION AND TRADE

Many products and objects were actively traded towards Russia at this period. Silk production and the silk trade were a significant branch of this colonial economy. Considerable quantities of silk cloth were exported from Central Asia to Russia, while Russian

⁴⁷ Moser, 1885, p. 8.

⁴⁸ Fridman, 1960, p. 62.

⁴⁹ René Koechlin, a young French engineer whose book on his travels in Central Asia in 1888 has recently been discovered and reprinted, met a young nanny escaping from Tashkent when he was in Samarkand: see Koechlin, 2002, p. 133.

⁵⁰ Fridman, 1960, p. 39; Dil’ mukhamedov and Malikov, 1963.

manufactured cotton goods were flooding the Central Asian markets (Fig. 7). Carpets were also actively traded to Russia.

Manuscripts and books were also objects of trade, and the decades of tsarist rule were a period of an active accumulation of new academic knowledge on Central Asia, based on better access to the local written sources. Valuable manuscripts have always been bought, sold (and stolen) in Central Asia. Moreover, it was in the nineteenth century that this luxury trade developed in almost every town, especially in Bukhara and Karshi, where manuscripts and printed books were openly displayed in the bazaars. Evidence of this is to be seen in the collections built up by Russian orientalists in the late nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth. One example is the collection of A.L. Kun, who was the first to sort through the Khiva documents in the khan's palace, after the capture of the capital by the Russian army in 1873.⁵¹

At the time of his mission to Turkistan in the summer of 1902, V. V. Bartol'd whose initial purpose was not to acquire manuscripts but to locate them and study them on the spot, had however been told by the director of the Asiatic Museum not to miss any opportunity that might arise.⁵² On his purchasing mission to Bukhara in 1915, V. A. Ivanov collected



FIG. 7. Samarkand. The Char-su bazaar. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

⁵¹ See the A. L. Kun Collection, No. 33 in the archives of the Leningrad Division of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia (*LOINA*).

⁵² Bartol'd, 1973, Vol. 8, p. 119.

no fewer than 1,057 volumes of Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Judeo-Persian manuscripts in four months.⁵³

There are a number of works that deal predominantly with economic history. One such is the unpublished Bukharan *Tārikh-i Sālīmī* [History of Salimi] by Mirza Salim Bek b. Muhammad Rahim ‘Salimi’, historian and Bukhara official, born in 1267/1850–1, who held positions of high office under the last three Manghit emirs.⁵⁴ This work, which is written in Persian, is also known as *Qasqul Salami*. It covers the period from the conquest by Chinggis Khan to the Soviet revolution in Bukhara, but focuses mainly on the Russian conquest of the emirate.⁵⁵

Transforming societies

The response to transforming economies may be traced in many sectors of the local societies and communities. Reformism in Islam, which paved the way for Jadidism in Central Asia (see Chapter 7 below), is one of the responses to the changes that occurred in the heart of the Muslim lands. Besides such ideological attempts to face global issues, local communities also showed a complex mixture of cultural resistance and multi-faceted adaptation to the modernity of that time.

THE ECONOMY AND INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS

Trade fairs have always been places of intense intercultural contact. This was particularly true during the tsarist period, with a great increase in the number of fairs throughout Central Asia, particularly in Steppe region, for example in the Irtysh valley.⁵⁶

Although most of the colonial economy of Central Asia was developed with Russian or foreign capital, local entrepreneurs also existed and some local capital was not absent from the region. Individuals such as Sa‘id Azimboi helped to finance Jadid schools and newspapers. He also created a new economic journal, *Tujjar* [Trader], in Tashkent. Alikhan Bokeykhanov (1869–1932), the founder of the Alash-Orda movement, had a financial interest in the copper mines in Semipalatinsk *oblast’*.

⁵³ Today, under the name ‘Bukhara Collection’, it is held at the *LOIV ANSSR*. For the list of 1,000 Persian manuscripts which was drawn up by Ivanov in 1918 and had not been published, see Ivanov, 1974, pp. 407–36.

⁵⁴ In 1870 Emir Muzaffar sent him to Tashkent as a tea merchant, where he remained for twelve years to observe the Russians’ movements, returning every six months to Bukhara to make his reports; then, in 1884, he was appointed Bukhara’s official observer in Tashkent: see Epifanova, 1965, p. 45.

⁵⁵ *SVRAN UZSSR*, 1971, Vol. 11, Tashkent, pp. 93–4; manuscript: *IVAN UZSSR*, No. 2016.

⁵⁶ On Central Asian and Russian traders, see Rozhkova, 1963.

Photography and even cinema started prior to the end of the tsarist empire. Khudoybergan Divanov (1878–1940) is considered to be the first Uzbek photographer and film-maker. It is believed that the first screenings of films in cinemas took place in Tashkent before the end of the nineteenth century, and in Khujand in 1905.

Many prominent personalities like the great Kazakh and Uzbek writers Abay Kunanbaev (1845–1904) and Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (1875–1919) grew up in a rapidly changing historical context; they were profoundly affected by the varied intercultural contacts. Too little mention is made of the region's scholars (with the exception of Chokan Valikhanov, 1835–65), although they were also part of these transformations: for example, the Kazakhs Musa Chormanov (1818–84), Muhammad Salih Babajanov (1832–71), Tleu Muhammad Seidalin (1837–1902) and others. Some of these prominent historian-ethnographers were also active members of the local branches of the Russian Imperial Geographic Society.

CENTRAL ASIAN JEWS

Central Asian Jewish communities are also a good (though too rarely studied) example of overall changes due to the new political and economic context of the colonization. From the arrival of tsarist Russia, which set up Turkistan governor-generalship in 1867, down to the first decades of the Soviet era, Bukharan Jews lived in close-knit groups in the great oasis-towns of ancient Transoxania and the Ferghana valley: Bukhara, Samarkand, Merv, Shahr-i Sabz, Panjikent, Kokand and Marghilan. Until the emirate of Bukhara was made a protectorate in 1873, Bukharan Jews formed the only major religious minority alongside the Muslim majority. Various sources agree that they numbered 10,000 out of a total population of some 3 million.

The Russian colonization of Turkistan and the subsequent economic growth led to major changes in the geography of Bukharan Jewish settlements, initiating a wave of emigration from Bukhara to Samarkand, Tashkent and the large towns of the Ferghana valley.⁵⁷ The new arrivals thereby hoped to escape the obligations attached to their status as *dhimmi*⁵⁸ and enjoy a better legal, financial and social situation than that prevailing in the protectorate of Bukhara until its abolition.

This area, with its rich raw materials (such as cotton, which had been in short supply since the American civil war, silk, coal, copper and oil), had become indispensable to the Russian industrial elite, who were determined to turn it into a profitable region. They hoped to attract the most enterprising Jews by holding out the prospect of possible integration into

⁵⁷ Poujol, 1993, pp. 549–56.

⁵⁸ Status granted to the 'People of the Book', principally Jews and Christians.

the economic development planned for Turkistan. A policy of relative liberalism turned on the opening up to local Jews of residence rights and access to property ownership.

Thus began a period that was particularly favourable to the Bukharan Jewish minority – it was to last for the three decades preceding and the three following the Russian colonization. Already prior to the conquest, in July 1833, a decree lifted the ban on Asian Jews becoming members of trading guilds in districts closed to Jews. In 1835 Jews were authorized to attend the fair at Nizhniy-Novgorod; in 1842 they were allowed to carry their goods into Russian towns along the Orenburg line (where Russian and foreign Jews were not usually allowed to live) and then, in 1844, into all the towns of Siberia.

By 1873 a distinction was made among three categories of Central Asian Jews, based on their rights of residence: indigenous or Bukharan Jews (*tuzemnye*) living in Turkistan before the colonial period, paradoxically called ‘foreign Jews’ in the archives, like those coming from Persia or Afghanistan; (eastern) Asian or Central Asian (*aziatskie, sredneaziatskie*) Jews, settled in Turkistan after the Russian colonization, who enjoyed the exclusive right to reside in Moscow for their business affairs; and finally Russian (western) Jews, of whom there were only a few before 1917.⁵⁹

With the decree of 29 April 1866, some Bukharan Jews could claim the status of Russian subject (*poddanstvo*).⁶⁰ Joining a Russian trading guild was the simplest way of gaining that status, although there were many administrative pitfalls. Membership of the First Guild of Russian Merchants was accessible to only a few major Bukharan entrepreneurs who were either rich or had become wealthy in a few years in Kokand and Tashkent. Examples were the Vodiaev father and sons (who called themselves the ‘Rothschilds Turkistan’); the Simkhaevs; the Potilahovs, settled in Kokand, who owned silk-spinning mills, carding, karakul skin and railway-coach businesses and controlled the bulk of the export of cotton to Russia and England; and the Davydov (Davidoff) family settled in Tashkent.

Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 8,032 Jews settled in Turkistan, and some 14,400 in 1908.⁶¹ However, these figures, taken from the 1897 census, even when supplemented by Count Pahlen’s revision in 1907–8, are unreliable (since Jews hid from the census enumerators). In the 1926 census, a linguistic criterion was adopted (Judeo-Tajik or *tuzemno-evreyskiy yazyk*). This produced a total count of 18,172 Jews, 17,816 of whom were living in urban areas and 356 in rural areas. After seeking to conciliate an enterprising religious minority (the only one available) that was also well-disposed

⁵⁹ The 1926 census indicates that there were 19,611 Yiddish-speakers in Uzbekistan: see Amitin-Shapiro, 1933, p. 11.

⁶⁰ Before then, Bukharan Jews were forced to turn to Muslim intermediaries to trade with Russia: see Davidoff, 2002, pp. 185–214.

⁶¹ Dmitriev-Mamonov, 1903, p. 322.

towards it, the Russian Government was thus 'overtaken' by the 'Jewish question' It was precisely from the late 1890s that Russian policy began to harden towards the Jews of Central Asia.

Conclusion

A rapidly changing economy and trade, more slowly changing political structures and societies, and slowly evolving mentalities – these were the three different, yet closely interconnected frameworks which constituted a unique reality during the period under review and which were addressed from many different points of view by political elites and thinkers, both the colonizers and the colonized.

Coal in Steppe region but also in Turkistan near Khujand, Chimkent and in the Ferghana valley, the processing of wool, fishing in the rivers and on the Caspian and Aral seas – all the diverse sectors of the economy and trade between Central Asia and Russia were influenced by the increasing concentration of capital during the tsarist period.

As we have seen through the example of the Transcaspian railway, the major impact of the Russian occupation was in the economic sphere. To avoid newly created tsarist businesses being harmed by the shortage of cotton (as was the case after the American civil war), the Russian authorities encouraged cotton planting in the new regions that they occupied. This had the direct consequence of destabilizing local agriculture, with the shift from food-crop mixed farming to monoculture. This standardization of plantations led to the great post-revolutionary famines, as basic foodstuffs became scarce.

With the arrival of cotton came banks, branches of big firms and all the activities associated with that industry. This meant a shift to a real market economy. A secure market existed in Russia for Central Asian cotton, combined with favourable food prices, even while food production declined in favour of cotton.

Some local entrepreneurs were able to amass great fortunes. Nevertheless, the ongoing changes provoked new questionings and revolts. Consequently, the development of a colonial economy went hand in hand with the birth of reformism in Central Asia.

At the end of the period under review, the *inorodtsy* were faced with a refusal to recognize their military capacities on the part of the colonial authorities, which poisoned relations between the communities. To avoid teaching them how to use weapons, they were excused from military service. But Russia would remember its *inorodtsy* in 1916, when it was engaged in the First World War. Calls for mobilization would then be placarded in every town and village, but, instead of conscripting future soldiers, it was labourers that were needed. All these *inorodtsy* were given spades to dig ditches and do road

maintenance. This policy of segregation was the last straw in a resentment that had been building up for years. It took hold in the steppes and the oases of Turkistan. The revolt of 1916 was a turning-point in this period of Central Asian history.

SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN CENTRAL ASIA¹

A. Tabyshalieva

Contents

Settled populations in the oases	81
The nomadic population	84
Impact of Russian rule	88
The religious establishment	94
Water administrators	97
Artisans	97
Slaves	98

In Central Asia, the social structure of the numerous groups varied greatly from Mongolia to Iran. Even within one ethnic group, the social structure changed significantly between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many groups that enjoyed linguistic, occupational, territorial, religious, ethnic and tribal unity were divided by the imperial borders imposed by Russia, Britain and China and embarked on different roads to development. The Russian colonial (and later Soviet) authorities integrated diverse populations into larger ethnic groups known today as Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and others. The social structure of the various multi-ethnic khanates and tribal unions was complicated by a mutable division between peoples of oasis and steppe. In some cases, the ethnic or tribal identity connoted a profession or way of life, whereas in others, occupation indicated ethnic affiliation. For instance, in Central Asia *sart* (merchant; from Sanskrit) usually meant

¹ This chapter was written with the contribution of Dr G. Krongardt from the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic.

a settled Tajik, Uzbek or a representative of a sedentary Muslim population engaged in agricultural and commercial activities. On the whole, the majority of the Central Asian peoples combined pastoralism and farming. Some of the Uzbek tribes, however, have continued their nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle.

There was some professional division among ethnic groups. For instance, as L. Adamec noticed in Afghanistan, the Tajik elite were known as ‘men of the pen’, whereas the Pashtoons were called ‘men of the sword’.² Bukharan Jews were engaged in crafts, trade and usury and were known as skilled merchants. The nomads’ disdain for commercial activities led to the unassailable position of the oasis merchants. The exchange of livestock products and manufactured goods between Mongols and the outside world was mainly in the hands of Chinese and Russian traders.³ Similarly, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar, Uighur, Muslim Chinese (Hui) and Russian merchants profited in barter exchanges with Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen nomads in the market place.

The Muslim population throughout Central Asia attached overriding importance to *qawm* identity,⁴ indicating kinship, social relations and territorial connections. Such identity could include representatives of various ethnic groups settled in one city or locality (Fig. 1). As O. Roy noted, ‘Both a Persian speaker and an Uzbek speaker from a family having come from Bukhara use the same term for their *qawm*, that is “Bukhara’i”.’⁵ On the whole, settled dwellers identified themselves as residents of particular cities or localities in contrast to Turkic nomads whose identity was linked with their tribal group. *Qawm* affiliation also reflected economic activity and change. Some Pashtoon tribes were engaged in the same profession and claimed the same ancestors.⁶ Social, professional, age and ethnic groups were distinguished from each other by their place of residence and their clothes. Before Russian colonization of the Muslim oases, non-Muslim residents had fewer rights than other inhabitants; for instance, in some cases, they were obliged to wear garments indicating their religious affiliation and to live in a separate district within the city.

The tribal structure of nomadic peoples such as the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmens, Karakalpaks, Mongols and others was based on hereditary military units, although the warlike structure of tribal divisions gradually decreased in importance. In daily life, kinship played a decisive role in social relations and establishing contacts between different

² Adamec, 1997, p. 303.

³ *Mongolia. A Country Study*, 1989. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+mn0057\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+mn0057)).

⁴ *Qawm* means the unity of people: it could be in a tribe or subtribe, a village, a kin group, a territorial or professional group.

⁵ Roy, 1992, p. 76.

⁶ *Pakistan. A Country Study*, 1994, p. 106.



FIG. 1. Naukat, Ferghana valley. Little girls in front of a *chay-khana* (tea-house). G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

groups. Genealogy and group (tribal, ethnic, religious, linguistic, territorial) membership remained very important markers for social affiliation and relationships among pastoral populations scattered over the vast territories (Fig. 2). The harsh climate and constant insecurity meant that kinship networks were crucial in the protection and survival of nomadic households. Wealthy tribesmen had an obligation to support poor and vulnerable members in their seasonal migrations and everyday life in exchange for loyalty and a recognition of their inherited privileges in access to common resources.

At the same time, inherited tribal membership fuelled endless clashes between tribes and kin groups over pastures and other resources that reflected a common belief in the collective property of their lands. The weakness of central power and the absence of documented regulations of governance among pastoral tribes stirred up continuous warfare and disputes over resources. Before Russian rule, the hereditary elite of the Turkmens, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz had to maintain mobile military units to counter the challenges from neighbouring tribes and their own subtribes and from the khan's tax-collectors. Following Russian colonization, the mutual feuds and raids on livestock (*alaman*, *barymta*) among tribal groups of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmens subsided.



FIG. 2. Ferghana valley. Kyrgyz nomadic women. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

Settled populations in the oases

Russia consolidated its control over the Khiva khanate (1512–1920) and the Bukhara emirate (1500–1920), which complied with the orders of the tsarist administration. The status of the emir of Bukhara was higher and more privileged than that of the Khiva khan, who was a mere vassal of the Russian emperor; the Russian troops did not enter the capital, Bukhara.⁷ A number of Turkmen tribes were only nominally subordinated to the Khiva khan and enjoyed a considerable degree of independence. The Kokand khanate (1710–1876), stretching from the south of the Syr Darya to the Pamirs, included settled and nomadic populations. A rebel leader, Pulat Khan, mobilized thousands of Kyrgyz, Kipchaks and Uzbeks to revolt against the Kokand khan (1873–6); this triggered the collapse of the Kokand state. The social structure and landowning pattern in both khanates were analogous to those in the Bukhara emirate.

Since the fullest available description of social structures relates to the Bukhara emirate, the information below relates mostly to that emirate. The centralization of power led to an excessively bureaucratic apparatus managed by the *qush-begi* (lit. ‘chief of the

⁷ Bartol'd, 1927, p. 118.

birds'), equivalent to prime minister, who was responsible for all administrative and economic affairs in the khanate and was simultaneously *hākim* (governor) of Bukhara *vilayet* (province). As a rule, the ethnic identity of the *qush-begi* played an important role in the domination of his countrymen. For instance, in January 1910, when Iranian Shi'ites organized a religious celebration under the patronage of the Bukhara *qush-begi*, Astankul, whose mother came from Iran, the Sunni majority mocked the demonstrators. The emir only managed to stop the ensuing interreligious slaughter (resulting in a death toll of 500) after the dismissal of the *qush-begi* and with the support of invited Russian troops.⁸

In the Kokand khanate, the *ming-bashi* (lit. head of '1,000') enjoyed a similar role to the *qush-begi* in the Bukhara emirate. Relatives of the khan or emir traditionally held the top positions in the administration. Subordinate to the *qush-begi*, all *hākims* and *beks* (provincial governors) until the end of the Bukhara khanate lived at the expense of the population. In some provinces, such as Darwaz, Karategin, Kulab and Kurgan-tepe, the *beks* considered themselves as practically independent rulers.⁹

The middle and lower classes included three major social groups: the *fukaro* (common people), the *sipohs* (military men) and the '*ulamā*' (sing. '*ālim*'; clergy). The administrative system was led by chief officials, the *kāzi kolon*, the *rais*, the *mir-shāb* and the *zakātchi*, or tax-collector (from *zakāt*, alms-tax). The *kāzi kolon* appointed the *muftis*, who approved decisions in line with the *sharī'a* (Islamic law) and searched for the relevant texts from the Qur'an or other religious books (Fig. 3).¹⁰ The *rais* (*muhtasib* in Kokand) and the *mir-shāb* both belonged to the clerical establishment and oversaw observation of the religious instructions of the *sharī'a*. The *rais* exercised surveillance over prayers and punished any evasions of mosque attendance. The *mir-shāb* supervised life in the cities at night and acted as a police chief.

The regular army consisted of military men (*sarbāzs*). The first *sarbāzs* were recruited from among prisoners of war; after the Russian colonization the *sarbāzs* were composed of volunteers from among the poor.¹¹ In the mid-nineteenth century the Bukhara emir maintained 40–50,000 troops, but in the early twentieth century his army had only 10–11,000 *sarbāzs*.¹² The *fukaro* consisted of artisans, traders, peasants and other commoners. The ruined *dehqāns* (peasants) had to become hired farm workers, *chairikers* and *mardikers*:

⁸ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, pp. 413–14.

⁹ Bartol'd, 1927, p. 251.

¹⁰ Sukhareva, 1996, p. 293.

¹¹ Sukhareva, 1996, p. 266.

¹² *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, pp. 161, 408.



FIG. 3. Samarkand. Reading of the Qur'an. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

the first worked for a quarter or half of the crop,¹³ and the second received their wages mainly in cash.

In Afghanistan, the sedentary population continued the semi-sedentary practice of seasonal movements from lowlands to mountains.¹⁴ Among the Pashtoons, a tribal assembly (*jirga*) resolved intra-tribal disputes, often with the mediation of respected members of the 'ulamā' and *pirs* (leaders of mystical orders).¹⁵ The *jirga* included leaders, elders and all other men; in some places a man without land could not participate in the local *jirga*.¹⁶ The *muhtasib*, an 'inspector of morality', supervised mosque attendance and checked weights and measures and scales in the markets; he was appointed by a *qāzī* (Islamic judge) (Fig. 4). With the organization of regular police in cities in the early 1920s, the position of *muhtasib* vanished.¹⁷

In British India, the Pashtoons were united in several tribal groups (*khels*) linked to the possession of land. The name Punjab (*punj* is a Punjabi/Sanskrit word for 'five' and *āb* means 'water' in Persian)¹⁸ reflects the agricultural character of the region located between the Indus and Yamuna rivers. The statistical records of British India divided Punjabis into

¹³ Sukhareva, 1996, p. 277.

¹⁴ *Afghanistan. A Country Study*, 1997. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+af0055\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0055)).

¹⁵ Adamec, 1997, p. 173.

¹⁶ *Pakistan. A Country Study*, 1994, p. 110.

¹⁷ Adamec, 1997, p. 223.

¹⁸ Burki, 1991, p. 169.



FIG. 4. Meeting of *qāzīs* (Islamic judges). (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

functional castes or agricultural tribes.¹⁹ The ethnic code of conduct (*pushtunwali*) played a key role in every aspect of the social life of the Pashtoons. Just as the Russian rulers had done, the British authorities supported *maliks* (minor chiefs who were intermediaries between the administration and the tribal groups of Pashtoons).

Iran's complex social structure included three main tiers (*tabaghehs*), the upper, middle and lower classes, split into numerous subgroups.

The nomadic population

Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads were strongly aware of their military-tribal structure and kinship which included three major divisions among tribes. Membership in the Kazakh Little or Younger, Middle and Great or Elder Hordes (*Zhuzs*) identified the possibilities and limitations for each affiliate. Among the Kyrgyz, the two major divisions, the left wing (*sol kanat*) and the right wing (*ong kanat*), and a separate group (*ichkilik*) were subdivided into dozens of tribes. The richest and most privileged feudal class inherited power over large territories, which included various tribal kin groups. In Mongolia, several *aimags* (provinces) included a number of *tūmens* (military units of '10,000' troops among the Mongols) and *ulus* (familial or tribal domains).

Both Mongol and Kazakh hereditary aristocrats claimed lineage from Chinggis Khan. The Kazakhs elected their khans only from *tores* (descendants of Chinggis Khan). Kazakh

¹⁹ *Pakistan. A Country Study*, 1994, p. 106.

nobles claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, and any person in command would lay claim to the title *sultān*.²⁰ In turn, a special group of *telengouts* served the Kazakh nobility (the *tores*). The Kyrgyz and the Kazakhs elected their khans by raising them on a white felt rug, which symbolized the inaugural ceremony and indicated that ‘khan’ was not always a hereditary title.

In order to centralize power, the tsarist administration significantly weakened the domination of the hereditary nobility, the Kazakh sultans and Kyrgyz *manaps*, who traditionally had power over a dependent population, the number of which varied from tens to thousands of households. Other categories among the upper class were composed of judges (among the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmens, they were known as *biis*) and military commanders (known as *batyrs* among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz and *serdars* among the Turkmens). With the development of market relations, the newly rich nomads started speculating in livestock prices, thus forcing the hereditary noblemen into the background. Their newfound wealth opened up opportunities for them to buy low-level positions in the tsarist administration. Among the Kyrgyz, these newly rich common people were disrespectfully called *sasyk bay* (‘stinking rich’), which reflected the redistribution of wealth and the fall in status of the hereditary nobility.

The largest lower class of commoners (*bukaras*) among the Turkic-speaking tribes consisted of nomads and farmers, whose economic and social status varied widely. For example, 66–90 per cent of low-income Kazakhs had no minimum level of subsistence (up to 40–50 sheep) and worked for richer kinfolk.²¹ The poor-stratum ‘neighbours’, such as the *kongshus* (Kyrgyz), moved with upper-class families and to farms, according to the demand for labour. The most common form of exploitation, known as *saan* (‘milking’), made a significant number of commoners dependent on *manaps* and *bays* (rich men). With their large flocks, rich families could temporarily offer impoverished breeders part of their livestock in exchange for dairy products and everyday jobs. Besides, numerous customs obliged dependent tribesmen to pay rent-in-kind and to cover a nobleman’s expenses when inviting guests, for hosting celebrations and when giving gifts at races and other entertainments (Fig. 5). Wealthy households used the labour of *mardikers* and *chairikers* during the busy season, especially during the sowing and cultivation of fields, irrigation and the harvest. Pastoral nomads existing at the mercy of a continental climate frequently suffered from murrain when livestock starved to death during snowstorms. After losing their livestock, the poor had to settle in lowland areas and become work-hands.

²⁰ Bacon, 1966, p. 39.

²¹ *Istoriya Kazakhstana: Narody i kul'tury*, 2001, p. 102.



FIG. 5. Ferghana valley. A hired horse awaiting a traveller. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

Stockbreeding was the principal activity of the nomadic peoples, who valued sheep and their by-products as the main assets in the barter trade. According to the Russian census in 1897, the pastoral economy was the main means of subsistence for some 80 per cent of the Kazakhs. Only 18 per cent of them subsisted owing to a combination of stockbreeding and farming the land. The Kazakhs also engaged in fishing, hunting, gathering, craft work, etc.²² For the majority of the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz, farming was an auxiliary livelihood (Fig. 6). Almost all the tribes engaged in animal husbandry at subsistence level, although it is known that the Kyrgyz tribes paid a tax (*ziaket*, from the Arabic *zakāt*) in sheep and a tribute in wheat to the Kokand khan.²³

Among the nomadic tribes of the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz and the Mongols, the most mobile households seized the best summer pastures and water sources. The size and speed of flock determined claims to the better ground. In order to lay claim to the best grazing lands and water resources, well-off households possessed livestock with a greater proportion of animals (horses and camels) that moved faster than the animals of their countrymen. Their flocks were the first to graze the grassland, whereas the animals of later-arriving households had to be content with what remained. According to Kazakh scholars, the right of 'the first taking' did not cover winter camps and adjoining territories, being applied

²² *Istoriya Kazakhstana: Narody i kul'tury*, 2001, p. 84.

²³ Kadyrov, 1955, p. 16.



FIG. 6. Ferghana valley. A farmer. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

to private (about 15–18 per cent) and communal use.²⁴ Poorer nomads owned more cattle and fewer horses, camels and sheep, which meant that they always arrived last. Thus, over time, the rich monopolized pastures and water sources. For instance, Kyrgyz *manaps* claimed some tracts and pastures as their own property (*koruk*) and demanded rent or a toll (in kind) from other households that passed through.

All Turkmens were divided into *charvas* (nomadic population) and *chomurs* (settled inhabitants) (Fig. 7). The majority of nomadic communities (*obas*) among the Turkmens consisted of several small families linked by patrilineal kinship and having one common, not very distant ancestor.²⁵ Authors suppose that the Turkmens were characterized by fewer class differences²⁶ than other neighbouring peoples. Power often belonged to leaders who had proved their skills in war.

In Mongolia, traditional society was made up of numerous herding camps, basic-level territorial units and Buddhist monasteries. An estimated share of noblemen (8 per cent) was

²⁴ Amrekulov and Masanov, 1994, p. 24.

²⁵ Bregel', 1961, pp. 71–6.

²⁶ Bacon, 1966, p. 53.



FIG. 7. Merv. A Turkmen village. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

traditionally engaged in political and administrative jobs alongside the top-level clergy; the rest of the population comprised common herders and monks.²⁷

In Iran, the Bakhtiari and Qashqa'i tribal units, led by their rulers (*ilkhāns*), were almost self-governing and possessed vast territories. In other tribes, a *khān*, a *beg*, a *shaykh* or a *sardār* would govern the commoners. Community leader (*kalāntars*) administered subtribes. It was not until the 1920s that Reza Shah (1925–41) severely restricted the political and economic rights and influence of tribal leaders with the purpose of strengthening his own power. He took hostage the sons of tribal leaders and dispossessed them of their lands.²⁸

Impact of Russian rule

Turkistan governor-generalship was established in 1867 and renamed Turkistan *kray* in 1886; it included the territories of the Kazakh Great or Elder Horde (mostly southern Kazakhstan), the Kyrgyz and the Kokand khanate, and parts of the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate. Orenburg and Western Siberia of the Russian empire – transferred in 1882 to Steppe governor-generalship – incorporated the northern and central regions of Kazakhstan. Military governors appointed by the tsarist authorities administered the provinces, whose borders disregarded tribal kinship ties.

²⁷ *Mongolia. A Country Study*, 1989. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field \(DOCID+mn0057\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID+mn0057)).

²⁸ *Iran. A Country Study*, 1987. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field \(DOCID+ir0068\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID+ir0068)).

The Russian authorities united the native inhabitants of western Turkistan into one estate group with the humiliating title *inorodtsy* ('people of alien origin' or 'people of different birth'), who had access only to low-rank positions in the administration. The number of educated indigenous people is still unclear because Russian statistics only took account of natives able to read Cyrillic, totally disregarding Muslims educated in *madrastas* and *maktabs* (elementary schools) and able to write in the vernacular.

New indigenous officials loyal to the colonial authorities and devoted to change emerged, supported by the tsarist administration; they gradually displaced the traditional power-holding elite. For instance, the Russian establishment minimized the role of the *ak suyek* ('white bone') aristocracy and elevated the status of loyal underprivileged groups known as the *kara suyek* ('black bone') among the Kazakhs by including them in the administration. The large bureaucratic apparatus involved a great number of educated natives regardless of their origin. From the mid-nineteenth century, among the Kazakhs, more *kara suyek* commoners, *biis*, *batyrs* and well-to-do nomads had access to positions as senior sultans and rulers than representatives of the *tores*.²⁹ These changes followed the repression of the anti-colonial movement led by the *ak suyek* khan Kenesary Kasymov, who mobilized over 25,000 Kazakhs against the Russian authorities in the 1830s–40s.³⁰

The rapidly developing cotton industry created a new class of middlemen between native producers and consumers.³¹ In 1913 the Ferghana valley supplied more than 62 per cent of the cotton imported by Russia, Bukhara – more than 13 per cent, Syr Darya – 8 per cent and Samarkand – about 7 per cent.³² The rise of the cotton-processing industry resulted in accelerated commodity–money relations; this led to the stratification of populations and the pauperization of many of them, and simultaneously a greater than ever number of entrepreneurs, money-lenders and usurers (*süt Kors*), brokers (*daldals/dalals*), resellers (*alyp satars*) and traders (*soodalers/soodagers*).

In order to enlarge the cotton-growing area, the tsarist administration conducted reforms designed to eliminate the feudal landowning class in Turkistan and distributed small plots to local peasants. This transformed farming and led to the development of a processing industry and the emergence of a native proletariat. The introduction of small land tenure gradually destroyed the nomadic households and reduced the area of pastoral pastures. For instance, the fodder supplies of the nomadic Kyrgyz in the Ferghana valley were undermined by cotton expansion and the sowing of wheat on their pastures.³³ In addition, new

²⁹ *Istoriya Kazakhstana: Narody i kul'tury*, 2001, p. 183.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Bartol'd, 1927, p. 186.

³² *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 277.

³³ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 277.

small food-processing and mining enterprises with a number of wage-workers emerged across Turkistan *kray*, but on the whole, it remained a region with a mainly agrarian population. In 1885, even in the largest city Tashkent, the capital of the *kray*, only 27 enterprises were in operation, each with an average of more than 10 workers.³⁴

Taxation in cash introduced by the Russian authorities accelerated the stratification between poor and well-off. The commodity-exchange economy and rising taxes contributed to an increase in the number of landless peasants (*chairikers*), who were forced to offer their labour to wealthy locals (*bays*) and Russian well-off farmers (*kulaks*). Cotton monoculture and the hardships of the nomadic and settled populations in the Ferghana valley resulted in the Andijan uprising in 1898, which involved the inhabitants of Andijan, Osh, Namangan and the surrounding areas. The leader, a Naqshbandi called Ishan Madali, mobilized thousands of impoverished peasants and urban wage-workers under the banner of *gazavat*, or holy war against non-Muslims. After the defeat of the revolt, the colonial authorities exiled 208 activists to Siberia; among them were 136 Kyrgyz, 52 Uzbeks, 13 Kashgharis, 4 Turks and 3 Tajiks. Tsar Nicolas II invented a cruel punishment for villages that stood in the way of the anti-colonial movement: all of them were destroyed and levelled to the ground and new Russian settlements were established in their place.³⁵

New economic relations, the rapid stratification of populations and the increased pace of rural–urban migration led to urbanization at the beginning of the twentieth century. Slav migrants from Russia consisted of bourgeois, merchants, Cossacks, middle and poor peasants, and a small number of hereditary noblemen (*dvoriane*). The colonial authorities mostly encouraged the migration of Russian subjects – Christians from among the rural population. The dramatic increase in cotton production led to the construction of railroads, with a consequent influx of Russians to build and service the railways.

In Ferghana *oblast'*, the number of urban inhabitants doubled between 1880 and 1897.³⁶ Some settlements and cities established by the tsarist administration had mainly Russian populations and large Russian quarters (Fig. 8). Entirely Russian towns sprang up around railway stations.³⁷ For instance, Novy Marghilan (later renamed Skobelev and today Ferghana city in Uzbekistan) was planned exclusively as a Russian city (Figs. 9 and 10). In all cities, the Russian minority enjoyed more privileges than the native population. In addition, the new railroad communications across Russian Turkistan and the Bukhara emirate gradually decreased the importance of the caravan routes linking up with the southern neighbours.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 269.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 368, 370.

³⁶ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 268.

³⁷ Lipovsky, 1995, p. 532.



FIG. 8. Karavan. A Russian house and an *arba* (carriage). G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)



FIG. 9. Skobelev. A Russian officer buying grapes in the bazaar. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

In a hazardous climate, stockbreeding remained the most prestigious employment among the Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz nomads, who lived better than their sedentary



FIG. 10. Skobelev. Principal mosque and the bazaar. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

counterparts and considered landowners to be second-class citizens. But from the end of the nineteenth century, the Russian administration and peasants started confiscating lands used by the nomadic population. Moreover, the tsarist authorities forced thousands of impoverished nomadic and semi-nomadic households to settle. The confiscation of lands and economic restructuring led to a mass pauperization of the nomadic peoples and forced them to settle and adopt a sedentary lifestyle. Nomads as a proportion of the population of Turkistan dropped from 84 per cent in 1867 to 57 per cent in 1875. After the incorporation of the Ferghana valley, this figure fell to 47 per cent and on the eve of the socialist revolution in 1917 only a third of the population was engaged in stockbreeding.³⁸

Sedentarization greatly affected the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz and part of the nomadic and semi-nomadic Uzbeks who were unwilling to change a long-established lifestyle and saw the colonial period as the end of their era of national prosperity. V. Nalivkin mentioned that pastoral Uzbek groups had no respect for the lifestyle of sedentary Uzbeks, and disassociated themselves from those who had discarded their nomadic felt houses to settle in clay huts and grow crops.³⁹ Kyrgyz and Kazakh bards composed a cycle of poems about the last days of their enjoyable pastoral life and the evils of sedentary survival. Despite all the social and economic changes, tribal affiliations were preserved in everyday life.

The influx of Russians and Ukrainians who moved to cities and fertile valleys, thus evicting indigenous pastoral and oasis dwellers, greatly aggravated the interreligious and

³⁸ Botiakov, 1990, p. 75; Bartol'd, 1927, p. 121.

³⁹ Nalivkin, 1886, p. 32.

inter-ethnic tensions. Russian migrants seized the lands of mainly Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribes, expelling the latter from their traditional territories. For instance, Slavs living in Kazakhstan totalled 1.5 million (28.5 per cent of the total population) by 1911.⁴⁰ The process of sedentarization among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz provided more opportunities for the tsarist administration to take possession of lands for the Russian population.

The last straw was when the tsarists requisitioned the entire male population to serve as the rearguard in 1916, which ignited a mass rebellion across western Turkistan against all Russians and other non-Muslims. Thousands of rebels demanded an end to this male conscription and the return of their territories. After the revolt had been suppressed, the tsarist administration acknowledged that the main reason for the rebellion was the withdrawal of about 2 million *desiatinas* (2,179,999 ha) (1 *desiatina* = 1.09 ha) of land for the state fund and consequently a shortage of land and pastures among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.⁴¹ Another source indicates that before the First World War, the Russian authorities had expropriated almost 20 per cent of the Kazakh nomads' common lands.⁴²

The Russian administration did not consider the major part of these lands as the private property of the native populations. For instance, a revision conducted in Turkistan *kray* in 1909 by Senator Palen determined that in three *oblast's* (Ferghana, Syr Darya and Samarkand), the right to private land extended over less than 1 per cent of the sown areas.⁴³

The Tatar commercial bourgeoisie played a distinctive role in the social and cultural transformation of the Turkistan colony. Speaking Turkic and Russian, they enthusiastically moved to Turkistan, bringing their own economic resources and skills. By 1926 the number of Tatars in Central Asia had reached 119,000.⁴⁴ In Kazakhstan they became the largest minority after Russians and Ukrainians.⁴⁵ Volga Tatars, who are linguistically close to all Turkic-speaking peoples, successfully served as intermediaries between the Russian administration and local merchants and as educators and religious men in promoting Islam among the nomads. For instance, Kazakh and Kyrgyz neighbourhoods gave a good reception to peripatetic Tatar mullahs and traders. As E. Lazzerini has indicated:

By the turn of the nineteenth century the Tatar diaspora, with its modernist mentality and economic resources to support a range of reformist activities involving publishing, education, religion, economics, language, and social relations, would shape a developmental model

⁴⁰ See *Istoriya Kazakhstana: Narody i kul'tury*, 2001, p. 248.

⁴¹ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 347.

⁴² Tursunbaev, 1973, p. 224.

⁴³ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 259.

⁴⁴ *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance. A Historical Overview*, 1994, p. 111.

⁴⁵ *Istoriya Kazakhstana: Narody i kul'tury*, 2001, p. 236.

attractive for many Turkic brethren faced with the challenge of preserving known ways while evolving a modern society.⁴⁶

Families remained large, but high child mortality led to few surviving children in the family. Polygamy was common among the well-off Muslim families and marked high social and economic status among the men. Inter-ethnic marriages between Muslims were considered customary, whereas both sides condemned interreligious marriages between Muslims and Christians. Property, knowledge and privileges were transferred patrilineally. As a rule, among the Muslim nomadic population, the youngest son inherited the largest part of his father's rights over pastures and property. On the other hand, market relations in the colonial period promoted a breakdown of the large patriarchal family and helped to weaken kinship relations.

The religious establishment

Russian governors-general considered the emir of Bukhara as the head of the Muslim community of Central Asia.⁴⁷ Bukhara, with its population of 80–100,000, had up to 365 mosques and 103 *madrasas* and 10–15,000 mullahs and students who played an active role in political and social events.⁴⁸ According to other authors, there were 8 Friday (*Jum'a*) mosques, more than 200 *guzars* (districts) and about 50 other mosques in bazaars and *madrasas*.⁴⁹ As a rule, every neighbourhood (*mahalla* or *guzar*) had its own mosque (Fig. 11), which functioned as a centre for the local community (Fig. 12). The '*ulamā*' owned a significant share of the lands and assets of the *waqf* (religious endowment). For instance, in the Ferghana valley, *waqf* lands made up 11–17 per cent of the sown areas.⁵⁰

The religious class consisted of *seyyids* (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) and *khojas* (descendants of the first four 'Rightly Guided' caliphs). Both considered themselves a sacred group as opposed to the populace (*karacha*). If they violated this endogamy, their descendants could lose their dignity. According to V. Bartol'd, *khojas* were reluctant to allow their females to marry *karacha*, because in such a marriage, the children, regardless of the origin of their father, acquired all the rights of the Prophet's descendants. Despite the resistance of the *khojas*, some nineteenth-century rulers forced women from this group to marry them in order to obtain the prestigious title of *seyyid*.⁵¹ *Khojas* and *seyyids* held high positions in the khanates, although their material situation varied. Even in the early

⁴⁶ Lazzerini, 1992.

⁴⁷ Bartol'd, 1927, p. 223.

⁴⁸ Gafurov, 1964, p. 184.

⁴⁹ Sukhareva, 1996, p. 293.

⁵⁰ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 270.

⁵¹ Bartol'd, 1963, p. 276.



FIG. 11. Namangan. Men sitting outside the Abdu-Karim mosque. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)



FIG. 12. Ferghana valley. A *mahalla* (residential quarter) in a town. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

years of the Soviet regime, some top administrative positions in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan belonged to descendants of *khojas*.



FIG. 13. Marghilan. *Mazār* of the Kok-Mazar mosque. (Photo: © S. Gorshenina-Rapin.)

Both Russia and Britain made significant efforts to modernize criminal and civil laws to transform social relationships in their respective spheres of influence. However, they could not fundamentally alter the role of the *sharī‘a* (Islamic law) in the oases and of *‘ādat* (oral customary law) in the steppes, which strictly determined the everyday life of Muslims. Almost all legal proceedings remained in the hands of the *‘ulamā* and well-off chiefs. Among the Turkic-speaking populations, the power of the *aqsaqals* (lit. ‘white-beards’, i.e. elders) and the court of the elders remained the strongest institutions, especially in remote regions untouched by market relations.

The heads of Sufi brotherhoods (which enjoyed great popularity among peasants and nomadic farmers) did not belong to the official clergy. The Naqshbandis remained the most influential of the numerous Sufi brotherhoods in the Bukhara emirate and the Kokand khanate. In Khiva, almost all artisans, merchants and officials were members of Sufi brotherhoods, mostly the Kubraviya.⁵² Leaders of dervishes and the official *‘ulamā* competed with each other to gain power and land. Numerous holy shrines (*mazārs*) managed by *shaykhs* played a considerable role in the life of local Muslims (Fig. 13). On the whole, the settled populations in the oases were more zealous Muslims than the nomadic populations.

In Mongolia, the Yellow Sect of Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism) played the key role in the administration and management of community life. In times of political crisis, as

⁵² *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 148.

with the end of Chinese rule in 1911, the Buddhist authorities assumed political power.⁵³ Around '250,000 people, more than a third of the total residents, either lived in territories administered by monasteries and living Buddhas or were hereditary dependents of the monasteries.'⁵⁴

Water administrators

In the arid climate of Central Asia, water regulation was of primordial importance for the survival and wealth of the populations. Traditionally, local inhabitants had elected many administrators responsible for water management and the repair of canals to prevent frequent disputes. Every community had its own *mir-āb* (water manager) or *aryk-aqsaqal*. For instance, the Zakh-Aryk water system in the vicinity of Tashkent had 40 *mir-ābs* and 1 *aryk-aqsaqal* remunerated in kind and later in cash.⁵⁵ However, in the colonial period, the tsarist administration started appointing officials responsible for irrigation instead of elected representatives, which led to mismanagement and continuous disputes among water users. In Afghanistan, more than one tenth of the land was cultivated and one quarter was irrigated; this necessitated collective efforts to maintain the water system and the hand-dug underground water channel systems (*kārezs*). The majority of the population had to use *lalmi*, rain-fed dry farming.⁵⁶

Artisans

The number of artisans in the oases was significant; for instance, in the city of Bukhara about 25 per cent of the total population consisted of artisans with their families and roughly 100 branches of arts existed.⁵⁷ As in Europe, city artisans were united in guilds with their own charter (*risāla*) and headed by respected masters, who used the wage labour of apprentices and accomplished poor masters (*khalfas*). Team leaders of the artisans collected purchase orders and allocated them among workshops. In the second half of the nineteenth century, an influx of Russian manufactured products led to a devastating decline of local crafts and put many artisans out of business; some arts have gradually vanished.

⁵³ *Mongolia. A Country Study*, 1989. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+mn0073\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+mn0073)).

⁵⁴ *Mongolia. A Country Study*, 1989.

⁵⁵ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 296.

⁵⁶ *Afghanistan. A Country Study*, 1997. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+af0055\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0055)).

⁵⁷ Sukhareva, 1996, p. 190.

In Central Asia, the common people ascribed supernatural powers to a skilled artisan (*ustā*) and believed that every craft has own divine protector (*pir*) who saves it from harm. According to traditional belief, Adam was the first farmer and weaver, and David was the patron of metal crafts.⁵⁸ Similarly, any educated writer or poet was highly respected because of the popular belief in his extraterrestrial ability and skills. For instance, a Kyrgyz *manaschi* (epic narrator), able to remember thousands of verses, could be asked to cure domestic animals because of his unique talent.

Slaves

At major markets in Bukhara, Samarkand, Karakul, Karshi and Charju, slaves consisted mainly of Iranians and Russians, and some Kalmuks; they were brought there by Turkmen, Kazakh and Kyrgyz raiders.⁵⁹ The major providers of the numerous slaves for the Khiva khanate's markets were Turkmens and Kazakhs; the first supplied Iranians and Kurds, and the second supplied Russians, Tatars, German colonists, etc.⁶⁰ Slaves were employed in the army and the administration; some managed to achieve top positions such as *qush-begi*. For instance, the Bukhara emir Muzaffar (1860–85) surrounded himself with a retinue of Iranian slaves and maintained a brigade of them. There were estimated to be some 40,000 slaves in the Khiva khanate alone; they were eventually released under pressure from the tsarist administration.⁶¹ The number of slaves in the emirate of Bukhara remains unknown; after joining Samarkand *vilayet* to Russia, it is estimated that Samarkand district had some 10,000 slaves.⁶² Among the Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Turkmens, slavery was not as widespread as in the oases: their domestic slaves (*kuls*) had been prisoners of war or criminals whose relatives failed to ransom them; most worked in households and their offspring gradually became integrated into the tribal community. Kyrgyz *manaps* included domestic slaves as part of the *kalym* (bride-price), as prizes at races and as payments for fines.⁶³ As A. Lomakin indicated, at the end of the nineteenth century, among the Turkmens a concubine was regarded as a commodity until she gave birth; after a child was born, her master could not sell her to anyone else, though it was his decision whether to marry her or to continue the illegal cohabitation.⁶⁴ The Russian authorities abolished slavery in 1861 and gradually it vanished from the subject territories.

⁵⁸ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, 1947, p. 303.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 150–1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁶³ *Istoriya Kirgizii*, 1956, Vol. 1, p. 217.

⁶⁴ Lomakin, 1993, pp. 10–11.

4

THE BRITISH IN CENTRAL ASIA^{*}*Madhavan K. Palat***Contents**

FROM THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1918	99
Iran	100
Afghanistan	103
Kashgharia	107
FROM 1918 TO THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY	109
The strategic context	109

Part One**FROM THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1918**

British action in Central Asia from the 1850s to the end of the First World War was mostly restricted to Iran and Afghanistan as the Russian empire invested the territory up to the present frontiers of these two countries. The Russian empire had drawn its Transcaucasian frontier with Iran on the River Arax by the treaty of Turkaman Chay in 1828. Iran had become obviously vulnerable to Russia as the decline of the Ottoman empire had created for the European great powers what was known as the Eastern Question. Whereas all the European powers competed for various segments of the economy and territories of the Ottoman empire owing to its large extent, only Russia and Britain faced each other in Iran. An overbearing Russian presence on the Iranian frontier, and an equally bullying British

^{*} See Map 4.

presence in the Arabian Sea, led to a sustained competition between them for the control of Iranian politics and the carving up of the country into spheres of influence. It culminated in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 (see below), when the spheres of influence were formally marked out; but that arrangement had already been in operation in effect since the 1830s.

Given the effective Russian domination of northern Iran after Turkaman Chay in 1828, Britain's strategic planners decided to make Afghanistan its secure sphere of domination to the exclusion of Russia. In 1836 the secret committee of the board of directors of the East India Company instructed Auckland, the governor-general of India, to counteract growing Russian influence in Kabul. It resulted in all the familiar themes of Britain's Afghan policy: the British deciding who should rule in Kabul, the boundaries of the future Afghan state and the extent of its independence; and two invasions of the country when the amir at Kabul appeared to display excessive independence of the British and friendship with Russia.

Thus both forms of action – sustained competition with Russia and the effective partitioning of Iran into spheres of influence, and the inclusion of all of future Afghanistan up to the Amu Darya within the sphere of the British empire of India – were determined as early as the 1830s. Equally, British planners had surrendered the rest of Central Asia to Russia although the Russian boundary in the early 1850s still stood at the Syr Darya near the Aral Sea. The only additional theme was the British attempt at creating a buffer state out of Kashgharia (in the manner of Afghanistan) in the 1860s and 1870s, during the temporary eclipse of Chinese sovereignty in that territory.

Iran

The main competition between Russia and Britain for influence in Iran lay in the sphere of economic concessions. Gaining control of the transport network was central since every major town was distant enough from the Gulf or from the Caspian to need a railway line. Between 1872 and 1875 the two powers jostled over the Falkenhagen contract supported by Russia and the Reuter contract sponsored by Britain. In 1872 Baron Julius de Reuter was offered a concession to exploit Iran's natural resources and engage in industrial enterprise. He could construct and operate railway lines from the Caspian to the Gulf, with branch lines thrown in for good measure, and pay a mere 2 per cent of the net profits for 70 years, after which all assets would be transferred to the Persian Government; he would enjoy an exclusive concession on all mineral resources except for gold, silver and precious stones, and the government would receive 15 per cent of the net profits of the mines; he could exploit all the forest wealth of the country and collect customs dues.

The Russian Government then stepped in to persuade the shah to cancel the Reuter contract and offer one instead to General Falkenhagen's company to construct a railway line from Julfa to Tabriz and to operate it for 44 years with a guaranteed 6.5 per cent on the capital invested by the Russian company. The British minister in Tehran, W. Taylor Thomson, argued for Reuter, while his Russian counterpart, A. F. Berger, energetically promoted the Falkenhagen concession. The hapless shah visited both St Petersburg and London in 1873 in order to escape these pincers, but he could not find a way out. Finally, Russia and Britain both agreed to withdraw from the field in order to avoid a confrontation.

The navigation of the Karun river was of obvious interest to the British, who sponsored a firm in Bushehr that went by the name of Gray, Paul & Co. to ask for rights. But in 1875 the Persian Government was nervous, for Khiva had been subjugated in 1873 and Russian steamer services to Iran had begun. The government declared for free navigation, to the chagrin of Taylor Thomson in Tehran and the fury of Lytton, the governor-general of India. Another British attempt failed in 1878. The British were perturbed that they seemed to be losing out, especially given Russian moves in Transcaspia. To add to their anxieties, the Russians organized a Cossack brigade in 1879 for service in Iran. It fell victim to personal quarrels among Russian officials and was an ineffective force until its proper reorganization and leadership in 1894 under V. A. Kosogovskii.

But the British and the Russians cooperated in energetically opposing any national of a third country from securing an advantage. Thus between 1875 and 1878 they frustrated Tholazan, a French scientist working with a number of Parisian entrepreneurs for rights to mines, public works and railways. In 1878 the shah had granted the Alléon concession for a railway line from Anzali to Tehran with a government guarantee of 6.5 per cent on the capital invested, no taxes at all and a period of 90 years. But I. A. Zinoviev, the Russian minister, and Ronald Thomson, the British minister, both protested so vehemently that it was cancelled. In 1885, however, Arthur Nicolson, the new chargé d'affaires, attempted to involve Germany to squeeze out the Russians, but Bismarck did not take the bait. In 1886 the old pattern reasserted itself, and the hope of a railway concession for an American by the name of Winston was killed by both Britain and Russia as usual.

In 1887 Nikolai Sergeevich Dolgorukov, the new Russian minister, went so far as to demand a Russian veto on all railway and waterway rights in the country. Nicolson so despaired of counteracting Russian influence that he suggested a formal partition of Iran into spheres of influence where Britain would enjoy at least full rights in the south. Dufferin, the governor-general of India, was quite as pessimistic and feared that without an alliance with a European power Britain would be unable to act on its own. Naser

al-Din Shah (1848–96) was so unnerved by the overbearing conduct of Dolgorukov that he pleaded with Dufferin for an alliance, but to no avail.

Instead, the British experimented with a novel approach. In 1887 the new British minister, Henry Drummond Wolff, suggested to Dolgorukov that Russia and Britain collaborate to ‘civilize’ Iran instead of competing with each other. Dolgorukov knew that the Russian advantage was political while the British was commercial, and that in any collaboration the British would win out. But Russian influence in Khurasan was mounting, and it appeared that the Yomud tribesmen were being roused to action. In October 1888 Wolff finally guaranteed Iran against attack, as the shah had wanted, and in a week’s time the Karun river was opened to commercial navigation to all nationalities. This was celebrated as a major British triumph; the Russian press was, not unexpectedly, vitriolic; but both Dolgorukov and Russia received a bad Iranian press too. Throughout 1888 Dolgorukov agitated for railway concessions for Russia; but he failed more because of intrigues by Zinoviev against him rather than as a result of British opposition.

Britain’s star was now in the ascendant, and, over bitter Russian protests, the shah granted the concession of the Imperial Bank of Persia to Reuter in 1889, with the exclusive right of note issue for 60 years, tax exemption and a monopoly on the right to exploit the mineral wealth of the country as long as 16 per cent of net profits went to the government. Dolgorukov happened to be absent when this was negotiated and he threw a tantrum when he returned, demanding all sorts of concessions for railway construction and river navigation. Robert Morier, the British ambassador, renewed the clever idea of Anglo-Russian cooperation ‘to endow them [the Iranians] with the blessings of civilization’, which he was candid enough to describe as ‘an Utopia’. But he was spurned again on the same grounds as before – that the Russian side would lose from it.

There were many Russian interests that wanted railways in Iran: capitalists like Tretiakov, the military led by the war minister Vannovskiy, and even the tsar himself. But Giers and Zinoviev objected on the ground that only Britain would benefit from linking the whole of Iran by rail; or, as the great Russian banker P. P. Riabushinskiy pithily expressed it, the best defence of Russian commercial interests in Iran lay in ‘the elemental monopoly of roadlessness’. Zinoviev won the round and it became established Russian policy until 1917 to oppose railway construction, to the extent of the new minister Evgenii Karlovich Bützow’s coercing the Iranian prime minister, Amin al-Soltan, in 1890 into signing an agreement that Iran would not construct a railway for 10 years or allow anyone else to do so. The British were stalled.

In 1890–1 the British won the pyrrhic victory of the Tobacco Concession, known as the Régie. In 1890 one Major Gerald F. Talbot was granted the monopoly to produce, buy and

sell tobacco in Iran on condition that he pay the treasury £15,000 a year and 25 per cent of the net profits. Talbot sold his rights at an astronomical profit to a syndicate which set up the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia. This time the opposition was more ominous for the Persian Government, since it was opposed not only by Russia but equally by Iranian merchants, especially from Tabriz and Shiraz, as they saw themselves reduced to the level of commission salesmen for foreign concerns. Russian agents freely stirred them up; more ominously still, the clergy of Shiraz agitated and in autumn there was violence in both cities. In November 1891 the new British minister, Frank Cavendish Lascelles, abandoned the Régie and the concession was cancelled in December (see also Chapter 20 below).

In 1899 Russia stepped up its presence by completing the Qazvin–Anzali road after also securing a monopoly on insurance and transport for Iakov Poliakov, a Russian businessman. As Russia was firmly entrenched in the north, the Russian Government generally opposed the idea of a partition as a concession to Britain. Russian officials argued that from a secure position in the north Russia could penetrate the south, whereas Britain could not do the reverse. Curzon, the governor-general of India, now once again proposed the partition of Iran into spheres of influence as a means of stabilizing Anglo-Russian relations, but London was not yet willing for fear that it might amount to an admission of weakness.

As the arguments went to and fro, Russia was embroiled in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5 and decisively defeated. Russian limitations were exposed and Russia was now ready to settle with Britain. This was the background to the final agreement on the respective spheres of influence, the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, by which Russia held the north and Britain the south of Iran, leaving only a central strip to the shah. This was the manner in which a position effectively arrived at in the 1830s was formalized by treaty in 1907, after much jockeying for influence in the whole country. But this stability was to last a mere decade, for the First World War and the Russian revolution created entirely new situations with another round of manoeuvring.

Afghanistan

British action in Afghanistan during this period, though somewhat clumsy, was nevertheless effective in keeping Russian influence out. At the time of the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1839–42, Dost Muhammad Khan (1826–63) of the Barakzai Muhammadzai dynasty reigned as amir of the territory that is modern Afghanistan, the final product of the imperial rivalries of Russia and Britain in the theatre. He read the signs correctly and remained firm in his support of the British while trying to unite as many territories under him as Britain would allow. The Dost brought under his control Mazar-i Sharif, Khulm, Kunduz,

Kataghan, Badakhshan and Kandahar. Two important outposts remained: Peshawar under the Sikhs; and Herat, which was independent under Muhammad Yusuf, a grandson of Shah Zaman, and looked to Iran. The amir briefly occupied Peshawar during the second Sikh war of 1848–9, but evacuated it after the British victory. Again, during the great Indian revolt of 1857, he remained surprisingly neutral, to the relief of John Lawrence in Punjab, who had even considered paying him this price for his neutrality. The amir thus lost two important opportunities to absorb Peshawar permanently, as is still believed in Afghanistan today.

Persian claims to Herat were ancient and sustained, and in October 1856 they occupied the province with the consent of Muhammad Yusuf. But to the British this could signal a dangerous extension of Russian influence, and they went to war with the shah for three months, ousted him and made him abandon all claims to the region for ever. At the same time in January 1857 they agreed to subsidize the amir to maintain an army to defend himself from the west (Iran) and the north (Russia). With the balance tilting against Iran and Russia in this manner, Herat was being gifted to Afghanistan. In 1863 Dost Muhammad Khan finally conquered the territory and died immediately thereafter. Modern Afghanistan had thus been created, clearly under British control and to the exclusion of the Russians (see also Chapter 19 below).

To the British the question now was how Afghanistan was to be dominated: by incorporation into the empire, as Ranjit Singh's kingdom to the east had been in the 1840s, or merely by manipulative politics to ensure the exclusion of Russian influence. These manoeuvres ranged from Lawrence's 'masterly inactivity' for ensuring the amir's independence to the 'forward policy' of maintaining a mission in Kabul and subsidizing the amir. The strategic goal of eliminating Russian influence was constant, and the British were prepared to go to war for that purpose; but the rest of the means to that end were fluid. These oscillations over means lent a peculiarly crisis-ridden quality to what was otherwise a fairly stable British Afghan policy.

Dost Muhammad's death was followed by prolonged civil wars of succession between his sons, with Sher 'Ali Khan (1863–4, 1869–78) eventually emerging triumphant. Sher 'Ali and the two governors-general of India, Mayo and Northbrook (until 1875), enjoyed a personal equation of trust. Sher 'Ali wanted assurances from the British that they would help him resist Russia, which was approaching dangerously close with the conquest of Khiva in 1873. The two imperial states had merely agreed in 1872 that the Amu Darya would be the frontier between Afghanistan and Russia, and in 1873 that Badakhshan and Wakhan would be in Afghanistan. But there was as yet no Anglo-Russian agreement as to the nature and extent of Russian influence in Afghanistan; and the British would not provide assurances to Sher 'Ali's embassy to Simla in 1873.

In 1874 a Conservative government took office in London under Benjamin Disraeli, with Salisbury as secretary of state for India. The 'masterly inactivity' of Lawrence, Mayo and Northbrook was abandoned in favour of the 'forward policy', and Lytton was appointed governor-general for the purpose in 1876. He occupied Quetta, made it a military base, and wanted to establish a mission in Kabul under an Englishman. Sher 'Ali objected that K. P. von Kaufman, the Russian governor-general of Tashkent, would demand the same treatment, especially as he had been sending aggressive messages to the amir. Russia meanwhile had annexed Kokand in 1876, which seemed ominous to the amir. While Lytton continued to insist, he offered nothing in return to the helpless amir, neither a promise to recognize Sher 'Ali's son, 'Abdullah Jan, as heir apparent, nor a steady flow of subsidies, nor (most of all) protection from Russian attack.

In order apparently to test British responses with respect to the forward policy, the Russian side sent a mission under Stolyetov to Kabul in July 1878 without permission from Sher 'Ali. Lytton dispatched a counter-mission under Neville Chamberlain, which Sher 'Ali blocked, in retaliation for which Lytton ordered the invasion of Afghanistan. Sher 'Ali turned to Russia for help, but was refused; he died in February 1879, unhappy and dejected at being used in this manner by the two empires on his frontiers. Meanwhile the Russian side had withdrawn after seeing the extent of Britain's commitment to its position in Afghanistan. But that did not prevent the British from going ahead with what is known as the second Anglo-Afghan war of 1878–80.

Muhammad Ya'qub Khan (1878–80), Sher 'Ali's son, now became amir, and signed the treaty of Gandamak in May 1879 by which he had to surrender the sovereignty of his country to Britain. Foreign policy would be in British hands, a British mission would be established in Kabul and elsewhere, some territorial concessions would be made to the British, and, in return, the amir would receive subsidies and promises of help against aggression. It was aggressive in tone, especially with a mission in Kabul, for Britain to proclaim the loss of Afghan independence; but the substantive items about foreign policy in British hands, and subsidies and help, had been staples of Britain's policy since the days of Dost Muhammad Khan.

Warfare erupted in Afghanistan beyond the control of Muhammad Ya'qub Khan, with Louis Cavagnari, the British resident in Kabul, being killed in September 1879. Ya'qub abdicated and eventually died in exile in India in 1923. The British General Roberts now instituted a reign of terror in Afghanistan as he fought, sometimes desperately, against sundry Afghan militias until September 1880. Afghan forces won several victories, but they could not sustain them and the British won the war. It was an opportune moment for the Russians to try their hand again, as they did by sending in 'Abd al-Rahman, a nephew

of Sher 'Ali living in exile in Russia. He arrived in Kabul in the summer of 1880 in a Russian uniform and with Russian arms and supplies. But the British gambled on him nonetheless and permitted him to become amir (1880–1901), and the Russians did not press their apparent advantage any further. As Britain had calculated, the new amir played the role of Dost Muhammad Khan, remained friendly to the British and concentrated on uniting, integrating and developing his country as best he could with two imperial powers breathing down his neck.

To the British all that remained was to fill in the details of the boundaries with precise commitments from Russia on non-interference. The Russian conquest of Central Asia continued with the incorporation of Transcaspia as also of the Merv oasis, formerly Iranian territory, now very close to the Afghan border. Local Russian commanders eyed the Panjdeh oasis, south-east of Merv, and in March 1885 they overran the area after a brief battle with the Afghans. The British negotiated over Panjdeh while informing Russia that any move towards Herat would be treated as a declaration of war. This came to be known as the Panjdeh crisis, with fears of an Anglo-Russian war. Eventually, Anglo-Russian conferences drew the boundary between Afghanistan and the Russian empire in the north-west with the hapless amir playing no role whatsoever in the negotiations. The line ran from Zulfiqar on the Hari Rud to Khoja Saleh on the Amu Darya.

The next boundary to be fixed was in the north-east, in 1891, with Britain and Russia agreeing that all the territory north of the Amu Darya was Russian and all south of it Afghan, thus leaving the Wakhan in Afghanistan so that the two empires did not touch at any point. Again, the amir stood by while his frontiers were drawn for him.

The third such boundary, the source of endless subsequent disputes, was the Durand Line of 1893 between the British in India and Afghanistan. It cut through the Pashtoon tribal areas and there has been much dispute as to whether it was intended as an international boundary between the two states or merely the demarcation of spheres of influence so as to grant the British rights to intervene politically in the areas defined by them.

One more boundary was then drawn in 1904, that between Iran and Afghanistan in Sistan. It essentially maintained the line drawn by Frederic Goldsmid as early as 1872, which was vague. The new precision did not improve matters, for the Afghans accepted and the Iranians rejected the decision, although they were unable to do anything about it.

The final settlement between the two imperial powers occurred with the convention of 1907 (signed at St Petersburg), under which Iran was divided into spheres of influence. Both powers recognized Chinese control over Tibet and agreed not to interfere; they also agreed that Afghanistan was outside the Russian sphere, that Britain would not annex any

part of Afghanistan or interfere in its internal affairs, and that Russia would consult Britain on anything relating to Russo-Afghan relations. This finally laid the basis for Afghan stability within the British sphere of influence. Significantly, the new amir, Habibullah Khan (1901–19), refused to recognize this convention since he had had no hand in it.

But such stability was to last less than a decade. During the First World War, Habibullah negotiated with German and Ottoman officials while resisting attempts to draw him into a war against the British. His main objective was to gain full sovereignty and independence from Britain, which his son Amanullah (1919–29) finally achieved. In addition, there were schemes aplenty by Indian nationalists and Afghan hawks for coordinated risings by the populations of India and Central Asia under colonial rule, the liberation of German prisoners of war in Tashkent, and an Afghan invasion of India. Nothing came of all this, of course, as Habibullah was too shrewd and the British intelligence service too efficient. But they pointed to the future, when Britain would have to accept the independence of Afghanistan, work for its neutrality on that basis, and be prepared to hold off revolutionary and German intrigues in the country. The course had been set for the next half-century until decolonization.

Kashgharia

Beyond Afghanistan and Iran, the British did make certain moves in Kashgharia in Chinese Turkistan between the 1860s and the 1880s. Kashgharia was the southern portion of Chinese Turkistan, or Xinjiang, while Dzungaria was its northern segment. It became an arena of Anglo-Russian rivalry largely owing to the temporary eclipse of Chinese power with the risings of the Taranchis (Uighurs) in 1856 and of the Dungs in 1864. The Dungan revolt provided the opening for Ya'qub Khan to establish his kingdom in Kashgharia from 1865 until his sudden death in 1876.

Ya'qub had been in Kokand when it was annexed by Russia and he was hostile to the Russian presence. The British at once sniffed an opportunity in Kashgharia, and they were egged on by the accounts of travellers like John Shaw, a tea planter, who visited the region in 1868 and 1869 and pronounced that Ya'qub and the Kashghari people were 'just like Englishmen, if they were not such liars'. Lawrence, the governor-general of India, devoted as ever to 'masterly inactivity', poured cold water on such excessive enthusiasm; but his successor, Mayo, spotted his chance to add to the ring of friendly states around India. Kashghar was to become another Afghanistan, not another Iran.

In 1870 Mayo sent a civil servant, Douglas Forsyth, along with Shaw to Ya'qub,^c while Thomas Wade, the British minister in Peking (Beijing), urged the *Tsungli Yamen*

(ministry of external affairs) to accept Kashgharia as an independent buffer state. While the Chinese Government obviously did not heed such far from disinterested advice, Ya‘qub did not receive his unwelcome guest for fear of Russian reprisals. His predicament was exactly the same as that of the amirs of Afghanistan. Noting this excess of British interest, Kolpakovskiy, the Russian governor of Semirechye, occupied the fertile Ili valley in 1871 and negotiated a commercial treaty with Ya‘qub in 1872. The British made another attempt in 1873 to foist Forsyth on Ya‘qub, this time as consul, but again with no luck.

Such British actions were premised on the prospect of the independence of Kashgharia from China. But the Chinese Government made an unexpected recovery and had regained the entire province militarily by 1876, when Ya‘qub conveniently died (it was rumoured that he had been poisoned). Russia was now obliged to negotiate the return of Ili, which was eventually restored in 1881. Kashghar ceased to be of major significance, and even such aggressive governors-general of India as Lytton did not seek to impose a British presence there. While Russia established more than one consulate, the British were not able to secure one from the Chinese Government until as late as 1911 – they had to be satisfied with Leh in Ladakh as the listening post for what was happening in Kashghar. Ney Elias was stationed at Leh when the Chinese Government turned down Lytton’s request for a British consul at Kashghar. His successor Ripon did not insist; Dufferin after Ripon pressed harder, with no success; and in 1886 Elias was permitted to visit Yarkand, not as British resident, but only ‘for pleasure and instruction’.

There was a momentary suggestion that China could be enticed with an alliance against Russia, but Elias dissuaded his superiors for fear of excessive commitment, or, as he put it, the Chinese troops were too incompetent. Eventually, a compromise was reached with George Macartney being sent as unofficial consul in 1890, waiting out his apprenticeship until his status became official at long last in 1911. The Russians enjoyed the advantage here, more because the British were unruffled as long as Kashgharia remained within the Chinese empire. The Kashghar episode was essentially an interlude caused by a crisis in China when the temporary independence of the region opened up one more space for Anglo-Russian rivalry. But it suggests how British policy might have evolved in the direction of fashioning another Afghanistan.

Part Two

FROM 1918 TO THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

After the Russian revolution and the First World War, Britain's role in Central Asia and its ambitions and activities were greatly curtailed and confined largely to Afghanistan and Iran. This was determined as usual by rivalry with Russia and its Soviet successor in both countries, but with the added fear of German incursions into the region during the two world wars. To the traditional great-power rivalry was added the fear that the revolution in the Soviet Union might encourage anti-colonial movements, both nationalist and communist, with the USSR using Central Asia as the base from which to penetrate Iran, Afghanistan and India. Russian colonial military planners in the nineteenth century had regularly proposed such strategies, of linking up with or stirring up anticolonial movements in India, but they had been closer to fantasies than plans. Now the fantasies threatened to become reality, with vibrant and organized national movements in Iran and especially India, along with communist and trade union movements. Thus two major concerns came together: the strategic context of purely great-power rivalry; and domestic nationalist and revolutionary politics of the states abutting on Central Asia integrating with the great-power moves of the British empire, the Soviet Union and Germany.

The strategic context

After cursory moves by the British in Central Asia during the Russian civil war, Anglo-Soviet rivalries were mainly confined to Afghanistan; while played out to a lesser extent in Iran, they were entirely excluded from Soviet Central Asia. With the collapse of the Russian empire, British policy in Central Asia did not change: India would continue to be used as the base for 'force projection' along the 'soft underbelly' of the former Russian empire (the future Soviet Union), from Central Asia to the Caucasus, including of course Afghanistan and Iran – the British saw this as the defence of India and the approaches to India. The collapse of Russian power rekindled the vision of Britain's gaining territorial reach in Central Asia at the expense of Russia and by using Afghanistan as a pawn. It revived the 'Great Game', which had supposedly been concluded in 1907; but now, in the context of the world war, the Central Powers, or the German and Ottoman empires, were

additional rivals. They hoped to gain control of the Caucasus, reach across Transcaspia through the railway line from Krasnovodsk to Merv, and thus bring pressure on India.

In 1917 the overriding British concern was to block Ottoman penetration of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Two British missions were sent for this purpose, the first under Major-General L. V. Dunsterville to the Caucasus, and the second under Major-General Wilfred Malleon to Transcaspia. By the time Dunsterville reached the Caspian in June 1918, Georgia had declared independence and become in effect a German protectorate with Ottoman troops given free passage. Azerbaijan was now a puppet regime under the Ottomans and only Baku remained in Bolshevik hands. With control of Baku, Ottoman forces would gain not only the oilfields but also the South Caspian and access to the Transcaspian railway, and thus to the Afghan border.

Ironically, it now suited the British and the Bolsheviks to cooperate against their common Ottoman foe, and both Dunsterville at the Caspian and the Baku government were keen on this. The Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and the Dashnaks (Armenian nationalists) were anxious to invite the British in; and the Baku Bolsheviks, led by Stepan Shaumian, were daily becoming more desperate and were inclined to do so also. But both Curzon in London and Stalin in Moscow were outraged at the prospect of Anglo-Soviet cooperation and turned down such proposals. Shaumian and his Bolsheviks therefore cut their losses and attempted to flee to Astrakhan in July, but his anti-Bolshevik sailors returned him to Baku, which now had a SR government. London permitted Dunsterville to defend this government since it was anti-Bolshevik, and he tried to do so for six weeks from July to September 1918. But Ottoman forces overwhelmed him; he fled in September, leaving the city to its fate: 9,000 Armenians were massacred by Azerbaijanis while the Ottoman army waited outside the city. This was the end of British intervention in the Caucasus against both Ottoman forces and in part the Bolsheviks.

The other mission was specifically to Central Asia under Malleon. His task was to base himself at Mashhad in Khurasan and block any Ottoman attempt to use the Transcaspian railway from Krasnovodsk to Afghanistan. The only government in Transcaspia in June 1918 was Bolshevik and objectively it might have prompted another attempt at Anglo-Bolshevik cooperation. A local British intelligence agent, Major Redl, noted in May 1918 that British and Bolshevik objectives were entirely compatible for the moment. But Simla and London looked at the global strategy against the Soviet state, and demanded a 'dual containment' of both the Ottoman and Soviet forces. London even suggested gaining an advantage over the Soviet Union in its moment of weakness. In June, the British War Cabinet seriously considered inciting the amir of Afghanistan to occupy the Murghab valley from Kushk to Merv, including Panjdeh, which the Russian empire had seized in 1885. But

the idea was rejected in India, where the government knew that the amir would fear for his throne should he act so crassly as an agent of the British.

By the time Malleeson arrived in Mashhad in July 1918 the problem had been solved for the British. The Bolsheviks had been overthrown in Transcaspia by a Menshevik–SR combination known as the Ashkhabad Committee, which now controlled the railway from Krasnovodsk to Merv. They at once sought Malleeson's help against the threat of an Ottoman invasion, and he readily obliged. The Government of India gave him a free hand, and he signed an agreement in August that committed Britain to defend the committee against both the Ottomans and the Bolsheviks, to protect Krasnovodsk and Baku, and even to offer financial aid. It was a sweeping commitment in the expectation of a Bolshevik defeat.

Malleeson's forces gained control of the railway line up to Merv, and in September 1918 they even permitted (or at least did not prevent) the Ashkhabad Committee's extraordinary massacre of the 26 Baku commissars who had managed to escape from Baku to Krasnovodsk. But two changes now supervened. The war in the West was coming to an end, and with it the German-Ottoman threat. Therefore, the only reason to remain in Transcaspia would have been to campaign against the Bolsheviks. But the Ashkhabad Committee did not inspire confidence in either Malleeson or his superiors. Curzon in London argued that Britain was not at war with the Bolsheviks and he was prepared to commit only arms and finances, not troops, to the anti-Bolshevik cause. Malleeson evacuated his forces finally in April 1919, and the British would depend henceforth on Denikin in southern Russia to overthrow the Bolsheviks rather than try to do so themselves in Central Asia. In short, while the British were prepared to reopen the Great Game, they could not find an agent to act for them. The amir was unwilling, and the Ashkhabad Committee (or for that matter any other) was not capable; nor were the British themselves prepared for a full-scale military adventure beyond Afghanistan, which even in the nineteenth century, when they had fought no major war and India was safe from nationalism, they had never been prepared to undertake. With these moves, British action in Central Asia came to an end. There now remained only Afghanistan and Iran.

After the war and the defeat of the Central Powers, Russia and Britain resumed their rivalry in Central Asia, but now as ideologically opposed forces in addition to being great powers. The new context foreshadowed elements of the Cold War. Throughout the nineteenth century, Russia and Britain had not been in fundamental ideological opposition, for both were European imperialists carving out colonies and justifying this as the 'civilizing mission'. Both either annexed territories and administered them directly, or ruled through puppet princes selected from pre-modern or traditional ruling structures, as happened in Khiva and Bukhara, in Iran and Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But radical movements of

various hues gathered momentum everywhere after the First World War, each in its own way directed against both the colonial power and the domestic traditional ruling elites which had degenerated into such pitiable instruments of colonial domination. While all these radicals were nationalist and targeted both the foreigner and his domestic agent, they could place themselves at any point on the ideological spectrum, from socialism through liberalism to counter-revolutionary dictatorship. They repudiated European domination firmly, but they replicated much of the European ideological discourse and nurtured visions of modernity with models provided substantially from Europe.

Thus two major changes of context were taking place. First, the great powers were themselves being driven by new ideologies, revolutionary (socialist Russia), anti-revolutionary liberal (Britain and the USA) or counter-revolutionary (National Socialist and fascist Europe). The great-power blocs also defined themselves as ideological blocs, whereas before the war there had been little ideological confrontation. Second, these power blocs, as ideological groupings, now faced a new set of inchoate power centres, also ideological, but nationalist everywhere, in the colonies and semi-colonies. The puppet rulers selected from pre-modern groups became obsolescent in their incapacity to assume an ideological position within the modern spectrum with its attendant powers of mobilization, or to face down nationalists; and the great powers realigned themselves to work with one of the local forces of radical nationalism. Outright annexation and direct rule were now out of the question. Even the Soviet overthrow of the princes of Bukhara and of Khiva assumed the form of local communist and nationalist revolutions by Young Bukharans and Young Khivans aligned with the Bolsheviks; these were no longer annexations of the kind that had occurred in Kokand and elsewhere in the nineteenth century. Such was the altered context in which Britain had to manoeuvre in Iran and Afghanistan: some brand of local non-communist but nonetheless socially radical nationalist must be relied upon to beat off the Soviet threat.

IRAN

After the war and the withdrawal from what was now acknowledged as the future Soviet Central Asia, British strategic debates in 1919–21 revolved around three options: first, to continue with the colonial practice of puppet regimes and take advantage of the eclipse of Russian power by extending the British protectorate to the whole of Iran, in brief, to replace Russia in the north and overturn the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907; second, to abandon Iran to Russia, which now meant the Soviet revolution, as was happening in Russian Central Asia; or, third, to encourage an anti-traditionalist, modern radical nationalist whose main attraction for Britain would be that he would not succumb to the Soviet state even if he wished to be firmly independent of the British.

The main protagonists in these debates were George N. Curzon at the Foreign Office, Winston Churchill at the War and Colonial Offices, the Treasury and the general staff in London, and the Government of India. Curzon fought a rearguard action for the first option of reviving and extending colonial rule but was worsted in the Cabinet. Nobody specifically argued for the second option, but it was repeatedly held out as a threatening possibility should Britain disengage from Iran. Churchill inconsistently demanded both a global anti-Bolshevik crusade in 1918–19 and the withdrawal from Iran in 1919–21. The third option was preferred, ironically, by the Government of India under Chelmsford, the governor-general, who argued for nationalism as the bulwark against Bolshevism. Without planning it as such, the third option came to be adopted through the 1921 coup by Reza Khan (see below), and it became consistent policy for Britain and then the USA until the Khomeini revolution of 1979.

Curzon hoped to exploit Russian weakness in 1919, replace Russia in the north, and in effect establish a protectorate over Iran. He imposed the Anglo-Persian agreement of 9 August 1919 by which British officials would advise the Iranian Treasury, supervise customs collections and construct railways, and be paid for their services through an interest-bearing loan to the government. Curzon dreamed of a continuous stretch of British-controlled territory from the Mesopotamian mandate country (Iraq) up to India. But the British had to bribe the Iranian prime minister, Vossuq al-Dowle, and two of his colleagues, and even the shah himself, to obtain their agreement. Since it had to be ratified by the *Majles* (parliament), nobody dared to present it, three prime ministers resigned in fear and the fourth, Sayyed Zia al-Din, denounced it to the *Majles*. The agreement was never ratified.

But Curzon put his hopes in military action. Britain maintained three military formations: the South Persia Rifles, in the south, in the British sphere of influence; the East Persian Cordon Field Force, set up in February 1918, first to insulate Afghanistan from German and Ottoman action, and then Khurasan from the Bolsheviks; and the North Persia Force, or Norperforce, to police the north against Russia. By May 1920 the Treasury refused to pay for the Cordon Force and it was disbanded. Norperforce was retained, but it surrendered its positions at Anzali on the Caspian to a Soviet landing in May 1920, abandoned its fleet and munitions there, and in July abandoned Qazvin also. In the recriminations that followed this humiliation, Curzon predictably warned of Bolshevism swallowing up Iran while Churchill demanded a complete withdrawal to more defensible positions since Britain had in effect abandoned the war against the Bolsheviks by ceasing support to Denikin in southern Russia and Kolchak in Siberia. The Cabinet judged that the Bolsheviks were not capable of an invasion and would confine themselves to sponsoring revolutionary

movements and regimes. If so, the British could encourage other types of regimes to oppose revolution with equal vigour and credibility, as Chelmsford from India had suggested. This now happened.

Like the British, the Russians maintained their own force, a Cossack division, in their sphere in the north. It consisted of 6,000 Iranian soldiers, officered by both Iranians and Russians, but headed by a Russian, Starosselski. The new British commander of Norperforce in October 1920, Edmund Ironside, planned to replace Starosselski with an Iranian and have him seize power. Ironside noted several factors: the helplessness of the British, who had retreated before small Soviet contingents; the venal incapacity of the shah's entourage and government; and the appearance of a radical nationalist and communist movement and even government in Gilan and Mazandaran which was uncomfortably close to the Bolsheviks and seemed likely to depose the shah. Instead of the shah's regime being overthrown by a modern nationalist with communist leanings, the British could have the job done by another modern nationalist of anti-communist convictions. Ironside therefore bullied the hapless shah into dismissing Starosselski and appointing Reza Khan as commander of the Cossack division in October–November 1920. He then urged Reza Khan in February 1921 to seize power, which he duly did within 10 days and went on to become the prime minister in 1923 and the new shah, Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–41), in 1925. The British had unwittingly found their solution: to promote a nationalism that would be anti-Soviet and non-communist, and would compete against another nationalism that might be pro-Soviet and possibly but not necessarily communist; whether it was a dictatorship or a democracy was of little moment. The value of Kemalist Turkey and Pahlavi Iran had been discerned. The strategy of the Cold War was already in place.

The shah's nationalist anti-communism suited British purposes, and during the inter-war years the shah pursued his military and social modernization with uneven results while the British confined themselves to extracting oil and its prodigious profits from Khuzestan through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935. But the war saw the recrudescence of colonial situations.

The shah's yearning for independence from the colonial powers led to his seeking German technical assistance for his country's development. By 1939 the Germans were a large visible foreign presence in Iran, and German plans for using Iran against India or the Soviet Union were expected and feared by both sides. As soon as the German invasion of the Soviet Union began in July 1941, and the prospect of German control of the Caucasus loomed large, the British and Soviet governments demanded the expulsion of the Germans from Iran. The shah temporized; Iran was promptly invaded by both sides in

September 1941 and the shah was deposed and exiled to South Africa. Iran was once again partitioned.

After the war, both sides withdrew their forces but sponsored their respective candidates in the country's internal politics. The Soviet Union pursued a social radicalism through the communist Tudeh Party in the north; but it was highly divisive and the Azeri country became virtually independent of Tehran. The British, now backed by the USA to the disappointment and dismay of Iranian nationalists, exploited the conservatism of the tribes, landlords and '*ulamā*', which Reza Shah had sought to curb so energetically. Iranian nationalists in the centre, coalesced around the National Front and led in effect by Mohammad Mosaddeq, were squeezed between the two and fell victim to Anglo-American intrigues. The last act of British colonialism was played out through the struggle for control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

The company's profits were astronomical, but it paid more in taxes to the British Government than in royalties to the Iranian, and the shah had demanded a revision of the concession in 1932. He was forced to accept a new concession in 1933, which reduced the territory but extended the term from 1961 to 1993, by when the oil was expected to be exhausted. Britain controlled the oil retail trade and southern politics; and in 1946 Britain organized a raid by Shaikh Khazal, a British pensioner in exile in Basra (Iraq), to break a strike in the Khuzestan oilfields. Britain then backed a revolt by the Qashqa'i tribal formations for the dismissal of Tudeh ministers, and they were successful. In 1947, under American influence, the *Majles* rejected a concession to the Soviet Union for northern oil.

In 1947 the Iranian Government demanded a new agreement for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; but what was signed in 1949 so outraged nationalist opinion that the elections to the *Majles* in 1950 were fought on oil policy. Under Mosaddeq's leadership of the National Front, the *Majles* voted for the nationalization of the oil industry and the appointment of Mosaddeq as prime minister. The British, supported by the Americans, organized an international boycott of Iranian oil, enforced in colonial fashion with gunboats. Deprived of oil revenues, the Iranian Government sought American loans, which were refused despite Mosaddeq's persuasive argument that the Tudeh might otherwise gain influence. In mid-1952 the British and Americans persuaded the young shah to dismiss Mosaddeq, but such was his popularity that he had to be recalled.

The Anglo-American plot was revived in 1953, but with better planning. Mosaddeq, hearing about the preparations for a coup, mobilized; the shah fled abroad; and Tehran was swept by anti-royalist rioting in which the Tudeh played an important role. Mosaddeq used the army to control the riots, which alienated the Tudeh and emboldened the conservatives. The army had remained loyal to the shah. The American Central Intelligence

Agency sponsored and financed counter-riots, and conservatives like Ayatollah Behbehani approved. Thus the army, the conservative '*ulamā*' and urban crowds had joined forces, with the financial and other support of the USA; but the nationalists under Mosaddeq were isolated from the potential mass support that the Tudeh could have organized. The shah was restored, Mosaddeq himself was spared after a brilliant defence at his trial, but all the others fell victim to a vicious wave of repression.

Iranian politics had set its course for the next quarter century until the revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. The challenge of the Soviet Union, of communism, of independent nationalism of the type pursued by India or by Nasser in Egypt had all been beaten off; the colonial partition of Iran that had lasted the full century from the late 1820s until Reza Khan's coup of 1921 had culminated in the country's absorption into the British sphere of influence in the inter-war years; and it had been followed by the post-colonial Cold War subservient alignment with the USA. Colonial Britain had handed the baton to the new superpower, the USA, through the drama of the coup against Mosaddeq in 1953 (see also Chapter 20 below).

AFGHANISTAN

Chelmsford, the British governor-general of India, had proposed that the best defence against Soviet ideology and revolution was a local nationalism that must be supported in its independence; he had derived that insight from his experience in India and he applied it to Afghanistan. Amir Habibullah (1901–19) of Afghanistan had managed to remain neutral during the First World War in the face of Pan-Islamic and Ottoman blandishments; but during the Paris Peace Conference, he demanded of the Government of India that Afghanistan be granted complete freedom in foreign policy. Before the governor-general could respond, the amir was assassinated and his son, the young, enthusiastic and ambitious Amanullah (1919–29), was on the throne. He pursued that same purpose more vigorously, if adventurously. He invaded India in May 1919, expecting a popular rising in support, but was cruelly deceived, was defeated and had to sign the treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919.

It was one of those wars in which the defeated emerge victorious, for Chelmsford read the signs of the times correctly and agreed to the full sovereignty of Afghanistan, that is, it could conduct its foreign affairs entirely independently and not necessarily through the British as until now. Amanullah, quixotically enough, was to be Chelmsford's putative model for a future Reza Khan and Kemal Atatürk. Amanullah forced Britain's hand by signing a treaty with the Soviet Union as early as May 1921. Edwin Montagu at the India Office in London was outraged, but Chelmsford in India realistically warned against the British isolating themselves. Since Afghanistan could no longer be treated as a British

fiefdom, it was better to compete locally with Soviet influence and intrigues rather than stay out altogether. Reluctantly, London agreed, and in November 1921, Britain and Afghanistan signed a treaty establishing diplomatic relations.

Amanullah was consistently, if brashly for Afghan circumstances, nationalist, and the British inferred from his independence, not to mention his invasion of India, that he was pro-Soviet. Instead, he had a number of conflicts with the Soviet Government, as when he corresponded with Enver Pasha, the leader of the anti-Soviet guerrilla Basmachi movement in 1922, or when the dispute over the Soviet occupation of the Urta Tagail (Yangi Qala) island in the Amu Darya river flared up in 1925–6. But British suspicions were aroused because the Afghan ruler did not depend entirely on them and he invited Soviet technical personnel to assist in the development of the country. Amanullah equally suspected the British of fomenting trouble, as with the Khost rebellion in 1924–5 led by ‘Abdullah, the Mullah-i-Lang. Essentially, he sought to maintain a balance between the two great powers and extract whatever aid he could from either: while his foreign minister, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, pursued that objective consistently, Amanullah did so erratically and in a manner that aroused British fears. He had alienated conservative Afghan opinion sufficiently with his modernizing reforms for the British to find ready material for a coup. This took the usual form of tribal risings and factional conflict, in which Amanullah was overthrown in 1929; after an interregnum of nine months, he was replaced by Muhammad Nadir Shah (1929–33) in late 1929. Amanullah’s faction did enjoy some Soviet support, and his partisan Ghulam Nabi Charkhi attempted an expedition into Afghanistan from Soviet Central Asia; but he received little popular support, and eventually retired, leaving the conservative Muhammad Nadir Khan and the British faction in control.

On Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1933, he was succeeded by his young son, Zahir Shah (1933–73), with Hashim Khan as prime minister and effective ruler; but that did not alter the pro-British orientation of the government, although no aid was received from either of the great powers. Instead, to extricate himself from Anglo-Soviet rivalries, Hashim Khan sought out independent partners for trade and technology – he found them, unsurprisingly, in Germany, Italy and Japan, the future Axis. While they had little impact on the development of Afghanistan, such contacts resulted in a large German presence in the country, the source of considerable intrigue during the war, including a potential flashpoint in 1941 when they were expelled at Anglo-Soviet insistence.

British policy pursued the zig-zags of great-power contests. London had long considered a Russian invasion of Afghanistan as grounds for declaring war on Russia. This had been the position in 1907, and it was restated on the assumption that Amanullah was pro-Soviet. Britain had always been fearful of a Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; and it felt

its suspicions were justified when the Soviets occupied the Urta Tagail island in 1926. Amanullah's supposed pro-Soviet leanings and the USSR's aggressive posture over the river island were contradictory indicators; but the War Office nonetheless drew the same conclusion: that the Soviet Union intended to attack (see also Chapter 19 below).

The 1930s saw major changes. Given the rise of fascist dictatorships in Europe, and the Japanese invasion of China in 1931, Germany, Italy and Japan appeared as potential new challengers to the British empire, and the Soviet threat receded. The War Office no longer planned for war against the Soviet Union in case of the latter's aggressive moves against Afghanistan, preferring instead various other forms of protest action.

But the pendulum swung the other way once again with the outbreak of the Second World War and the German-Soviet alliance of August 1939. The Soviet threat to Afghanistan loomed large once again, but this time, in tandem with Germany. This combination had never been seriously faced before, and the fear was: first, that the two powers might conduct a military operation in Afghanistan, either jointly or with Germany assisting the Soviet Union; second, that they might foment trouble in Afghanistan, mainly by rousing the frontier tribes against the British in India or against British factions in Afghan politics; and, third, that they, in particular Germany, might attempt to restore Amanullah to the throne since he was waiting in Rome, prepared for action. In Afghanistan, Zahir Shah's government feared they might suffer the fate of Poland, the Baltic and Finland. Whatever the seriousness of the sundry German and Soviet plans and intrigues, the Government of India and the general staff on one side, and the Afghan Government on the other, decided to treat these as real possibilities. Britain's response was to keep a friendly, pro-British government in power in Afghanistan; and the Afghan answer was to keep out of the clutches of both Britain and the Soviet Union without succumbing to German designs on succulent pieces of Indian territory.

Thus, initially, when he saw what had happened to Poland, the prime minister Hashim Khan sought British guarantees and even British troops; but he withdrew quickly for fear of Soviet retaliation. Thereafter the Afghan regime attempted to remain neutral. To maintain this neutrality and independence, it asked Britain for war *matériel*; but the British were prepared to grant it only under their control, that is, an effective control of the defences of Afghanistan. Hence the negotiations dragged on from 1939 right up to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

But what was the nature of German and Soviet moves during these years of their alliance? Both were ambivalent about their policy towards the British empire, for on that hinged their policy on Afghanistan. Hitler wanted to arrive at an understanding with the British empire, which he admired for holding 'inferior races' in subjection in the manner he

himself would have liked to do (and indeed planned to do) in the European east. He could not contemplate fanning local nationalisms against the 'superior races'. He did not wish to dismember the British empire, preferring to concentrate on his principal future foe, the Soviet Union. Therefore, he kept giving openings to the British in the hope that Churchill would be overthrown and that peacemakers like Samuel Hoare would come to power. While his subordinates intrigued to restore Amanullah to the throne and discussed plans to invade India and enlarge Afghanistan, Hitler himself did not take their plans seriously. He ordered an end to the Amanullah restoration scheme as early as December 1939 and even refused Amanullah permission to visit Berlin. After the fall of France, pro-German forces in Afghanistan, like 'Abdul Majid Khan, the minister of the national economy, offered an alliance to Germany if the Soviet Union would respect Afghan integrity, grant Afghanistan access to the sea and supply military equipment. But these were mere probes, and Hitler refused even to meet him during the six months that he was in Berlin, where he went (ostensibly for medical treatment) in 1940.

There is no evidence that the Soviet Union was keen on dismembering the British empire. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, negotiated with V. M. Molotov, his Soviet counterpart, in late 1940, offering India on a platter if Germany were given a free hand in the Dardanelles, the Balkans and Finland. Molotov refused the deal, and instead demanded all of these together in exchange for a mere alliance. But these were no more than negotiating positions and probes; and while Hitler had more serious reason to reduce the British empire and yet dithered, the Soviet Union saw no immediate advantage. The British general staffs were preparing for a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, not on the evidence of Soviet plans so much as on an inference drawn from the German-Soviet alliance. Hence they repeatedly demanded assurances from Hashim Khan that German intrigues would be held in check. In the event, nothing happened during these two otherwise eventful years.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in July 1941 dramatically altered the strategic situation. The Afghan Government lost its capacity to manoeuvre between the two great powers, but Kabul was delighted that Russia was in trouble. Dr Hans Pilger, the German minister in Kabul, did all he could to fan Afghan optimism; certain groups around the air force commander and sirdar Muhammad Daud Khan, the king's cousin and brother-in-law, wanted to repeat Amanullah's feat of 1919 and attack the British in India; but others wisely preferred to sit it out. This was the one moment when the British could not take comfort in Soviet defeat or collapse, as they had done in 1919. However, unlike in Iran, they did not relish an Anglo-Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to ward off a German threat. The War Office saw that in case of an occupation, the Soviet Union would not let go of

northern Afghanistan, that is, the region between the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya, and Afghanistan would then be partitioned in the manner of Iran.

Francis Wylie, the British minister in Kabul, wanted to round up all non-official Germans and Italians as fifth columnists, as they had done in Iran, but the Afghan Government was reluctant to do so. But the War Office did not want to go to the extreme of a joint occupation, and the Afghan Government was very alive to the fate of the shah of Iran. In October 1941 both the British and Soviet governments drove the Afghan Government to expel all non-official Axis citizens, by which Britain had achieved two major objectives: the expulsion of a supposedly potential fifth column, and no joint invasion. Thereafter, German intelligence was not able to go beyond petty intrigue, whose import both sides inflated to keep themselves in business. The only possible additional problem for the British was the use of Afghanistan as a base by Subhas Chandra Bose, the radical Indian nationalist who differed from Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru and wanted to use the Axis for the nationalist struggle against the British; but from 1941 onwards, the activities of those acting on his behalf were fully known to both Soviet and British intelligence, and these agents were then appropriately manipulated in the Allied cause.

In the first half of the twentieth century, which is sometimes thought of as the twilight of empire, the British were militarily more active in the region than they had been throughout the nineteenth century; and while the Russian side of the boundary was consolidated by the Soviet Union, the other side was similarly reinforced by the British before the Americans assumed the function of challenging the Soviet Union. While the Soviets invaded Iran during the Second World War and intervened in Iranian politics through the Tudeh Party in the 1940s, the British won the round in effect against their ancient rival by establishing their hegemony in all of Iran and retaining it in Afghanistan. But the line between them was more firmly drawn in the twentieth century than it had been in the nineteenth, not merely militarily but also by ideologies armed to the teeth. By the time the boundaries were next withdrawn through the Khomeini revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1985–91, the British empire had long disintegrated.

5

TSARIST RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA *

*N. A. Abdurakhimova***Contents**

Administration	127
Economic development	136
Banking and foreign capital	140
Relations with Islam	142
Scientific interest in Central Asia	145
Jadidism	147

Interaction between the civilizations of West and East, which had developed in varying degrees for several centuries, became a steady trend of world history in the colonial period. An important role in this was played by nineteenth century industrial capitalism, which replaced the eastward trade expansion of the world's most developed capitalist countries. Practically all the countries of the East experienced one form of dependence or another, being turned into colonies or semi-colonies of the West. Central Asia was unable to avoid this fate, being situated in the heart of Eurasia and constituting a broad intracontinental base for Russian imperial influence.

Russia itself, having begun the process of Westernization in the time of Peter the Great, also received an appreciable stimulus towards bourgeois development from the more developed West, which represented not only an example to follow but also a potential external threat. These circumstances explain the different course of its capitalist development which, compared with Britain, France and Germany, was compressed in time and pursued by the state, which had difficulty in combining the more advanced technical and

* See Map 1.

organizational forms with its own 'incomplete' pre-bourgeois structures. Russia was nevertheless able to join the world capitalist market system, which by the nineteenth century had not completed its formation, and to overcome its backwardness in the framework of national bourgeois development. Tsarist Russia's greatest political achievements in the nineteenth century were the bourgeois reforms of the 1860s–80s and the economic measures of the outstanding statesman Count Sergei Yulyevich Witte, who in 1897 carried out a successful monetary reform which put gold currency into circulation and permitted the free exchange of the credit rouble. However, there were still great imbalances in the economy's development and expenditure on frequent wars placed a heavy burden on it.

Russia approached the borders of Central Asia immediately after the conquest of western Siberia. The Kazakh lands of the Little Horde (1731) and Middle Horde (1735) were the first to be drawn into the orbit of its political and economic interests, marking the beginning of the more than a century-long process of including the Kazakh nomads in the Russian empire. From the 1820s it introduced direct rule over all the Kazakh *Zhuzs* (Hordes), including the Great Horde (1847).

It was around this time that a drive to the south began, accompanied by the infringement of the territorial integrity of the khanate of Kokand, deep reconnaissance across its territory and the annexation of the khanate's strategically significant outposts and fortresses – Raim (1847), in the lower reaches of the River Syr Darya, which flows into the Aral Sea; the Kokand fort of Ak-Mechet, renamed Fort Perovsk (1857) by General Perovsky, its captor; and from the western Siberian side, Kopal (1847) and Verny (1854) (now Almaty). The capture of Ak-Mechet marked the beginning of the formation of the Syr Darya strategic military line which, together with the Orenburg and Siberian lines, was the starting point for Russian expansion deep into the khanates of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva.

The swift development of events in the region was all the more significant because of the international dimension – the intensified rivalry for influence in Central Asia between Russia and Britain, which by then (1857) had established control over Herat in western Afghanistan. The Russian Government saw this as a serious threat to its geographical position in the south-eastern sector. London, however, concerned about instability in India, reverted to a 'border policy' with Russia while St Petersburg, urged on by ambitious generals, decided to consolidate its hold on the lands it had seized from the khanate of Kokand and carry out further large-scale actions.

For a time the militant mood of the Russian generals was tempered by the diplomats of the Asiatic Department, who preferred to influence the situation through their missions, embassies and various expeditions sent into Central Asia and the neighbouring countries. In 1858 three expeditions were fitted out: a scientific expedition to Persia and the

Herat oasis headed by the orientalist N. V. Khanykov; a trade expedition to south-eastern Turkistan headed by the Kazakh ethnographer Chokan Valikhanov (1835–65); and a diplomatic expedition to the khanate of Khiva and the emirate of Bukhara headed by the Russian military agent in London, Colonel N. P. Ignatyev. Ignatyev's mission was considered the most important. His task was to establish friendly relations with Khiva and Bukhara, negotiate equal trade rights, put an end to Russian merchants being charged customs duty and taxes amounting to almost half the value of their goods, and obtain the khans' agreement to Russian ships' navigation of the River Amu Darya. At the same time Ignatyev was to convince the khans that their priority should be trade with Russia, not with Britain. The Aral Sea flotilla under the command of Lieutenant-Commander A. I. Butakov was sent in support of Ignatyev's mission.

The khan of Khiva, Sa'id Muhammad, agreed to practically everything in the draft treaty proposed by Ignatyev except freedom of navigation for Russian ships on the Amu Darya. He declared that the merchants of Khiva were more likely to agree to see their 'goods rot rather than being loaded on to Russian ships'. The situation was not helped by Ignatyev's undertaking, in the name of Russia, to set aside the previous disputes between the two states, grant the merchants of Khiva the same rights and privileges enjoyed by the merchants of other Asian countries and, finally, permit the collection of a 2.5 per cent duty on goods in transit carried on the Amu Darya and 5 per cent on goods landed in the khanate.

The negotiations in Bukhara with Nasrullah Khan proceeded more smoothly and mutual agreement was reached on all issues. Ignatyev received assurances of Bukhara's absolute loyalty to Russia, not to Britain.

As a result of the Russian mission's seven-month stay in Khiva and Bukhara, the tsarist government received detailed information about the political, social and economic situation in the khanates, topographic, statistical and military information about the mouth of the Amu Darya, the roads from Khiva and Bukhara to Persia and Afghanistan, through the Hindu Kush to the Indus valley, and about the military strength and resources of the Central Asian khanates. In a general evaluation of its outcome, the leader of the mission said:

The most important and essential result ... is that the fog concealing the khanate from the Russian Government has dispersed ... The information obtained by our mission and deliberate destruction of the former 'mirage' brought about a sharp change in the nature of our relations with those cunning and treacherous neighbours, promoted the establishment of a more correct view of the importance and basis of their power, their real strength, and in particular regarding the position that we should and can occupy in Central Asia and equally the aims we should pursue to protect our vital interests more truly and powerfully.¹

¹ Ignatyev, 1897, p. 278.

This evaluation meant that important changes were to be expected in Russian foreign policy. From that moment the positions of the diplomatic and military departments regarding policy in Central Asia quickly began to converge, proving that the earlier ‘disagreements’ amounted to nothing more than ‘politicking’. The actions of the Russian detachments of V. V. Dandevil on the Caspian shore, of A. I. Butakov on the Amu Darya and of Venyukov in Kokand’s possessions on the River Chu in the spring and summer of 1859 were crowned by the capture of the Kokand fortresses of Tokmak (1869) and Pishpek (now Bishkek) (1862), and it was considered expedient to join together the Orenburg and Siberian strategic military lines. In 1864 tsarist troops began a broad and longterm penetration deep into the khanates of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva.

On 21 November 1864 foreign states were sent a circular note from the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov (1798–1883), who said with reference to the actions ‘of the US in America, of France in Africa, Holland in its colonies and Britain in the East Indies’ that the aims of the Russian empire were ‘to ensure the security of Central Asia’, the development there of ‘a social structure, commerce, prosperity and civilization’ and the facilitation of ‘its proper settlement’. It also contained a reference to the ‘insuperable efforts of a properly organized state’ to spread its influence to neighbouring territories lacking a ‘stable regime’.²

In fact, the veil of tsarism’s messianic interpretation of its aims concealed a ‘triad’ that matched its true intentions much more closely: occupation, colonization and Russification of the region and the creation in the near future of a ‘new Russian Turkistan’.³ However, documents show that initially tsarism did not plan to eliminate the independence of the Central Asian states. This was a complex, expensive and dangerous business. While in fact subordinating them to tsarism, it was considered more advantageous to preserve their internal independence. This idea was actively put about towards the end of the 1860s, after tsarist troops’ capture of the towns of Turkestan, Aulie-Ata, Chimkent and Tashkent and the formation of a Turkistan governor-generalship in 1865. For example, according to the newspaper *Moskovskie vedomosti*, it was not acceptable ‘that the money from our state treasury is spent on this new borderland and local expenditure is not fully reimbursed from local funds’.⁴ In 1867, however, it was decided to create Turkistan governor-generalship within the Russian empire.

As a result of tsarism’s military operations, the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva lost a considerable part of their territory and were made protectorates of the

² Tatishchev, 1911, Vol. 2, pp. 107–8.

³ Krivoshein, 1912b, p. 30.

⁴ Dmitriev, 1976, p. 31.

Russian empire. Khujand, Ura-tepe (Ura-tyube), Jizak, Samarkand and Kattakurgan, which had been taken away from the emirate of Bukhara, were formed into *Zerafshan okrug* (region) of Turkistan governor-generalship in 1868. The khanate of Khiva was deprived of the whole right bank of the Amu Darya, which was attached to Turkistan as *Amu Darya otdel* (division). Both khanates were included in the Russian customs line, which meant complete subordination of their economies to the interests of tsarism and the undivided supremacy of the Russian merchants and bourgeoisie. Russian banknotes and gold and silver coins were brought into the emirate and gradually forced the local currency out of the Bukhara market.

Under the trade agreement of 1868, the khanate of Kokand was also turned into a market controlled by tsarism for the sale of Russian goods and as a source of raw materials. Kokand, however, unlike Bukhara and Khiva, was shaken by internal dissension and popular rebellions against Khudoyar Khan and tsarist troops and was occupied and deprived of its political status.⁵ The tsarist government, fearing a 'second Caucasus' (that is, a serious rebellion, as had broken out after the initial Russian conquest of the Muslim Caucasus), declared the territory of the khanate of Kokand to be an 'inalienable part of the Russian empire' (1876) and attached it to Turkistan governor-generalship with the name *Ferghana oblast'*.

Following the elimination of the khanate of Kokand, the tsarist government firmly established itself in the central and eastern parts of Central Asia and became much more actively expansionist in its western regions. The point of departure for the troops' further advance deep into the areas of the Turkmen tribes was the base of Krasnovodsk, which had been greatly enlarged from 1869. During the spring and summer of 1879 there were intensive preparations for the seizure of the fortress of Geok-tepe (near Ashgabat), which ended in failure, however; it was only in January 1881 that tsarist troops, under the cover of artillery fire, captured the fortress and forced the besieged Tekes (a Turkmen tribe) to surrender.

In May 1881 the territory of the Akhal Teke oasis (now the city of Ashgabat) was turned into Transcaspian *oblast'* as part of Transcaspian *otdel* (the lands east of the Caspian Sea inhabited by Turkmen tribes). On 1 January 1885 its annexation by Russia was decided by resolution of the *kengnesh*, the assembly of people's representatives of the city of Merv. This marked the completion of the Russian empire's territorial growth, whose final stage is linked with Central Asia. The sphere of geostrategic interests of the Russian state included

⁵ Khudoyar faced a series of insurrections until April 1875, when he sought Russian protection in Tashkent; he was exiled to Orenburg. The khanate of Kokand was absorbed into Turkistan governor-generalship and Russian control reached within 80 km of what Britain saw as the extent of its 'sphere of influence' in the Pamirs. [*Trans.*]

extensive territories from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east, from the Aral Sea steppes and Siberia in the north to the mountain ridges of the Pamirs, Hindu Kush and Tian Shan in the south.

It was a specific feature of Central Asian civilization that for millennia the oases and fertile river valleys had produced flourishing towns and commerce, extensive irrigation systems and trades and various religions, scripts and literatures, while the nomads who dwelt in the steppes and deserts had made their way into the oases and some settled in agricultural areas. An important role was played not only by the uniformity of geographic conditions, historical destinies and ethno-cultural processes but also by the absence of internal frontiers, which allowed constant large-scale contacts of tribes and nations within the region. Thus Central Asia was always a self-sufficient and integral region with clearly defined cultural-historical processes and a unique system of complementary settled agricultural and nomadic civilizations.⁶ It played the role of a connecting link between East and West and was a transit zone for numerous trade routes of transcontinental significance.

In addition to the geopolitical benefits of the conquest of Central Asia, the Russian empire now had its first serious contacts with the Muslim world – not the Muslim regions of the periphery, the Volga valley or the Caucasus, but with one of the historic centres of Islam, founded on a powerful religious civilization and traditional structures. It was on these factors that all other internal factors depended – the nature and orientation of Central Asian society; its philosophy and culture; its readiness for and interest in mutual relations and mutual influences; the power of tradition of that society and its readiness for changes brought in from outside; and its capacity to resist and the internal strength of society. Thus, with the conquest of Central Asia, the Russian empire assumed both a great responsibility and equally a duty towards the processes which would take place there. Primarily the new lands required a new structure of government. Let us examine how that came about.

The main reference point for governing Central Asia and deriving political and economic advantages from it was the Russian structure as a whole, or more specifically, modifications to it tested in the Muslim areas of the Volga valley, Siberia, the Caucasus and the Crimea. The fundamental principles for governing the minority nationality regions of Russia were based on the merging of military and civilian authority and the concentration in one and the same establishment of administrative, judicial, economic and other functions. These principles were adopted, practically unchanged, as the foundation in Central Asia and this constituted a fundamental revision of the previous system of government.

The basic documentation was drawn up from 1867, the determining factor being the 'military situation'. As new territory was seized, documents were issued, generally

⁶ *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii*, 2001, p. 5.

provisional in nature.⁷ It was only in 1886 that a permanently effective law was brought in, the 'Regulations on the Government of the Turkistan Region'.

Administration

Initially Turkistan governor-generalship was divided into two *oblast's*, Syr Darya *oblast'* (centre: Tashkent) and Semirechye *oblast'* (centre: Verny). The following were formed from territory conquered later: Zerafshan *okrug* (centre: Samarkand; 1868); Amu Darya *otdel* (centre: Petroaleksandrovsk; 1874); and Ferghana *oblast'* (centre: Novy Marghilan; 1876). In 1882 Semirechye *oblast'*, was removed from Turkistan governor-generalship and placed in Steppe *kray* (peripheral territory), which included Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Uralsk and Turgay *oblast's*.

In 1886, in accordance with the new Regulations, changes were made to the administrative territorial divisions of Turkistan. The principle of unification of component units was pursued more consistently. For example, Zerafshan *okrug* was transformed into Samarkand *oblast'*, and Amu Darya *otdel* became part of Syr Darya *oblast'*. Contemporaries began to call Syr Darya, Ferghana and Samarkand *oblast's* 'indigenous'. In 1899 Semirechye *oblast'* was returned to Turkistan governor-generalship and a new Transcaspian *oblast'* (the fifth of that name) was added; from 1881 to 1899 it had been part of the Caucasian vice-regency.

The lowest-level unit in the system of territorial organization was the *volost'* (jurisdiction of several parishes), the mid-level unit was the *uezd* (district) and the upper-level unit the *oblast'*. In nomadic regions, *aqsaqalstvos* (councils of elders) were set up as well as *volost's*. Generally these divisions did not take into account the particular natural, historical, economic or national features of the region. For example, they did not correspond to the centuries-old arrangements for the use of pasture, and the summer and winter pastures of the Kazakh clans often finished up in different administrative units. The powers of the local aristocracy were weakened and this affected their legal, economic and political status.

The new system of government was called military-popular (from 1886, military-administrative) and reflected the establishment of a military regime in the form of the tsarist generals and senior army officers who regulated every aspect of the political,

⁷ *Polozhenie ob 'upravlenii v Semirechenskoy i Syrdaryinskoy oblastiakh 1867 g.'*; *Vremennye pravila upravleniya Zerafshanskim okrugom 1868 g.*; *Vremennoe polozheniye 1873 g. po upravleniyu Ferganskoy oblasti'yu*; *Vremennoe polozheniye ot 21 maya 1874 g. po upravleniyu Amudaryinskim otdelom* [Regulations on 'The Government of Semirechye and Syr Darya *oblast's* of 1867'; Provisional Rules for the Government of Zerafshan *okrug* of 1868; Provisional Regulations of 1873 for the Government of Ferghana *oblast'*; Provisional Regulations of 21 May 1874 for the Government of Amu Darya *otdel*].

economic and social life of the local community and, at the same time, the introduction of local self-government – Muslim judges, village, *volost* and town elders (*aqsaqals*), tithe collectors (*zakāchis*, from *zakāt*, alms-tax), etc., elected by the population.

This kind of ‘compromise’ with the traditional social and legal institutions was forced on the colonial authorities by the military situation from the 1860s to the 1880s and the pressing need to draw the conquered peoples into Russia’s sphere of socio-economic interests, the aim being to pump profits out of the region more efficiently. There was a special interest in this among the young Russian bourgeoisie, which was accumulating capital and demanded ‘the strengthening of the merchant class to the detriment of the political and clerical parties’ (which enjoyed as powerful an influence in the region as the ‘Catholic clergy in some European countries’) and called on the authorities to turn Tashkent, the centre of the region, into an ‘Asian Hamburg and Frankfurt, for which it has all the ingredients’.⁸

At the apex of this system was the governor-general, who was appointed by the tsar and subordinate to the Russian minister of war as far as official business was concerned. He was the head of the administration and also commander of the troops of Turkistan military *okrug* and was considered under imperial law to be the ‘chief guardian of the inviolability of the rights of autocracy, the benefits of the state and the precise execution of the law’. The first governor-general, K. P. von Kaufman, who ruled the region for 14 years (1867–81), had unlimited powers. The tsar’s rescript empowered him to decide all political, frontier and commercial matters; to negotiate with neighbouring countries and sign treaties; to determine the degree of guilt of persons accused of crimes and, when necessary, to hand them over to a military court. He had the right to exile individuals from Turkistan for up to five years on political grounds. The Regulations of 1886 somewhat limited the rights of the governors general and the colonial administration in judicial matters, foreign policy and economic affairs, the corresponding powers being transferred to Russian ministries and departments.

The executive body under the governor-general was his chancellery, whose powers in the military, political and administrative spheres remained in essence unlimited. The chancellery had a particularly important role in drafting Turkistan legislation, which was passed to the ministries and the Russian State Council for examination. It was actively engaged in the selection of personnel and the staffing of the region’s various state establishments with appropriately qualified officials. Senator F. Girs, Privy Councillor, who carried out an audit of Turkistan in 1882, reported that ‘the chancellery has grown into a main executive institution of an illegal and inappropriate level’.⁹

⁸ *Turkestanskiy kray. Sbornik materialov po istorii ego zavoevaniya ...*, 1865.

⁹ Girs, 1888, p. 10.



FIG. 1. Army division with Cossacks. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

The colonial administrations in the *oblast's* were headed by military governors who were at the same time the commanders of army corps or divisions, depending on the number of troops stationed in the *oblast'*. In *oblast's* where there were Cossack units, the military governors were also mandated *atamans* (chiefs) (Fig. 1). Executive functions under these boards were carried out by *oblast'* boards similar to *guberniya* (province) boards but with far greater powers. The main role in them was played by the economic sections, which had the following functions: agrarian organization of the settled and nomadic population, superintendence of *waqf* (religious charitable endowment) affairs, water consumption and taxation of the population, supervision of *zemstvo* (local elective assembly) expenditure and the receipt of taxes and duties, examination and appraisal of various agreements, the issuing of licences, drawing up of commercial transactions and contracts, etc.¹⁰ Examination of the structure and functions of the lowest-level bodies shows clearly and precisely the tendency towards comprehensive regulation and cavalier interference by the colonial authorities in all spheres of life of the indigenous population (Fig. 2).

The head of the *uezd* administration was the *uezd* chief to whom the troops stationed in the *uezd* were also subordinated. He had his own administration to plan and coordinate

¹⁰ Abdurakhimova and Rustamova, 1999, pp. 31–2.



FIG. 2. Indigenous servants of the Agency. 1889–90. Photo: © Ethnographic Collection at the Bern Historical Museum BHM. Photo: S. Rebsamen

all local work. It was this level of the system which bore the basic burden of the numerous current duties in supervising the activities of the *volost'* and village administrations, resolving water and land disputes and determining taxation levels. It may be said that the *uezd* administration, being closest of all to the indigenous people, embodied the logic and spirit of tsarism's colonial policy. This is why its punitive and police functions were constantly expanded. 'Concern' about this on the part of the higher authorities was justified as follows:

The main reason for the establishment of the boards was that the natives, being accustomed to the cruel punishments existing in Turkistan before annexation by Russia, are unable to imagine authority not invested with the right to punish the guilty directly, especially for disobedience to its orders.¹¹

This very frank admission by Kaufman is proof that, from the very beginning, reliance was placed not on the professionalism of Russian officials but on brute force and intimidation of the population. Even then, however, there were people who understood the lamentable consequences of such a policy. One of them was chancellery head P. Khomutov, who warned Kaufman that 'not all *uezd* chiefs will be equal to such wide trust in them and such a right, and it may easily happen that lack of control will give rise to abuse of this right'.¹² And that is what happened.

¹¹ *Tsirkulyar K. P. Kaufman ot 21 dekabrya 1876g.*; Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I-1, inv. 20, file 8884, fol. 8.

¹² Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I-1, inv. 20, file 8884, fols. 8–9.

The audit reports of Senators F. K. Girs (1882) and K. K. Palen (1908–9) said that ‘the *uezd* boards were working most unsatisfactorily’,¹³ that ‘the boards’ affairs, especially financial affairs, are in great disorder’ and that ‘the wide powers and rights to punish the local and the Russian population of the region give plenty of scope to the local administrations to intensify corruption and abuses’.¹⁴

Complaints from the local population, sent in to the governor-general in their thousands, indicated the considerable scale of extortion of goods and money, illegal contracts and the buying and selling of the posts of *volost’* and village board (*uprava*) chiefs, *qāzīs* (Islamic judges) and *beys* (dignitaries). However, over a 50-year period of the colonial regime there were not even 10 examples of the higher-level administration taking serious measures to put an end to this social evil, which was generally typical of the whole colonial system from top to bottom. Instead of doing their difficult duty, which demanded knowledge, local language ability and practical skills, the corps of officials provided only a miserable and wretched substitute which caused popular dissatisfaction everywhere.

The last link in the system of local government was the grass-roots administration elected every three years from among representatives of the indigenous population. Government in the *volost’* consisted of the *volost’* board and the *volost’*, congress of elected delegates. Elections took place in two stages: each village meeting chose one candidate, then all the elected candidates gathered at the *volost’* congress, which elected the *volost’* board chiefs, tax-collectors, irrigation supervisors and people’s judges, the *qāzīs* and *beys*. The *volost’* congress of delegates decided on taxation of the villagers in the *volost’* determined the emoluments of officials, monitored the condition of roads, bridges and production buildings, water consumption and water supply and brought all laws and instructions of the tsarist government to the people’s attention.

The main task of the elected administration was to ensure the successful and timely collection of duties and taxes under the vigilant supervision and control of Russian officials. The authorities maintained a patronizing and paternalistic attitude towards the lowest level of administration loyal to the tsarist regime, realizing its potential role in stimulating economic initiative and boosting the economic potential of the newly acquired colony, and also hoping to create a source of trained supporters of its own for the implementation of its plans. If one candidate or another did not suit the Russian authorities, he was rejected and replaced by another. Elections could be cancelled and new ones set. The tsarist administration made quite wide use of this right. The report by Girs on his audit of the *volost’* and village boards provides the following data: ‘Of the 109 *volost’* board chiefs in Syr Darya

¹³ Ibid., coll. I–1, inv. 27, file 1509, fol. 4.

¹⁴ Palen, 1910b, p. 151.

oblast', 38 were dismissed over a period of three years, which is 38 per cent or about 13 cases a year.¹⁵ Similar data may be provided for other *oblast'*s of Turkistan.

The time and effort spent by the elected administration on state service in the collection of taxes and duties and the preservation of public order was paid for by the people, not the tsar's treasury. Moreover, it bore legal and material responsibility for losses and damage suffered by the treasury and the state in the event of any unforeseen circumstances.

Documents show that the 'elective basis' was completely lost in the hierarchy of bureaucratic distortion, abuse and fraud, and the regime at that level constantly experienced instability, uncertainty and a lack of security. The cause of such tension was to a considerable degree the way in which the military administrative system was introduced at the local level. Falsification of the decisions of *volost'*, meetings, the bribing of voters and other abuses occurred on a massive scale and often had the silent assent, connivance and complicity of the Russian administration. It is known that at the beginning of the twentieth century huge sums of money were spent on bribes, reaching as much as 40–50,000 roubles.¹⁶ It was no secret that some of this money finished up in the pockets of the people who observed the elections and confirmed the results.

This kind of government 'technology', enslaving the people at whose expense all 'expenditure' on election campaigns was refunded, provoked the resistance of the mass of the population and whole areas were sometimes engaged in extremely bitter resistance. Under constant social pressure, the people rejected the colonial system forced on them and were drawn ever more deeply and forcefully into political, economic and social conflict with the authorities, undermining them from within. Sometimes the conflicts took on a religious dimension, which was quite natural considering the tsarist government's attitude towards the Muslim clergy.

When Turkistan governor-generalship was formed, the overriding principle of Russian colonization was officially announced to be the peaceful coexistence of all confessions (Fig. 3). Stemming from this, missionary work by the Russian Orthodox Church was banned and a policy of non-interference in Islamic affairs was proclaimed. Construction of Orthodox places of worship was permitted only in Russian population centres and on the territory of military units. Support was given to participants in the traditional Muslim *hajj*, the more so since this had been simplified by the construction of the Central Asian mainline railway.

At the same time, for fear of the Muslim clergy's political influence on the population, even in Kaufman's time a merciless blow was struck at its economic basis – the right to

¹⁵ Girs, 1888, p. 29.

¹⁶ Palen, 1910c, p. 96.



FIG. 3. Bukhara. *Dastarkhan* (lunch). 1889–90. Photo: © Ethnographic Collection at the Bern Historical Museum BHM. Photo: S. Rebsamen

private ownership of land donated by the state and private individuals, dating back to the period of Arab rule. The religious charitable endowments, or *waqfs*, embracing primary, secondary and higher schools, books, money, mosques, *mazārs* (holy places), shops and caravanserais, as well as land transferred ‘for all eternity’ under *sharī‘a* (Islamic law), were all made subject to revision by the tsarist administration. Land taxation commissions looked for surplus land, determined what was to be taxed and studied and analysed *waqf* documents and the legal rights of owners. Documents not bearing the seals of khans or emirs were declared invalid, the land was recorded as state property and then sold for a song to tsarist officers, officials and merchants or set aside for the construction of various state projects and the Russian quarters of towns. The establishment of a new *waqf* was possible only with the permission of the governor-general (Article 266 of the Regulations of 1866). Approval of *waqf* documents, organization of *waqf* management and supervision of *waqf* revenues was transferred to the *oblast’* and *uezd* boards. They were also given the right to lease out *waqf* land and property.

In 1873 General Abramov, the chief of Kattakurgan *otdel* of Zerafshan *okrug*, gave orders that the land belonging to the Tilla-kari, Shir Dor and Ulugh Beg *madrasas* should be leased out by the Russian administration instead of the *mutawalliyāt* (mosque executive committees) as before.¹⁷ From 17 July 1874 the tsarist administration’s leasing rights were extended to all *waqf* land.

¹⁷ Ilyasov, 1963, p. 102.

In 1876 a commission was set up in Ferghana *oblast'* to organize survey work. *Waqf* land was surveyed even when the *waqf* institutions issued declarations of landownership and presented the necessary documents. These were collected 'for examination' and often disappeared into the bowels of the colonial departments. According to K. K. Palen, of 7,955 *waqf* documents presented across Turkistan region for the determination of rights, only 792 were authenticated.¹⁸ Thus only about 10 per cent of the total number of *waqfs* retained their rights and were able to claim any tax concessions. The remaining 90 per cent of *waqf* plots were liquidated, either by endowment of the people living there or by state sequestration.

This is how tsarism's strategic plan to redistribute property to the advantage of the new authorities was implemented. All lands with more or less clear signs of ownership, particularly *mulk* land (private dominion), were taken into state ownership and subjected to land tax, which enriched the tsar's treasury. Later, with the adoption of the 'Rules for the Introduction of Land Taxation Arrangements, 1903', by implementation of a resettlement policy additional amendments were made to the land relations system which ignored the interests and requirements of the national economic complex of Turkistan itself and its indigenous population.

Tsarism's land policy in Central Asia, based on the right to state ownership of its territory, was gradually transformed into confiscation from the population of so-called 'surplus land' and developed into large-scale expropriation of land for the resettlement of Russian peasants in connection with the implementation of agrarian reform introduced by Stolypin.¹⁹

This process primarily affected the forest-steppe zone in the area of the western Siberian lowlands and the foothills of the Altai, Tarbagatai and the Dzungarian, Trans-Ili and Kyrgyz Alatau mountains, rich in lakes, rivers and good soils permitting the non-irrigated cultivation of crops. At the end of the nineteenth century alone, about 14 million *desiatinas* (15.3 million ha) (1 *desiatina* = 1.09 ha) of fertile land, or 8.2 per cent of the whole land area of Steppe *oblast'*, was confiscated from Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, Turgay and Uralsk *oblast'*s for use by Cossacks, retired soldiers and resettled peasants.²⁰

Another 100,000 *desiatinas* of land were confiscated after the settlement in Semirechye *oblast'* of Taranchis (Uighurs) and Dungans (the Hui, Chinese-speaking Muslims) from

¹⁸ Palen, 1910a, p. 321.

¹⁹ P. Arkadyevich Stolypin (1862–1911), prime minister of Russia from 1906 to 1911. [Trans.]

²⁰ *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii*, 2001, p. 361.

Kuldja region (1881–4).²¹ As a result of Stolypin's agrarian reforms, this process was further intensified and confiscation developed on a grand scale. Altogether around 40 million *desiatinas* were confiscated, about 20 per cent of the agricultural land. Consequently the area of land available for nomadic livestock herding decreased noticeably and households were deprived of their winter and summer pastures.²² At the same time settlers from the *guberniyas* of central Russia benefited from a policy of preferential land grants. Thus if Kazakh or Kyrgyz nomads wished to take up cultivation, they had to enlist the support of their community and survey the appropriate reserves of land, while Russian settlers received at first 30 *desiatinas* of land per family member, then 15 *desiatinas* from 1882 and later on 10 *desiatinas*. Cossacks at first received 100 *desiatinas* of land and, in the words of N. A. Ivanov, turned into 'lazy and dissolute serf landowners';²³ later they received 20–25 *desiatinas*. Army officers received 200 *desiatinas* each. Taranchi settlers were allocated 10 *desiatinas* per whole family.

In the irrigated zones of Ferghana and Samarkand *oblast's*, despite the large number of *dehqāns* (peasants) who were landless or had little land, 91 Russian settlements were founded with altogether 4,663 homesteads. In Syr Darya *oblast'* there were 209 settlements with 11,694 homesteads.²⁴

The authorities' efforts to expand the zones of colonization and Russification were accompanied by coercion of the indigenous population, confiscation of their ancestral land, raising of land taxes and the *kibitka* (household tax on nomads) and increasing land rents, worsening in all vital aspects the life of the local communities. In spite of this the authorities put forward even more ambitious plans, voiced in particular by a close associate of Stolypin's in land reform, A. V. Krivoshein, who was chief superintendent of land organization and agriculture in Russia (1908–15).

In 1912 Krivoshein paid an official visit to Turkistan and compiled for Tsar Nicholas II a report, the appendix of which was published subsequently as a book. Krivoshein's evaluation of the state of colonization and process of Russification in the region was very important. Criticizing the slow process of colonization he said: 'Meanwhile, indigenous Turkistan is still a whole sea of natives. The Russian settlements and new "towns" are for now just small islands in that sea, just strong points for the further settlement of Russian

²¹ The Ili territory and the town of Kuldja (Gulja), centre of the Taranchi khanate, were occupied by Russia in June 1871 and returned to China under the treaty of St Petersburg of 1881. Kuldja is now called Yining, centre of Ili Kazakh autonomous prefecture, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. [Trans.]

²² *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii*, 2001, p. 361.

²³ Orzaev, 1995, p. 12.

²⁴ Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I–18, inv. 2, file 118, fol. 114.

people.’²⁵ Considering the reasons why ‘Russian settlement of the region has been held back’ he emphasized: ‘The reasons are the density of the agricultural population in the belt of irrigated land and great infertility of unirrigated land’ and he proposed ‘letting the settlers have access to the irrigated land, to the valuable crops’.²⁶

For this he proposed ‘a plan for irrigation in the cotton-growing regions alone of not less than 3 million *desiatinas* of land, that is, an area equal to the existing irrigated area of Turkistan’, making it possible to ‘create a second Turkistan’. Moreover, ‘this new Turkistan, on the scale of the old one, the native one, could surpass it in wealth and culture, and its new population will be Russian. At the same time our economic task will be solved,’ said Krivoshein, ‘the cotton harvest will be increased to meet the full demand of Russian factories’, while irrigation ‘will open up the opportunity to pour into the region a Russian population of 1.5 million.’²⁷ Krivoshein’s report said not one word about the fate of the native peoples of Turkistan, beyond the promise that ‘the state will in no way harm their interests’.²⁸

Economic development and the creation of infrastructure

Russia’s economic policy in Central Asia was quite similar to the policy in its European colonies. National wealth was confiscated, valuable raw materials were exported and, under pressure from goods from Russia, local crafts went into decline and were forced to seek new economic niches, while the traditional ways of life and value systems collapsed.

At the same time, Central Asian civilization was drawn into the new system of world links and together with Russia was influenced by the traditional economic culture’s shift to the culture of the capitalist market. An important part of this process was the creation of an infrastructure in keeping with the needs of the times – water transport, networks of railway lines and main roads, a banking and credit system, industrial production and new means of communication – the telegraph and telephone.

The creation of a transport network was directly linked to the implementation of tsarism’s strategic military tasks, and the conquest of the last southern frontier, the Transcaspian region, was considered a way of reinforcing the political dependence of Central Asia on Russia as well as a main route for the economic colonization of the region. The initiative for this, from the survey work to the creation of lines of communication

²⁵ Krivoshein, 1912a, p. 47.

²⁶ Krivoshein, 1912a, Appendix, p. 47.

²⁷ Ibid., Appendix, pp. 30, 38.

²⁸ Ibid., Appendix, p. 57.

and the construction of depots and repair workshops, lay entirely with the state, although Russian and foreign businessmen showed great interest and put forward their own projects. Between 1880 and 1906 the following were built: the Transcaspian military railway from Krasnovodsk bay via Ashkhabad (now Ashgabat) and Charju to Samarkand (1888); the Samarkand–

Andijan line, with a branch to Tashkent (1898); the Murghab railway from Merv to Kushka (Gushgy, on the border with Afghanistan) (1900); and the Orenburg–Tashkent railway (1906).

Private capital was involved in the building of internal railway branches from the main line, the Central Asian railway. Following publication of the law ‘On Measures to Encourage the Participation of Private Capital in Railway Construction in Russia’, three big joint-stock companies were set up: the Ferghana railway (1912), Semirechye railway (1912) and Bukhara railway (1913). By the beginning of 1917 the overall length of private railways was 863 km.²⁹

Waterways were another form of transport. The Caspian shipping line, set up in the 1840s, was joined by the Aral Sea and River Amu Darya flotillas.

Industrial enterprises specializing in the primary processing of agricultural raw materials were usually built along transport routes. In Turkistan the cotton-ginning industry in 1913 accounted for 56.5 per cent of the total value of gross production (143 million roubles). Closely linked to it were the 30 enterprises of the cotton-seed oil-pressing industry, whose gross output in 1915 was estimated to have been worth 12.4 million roubles.³⁰

The cotton-growing centre was Ferghana *oblast'*, where the area sown to cotton accounted for one-third of all irrigated land.³¹ Penetration of the region by Russian firms and companies began in the 1880s and developed on a wide scale at the beginning of the twentieth century. The firms Savva Morozov, Son & Co., N. N. Konshin Associates Textiles, Yaroslavl Grand Textiles and many others made great efforts to introduce the best-quality cotton plants into Turkistan. They began by distributing to the local population high-quality varieties of American cotton-seed, they set up experimental stations and plantations, imported equipment for their factories from America and Europe and cooperated closely with St Petersburg and Moscow stock exchanges to set up the Kokand exchange (1906). The exchange was run by major bankers and businessmen: A. I. Zigel (manager), S. A. Knabe, V. E. Kokh, A. Ziyaev, A. Khusainov, Y. K. Vadyaev and others.

²⁹ Ferghana railway 273 km, Semirechye railway 79.1 km, Bukhara railway 450 km.

³⁰ Skobelev, 1924, p. 46.

³¹ Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I–90, inv. 1, file 2, fol. 22.

The scale and tempo of development of the cotton-processing industry depended on the demands of the Russian textile industry. The rise and fall of industrial production in Russia was mirrored in Turkistan. It was therefore no coincidence that in the years of industrial growth (1909–13) in Turkistan, 468 industrial enterprises were set up, whereas the number for the entire preceding period had been only 195. On the eve of the First World War, there were 1,100 enterprises operating in Turkistan (including mixed trade and industry enterprises).

The quantity of raw cotton exported to Russia grew from year to year. Exports rose from 873,000 *poods* (1 *pood* = 16.38 kg) in 1888 to 1.8 million *poods* in 1890, 3.1 million *poods* in 1895, 10.1 million *poods* in 1906 and 14.5 million *poods* in 1908.³² Turkistan's cotton-processing industry was geared not so much to the needs of the internal market as to serving the interests of the centre. A specific feature of the developing capitalist structure was the wide use of traditional conditions which had formed in the region in the pre-colonial period: a cheap workforce, manual labour and seasonal activity.

In the regions of Central Asia not growing cotton the leading position was taken by enterprises processing the by-products of animal husbandry, especially wool-washing, tanning and gut-cleaning. For example, up to 60 per cent of all the commercial wool produced came from enterprises in Semirechye. Sectors working for the local market accounted for only 6.5 per cent of production.³³ In the indigenous *oblast's* of Ferghana, Samarkand and Syr Darya there were 63 tanneries whose improvement was actively promoted by well-known commercial firms like G. I. Veksler & K. Pauli, Goldberg Bros. & Co. and Louis Zalm.³⁴ The firms Kraft Bros., Durschmidt and Stucken and Co. engaged in sheep-gut processing and exported their products to Russia, the US and Europe. Branches of these firms were scattered across Turkistan and Steppe *kray*. Astrakhan lambskin pelts and wool were exported in large quantities from the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva. Astrakhan's annual exports rose from 30,000 to 40,000 pelts in the first years of the Russian protectorate to 1.8 million on the eve of the First World War; wool exports rose from 150,000 to 250,000 *poods* respectively.³⁵

Silk spinning was less successful. The monopolist in this sphere was the Italian I. Aloizi, who arrived in Turkistan from Corsica in 1888 and built several silkworm breeding enterprises in Tashkent, Samarkand, Novy Marghilan and Khujand. Aloizi was followed by a number of other businessmen attracted to this profitable enterprise: in Novy Marghilan

³² Gubarevich-Radobylsky, 1912, p. 28; Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I–1, inv. 12, file 1441, fol. 19.

³³ *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii*, 2001, p. 417.

³⁴ Potapova, 2002, p. 20.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

by Yevtikhidhis, Glavkidhis and Kasyanov; in Kokand by Sotereadhis, Mandalaka, Valyuli and Elevtoriadhis; in Namangan by Bamanov, Ishkhanov, Tumasov and others.³⁶ Increased interest in silk boosted the gross output of cocoons. In 1910 production reached 450,000 *poods*, 80 per cent of which was exported to Russia, France and Italy.³⁷ The remainder was processed by traditional handicraft methods.

In the primary processing of agricultural produce a new branch for Central Asia appeared – wine- and vodka-making, which developed to meet the demands of the Russian population. Of 33 factories making alcoholic products, 27 were in Samarkand *oblast'* and the remainder in Syr Darya and Ferghana *oblast'*s. In Tashkent alone in 1910 there were 3 vodka distilleries, 1 wine-making enterprise and 4 breweries belonging to the Moscow merchant I. I. Ivanov. The production of alcohol led to the appearance of a large number of wholesale warehouses, wine cellars, beer shops and pubs which brought in huge profits for their owners and gave rise to dissatisfaction among the Muslim population, which was concerned about the spread of alcoholism among young people.

The mining and oil-extraction industries were based on the exploitation of the rich natural mineral resources. There were some relatively large enterprises with their own developed infrastructure: the coalmines of the Kizil Kiya joint-stock company, Aleksandrov's company Shurabskiye Kopi (Shurab mines) and the Santo and Chimion oilfields in Ferghana *oblast'*, which generally satisfied the ever-growing demands of the capitalist structure in the Central Asian economy.

According to data from the statistical committee of Ferghana *oblast'*, 3,239,079 *poods* of petroleum were extracted in 1907, and in 1910 the Chimion joint-stock company alone extracted 1,416,551 *poods*.³⁸ Besides petroleum extraction, this company was engaged in the construction of oil pipelines and kerosene factories and the supply of modern equipment and quickly turned into a very large monopoly enterprise with a fixed capital of 2 million roubles.

In Steppe *kray*, the Karaganda coalmines and Spassk and Ridder copper mines underwent considerable development. Altogether in the mining sector there were 197 active enterprises which, together with the oilfields, contributed 18 per cent of the region's gross industrial production and employed over 70 per cent of the workforce.³⁹ The vast majority of the enterprises in this sector, however, were poorly equipped (Fig. 4). The main tools were still the pick, shovel and wheelbarrow. With the mass employment of cheap unskilled

³⁶ Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I-37, inv. 1, file 250, fol. 15.

³⁷ Kasatkin, 1907, No. 4.

³⁸ Skobelev, 1909, p. 59; Skobelev, 1912, pp. 90–1.

³⁹ *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii*, 2001, pp. 418–19.



FIG. 4. Ferghana valley. A small factory at Baimat Tash. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

labour, which constantly reproduced itself, the mines and oilfields earned their owners fabulous profits.

Banking and foreign capital

Among the external influences on the development of Central Asia's economy was one closely linked with the invasion of the colonialists – financial and banking capital in the form of commercial links and the capitalist market, with the harsh laws of private enterprise. Besides the branches of the Russian State Bank opened in all the major towns of Central Asia, there were more than 40 branches of various commercial banks. For example, 5 branches and 7 agencies belonged to the Moscow Discount Bank, founded by the trading houses Vogan & Co., L. Knop and Petr Botkin and the businessmen A. P. Shiling, A. S. Spiridonov and K. T. Soldatenkov. Moscow International Bank opened branches in Kokand (1891) and Bukhara (1892). Through its mediation, the Company for Trade with Persia and Central Asia was set up in 1904. Later it merged with the United Bank and took part in the financing of Central Asia's biggest cotton-seed oil-milling company, Besh-Bosh.

Special interest in the cotton trade and cotton-ginning industry was shown by the Russo-Chinese Bank (1895), which later became part of the Russo-Asiatic Bank (1907) and had branches in 12 of the region's towns. The firms Mirkanula Mir-Muminbaev, Shakirov Bros., Fuzailov Bros., Vadyaev Bros. and Potelyakhov Bros. had permanent or seasonal credit from this bank and gave it all their cotton for sale on commission.⁴⁰ For example, in the 1910 season the Russo-Asiatic Bank approved credit amounting to 13 million

⁴⁰ Vekselman, 1987, pp. 40–1.

roubles. It actively invested its own capital in the development of the petroleum sector, railway construction and the creation of land irrigation concessions in the region.⁴¹

Major trading operations were also carried out by the Azov-Don Bank, Siberian Trade Bank, Volga-Kama Bank and others. Despite tsarism's protectionist measures, foreign capital actively took root in Central Asia's commercial and industrial infrastructure via Russian banks. Considerable investments of British, French, American and German capital promoted the founding and development of the petroleum and mining sectors and the extraction of copper, lead and gold, as well as the equipping of factories and the supply of consultants and managers in various areas.⁴²

The petroleum-extracting company Maili-Sai was established with British capital; in the Transcaspian petroleum sector, the company Nobel Bros. was the main player. British and French capital was actively involved in the setting up of the Pamir Gold Mining Co. and the Atbasar Copper Ores Co. All the same, the leading position was generally maintained by the capital of Russian monopolies and banks.

The import of capital from Russia into Central Asia took place in the form of direct investment, loans and credits to form a potential reserve for speeding up the development of commerce and industry. Considering the size of the region, however, this potential was realized only to a limited degree. Moreover, these investments, being oriented towards serving the interests of Russia, created a mechanism for the constant and large-scale outflow of the region's material resources. The outflow of financial resources from Central Asia to Russia in the form of the transfer of profits, the cancellation of loans and credits and the redistribution of the social product with the help of monopoly prices in the process of trade exchange constantly exceeded the inflow of resources for the national economy. These circumstances and their colonial prescription had an oppressive effect on Central Asia's economy, in the end promoting the reproduction of its backwardness.

In view of the above, the formation of a single internal market was from the very beginning contradictory, proceeding in conditions (as envisaged by tsarism's colonial policy) of an artificially created imbalance in the national economic complex. This influenced the formation of the national bourgeoisie, which was unable to participate equally in the process of capitalization and to build business relations with Russian partners on the basis of mutual interest. Because of the region's political subordination, the Russian partners dictated rules of the game that were advantageous to themselves and built up commercial exchanges on the basis of the balance of power. However, the colony's businessmen gradually freed themselves from their traditional economic ties and mastered the latest

⁴¹ Vekselman, 1987, pp. 41, 52.

⁴² Ibid., p. 52.

innovations, accumulated capital and invested it in industrial production while acting as intermediaries in providing credit for the producers of goods, using the resources of Russian and foreign capital.

The well-known merchant Arif Khoja Azizkhojinov had close links with Moscow and St Petersburg businessmen, visited London and Paris several times and was the owner of the Arif Khoja Passage in the middle of Tashkent, where Russian and European goods were sold. He was also the owner of several industrial enterprises. In 1905 he paid 0.5 million roubles at auction for the right to build and operate Tashkent abattoir, a modern, technically equipped meat processing combine.

The brothers Seid Kerim and Seid Gani Seidazimbaev, sons of a famous *karavan-bashi* (caravan leader), created a large building and contracting firm in Tashkent which built roads, premises for state institutions and private housing. A group of merchants, Tashkenbaev, Isamukhamedov, Abdurashidov and Khojiev, invested 1.5 million roubles in the exploitation of minerals in Samarkand *oblast'*; and the merchants Nazarov, Nishanov and Abdukadyrov built their own iron foundry in Namangan *uezd*.⁴³ There were many similar examples. By the end of the nineteenth century local businessmen owned 117 of the 220 cotton-ginning mills operating in the region, 54 of the 75 tanneries and 20 of the 34 soap works.⁴⁴

In terms of local history the national bourgeoisie developed quite successfully. Its members were absorbed by the region's new 'climate' of business relations, stock-market speculation, unprecedented capital investment, participation in setting up industrial production facilities, firms and companies, that is to say, by what the literature calls the capitalist 'spirit'. However, they were too weak to grow. Due to dependence on Russian capital, the national bourgeoisie was unable to take any independent decisions or to compete equally with Russian businessmen in the local market. Moreover, a great part of the economic area of Central Asia, which needed major investments from the state and business structures, remained outside the national bourgeoisie's field of vision, untouched by 'colonial capitalism'. Everything was subordinated to the fulfilment of tsarism's main strategic task – turning Turkistan into Russia's cotton base.

Relations with Islam

The historical experience of the contacts of colonial capital with traditional Turkistan shows that these were not just a particular kind of socio-economic relations but also a

⁴³ Potapova, 2002, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Dobromyslov, 1912, p. 398.

particular phenomenon of spiritual culture. The development of capitalist relations was not organically linked with local Islamic culture, nor had Islam created any clearly expressed premises for proceeding along the capitalist road. The mass of the population still adhered to the traditional way of life. This explains in many ways the special drama of the national history of the peoples of Central Asia from the second half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, when they were forced 'from above' and 'from outside' into transformation.

Local society, having experienced the bitterness of defeat by tsarist troops, the humiliation of merciless exploitation by their own people and by outsiders, disappointment and a fall in their living standards, perceived tsarism's measures as an encroachment not only on values hallowed by Islam but also on the very pillars of daily life. There is eloquent proof of this to be found in extracts from a secret report dating from the 1890s:

The mass of the population have not yet forgotten their independence under the dominion of their khan, who shared their faith; they have not yet lost their respect for their clergy and scholars; the authority of the *sharī'a*, enjoyed by the people's court, encourages respect for the *qāzīs* and ... thanks to these factors, the masses would probably not be averse to separating themselves from the Russian Government if suitable conditions for this could be found. The group which has not given up thoughts of independence is the biggest and most numerous and almost all the masses of the rural population and part of the urban population are part of it.⁴⁵

Reports such as this were confirmed by various forms of public protest, ranging from the stream of complaints and petitions sent in to various state bodies by the population, to popular disturbances and national liberation movements against colonialism (1892, 1898, 1905–7, 1916).

The growth of opposition to the tsarist regime was 'extinguished' in accordance with Russia's great-power hegemonistic aims by measures ranging from considerably expanding the policing and repressive powers of the whole government apparatus to emergency and military measures which became permanent, with their special military field courts, cruel punitive expeditions and exile and imprisonment.

The forcible reform of the traditional pillars of Central Asian society in the sphere of administration, the courts, the economic forms of development and the establishment of new social relations objectively influenced its cultural and spiritual life as well. However, the reform process in this sphere was the most difficult and complicated.

The Russian authorities began active work to introduce Russian standards in education for the formation of a nucleus of people capable of ensuring the region's movement down the road of further transformation. The administration's interference in the centuries-old

⁴⁵ Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I–3, inv. 2, file 60, fol. 219.

education system produced an ambiguous reaction at all levels of society, from passionately hostile among the Muslim clergy and critical among the national intelligentsia to relatively loyal among the social 'upper crust', strongly tied by its economic interests to Russian bourgeois structures.

The fact is that the traditional *maktabs* (primary schools) and *madrasas* played an important role in the region's social life and were the source of the population's literacy and education and much of its spiritual values. Their overall number, according to data from various sources, was as follows: in the three indigenous *oblast's* of Turkistan 4,632 *maktabs* were active, providing elementary education, and 277 *madrasas* providing secondary and higher education. The greatest numbers of *maktabs*, 5,000, and of *madrasas*, 117, were concentrated in the emirate of Bukhara; there were 1,140 *maktabs* and 621 *madrasas* in the khanate of Khiva. In 1908 the number of students in these educational establishments totalled 94,973 in *maktabs* and 22,625 in *madrasas*.⁴⁶

The most influential *madrasas* in the religious education system were in Bukhara, Samarkand, Kokand, Tashkent and Khiva, which also trained scholars for neighbouring countries. As well as the study of Islam they also taught philosophy, astronomy, history, linguistics, logic, mathematics and medicine. Many Central Asian cultural figures were products of this environment – the Jadid⁴⁷ leader Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (1874–1919), Munawwar Qari (1880–1933), 'Abdurrauf Fitrat (1884–1937), Tavallo, Sadridin Aini (1878–1954), 'Abdallah Avlani (1878–1934), Furkat, Ahmad Donish (1827–97), Sattarkhan 'Abdulgafarov, Berdakh, Abay Kunanbaev (1845–1904), etc.

On the basis of experience in other minority nationality regions of the empire, it was initially decided to set up so-called Russian-native schools with the promise that the 'religious convictions of the *inorodtsy* [lit. 'people of different birth', i.e. indigenous people] should not be encroached upon by schools, which should in no way have a confessional tendency'.⁴⁸ In the 1860s and 1870s they were unsuccessful.

A 'Plan of Arrangements for Schools and Popular Education in Turkistan Region' was adopted in 1875. The Directorate of Educational Establishments in Turkistan Region was opened in the following year, to establish control over all *maktabs* and *madrasas*. The Turkistan Teachers' Seminary went into operation in 1879 to train teachers for the

⁴⁶ Geier, 1908, p. 339; Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I–1, inv. 11, file 1724, fol. 69; they included in 1908 in Syr Darya *oblast'*, 1,809 *maktabs* and 49 *madrasas*, in Samarkand *oblast'* 1,680 *maktabs* and 69 *madrasas*, and in Ferghana *oblast'*, 1,143 *maktabs* and 159 *madrasas*.

⁴⁷ The Jadid or 'innovation' movement, which set out to modernize Islam, first emerged in Russia among the Crimean Tatars and Muslims from the Caucasus, the Volga valley and the Urals. Ismail Gasprinsky (Gaspirali, 1851–1914), the founder of the first Jadid school in the Crimea and of the first Muslim newspaper *TercÜmān* [The Interpreter], has been called the 'father of Jadidism and Pan-Turkism'. [Trans.]

⁴⁸ Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I–47, inv. 1, file 382, fol. 14.

Russian-native schools, colleges, progymnasiums and gymnasiums and secondary technical and commercial colleges which appeared in quite considerable numbers in all the region's major towns. The colonial authorities planned that the Teachers' Seminary:

should give a lead to all popular education and be ... one of the most powerful tools for resolving the difficult question of the *inorodtsy* and for merging the newly conquered region with the empire spiritually.⁴⁹

Graduates of the Kazan Religious Academy, including N. P. Ostroumov, headed the seminary; S. Gremenitsky, F. A. Kerensky and V. P. Nalivkin all served at various times as chief inspectors of educational establishments.

Around 100 Russian-native schools and colleges had been set up by 1909 but were teaching fewer than 3,000 pupils – though the number of students had doubled by 1917.⁵⁰ The vast majority were Russian. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Russian-native schools virtually gave up teaching the children of the indigenous population the bases of Muslim belief and the Arabic script, while history and geography were taught from Russian material.

The Muslim population was little affected by education in the gymnasiums. Of the 463 pupils studying at Tashkent gymnasium in January 1917 only 4 were Muslim, and of the 287 pupils at Andijan girls' gymnasium only 3.⁵¹ According to data for 1917, only 10 Muslim girls were studying at the girls' gymnasiums. From the very beginning, tsarism's education policy came up against the objective opposition of the national psychology and the historically formed social lifestyle of the indigenous people of Central Asia, especially in the towns and agricultural areas of Turkistan region.

Scientific interest in Central Asia

One consequence of the contacts between the traditional and Russian structures was an enhanced interest in the study of Central Asia. This subject occupied a considerable part of the work of scientists at St Petersburg, Moscow and other Russian universities. The more progressively inclined elements of the Russian intelligentsia were fascinated by the opportunities to study this huge area, so rich in natural resources and historical inheritance. Successful research was carried out by the well-known zoologist and traveller Nikolai Alekseevich Severtsov (1827–86), who built up valuable zoological, botanical, mineralogical and palaeontological collections. The famous Russian geographer Petr

⁴⁹ Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I-47, inv. 1, file 590, fol. 2.

⁵⁰ Bendrikov, 1960, p. 211.

⁵¹ Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. I-47, inv. 1, file 1521, fol. 11.

Petrovich Semenov-Tyan-Shanskiy (1827–1914) laid firm foundations of geographical knowledge about Central Asia, particularly the Tian Shan mountain system. Great work in studying the Ferghana valley was undertaken by the naturalist Aleksey Pavlovich Fedchenko (1844–73). He explored the Za-Alai mountain chain and studied the Zerafshan valley and the Kyzyl Kum desert.

The geologist and geographer I. V. Mushketov (1850–1902) made considerable contributions to science. He described many mineral deposits and compiled the first list of minerals of Central Asia as well as creating the first scientific concept of its geological structure and the sequence of its formation. Historical and archaeological studies and excavations are linked with the names of V. V. Bartol'd, P. I. Lerkh, N. I. Veselovsky, V. A. Zhukovsky, and local researchers. In view of the lack of scientific research institutions in the region, representatives of the Russian intelligentsia set up several scientific societies – the Turkistan branch of the Society of Amateur Natural Scientists, Anthropologists and Ethnographers, the Turkistan Circle of Amateur Archaeologists, the Turkistan branch of the Russian Geographical Society, the Turkistan Agricultural Society, the Turkistan Medical Society, etc.

The activities of Russian scientists were appreciated and supported by the local intellectuals. Especially well known among them were Mirza Bukhari, who built up a large archaeological and numismatic collection, part of which was added to the State Hermitage collection; the fine artist and calligrapher Mirza Barat Mully Kasymov, who sketched many of Samarkand's ancient monuments and the Ulugh Beg *madrassa*; Akram Palvan Askarov, who assembled an enormous collection of antiquities and was awarded the medal of the Imperial Archaeological Society for his services to archaeology; and the Samarkand calligrapher and antique collector Abu Sa'id Mahzum, who actively participated with V. L. Vyatkin's expedition in the search for the ruins of Ulugh Beg's observatory.⁵² The works of Russian scientists and students of local lore drew the world's attention for the first time to the culture and life of the peoples of Central Asia.

Another consequence of contacts between the traditional and Russian cultures on an equal basis was the development of politicized national consciousness. The intellectual and spiritual life of local society came under the influence of events taking place in neighbouring countries of the East – the adoption of the law on local self-government in India (1880) and the opening of colleges and universities in Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and other towns; the proclamation of the rights and freedoms of citizens in the constitution of Turkey (1876) and the Turkish revolution of 1908; the constitutional movement in Iran (1905–11); and the revolution of 1905–7 in Russia.

⁵² *Russkie uchonye-issledovateli Sredney Azii ...*, 1956, Vol. 1; 1958, Vol. 2; Lunin, 1962; and others.

Of course, the closest ties were established with the Muslim areas of Russia, from which newspapers and journals were received – *Tercümān* [The Interpreter] from Bakhchisarai (Crimea), *Vaqt* [Time] from Kazan, *Idil* [Volga] from Astrakhan, *Taraqi* [Progress] and *Ittifāq* [Unity] from Baku, the journals *Shurā* and *Chukuch* from Orenburg, *Mullah Nasreddin* from Tiflis (modern Tbilisi, Georgia), etc. Besides providing general information about politics, economics and culture and the Muslim world, these publications questioned the colonization of Eastern countries and demanded the modernization of education, the raising of the status of native languages and the preservation and encouragement of spiritual values.

Jadidism

All this gave a powerful stimulus to the birth and development of Jadidism in Turkistan, which played an important role not only in the reform of national education but also in the intensification of the national liberation movement at the beginning of the twentieth century (see Chapter 7 below).

The most distinguished Jadids were the writer and educator Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, the teacher Munawwar Qari, the journalist and lawyer ‘Ubaydullah Khojaev, the scientist and writer ‘Abdurrauf Fitrat, the poet and current affairs commentator Tavallo and others.⁵³ Understanding that the way to national rebirth lay through the education of the people and the raising of an educated generation, from the end of the nineteenth century the Jadids created a quite broad network of new-method schools, or *usūl-i jadid*, where children were taught to read on the basis of phonetics and, besides religious sciences, the programme of education included arithmetic, geometry, logic, history and geography as well as Arabic, Persian and Russian. As the movement for the modernization of education developed, the publication was arranged of new textbooks and teaching aids and libraries and reading rooms were opened.

Under the direct leadership of the Jadids dozens of newspapers and journals began to appear: *Taraqi*, *Shukhrat*, *Khurshid* and *Sado-i Turkistān* [Voice of Turkistan] in Tashkent, *Samarqand* and *Oina* [The Mirror] in Samarkand, *Tūrān* [Turki Nation] and *Bukhārā-i Sharif* in Bukhara, *Sado-i Farghāna* [Voice of Ferghana] in Kokand, etc.

On the Jadids’ initiative the first socio-political organizations were set up – *Tarbiyat-i atfol* (Education of Children), *Umid* (Hope), *Nashri-maorif*, *Barakat*, *Gairat* and *Tarakki-parvar*, which helped stimulate political life in the region, especially during the First World War, and the mobilization of the local indigenous population for military work in the rear

⁵³ Alimova, 1996, pp. 6–20.

services.⁵⁴ These organizations, despite their lack of experience, strove to raise the opposition movement to a level corresponding to the urgent historical realities of national interests.

Thus in Central Asia colonial developments collided with innovative trends of an intellectual and moral nature which had been initiated by the Jadids. Doubt was cast on them not only by the traditional norms of education but also by the *qāzīs*' false interpretation of *sharī'a* norms in their own interests and their unlawful involvement in dealing with matters of daily life, and important questions were raised about the cultural heritage of the peoples of Central Asia and their identity. Thus a new generation of the intelligentsia, capable of opposing the traditional inertia, accepting new ideas and the intellectual novelties of Eastern and Western civilizations, strove to change the existing material and social world, and to mobilize and use the people's spiritual resources to achieve freedom and national rebirth.

⁵⁴ Abdullaev, 1998, p. 27; Abdullaev, 1992, pp. 106–13.

6

ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA (1917 – 24)*

R. Y. Radjapova

As a consequence of 50 years of the colonialist policies of tsarist Russia in western Central Asia,¹ the region had been transformed into both a source of raw materials for metropolitan Russia and a ready market for Russian industrial production. Although Russian capital was actively directed to the region, and with it came new technologies, market mechanisms and an entrepreneurial spirit, thus laying the foundations for a capitalist regime, none of this helped the productive forces of the region to flourish or contributed to the welfare of its inhabitants.

The end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century constituted a spiritual turning-point in the social life of the peoples of the region. A new, modernizing social force, Jadidism (see Chapter 7 below), emerged, which, in the face of the achievements of global civilization, was capable of apprehending the full scope of the threat to the future of the Central Asian peoples posed by the blinkered conservatism of the outmoded pillars of traditional society, aggravated by half a century of the colonial policy of tsarist Russia. The modernizing forces of the Jadids, under the influence of ideas and ideological outlooks which were penetrating the region both from neighbouring eastern countries (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India) and from other Muslim regions of Russia, played a major role in shaping the ideology of social renovation and reform and encouraging the rebirth of the spiritual potential of the peoples of the region.

* See Map 2.

¹ By the beginning of the twentieth century, the whole of western Central Asia had come within the Russian sphere of geopolitical influence: the governor-generalships of Turkistan, Orenburg and Western Siberia (Kazakhstan and Steppe region) had been directly incorporated into the Russian empire, and were putting significant pressure on the khanate of Khiva and the emirate of Bukhara, which were nominally independent under Russian protectorate.

The February 1917 revolution in Russia and its first legislative acts proclaimed to the world that the country was breaking with the centuries-old tradition of autocracy and was embarking upon a new path. The spring of 1917 was a turning-point in the history of Central Asian Jadidism, which boldly entered the political arena of the region and declared its determination to lead the democratic process. Seeing the victorious February revolution in Russia as the embodiment of their ideals of progress, the Jadids actively set about putting its declared principles into practice. The desire to defend and give priority to the political interests of the indigenous peoples determined the overall thrust of their action. A decisive role in the dissemination of Jadid ideology and policies, and the shaping on that basis of public opinion and the national awareness of the inhabitants of Turkistan, was played by Jadid newspapers and journals: *Najāt*, *Kengash*, *Shūrā-yi Islām*, *Tūrān*, *Turk eli* [The People of Turkistan] and *Ulūgh Turkistān* [Great Turkistan] in Tashkent; *Hurriyat* in Samarkand; *Tirik Soz* and the journal *Hurriyat* in Kokand, etc.

With a view to ensuring the representation of the indigenous population in the local governmental structures taking shape, national intellectuals made significant efforts to unite all the social forces of the Muslim population. A focal point for such unity was the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya* (Islamic Council), founded in March 1917 in Tashkent. While its membership and leadership included individuals with a range of ideological outlooks, the heart and soul of the organization was made up of well-known leaders of the Jadid movement: ‘Ubaydallah Khojayeve, Munawwar Qari, ‘Abdallah Avlani, Behbudi, etc.² Their influence was keenly felt in the activities and manifestos of the organization.

In April 1917, on the initiative of the Jadids, local branches of the *Shura-yi Islamiya* were founded in Osh, Andijan, Skobelev, Turkestan, Merv, Namangan, Samarkand, Kokand and other towns of Turkistan. This process helped to enhance the role of the indigenous population, together with the European population, in dismantling the old governmental structures and in overcoming the opposition of their defenders, etc. Thus by early April 1917, the governor-generalship of Turkistan had been abolished, and the apparatus of government was undergoing a thoroughgoing reorganization.

The establishment of the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya* provided a strong corrective to the balance of political forces and the reorganization of the structures of government in the region. The development of this institution put a halt to the perceptible tendency to develop a two-pronged political structure in Turkistan, as at the centre. Instead, there was a three-pronged political structure, with soviets (councils) of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies, executive committees of social organizations, such as the local organs of the Provisional Government, and the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya*. The platforms and tactical positions adopted by all three

² *Najāt*, 9 April 1917; *Ulūgh Turkistān*, 25 April 1917.

political forces were most clearly articulated by their regional congresses held in April 1917.

The First Pan-Turkistan Congress of Muslims (16–21 April), convened in Tashkent by the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya*, was attended by 150 delegates representing the indigenous peoples of the region. Having recognized the Provisional Government of Russia and its programme, the congress unanimously supported the idea of the establishment in Russia of a federal democratic republic which would grant a large measure of autonomy to all regions, including that of Turkistan. The final meeting of the congress adopted a resolution for the formation of a central governing body, the Turkistan Regional Muslim Council (*Kraymussovet*). According to the statutes adopted on 12 June 1917, the Turkistan Regional Muslim Council was to be a representative Pan-Muslim governing body. It elected Mustafa Choqayev (Choqay-oghlu) as its chairman, and Ahmad Zeki Velidi as its secretary, and the members of the presidium were well-known progressive Jadids such as Munawwar Qari, Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, ‘Ubaydallah Khojayeve, Tashpulat Norbutabekov, etc.

At the same time, the First Turkistan Regional Congress of Councils of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (7–15 April), at which only 5 of the 263 deputies were Muslims, came out in favour of the establishment in Russia of a republic with a strong centre, but did not voice any opinion on the question which was of major importance for the peoples of Turkistan: the autonomy of the region.³

With regard to the future form of government, the Congress of Executive Committees of Social Organizations of the Region (9–16 April 1917)⁴ considered it necessary to ‘establish in Russia a democratic republic based on the principle of broad autonomy for the various regions of the state’. However, even the proposal to grant territorial rather than national autonomy was blocked by the chairman of the Turkistan Committee, who had been appointed by decision of the Provisional Government of Russia on 6 March 1917.⁵ ‘As far as the administration of *oblast*’s [provinces] and *krays* [peripheral territories] is concerned, that is a matter for the Turkistan Committee.’⁶ At bottom, in replacing the governor-generalship of Turkistan with the Turkistan Committee, the Provisional Government had merely changed the external guise of the colonial administration of the region, while its essence remained as before. It led to confrontations between the Turkistan Committee and local organizations.

³ Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, coll. 17, inv. 1, file 399, fol. 187; Tashkent State Archive, coll. 10, inv. 1, file 28, fols. 2–3; *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 12 April 1917.

⁴ *Protokoly syezda delegatov ispolnitel’nykh komitetov Turkestanskogo kraya*, 1917, pp. 8, 9, 28–9.

⁵ *Pobeda oktiabr’skoy revoliutsii v Uzbekistane*, Vol. 1, 1963, pp. 57–8.

⁶ *Protokoly syezda delegatov ispolnitel’nykh komitetov Turkestanskogo kraya*, 1917, pp. 15–16.

Especially fierce was the political tug-of-war between the Turkistan Committee and the Tashkent Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Although the leaders of the national democrats did not believe that the Turkistan Committee was democratic, they nevertheless came out against the injunction of the Tashkent soviet that it should be wound up. The fiercely class-based approach of the Tashkent soviet to all social problems of the region, its growing demands for power, and its neglect of the general national interests of the indigenous inhabitants all tended to push the national democrats away from the soviets and exacerbate the opposition between them. This became particularly marked during the September (1917) events in Tashkent, when, taking advantage of the spontaneous indigination of the population in the face of the growing famine, the Bolsheviks attempted a *coup-d'état*, under the slogan of 'transfer of power to the soviets'.

The Second Regional Muslim Congress (7–11 September 1917), convened on the initiative of the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya*, firmly proclaimed that:

the congress is against the transfer of power to the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies. Power must be held by a coalition, based on all the forces of the country; in other words, it must be truly popular.⁷

At this congress, the national democrats adopted the main planks of their platform: the indigenous population would take part in the regional government only if it was democratic and took their interests into account as the dominant constituent of the region; a top priority for the population of Turkistan was the right to self-determination; and the Regional Muslim Council should be the legal pan-Muslim representative organ, acting in the name of the entire Muslim population, and defending its interests.⁸

Within the movement to broaden the rights of the indigenous peoples to administer the region, fresh nuances became apparent. The liberal democratic tendencies, which had become stronger in the positions of the Jadid members of the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya* under the influence of the All-Russian Movement of Muslims,⁹ gave rise to a backlash on the part of the clergy, who sought to stand apart in order to uphold the stability of traditional society and the inviolability of all Islamic rules and prescriptions. In June 1917 the Muslim clergy and their supporters left the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya* to form a new organization known as the *Shūrā-yi 'Ulamā'* (Council of Religious Scholars).

⁷ *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 13 Sept. 1917.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 14 Sept. 1917.

⁹ Decisions of the First All-Russian Congress of Muslims (1–11 May 1917) on the granting of equal political rights to Muslim men and women, and the weakening of a number of *shari'a* rules with a view to the emancipation of women. *Programmnye dokumenty musul'manskikh politicheskikh partiy (1917–1920)*, 1985, pp. 11–12.

The separatist aims of the *Shūrā-yi ‘Ulamā’* became evident in the heated electoral campaign of the summer of 1917 for seats on the town councils (*dumas*). In this campaign, the *Shūrā-yi ‘Ulamā’* produced its own platform and electoral list. The elections in Tashkent were won by the *Shūrā-yi ‘Ulamā’*, which gained 62 seats out of 112, with 5 seats going to the Social Democrats, 24 to the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and 11 to the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya*.¹⁰

The appearance in the public arena of the *Shūrā-yi ‘Ulamā’* substantially shifted the balance of political forces in the national movement, underscoring the steadily growing rift between the strategic and tactical aims of the two main currents that had come to the fore: the progressive democrats and the *qadims* (Persian *qadim*: ‘old’, traditionalist conservative), supporters of the ‘*ulamā*’. Each of these currents immediately sought to make its mark in terms of both organization and programme. The Congress of Muslim Organizations of Ferghana *Oblast’*, held in Skobelev from 12 to 14 June 1917 under the leadership of the intelligentsia and the progressive wing of the Muslim clergy, the *Türk Adamî Markaziyat* (Turkic Federalist Party, lit. ‘Turkish People’s Association’),¹¹ and the Regional Congress of Muslims convened by the *Shūrā-yi ‘Ulamā’* from 17 to 20 September 1917, both recognized the need to form a political party to be known as the *Ittifāq-i Muslimin* (Muslim Alliance).¹² The meetings of both currents also hammered out their respective platforms.

On a number of key issues, the progressive intellectuals and the *qadims* took identical positions. They came out unambiguously in favour of granting Turkistan, Kazakhstan and other Turkic peoples national and territorial autonomy within the framework of a new Russia, and of the introduction there, for the first time in history, of a republican and parliamentary form of government. However, the programme of the ‘*ulamā*’-supporters was aimed at the thorough Islamization of the future national political system.

Social and political trends in the post-February period developed along very similar lines in Kazakhstan. Here, the leaders of the national democratic intelligentsia, A. Bokeikhanov, A. Baitursynov, B. Dulatov, Zh. and Kh. Dosmuhamedov, Kh. Ghabbasov, M. Tanyshbayev, A. Yermekov, etc., functioned as a force for social consolidation under the watchword of national autonomy. Their weekly newspaper *Qazāq* [Kazakh] gained indisputable authority among the people.¹³ With its hotly debated articles about the political situation of the Kazakh people and the political organization of the region, the newspaper played a major role in the political unification and activization of the democratic forces.

¹⁰ *Kengash*, 6 Aug. 1917.

¹¹ *Pobeda oktiabr’skoy revoliutsii v Uzbekistane*, Vol. 1, 1963, pp. 174, 193–4.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Choqay Oghli, 1992, p. 13 (reminiscences from 1917).

The All-Kazakh Congress convened by the national-liberal intelligentsia in Orenburg from 21 to 26 July 1917 was attended by delegates from all areas of Steppe region. The congress debated the vital problems of the Kazakh people: landownership, the workers' question, public education, etc. In its resolutions adopted on those issues, the congress was in favour of halting the policy of resettling Russians in Steppe region, and returning the lands distributed to the settlers to the local population; of securing the immediate return of Kazakhs who had been mobilized during the First World War for work behind the front lines, and halting further such mobilization in the future; and of freeing those imprisoned for their opposition to the mobilization, and the halting of prosecutions on those grounds. With its proposals for the introduction of a special national administration, the creation of judicial organs for the local population, and the wide-scale development of public education, the congress laid the foundations for the future autonomous organization of the Kazakh steppes.¹⁴ The platform elaborated by the congress defined the main lines and political programme of the national political party, Alash-Orda, which was founded at the congress.¹⁵ The party came out firmly in favour of a democratic Russia, in which 'each individual state within the federal republic would be autonomous and self-governing with equal rights and interests.'

On the whole, a characteristic of the movement for the autonomy of the peoples of Russian Central Asia was faith in the possibility of peaceful, constitutional means to achieve that goal. Muslim leaders of all tendencies were enthusiastic supporters of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and saw in its convening an opportunity to achieve autonomy and to decide the future of their peoples.

The February 1917 events in Russia also produced an echo in the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva, both under Russian protectorate, and helped to unite the progressive forces of the two khanates. In a comparatively short space of time, the Jadids organized themselves in the Young Bukharan and Young Khivan parties, drawing up their own ideology on the model of the Young Turks.

A small number of young democratic elements, inspired by the ideas of the February revolution, proclaimed themselves ardent supporters of reforming and democratizing the social structure of their countries. They understood very clearly just how difficult and complex those tasks were, given the monarchistic foundations of society, whose stability was supported and encouraged by the indisputable authority of Islam and the Muslim clergy. The new political forces were obliged to seek help from outside. On 14 March 1917 the leader of the Young Bukharans, 'Abdurrauf Fitrat, together with his

¹⁴ Choqay Oghli, 1992, pp. 14–15.

¹⁵ *Qazāq*, 21 Nov. 1917.

comrade-in-arms, Yuldashev, sent a congratulatory telegram to the Provisional Government of Russia in which they included a request for help in carrying out political reforms in the emirate of Bukhara.¹⁶

Under pressure from the democratic forces of Russia, the rulers of the khanates agreed to make a number of concessions to the reformers. On 5 April 1917 a manifesto was adopted in the khanate of Khiva whereby the power of the khan was limited by a *majlis* (parliament), to be elected from among the representatives of the clergy and the bourgeoisie, and a Council of *Nāzirs* (ministers). The government and the *majlis* were headed by Young Khivans, who saw the establishment of a constitutional monarchy as a stepping-stone on the way to realizing their reformist aspirations.

On 7 April 1917 the last Bukhara emir, Sayyid 'Alim Khan, signed a manifesto for reforms drawn up by the Russian resident in Bukhara, Miller. In it, the emir promised to regulate the tax system, institute a government treasury, introduce a fair system of justice and a proper budget, institute controls over government officials, establish a system of municipal government, and encourage and foster the development of industry, trade, science and education. Announcing the reforms, the manifesto stressed that 'the sole basis for all improvements and useful changes can only be the Holy *sharī'a*'.

The Bukharan Jadids received the manifesto enthusiastically and decided to show their support in a demonstration, which was broken up by conservative forces. The Jadids, fearing persecution, fled to Tashkent and Samarkand. Under pressure from the clergy, the emir had the manifesto abrogated. In the *riwāyat* (religious ruling) proclaimed by the clergy, all proponents of reform were declared outlaws.

A little later, in June 1917, the Khivan Jadids were also defeated. On the orders of Esfandiyar Khan, 17 Young Khivans were arrested and their places in the *majlis* were taken by representatives of the feudal aristocracy. In early November 1917, the khan dissolved the entire *majlis*. The Young Khivans who remained at liberty also sought shelter in Turkistan.

These events had a decisive impact on the subsequent political course of the khanates. On the one hand, the forces that supported absolute monarchy were able to consolidate their position, and the monarchy itself became more brutal. On the other hand, the opposition movement underwent changes. With the loss of their illusions concerning the possibility of a peaceful reform of society, a section of the Jadids, in particular the liberal wing, shied away from active political work, and another section – the Young Bukharans and Young Khivans – adopted a sharp change in tactics: relying on external political forces, they embarked upon the path of armed struggle against the regime.

¹⁶ *Pobeda oktiabr'skoy revoliutsii v Uzbekistane*, Vol. 1, 1963, pp. 38–9.

By the autumn of 1917 in Turkistan, the widespread bitterness of the European workers and soldiers in the towns of the region had clearly boiled over into revolutionary sentiments. Spearheading the masses, who were steadily becoming revolutionized, was the Tashkent Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, led by the Bolsheviks. Thus, as soon as the news was received in Tashkent on 27 October 1917 that the Provisional Government in Petrograd had been overthrown, a plenary meeting of the Tashkent soviet held on the night of 27–28 October adopted a decision to launch a military uprising. The three days of fighting in Tashkent culminated in an armed *coup d'état*, and on 1 November, the Tashkent soviet seized power. The same day, it sent a telegram to all soviets of the region: 'All power has been taken by the soviets. Take power into your own hands.'

Unlike in Petrograd, where the question of power in the country had been immediately resolved at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in Turkistan there was a fierce battle for power between the parties and organizations that had participated in the October coup in Tashkent (Bolsheviks, Left Socialist Revolutionaries, Internationalist Mensheviks, members of the Tashkent soviet and the Turkistan Regional Muslim Council, etc.) and those who were opposed to the transfer of power to the soviets. Defending their previous positions, which had been repeatedly proclaimed by the Turkistan Regional Muslim Council, the national democrats publicly expressed their strong protest against the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks.¹⁷ The members of the Turkistan Regional Muslim Council who, following the October events, had left Tashkent for Kokand were antagonistic towards the Bolsheviks, and considered it absolutely unacceptable to come to an agreement with them on the question of power.

The fierce struggle over the principles governing the form that the new government should take affected the working atmosphere at the Third Regional Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which opened on 15 November 1917 in Tashkent.¹⁸ The 114 delegates to the congress were composed mainly of European workers and soldiers. The draft resolutions on how regional power should be organized submitted for discussion by the party fractions of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, the United Social Democrats (Right Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks), the Regional Congress of Peasants' Deputies and the resolution of the Conference of Muslims (12–15 November 1917) proclaimed by the leader of the '*ulamā*', Sher 'Ali Lapin, all included arrangements for the representation of the indigenous population in the regional government bodies. However, the Maximalist¹⁹-Bolshevik majority blocked these proposals.

¹⁷ *Svobodniy Samarkand*, 25 Nov. 1917.

¹⁸ The congress, which merged on the following day with the Regional Congress of Peasants' Deputies, became known as the Regional Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

¹⁹ Maximalists: Menshevik-Maximalists.

The Bolsheviks resolutely insisted on creating regional power structures on centralist principles and on a strictly proletarian class basis. In his address, the Bolshevik F. I. Kolesov said:

It is the soldiers, workers and peasants who were victorious, and they must take power into their own hands. . . . We demand that all power should go to the soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies.²⁰

At the congress, a majority of votes went to the draft resolution by the united fraction of Bolsheviks and Maximalists, which became known as the Declaration. It stated that the highest organ of authority in the region would be the Regional Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, henceforth to be known as the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Turkistan Region, and that its membership would be limited to representatives of the Left Socialist parties which had taken part in the October coup. Concerning participation by the indigenous population in the regional organs of government, the congress was quite unambiguous:

The inclusion of Muslims at present in the organs of the highest regional revolutionary authority is unacceptable in view of the uncertain attitude of the native population to the authority of the soldiers', workers' and peasants' deputies, and in view of the fact that there are no proletarian class organizations among the native population.²¹

The government elected at the congress (Soviet of People's Commissars) did not include a single representative of the indigenous population of the region.

In accordance with the resolution adopted at the Third Congress of Soviets concerning the organization of power at local level, power began to be transferred there to the soviets. Between November 1917 and January 1918, Soviet power was established in all new quarters of the towns of the Turkistan region. As in Tashkent, a decisive role in the establishment of Soviet power was played by workers and soldiers of European origin, led by the Bolsheviks and supported by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. In the soviets themselves, the proportion of Muslim representatives was insignificant, with none at all among the leaders of local soviets at that time.

With the establishment of Soviet power began the process of creating Soviet administrative structures and, above all, punitive organs. On 28 November 1917 the Sovnarkom (Soviet of People's Commissars: the first Soviet government) of Turkistan took a decision to create detachments of the Red Guards in Turkistan. From early 1918, Red Army units began to be formed in the Turkistan region, and *Chekas* (from the Russian initials for Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage – the first

²⁰ *Nasha gazeta*, 18 Nov. 1917.

²¹ *Pobeda velikoy oktiabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revoliutsii v Turkestane*, 1947, p. 93.

Soviet security organs) and revolutionary tribunals began to be set up everywhere. The soviets and their punitive organs waged a relentless battle against all parties, organizations and forces which did not recognize Bolshevik power.

The Turkistan Bolsheviks' orthodoxy and their literal interpretation of the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat prevented them from gaining a proper appreciation of the true situation obtaining in the multi-ethnic Russian empire, which was in fact borne in mind by the Sovnarkom of the Russian Republic. The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia (2 November 1917) solemnly proclaimed the 'right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, and even to separation and the formation of an independent government'. In accordance with the declaration, in a special address 'To all Muslim workers of Russia and the East' (20 November 1917), the Sovnarkom of the Russian Republic urged them to:

seek to order your national life freely and without hindrance. This is your right. Please know that your rights, like the rights of all the peoples of Russia, are safeguarded by the full power of the revolution and its organs, the soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies.²²

By refusing the indigenous inhabitants of Turkistan and their national forces and organizations the right to administer the region, the ruling parties, the Turkistan Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries, ruled out the possibility of a compromise solution to the question of who should hold power, and thereby made unavoidable the forthcoming clash of forces in the political life of the region.

On 26 November 1917 in Kokand, the Fourth Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress began its work. It was attended by more than 200 representatives from Ferghana, Syr Darya and Samarkand *oblast's*, Transcaspia and Bukhara, and by delegates from the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya*, the *Shūrā-yi 'Ulamā'*, the Soviet of Muslim Warriors, the Regional Jewish Organization, etc. The focus of attention at the congress was the question of the form of government in Turkistan. Most statements in that debate were sharply critical of the Turkistan Bolsheviks and their interference in the internal life of the indigenous population. All participants supported the idea of declaring autonomy. In a resolution adopted unanimously on 27 November, the congress:

expressing the desire of the national groups inhabiting Turkistan for self-determination on the basis of the principles proclaimed by the great Russian revolution, declares Turkistan an autonomous territory within the Federal Russian Republic.

The precise form of autonomy, however, was to be determined by the Turkistan Constituent Assembly.²³ On 28 November a name was given to the nascent government body:

²² *Pobeda oktiabr'skoy revoliutsii v Uzbekistane*, Vol. 1, 1963, p. 571.

²³ *Ulūgh Turkistān*, 8 Dec. 1917.

the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati* (Turkistan Autonomous Assembly),²⁴ the first practical experiment in introducing a national democratic form of government in the territory of Turkistan.

The structures of power determined by the congress – the Turkistan Provisional Soviet elected before the convening of the Turkistan Constituent Assembly, the Turkistan (National) Assembly, the national government, and indeed the work of the congress – all had a clear democratic orientation. The new government structures were based on the proportional representation of all national groups, and drew on an integrated combination of general democratic and national values. When the government was formed at the congress, eight people were elected, and the remaining four seats were set aside to be filled by candidates of European origin. The government consisted of M. Tanyshbayev (prime minister), I. Shah-Ahmedov (deputy prime minister) and the following ministers: M. Choqayev, ‘Ubaydallah Khojayev, Yurali Aghayev, Abijan Mahmudov, ‘Abd al-Rahman Urazayev and S. A. Gertsfel’d.²⁵

The decisions of the Fourth Extraordinary All-Turkistan Congress of Muslims stirred the broad masses of the indigenous population, who had hitherto been sluggish about the *coup d’état* and the appearance of soviets in the towns. There were thousands of political rallies, meetings and demonstrations in the towns and villages in support of the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati*: in Namangan, the *qishlāqs* (winter quarters) of Khanabad in Jalalabad *volost*’ (6 December), Tashkent (6 and 13 December), Kokand (7 December), Samarkand and other towns, and the First Extraordinary Congress of Muslim Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies (late December 1917), which sent a telegram to the Sovnarkom of the Russian Republic proposing that it should instruct the Tashkent Sovnarkom to hand over power in the Turkistan region to the Provisional Government of Turkistan in order to avert anarchy and diarchy (dual power), which might lead Turkistan to a great catastrophe.²⁶ The proclamation of the autonomy of Turkistan was supported by the Turkistan branches of a number of Russian parties, in particular the Turkistan Left Socialist Revolutionaries, the Tashkent branch of the Bund (the General Jewish Workers’ Union), the Tashkent Georgian Society, the First All-Ukraine Congress, the All-Russian Muslim Council, etc.

Against the backdrop of the growing expression of popular will in favour of autonomy for Turkistan, the fickle behaviour of the leaders of the *Shūrā-yi ‘Ulamā’* was rather curious. On 6 December 1917 at a political meeting in Tashkent, together with national democrats, *Shūrā-yi ‘Ulamā’* representatives supported the decision to proclaim autonomy and form the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati*, but soon afterwards, following the bloody events of

²⁴ *Turkestanskiy vestnik*, 1 Dec. 1917.

²⁵ *Ulūgh Turkistān*, 18 Dec. 1917; *El bairaq*, 9 Dec. 1917.

²⁶ *Gosudarstvenniy arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii (GARF)*, coll. 1318, inv. 1, file 88, fol. 22.

13 December 1917 (when on Bolshevik orders a peaceful demonstration of local inhabitants in Tashkent was gunned down, at a political meeting called by themselves in Tashkent), the same representatives criticized the Provisional Government of the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati*, laying full blame on it for the events of 13 December, and calling for it not to be recognized.

In this way, the conflicting views which had already come to light in the period leading up to October between the Jadids and the ‘*ulamā*’-supporters concerning both strategic and tactical questions not only did not die down, but rather flared up with renewed intransigence, seriously jeopardizing national unity and the future of Turkistan autonomy.

These conflicting views also shook the Provisional Government of the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati* itself. After little more than two months of existence, it underwent a number of changes in its leadership. In early January, Prime Minister Tanyshbayev was replaced by M. Choqayev, who promised to take ‘more vigorous measures to defend Muslim interests’.²⁷ Under the leadership of Choqayev, the cabinet of ministers did indeed take active steps to consolidate the national forces around the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati*, to put it on a sound financial footing, and to create the *Mukhtāriyat*’s own armed forces, which in addition to the regular national army (which by January had grown to a force of 2,000) also included the forces led by the head of the Kokand militia, Ergash.²⁸ However, the actions of Choqayev’s cabinet did not please those in favour of a more radical approach, who demanded an end to all contacts with the organs of Soviet power, and the launching of military action. On 5 February 1918 Choqayev’s cabinet was overthrown and power passed to Ergash, the leader of the more radically inclined forces.

By this time, the Soviet posture had become more hardline. A majority of delegates at the Fourth Regional Congress of Soviets (19–26 January 1918) voted in favour of a resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks: ‘The party of revolutionary social democrats must work to ensure the proletarian autonomy of the region.’²⁹ They adopted the following resolution: ‘The Kokand Autonomous Government and its members shall be outlawed, and its ringleaders arrested.’³⁰

In late January/early February, Soviet military units began to converge on Kokand, not only troops from the garrisons in Ferghana *oblast*’, but also those who had managed to escape following the crushing of the Cossacks’ revolt at Samarkand, and troops from the

²⁷ *Ulūgh Turkistān*, 7 Jan. 1918.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 31 Jan. 1918; Alekseyenkov, 1931, p. 45.

²⁹ *Nasha gazeta*, 25 Jan. 1918.

³⁰ *Pobeda sovetskoy vlasti v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane*, 1967, p. 587.

Orenburg Front.³¹ On the orders of the military commissar of the Turkistan Republic, who arrived with them, from 6 to 9 February not only the residence and armed forces of the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati* were subjected to fierce shelling, but the peaceful population of Kokand and surrounding areas were also bombarded, and those localities were reduced to lifeless ruins. During the military operations, two members of the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati*, Yurali Aghayev and Miradil Mirza Ahmedov, were killed and Nasir Khan Tura, S. Gertsfel'd and Abijan Mahmudov were arrested after they had fled Kokand. Ergash also fled Kokand with the remains of his troops. Many supporters of the *Turkistān Mukhtāriyati* were arrested and shot without trial or investigation, and others emigrated.³²

Equally fierce measures were taken against national organizations. Following the dissolution by the *Shūrā-yi Islāmiya* of the municipal *dumas* in October and later months, such measures were now taken against the *Shūrā-yi 'Ulamā'*. By decision of the Turkistan Sovnarkom of 13 May 1918, the Tashkent branch of the '*ulamā*' was prohibited as 'not corresponding to the interests of the working class' and its property was nationalized. Its journal, *al-Izāh* [Clarification, Commentary], was banned.³³

No less sad was the fate of the national autonomous assembly formed at the Second All-Kazakh Congress held from 5 to 13 December 1917 in Orenburg. The autonomous Alash government elected at the congress was dubbed the Alash-Orda. At the same time, Alash supporters left the ratification of the autonomous constitution to the 'goodwill' of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, in their search for guarantors of their national autonomy, the Alash party activists were obliged to turn to anti-Soviet forces, in the persons of the *ataman* (chief) Dutov and Admiral Kolchak. But those who were fighting Bolshevism were above all fervent supporters of a 'united and indivisible Russia', and refused to engage in military collaboration with the Alash-Orda.

The leaders of the national liberal movement appealed repeatedly to the Bolshevik leadership. On the question of territorial and national autonomy, talks were held with Lenin and with the people's commissar for nationality affairs, Stalin, in late March 1918 in Moscow by an Alash delegation from Ural'sk (the Dosmuhamedov brothers) and on a direct line in April 1918 by A. Bokeikhanov, Kh. Ghabbasov and A. Yermekov.³⁴ However, the Alash-Orda programme received little understanding on the part of Russia's Bolshevik leaders, or indeed local Bolsheviks. On 21 March 1918 the Ural *Guberniya* Congress of Soviets decided to dissolve the local Alash-Orda 'government', and made

³¹ According to several Soviet historians, 11 troop convoys arrived at Kokand station carrying cavalry, artillery and infantry units: see Zevelev, 1972, p. 265.

³² *Ulūgh Turkistān*, 12, 14, 19 March 1918; Choqay Oghli, 1992, p. 49 (footnote).

³³ *Pobeda oktiabr'skoy revoliutsii v Uzbekistane*, Vol. 2, 1972, p. 265.

³⁴ *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii: Uchebnoe posobie*, 2001, pp. 519–20.

arrangements for the arrest of the Dosmuhamedov brothers. The First Turgay *Oblast'* Congress of Soviets (March–April 1918) decided to close down the Alash-Orda newspaper *Qazāq* and confiscate its printing press. The Semirechye *Oblast'* Commissariat for the Regulation of Russian–Kazakh Relations decided to abolish the Kyrgyz Provincial Alash-Orda Committee.³⁵

However, Russia's Bolshevik leadership, having engaged in a fierce struggle with the national democratic governments which had arisen in the peripheral regions of the Russian empire and which it saw as simply 'bourgeois nationalist and counterrevolutionary', was, with respect to political reconstruction, nevertheless obliged to make certain concessions to the national interests of the various peoples.

In accordance with the programme being implemented in the first half of 1918 for the federation of the Russian state, and under the leadership of the extraordinary commissar of the Soviet Government, P. A. Kobozev, dispatched from Moscow in early April 1918, the plan for 'Soviet autonomy' began to be carried out in Turkistan. In the resolution on the Turkistan Soviet Republic adopted on 30 April by the Fifth Regional Congress of Soviets, Turkistan was proclaimed a Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federation, governing itself autonomously and coordinating its action with the Government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).³⁶ The proclaimed autonomy was legally ratified at the Sixth Regional Congress of Soviets (autumn 1918), through the adoption of the constitution of Turkistan.

The constitution, having proclaimed the Turkistan Autonomous Republic to be part of the RSFSR, determined the allocation of powers between the federation and the autonomous republic, and confirmed the existing structure and functions of the organs of government: all power within the territory of Turkistan belonged to the soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies; the supreme legislative organ of the republic was proclaimed to be the Congress of Soviets, with the Turkistan Central Executive Committee (Turk TsIK – Turkistan TsIK) as the standing legislative body acting between congresses, and the Soviet of People's Commissars (SNK) as the executive organ with the right to take legislative initiatives. The constitution, drawn up in accordance with the 1918 constitution of the RSFSR, withheld voting rights from individuals who used hired labour or lived on unearned income, and from the clergy and other such categories of the population.³⁷

'Soviet autonomy' ignored the specific national aspects of the social, political and cultural life of the peoples of the region, and provided no legal protection therefore. 'Soviet

³⁵ *Pobeda sovetskoy vlasti v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane*, 1967, p. 608.

³⁶ *Pobeda oktiabr'skoy revoliutsii v Uzbekistane*, Vol. 1, 1963, pp. 251–2.

³⁷ *Syezdy sovetov RSFSR i avtonomnykh respublik RSFSR*, Vol. 1, 1959, pp. 279–80.

autonomy', given its lack of the fundamental principle of national autonomy – the right of the indigenous people of a national-territorial unit to the independent exercise of government authority – was basically territorial, but not national-territorial.

The aspirations of the indigenous peoples of Turkistan for the establishment and consolidation of political sovereignty and national self-determination were not satisfied by the proclamation of 'Soviet autonomy'. Indeed, the constitution of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) was not ratified by the Russian legislative organs. Instead, the preparation and holding of the Fifth and Sixth Regional Congresses of Soviets, the enthusiastic political agitation and propaganda, and the use of slogans concerning the need to involve the broad masses of the indigenous population in constructive work all led to shifts in the attitudes of the indigenous population, who had thus far been fairly indifferent to Soviet power. The re-elections to local soviets held immediately prior to those congresses were accompanied by an expansion in the area under Soviet power and the penetration of soviets into rural localities. There was also a growth in the proportion of representatives of the indigenous population in the government structures of the republic. While in the Turkistan Executive Committee elected by the Fifth Congress of Soviets there were 7 indigenous representatives out of 26, and in the Soviet of People's Commissars 3 out of 16, in the Turkistan Executive Committee elected by the Sixth Congress of Soviets, there were 20 out of 75.

These developments were decisively influenced by the First Congress of the Communist Party of Turkistan (KPT, June 1918), which completed the welding of the various Communist Party committees and organizations into a single party. Of particular importance for the future of Soviet statehood was the resolution adopted by the congress entitled 'On party work among the Muslim proletariat'. The congress's proclamation that the Muslim proletariat was recognized by the communists as 'the mainstay of Soviet power in Turkistan' sounded somewhat demagogic. Nevertheless, a number of measures outlined by the congress with a view to putting the proclaimed autonomy into practice – recognition of the language of the majority of the population (Turkic) as an official language alongside Russian; the publication of official documents in these languages; and the establishment at all levels of the Soviet system of commissariats for nationality affairs³⁸ – all played, as was the intention, a certain propagandizing role.

At the same time as the formation of the Turkistan ASSR, the Soviet autonomy of the Kazakh people began to take shape. On 12 May 1918 a decision of the people's commissar for nationality affairs of the RSFSR was published, providing for the establishment within the commissariat of a Kazakh Department. Within the People's Commissariat for

³⁸ *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana v rezoliutsiyakh syezdov i konferentsiy*, 1987, pp. 11–12.

Nationality Affairs, an action group began work to convene an All-Kazakh Congress of Soviets. However, the preparatory work, under the leadership of the extraordinary commissar for the Kazakh Steppe region, A. Zhangel'din, was halted by the civil war that began in mid-1918. It was only a year later, on 10 July 1919, that Lenin signed a 'Decree on the Revolutionary Committee for the Administration of the Kyrgyz³⁹ Region'. On 26 August 1920 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissars of the RSFSR adopted a 'Decree on the Creation of the Autonomous Kyrgyz (Kazakh) Socialist Soviet Republic', according to which Kazakhstan was to acquire Soviet statehood, including the right to autonomy within the framework of the RSFSR. This decree was approved at the Constituent Congress of Soviets of Kazakhstan held from 4 to 12 December 1920 in Orenburg. The congress, which was attended by 273 delegates, proclaimed the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR).⁴⁰ Soviet autonomy was thus established in Kazakhstan, as it had been in Turkistan, from above, on the initiative of the Bolshevik leadership of Russia.

However, the increasingly complex political situation in the second half of 1918 had the effect of stalling the implementation of even these principles of autonomy. The policy of crushing democratic freedoms, the plundering of the property-owning classes, the destruction of the economic infrastructure, the food crisis, the growing threat of famine and the narrow, class-based approach to state-building all conspired in mid-1918 to unleash a fierce civil war in Transcaspia, Semirechye and Kazakhstan. Being cut off from Soviet Russia by the Orenburg, Semirechye and Transcaspien fronts, Turkistan found itself effectively under a blockade. The White Guards controlled two-thirds of Kazakhstan.

The anti-Soviet uprising in Tashkent, headed by the military commissar of the Turkistan Republic, the Bolshevik K. Osipov (January 1919), demonstrated the full extent of the crisis of Soviet power. The tight concentration of power in the aftermath of the uprising led to an even greater restriction of limited freedoms, and the unleashing of fresh terror and repressive measures: an extraordinary commission was set up to investigate the participants in the uprising and was empowered to 'hand down and carry out sentences'. A purge of political parties and Soviet institutions was proclaimed, and the bourgeoisie was made liable to pay indemnities and perform forced labour.

It was in this period that the fate of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party was decided. Following the Osipov uprising and its crushing and, more particularly, the Left Socialist Revolutionary uprising in Moscow and the consequent collapse of the Soviet coalition

³⁹ In those years in official documents, the Kazakhs (Qazāq) were called Kyrgyz (Qirghiz), and the Kyrgyz were called Kara-Kyrgyz (Qara-Qirghiz).

⁴⁰ *Pobeda sovetskoy vlasti v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane*, 1967, p. 608; *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii*, 2001, p. 523.

at the centre, the Seventh Regional Congress of Soviets legalized the liquidation and dissolution of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party in Turkistan. The two-party coalition, which had been in existence in the region since November 1917, fell apart. The Bolsheviks became the only party in power. The monopoly on power of the 'workers' party' further strengthened the 'local separatism' of the Bolshevik leadership of Turkistan, and their determination to be the sole deciders of the fate of the peoples of the region.

However, these developments came into sharp conflict with the by then strongly centralizing tendencies of the Russian Bolshevik Government. Their growing conviction of the need for a strong central power capable of restoring broken economic links and contacts with local authorities, standardizing the financial system, and ensuring order and discipline was reflected in a shift by central government in matters of practical detail towards extraordinary methods and forms of government, and the establishment of special organs – extraordinary commissions, extraordinary commissars, etc. – which were designed to compensate for the weakness of local authorities.

Upon receiving the news of the crushing of the Tashkent uprising, the Russian Soviet of People's Commissars established such a special commission on 12 February 1919. It was entrusted by the central government with the supervisory, judicial and executive functions of state power. On 5 March, of the various members of the special commission, P. Kobozev arrived alone in Tashkent at the head of a group of party workers.

With the arrival of Kobozev, the situation in Turkistan became even more complicated: relations between him and several members of the Turkistan leadership deteriorated sharply. In his fight against their 'local separatism', Kobozev used the national question. He accused the Turkistan leadership of failing to resolve the national problem by creating autonomy only for themselves, and not for the broad masses of the indigenous population, by issuing calls for the immediate exercise of the right to self-determination.

It was the position of Kobozev which in many ways determined the creation in March 1919 by the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan of the Regional Muslim Bureau (*Kraymusbyuro*, *Musbyuro*) to work among the indigenous population (its members included T. Ryskulov as chairman, A. Muhitdinov, N. Khojayev, etc.) and dictated the introduction of the principle of proportional representation of national groups (nationalities) in the government organs of Turkistan (July 1919). In a comparatively short space of time, the Regional Muslim Bureau achieved concrete results by creating within the party committees local bureaux of Muslim communists and Muslim sections among the grass-roots party organizations, which very quickly became independent organizations existing alongside the party cells in production units.⁴¹

⁴¹ *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana v rezoliutsiyakh syezdov i konferentsiy*, 1987, p. 52.

Among the members of the national party organizations, there were numerous former Jadids. According to the leader of the Turkistan Jadids, Munawwar Qari,⁴² as early as the first half of 1918, the Tashkent section of the secret Jadid society *Ittihād-i Taraqqi* (Union for Progress), formed in August 1917, officially permitted its members to join Soviet government parties. Cooperation with the Soviet authorities was begun by members of the national intelligentsia, many of whom started to work in Soviet institutions, particularly in the field of education.⁴³ The fact that the Jadids and members of the national intelligentsia joined the Communist Party had an impact both on the future development of the budding national communist movement and on the political positions of the leaders of the Regional Muslim Bureau.

The Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan, and more particularly the Regional Muslim Bureau, took the initiative of implementing the decisions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) regarding proportional representation of the national groups of the region. The authority of the Regional Muslim Bureau and its local branches grew significantly: they effectively controlled and ensured the movement of national cadres among the soviets.

This group of party and Soviet workers, headed by the chairman of the Regional Muslim Bureau, T. Ryskulov, and intent on actively combating the remains of colonialism in the region, was initially supported by the Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on Turkistan Affairs (*Turkkomissiya* – the Turkistan Commission). It was formed following the breaching of the blockade and the definitive linking of Turkistan to the centre in October 1919. Its members included key party workers from the centre: Sh. Z. Eliava (chairman), M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuibyshev, F. Goloshchokin, Ya. Rudzutak and G. I. Bokii. Granted sweeping powers not only by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, but also by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Turkistan Commission took decisive steps to neutralize the political forces that were firmly convinced that the Turkistan Bolsheviks had priority rights to the leadership of Turkistan to counterbalance the centralizing aspirations of Russia.

In this conflict, portrayed by the Turkistan Commission as a struggle with Great-Power chauvinism, the Regional Muslim Bureau and its chairman, T. Ryskulov, sided with the

⁴² His memoirs were written at the behest of the head of the Central Asian Department of the United State Political Administration (secret police; Russian acronym: OGPU) of the USSR, Bel'skiy, in 1928. Begun while Qari was still at liberty, they were completed behind the walls of OGPU, where he was imprisoned in 1929.

⁴³ Munawwar Qari, 2001, pp. 22–4.

Turkistan Commission, with the result that Ryskulov was elected in January 1920 as chairman of the Turkistan Central Executive Committee. However, in this struggle it soon became apparent that the national communists were quick to defend their interests. As early as January 1920, the Third Conference of Muslim Organizations of the Communist Party of Turkistan elaborated, and the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Turkistan later proclaimed, a programme entitled 'On the autonomy and constitution of Turkistan'. Designed to substantiate the premise, 'Turkistan, from the point of view of ethnography and numerous other factors, is a Turkic national republic,' this programme was aimed at upholding the sovereign rights of its indigenous population.⁴⁴

The ideas affirmed by the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Turkistan (January 1920) through its decision to form the Turkic Communist Party and the Turkic Soviet Republic were boldly defended by Ryskulov's group in a struggle lasting several months with the Turkistan Commission not only within the country, but also, on more than one occasion, involving appeals to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The visit to Moscow in May 1920 by a plenipotentiary delegation led by Ryskulov had considerable resonance in the social and political life of the region. Members of the Turkistan Commission also arrived in Moscow at the same time. In its observations on the 'Project for the establishment of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Republic of the Russian Socialist Federation' and its report on 'The situation in Turkistan' submitted to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Turkistan delegation, drawing on its experience of more than six months of the functioning of the Turkistan Commission and the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Turkistan Front in Turkistan, gave a sharply critical assessment, in view of 'the tendency of these two organs to consider Turkistan as a Soviet colony, whereas what is needed is a military administration of the region.'⁴⁵

Finding that situation abnormal, the delegation demanded that full powers be granted to the workers of the indigenous national group, all superstructures such as the Turkistan Commission be abolished, and the rights of the Revolutionary Military Soviet be restricted.⁴⁶ In the concrete measures proposed, particular attention was devoted to the affirmation of such symbols of state sovereignty as the creation of a national army, the attribution of full political powers solely to state organs of the republic (the Congress of Soviets, the Turkistan Central Executive Committee, the Turkistan Council of People's

⁴⁴ The Archives of the Apparatus of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (AAP RUz), coll. 60, inv. 1, file 406, fol. 24ob.

⁴⁵ Russian Centre for the Conservation and Study of Documents concerning Recent History (RTsKhIDNI), coll. 2, inv. 1, file 14099, fols. 2-5.

⁴⁶ Ibid., fols. 5-5ob.

Commissars), the affirmation of the autonomy of the Turkistan Republic, and arrangements for the representation of Turkistan in Moscow, etc.

It was basically with such an outline of the nature and powers of the Turkistan Republic that the national communists defended its future development within the framework of Russia, building mutual relations with the centre on the basis of a single, large-scale state union of peoples linked historically in an ethnic, territorial, economic, spiritual and material community. However, this did not suit the leadership of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Among the wide range of solutions proposed during the decision-making process on Turkistan, the main idea was that of dividing Turkistan along ethnic lines put forward by the Turkistan Commission as early as January 1920. Clearly, it was only the fear of boosting the national insurgent movement which accounts for a certain restraint on the part of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) regarding the time-frames for the implementation of these ideas.

In the four resolutions adopted on Turkistan matters on 29 June 1920 at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), subsequently known under the collective title of 'On the principal tasks of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in Turkistan', a special task was entrusted to the Turkistan Central Executive Committee: 'to proceed to reorganize the administrative districts of Turkistan in accordance with their ethnic composition.'⁴⁷ Among the primary tasks of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in Turkistan were the normalization of relations between the settler population and the indigenous peoples rooted in former tsarist policies in Turkistan, and the elimination of the patriarchal-feudal heritage. At the same time, attention was drawn to the need to maintain in Turkistan a permanent representation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); furthermore, the competence was defined of the federal authorities and organs of state power in Turkistan, etc.

The political processes governing the social life of the country and the never-ending squabbles between competing groups in the administrative apparatus took place against the background of the ongoing civil war, which rendered them especially acute. Thanks to the victory of the Soviet armed forces over Kolchak, and the ensuing creation from the various liberated military units of the Turkistan Front under the command of M. Frunze, which undertook military operations all over Turkistan, it became possible fairly rapidly to liquidate the Transcaspian Front (February 1920) and the Semirechye Front (April 1920).

⁴⁷ Russian Centre for the Conservation and Study of Documents concerning Recent History (RTsKhIDNI), coll. 79, inv. 1, file 158, unnumbered sheet.

However, the Basmachi movement in the Ferghana valley remained for many years a key element of the armed opposition in the country. One of the leaders of the movement, Madaminbek, appealed to the commander of the Soviet troops in the Ferghana valley in 1919:

You have proclaimed a federation; you have proclaimed the self-determination of peoples; so why do you not grant it to us? Is it only because we are Muslims? Allow us to live as we wish, in accordance with your own slogans; allow us to choose the kind of government we wish, because there are more of us Muslims. . . .⁴⁸

Launched with the slogans ‘Turkistan for the Turkistanis’ and ‘Freedom for Turkistan’, as the movement developed, it drew to its ranks not only fervent advocates of independence for Turkistan, but also the broad masses of the population, who were unhappy with the unpopular ‘socialist’ policies: the closure of mosques and *madrasas*, the prohibition of *qāzī* (Islamic judge) courts, the nationalization of all industrial enterprises down to craft workshops, the introduction of a bread monopoly and the requisitioning of farm produce, the activities of the food rationing detachments, the closure of the bazaars, the prohibition of free trade, etc. With strong support among the population, the movement included not only individuals from the more affluent sections of society – merchants, *beys* (dignitaries) and clerics –, but also rural dwellers and artisans. It was they, according to one of the leaders of the Turkistan Republic, who were the mainstay of the movement, which also included numerous representatives of the Jadid intelligentsia and members of secret Jadid organizations, such as the *Ittihād-i Taraqqi* (1918–19), *Milli Ittihād* (National Association, 1920–4) and the underground society *Turkistān Milli Birligi* (Turkistan National Union), created with the active participation of the celebrated social activist Ahmad Zeki Velidi.⁴⁹

All this explains why, following the failures of the Soviet armed forces on the Ferghana Front, Frunze was forced to admit that their opponents ‘were not mere brigands – had they been, . . . we would have finished with them long ago’.⁵⁰ From the very beginning, the insurgency was a mass movement, involving during certain periods in the years 1918–20 as many as 60,000 individuals. In these years, the insurgents had major successes in their military operations: at some times they had nearly the entire Ferghana valley under their control, with the exception of a few towns and railway stations. An important event was the establishment in October 1919, under the leadership of the commander of the Ferghana valley insurgency, Madaminbek, of the *Farghāna Muwaqqat Mukhtāriyat Hukūmati* (Ferghana Provisional Autonomous Government), which represented the true objectives of the movement.

⁴⁸ Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), coll. 28113, inv. 1, file 1, fol. 1.

⁴⁹ *Turkistan v nachale XX veka*. . . , 2000, pp. 183–8.

⁵⁰ *M. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny*, 1941, p. 308.

From the death of Madaminbek in spring 1920 until the end of 1922, the leader of the insurgents was *Qurbāshi* (commander) Sher Muhammad Bek (known in Soviet sources as Kurshermat), elected at a *qurultay* (assembly). Under his leadership in May 1920, the *Turkistān-Turk Mustaqill Islām Jumhūriyati* (Turkistan-Turkic Independent Islamic Republic) was established, which adopted a provisional constitution in April 1922. The government of Sher Muhammad Bek and the leaders of the *Turkistān Milli Birligi* at this time exerted particular efforts to unite the movement. However, in late 1922, having come under heavy pressure from the Soviet armed forces, the situation of the insurgency took a sharp turn for the worse, and Sher Muhammad Bek decided to dissolve the government and flee abroad.

In 1923–4 the separatist tendencies within the movement became stronger. In the course of the fighting in 1924, the lack of contact and coordination between the various *qurbāshis* was soon felt in the fighting potential of the movement. Soviet armed forces in Ferghana, whose fighting strength continued to grow thanks to troop reinforcements from central Russia, doggedly squeezed the insurgents out of the positions they had conquered. The national military opposition suffered a defeat.⁵¹ However, the defeat was only temporary; the insurgency movement continued on into the years 1925–35.

The fighting in the Ferghana valley was bitter, with each of the warring sides experiencing its share of terror and violence, and the civilian population caught between the two. The endless requisitioning of food, livestock and horses, the hunger, the sacrifices during the military operations, etc. all gave rise to countless losses in the human and productive resources of the region. Between 1918 and 1924 in the Ferghana valley, 1 million people died of starvation and no fewer than 500,000 died in the fighting.⁵²

The peoples of the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate experienced no less dramatic and tragic events. In both places, following the October 1917 coup and the establishment of Soviet power in Russia and Turkistan, the internal and external political situation changed abruptly. The hostile attitude to the Bolsheviks, the refusal to recognize the Bolshevik government of Turkistan, and the overt endeavours of the ruling circles of the khanates to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Iran and Britain were all clear signals regarding their external political orientation. Relations between Russia, Soviet Turkistan and the Central Asian khanates began to take on a distinctly confrontational hue.

The existence of an undeclared war with neighbouring states was a major irritant to the leaders of the Turkistan Commission and the Turkistan Front, who were increasingly inclined to the use of force in order to resolve the conflict. Prominent in their tactics was

⁵¹ Rajabov, 1995, pp. 28–9.

⁵² Ibid., p. 19.

the practice of inciting opposition forces in the khanates to use armed struggle against the ruling regimes.

Within a comparatively short space of time, it proved possible to bring together all the opposition forces of the Khiva khanate: the Khiva Communists, the Young Khivans and the leaders of the principal Turkmen tribes in competition with Junaid⁵³ – Goch Mamed Khan and Ghulam ‘Ali Khan – and to create in November 1919 at Tortkul the Khivan Revolutionary Centre, which initiated the uprising in Khiva. On the orders of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkistan Republic, on the pretext of ‘providing assistance to the workers of Khiva in liberating themselves from the arbitrary rule of Junaid’, military units from the specially created Amu Darya Army Group immediately entered Khivan territory. Between late December 1919 and early January 1920, Soviet troops moving in from the north and south successfully occupied the strategic points of the khanate: on 20 January, Takhta, Junaid’s general headquarters, was taken (Junaid disappeared into the desert with a small detachment), and on 1 February the troops entered Khiva. On the following day, the khan of Khiva abdicated.

Concealing the role of Soviet military expansionism in overthrowing the political regime of a neighbouring state, the leaders of the Turkistan Commission and the Turkistan Front hastened to depict the events in Khiva as a revolutionary uprising, a popular revolution. Convened on 26 April 1920, the First All-Khwarazm *Qurultay* of People’s Representatives declared the Khiva khanate dissolved and proclaimed the Khwarazm People’s Soviet Republic, reviving the ancient name of the region: Khwarazm. The provisional constitution adopted at the *qurultay* noted the anti-monarchist, anti-feudal and popular-democratic character of the coup and the new regime installed thereby. While this constitution borrowed the form of government from the RSFSR, with its soviets and typical structure, these soviets were supposed to express not the dictatorship of the proletariat, but rather the dictatorship of the people.⁵⁴ The *qurultay* formed the government of the republic – the Soviet of People’s *Nāzirs* (inspectors, administrators). The leader of the Young Khivans, Pahlawan Niyaz Yusupov, was elected as chairman, the Young Khivan, Jum‘a Niyaz Sultan Muradov, and the chief of one of the Turkmen clans, Goch Mamed Khan Sapiyev, as vice-chairmen.

On 13 September 1920 a treaty of alliance was concluded between the RSFSR and the Khwarazm People’s Soviet Republic, according to which Russia unconditionally recognized the ‘full independence of the Khwarazm People’s Soviet Republic, with all the

⁵³ In January 1918 the khan of Khiva, Asfandiyar Khan, feeling that his grip on power was weak, invited Junaid Khan to Khiva and conferred full powers on him, appointing him commander-in-chief of the army.

⁵⁴ *Istoriya Khorezmskoy narodnoy sovetskoy respubliki*, 1976, pp. 41–6.

consequences deriving from such recognition'. However, with the military-political and economic agreements concluded alongside the treaty of alliance, the Khwarazm People's Soviet Republic found itself once again fully dependent on Russia.⁵⁵

Events in the Bukhara emirate unfolded according to a similar scenario to that in Khiva. In a series of special directives issued on 10 August 1920, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), under pressure from the workers of the Turkistan Commission and the Turkistan Front, unambiguously foresaw the possibility of a similar course of events in Bukhara:

4. Launching an offensive on our own initiative instead of adopting preparatory measures for defence may only be carried out with the help of a more or less popular Bukhara revolutionary centre (albeit on our territory) urging us to launch such an offensive. . . .⁵⁶

The leadership of the Turkistan Commission and the Turkistan Front interpreted the directives of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as a spur to action. As early as 3 August 1920, the Turkistan Commission held a meeting at which it managed to organize the Bukhara Communists and the Young Bukharan Revolutionary Organization into a bloc, on condition that the members of the latter agreed to 'join the Communist Party officially, the very first day after the coup in Bukhara'. For the management of the 'revolutionary' events, a party centre was set up, consisting of one member of the Turkistan Commission, V. Kuibyshev, the chairman of the Central Bureau of the Young Bukharan Revolutionaries, Faizullah Khojayev, and the chairman of the Bukharan Communist Party, N. Husainov. On 28 August the party centre moved from Tashkent to New Bukhara. The following day, in Old Charju, the Bukharan Communist Volunteer Unit staged a parade – immediately proclaimed an uprising by the working masses, and the beginning of the revolution – and an appeal for assistance was sent to the Turkistan Commission.

The Turkistan Front troops were by then already mobilized and ready for battle. Most of the offensive groups had been ordered to occupy their designated positions, and to begin active operations on the night of 28–29 August. The use of heavy armaments predetermined the outcome of the operation. On 2 September 1920 the Turkistan Front troops and the Bukharan Volunteer Units entered Bukhara. The emir left Bukhara with his troops.⁵⁷

On 14 September 1920 the All-Bukharan Revolutionary Committee was established, with 'Abd al-Qadir Muhitdinov as its chairman. Also created was the new government – the

⁵⁵ *Istoriya Khorezmskoy narodnoy sovetsoy respubliki*, 1976, pp. 56–64.

⁵⁶ *M. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny*, 1941, p. 328.

⁵⁷ Practically at the same time as the former emir, in 1920–1, more than 200,000 refugees, or about one-fourth of the population of eastern Bukhara, left the southern regions of what is now Tajikistan (Abdullayev, 1991, p. 191).

Soviet of People's *Nāzirs*, to which Faizullah Khojayeov was appointed chairman. Both the All-Bukharan Revolutionary Committee and the government were composed essentially of communists. By that time the Young Bukharan Revolutionary Party had dissolved itself.

The All-Bukharan *Qurultay* of People's Representatives held on 6–8 October 1920 proclaimed the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic. Under the treaty of alliance signed on 4 March 1921 between the RSFSR and the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic, Russia unconditionally recognized the independence of the Bukharan Republic. However, the adopted principles of economic cooperation, as in the case of the Khivan Republic, further increased the dependence of Bukhara on Russia.⁵⁸

The coups in Bukhara and Khwarazm constituted a practical implementation of the Bolshevik idea of 'world revolution'. In pursuit of this aim, the Bolsheviks did not refrain from armed aggression against the sovereign states of Khiva and Bukhara, on the pretext of providing assistance to the 'people in uprising', a situation that they had themselves organized.

In response to the coups in Bukhara and Khiva and their occupation by Soviet armed forces, armed liberation movements arose immediately. Their popular and ubiquitous nature bore witness to the hostility of the peoples of these countries to the new regimes. This struggle continued on into the 1930s, but was at its most widespread and intransigent during the initial period of 1920–4. One of the constant demands put forward by the insurgents was the immediate withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from the territories of those countries. At times, the insurgents managed to control almost the whole territory of western Bukhara (late 1921) and eastern Bukhara (late winter–early spring 1922); the capitals of the two states were subjected to prolonged sieges, which were accompanied by hard and bloody fighting in Bukhara (March 1922) and Khiva (January 1924).

Only by increasing the strength of its forces was the leadership of the Turkistan Front able to dampen the ardour of the insurgency. According to Western sovietologists, in spring–autumn 1923, the Soviet command fielded against the insurgents in the Bukharan Republic a large contingent numbering, according to some estimates, as many as 100,000 troops. Even so, it proved impossible to crush the liberation struggle completely for many years. The glorious pages of that movement's history were written by its leaders, who were devoted to the ideas of freedom and independence, and endeavoured to consolidate the insurgent forces and lead their military operations: Ibrahim Bek Laqay, Mulla 'Abd al-Qahhar and the celebrated Turkish activist Enver Pasha in Bukhara, and Junaid Khan in Khwarazm.

⁵⁸ *Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsii...*, Vol. 2, 1921, pp. 5, 12–14.

The undiminished popular opposition in Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm grew into a broad liberation movement in defence of the sovereignty of those peoples' states, way of life and faith, which the Bolsheviks, in view of the changes they had wrought in those countries, clearly intended to obliterate. Following the well-known decisions on Turkistan taken by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in June 1920, the state apparatus of Turkistan had come completely under the control of the central authorities. As early as July 1920, the Turkistan Commission found it necessary to reform the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan, and to establish, pending the convening of the Fifth Congress, a Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan. At the same time, a decision was taken to renew the membership of the Presidium of the Turkistan Central Executive Committee. The renewed central organs refused to admit as members Ryskulov and his supporters, who backed the idea of a Turkistan Republic. Under the slogan, 'Only a successful struggle against Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism', campaigns were undertaken in Turkistan to purge the party-state apparatus at all levels, update the lists of party members, and re-elect local soviets. The entire party-state apparatus was thus renewed.

Under the slogan, 'There is no single Turkic language, just as there is no single Turkic culture,' a campaign was unleashed against Islam and Islamic institutions as the principal bearers of the cultural heritage of the East. In 1920 party resolutions were adopted for the closure of the legal courts of *qāzīs* and *beys*, and the expropriation of *waqf* (religious endowment) lands. In 1922, owing to the strengthening of the insurgency, the Bolsheviks were obliged to make a number of what they called 'political concessions', among which it was felt necessary to re-establish the Islamic courts and return the *waqf* lands to the Muslim communities; as early as March 1923, the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Turkistan insisted that in no case should such concessions be extended further.⁵⁹

The independence of the Khwarazm and Bukharan republics in the early mid-1920s was highly illusory; in practice they had already lost their independence. Almost immediately, the external economic and political functions – the chief attributes of state sovereignty – were removed from them. With the economic union of the three republics of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm, the creation of the Central Asian Economic Council (1923), the inclusion of the communist parties of Khwarazm and Bukhara within the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (1922), the creation of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) for the unification and coordination of the activities of the communist parties of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm, monetary unification, the basis of which was the Russian *chervonets* (10-rouble banknote),

⁵⁹ *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana v rezoliutsiyakh syezdov i konferentsiy*, 1987, p. 213.

and various other measures, the political, economic and financial levers of power in these states fell into the hands of the party-state leadership of Russia.

With a view to 'synchronization' with the more developed regions of Russia, backward Bukhara and Khwarazm were brought into the general process of modernization. This led to an extremely harsh, forcible break-up of traditional structures, causing great suffering among the population. The formal beginning of the socialist stage in the development of Bukhara and Khwarazm came with the resolutions of the legislative organs of these republics. The Ninth All-Khwarazm Congress of Soviets (October 1923) and the Fifth All-Bukharan Congress of Soviets (19 September 1923) proclaimed the transformation of their republics into socialist republics, which became known as the Khwarazm People's Socialist Republic and the Bukharan People's Socialist Republic respectively.

In this new situation, the leadership of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) again examined the idea of national-territorial demarcation. On 31 January 1924 the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) entrusted Ya. E. Rudzutak, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), with the task of carefully examining the question of demarcation of the national-territorial boundaries of the region, and ascertaining the views of the leaders of the three Central Asian republics (Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm) thereon.⁶⁰ Thus, the 1920 idea of demarcating the boundaries of the Turkistan Republic, which was part of the RSFSR, turned into a more large-scale proposition – that of drawing the borders not only of the Turkistan Republic, but also the Bukharan Republic and the Khwarazm Republic, which were legally still independent sovereign states.

The party leadership of Russia had not the slightest doubt about the correctness of the proposal to draw the borders of the three state entities, which reflected the general orientations that had by then clearly emerged among the party leadership at the centre. The representatives of almost all Union Republics came out against these orientations, sharply criticizing them as early as at the first party congress after the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (April 1923). Noting that 'the construction of the Union had gone down the wrong avenue', the participants in the debates examined the chief reasons for this, in the light of the growing tendencies for bureaucratic administration, voluntarism and centralism that had become established under the leadership of Stalin and the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks.⁶¹

Given these developments, the position of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party with regard to the Central Asian region is understandable. It was on its direct

⁶⁰ *Istoriya kommunisticheskoy organizatsii Sredney Azii*, 1967, p. 726.

⁶¹ *Dvenadtsatiy syezd RKP(b)*..., 1968, pp. 295–519, 567–619.

orders that the leading party organs of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm found themselves involved in implementing the idea that they themselves had put forward for national-territorial demarcation.

Much of 1924 was taken up with the drawing of borders, which was carried out from beginning to end by party functionaries of the region, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and its duly empowered representatives – the members of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, with a complete absence of mechanisms for the expression of the will of the peoples, and without taking into account the views of ethnographers, economists, historians, etc. Only in its final stage was the question of national-territorial demarcation transmitted to the state organs of the republics for ratification.

The resolutions of the extraordinary session of the Turkistan Central Executive Committee (15 September 1924), the Fifth All-Bukharan *Qurultay* of Soviets (20 September 1924) and the Fifth All-Khwarazm *Qurultay* of Soviets (29 September–5 October 1924), as the supreme governing organs of the republics, all approved the results of the demarcation and the creation of the new state entities: the Uzbek and Turkmen Union Republics, which joined the USSR; the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR; the Tajik Autonomous *Oblast'* within the Uzbek Republic; the Karakalpak Autonomous *Oblast'* within the Kazakh ASSR; and finally the transfer of territories inhabited by Kazakhs to the Kazakh ASSR.⁶² A little later, the status of the national self-determination of the Tajiks was modified. At a meeting on 4 October 1924, the Uzbek Bureau on National-Territorial Demarcation decided to agree to the decision of the Tajik Commission to establish the Tajik Autonomous Republic, to be part of the Uzbek Union Republic.

At the beginning of the second session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR (14 October 1924), and subsequently the second session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR (27 October 1924), a favourable response was given to the petitions of the extraordinary sessions of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkistan ASSR, the Fifth All-Bukharan and the Fifth All-Khwarazm *Qurultays* of Soviets for national-territorial demarcation and the formation of new Union Republics, autonomous republics and *oblast's*.⁶³

The Third Congress of Soviets of the USSR (May 1925) responded favourably to the 'free expression of the will of the peoples' of the Turkmen and Uzbek Republics to join

⁶² Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan, inv. 1, file 139, fols. 25–7; coll. 47, inv. 1, file 563, fols. 7–8; file 32, fol. 32.

⁶³ *Narodnoye khoziaystvo Sredney Azii*, 1924, No. 4, p. 208.

the USSR. The national-territorial demarcation and formation of the new state entities was thus completed.

However, the process of state-building in the part of Central Asia that was under Russian influence continued. On 1 February 1926 the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR transformed the Kyrgyz Autonomous *Oblast'* into an autonomous republic. On 15 October 1929 a decision was taken to form the Tajik Union Republic. In 1930 the Karakalpak Autonomous *Oblast'* was hived off from the Kazakh ASSR and transferred to the Uzbek SSR as an autonomous republic. The 1936 constitution of the USSR enshrined the change in the legal status of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz Autonomous Republics – they became Union Republics of the USSR.⁶⁴

The implementation of the idea of demarcation was a fairly 'successful' manoeuvre by the Bolsheviks. Above all, a substantial blow had been dealt to the ideology and practice of the national liberation movement. The centre had succeeded in shifting the attention of the peoples of the region from external to internal problems, and this was soon reflected in a decline in the insurgency movement. Most important, by this action the Bolsheviks achieved patent successes in their strategic aims. Above all, by including in the demarcation exercise concerning the Turkistan ASSR both the Bukharan and Khwarazm Republics, which were legally speaking independent states, these two ancient states of the region disappeared from the political map of the world. Once again, the Bolsheviks demonstrated their loyalty to the imperial policies of tsarism, and its geopolitical claims to the Central Asian region. At the same time, the demarcation exercise and the formation of the new political entities afforded the Bolshevik leadership a welcome propaganda image of socialist democracy regarding the resolution of the national question in Soviet Central Asia, a matter to which they accorded considerable significance in their utopian hopes for the worldwide triumph of the revolution.

For the peoples of Central Asia, the demarcation of borders and the formation of new 'national states' imparted fresh nuances to their ongoing development. The thousand-year-long tradition of Central Asian statehood was thus interrupted. Despite the frequent changes of ruling dynasties and the shifting spatio-territorial parameters, the chief component of this statehood had remained constant: the long-standing multi-ethnic nature of the population, with intermixed patterns of settlement, and the inhabitants' common economic, social, religious and cultural attributes. Each ethnic group, occupying its own specific niche, remained a truly equipollent constituent of the community.

Now, the formation of Union Republics, autonomous republics and *oblast'*s introduced a size-based hierarchy of ethnic groups, not only in relation to the status of the political

⁶⁴ *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii*, 2001, p. 530.

entity, but also within that entity: the titular ethnic group, which gave its name to the political entity, and 'national minorities'. In this way, portions of the population, who continued to live and work on their ancestral lands, were, according to official definitions, turned into 'national minorities'. This was bound to affect their self-awareness and give rise to a feeling that their rights had somehow been circumscribed, and this was in turn reflected in the ethno-national processes within the various political entities. The conflictual nature of the situation was exacerbated by the problem of 'divided ethnic groups': the new political entities, which brought together the greater part of the 'titular' nationality, nevertheless also remained multi-ethnic societies, with an identical set of ethnic groups present in each of them. In essence, the ethno-national processes and relations among the peoples of the region were thus sown with time-bombs, which in emergency situations were likely to explode into all manner of conflicts.

Naturally, the process of national statehood-building had diverse consequences, including both long-term negative phenomena and positive shifts. National-territorial demarcation, although carried out 'from above', often using voluntarist methods, spurred the consolidation of the region's major ethnic groups – the Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Tajiks and Karakalpaks – and to a certain extent this fostered the formation and development of their national self-awareness and their spiritual and linguistic unity.

However, the positive potential of the boundary demarcation exercise was seriously limited by the impact of Soviet unitarism, which had by then begun to be felt and had actually been enshrined in the constitution. In accordance with the first constitution of the USSR, adopted in January 1924, many strategically important questions were entrusted to the supreme organs of the USSR: foreign policy and foreign trade, establishment of the foundations and overall development of the economy, a unified monetary and credit system, ship building and production, basic labour laws, general principles in the field of education, use of mineral, forest and water resources in the national territory, management of transport and posts and telegraphs, adoption of the government's budget, etc.⁶⁵ In this connection, it is hardly correct to claim that the new political entities of the region constituted the creation of 'national statehood'. Given their almost complete absence of sovereignty, these entities were effectively reduced to the level of administrative-economic provinces of the USSR.

The constitutionally instituted structures of Soviet power and their plenary powers constituted a political extension of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the class-based nature of socialist statehood, with its cornerstone idea of the dictatorship of the working class. Elections to the governing bodies of the country were instituted by the constitution on the basis of indirect and unequal voting rights: five times as many delegates were elected by urban

⁶⁵ *Pervaya konstitutsiya SSSR...*, 1948, pp. 367–8.

inhabitants as by rural inhabitants;⁶⁶ this was supposed to ensure the 'leading role of the working class' in government bodies. Also deprived of voting rights were people who used hired labour or who lived on unearned income, members of the clergy, former policemen, etc. Given that the Central Asian region of the USSR had a predominantly rural population, and that typical local occupations (cotton-growing, livestock-raising) required the use of hired labour, the electoral system introduced by the constitution reduced the representation of the Central Asian peoples in the central power structures of the country.

The constitutionally sanctioned non-separation of the legislative, executive and juridical arms of government, the absence of generally recognized checks and balances in the centralized political life, and the fact that the constitution completely ignored the rights and freedoms of the individual all inevitably led to the consolidation of totalitarianism, and consequently of violence, terror and repression, all of which were particularly prominent in the 1930s. Thus, within a fairly short space of time, the formal legal status of the national-territorial entities of the region underwent substantial changes. However, with regard to sovereignty, they retained their original status quo, since they continued to remain a part of the political entity known as the USSR, without rights and rigorously subordinate to the central authorities.

The usurpation of power by the Bolsheviks and the forcible communist expansion in Central Asia led to the destruction of the political pluralism engendered by the February revolution, and the ideas of democracy and people's power embodied in the ideology and practice of the liberal democratic Jadid intelligentsia of Turkistan, Kazakhstan, Bukhara and Khwarazm. In their alternative models for the social and political organization of their peoples, those peoples' specific national traits and their moral and ethical principles and standards were closely linked to the achievements of democracy and global progress. The fact that the Bolsheviks accorded priority to class interests over national interests, ignored the national factor, pursued a policy of forcible Sovietization and imposed a socialist form of statehood on peoples constituted a domination of the majority by a minority, and a denial of the right of peoples to determine their own historical destiny and way of life.

⁶⁶ *Pervaya konstitutsiya SSSR...*, 1948, p. 369.

INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL FERMENT

G. Ashurov

Contents

The role of religion	181
Intellectuals and poets among the nomadic peoples	182
Intellectuals and poets among the oasis peoples	185
The new generation of Jadids	190
Pan-Turkism	199
Impact of the Jadids	201

In the 1860s and 1870s the ethnic composition and socio-political structure of Central Asian society were rather complicated. The Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek peoples belonged to various states: Turkistan governor-generalship, which was part of the Russian empire, the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva. Since ancient times the peoples of the region had lived in close contact and influenced one another, developing many common features in their material and spiritual culture and way of life. An important role in this was played by Islam, which for many centuries had been the region's dominant religion. While emphasizing the common history of the region's peoples we should nevertheless note the nature of the differences between them, in particular their various historical and cultural traditions. Some (the Tajiks, and to a considerable extent the Uzbeks) led a settled way of life, others were in transition to a settled way of life, while still others were nomadic and began the transition to a settled way of life only in the Soviet period (after 1917). These circumstances are important for any analysis and understanding of the problems of their spiritual life. In the region two cultures interacted, and continue to

interact, as components of all human culture – the settled (Iranian) culture and the nomadic (Turkic) culture.

The role of religion

The socio-political thought of the region's peoples at the time of the emirate of Bukhara, the khanate of Khiva and Turkistan cannot be understood without an analysis of religion as a form of social consciousness and its place in society. Religion dominated all spheres of life in the society and determined the nature of education and upbringing, filling people's everyday affairs, their way of life and way of thinking. It is no exaggeration to say that Islam constituted the legal system, the political and moral doctrine and the social philosophy in the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva. It synthesized the whole spiritual life of society and subordinated to itself other forms of social consciousness, at least until the mid-nineteenth century, when the reformist movement known as Jadidism¹ first broke through into the ossified life of the antiquated feudal society.

The exceptional position of Islam and the clergy was no coincidence and stemmed from the very nature of feudal society itself, in which religion and the religious nature of social consciousness had become the necessary attribute of society. First of all, the clergy had a monopoly over education. The whole system of education and upbringing, from the lowest level (the *maktab*, religious elementary school) to the highest (the *madrasa*), was concentrated in their hands. Second, the clergy also exercised legal functions, giving their class the highest level of political importance in society. They monopolized the right to interpret the law on the basis of *fiqh* (jurisprudence, understanding) of the *sharī'a* (Islamic law). In the circumstances, any criticism of the existing regime (especially in Bukhara and Khiva) had to be of a religious nature and form.

This dominant position of Islam and the clergy relates to the settled populations of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to a great extent and to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan to a lesser degree. Among the nomads, however, the influence of religion on the way of life and thought both of the individual and of society as a whole was quite superficial. The outstanding Kazakh Jadid, Chokan Valikhanov (Wali Khan, 1835–65), wrote about this in relation to the Kazakhs:

although they are followers of Islam, like their heathen colleagues they are quite different from their settled fellow tribespeople. The Muslim religion, which they acquired only

¹ The Jadids were modernizing social and political reformers who were inspired by the ideals of the European Enlightenment and subsequent European modernization. The word Jadid (*jadid*) means 'new'. [Eds.]

recently, had no overwhelming influence on them as it did on the Tatars and others ... [The Kazakhs] are true believers in name [only].²

Elsewhere Valikhanov notes that under the influence of Tatar mullahs, Central Asian *ishāns* (Sufi teachers, headmen) and their proselytes, 'our nation is developing more and more into one of the general Muslim type'.³

The lack of the necessary socio-political and cultural conditions in society meant that a 'division of intellectual labour' (as there was in Russia) could not occur – in other words, it was not possible to deprive the clergy of their monopoly over education and the performance of juridical functions. As a result, the clergy continued to play an important role in the cultural and political life of society. In the second half of the nineteenth century, influenced by changing conditions, the social thought of the region's peoples also began to change gradually. The result was the rise of the Jadid movement, which changed the very argument of social thought, its direction and development. The writings of the Jadids criticized feudal social relations and institutions, including religion. The fight against ignorance, backwardness and despotism and the criticism of oppression and the feudal powers' arbitrary rule, the clergy's hypocrisy and fanaticism, the money-lenders' grasping nature and greed and so on became the main trend in Jadid literature. The Jadids were advocates of secular education, equality, freedom and human worth.

The Jadid movement in Central Asia and Kazakhstan had its own particular features, which left their mark on the ideological current in general. Primarily, the movement in this region was not only anti-feudal in nature but also anti-colonial. It had much in common with the modernizing movement in the neighbouring countries – Iran, Afghanistan and India. It should be noted that in Soviet times analyses of the movement drew attention to its antifeudal nature alone and did not indicate that Jadidism in Central Asia and Kazakhstan had also conveyed the ideology of the national movement.

Intellectuals and poets among the nomadic peoples

Russia's influence on Kazakhstan, including education and culture, was much broader and came considerably earlier than its influence on the rest of Central Asia.

Chokan Valikhanov,⁴ an outstanding Kazakh intellectual, was born into the family of a pro-Russian hereditary khan and graduated from the cadet college in Omsk. His short but brilliant life achieved much in the name of science and progress. His work as an enlightener

² Valikhanov, 1984, Vol. 1, p. 302.

³ Valikhanov, 1985, Vol. 4, p. 71.

⁴ His real name was Muhammad Hanafiya, which indicates that his family were Hanafis; Chokan was the nickname given him by his mother. [Trans.]

laid the foundations for the dissemination across the Kazakh steppes of progressive ideas about the benefits of knowledge and the people's need for education. These ideas attracted the Kazakh reformer, Ibray Altynsarin (1841–89), and the founder of Kazakh literature, Abay Kunanbaev (Ibrahim Qunanbayuly) (1845–1904). Valikhanov lived and worked in historically significant times: the process of Russia's annexation of Kazakhstan was completed, the old patriarchal and feudal foundations were crumbling and the outlying steppe was gradually drawn into the orbit of general Russian development.

Russia's annexation of Kazakhstan and then of Central Asia was a complex process. Coming at a crucial moment for the survival of the Kazakh and other peoples of Central Asia and their need to be included in broader social processes, annexation was an acceptable way out of the historical situation which had developed. However, annexation also meant colonization of the region by tsarist Russia, with its tragic moral and social consequences, all of which had a profound influence on Valikhanov. His works are examples of in-depth research into the most varied aspects of the history and culture of the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uighurs and other Turkic peoples of the region. His efforts to interpret the phenomena occurring in daily life can be traced in his works. Defending the rights of ordinary people in his *Notes on Legal Reform*, he questioned the essence and nature of the reforms being carried out by the colonial administration. Defining the concept of 'progress' as improvement of the people's material prosperity, Valikhanov considered that the spread of education and 'true knowledge' and the raising of cultural standards were the only way to achieve progress. 'For the normal growth and development of a nation,' he said, 'freedom and knowledge are needed above all else. Evidently the first thing to do is to teach.'⁵

Valikhanov also made a great contribution to the study of the Kyrgyz people's history by opening up to the world their heroic epic, *Manas*. He described this as an encyclopaedic collection of all the Kyrgyz people's myths, tales, stories and legends as well as their geographic, religious and intellectual knowledge and moral concepts. *Manas* is a national epic, a kind of steppe Iliad.⁶

Altynsarin⁷ was a well-known teacher and poet. He tried to deal in practice with the tasks of educating the Kazakh people that Valikhanov had set out in theory. He was a keen supporter of the Kazakh people's acquisition of Russian culture. An inspector of the people's colleges in Steppe region (*krai*) in the 1870s and 1880s, Altynsarin opened a number of schools for Kazakh children. He saw these schools as sources for spreading education and propagating secular science and culture. Altynsarin was opposed to ignorance and

⁵ *Chokan Valikhanov i sovremennost'*, 1988, p. 36.

⁶ Valikhanov, 1984, Vol. 1, p. 42.

⁷ *Istoriya filosofii v SSSR*, 1968, Vol. 3, pp. 583–4. See also Beysembiev, 1976.

critical of religious prejudice; and he defended secular education. Indeed, he devoted his whole life to the cause of popular education.

The most colourful figure among the Kazakhs was Abay Kunanbaev. In the formation of his humanist philosophy, Kunanbaev was much influenced by such prominent Russian writers as Pushkin, Dostoevsky and Nekrasov⁸ and Eastern writers like Ferdowsi, Nizami and Nawa'i.⁹ Kunanbaev hotly defended education and personal freedom and fought ignorance, backwardness and religious fanaticism. At a time when the feudal states were fragmented, he supported the idea of a centralized state to be headed by a strong and enlightened monarch. He saw this as the only way to overcome the feuding between clans and tribes, a topical issue among the Kazakhs at that time.

Kunanbaev considered quite correctly that knowledge is an important aim of human existence and a demand of the human soul: 'If we do not strive for knowledge, our soul will be that of an animal rather than of a human being.'¹⁰ In philosophical terms Kunanbaev was not an atheist but he was sharply opposed to the ethics of Islam. Trying to separate ethics from religion and to liberate people from fanaticism, he claimed that all ideas and concepts of virtue and vice, truth and falsehood had been invented by human beings. Kunanbaev's lofty evaluation of the purpose of humanity is concentrated in the ethical meaning of his formula 'be a human being'. He was convinced that every person should be wise, just, humane, honest and industrious, and that anyone who was ignorant, lazy, cruel, unsociable or dishonest was unworthy of being called a human being.

Kalygul Bay-uulu, Arstanbek Boylosh-uulu, Moldo Niyaz, Toktogul, Moldo Klych and Togolok Moldo were popular Kyrgyz poets who played an important part in the formation of the thinking of the Kyrgyz. Their poems and homilies were devoted to the interpretation of historical events, Russian colonization and the policy of forcing the Kyrgyz off their fertile pastures, the social situation of the nomads and cultural traditions and innovations among the Kyrgyz. The first published works by Kyrgyz poets were printed in Ufa and Kazan.¹¹ The poem *Kysy-i zilzala* [Story of the Earthquake] by Togolok Klych was published in 1911 and the researcher Osmonaaly Sydyk-uulu brought out a short history of the Kyrgyz called *Mukhtassar tarikh-i Kirgiziya* in 1913–14.

⁸ Russia's first national poet Aleksandr Sergeevich Pushkin (1799–1851), the Russian novelist Fedor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky (1821–81) and the Russian poet Nikolai Alekseevich Nekrasov (1821–78). [Trans.]

⁹ The poet Abu'l-Qasim Mansur Ferdowsi (940–1020), the Sufi poet Nizami (1141–1209) and the poet 'alishir Nawa'i (1441–1501). [Trans.]

¹⁰ Kunanbaev, 1961, p. 332. See also *Istoriya filosofii v SSSR*, 1968, Vol. 3, p. 585.

¹¹ Ufa is the capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan (Bashkiria), and Kazan is the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan (Tataria). [Trans.]

Berdimurad Berdakh (1827–1900) was a famous Karakalpak poet.¹² He witnessed several popular uprisings against the khan of Khiva. Some of his poems, particularly *Aman-geldy*, were dedicated to this uprising. He devoted a special poem called *Shajara* [Genealogy] to the history of the Karakalpaks. Much of his poetry is concerned with moral issues in social life.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Turkmen intellectual thought faced two important tasks. The first was to overcome clan and tribal feuding and unite the Turkmen in a single nation, and the second concerned relations with Russia. Leading Turkmen thinkers were required to deal with these important issues. The leading Turkmen poets tried as much as they could to provide answers to questions raised in the course of historical development. The writings of the Turkmen Jadid Aveztagan Katibi (1803–81)¹³ centred on the first of the two tasks. He was particularly concerned with the idea of national unity, overcoming clan and tribal feuding and creating one national state as factors promoting social progress.

Miskinklych (1850–1907)¹⁴ was a contemporary of Katibi. After Katibi, the creative works of Miskinklych raised the most acute socio-political questions. Miskinklych spoke with indignation about the coexistence of luxury and idleness with poverty and slavery in the society of his times. He condemned the senseless fratricidal clashes between Turkmen tribes. The Turkmen poets were also critical of Russia: ‘For the most part they saw only one side – invasion and colonization.’¹⁵

Intellectuals and poets among the oasis peoples

In the emirate of Bukhara, as in the Central Asian khanates, the necessary changes and innovations in the spheres of production and social relations took place extremely slowly. One generation of society after the other tended to block the same social structures which were copied and passed on to the next generation. The condition of society was reflected in its spiritual life. Priority was given to traditions and standards which accumulated the experience of the previous generations. However, this canonization of the experience of past generations created favourable conditions for dogmatism to develop in science, culture and the spiritual life of society as a whole.

It was from this kind of society that a great social reformer emerged. Ahmad Donish (1827–97) was one of the reformers of the Jadid movement in Central Asia. Donish was

¹² *Materialy po istorii progressivnoy obshchestvenno-filosofskoy mysli v Uzbekistane*, 1967, pp. 533–41.

¹³ *Ocherki istorii filosofskoy i obshchestvenno-politicheskoy mysli v Turkmenistane*, 1970, pp. 270–80.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 281–5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

a universal figure in the Tajik people's history of social thought in the nineteenth century. Proof of this is to be found not only in his heritage¹⁶ but also in his recognition by his contemporaries and followers. According to the orientalist and Iranist Ye. E. Bertels, one of the first to investigate Donish's heritage:

In approaching nineteenth-century Tajik literature we first come up against the outstanding figure of the 'father' of modern Tajik literature, Ahmad Kalle, whose works have left their imprint on all subsequent literature of the period and even after the [Bolshevik] October [1917] revolution continued to have a certain influence on the formation of Tajik literature.¹⁷

The humanitarian ideas and traditions of the history of philosophy and social thought of the Tajik people provided the theoretical basis for Donish's social philosophy. The formation of his Jadid views was undoubtedly influenced by Russia, which he visited three times, in 1858, 1868 and 1873, to learn about conditions there.

Problems concerning the emirate's political structure occupied an important place in Donish's social philosophy of Jadidism. In his opinion, the state was necessary to ensure the people's interests and the proper running of the country. Donish's concept of the essence and functions of the state was quite progressive for his times. He well understood that the emir's absolute rule was completely unsuited to protecting the interests of his subjects and ensuring the country's prosperity. Donish realized that without well-educated people who were familiar with secular as well as canonical science, it would be impossible to speak of sensible leadership of the state or of the well-being of its subjects, the prosperity of the state or the use of its natural resources to meet the needs of its people. He also well understood that all these tasks could not be resolved on the basis of religion alone. He therefore proposed that, besides the canon, secular thought – mathematics, geometry, astronomy, geography, history, arts and crafts, calligraphy and so on – should be studied in schools and *madrasas*.

Donish realized that it would be impossible to persuade the emirs of Bukhara to build a just society and that plans for the moral and religious transformation of the emirate were unrealizable. Donish's ideas therefore underwent considerable change and became more radical. They are reflected in his historical work *Risāla* [Treatise], which was written in 1895–7. The most serious and important changes in his position as a Jadid included his rejection of reformism. He called for a bold uprising against the existing regime, considering that such a step was completely in keeping with the rules and aims of the *sharī'a*. He wrote:

¹⁶ Donish, 1988; Donish, 1959a; Donish, 1959b; Donish, 1960.

¹⁷ Bertels, 1936, Vol. 3, p. 19.

These rulers, whom we call His Majesty the Emir and His Excellency the Wazir [the ruler's chief counsellor], are nothing but 'prodigal brutes' or worse. If the *sharī'a* were properly observed, they would be removed from power several times an hour. No one is obliged to subordinate himself to their dictates, and if anyone is insubordinate that does not make him a trouble-maker or a rebel.¹⁸

For Bukhara in the second half of the nineteenth century, the modernizing social philosophy of Donish was a theory of social importance, expressing the thoughts and aspirations of the people and aimed at the reconstruction of the country's social life. His legacy greatly influenced the subsequent development of social thought among the Tajiks, Uzbeks and other Central Asian peoples.

The progressive historian, poet and literary critic Mirza Azimi Sami (1837–1909) was a contemporary of Donish. He was a sharp social critic of the emir, his courtiers and the practices prevailing in Bukhara. His basic work was a history of the rule in Bukhara of the Manghit dynasty.¹⁹ This tract reflected the socio-political and economic backwardness of the emirate of Bukhara at the time of tsarist Russia's conquest of Central Asia and also illustrated the unconstrained arbitrariness of feudal rule and the grave situation of the people.

Mirza Siraj Hakim (1877–1914) was a young contemporary of Sami. Born in Bukhara, he travelled a great deal, visiting the Caucasus, Russia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France and Britain. He learned about modern medicine in Europe, graduated from medical college in Tehran and practised medicine in Bukhara and Iran. Mirza Siraj's fundamental work, reflecting his Jadid ideas, was his *Tuyāfi ahl-i Bukhārā* [Gift to the Inhabitants of Bukhara]. It was the outcome of his many years of travel in Europe and Asia.

The impressions Mirza Siraj gained on his travels promoted the emergence and development of his modernizing ideas. As a teacher, he particularly admired the state of education, science and culture in European countries, comparing it to that in his homeland and noting with bitterness:

I remembered our schools – the lessons on mats, the dirty blackboards and illiterate teachers who behaved towards the children like angels of vengeance, and I involuntarily wept tears of grief and jealousy and cried out, 'Heavens! How did it come about that we failed to appreciate science and became such contemptible creatures!'²⁰

Meditation on these problems – why things were so different in Europe and Bukhara – led Mirza Siraj to raise an important question: Why is it that the Europeans mastered all

¹⁸ Donish, 1960, p. 121.

¹⁹ Mirza Azimi Sami, 1962.

²⁰ Mirza Siraj Hakim, 1992, p. 66.

the sciences and arts and achieved progress, while we who did not master the sciences and crafts are backward in our development? This question, raised by a Jadid at the beginning of the twentieth century, is all the more topical for Central Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, relations with Russia began to be discussed more frequently and widely in the Tajik and Uzbek Jadid movement. Such matters occupied an important place in the creative work of the Tajik Jadid Asiri and the Uzbek Jadids Mukimi and Furkat. They all knew one another, having studied at the *madrassa* in the town of Kokand, which in the not so distant past had been the centre of the Kokand khanate. It should also be noted that the Tajik Jadids spoke Uzbek well and the Uzbek Jadids knew Tajik, an important factor in their creative cooperation.

Tash Khoja Asiri (1864–1915) was born in the town of Khujand (Leninabad in Soviet times). Asiri was well known in the literary and public circles of Kokand, Samarkand and Bukhara. He was a friend of Aini (see below), who had a high opinion of him. Asiri broached questions of daily life, education, culture and morality. Like Mirza Siraj, he was acutely aware that his people and nation lagged centuries behind the leading countries, in particular Russia. He said in one of his poems:

Now we must show diligence,
Take care to put our affairs in order,
Set up new schools,
Open the way to new knowledge,
Teach our sons the sciences,
And look to future prospects.²¹

Muhammad Amin Khoja (pseudonym Mukimi, 1851–1903) was a popular Uzbek poet and Jadid. The formation of Mukimi's philosophy took place at a complex time in Central Asian history. On the one hand democratic ideas were penetrating the poet's homeland, but on the other hand there was a colonial regime and the first steps were being taken to establish a national bourgeoisie in its ugly usurious form. Mukimi's creative works are full of the spirit of rationalism and the European Enlightenment, as shown in the following example:

We honour ignorance
And have no respect for knowledge,
We have no inclination
Towards wise and worthy actions,

²¹ Asiri, 1960, p. 60.

We have respect for bad deeds
But no approval for good ones.²²

Zakirjan Khalmukhammadov (pseudonym Furkat, 1858–1909) was one of the initiators of the Jadid movement in Uzbekistan. A well-educated man, he had absorbed the humanist ideas not only of Eastern classics like Hafiz, Nawa'i and Bedil²³ but also of Russian literature, including Pushkin and Nekrasov. His wide knowledge promoted the development of his critical realism. Furkat was an active defender of Jadidism and an enemy of archaic feudal tradition and religious fanaticism.

Furkat was in favour of the Central Asian peoples drawing closer to the Russian people and cooperating with them. He emphasized that drawing closer to Russian culture would awaken in his own people aspirations to enlightenment, knowledge and modern culture. He said: 'We must learn the customs of the Russians since we have many trade and other links. It is for our own benefit that we should study in depth what the Russians do.'²⁴

Furkat noted that in Russian gymnasiums (high schools) there were sensible practices and a respectful attitude towards science and scientists. The logic of his reasoning implied that things should be the same in Uzbekistan too. He wrote:

We realized with regret that our former khans had not used a teaching system like this. Of course, if they had, our people would have mastered many sciences by now.²⁵

Furkat noted with satisfaction that the arrival of the Russians had put an end to feudal strife and the people had sighed with relief:

We had seen and heard the period of the past khans, when from month to month the country was ravaged by enemy raids, children were orphaned and wives widowed, and it was only when Russia reached Ferghana that the Muslims were released from this grave fate.²⁶

The inherent contradictions in the outlook of Donish, Mukimi and Furkat were further developed in the philosophy of the following generation of Jadids. If we take the ideas of the above-mentioned Jadids as the sum of particular 'understandings' (education, science, the enlightened monarch, etc.), ignoring the specific historical context, these ideas and theories seem to be the same as those of the European Enlightenment. However, if we take into account – as we must – the conditions of Bukhara, Khiva and the Kazakh countryside at the end of the nineteenth century, then an appeal for reform, culture and equality was,

²² *Materialy po istorii progressivnoy obshchestvenno-filosofskoy mysli v Uzbekistane*, 1967, p. 546. See also Muminov, 1957.

²³ Mirza 'abd al-Kadir Bedil (1644–1721). [Trans.]

²⁴ *Materialy po istorii progressivnoy obshchestvenno-filosofskoy mysli v Uzbekistane*, 1967, p. 556. See also: *Istoriya filosofii v SSSR*, 1968, pp. 581–2.

²⁵ *Materialy po istorii progressivnoy obshchestvenno-filosofskoy mysli v Uzbekistane*, 1967, p. 557.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 555.

both objectively and subjectively, an appeal to master a more developed and advanced culture and to take a historic leap from the medieval past into the twentieth century. This was the real purpose and importance of the Jadids' actions.

The new generation of Jadids

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the revolutions in Russia, Turkey and Iran influenced social consciousness considerably and promoted the region's general awakening. The degree of influence of these revolutions on the subsequent development of Central Asian society was complex and contradictory. Onto the stage of history stepped a new generation of Jadids.

The realities of daily life for the Muslim peoples within the Russian empire were such that the need to reform the education system became the cornerstone of the Jadid movement and an important issue in the socio-political life of these peoples. Without education there can be no social progress. The Jadids had learned this truth well.

The general spiritual condition of Russia's Muslims was correctly described by Isma'il Gasprinsky (Gaspıralı, 1851–1914) as social and intellectual isolation and total immobility in all spheres of activity. Comparing the conditions of Muslims in Russia and in Asian countries, he said:

Is it not strange that Muslim societies in many Asian countries, in Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus, Tunis and elsewhere, have outstripped the Muslim societies of Russia so far in all respects that among these Muslims you sense Europe, the animation of intellectual stimulation and moral life, and you hear ideas and aspirations which are new and far from Asian?²⁷

The problem of educational reform in the *maktabs* and *madrasas* had been raised by the Tatar Jadids Abu Nasr Kursavi (1765–1813) and Shahab al-Din Marjani (1848–89), both of whom had studied in Bukhara. They were opposed to the scholastic system of education and supported the inclusion of secular science in the teaching programme. In the 1880s a new impetus was given to the educational reform movement among the Crimean Tatars by Isma'il Gasprinsky. He wrote:

In 1884 we began to work out a new method of teaching [*usūl-i jadīd*] and founded a school in Bakhchisaray (Crimea) where we introduced the teaching of reading and writing by the new phonetic method.²⁸

This was the first Russian Muslim school to adopt the new method of teaching. (The primary meaning of the concept of Jadid was 'supporter of the new method of teaching'.) The

²⁷ *Ismail bey Gasprinsky...*, 1881, pp. 29–30.

²⁸ Quoted from Vámbéry, 1912, p. 280. [Vámbéry's description of his Central Asian travels was first published in London in 1864. *Trans.*]

Muslim clergy sharply opposed the new method of teaching and the new-method schools. Despite the fierce resistance put up by the traditionalists, or *qadimists* (from *qadim*, old), the number of schools using the new method of teaching increased and, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the first new-method schools were opened in Central Asia. The first such schools in Turkistan and Bukhara (at Kagan, a town near the city of Bukhara) were Tatar ones. The growth of the network of new-method schools for the native population, that is, Uzbeks and Tajiks, began in 1905. By 1916 there were over 5,000 new-method schools in the Russian empire.²⁹ At the initial stage of the new system of teaching, the Crimean and Kazan (Tatar) Jadids set themselves the task of renewing and modernizing the Muslim community by reforming the education system.

With time, as the network of new-method schools expanded and they were opened in Turkistan and Bukhara, the Central Asian Jadids were faced with the same tasks as had faced the Tatar Jadids. As the scale of the Jadid movement grew, its tasks changed accordingly. This is how the change was described by a participant in the movement, the Tajik writer Sadriddin Aini (1878–1954):

It was generally considered that from 1905 to 1917 the homeland, the nation, religion, science and education, propaganda against the despotic government and also verbal attacks on the clergy were quite definitely the main subject matter of the literature of this period.³⁰

The issues listed here touch not only on the system of education but also on society as a whole. In the conditions of Turkistan and Bukhara, Jadidism was essentially performing the historic function that the Enlightenment had done in other countries. The issues raised by Jadidism touched on very important spheres of the life of society – socio-economic, political, cultural and so on. The Jadids criticized archaic medieval ways and propagated the ideas of progress and renewal which responded to the spirit of the times.

On the eve of the 1917 (Bolshevik) revolution, the transformation of Jadidism led to this concept losing its original meaning and acquiring a broader socio-political and ideological one. The political and social ideals of the Turkistan and Bukhara Jadids did not differ essentially from the ideas of the modernist reformers of neighbouring Eastern countries. In the economic field, the Jadids of Bukhara demanded the abolition of the medieval system of taxation and the introduction of regulations and the precise setting of taxes, sharply criticizing the arbitrary practices in this socially important matter. One significant element was the demand that the state treasury be separated from the emir's private household. All

²⁹ Bennigsen, 1992, p. 119. [Bennigsen is the author of several books about Soviet Islam published in English and French in the 1960s and 1970s. *Trans.*]

³⁰ Aini, 1925, pp. 539–40.

these economic, political and cultural demands of the Jadids were contained in the emir's 'Manifesto' (see below), which was published in April 1917 but not implemented.

The Jadid movement was formed of representatives of various public strata: the intelligentsia (poets and writers), merchants and traders and liberal clergy (as in Bukhara and Samarkand), people employed in the lowest administrative posts (as in Turkistan governor-generalship), and young people who had been educated in Russian schools in the towns of Omsk, Orenburg and Troitsk (typical of Kazakhstan) and the Russian-native schools of Tashkent, Kokand and Samarkand (where local children were taught in Russian). Although the movement was heterogeneous it had its own ideological and spiritual leaders.

The talented commentator, writer and teacher Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (1875–1919) was a progressive and authoritative Jadid leader. He graduated from a *madrasa* and was the *mufti* (jurist, chief law officer) of Samarkand. He travelled the countries of the East and Russia's Muslim regions. He wrote textbooks on geography and history, reading books for children and so on for the new-method schools, one of which operated in his home. He compiled and printed a map of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khiva. He was the editor and publisher of the newspaper *Samarqand* and the journal *Oina* [The Mirror] (1913–15]. He wrote a play entitled *Padarkush* [The Patricide], which reflected topical problems of the early twentieth century. A passage in the play reads as follows:

To be educated in the secular way, children must first be taught the mother tongue of the Muslims and religion and then they must go to the state gymnasium. When they finish the gymnasium or town school, they must be sent to universities in St Petersburg or Moscow to train as lawyers, engineers, economists and physicists. They must be real participants in the running of the Russian state.³¹

Another article Behbudi wrote in *The Mirror* said:

We can speak about our needs in the State Duma [Russian parliament] but there is none among us who would defend our interests there. For ten years now I have been campaigning for people not to fear the Russians, to work with them hand in hand, to act like citizens of Russia and be active participants in the running of the country.³²

These extracts clearly illustrate Behbudi's important idea of being 'a participant in the running of the country' and for this it was necessary to have had a modern education. This idea had been expressed in a slightly different form back in the 1880s by Gasprinsky in his newspaper *Tercümān* [The Interpreter]. In the second decade of the twentieth century it won over the minds of the more thoughtful representatives of Turkistan's intelligentsia, in particular Behbudi, Hamza Hakimzoda Niyazi and others. This idea is important in terms

³¹ Quoted in Radzhabov, 1957, pp. 402–3.

³² *Oina*, 1913, No. 9; quoted in Radzhabov, 1957, p. 412.

of law and legal awareness and it means that considerable changes had taken place in the social consciousness of the native inhabitants of Turkistan governor-generalship.

Behbudi was a supporter of reform, particularly in the emirate of Bukhara. His commentaries actively pursued the idea of reform in the emirate. This was known to the emir, Sa'id 'alim Khan, who hated Behbudi with every fibre of his being, as illustrated by the following incident. A ceremony marking the publication of the emir's reform 'Manifesto' for Bukhara was held in a festive atmosphere in the city on 8 April 1917. The ceremony was attended by a delegation from Samarkand headed by Behbudi. When the emir entered the hall he greeted everybody present except Behbudi. Two years later Behbudi was brutally murdered by agents of the emir.

The Tajik Jadid Sa'id Ahmad Siddiki (literary pseudonym Aji, 1865–1927) was a close acquaintance of Behbudi. Although he was very popular in Turkistan and Bukhara, his works, especially *Anjumani arvokh* [Gathering of Spirits, 1914] and *Mir'oti ibrat* [Mirror of Learning, 1914], were officially banned in Bukhara. In his *Mirror of Learning*, Siddiki describes an imaginary country where justice is supreme, science, technology and culture are well developed and, especially important in this imaginary land, religion does not forbid the study of secular science. He represents social utopia as a public ideal, as an expression of dissatisfaction with the existing social order. He calls on his compatriots to wake up from their eternal slumbers and without wasting time to study science as in Russian schools:

In Russian schools children are taught all the sciences: invention, philosophy, agronomy, business and machine operation; they learn how to make clocks, steamboats, telephones, the telegraph and balloons and how to grow cotton and weave silk cloth.³³

Siddiki's progressive ideas played a positive role in the development of sociopolitical thought among the Tajik and Uzbek peoples.

The direct successor and continuer of the reformist ideas of Mukimi and Furkat was their contemporary, 'Ubaydallah Salih (pseudonym Zavki, 1853–1921), who was born in Kokand. Thanks to the intensive development of cotton growing, which produced much-needed raw material for Russian industry, Kokand was fast turning into one of the biggest towns in the region. In his poetry Zavki expresses the interests of the ordinary people, criticizes social injustice and condemns the pharisaical and hypocritical life of the local wealthy elite and the clergy. Criticizing the moral principles of his times, the poet declares with regret that the times of honest, decent and enlightened people have not yet come, when 'the lowest people in society are shown kindness by the law'. In one poem, appealing to the people, he says that times have changed and the world must be looked at anew:

³³ Quoted from the journal *Sadā-i sharq*, 1989, No. 1, pp. 40–3.

Friends, times have changed, it's time to open our eyes!
So that the nation shall be strong, it's time to open our eyes!
So that honour shall be preserved, it's time to open our eyes!
Science should flourish, it's time to open our eyes!
Ignorance should be smashed, it's time to open our eyes!³⁴

The most important figure in the Jadid movement in the 1920s was the talented Uzbek poet, writer and teacher Hamza Hakimzoda Niyazi (1889–1929). He was born in Kokand into the family of a pharmacist, graduated from school and entered a *madrasa*. On leaving the *madrasa* in 1909, he travelled all over the East. One common feature of the biographies of all or nearly all Turkistani and Bukharan Jadids should be emphasized – they travelled extensively throughout the countries of the Middle East. Their travels enriched their experience of life, and allowed them to compare the way of life and thinking of the people and the standard of social progress achieved in the countries they visited with those in their own countries. Mostly their conclusions did not favour Turkistan and Bukhara. This was important from the philosophical point of view. Why in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey was the electric lighting of mosques considered normal, when in Bukhara a kerosene lamp was considered to be an impermissible novelty and sometimes condemned?

In Tashkent Hamza Hakimzoda came to know the town's intellectuals, the new schools and their teaching methods. On returning to Kokand he opened his own school, wrote textbooks and did some teaching. He was friendly with Kokand's business elite, in particular Abijan Makhmudov, who published the newspaper *Sadoi Farghāna* [Voice of Fergana, 1914]. Hamza Hakimzoda was an active writer for this newspaper. His commentaries sharply criticized the religious theory of predestination. In 1916 Hamza Hakimzoda published his collection of *National Songs*, which provided ample proof of the radicalization of his views. As a Jadid he wrote: 'anyone who stops to think and opens up his mind a bit will understand that all this humiliation and resentment stems from illiteracy and ignorance.'³⁵

Schools with the new method of teaching were quite widespread in Tashkent. Munawwar Qari 'abdurashid Khan (1878–1913) and 'abdallah Avlani (1878–1934) were intellectual figures among the Tashkent Jadids. Munawwar Qari's school was one of the best and most famous schools to adopt the new method of teaching in Turkistan. Munawwar Qari wrote textbooks for schools, was engaged in publishing and had a bookshop. His commentaries

³⁴ *Materialy po istorii progressivnoy obshestvenno-filosofskoy mysli v Uzbekistane*, 1967, p. 577. See also *Istoriya filosofii v SSSR*, 1971, pp. 729–30.

³⁵ *Materialy po istorii progressivnoy obshestvenno-filosofskoy mysli v Uzbekistane*, 1967, p. 585. See also *Istoriya filosofii v SSSR*, 1971, pp. 730–1.

were printed in almost all publications in Turkistan. After 1914 he and Avlani devoted themselves to the theatre.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the leading representatives of the Kazakh intelligentsia (Sh. Kудayberdiev, M. Dulatov, A. Bukeykhanov) rallied around the newspaper *Qazāq* (Orenburg, 1912–18) and the journal *Ai qap* (Troitsk, 1911–16). The newspaper expressed the then traditional point of view of Kazakh society, but the journal asserted a more radical path of development. Toraygyrov (1893–1920) was a continuer of the liberal ideas of Altynsarin and Kunanbaev.

The development of Jadidism before the revolution in Bukhara (1920) is connected with the names of the successors of Donish, among whom Aini, ‘abd al-Wahid Munzim (1877–1934) and ‘Abdurrauf Fitrat (1884–1937) occupy a worthy place. The struggle of Aini and Munzim was concentrated on the question of the new-method schools. Together with Munzim, Aini opened in his home a new-method school teaching in Tajik (1908). In his autobiography, Aini says:

I compiled a reading book. The book was of a literary nature, and the children found it interesting to read. Of course, in keeping with the requirements of the times, I included in this book many religious texts. All the same, the book as a whole was something of a novelty. (I published this book in 1909 under the title, *The Upbringing of Young People*.)³⁶

When the time for the school inspection came, however, the mullahs were provocative and hostile and published findings suggesting that the school was ‘putting the children off religion and raising them in unbelief’. They persuaded the emir to close the school.

For the reform of schools and *madrasas*, Aini and his comrades organized a secret society called ‘Upbringing of Children’. With this society’s help schools began to open. The children who had finished their lessons at these schools were sent for further studies to Orenburg, Kazan, Ufa, the Crimea and Turkey. Fitrat was one of those sent to Turkey.

‘Abdurrauf Fitrat was a talented writer, scientist and Jadid. Between 1909 and 1917, he wrote the following works in Tajik: *Munozira* [The Debate, 1909], *Bayonoti saiyo Hindi* [Stories by an Indian Traveller, 1912], *Saykha* [Cry of the Spirit, 1911], *Raybari najot* [Guide to Salvation, 1915], *Oila* [Family, 1916], *Tarikh-i Islām* [History of Islam, 1916] and several others. These works played an important role in awakening the social consciousness of the emirate from its long medieval sleep. Fitrat’s main Jadid idea was that Bukharan society in its development, or rather in its medieval stagnation, had fallen too far behind other countries, including its neighbours, and that reforms were needed in all spheres of social life to turn the country in the direction of progressive development. Aini was a living witness to the ideological influence that Fitrat’s works had on Bukharan

³⁶ Aini, 1971, Vol. 1, p. 83.

society, awaking it from ‘the sleep of complacency’ and ‘stirring social thinking to ferment and movement’. At the same time, Fitrat’s literary and socio-political activity on the eve of the Bukharan revolution, during the revolution and in the 1920s and 1930s was closely linked with Pan-Turkism (see below), of which he was an active ideologist.

The reform of the emirate of Bukhara was the central idea of the Jadid movement in Bukhara and Turkistan headed by Behbudi; it had a broader context and significance than the reform of the education system, although that was of considerable importance for Bukhara. Over the period 1909–14 the Russian authorities discussed the problem of reforming Bukhara four times. A government meeting decided:

We should not force events in Khiva and Bukhara towards the annexation of these countries to Russia at the present difficult time. . . There is no doubt that Bukhara, which is now actually dependent on Russia, will be annexed to it sooner or later.³⁷

The problem of the democratic transformation of Bukhara acquired new urgency after the victory of the February (1917) revolution in Russia, which was greeted with joy by the Jadids of Bukhara and Turkistan, and the question of reforms in Bukhara was raised anew. On the instructions of the Provisional Government, the Russian political agency (diplomatic mission) in Bukhara prepared the text of the reforms and agreed it with the emir, Sa‘id ‘alim Khan, and the Russian government.

This ‘Manifesto’ said that ‘the emir had decided to illuminate Bukhara with the light of progress and knowledge’. The emir considered that ‘all improvements and useful changes can only be based on the Holy *sharī‘a*’. The ‘Manifesto’ raised important issues for the life of society:

improvement of the system for the exercise of justice; placing within a legal framework the levying of taxes such as *kharāj* [for a new ruler] and *zakāt* [for relief of the poor]; establishment of a salaries administration and auditing system; inauguration of the country’s budget and state treasury; encouragement of ‘useful sciences and knowledge in precise accordance with the injunctions of the *sharī‘a*’.

The ‘Manifesto’ also stated that a printing shop would be opened in Bukhara with the aim of publishing a newspaper for disseminating useful information. These matters, which the ‘Manifesto’ promised to deal with, were undoubtedly of importance for the progress of Bukharan society.

In his *History of the Bukharan Revolution*, Aini analysed the situation and put forward these questions: Do the people demand the reform of society and are they ready for it? He answered these questions himself: In reality the people want reform, but they are not ready to carry it out. Unfortunately, in their absolute majority, because of political repression,

³⁷ *Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR*, 1956, Vol. 1, Book 2, p. 315.

their downtrodden situation, illiteracy and ignorance of their own interests, the people are not ready to carry out reform. Moreover, out of ignorance, the people are not only not ready for reform, they are prepared to oppose it.³⁸ Subsequent events, after the proclamation of the 'Manifesto', confirmed Aini's conclusions. The Jadid movement in Bukhara suffered a defeat.

The Jadid movement was not only an ideological, socio-political, literary and religious current in the social thinking of Central Asian society; it was also something special, in a particular sense a single whole. This single whole contained ideas and views which were not of equal value from the point of view of social progress. First, the works of the Jadids generally analysed the social life of Turkistan, the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva from the point of view of the reform of the socio-political, cultural and economic situation, with the aim of creating the necessary conditions for society's progress. For the Jadids, the way to change society was simultaneously the answer to the question how to develop the country in accordance with the spirit of the times. This most important aspect of Jadidism was of historically progressive importance.

Second, many active participants in the Jadid movement came from a clerical background and thus, philosophically, they retained the point of view of their class. In other words, the religious context of the movement was quite considerable. Turkistan, Bukhara and Khiva were not untouched by the influence of the Pan-Islamic movement in neighbouring Eastern countries like Turkey, Iran, India, Afghanistan and Egypt. This was all the more so because there were quite favourable conditions for this in the region.

Third, as the movement was established and developed there was a gradual strengthening within it of Pan-Turkic ideas and views, which by the time of the revolution (1917–20) had become quite an aggressive current in the ideology of Jadidism. Fourth, while not a political party, Jadidism was the only opposition force in the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva. Subsequently, on the basis of the Jadid movement, there appeared Young Bukharan and Young Khivan activists along the lines of the Young Turks.³⁹

Bukhara was known throughout the Muslim world as a centre of religious knowledge and education. However, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, during the rule of the last of the Manghit emirs, the situation changed and in reality Bukhara continued to enjoy its previous glory only by inertia. Aini wrote about this in his introduction to the *History of the Bukharan Revolution*. The thinking and behaviour of the clergy were typically dogmatic and conservative. They ruled out new interpretations

³⁸ Aini, 1987, p. 150.

³⁹ The Young Turks were early twentieth-century reformers who carried out the Turkish revolution of 1908 and overthrew the Ottoman sultan 'abd al-Hamid II. [*Trans.*]

of Islamic tenets not only on matters of theology but also on socio-political issues. The Bukharan clergy considered that socio-political, moral and ethical issues had already been defined and elaborated in the *sharīʿa* and that there was no need for new interpretations or approaches. All this had the purpose of guarding society against any external influences or innovations.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the ideas of Jadidism – ideas of innovation and renewal in combination with the slogan of the ‘revival of Islam’ – spread widely throughout Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India and elsewhere in the Middle East. An important intellectual figure in that movement was Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838–97).⁴⁰ He had a profound and shrewd knowledge of the real situation at that time in Muslim society, where Islam as a mass ideology had become a powerful spiritual force. He tried to use this force on the one hand for the region’s revival and on the other against the policy of colonialism. Afghani was free of prejudice and fanaticism. He set out the principle of purifying Islam of secondary archaic elements and stood for its adaptation to the realities of Muslim life.

As a Jadid, Afghani criticized the backward system of education and upbringing and was a conscientious supporter of the system’s reform. He emphasized here the need to study not only social science but also the natural sciences, and this was an important feature of his concept of education. His assertions that science was an important factor for social progress and that ‘the purpose of humanity is for the sake of humanity itself’ resonated in the countries of the region. Afghani’s ideas received wide dissemination in Afghanistan, Iran, India, Egypt and other countries. His concept and understanding of the paths of development of Muslim countries were widely supported by representatives of the intelligentsia from those countries. At the same time, his concept of Jadidism was complex and contradictory. For example, he defended the unity in principle of religion and science.

In Turkey in 1892–7 Afghani and his followers tried to legalize a ‘Muslim Union’. However, he realized that Sultan ‘abd al-Hamid intended to use the idea of a union of Muslim countries to strengthen his own power and political position. What Afghani and his followers had in mind was a union of the region’s Muslim countries aimed at overcoming their socio-political and cultural backwardness and intensifying the anti-colonial struggle. Moreover, the ‘Muslim Union’ embraced the idea of supranational unity, which basically contradicted the concept of the nation-state and was essentially a utopian idea. Osmanism⁴¹ contained two important components. First, it was based on Pan-Islamism and

⁴⁰ See Nazarov, 1993.

⁴¹ The ideology of the Ottomans, named after the Osmanli (Osman dynasty’s) founder (1259–1326). [Trans.]

the unification of all Muslim countries under the aegis of Turkey, for which political borders were of no material importance. Second, it wanted to assimilate non-Turkic peoples. The idea of recognizing the kinship of the Ottoman and Central Asian Turks was contributed by the Russian Turco-Tatars and the Young Turks who had won the revolution.

Pan-Turkism

Turkism, which eclectically contained elements of both Pan-Islamism and Osmanism, was transformed into Pan-Turkism after the victory of the Young Turks in the 1908 revolution and in the euphoria of this victory. 'The chauvinism of the Young Turks was one of the main reasons for the failure of their policy and, finally, the collapse of the Ottoman empire.'⁴²

Pan-Turkism developed ideologically among the Muslim peoples of Russia in the milieu of the Turco-Tatar intelligentsia of the Crimea, the Volga valley and the Caucasus and then began to penetrate Turkistan and Bukhara. Without doubt its ideologically most influential leader was Isma'il Gasprinsky. As noted by Bennigsen:

Gasprinsky fell under the influence of various ideologies, including Russian Populism in its Slavophile form, French liberalism and moderate socialism, the Pan-Turkism of the Young Turks and German Romanticism.⁴³

The unity of Russia's Muslim Turks was formulated in Gasprinsky's thesis, 'Unity of Language, Thought and Action'. He expounded his thesis in his writings and publications. His most important works include *Russian Muslim Society* (1881) and the social utopian novel *Dar al-rahāt musulmanlari* [Muslims in the Land of Prosperity, 1891]. Fitrat translated this novel into Tajik and published it.

By the time of the first Russian revolution (1905–7), the ideas of Pan-Turkism had spread considerably among the Turco-Tatar peoples. Newspapers, journals and the writings of Tatar and Azerbaijani Jadids of the Pan-Turkic tendency were widespread in Turkistan and Bukhara. The importance of the newspaper *Tercümān* has already been mentioned. Published from 1883 to 1914 by Gasprinsky, this newspaper had dozens of subscribers in Central Asia. Gasprinsky visited Turkistan and Bukhara more than once (in 1893 and 1908) with the aim of widening the distribution of Turco-Tatar publications as well as opening new-method schools and expanding their network. Newspapers like *Yıldız* [Star, Kazan], *Vaqt* [Time, Orenburg], *Irshād* [Directions] and *Hayāt* [Life, Baku], as well as *Ulfat* [Friend, St Petersburg], were distributed widely.

⁴² *Sovremennaya filosofskaya i sotsiologicheskaya mysl' stran Vostoka*, 1965, p. 234.

⁴³ Bennigsen, 1992, p. 119.

After the defeat of the first Russian revolution, many leaders of the movement (Yusuf Akchurin, Sadri Maksudi, I. Is‘haki, Ahmad Agaev, ‘Ali Huseinzade and others) emigrated to Turkey. At that time Pan-Turkism in Turkistan and Bukhara was gaining in strength. External influence on the rise and development of Pan-Turkist ideology in Central Asia varied.

First, the ideological influence of the Young Turks increased considerably, particularly after their victory in the 1908 revolution and their coming to power. An important factor was the many Turkish prisoners of war who had fought in the First World War and who had received permission from the Russian authorities to return home through Central Asia but remained in Turkistan and Bukhara, as a rule taking up work in the education system.

Second, dozens of young people from Bukhara and Turkistan who had been educated in Turkey became active propagandists of Pan-Turkist ideas on returning home. The following incident from Fitrat’s autobiography is typical:

With the help of the Jadids I went to study in Turkey. At that time (1909–13) Pan-Islamism was receiving massive dissemination in Turkey. I too was absorbed by it. I was then a supporter of the reform of religion and reconciling it with science and I believed in the idea of purifying religion. However, the fallaciousness of Pan-Islamism was exposed by everyday reality. Having realized the absurdity of Pan-Islamism, I devoted myself to the ideas of Pan-Turkism. Subsequently life stopped me from getting bogged down in Pan-Turkism and I became an Uzbek nationalist. In 1917–18 the Pan-Turkic movement in Central Asia grew stronger. This was especially so in Tashkent, where various groups were set up, feeding on the ideas of Pan-Turkism.⁴⁴

The complex evolution of Fitrat’s philosophy is typical of that of many of his contemporaries.

Third, the new-method schools attended by the local young people also experienced the attention and influence of their times. Most textbooks were written in Tatar and the teaching was also in this language. Aini described the situation in Bukhara as follows:

In Samarkand and Tashkent the new national schools were already operating and the Tatars living in Bukhara also opened a new-type school for their children. Some Bukharans who were suspicious about the old-type schools sent their children to Tatar schools. I visited these schools (in 1907) and saw Bukharan children who did not know Uzbek, let alone Tatar, but who were taught in Tatar at school.⁴⁵

Thus by the time of the revolutions in Turkistan (Tashkent, 1917) and the emirate of Bukhara (Bukhara, 1920), the above-mentioned factors had led to Pan-Turkism becoming the dominant ideological trend in Central Asian social thought.

⁴⁴ See the journal *Dialog*, 1991, No. 7, p. 76.

⁴⁵ Aini, 1971, p. 82.

Impact of the Jadids

The intellectual thought and socio-philosophical outlook of any nation or country develop from age to age, and the new generation takes up the results of the previous generation's activity and develops them further, making allowances for changed conditions and their requirements. This occurs during the more or less normal course of history. History comprehends the past through the present and the present through the past, not as disconnected elements but as a continuous process. The dialectics⁴⁶ of the history of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, however, interrupted this continuous process of intellectual development. As a result of the revolutions in Tashkent (1917), Bukhara (1920) and Khiva (1920), the region's natural historical course of development was altered and the further development of Jadidism was interrupted. A sharp division developed between past and present in the social thought and social consciousness of the region's peoples. Immediately after the revolution, it became obvious that the ideas of social progress and renewal contained in the concepts of the Jadids were no longer needed or demanded by post-revolutionary Central Asian society, in so far as the revolution had brought to Turkistan, Bukhara and Khiva its own concept of building a new society.

Although the social concepts of the Jadids contained undoubted scientific potential, their fate was inevitable. From the end of the 1920s and for decades thereafter they had many labels attached to them, from 'ideologists of bourgeois nationalism and obscurantism' to 'enemies of the building of socialism' in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. An official ideological directive of this kind ensured that for many years the legacy of the Jadids was excluded from the natural development of socio-political thought of the region's peoples. On the other hand, Jadidism itself was studied not as a coherent current of sociopolitical thought but one-sidedly, separated from the context of the historical age of which it was a product. Donish, Abay Kunanbaev, Aini, Hamza Hakimzoda Niyazi, Furkat, Mukimi and others were studied as Jadids and progressive thinkers, but Behbudi, Fitrat, Munawwar Qari, Siddiki, Vasli, 'Abd al-Hamid Sulayman (Cholpon) and many others were mentioned merely as reactionary Jadids and gradually the very concept of Jadid and Jadidism acquired a negative socio-political resonance in the public consciousness.

The ideology of Pan-Turkism was demonstrated most actively in the first post-revolutionary years and on the eve of national-territorial demarcation⁴⁷ and the formation of the Central Asian republics (1924). The Pan-Turks intended to make the Kazakh,

⁴⁶ Dialectics: the testing of truth by discussion; in Marxism, history interpreted as a series of contradictions and their solutions. [*Trans.*]

⁴⁷ National-territorial demarcation (*razmezhevanie*), favoured by Lenin's commissar for nationalities, Stalin, created a federal structure granting 'national statehood' to the most numerous ethnic groups, in

Uzbek, Turkmen and Kyrgyz peoples form a single, but artificial Turkic republic. They emphasized their common ethnic origin and their common religion, Islam. In other words, they were trying to give new impetus to Pan-Islamism on a secular basis in the form of Pan-Turkism. 'On the Autonomy and Constitution of Turkistan', a resolution of the Third Regional Muslim Conference (1920), expressed this idea in the following way:

By means of communist agitation [campaigning], implement the idea of destroying the Turkic nationality peoples' will to divide themselves in name and essence into Tatars, Kyrgyz [meaning Kazakhs at that time], Bashkirs, Uzbeks and so on and establish separate small republics and, for the sake of cohesion and to draw in other Turkic peoples who are not part of the RSFSR [the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic], unite around the Turkic Soviet Republic.⁴⁸

The idea of a 'single Turkic republic' was also directed against the Russian central Government.

The concepts of the Turkistani and Bukharan Pan-Turkists contained two ideas they thought important – on the one hand, forming a 'single Turkic republic', and on the other preventing the formation of the Republic of Tajikistan. They openly denied the existence of the Tajiks, an ancient Central Asian nation:

The Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz people inhabiting Turkistan are not separate nationalities, they all belong to one great Turkic nation. As for the Tajiks, they basically originate from the Türks and became Tajik only as a result of Iranian influence. This is why the Tajiks are Türks.⁴⁹

However paradoxical, this fact showed that the Tajiks as a nation were not ready even minimally to recognize themselves and defend their own national interests. In the first years of the revolution, in the 1920s, almost all the intelligentsia of Bukhara, Samarkand and Khujand participated actively in the Turkicization of their people. This position was adopted even by the leaders of the movement who were ethnic Tajiks (Behbudi, Fitrat and others).

Gradually the intervention of the central (Moscow) authorities into the affairs of Turkistan and Bukhara intensified and the situation more or less stabilized. Realizing their defeat, many of the ideologists of Pan-Turkism, especially Mustafa Chokay and Zeki Velidi, emigrated to Turkey.⁵⁰ Many of those who emigrated began to write their memoirs

some cases within redrawn national boundaries, but preserving rigid centralized government from Moscow. [Trans.]

⁴⁸ Quoted in Safarov, 1921, p. 110.

⁴⁹ Dzhahbarov, 1929, Nos. 3–4, p. 93.

⁵⁰ Mustafa Chokay was a leader of the Alash-Orda, a nationalistic organization in Kazakhstan from 1917 to 1919, treated by the Bolsheviks as 'counterrevolutionary'. Alash is the general Turkic name for the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tatars, etc. [Trans.]

of the events in which they had actively participated. This literature does not always reflect in a balanced and objective way the events of the first quarter of the twentieth century in Turkistan and Bukhara.

The aims and tasks of the October revolution included the building of a socialist society. However, many leaders of the Marxist movement considered that the historical conditions for the building of the new society were not yet ripe in Central Asia or even in Russia. It is known that Marx and Marxism developed from a particular West European historical, cultural and philosophical tradition. In Russia, however, Marxism found itself in a quite different socio-cultural environment which sometimes transformed it to the point of being unrecognizable. This was quite natural – at the time of the October revolution, Russia and its borderlands, the Central Asian region in particular, were at the capitalist, feudal and pre-feudal levels of development.

Back in the 1880s Marx said in a letter to Vera Zasulich that he had not drawn up any plans or obligatory forms of social development. He said that everything that he had written was based on West European experience and had no broader application outside that region.⁵¹ In another letter Marx warned Mikhailovsky not to turn his theories into a doctrine for ‘a communist path down which all nations, whatever their historical conditions, are fatally condemned to go’.⁵² It follows from Marx’s answers that he did not attach to his theories the importance of a ‘universal master key’ to the history of any country or nation.

One of the best-known Russian revolutionaries, Gueorgui V. Plekhanov, who enjoyed great authority in European Marxist circles, opposed the October revolution. He sharply criticized the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power and expressed regret over the fall of what he called the ‘coalition government of Alexander F. Kerensky’ in the transition to Soviet power. Plekhanov emphasized that the Russian proletariat, having seized political power at the wrong time, would be unable to carry out the social revolution and would only bring about civil war. The seizure of power by a class comprising the majority in society would lead to even worse consequences, dictatorship by one party.⁵³ Plekhanov’s evaluation is striking for its historical far-sightedness. The 75-year history of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) confirmed his worst predictions.

⁵¹ See Marx and Engels, 1917, Vol. 19, p. 250. [Vera Ivanovna Zasulich (1849–1919), Russian revolutionary and Populist who shot the mayor of St Petersburg in 1878 but was acquitted; she translated Marx into Russian, joined the Mensheviks in 1903 and was hostile to the Bolsheviks. *Trans.*]

⁵² Marx and Engels, 1961, Vol. 19, p. 120. [Nikolai Konstantinovich Mikhailovsky (1842–1904), sociologist, literary critic, ideologist of the Populists; he believed in personality as the key to history and that the masses should be guided by a hero. *Trans.*]

⁵³ Plekhanov, 1989, p. 105.

Marxism was a typical product of Western culture. For this very reason it was unable to spread widely in Russia, a country with its own particular history, not to mention the Central Asian region. Bolshevism was a much more complex political phenomenon, conditioned by its specifically Russian features. It was a product of Russian reality. The philosopher Nikolai A. Berdyaev commented neatly: 'Marxism was Russified and orientalized.'⁵⁴ This is a correct comment in the sense that nowhere did Marxism turn into Leninism, Trotskyism or Stalinism.

In the second half of the 1920s the building of a new society in the region became a topical issue in the political life of Central Asia. The leaders of the Bolshevik Party, while understanding the complexity of the problem, nevertheless proclaimed the building of socialism in historically unfavourable circumstances. Lenin⁵⁵ was an educated man who understood the problem and set the question on a political plane – 'how to use communist tactics and politics in pre-capitalist conditions'. In other words, how was Marxism to be translated into the specific conditions of Central Asia?

In the course of the practical implementation of socialist ideas in the 1920s and 1930s, there were many mistakes and distortions of Marxism which were foreseeable and to some extent inevitable. Thus, over a short period of time, the script (alphabet) used in Central Asia was changed twice, which was certainly a mistake. The first error was the adoption of a resolution at the Congress of Peoples of the East (Baku, 1926) under the influence of the Pan-Turkists and imitating Turkey. From the end of the 1920s to the beginning of the 1930s, the script based on the Arabic alphabet was replaced by a Latin one. The second error was a resolution of the USSR Government at the end of the 1930s on the transition from the Latin script to Cyrillic. These errors had negative consequences for the following generations, which were deprived of access to their past culture. They had a particularly negative effect on the general state of mind of the peoples who had a written tradition and literature.⁵⁶

The socio-political thought of the Central Asian peoples, as had happened after the revolution, faced a new and quite difficult dilemma – the choice of a new path of development for their society, a society which could successfully and smoothly join the world community. One thing was obvious: this new society was not to be built on the basis of socialism

⁵⁴ Berdyaev, 1990, p. 89. [Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdyaev (1874–1948), Russian philosopher and mystic, opponent of revolution, founder of the New Christianity movement, ideologist of the Vekhi [landmarks] movement of Russian intellectuals, who lived in exile in Paris from 1922. *Trans.*]

⁵⁵ Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, pseudonym Nikolai Lenin (1870–1924), ideologist of the Bolshevik movement in Russia, leader of the 25 October (modern calendar 7 November) 1917 revolution which overthrew Aleksandr Kerensky's Provisional Government and proclaimed Soviet rule. [*Trans.*]

⁵⁶ Several Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan in 1993 and Turkmenistan in 2000, have decided to abandon Cyrillic in favour of new Latin scripts, while Tajikistan is reviving the Arabic script. [*Trans.*]

and its methodology and ideology alone. To overcome the transition period and the general state of crisis within society, the intellectual and political elite must devote themselves to intensive mental and creative effort along the path to development.

Part II:

**POLITICAL CHANGES AND STATE
FORMATION**

THE EVOLUTION OF NATION-STATES*

Madhavan K. Palat

Contents

From the 1850s to the 1920s	207
From the 1920s to the 1990s	212
Conclusion	218

From the 1850s to the 1920s¹

The first phase was marked by the complete absence of nation-states although national movements had begun stirring from the 1870s and 1880s everywhere except perhaps Afghanistan. The existing states were either empires like the Qajars in Iran, or parts of colonial empires such as that of the British in India or the Russians in Central Asia proper. Only Afghanistan was no longer an empire, but it was a territory mostly hemmed in by three empires and the product of their rivalries. Subordinate political entities existed in the two colonial empires. These were Bukhara and Khiva in the Russian empire and what were known as the ‘princely states’ in the British Indian empire, of which the states of Jammu and Kashmir, and various others in Punjab, were the most notable. But all these were essentially provinces of the two empires in all respects other than technical definition. They were a different type of province from the regular ones, however, for their archaic structures were deliberately preserved and even put on exhibition by the colonial state. Princes were just another type of governor or colonial official, their administrations

* See Maps 1–6.

¹ The period covered by this chapter clearly divides into three for the whole region: from the 1850s to the 1920s; the 1920s to the 1940s; and the 1940s to the 1990s. However, for easier reading, the last two periods will be considered together.

a variant of the colonial one, and all were directed and functioned within the limits and structures set by the colonial state.

Afghanistan was almost an extension of this system, for it could not conduct its own foreign policy and was subservient to the British empire in India, albeit with the freedom to determine its internal affairs, unlike the Indian princes. Qajar Iran was more independent, but nonetheless subject to British and Russian dictates in many important areas. In essence, it had been agreed as early as 1829, after the treaty of Turkaman Chay (1828), that northern Iran was in the Russian sphere of influence, and southern Iran was in the British, with only the centre under the full control of the shah. Even so, internal policy and even senior appointments were largely dictated by the two colonial powers; and Naser al-Din Shah (1848–96) once complained in 1888 that he could not go on a hunting trip to the north without explaining himself to the British, nor to the south without consulting the Russians. This *de facto* arrangement was ratified by treaty between the colonial powers only as late as 1907, though it had been in operation throughout the nineteenth century.

But the model of the nation-state beckoned from Europe; and the seeds of national movements and modern nationalism had been sown in Central Asia with the Jadids, in Iran with Akhundzadeh, and in North India with the Aligarh, Arya Samaj and related movements, all of which dated from the 1870s and 1880s at least, some of them earlier.

Prior to the 1920s, these nationalisms shared certain features arising from their common experience of colonial or semi-colonial subjugation. They were self-consciously modernizing movements against what came to be known as their own traditionalisms; and they critiqued colonial modernization as a form of what later came to be called underdevelopment. In their critiques of their traditions they sought to pursue reforms through continuities with history; and they deplored the colonial modernization which attempted transformation through alienating ruptures with the past. Their models of state and development were mostly liberal; they aligned themselves with models and practices in the metropolises, whether London, St Petersburg or Paris; and they roundly condemned the perversion of these ideals in the colonial states in Central Asia, India and the client state in Iran.

As nationalists, they aimed to create a nation or a nation-state where none existed as yet. Nowhere in Russian Central Asia was there even a semblance of nations. There were relics of kingdoms like Bukhara and Khiva, or recently extinguished states like Kokand and the three Kazakh Hordes or *Zhuzs*. But none of these resembled or functioned as nations. Loyalties were owed to tribes, clans and rulers, not to the territory and to the abstraction known as the nation. The territories over which the sultans, emirs and khans ruled or exercised varying degrees of control were not defined by a single language or a common culture, or even necessarily a single religion, although Islam dominated into

the plains of Punjab. These territories were assemblages of various clans, tribes and communities under dynastic rulers and their ruling hierarchies. There was a wide variety of languages, with Persian as the language of culture and administration.

It was from this bundle of cultures, shifting group loyalties and variable power structures that the Jadid intelligentsia dreamed of forging a great Turkistani nation in Central Asia, united by their common linguistic membership of the Turkic family (with the solitary exception of the Persian-speaking Tajiks), their common Islamic religion and a liberal model of government and development. The visionaries of the future Turkistan were of varied background. Some were Tatars like Isma‘il Bey Gaspirali (1851–1914); others were Bashkirs like Ahmad Zeki Velidi, also known as Togan (1890–1970); or Munawwar Qari ‘Abdurashid Khan-oghli (1880–1933) in Tashkent; and Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (1874–1919) and ‘Abdurrauf Fitrat (1884–1937) in Samarkand. Their method was an innovative pedagogy, the nursery of the new intelligentsia; and, as one of their school textbooks put it simply, ‘our homeland [*watan*] is the Turkistan country’. There was no talk of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbek or Tajik.

But this ‘Turkistan’ was not a precise geographic entity such as India, Afghanistan or Iran. It was merely understood as the land of the Turkic people, which could include both the Crimean Tatars and the Uighurs in Chinese Turkistan. In practical terms, however, it meant what later came to be known as Soviet Central Asia. The Russian colonial state had no notion or plan for a nation of any kind in this vast region; their concepts did not proceed beyond provinces defined by political and administrative convenience. Thus the first identification of territory and language, with the goal of modern development as emancipation, was made by the Jadids; it was on that foundation that the Soviet Union built, but by fracturing the territorial and linguistic ideal into five.

NORTH INDIA

North India was comparable and yet different in important respects. Here also, a number of kingdoms with shifting boundaries were held together by nothing more than their respective ruling dynasties. A particular territory was not central to their constitution, nor was language; only the dynasty and the ruling hierarchies mattered. As in Central Asia, a colonial empire was superimposed on this crazy quilt, and indeed at almost the same time, the first half to the middle of the nineteenth century. On this patchwork foundation, the intelligentsia constructed its ideal of a new nation based on the territory (the subcontinent) but with multiple languages. Language was not the single identifier of the nation and its territory, as was mostly the case in Europe, as the Jadid intelligentsia sought to establish for their Turkistani nation, and as the Iranian nationalist intelligentsia had selected Persian

for the modern nation. Nor was the cultural foundation of a single religion available in India as in Central Asia, Iran and Europe. The future nation and its territory were identified through multiple criteria: a common recent history of dynastic rule under the Mughals and colonial subjection to the British; a recreated memory of a classical India of the sub-continent that was described as Hindu; and a composite culture of Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and other religions and cultures that had flourished in apparent symbiosis for at least a millennium. A territory was defined; and a composite culture that was nearly impossible to define but was claimed to exist was confidently affirmed. But no single language, whether classical or living, could be specified; and a single religion, most importantly, could not be asserted. As in Central Asia and the Russian empire, here also the colonial state firmly repudiated any notion of nation and nationalism, derided it as manifestly impossible and worked tirelessly against nationalist projects of uniformities. The new nation was an anti-colonial emancipatory dream of the modern intelligentsia; and, like all dreams, it seemed unreal to all except the dreamers.

IRAN

Iran was another kind of empire; but unlike the Russian Central Asian and British Indian empires, its state was formally independent and could turn the empire directly into a nation through modernization from above, something the neighbouring colonial states could not contemplate. During the reforming phase of the reign of Naser al-Din Shah in the 1860s and 1870s, strenuous efforts were made to reform the institutions of government, the judiciary, the military and the state's finances, comparable to the great reforms in Russia at that time and the Tanzimat in the Ottoman empire. Among the significant leaders of this outpouring of energy, Mirza Hoseyn Khan Moshir al-Dowle was already distinctly nationalist in his outlook and pronouncements. He worked for Iran, the resurgent nation; and he was in close touch with Akhundzadeh in Tiflis, who promoted the ideal of the rebirth of a great pre-Islamic Iran.

It was only in the 1890s, however, that a true nationalist movement of the intelligentsia, represented by persons like Malkam Khan (the reformer of the 1860s), Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, Talebof, Maragheh'i and his son Ebrahim Beg, joined with these modernizing reforms from above. Their aim was to create an Iranian nation, drawing on the symbolism of pre-Islamic greatness, the Persian language purged of Arabic and European corruptions, and the country united and revived through the rule of law, citizenship, political representation and self-directed economic development. The territory was already defined and fixed by the two colonial powers; and the Persian language was selected to carry this nationalism and to override Kurdish and Azeri, both major languages in Iran. These movements and

actions flowed into the constitutional revolution of 1905–11 and provided the foundation for the eventual reconstruction of Iran as a modern nation-state under the Pahlavi dynasty after the First World War.

AFGHANISTAN

The situation in Afghanistan was in many ways comparable to states in Central Asia and North India. Afghanistan was the creation of the two colonial rivals, with Britain providing the final guarantees and outlines of its boundaries to the Muhammadzai ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan (1826–63), from the 1850s to 1863 when Herat was finally incorporated. To this territory, effectively created by the British and Russian empires, the name Afghanistan was given, although within the country ‘Afghan’ denoted only the Pashtoons. The territorial consolidation under the Muhammadzais was not accompanied by modern governance: the state remained a loose assemblage of clans, with the Pashtoons dominant. Both of Dost Muhammad Khan’s successors, Sher ‘Ali Khan (1863–4, 1869–78) and ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880–1901), continued the territorial integration of Afghanistan but without conspicuous success in building the state internally. The territory was a colonial shell with a tribal content.

Afghanistan was theoretically akin to Iran in that it was an independent state, but it lacked even the degree of independence that the Qajar state enjoyed. Isolated as a buffer state by the colonial powers, Afghanistan did not participate in the modern politics of the intelligentsias of Iran, India and Central Asia. Neither from the state above as in Iran, nor from the intelligentsia from below as in the neighbouring regions, did any national modernizing initiative emerge. Even modern communications like the railways and the telegraph, so attractive to any state, and wider contact with the world outside, were firmly denied to the country. The next emir, Habibullah Khan (1901–19), introduced the rudiments of modern education modelled on Aligarh in India, while a group of Young Afghans led by Mahmud Tarzi emulated the Young Turk movement and proposed modern reforms of the state. But these initiatives were confined to the narrowest layer at the top of the social hierarchy; they did not enter the policies of the state and there was no intelligentsia to sustain it. Afghanistan remained trapped and isolated in tribal and regional fragmentation without a nationalizing movement from above or below. It had to wait until Amanullah (1919–29) after the First World War for such action.

From the 1920s to the 1990s

This set of circumstances altered dramatically in the 1920s in the wake of the world war, revolutions and nationalist movements. It was now the epoch not merely of defining and strategizing, but of deliberate action by states and national movements in nation-building in the whole region.

In Central Asia proper, the new Soviet state created in stages the five republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, further subdivided into the Karakalpak autonomous republic in Uzbekistan and Gorno- Badakhshan in Tajikistan. The Jadid Pan-Turkic dream of a single Turkistani state with a single language was fractured into five national states of which four were Turkic-speaking – and one (Tajikistan) Persian-speaking. But the principles of linguistic nationalism were applied, those of defining a territory by language and a supposed common history, and calling the population in it a single people and granting them a single state. This was the exercise carried out in what is known as national territorial delimitation in 1924.

There were of course important departures from these principles. Kazakhstan was composed of Kazakhs and Russians in roughly equal proportions and both were minorities. Yet the name Kazakhstan was designed to suggest that this was the country of the Kazakh people, a people who spoke a single language and belonged to a single territory and state even if they were a minority there. This is what is known as the ‘titular nationality’. Another exception was in Uzbekistan, where the Karakalpak autonomous republic was carved out to accommodate a different language; and the same occurred in Tajikistan with Gorno-Badakhshan.

In addition, there were important minorities in each republic, however strenuous the attempts at drawing the borders to assemble compact groups. The most flagrant example, amounting almost to an anomaly, was the location of the majority Tajik cities of Samarkand and Bukhara in Uzbekistan to the dismay of the Tajiks. But then, these two cities were entirely surrounded by Uzbek territory; and if they were to be in Tajikistan, a large Uzbek population would have been carried into Tajikistan. Either solution would have been unsatisfactory by purely nationalist logic, and it is a measure of how inadequate such nationalist logic necessarily is. Such compromises have to occur as cultural groups are intermingled the world over and it would be almost impossible to find pure uniformities. Nationalism creates or attempts to create such uniformities.

The Soviet system deliberately promoted the Turkic languages and Tajik (which is Persian) over the next quarter-century into fully modern languages, ensured universal literacy in these languages in their respective territories, and employed them from primary school

to post-secondary education, as also in the administration. These were accompanied by 'nativization' (*korenizatsiya*) policies in appointments, that is, people of the territory were given preference in party and state structures, such that the new nations now acquired their own political and administrative leaderships, their own cultural institutions from schools to museums, radio stations and ballet troupes, and of course their own languages. New nations were born, with remarkably distinct identities, as a process of building from top down as much from bottom up. The first stage of these processes was carried out from the 1920s to the 1940s; but it entailed shattering the Pan-Turkic dream of the old pre-revolutionary Jadid intelligentsia and persecuting them in the 1930s in the course of moulding a new Soviet intelligentsia. Such was the Soviet enterprise: to find, as far as was possible, territories with compact populations and to create new nations with single languages in them.

The Soviet undertaking differed from what is customarily understood as nationalism in that these new Soviet nations were not permitted independence, they were subjected to the ideological homogenization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). However, Soviet practice was not as exceptional as the furious ideological battles throughout most of the twentieth century have made it appear. Quebecois nationalism within Canada, Catalan within Spain, or Welsh and Scottish within the United Kingdom, are all instances of permitted nationalisms and nations within a larger state boundary and subject to constitutional homogeneity or compatibility. The nationalisms within the European Union (EU) are allowed within the strict limits of what are constitutionally and, more importantly, ideologically defined as liberal democracies.

Within India, a number of regional nationalisms were promoted by political parties before 1947 on the premise of a single overarching nation; and they were deliberately fashioned by both the independent state and parties thereafter, all subject to their being contained within the Union and functioning according to the constitution of India. This is a combination of ideology and procedure comparable in principle to what the CPSU imposed on the Soviet Union, or the EU (including its earlier avatars) demands of its members. The Soviet system belongs to one end of the spectrum, the EU to the other, in terms of tightness of control; but essential similarities should not be overlooked in the heat of ideological debate.

But the CPSU itself did not admit of any nationalism, indeed it denounced it ceaselessly, for it was constructed as a unitary system with territorial branches in each republic. Neither the party nor the republic represented a nationality as such: in each case they represented the territory of the republic only. Thus the party in Kazakhstan could not officially speak for the Kazakhs of Uzbekistan; and Tatarstan could not represent the Tatars of Kazakhstan, and so on. This was especially significant for Tajikistan given that Samarkand and Bukhara

were essentially Tajik cities, and for the Russian Republic which could not speak up for the Russians in Kazakhstan. These policies and practices derived from the Leninist rejection of any party representing a nationality, whether the Bund representing the Jews, or others attempting to represent the Latvians, Georgians or Tatars.

Thus nations and perhaps even nation-states were created without sovereignty, and fitted into the Soviet Union under the direction of the CPSU. Nations had emerged in a swathe of territory whose previous history did not promise anything of the kind; and this had occurred in conditions that were ideologically hostile to nationalism. However, there was an ambiguity in the structure and practice of the CPSU. Its division into republican branches caused these branches to fuse with these nations gradually; and the original slogan and practice of 'socialist in content, nationalist in form' of the Stalin years imperceptibly evolved in the post-Stalin decades into the practical politics of 'nationalist in content, communist in form'. The party leaders, despite their membership of the party and its necessary discipline, had effectively also become national leaders of the territories or republics they represented.

The republics had become nations in the full sense of the term; once they became sovereign, they would be nation-states, as occurred in 1991. The initial success of the CPSU in fashioning nations, and this symbiotic evolution of nation and party subsequently, largely accounts for the stability of the Soviet regime until the 1980s and for the remarkably peaceful break-up of the Union into five stable independent nation-states in its Central Asian regions in 1991. It also accounts for the surprising stability of the Central Asian regimes after 1991 in the face of extraordinarily destabilizing forces, with the exception of Tajikistan. But even in Tajikistan, the territorial arrangement has not been questioned, and the regime has survived a debilitating civil war.

NORTH INDIA

In North India before 1947, the situation was different in the extreme, but with important parallels. The state, which was part of the British colonial empire, was obviously hostile to any form of nationalism; but, unlike the Soviet Union, it could not dream of promoting any kind of regional nationalism. It maintained and even reinforced its patchwork of administrative provinces and princely states. But the chief contender for power, the nationalist Congress Party, pursued a form of mobilization akin to that in the Soviet Union. It did so by reorganizing itself from 1920 on the basis of linguistic regions. Its nationalist mobilization would now take place on this new territorial and linguistic base, all of it combining under the larger Indian National Congress for the subcontinent. Thus, as in the Soviet Union, a two-tier nation-state structure was emerging, one for the sovereign state of international relations, and the other, the regional nationalisms that would federate into

India but be governed in unitary fashion by the single Congress Party. The superstructure was multilingual, but the regional units had a single language each, albeit with important exceptions and compromises.

These departures from the rule are important, especially in North India. Not all the Hindi-speaking territories were combined into one linguistic province; they were instead divided into several provinces: Himachal Pradesh (1948); Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan (1956); and Haryana (1967). The regional national movement in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir occurred in a linguistically diverse territory that spoke Hindi, Kashmiri and Urdu. In Punjab it consisted of Punjabi, Hindi and Urdu. But while Hindi (or Hindustani) and Urdu could interpenetrate, neither of them enjoyed that form of compatibility with either Kashmiri or Punjabi, which were both very distinct. Thus they developed as regions, each with multiple languages, until Punjab was divided into Punjabi-speaking Punjab and Hindi-speaking Haryana in 1967. It was the same with Bombay, which had two official languages, Marathi and Gujarati, until the separate states of Maharashtra and Gujarat were created out of Bombay province in 1960. Jammu and Kashmir has, however, remained a single state with its special history as the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Whatever the departures from the rule, the Indian National Congress would not accept any religious units within itself, just as the CPSU refused national representation within the party. The Congress insisted on the non-religious organization of the party, and therefore of the future constitution of the country it expected to rule.

The Congress Party's secular nationalism was severely challenged by the religious nationalisms of Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus. By far the most portentous was the movement for Pakistan as a homeland for the Muslims, followed by the demand for a separate state for the Sikhs. Both were national movements defined by religion, not language. A comparable movement flourished among Hindus, that of the Hindu Mahasabha and of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) for a Hindu nationalism and a Hindu India. Hindus being the majority, however, these movements of Hindu nationalism were contained by and partially even within the Indian National Congress. From the 1920s to the late 1940s, divergent definitions of the future post-colonial independent nation and nations competed for space. One was secular in its overarching principle, with linguistic subdivisions, and as such akin to the Soviet construction, albeit with a liberal ideology of politics. The other was religious (called communal in South Asian political vocabulary), and with or without linguistic subdivisions. They were principally Hindu, Muslim and Sikh.

Colonial India therefore was not fashioned into a secular nation with linguistic sub-nations in the manner of the Soviet Union; it was reconstructed after 1947 as multiple

nations and multiple sub-nations following multiple constitutive principles, religious, secular and linguistic. Pakistan became a land for the Muslims; but a vast number of Muslims remained in India, and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir had a Muslim majority. Pakistan fractured in 1971, when Bangladesh broke off as a separate sovereign Bengali nation-state. It was Muslim, but refused to remain with Pakistan. It was Bengali-speaking, but had opted for an independent Muslim nationhood with Pakistan in 1947 and rejected union with the Hindu-majority West Bengal in India. Thus two Bengali nations emerged, one a sovereign state and Muslim, the other not sovereign, majority Hindu, but distinct in its identity within India. Religion by itself could not provide the basis for nationhood, however, and multiple nations with the same religion appeared in the north and east of South Asia, in Pakistan and Bangladesh as sovereign states, and in Kashmir within India. In addition, powerful movements for a separate homeland for the Sikhs swept through Punjab in the 1960s (the Punjabi Suba agitation) and the 1980s (the Khalistan insurgency); but the Indian state firmly beat off a religious sub-nationalism while conceding the linguistic one for Punjabi-speakers in 1967.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is a peculiar example of a state that has not yet been able to become a nation. In 1919 Amir Amanullah, one of Tarzi's Young Afghans, entered into conflict with the British in India to take advantage of the weakened British empire after the First World War. Although he was militarily beaten off, he was politically successful in having the sovereign independence of Afghanistan recognized by the treaty of Rawalpindi in 1921 and promptly signing a treaty with the Soviet Union that year. This was a first major step toward building his nation. Amanullah followed it up in 1923 with a new constitution which pursued the reforms typical of such modernizers. He declared himself *pādshāh* (king), established a council of ministers to assert the powers of the central government, proposed free education, emancipated women from purdah and permitted co-educational schools, thereby reducing the powers of the '*ulamā*' in education. These measures inevitably threatened the power of local notables, in this case tribal leaders, and of the clergy; they also disquieted conservatives, who had to rethink all issues of social relations, especially those of gender.

Such sweeping moves must be sustained by a state that is already sufficiently developed to beat off the conservative opposition, as for example under Peter the Great in Russia in the early eighteenth century; or such acts must be carried out by a compelling movement from below against an inadequate state, as in the French and Russian revolutions; or the movements from above and below must coalesce in sundry fashion, as happened more prosaically in most of Europe, especially Britain and Germany. But in Afghanistan under

Amanullah and thereafter, none of these conditions were available: both the state and the intelligentsia were too feeble to carry such a burden. Amanullah met his nemesis in 1928: tribal leaders rose against the usurping modern state; the clergy rebelled against the loss of their ideological monopoly; and conservatives were appalled in general at the social reforms. After his overthrow and a brief interregnum, the new king, Nadir Shah (1929–33), secured his position by reversing Amanullah's modernizing reforms, just as his son and successor, Zahir Shah (1933–73), did.

But modernization beckoned. Muhammad Daud, prime minister from 1953, turned to Amanullah's abandoned project of creating the nation-state through centralization, modernization and nationalism, with a powerful army, economic development and their appropriate ideological structures. He turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for help, given that the United States was sponsoring both Pakistan (with whom Afghanistan had an unresolved dispute over 'Pashtoonistan') and Iran. Daud's modernization led to the constitutional monarchy of 1964 and the eventual deposition of the king himself in the coup of 1973. But he aligned his new republic ever more with the Soviet Union, which led in quick succession to his overthrow in 1978 by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion of 1979, the United States and Pakistan fuelling the Islamist guerrilla war, and the triumph of the Mujahidin in 1992 and the Taliban in 1996.

This unhappy story reproduced an old rhythm. Afghanistan has been unable to modernize into a nation-state through modern party politics and a centralized developmental state. It has remained instead a territory of tribal and other factions, degenerating into warlords in the 1990s, such that the state remained a coalition of tribal and ethnic power groups. Afghanistan is the most failed nation in the entire region, first as the victim of isolation and the plaything of the colonial powers, and then as the battleground of the superpowers. There is as yet no indication of a way out of this impasse.

IRAN

Iran, however, evolved successfully into a nation-state, albeit in the most turbulent fashion. The Pahlavi monarchy was a vigorous modernizer from the outset in 1925. It asserted itself against tribes, nomads and feudal landlords, pursued industrialization and expanded education and the services. It emancipated women, undercut the '*ulamā*'s monopoly or control over education and the judiciary, and even took over the licensing of religious teaching. In its nationalist symbolism, it projected a pre-Islamic greatness of Sasanian and Achaemenid times, thus shifting the national identity from Shi'ite Islam to pre-Islamic Persianness. Linguistically, it Persianized at the expense of the other languages, Azeri and Kurdish.

Iran possessed the ingredients that Afghanistan lacked: a powerful state, a developed intelligentsia and firm international support from the US. The national project could be carried forward for that reason. But the Pahlavi enterprise provided no space for that intelligentsia; and an intelligentsia engages in such state-building only as a participant, not as a subordinate. The CPSU, despite its repression, Indian electoral politics, and the fitful combination of electoral politics and military rule in Pakistan, all in their respective ways actively engaged the intelligentsia. In Pahlavi Iran, a powerful and developed intelligentsia was excluded. The shahs were overly dependent on the instruments of state and on their alignment with the US. The state was thus no more than a dictatorship to radicals, an abomination to the '*ulamā*', a usurper to landed magnates and tribal leaders, and offensive to republicans for being a monarchy. To nationalists, its unqualified attachment to the US recalled the pitiful subservience of the Qajars to the colonial powers rather than the grandeur of the Achaemenids and Sasanians with whom the Pahlavis identified themselves to excess.

A vibrant intelligentsia or public opinion would have converted these negative features into positive achievements; but it was a relationship that did not fructify. The Islamic revolution of 1979, the enormously expensive war with Iraq (1980–8) and the sustained isolation imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran by the US have produced a most chequered history. Regimes have come and gone, but the Iranian nation and nation-state have emerged much fortified from these vicissitudes, for the state and the public have a symbiotic relationship and a common commitment to fashioning the nation. This was more than the Pahlavis could manage.

Conclusion

As is evident, there is no single model of a nation-state in the region. For India and for Russian and Soviet Central Asia, it was a composite multi-tiered structure, as both imagined and practised; Iran was more nearly a single nationstate; and Afghanistan has remained a state without becoming a nation and still less a nation-state. The criteria used to construct these nations have been varied – religion, language, ethnicity or pragmatic combinations of all these features. However diverse the instruments and criteria, the nations have been forming since at least the 1920s, when effective nationalist mobilizations and statebuilding began as an interrelated process. Even Afghanistan, which has been a remarkable failure, promises to become a nation when development takes effect. It is sometimes suggested that nations, nationalism and nation-states are *passé*; certainly that does not hold true for Central Asia. The nation dominates the political landscape more than religion or any other ideology; it is the one constant and common attribute of the politics of the region.

9

UZBEKISTAN*

*D. A. Alimova and A. A. Golovanov***Contents**

Soviet Uzbekistan	219
Independent Uzbekistan	236

Although the establishment of the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was imposed on Uzbekistan, in fact it promoted the unification of the Uzbek people into a national state. It stimulated the ethnic consolidation of the Uzbeks and strengthened their territorial, cultural and linguistic unity.

Soviet Uzbekistan

To begin with, the USSR Government sought to create a legal basis for the sovereign rights of national republics. The 1924 constitution, for example, proclaimed the voluntary principle of the USSR's federal structure and provided for its development. This principle was also reflected in the constitution of the Uzbek SSR, adopted in March 1927, which declared the republic to be an equal and sovereign component of the USSR.

On the establishment of the Uzbek SSR, the government, headed by Faizullah Khojaev, strove as far as its authority permitted to promote the interests of the local people. This was reflected principally in the growth of the proportion of Uzbeks in state and economic bodies. This proportion rose in the republic's central bodies from 23 to 32.3 per cent between 1924 and 1928, and in the lower levels of the state apparatus reached 75 per cent by the end

* See Maps 1 and 2.

of 1930. At the same time greater use was made of the Uzbek language in administrative work.¹

The republic's leaders set about dealing with Uzbekistan's current problems, such as the integrated development of the country's productive forces, overcoming the predominance of cotton in agricultural production and creating an industrial base capable of transforming all public production in town and country. However, the USSR methodically pursued a line of reinforcing super centralization. The growing hold of Stalinist radicalism put an end to even the limited area of 'national independence'. From the end of the 1920s to the mid-1930s, Uzbekistan saw the establishment of the totalitarian administrative model of the Soviet social and state structure based on ideologization of the economy and strict centralization of the system of management.

COLLECTIVIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Curtailment of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and a return to the leadership methods of the 'war communism' period created the bureaucratic command system of managing society. The second half of the 1930s saw the establishment of the dictatorship of Stalin and his entourage. From that time the soviets (local government bodies) became mere window-dressing for the monopolization of power in the hands of the Communist Party and its leader. The party and the state were interlocked in a single apparatus and the institutions of civil society were destroyed. They were displaced by pseudo-social organizations whose activities were regulated by the party and the state.

The 'advance of socialism along the whole front' was accompanied by global coercion whose ideological justification was Stalin's formula that class struggle would intensify on the road to socialism. The first wave of repression swept through Uzbekistan in the course of the retreat from the NEP. Its victims were the members of the resistance movement, representatives of the national intelligentsia, public figures and politicians who had tried to focus attention on alternative forms of transformation, the rebirth of national culture and the improvement of the people's life.

In the first half of the 1920s, for instance, statesmen like K. Atabayev, T. Ryskulov, A. Rakhimbayev, N. Tyurakulov, I. Khidiraliyev and S. Khojanov were accused of nationalism. Next came the fabricated cases against Inogamov, the 'Group of 18' and Kasymov. The end of 1929 saw the arrest of members of the *Milliy Istiqlol* (National Independence) underground organization headed by the well-known philosopher Munawwar Qari (1880–1933). Of the 85 members of this organization who were arrested, 15 were

¹ Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 87, Inv. 1, File 10, pp. 29–30; *Sovietskoe stroitel'stvo i pravo*, 1933, Nos. 3–4, pp. 35–6.

executed and the rest were dispatched to 'corrective' labour camps. Members of the *Milliy E'tiqod* (National Faith) movement, including (Mannan) Ramiz, Nasir Saidov, Batu, Khosil Vosilov and Sobir Kadyrov, were sentenced to death or lengthy terms of imprisonment.

At the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, repression was carried out under the banner of struggle against 'hostile class elements' such as 'supporters of the New Economic Policy', *beys* (dignitaries) and 'bourgeois specialists', but later it embraced more and more sections of the population. At the beginning of the 1930s, repression was applied to believers and the clergy. By the mid-1930s, repression had swamped the republican authorities. In particular, falsified cases were brought against Faizullah Khojaev, chairman of the republic's Council of People's Commissars; A. Ikramov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Uzbekistan; and other officials including S. Segizbayev, A. Karimov, A. Islamov and M. Tursunkhojayev. They were all executed. By the spring of 1938, over 70 per cent of the republic's leaders had been subjected to repression. Uzbekistan was swept by a wave of mass arrests embracing all sections of the population. From 1937 to 1939 alone the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) *troikas* (three-person tribunals for dealing with 'counter-revolutionaries') imprisoned more than 41,000 people, of whom 6,920 were executed.²

The national intelligentsia was also subjected to persecution. In the 1930s some of the most talented figures in literature and the arts were declared 'enemies of the people', including 'Abdullah Qadiri, 'Abdulhamid Cholpan, 'Abdurrauf Fitrat, Shakir Suleyman, Ziya Said, Elbek, Agzam Ayub, Usman Nasir, Qasim Sorokin, Muhammad Hasan, Abdusalom Niyaziy and Atajan Khashimov. The history school was destroyed and the first Uzbek professor of history, Pulat Saliyev, was arrested and shot, together with many of his students. For many years the works of repressed Jadid (modernist) writers, poets and scientists were banned (see [Chapter 7](#) above).

Hundreds of thousands of ordinary people also fell victim to persecution – *dehqāns* (peasants), artisans, workers and employees, all remote from politics. The Uzbek *dehqāns* suffered terribly in the course of collectivization. As everywhere else in the Soviet Union, this measure was carried out by force and accompanied by repression and crude infringements of the law. The *dehqāns* were forced into collective farms (*kolkhozs*), often under threat of being deprived of land, water and food supplies. Those who resisted were subjected to 'dekulakization' (being victimized as *kulaks*, rich peasants), all their property was confiscated and they were sent into exile. Besides farm buildings, all livestock and poultry were subject to collectivization. Between 1930 and 1933 alone, 40,000 *dehqān* farmsteads were 'dekulakized' and 31,700 *dehqāns* were 'repressed': they were either expelled to the

² [Soviet Uzbekistoni](#), 15 Sept. 1991.

less populated regions of the republic, where 17 special settlements were organized,³ or exiled from Uzbekistan to the northern Caucasus, Ukraine or Siberia. By 1933 more than 5,500 *kulak* families had been expelled beyond the borders of the republic.⁴ Then in the course of the campaign to ‘purge’ the collective farms of ‘class enemies’, over 60,000 *dehqāns* were ‘repressed’.⁵

Agriculture suffered enormous losses from collectivization. There was a sharp decline in the size of livestock herds and the production of grain and foodstuffs. Once again famine broke out in the USSR, including Uzbekistan, and hundreds of thousands of people starved to death. Famine came to an end only in 1935. In the following period, however, agriculture changed for the better. Compared with 1924, by 1940 Uzbekistan’s gross agrarian production had expanded by over 130 per cent, the area of cultivated land had increased by 50 per cent and livestock numbers had risen from 734,000 to 1,693,100. The farms’ stocks of materials and machinery were built up. Back in the 1920s there had been only a handful of tractors, but by 1940 their number had reached 24,200.⁶

Essentially, however, the collective and state farm (*sovkhov*) system of land use and the administrative-command style of management in the countryside led to a slowdown in agrarian production by the Uzbek *dehqāns*. Collectivization broke the ancient foundations of *dehqān* life and destroyed the centuries-old traditions of farm management and the economic interest of the rural producers, encouraging their alienation from the land. Stalin’s ‘agrarian revolution’, which established state dictatorship over the rural economy, was really the precondition for the extensive planting in the republic of a single crop, cotton. In 1933 cotton accounted for 81.5 per cent of the total volume of agricultural produce in the republic. By 1937 this figure had reached 93.4 per cent.⁷

Adopting bureaucratic methods, the Stalin administration demanded a rapid increase in deliveries of raw cotton. As a result the republic’s contribution to total Soviet cotton production reached 63 per cent in 1940.⁸ As disclosed in government documents, this ‘played a decisive part in liberating the Soviet Union from cotton imports and fully supplying the USSR’s textile industry with raw cotton’. In 1925 the USSR imported 103,100 tonnes of cotton, but by 1932 this figure had fallen to 24,300 tonnes.⁹ Thanks to the labours of Uzbek cotton-growers, the Soviet state was able not only to end its dependence on imported

³ Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 86, Inv. 1, File 7985, p. 24.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 16–18.

⁵ Aminova, 1995, p. 49.

⁶ *Narodnoe khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR za 50 let. Sbornik statmaterialov*, 1967, pp. 82, 88, 117, 136.

⁷ Golovanov and Inatov, 1997, p. 101.

⁸ *Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnego plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR*, 1939, p. 54.

⁹ *Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khozyaystvo SSSR. Sbor statmaterialov*, 1937, p. 66.

cotton, but also to rank second in the world production of raw cotton. Cotton became an important Soviet export. In particular, by the beginning of the 1930s cotton fibre accounted for 80 per cent of Uzbek exports through the USSR's foreign trade channels.

A contradictory situation emerged in industry. The policy of industrialization pursued in the 1920s and 1930s created a quite powerful industrial production potential across the USSR as a whole, but this was accompanied by the weakening of the consumer production sector and the slower growth of living standards. Intensification of centralized management, planning directives, low levels of workers' pay and attempts to raise labour productivity by non-economic means were typical of the 1930s. The system of production for the sake of production developed at this time, an economic mechanism based on wasteful outlay.

The policy of forced industrialization applied to the national republics was considered the precursor to ending their 'backwardness'. For Uzbekistan industrialization was of course a pressing problem. The republic's economy was agrarian. Implementation of the notion of ending 'real inequality' by accelerating the accumulation of industrial potential would create the material basis for promoting the republic's national economy and culture and enable it to reach a new level of historical progress.

Industrialization modernized the national economy considerably, and industrial potential grew noticeably. The republic had 191 industrial enterprises in 1927, for example, and 1,145 by 1940. Industry's share in the national economy increased from 43 per cent in 1928 to 70 per cent in 1940.¹⁰ New branches of production emerged and a working class of many thousands was formed. However, the central government's continuing predatory attitude towards Uzbekistan's natural and human resources had a harmful impact on the republic's developing industrial base.

The Soviet leadership stimulated the development of those sectors where the 'USSR's independence of the world market' was sensed most strongly and which were required to provide the central regions with the necessary industrial raw materials. As a result the Uzbek Republic was making a weighty contribution to the USSR's industrialization and the strengthening of its economic independence, but remained an exporter of raw materials. Despite the large capacity of the extraction sector and the primary processing of agricultural produce, the share of processing and engineering in the republican economy was small, several times less than the general Soviet level. The vast majority of industrial enterprises, 81.7 per cent, were under USSR jurisdiction.¹¹ Moreover, in the course

¹⁰ Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 837, Inv. 32, File 448, pp. 44–5.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 37–8.

of industrialization many traditional production structures, particularly those in the handicrafts sector, were destroyed.

LITERACY AND DECULTURATION

A deeply contradictory situation developed in the national intellectual and spiritual sphere. On one hand, there were considerable changes in the field of cultural development. The appreciable raising of education standards was a major achievement. As a result of measures to put an end to illiteracy, the literacy level among the republic's population rose from around 11 per cent in 1928 to 68 per cent in 1939.¹² The network of schools was expanded substantially. Uzbekistan had 5,504 general education schools of all types in 1940, when the number of students was 1,368,800, having risen from 82,300 in 1924. The republic introduced compulsory primary education and began the transition to universal seven-year schooling.

The broad development of the network of secondary specialized and higher education establishments promoted the growth in numbers of specialists. The whole of industry in Uzbekistan had 1,400 engineers and technicians in 1928, while their number had reached 6,000 by 1940.¹³ Altogether, as of 1 January 1941, the republic had 55,300 specialists with diplomas, 20,200 of whom had a higher education and 35,100 a secondary specialized education.¹⁴

Despite the persecution of intellectuals at the time, many works of art were created, enriching the literature and art of Uzbekistan. A great contribution was made by already well-known writers, poets and playwrights such as Sadriddin Aini, 'Abdullah Qadiri, Usman Nasir, 'Abdurrauf Fitrat, 'Abdulhamid Cholpan, Sufi-zade and Batu, as well as representatives of the new wave of national literature like Aybek, Hamid Alimjan, 'Abdullah Qahhar, Ghafur Ghulam, Mirtemir and Shaykh-zade.

Some success was achieved in science. At the same time, however, there were negative trends in the spiritual and cultural sphere. The Soviet cultural model did not correspond to the spiritual requirements and mentality of the Uzbek people. In the circumstances of repressive implantation, its distorted nature took extreme forms.

Amid mass repression the offensive against religion was intensified, in line with a policy of militant atheism. Most of the clergy in Uzbekistan were sent to labour camps. A huge number of religious manuscripts and books were destroyed, religious schools were banned, mosques and *madrasas* were demolished and sacred relics were confiscated. Even

¹² Rabich, 1991, p. 105.

¹³ Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 937, Inv. 32, File 1311, p. 14.

¹⁴ *Sovietskiy Uzbekistan za 40 let. Statsbornik*, 1964, p. 270.

holders of non-religious literature published in Arabic script risked imprisonment for 10 to 15 years.

A struggle developed against such fundamentals of national consciousness as popular and religious customs and the traditions of the family and daily life. The new Soviet rites and rituals were artificially implanted in their stead.

Great harm was done to cultural development by the policy of accelerated ‘internationalization’, which was based on communist ideas about the priority of class interests over national interests and the inevitability of nations merging. By the end of the 1920s Stalin’s administration had already begun active curtailment of the appointment of native cadres and set about the formation of a culture which was ‘socialist in content, internationalist in spirit’ and national in form. This approach led to the pernicious process of changing Uzbek culture to match the demands of ‘class purity’ and ‘proletarian internationalism’. The result was the increasing alienation of the people from the roots of their thousand year-old spiritual heritage and the destruction of their historical memory.

Language policy was another tool for destroying national consciousness and national spirituality. In 1938 the USSR leaders adopted a resolution on the obligatory study of Russian in national schools which entailed a reduction in the number of hours allocated for study of the mother tongue. In 1940 the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced by decree. These measures, and raising Russian to the level of the state language, further limited opportunities for developing the Uzbek language.

MIGRATIONS AND CENTRALIZATION

The policy of artificially increasing the multinational mix of the Union Republics, including Uzbekistan, had a special place in the Soviet model of ‘socialist internationalization’. There was forced migration into the republic as well as voluntary migration, which was uncontrolled.

A tidal wave of compulsory resettlement developed in the second half of the 1930s, when at the time of mass repression the deportation of whole nations began. Koreans from the Soviet Far East, Germans from the Volga basin and Poles from western Ukraine and western Belorussia were the first to be subjected to such population transfers. More than 74,500 Koreans arrived in Uzbekistan between September and December 1937.¹⁵ A number of peoples from the northern Caucasus, Georgia and the Crimea became political exiles in 1943 and 1944. About 110,000 Meskhetian Turks were sent to Uzbekistan from Georgia and 151,424 Crimean Tatars from the Crimea.¹⁶ Tens of thousands more were ‘special

¹⁵ Kim, 1993.

¹⁶ Golovanov and Tursunov, 1993, p. 55.

settlers' of other minority nationalities. Uncontrolled migration into the republic, mainly from Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, was on a broad scale in the famine years at the beginning of the 1920s and 1930s.

A noticeable factor in the growth of the mass migration into Uzbekistan was the USSR administration's deliberate transfer of 'labour resources'. This showed up clearly in connection with forced industrialization. From the mid-1920s groups of workers and specialists were sent from the central regions to Uzbekistan for permanent residence, to promote the development of industrial construction and the formation of a republican detachment of the working class. In the period from 1933 to 1938 alone, 650,000 people came into the republic.¹⁷ The concentration of migrants in the towns, where the standard of utilities and services was higher and the impact of the worsening ecological situation less marked, constituted a hidden aspect of discrimination against the local population on grounds of nationality.

Stalin's administration, by means of mass violence, succeeded in erecting the structure of barrack socialism. The changes brought about 'from above' by Stalin's revolution led in the political sphere to the elimination of the slightest dissent and the establishment of the Communist Party's monopoly; in the economic sphere to the creation of a state-centred and ideologized economy; in the social sphere to a unified structure of two 'socialist classes', the workers and the collective farm peasantry, together with a 'social stratum', the 'new' intellectuals; and in the spiritual sphere to the propagation of communist ideas and indoctrination in 'socialist culture'.

These changes were reflected in the new USSR constitution, adopted on 5 December 1936, and in the Uzbek SSR constitution based on it, adopted by the republican sixth Congress of Soviets in February 1937, which emphasized the sovereign status of 'national statehood'. In fact the new USSR constitution considerably restricted many former constitutional provisions relating to the sovereign rights of the Union Republics, in particular their right to suspend or appeal against the resolutions or instructions of any USSR body. The decisions of USSR executive bodies were thus given legal precedence over the republics' laws. Moreover, the 1936 constitution was supplemented by a system of laws and criminal codes which legalized the abuse of legislation and the use of repression as a means of transforming society. The new constitution legalized the party's dictatorship. It is no coincidence that the Uzbek SSR constitution, following the USSR constitution, particularly emphasized that the All-Union Communist Party was the core of leadership of all public and state organizations.¹⁸

¹⁷ Melnikova, 1956, p. 78.

¹⁸ *Konstitutsiya Uzbekskoy SSR*, 1937, pp. 16–17.

In all respects Uzbekistan remained strictly subordinated to the central authorities of the Soviet state. Infringement of the sovereign rights of Uzbekistan, as a sovereign republic, was tolerated even by the constitution itself. Under Article 17(c), even the fixing of boundaries and the division of *oblast*'s (provinces) into *rayons* (districts) had to be examined by the USSR Supreme Soviet,¹⁹ although these matters should have been within the competence of the republic in the form of its supreme organs of government.

The Soviet-German war of 1941–5 (known as the Great Patriotic War) was a special chapter in the life of the Uzbek people and the USSR as a whole. Altogether 1,433,230 people from Uzbekistan took part in the war – over 40 per cent of the republic's able-bodied population; 263,005 Uzbek soldiers were killed, 132,670 went missing in action, 395,795 did not return home and 60,452 were disabled.²⁰ Proving the courage and heroism of the Uzbek soldiers, orders and medals were awarded during the war years to around 120,000 soldiers from Uzbekistan, including the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded to 280 men from the republic, of whom 75 were Uzbeks.²¹

The people of Uzbekistan played a notable role in supplying the front with weapons, ammunition, uniforms and food. When the war began, local industry in the republic was quickly put on a war footing and over 100 industrial enterprises evacuated from Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia were relocated.²² The Uzbek people received the evacuees and refugees hospitably. During the war over 1 million citizens arrived in the republic from the occupied areas of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia and the Baltic region, including 200,000 children.²³ Despite the difficulties, all arrivals were provided with warm clothing, food and a roof over their heads. The people of Uzbekistan surrounded orphaned children with parental love. Children's homes were opened for them and many were adopted by Uzbek families.

The beginning of the war was marked by some weakening of the ideological grip of Stalin's regime. The cultural life of Uzbekistan was marked by a deepened interest in the national historical heritage and the history of the struggle of the republic's peoples against alien invaders, as well as greater historical and ethnic consciousness. During the war, publishers brought out two volumes about the life and works of 'Alishir Nawa'i (1441–1501), works of Uzbek classics, including Lutfi, Bedil (1644–1721) and Gulhan and the national poems 'Shirin and Shakar', 'Kunduz and Yulduz', 'Dalli', 'Muradhan' and 'Malika Aiyar',

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 18–19.

²⁰ *Pravda Vostoka*, 5 May 1995.

²¹ *Uzbekistan v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny*, 1966, p. 36.

²² Archives of the Apparatus of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 58, Inv. 17, File 21, p. 4.

²³ Mulladzhonov, 1989, p. 143.

which sang the praises of the courage and daring of the heroes of the past. Creativity flourished among such masters of the literary genre as Aybek, Aydin, S. Ahmad, Hamid Alimjan, Ghafur Ghulam, Nazir Safarov, I. Rahim, Sharof Rashidov, Mirza Ismoil, Z. Fathullin, A. Umari, Abdullah Qahhar, Rahmatullah Uyghun, Zul'fiya and many others.²⁴

AFTER STALIN

The end of the war raised hopes of a better life among all peoples of the USSR but Stalin, sensing the weakening of his regime, made energetic efforts to strengthen it. From the late 1940s to the early 1950s, famous Uzbek intellectuals were subjected to ideological persecution. They included masters of literature like Musa Aybek, K. Atabayev, S. Abdullah, A. Babajanov, T. Tula, Mirtemir and Habibi, and the scientists K. Abdullayev, K. Zarifov, I. Sultanov and H. Yakubov. At the beginning of 1952 Shukrullah, M. Shaykhzade, M. Osim, S. Ahmad, M. Ismoil, Shohrat, K. Suleymanov and several other well-known writers and scientists from Uzbekistan were sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for 'anti-Soviet activities'. The political oppression of the clergy was intensified. Altogether in the republic between 1937 and 1953 almost 100,000 people were repressed, of whom 13,000 were executed.²⁵

In the mid-1950s the USSR's new leadership headed by Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed the policy of de-Stalinization. Mass repression was officially condemned. The victims of political genocide began to emerge from prisons and camps and many 'repressed' people were rehabilitated. At the same time, people in high positions began to talk about the necessity of 'broadening democracy' and the concession of 'sovereign rights' to national republics.

Some steps were taken in that direction but on the whole the regime's basis remained unchanged. The development of limited 'democratic' trends at the time of 'Khrushchev's thaw' at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s was unable to renovate fundamentally the existing structure. There was little change in the general approach to national politics. In the upper echelon of Soviet power, notwithstanding the routine declarations, there was no firm understanding of the complexity and specific nature of nationality or the need for a flexible and careful approach to the population's spiritual and national interests. Moreover, the new leadership under Leonid Brezhnev, which took over from the Khrushchev administration in 1964, brought to a halt the exposure of the Stalin cult and continued the former course in a superficially toned-down way.

²⁴ Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 1, Inv. 1, File 17, p. 56.

²⁵ *Pravda Vostoka*, 13 May 2000.

The final decades of Soviet power were distinguished by the complex interlacing of individual achievements with a growing wave of severe crises which were evidence of the systematic decay of the totalitarian system. The most marked contradictory trends at that time appeared in the socio-economic sphere. Withdrawal from the extremes of Stalin's repressive regime and attempts at a 'leap into communism', the country's leaders' move towards solving social problems and boosting agrarian production, together with measures to accelerate scientific and technical progress – all these measures stimulated the development of the USSR's national economy and led to improvements in the material conditions of the population.

Uzbekistan too was raised to a higher level of social and economic progress over a range of parameters. The republic's leader Sharaf Rashidov played an important role in this. From the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s dozens of big industrial plants were built in the republic and the branch structure of industrial production was expanded. In Uzbekistan 1,549 industrial enterprises, engineering, chemical, construction, light industry and agro-industrial complexes were in operation in 1985, by which year gross industrial production had increased by more than fivefold since 1960.²⁶

Agricultural construction developed on a grand scale. By the middle of the 1980s important changes had taken shape with regard to the materials and machinery used in agriculture, the consolidation of its potential and the largescale intensification of agricultural production. A great deal of work was done in the republic to assimilate new areas of steppe-land. By 1985 the republic had a total of 900 irrigation systems and 92 water engineering structures in operation. The total length of irrigation channels exceeded 197,000 km. To safeguard against low water levels, 23 reservoirs were built to accumulate 10 billion m³ of water for irrigation. They included the Charvaq reservoir, the largest in Uzbekistan, the Tuyamuyun reservoir in Khwarazm, on the lower reaches of the Amu Darya, and the Andijan reservoir on the Kara Darya. An extensive area of land was brought under the plough. From 1946 to 1965 some 600,000 ha were assimilated, but between 1966 and 1985 the area reached 1.6 million ha. At the same time 6.9 million ha of pasture were provided with water supplies. In the republic's virgin lands 160 farms were built and 7.7 million m² of housing were brought into use.²⁷ Big agricultural regions and towns developed there.

Energetic efforts were made by the leadership of Uzbekistan, headed by Sharaf Rashidov, to develop national education and culture. Whereas in 1960 the republic had 7,511 general education schools, their number had reached 9,188 by 1985. The number of secondary

²⁶ *Narodnoe khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR v 1985 g. Statezhgodnik*, 1986, pp. 13, 46.

²⁷ Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 90, Inv. 10, File 476, pp. 95–100.

specialized and higher education establishments increased from 75 to 249 and from 30 to 42 respectively. Over that period 6.4 million people received a secondary (general or special) education. The flow of graduates from higher schools increased. As a result, the general educational level of the population rose steadily and the ranks of qualified specialists were actively expanded. For example, in 1986 the republic's national economy employed 690,000 specialists with a higher education and 734,000 with a secondary specialized education, whereas in 1960 the figures had been 108,900 and 130,000 respectively.

The development of republican science brought big changes. From the 1960s to the 1980s the republic's corps of scientific workers more than trebled in size, from 10,329 to 35,056.²⁸ In those years a good many scientists and scholars from Uzbekistan became famous not only throughout the USSR but also worldwide. They included K. A. Abdullayev, U. Arifov, Y. G. Gulyamov, Y. Masson, I. M. Muminov, K. T. Zarifov, G. I. Pugachenkova, E. V. Rtveladze, A. S. Sadykov, Z. K. Turakulov, I. A. Khamrabayev and S. Y. Yunusov. Uzbek scientists' work in the fields of archaeology, chemistry, geology, mathematics, astronomy, geodesy and physics was well known.

Some clear successes were achieved by Uzbek literature. Despite party political limitations, new works of talent continued the best national traditions of artistic creation. Particular popularity was enjoyed by works filled with the spirit of humanism by such masters as Ghafur Ghulam, Aybek, 'Abdullah Qahhar, Kamil Yashen, Uyghun, Gayrati, Asqad Muhtar, Sabir 'Abdullah, Zulfiya, Mirtemir, M. Shaykh-zade, Mirmuhsin, Ibrahim Rahim, Hamid Ghulam, Said Ahmad, Pirimkul Kadyrov, Adyl Yaqubov, Shohrat, Mirzakalon Ismaili, Mikhail Sheverdin, Shukrullah and Utkir Hashimov.

There were also positive trends in the development of national arts. In the period from 1960 to 1985 the number of theatres grew from 20 to 30. They included 20 theatres for drama and musical comedy, 8 children's theatres and 2 opera and ballet theatres. Among Uzbekistan's talented artists of particular note were K. Nasyrova, S. Ishanturayeva, Tamara Khanum, G. Izmaylova, L. Sarymsakova, A. Khidoyatov, B. Zakirov, F. Sadykov, S. Burkhanov, N. Rakhimov, M. Ashrafi, R. Pirmukhammedov, K. Jabbarov and others whose names became well known far beyond the republic's borders. Uzbek cinematography grew notably in prestige and films by S. Abassov, Y. Agzamov, L. Fayziyev, K. Yarmatov and R. Batyrov were noteworthy for their high level of professionalism and national colour.

²⁸ *Narodnoe khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR za 70 let sovietskoy vlasti Yubiley Statezhagodnik*, 1987, pp. 29, 210.

Housing construction increased in the republic, health services were improved, the service industry network expanded and a programme was developed to supply gas to towns and rural settlements.

However, the opportunities available to the national leadership remained limited. Positive changes were fragmentary and tended mostly to be in terms of quantity rather than quality. The primary reasons for the worsening trends from the 1960s to the 1980s were, first, the impact of adverse developments across the USSR and, second, the consequences of the Soviet Government's policy towards Uzbekistan.

After Brezhnev came to power in 1964, there was a retreat from de-Stalinization and a conservative policy was pursued, combined with ideological intolerance. The 'renewal' undertaken in those years amounted only to reshuffling the administrative and management system into seemingly more democratic forms while preserving its essence. Political conservatism was reflected in the rejection of radical reforms, an expansion of the apparatus of bureaucracy, the monopoly of the 'partocracy' and the spread of corruption, nepotism and fraud at the various levels of power. The result was the stagnation of the whole Soviet system.

A new USSR constitution adopted in 1977 proclaimed the building of 'developed socialism' in the country. It laid the legal foundations for the legitimacy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its Politburo as the organ of power determining and directing state policy. The Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and the local organs of government were only to carry out party directives from the centre. The status of first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was enormously increased, concentrating in his hands more power than that enjoyed by any leader of a democratic country. A new constitution of the Uzbek SSR based on the new USSR constitution was adopted.

The growing tendency towards crisis in the socio-economic sphere was an important factor in the corrosion of the Soviet system. The stimulus imparted by the economic reforms of the 1950s and 1960s had only had a limited effect. The truncation of the reform and its concentration on secondary issues prevented any solution of the problem of intensification of production. By the beginning of the 1980s the USSR's economic growth rates had fallen to a level marking the onset of stagnation. The Soviet economy displayed ever more clearly an unreceptive attitude to innovation and an extreme reluctance to change.

The ailments of the Soviet state were compounded in Uzbekistan by the intensified policies of the central government. The republic continued to be seen as a mere supplier of raw materials. The interests of Uzbekistan were ignored as before and possible alternative ways of developing the national economy and changing the republic's place and role in the

USSR division of labour were discounted. On the contrary, from the 1960s to the 1980s the republic's specialization as a supplier of raw materials increased. Besides agricultural produce, deliveries of gas, non-ferrous and rare metals and other minerals increased intensively. In the 1980s the annual deliveries of gas from Uzbekistan exceeded 250 billion m³ and deliveries of gold exceeded 50 tonnes.²⁹ A never-ending stream of cobalt, molybdenum, wolfram, refined copper, uranium, etc. flowed into the central regions.

Minerals worth around \$5.5 billion a year were extracted in Uzbekistan. However:

revenue from the production and sale of gold, rare and non-ferrous metals, strategic materials and other high-value products in demand on the world market did not go into the treasury of Uzbekistan.³⁰

In the last 15 years of the USSR, 'cotton and gold worth at least \$35 billion were shipped out to meet the centre's needs'.³¹ The total value of the minerals delivered to the central regions in this period exceeded \$75 billion.

Uzbekistan suffered enormous losses from not being able to process its own raw materials and sell finished goods. From deliveries of Uzbekistan's agricultural produce alone, other regions of the USSR derived 40 billion roubles annually in national income. The USSR's subsidy to the republican budget averaged 1.5 billion roubles.³² Because industry continued to be centred on raw materials, finished goods accounted for only 25 per cent of the total volume of production, and output of consumer goods per head of the population reached only 40 per cent of the general USSR level.³³

Cotton monoculture turned out to be a disaster for the Uzbek people. Under pressure from the Soviet Government, new land was set aside for cotton planting and sowings of other crops were reduced, while the size of country-dwellers' private household plots was limited. Over-reclamation of land connected with the emphasis on cotton in agrarian production had serious consequences. Because of the unsound approach to the reclamation of land imposed by the Soviet Government and the uncontrolled use of the waters of the rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya, the annual average flow of these rivers into the Aral Sea declined from 42.9 km³ between 1961 and 1970 to 4.2 km³ from 1981 to 1984.³⁴ This was one of the main reasons for the catastrophic state of the Aral Sea today. The situation was aggravated by the excessive use of pesticides and other chemicals. For example, in the

²⁹ *Pravda Vostoka*, 23 Jan. 1999.

³⁰ Karimov, 1999, p. 4.

³¹ Karimov, 1996, p. 180.

³² *Pravda Vostoka*, 30 Sept. 1989; *Ekonomiya i jizn'*, 1990, No. 5, p. 10.

³³ *Pravda Vostoka*, 5 June 1990.

³⁴ *Aral prosit pomoshchi*, 1987, pp. 30–2.

1980s the world average application of pesticide per hectare was 300 g while in Uzbekistan it averaged 54 kg, that is, 180 times more than the permitted maximum.³⁵

The Soviet Government's consumerist attitude towards Uzbekistan, the predatory exploitation of its natural and human resources and the one-sided nature of the national economy as a supplier of raw materials all created conditions that impeded the republic's socio-economic development. At the end of the 1980s, the Uzbek SSR occupied twelfth place among the 15 Union Republics for per capita gross social product, and its national income was half that of the USSR.

The branches of the social infrastructure that were financed from funds left over after other major allocations were in the most serious position. If in 1940 social and cultural expenditure accounted for 67.9 per cent of all budgetary expenditure of the Uzbek SSR, in 1950 it amounted to 64.4 per cent, in 1960 to 50 per cent, in 1970 to 49.6 per cent and by the middle of the 1980s it had fallen to about one third.³⁶ The particular demographic situation in the republic, linked with the high rate of population growth, was ignored. The widening of the gap between budgetary financing of the socio cultural programme and the population growth rate led to a situation in which, despite the considerable scale of housing construction and the expansion of the network of socio-cultural facilities, the population's needs for modern housing, general education schools, kindergartens, health service establishments, service industry outlets, etc. were not satisfied. The lag behind other republics of the USSR in the social sphere increased.

The health services experienced serious problems. From the 1960s to the 1980s almost half the growth in hospital capacity in Uzbekistan was met by organizing treatment in converted buildings or increasing the number of beds in existing hospitals. The housing problem was particularly acute. For example, in 1985 one tenth of urban families had less than 4 m² of dwelling space.³⁷

The all-pervading interference of party bodies had a pernicious effect on the spiritual life of Uzbekistan. The ramified ideological apparatus put a stop to any attempt to criticize Soviet life or to restore national values and cultural traditions. For example, in 1982 the CPSU Central Committee unleashed a series of grave accusations against staff of the Institute of Language and Literature of the republic's Academy of Sciences for trying to escape from established stereotypes in examining the ideology of Jadidism. Attempts to rehabilitate Fitrat and Cholpan were sharply criticized.³⁸

³⁵ Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 2454, Inv. 6, File 9962, p. 6.

³⁶ *Narodnoe khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR v 1980 g. Statezhgodnik*, 1981, p. 328; *Narodnoe obrazovanie i kul'tura v SSSR. Statezhgodnik*, 1989, p. 284.

³⁷ Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 837, Inv. 1, File 5594, p. 87.

³⁸ *Tashkent Regional State Archives*, Coll. 2396, Inv. 1, File 83, pp. 6–25.

PERESTROIKA

The 'restructuring' proclaimed in April 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev gave rise to hopes of a way out of the systemic crisis. The merits of Gorbachev and his supporters included the weakening of the Communist Party's ideological grip, the removal of the veil of semi-secrecy which had concealed the realities of the Stalin period even at the time of Khrushchev's 'thaw', cutting back the power of the *nomenklatura* elite, relative pluralism in political and economic life, and the proclamation of a 'new thinking' in foreign policy which played down the importance of class struggle in favour of 'common human values' and a 'world without violence and war'.

However, the attempts to modernize the Soviet system and give socialism a 'human face' ended in failure. 'Restructuring' did not reach down to the fundamentals and suffered from half-heartedness. To sum up, there were progressive changes in the political sphere, but the socio-economic condition of society and the material position of the people were worsening from day to day.

Problems which had accumulated for years in the multinational state were more sharply perceived through the prism of relations between the nationalities. The republics saw the birth of national movements which expressed demands for national democratic reform and true sovereignty, national consciousness was reborn and political movements appeared which focused on the restoration of national statehood. The need for system change on a unitary basis became obvious.

In an attempt to bar the way to 'separatist' aspirations, the USSR leaders, within the framework of the new struggle against the compromised *nomenklatura*, tried to establish themselves in the eyes of the people as fighters for social justice. With this aim, much-publicized campaigns of 'exposure' developed in a number of regions of the USSR to demonstrate the efforts of the new political elite to achieve 'socialist purification' and end corruption, whereby the blame for economic failures was placed on local leadership cadres.

One of the regions receiving close attention was Uzbekistan, where the so-called 'Uzbek' or 'cotton' case was unravelled. Fed from the centre, the USSR mass media began to spread the view widely that the system of corruption in Uzbekistan had embraced the whole nation. This offended national dignity. Groups of party, local government, law enforcement and economic workers were sent down to the republic. Many of them took their appointment to leadership responsibilities as giving them the right to do as they pleased. They started interfering with people's customs and culture and increased the artificial restrictions on the Uzbek language.

The situation was aggravated by the investigation teams, headed by Gdlyan and Ivanov, which began 'purification' work using the methods of Stalin and Beria. They beat

suspects during interrogation and illegally arrested and imprisoned thousands of innocent people.³⁹ Altogether over 25,000 executives and economic managers from Uzbekistan were arrested.⁴⁰

Soviet nationality policy, superimposed on the grave socio-economic position of the people, destabilized the political situation in the republic. In the summer of 1989 a wave of demonstrations swept Ferghana, Kokand, Quvasay, Gulistan, Parkent and Buka and extremist national radicals tried to take advantage of them. In these conditions it was important to prevent a political explosion and restrain the republic on the verge of a disastrous social conflict.

The formulation of a new policy based on the national interests of Uzbekistan came about with Islam Karimov's accession to the republican leadership. The Kremlin elite expected him to implement the policy of the Soviet Government. However, from the beginning Karimov put forward the idea of Uzbekistan's political sovereignty and economic self-dependence as the decisive conditions for independence. An essential prerequisite of the achievement of state sovereignty was Islam Karimov's election to the post of president of Uzbekistan at the first session of the twelfth Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet (March 1990).⁴¹ This was an unprecedented step in the history of the USSR: until then no president had been elected in any republic. The centre reacted extremely negatively to the introduction of this essentially new political institution of state leadership and Karimov's election to the post of president of Uzbekistan.

The principle of Uzbekistan's own road to development began to be elaborated and implemented even before the proclamation of independence. Presidential decrees and laws and resolutions of the Supreme Soviet and Government at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s were intended to ensure political sovereignty and economic self-dependence as well as national rebirth. This process found specific expression in giving Uzbek the status of the state language in 1989, drawing up measures aimed at resolving the most important national economic tasks, ending the cotton monoculture and returning to the people their national spirituality, traditions and customs. Measures to create the necessary conditions for satisfying the interests and spiritual needs of the peoples living in Uzbekistan were an important factor in ensuring political stability and accord among the nationalities in the republic.

Another constructive development was the resolute fashion in which Uzbekistan's new leadership tackled the socio-economic problems which had accumulated during the years

³⁹ Ilyukhin, 1993.

⁴⁰ *Pravda Vostoka*, 24 Nov. 2000.

⁴¹ Archives of the Apparatus of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coll. 58, Inv. 405, File 1, p. 15.

of Soviet power. In August 1989 the government of the republic adopted a resolution on the essential development of private auxiliary plots of land by collective farmers, state farm workers and citizens and the expansion of individual housing construction.⁴² At the beginning of 1990 work began on the state employment programme which was designed to reduce high unemployment, particularly in the republic's densely inhabited regions.⁴³ In July of the same year the president of Uzbekistan issued a decree on improving drinking water and natural gas supplies to the rural population.⁴⁴

The 'Declaration of Independence' adopted at the second session of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan (June 1990) was an important step on the road to independence.⁴⁵ It consolidated the fundamental principles of the republic's state sovereignty: supremacy of the democratic state and laws over its whole territory; independent resolution of matters of internal and foreign policy; recognition and respect of the basic principles of international law; determination of Uzbekistan's own road to development; its denomination, etc.

A final attempt to preserve the collapsing USSR was made by reactionary forces on 19 August 1991, when an unconstitutional coup was staged and a State Committee for the State of Emergency formed. The plotters, who included senior members of the USSR Government, intended to establish a tough dictatorship of central power and resolutely uproot separatism.

Independent Uzbekistan

NEW INSTITUTIONS

The leadership of Uzbekistan considered the formation of the State Committee to be political adventurism. The national government immediately declared uncompromisingly its own policy, which would be 'guided exclusively by the interests of the republic'.⁴⁶ Political independence was proclaimed on 31 August 1991 at the extraordinary sixth session of the Supreme Soviet. The country was named the Republic of Uzbekistan, and 1 September was declared Independence Day, the national festival of the newly formed state.

The proclamation of independence was consolidated in the law, Fundamentals of the State Independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The population expressed its attitude towards the proclamation of independence and its approval of the position of the leadership of the republic in a straightforward way in the election of the country's president

⁴² *Pravda Vostoka*, 15 Aug. 1989.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 9 Jan. 1990.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 31 July 1990.

⁴⁵ *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta UzSSR*, 1991, No. 4 (1180), p. 4.

⁴⁶ *Press-byuleten' Apparata Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistana*, 1992, No. 3, pp. 9, 11.

and the national referendum on questions of political sovereignty held on 29 December 1991. The multi-candidate elections for the head of the young Uzbek state were observed by representatives of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The first president of sovereign Uzbekistan to be elected by the whole people was Islam Karimov, who was supported by 86 per cent of the electorate. The country's independence was approved by 98.2 per cent of the citizens who voted.⁴⁷

In the relatively short period from September 1991 to July 1993, the Republic of Uzbekistan was officially recognized as an independent state by more than 160 states across the world. On 2 March 1992 Uzbekistan became a member of the United Nations. The achievement of independence marked the beginning of a new historical epoch, the age of free development. However, the future of the young Uzbek state depended upon whether it was able to take advantage of the opportunities opening up before it and successfully solve the most difficult tasks of radical innovation.

REASSESSMENT OF UZBEK CULTURAL IDENTITY

Independence created the need for ideological and spiritual reference points. The transition from one social system to another is inevitably accompanied by painful changes in values and crises in spiritual life. Uzbekistan was able to alleviate these processes. Spiritual rebirth in the republic came about by returning to spiritual sources, acquiring the values of world civilization and developing an individual ideology.

The path of 'de-ideologization' proclaimed in Uzbekistan was not intended to reject ideology altogether. In the first years of independence, Karimov drew attention to the danger of an ideological vacuum, which risked the encroachment of alien ideas, and he indicated the importance of the purposeful establishment of new thinking. The course was set for the formation of common national ideas of Uzbek society, a new ideology capable of consolidating all social strata, meeting the needs of the historical process and promoting the development among the broad masses of immunity from all forms of ideological extremism. The ideology of national independence became such an ideology.

One of the achievements of the period of independence has been to return to the people the memory of such outstanding historical figures as Ahmad al-Farghani, al-Bukhari, al-Termezi, Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, Burhan al-Din al-Marginani, Baha al-Din Naqshband and Ahmad Yasawi, all of whom made invaluable contributions to the treasure-house of world culture and national spirituality. Broad measures have been taken for the rehabilitation of participants in the national liberation movement in the times of tsarist

⁴⁷ *Istoriya Uzbekistana*, 1995, p. 320.

colonialism and Soviet totalitarianism, as well as the victims of Stalin's repression. They include Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, Munawwar Qari, Ubaidullah Khojayev, Faizullah Khojayev, 'Abdullah Qadiri, 'Abdurrauf Fitrat, 'Abdulhamid Cholpan, Usman Nasir and Elbek.

The raising of Uzbek to the status of the state language has played an important part in the spiritual rebirth of the nation. The law on this subject was adopted on the eve of independence. The further renewal of language policy was reflected in the Law on the Introduction of the Uzbek Alphabet Based on the Latin Script, adopted on 2 September 1993.⁴⁸ This programme is expected to be completed by 2005.

The proclamation of Uzbek as the state language did not entail the displacement of other languages in use in the republic. Moreover, the democratic nature of this law was indicated by the inclusion of a clause giving citizens the right to choose the language of their children's education and to use the services of an interpreter in court, etc. Russian, a world language spoken widely in Uzbekistan, has preserved its dominant status as before. For many years the people had used it to gain access to world culture and to science within the framework of the world intellectual space. Although the range of applications of Russian has narrowed, it remains in active use, particularly in education and science. On 22 December 1995 the *Oliy Majlis* (parliament) adopted the Law on the State Language in a new redaction, which enhanced its democratic and humanitarian nature.⁴⁹

The restoration of national spiritual values is reflected in the renewed celebration of popular and religious festivals which were banned in Soviet times (e.g. *Nowruz*, the Persian New Year). There have been widespread celebrations of the anniversaries of the great Central Asian religious thinkers al-Termezi, al-Bukhari, Mahmud al-Zamakhshari, Najm al-Din Kubra, Naqshband, Khoja Ahrar Wali and others. Their works have been reprinted and their names immortalized.

By a resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers on 19 May 1995, an international research centre was opened in Tashkent to study Islam and the historical and cultural heritage. At the same time, a University of Islam was set up in Uzbekistan. Since independence, more than 1,000 mosques and *madrassas* have been built in the country. Every year hundreds of pilgrims carry out the *hajj* to Mecca, the centre of the Muslim religion.

The revival of other religions besides Islam has begun. One of the largest is the Russian Orthodox Church, which has around 30 parishes in the republic, a nunnery in Tashkent and a monastery in Chirchiq. A seminary was opened in 1998 in the premises of an existing religious college; it trains clergy for parishes of the Central Asian diocese. Besides the

⁴⁸ *Khalk Suzi*, 3 Sept. 1993.

⁴⁹ *Khalk Suzi*, 23 Dec. 1995.

Russian Orthodox Church, 13 other religious denominations are represented, including the Roman Catholic, Armenian Gregorian, Lutheran and Baptist.

The principles of mutual relations between the secular Uzbek state and the religious denominations are set out in the constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Articles 31 and 61): respect for the religious feelings of believers, recognition of religious convictions as the private affair of citizens and their congregations, and the equality of all religions.

Since independence, several higher education establishments have been opened to train specialists in skills that were formerly lacking in the republic. These include the Military Academy, the Academy of State and Public Development, the University of World Economics and Diplomacy and the Tashkent Aviation Institute. In September 2001 a Higher School of Business commenced operations, the teaching being done by professors from leading foreign countries. In January 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan adopted a resolution on the establishment of an International Westminster University in Tashkent.⁵⁰ In 2001 Uzbekistan was the only one of UNESCO's 190 Member States to be awarded the United Nations Prize for Education, Science and Culture and this is proof of the country's considerable achievements in the restructuring of education. The republic pays particular attention to the development of physical culture and sport. Uzbekistan became a member of the International Olympic Committee in September 1993.

The role of science in the transformation process is being increased substantially. The republic's scientific research network includes 361 establishments of academic, higher education and sector specialization, including 101 research institutes, 55 research departments of higher education establishments, 65 planning and design organizations, 32 science and production associations and experimental enterprises and 30 IT and computing centres. The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan is the core of the country's scientific potential.

THE ECONOMY

Independence has created favourable conditions for determining an independent path of economic development on the basis of the following principles: 'deideologization' of the economy and the priority of economics over politics; the state as the chief agent of reform in the transition period; a legal basis for the whole process of renewal; economic policy with a social orientation; and an evolutionary and gradual development of market relations.

Over the years of sovereign development, economic reform in Uzbekistan has passed through two major stages. The first and most difficult stage, essentially one of crisis, was

⁵⁰ *Khalk Suzi*, 18 Jan. 2002.

from 1991 to 1993. At that time the young state had to work out urgently a programme of socio-economic recovery, determine the mechanism for transforming economic relations from administrative planning to the market, and seek out optimal ways of entering the world economic system. Monetary reform was an important step in the formation of the new economic relations. An interim monetary unit called the *süm* coupon was introduced in November 1993, and the national currency, the *süm*, in 1994.

Measures to encourage the use of private household plots by country dwellers, and to allot land for individual and collective use by town dwellers, were of great importance. In 1991 and 1992 alone, 2.5 million families received allotments or enlarged them. As a result, by the middle of the 1990s over 9 million people were enjoying the produce of their private plots. By then over 80 per cent of the republic's sheep and goats were kept on private household plots, which were producing up to 86 per cent of the republic's meat, 69 per cent of its potatoes and other vegetables and more than 5 per cent of its fruit.⁵¹ In this way it was possible to end acute shortages in the supply of foodstuffs to the population.

Much has been done to establish multiple forms of ownership, privatization and the abolition of state ownership. In the period from 1992 to 2001, the number of privatized enterprises increased by 85,000 and the proportion of the country's economy in the non-state sector reached 90 per cent.⁵² Economic reform is linked with Uzbekistan's integration in the world economy. Uzbekistan inherited from its Soviet past a difficult foreign trade situation, particularly in terms of the balance of imports and exports. On the eve of independence, the negative balance of trade reached 19 per cent. Moreover, exports were in decline and accounted for only 4 per cent of GDP at that time.⁵³ The basic exports were raw materials, primarily cotton.

The undoubted successes achieved by sovereign Uzbekistan do not mean that all problems have been solved, however. An array of acute issues still remains, concerning especially the quality of life of the population. It must not be forgotten that the country is still at the transition stage.

⁵¹ *Sel'skoe khozyaystvo Uzbekistana*, 1995, No. 6, pp. 35, 36; *Ekonomika i statistika*, 1997, No. 10, p. 15.

⁵² *Privatizatsiya v Uzbekistane ...*, 2001, p. 73; *Khalk Suzi*, 19 Jan. 2002.

⁵³ *Narodnoe khozyaystvo Respubliki Uzbekistan v 1993 godu. Spravochnik*, 1994, p. 19.

10

KAZAKHSTAN^{*}*K. Nurpeis***Contents**

The tsarist period	241
The Alash movement	247
Soviet history	250
Prior to independence	255
Independence	257

The tsarist period

By the mid-nineteenth century, Kazakhstan's annexation to Russia, which began officially in the 1730s and ultimately transformed the region into a colony of tsarist Russia, was virtually complete. This process was complex and contradictory, for it lasted more than 130 years and took place under a variety of foreign-policy and domestic political conditions.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that a large part of the territory of the Little or Younger *Zhuz* (Horde) and certain areas of the Middle *Zhuz* (the western, central and north-eastern regions of Kazakhstan) were annexed to Russia by peaceful means between the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the southern and south-eastern regions (primarily the territory of the Great or Elder *Zhuz*) were seized by tsarist Russia in the 1850s and 1860s by military force.

Over the many years while Kazakhstan was being annexed to Russia, the Kazakh people's traditional statehood, which took the form of the khanate, was wiped out. The completion of Kazakhstan's annexation to Russia coincided with the emancipation of the

^{*} See Maps 1 and 2.

serfs in Russia (1861) and the implementation of several reforms aimed at developing capitalistic social relations. All this could not help but affect Kazakhstan. The quickly developing industry of the mother country had an increasing need for cheap sources of raw materials and for markets. Fabulously wealthy in natural and agricultural (primarily livestock) resources, Kazakhstan had long attracted Russian business interests.

In order to finalize Kazakhstan's status as a colony and make its further development purposeful and systematic, tsarist Russia decided to create a new system of administrative-political and judicial administration here. To prepare this reform, a Steppe Commission drawn from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of War was created in 1865. Included in the commission's work were officials of the local colonial administration and individual representatives of the Kazakh people who were on the whole loyally inclined towards the government transformations. The commission spent two years working on a plan for the administration of Kazakhstan, a plan which took the form of two 'temporary provisions': 'On the Administration of Syr Darya and Semirechye *Oblast's* [provinces]' and 'On the Administration of Ural, Torghay, Akmola and Semipalatinsk *Oblast's*'. On 11 July 1867 Tsar Alexander II (1855–81) signed the first, and on 21 October of the same year he approved the second provision. In the administrative-territorial reform carried out under these provisions, nearly the entire ethnic territory of the Kazakhs was divided into three governor-generalships: Turkistan, Orenburg and Western Siberia (later, Steppe governor-generalship). Full military and civil power was concentrated in the gubernorgeneral's hands, and the system of administration was military in nature. The governor-generalship consisted in turn of *oblast's*. Turkistan governor-generalship included Semirechye and Syr Darya *oblast's*; Orenburg governor-generalship consisted of Ural and Torghay *oblast's*; and Western Siberia (Steppe) governor-generalship of Akmola and Semipalatinsk *oblast's*. The *oblast's* consisted of *uezds* (districts), the *uezds* of *volost's* (jurisdictions of several parishes), and the *volost's* of *auls* (villages). Governors-general were appointed by the tsar, and *oblast'* administrations were subordinated to military governors.

The *uezds* were headed by chief *uezd* officers, who had two aides, one senior and one junior. In this entire hierarchy, representatives of the local clan and sultan elite could occupy only the post of junior aide to the *uezd* chief (not counting the post of local *volost'* administrator or *aul* elder). Undivided military and civil power was the fundamental principle of Kazakhstan's administrative organization under the new reform. The new system of administration shattered the nomads' customary way of life and restricted the power of the sultans, *beys* (dignitaries) and elders.

In addition to administrative-territorial reform, tsarist Russia carried out social, economic and judicial reforms. The essence of social reform was that henceforth the entire

Kazakh population was to be considered peasants, and a Kazakh could acquire a title of nobility only by entering the tsar's service. The essence of the economic reform was defined by the fact that all Kazakh lands acquired the status of state lands, and the per *kibitka* (nomadic household) levy and other taxes increased in favour of the state. Under the judicial reform, *uezd* and military courts in Kazakhstan henceforth functioned under empire-wide laws and tried cases such as state treason, opposition to the authorities, assassination of officials and damage to state property. The traditional courts of the *beys* and *qāzīs* (Islamic judges) that followed the customary law of the Kazakhs and the *sharī'a* (Islamic law) were preserved only at *aul* level.

As a result of the reforms carried out in the years 1867–8, Kazakhstan became a full-fledged colony of Russia. The ethnic territory that had served as the foundation for the Kazakh nation-state was divided up, the judicial system was transformed in accordance with Russia-wide laws, and all Kazakh lands were declared to be state property. All this was an expression of the fundamental principle of Russia's colonizing policy: divide and rule.

The gravest consequence of the reform was the declaration that all the land of Kazakhstan was the state property of the Russian empire, a declaration which served as the basis for the wide-scale resettlement here of hundreds of thousands of peasants from the central provinces of the mother country. These innovations led to protests among the masses and were the reason behind the uprising by the Kazakhs of Torghay and Ural *oblast's* in the years 1868–9, the uprising in 1870 on the Mangystau (ex-Mangishlaq) peninsula, and other forms of popular resistance, which were all quashed by the punitive forces of tsarist Russia.

Between the mid-1880s and the early 1890s, the above-mentioned 'temporary provisions' were replaced by two 'permanent provisions'. On 2 June 1886 the 'Provision on the Administration of the Territory of Turkistan' was approved; and on 25 March 1891 the 'Provision on the Administration of Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Semirechye, Ural and Torghay *Oblast's*'. Under these provisions, there were to be two governor-generalships on the territory of Kazakhstan: Turkistan governor-generalship, with its centre in Tashkent and consisting of Ferghana, Samarkand and Syr Darya *oblast's*; and Steppe governor-generalship, with its centre in Omsk and consisting of Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Ural, Torghay and Semirechye *oblast's*. In 1897 Semirechye *oblast'* was transferred to Turkistan.

Under the new provisions, the power of the governors-general increased significantly. Police administrations were created in the *oblast'* centres (in the towns of Verny [later renamed Alma-Ata, then Almaty], Uralsk, Petropavlovsk and Semipalatinsk) and police officer positions were instituted in *uezd* towns (Akmolinsk [later Akmola, now Astana], Kokshetau, Zaysan, Pavlodar, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kapala, Leninsk and Kostanay). All the

basic principles of the ‘temporary provisions’ of the 1860s for Kazakhstan’s administration were retained virtually unchanged. All that did change was that the per *kibitka* assessment of other taxes and obligations increased, the power of judicial and police organs increased significantly and the lowest judicial link – the courts of the *beys* and *qāzīs* – lost all independence. More and more, the land, which the reforms of the 1860s had declared to be state property, became the object of plunder for the mother country’s state structures.

Once Kazakhstan had been completely transformed into a colony, Russia put its resettlement policy in motion. Stepping up the resettlement of peasants from Russia’s central provinces to Kazakhstan helped achieve two aims: first, it eased somewhat the social tension in the mother country over the shortage of land and, second, it facilitated the territory’s further colonization, which was part and parcel of its economic development, and the creation here of a new social bulwark for tsarist Russia in the person of the resettled peasantry. Peasant colonization took the place of the military-Cossack colonizing that had gone on at the very beginning and later on when Kazakhstan was being transformed into a colony of Russia.

Gradually, tsarism made the process of resettling Russian and Ukrainian peasants increasingly purposeful and organized. The systematic resettlement of peasants in Kazakhstan began in the 1870s and reached massive proportions in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and especially in the early twentieth century, when the chairman of Russia’s Council of Ministers was P. A. Stolypin, who tried to create an agrarian stratum of the bourgeoisie – *kulaks* – in the countryside. Under his agrarian reforms, peasants were permitted to secede from their community with their allotment and create private farms. Stolypin paid special attention to the empire’s periphery, including Kazakhstan – a favourable region for growing wheat. Through a system of benefits, he encouraged both resettlement here by peasants from Russia and the creation of *kulak* farms.

If, according to the data for the years 1893–1905, the Kazakhs had 4 million *desiatinas* (4.4 million ha) (1 *desiatina* = 1.09 ha) of their best lands confiscated, then during Stolypin’s premiership (1906–11), more than 17 million *desiatinas* (18.5 million ha) were confiscated. By 1917, a total of about 45 million *desiatinas* (49 million ha) of Kazakh lands had been confiscated for Cossack colonization, for the resettlement fund, and for building forts, towns, railroads and so on.

During the colonial period of Kazakhstan’s history, the ‘civilizing initiative’ belonged in general to the Russian state and representatives of the Russian people. This affected nearly every aspect of the territory’s public-political, socio-economic and cultural life. On the whole, it was a harsh, and in some cases cruel, kind of ‘civilizing’. Nonetheless, it brought some positive changes in Kazakhstan’s public-political and cultural life.

THE ECONOMY

The colonizing orientation of tsarist Russia's economic policy, especially its agrarian policy, led to a gradual change in the ratio of nomads to settled Kazakhs, the appearance of new economic forms, and a change in the structure of the Kazakhs' herd.

The penetration, beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century, of Russian and later foreign capital into Kazakhstan led to the appearance of a number of enterprises in the metallurgical industry (primarily in Akmola and Semipalatinsk *oblast's* and Kazakhstan's Altai), for refining agricultural raw materials, and in the salt industry (primarily in the western region), as well as the development of transportation and towns and the spread of trading at fairs, all of which greatly altered the economic situation in the territory.

Fishing became an important branch of Kazakhstan's economy in the basins of the rivers Syr Darya, Ural, Irtysh, Emba and others, reaching a significant scale. In several cities of Kazakhstan (Uralsk, Petropavlovsk, Semipalatinsk and others), branches of the state bank and various credit institutions began to function. The development of industry and transportation brought with it the creation of a local working class. Engineers, technicians – indeed, most of the skilled workers – came from Russia. Kazakh workers were employed primarily in the heaviest and lowest-paying jobs. Wide use was made of cheap female and child labour.

EDUCATION

As a result of all this, there were profound changes in the traditional foundations of Kazakh society, which in turn gave rise to previously unknown or weakly developed forms of human activity, primarily in the culture and spiritual life of the territory and its native inhabitants. As Kazakhstan was transformed into a colony, and especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century, secular educational institutions opened in addition to the already functioning *maktabs* and *madrasas*, which had operated as a rule under the mosques and offered mainly a religious education. The first of these secular schools taught children – including Kazakh children – the professions of translator and clerk. The cadet corps in Orenburg (opened in 1825) and Omsk (founded in 1846) trained military specialists and administrative officials.

Thanks to Ibray Altynsarin (1841–89), inspector of public schools for Torgbay *oblast'* and an outstanding pedagogue, two-class Russo-Kazakh schools were opened in each of the *oblast's* *uezd* centres (Irgiz, Torgbay, Nikolaevsk-Kostanay, Iletsk), which were supplied with teachers and textbooks. In the last third of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, an entire network of Russo-Kazakh and Russo-indigenous grammar

schools (*shkolas*), secondary educational institutions (*srednie uchebnye zavedeniya*), non-classical secondary schools (*real'nye uchilishchas*) and men's and women's high schools (*gimnazii*) was created. One progressive phenomenon was the development of women's education. Thanks once again to the efforts of Altynsarin, a college for women was opened in Irgiz in 1887. In the years 1890–6 Russo-Kazakh colleges for women were opened in Torgay, Kostanay, Aktyubinsk and the settlement of Karabutak.

CULTURE

Beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the scholarly study of Kazakhstan became an important direction for the central state structures of the mother country and its various research centres, as well as for individual private scholars. In the nineteenth century, a substantial contribution was made to the study of the geography, flora and fauna, economy, territorial history, literature, language, folklore, and daily life and customs of the Kazakh people by P. P. Semenov-Tyan'-Shanskiy, N. A. Severtsov, I. V. Mushketov, V. V. Radlov, A. I. Dobromyslov, N. N. Aristov and others. The leading Russian intelligentsia had a major influence on the development of education, culture and social thought in Kazakhstan. Representatives of that intelligentsia, who found themselves in Kazakhstan for various reasons, frequently acted as initiators in the organization of libraries, museums and other cultural-educational and scholarly institutions, sections and subsections of the Russian Geographical Society, and statistical committees. Sections of the Russian Geographical Society in Orenburg and Tashkent, and a subsection of its Western Siberian section in Semipalatinsk, published their works, in which they printed diverse research materials on the history, ethnography and geography of the territory. Individual representatives of the Kazakh people (I. Altynsarin, Ch. Valikhanov, A. Kunanbaev, M.-S. Babazhanov, M. Chormanov and others) also collaborated with some of the above-named cultural-educational and scholarly institutions.

Chokan Valikhanov (1835–65) was an outstanding, multifaceted scholar who wrote his main studies in the 1850s and the first half of the 1860s. He left a vast scholarly legacy that enriched Russian oriental studies and, through it, world oriental studies. Abay Kunanbaev (1845–1904) was a great poet and an outstanding thinker. Kunanbaev studied ways to improve the life of the working masses, given the conditions of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, above all in changing society's economic foundations and transforming the Kazakhs' centuries-old economic structures. He linked his people's progress with the development of agriculture, trade and commerce and the achievement of a high level of culture and education.

In the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the scientific life of Kazakh society was enriched by the works of M.-S. Babazhanov (on problems in the ethnography and religious conceptions of the Kazakhs), Sh. Kudayberdiev (on issues in the history, philosophy, music and annals of the Kazakhs), A. Baytursynov (on issues in pedagogy, education, literary studies and linguistics) and others.

Vivid representatives of the poetry of the 'Era of Grief' (*Zar Zaman*) were Dulat Batayula (1812–71), Shortanbay Kanayula (1818–81) and Murat Monkeula (1846–1906), whose art was marked by harsh criticism of the colonizers and their abettors and by profound grief over their people's lost independence. Kazakh music also developed, with the work of K. Sygyrbaeva, D. Shigaev, T. Kazangapov, B. Kozhagulov and others gaining universal recognition.

The Alash movement

The early twentieth century was marked by an exacerbation of the social contradictions in the Russian empire and by a stricter colonial policy in Kazakhstan, especially agrarian policy. The resettlement movement grew every year, especially in connection with the implementation of the so-called Stolypin reforms mentioned above.

Kazakhstan was not only a region where hundreds of thousands of peasants were resettled from Russia, but also a place of exile for hundreds of political and revolutionary figures. In the early twentieth century, under their influence and with their active participation, various political circles and organizations arose, including social democratic and Marxist ones, as well as a few trade unions (for example, the railroad workers' trade union in Uralsk) and so on. The revolutionary events of the years 1905–7 and their consequences focused great attention on all social strata of Kazakh society, especially the national intelligentsia.

In addition, in the early twentieth century, Russian society itself, weary of despotic and inefficient governance, was thirsting for change and profound reforms. The country's archaic and cumbersome administration in the form of a tsarist autocracy was coming into increasing contradiction with the current problems and development of Russian society. Naturally, Kazakhstan's economic and social backwardness alarmed the educated segment of the Kazakh people, leading it to the aspiration of restoring a nation-state and creating a political party. The idea of defending the illiterate and for the most part downtrodden Kazakh population against the tyranny and oppression of the tsarist authorities gradually took hold of many educated Kazakhs who had studied at and graduated from educational

institutions, primarily in Russia and Europe (Moscow, St Petersburg, Tomsk, Omsk, Kazan, Warsaw).

In the years 1910–13, on the initiative of M. Seralin, A. Baytursynov, A. Bukeykhanov (a member of Russia's Constitutional Democratic Party) and E. Burin, several Kazakh journals and newspapers – *Kazakh*, *Kazakhstan*, *Aykap* – were created. They reflected popular discontent with the authorities' social, ethnic and financial policy (requisitions, corruption, confiscation of lands) and also castigated and ridiculed negative features of the steppe-dwellers: their laziness, disorderliness and lack of education. The materials published in the pages of these periodicals, especially the newspaper *Kazakh*, gradually led to the creation of an anti-colonial political climate among the population. They were developing the ideas of national awakening, as stated in the pamphlet collections of M. Dulatov, *Oyan, Kazakh!* [Wake up, Kazakh!], published in 1909, and in A. Baytursynov's *Masa* [Nightmare], which came out in 1911.

The idea of nationalism was replaced by ideas of justice, of awakening and defending the people, and of modernizing Kazakh society – these were the core activities among prominent representatives of the Kazakh national-democratic intelligentsia around the turn of the twentieth century. One of the people who came to the fore in the years 1905–17 was Alikh an Bukeykhanov, a first-class economist, legal scholar, essayist, and deputy to the first and second congresses of the Russian State Duma. Gathered around him were like-minded men such as A. Baytursynov, Kh. Dosmukhamedov, Zh. Dosmukhamedov, M. Dulatov, Kh. Gabbasov, S. Amanzholov, M. Tynyshbaev, B. Kulmanov, M. Zhumabaev, M. Chokaev, G. Karashev, A. Ermekov and other prominent representatives of the Kazakh intelligentsia. Thanks to their efforts, during the years 1905–17, the Alash movement was born and grew in strength, setting itself three main tasks: ridding the Kazakh people of the colonial yoke, resurrecting statehood, and adding Kazakh society to the ranks of civilized nations.

The members of the Alash movement spent the years from 1905 to 1917 working out the theoretical, political, socio-economic and organizational aspects of this problem. They saw the name 'Alash' (which is synonymous with 'Kazakh') as the embodiment of the idea of uniting the entire ethnic territory of the people divided by tsarist Russia as well as of restoring independent statehood as the main instrument in a system for defending national hopes and interests.

The leaders of Kazakh society greeted the tsar's abdication and the victory of the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution with enthusiasm, since they linked their hopes for emancipation from oppression with the coming to power of the Russian liberals (Milyukov, Chkheidze and Kerensky). As if in confirmation of these hopes,

A. Bukeykhanov was appointed as the Provisional Government's commissar for Torg'hay *oblast'*, and M. Tynyshbaev and M. Chokaev became members of the Provisional Government's Turkistan Committee.

The public-political situation that took shape in the country after the February revolution made it possible to complete the creation of a Kazakh National Democratic Party, which was officially launched at the first All-Kazakh Congress, held from 2 to 28 July 1917 in Orenburg. The party was given the name 'Alash'. In all of Central Asia at that moment there was probably not another such organization that could compare with the Alash Party in its stated goals, political significance and sweep (democracy, secularism). Testament to this is its draft programme, published in the newspaper *Kazakh* on 21 November 1917, which reads, in part:

Russia must become a democratic, federative republic. Each separate state in the Federative Republic must be autonomous and govern itself with identical rights and interests ... Every one must have the right to vote, without distinction of origin, confession or gender ... In the Russian Federation there must be equality of rights, inviolability of the individual, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly ... Religion must be kept separate from the state ... All peoples must enjoy equal rights in a court of law ... Taxation must be based on the degree of wealth and property status in general: a rich man pays more; a poor man less ... Education must belong to everyone. Study in all educational institutions must be free ... In elaborating a land law ... at its base must lie the allocation of land to native inhabitants first of all. Allocation to peasant resettlers must not take place until the completion of full allocation for native inhabitants ... The sale of land is categorically forbidden. All the earth's wealth – large forests, rivers – must belong to the state and must be administered by the *zemstvo* [district council].

At its base, the Alash movement's platform generally meshed with the political programmes of Russia's liberal democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries; nor did the movement attempt to conceal these connections. The merit of its leaders consisted in the fact that they introduced new ideas and principles to the largely apolitical masses and roused the slumbering peoples of the empire's Asiatic regions.

In Russia, meanwhile, events took an unexpected turn. In October 1917 the Bolsheviks seized power. The Alash movement's leaders had to speed up events as well. The second All-Kazakh Congress, where Alash autonomy was declared and its government, the Alash-Orda, was elected, was held from 5 to 13 December 1917. By decision of the congress, this autonomous entity was supposed to include Akmola, Ural, Torg'hay, Semirechye and Syr Darya *oblast'*s, the Kazakh *uezds* of Ferghana, Samarkand and Zakaspiisk *oblast'*s, as well as the adjacent *volost'*s of Altai *oblast'* inhabited by Kazakhs. The congress's resolution, which was passed unanimously, emphasized that everyone who lived among the Kazakhs

must 'be guaranteed the rights of a minority, and representatives of all ethnic groups be represented proportionally in all institutions of the autonomous entity'.

It was determined that the Alash-Orda would consist of 25 seats, 10 of which were set aside for Russians and representatives of other peoples residing in Kazakhstan. The movement's leaders were very methodical. Step by step they moved towards implementing the congress's decisions on creating the autonomous entity. During this period, however, there was essentially a multiple authority in Kazakhstan. Soviets (Bolshevik councils) started to appear alongside the remnants of the Provisional Government's rule here and there. The Orenburg, Siberian and Semirechye Kazakhs created militarized organs of self-government, and peasants and soldiers returning from the fronts of the First World War created their own. Beginning in October 1917, the soviets, which were run by the Bolsheviks, began seizing power locally. Bolshevik violence provoked a fierce reaction. Late in the spring of 1918, a bloody civil war began in the country that pulled Kazakhstan into its orbit as well.

Located at the epicentre of the civil war, Alash-Orda detachments took part in military operations against the Bolsheviks. The Alash autonomous entity lasted only about two years; Soviet power wiped it out by force in 1919. The same fate befell the Turkistan (Kokand) autonomous entity, which had been organized by a decision of the fourth All-Turkistan Special Islamic Congress (November) and which included historically Kazakh lands – Syr Darya and Semirechye *oblast*'s.

Thus an end was put to attempts by the indigenous peoples of Kazakhstan and Turkistan (as well as the Tatars and Bashkirs in the Volga region) to create their own nation-states on a unified ethnic territory that had been destroyed by tsarist Russia.

Soviet history

After this a second stage began in the restoration of Kazakh statehood (though not a nation-state) on the basis of Soviet power and the class principles declared by the party of the Bolsheviks led by Lenin and his close associates. On 26 August 1920, towards the end of the civil war (1918–20), Kalinin and Lenin signed the Soviet Government's decree, 'On the Formation of the Autonomous Kyrgyz (Kazakh Autonomous) Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic)'. This stated that the new entity included the territory of Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Torgay and Ural *oblast*'s, while Syr Darya and Semirechye *oblast*'s remained in the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TurkASSR), created under the Bolsheviks' leadership and by decision of the fifth Turkistan Congress of Soviets in the spring of 1918. The two above-named *oblast*'s joined

the Kazakh ASSR in late 1924 as a result of a national-territorial demarcation of Central Asia.

In the second half of the 1920s, the administrative-command system that had taken hold in the USSR, and whose embodiment was Stalinism, conducted tragic experiments that affected the entire Soviet Union, including Kazakhstan, and were aimed at making changes in every aspect of public life, including the following:

- the forced collectivization of agriculture, the elimination of the *beys* and wealthy peasants 'as a class', and the forced permanent settlement of nomadic and semi-nomadic households;
- unreasonably high, 'shock-worker' rates of industrialization;
- Russification of the local native population, demographic policy, and the nationalities issue;
- establishment of a unified communist ideology in all spheres of the life of society.

The totalitarian regime established in the USSR brought grave misfortune to the country's peoples, including the Kazakhs. About half the Kazakh population perished or were forced to leave their native land to wander through other countries. The people lost their national traditions, religion was eradicated, the Kazakhs became a national minority in their own land, and their native language became essentially a means of communication for daily life only. The most disastrous phenomenon in Kazakh history after 1917 was Stalinism, the sinister handiwork of which was the mass political repressions and genocide against its own people that were carried out with just a few breaks from the 1920s to the 1950s, and again in the 1980s.

In connection with the ratification of the USSR constitution on 5 December 1936, the Kazakh ASSR was transformed into a Union Republic – the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KazSSR).

The pressure of the Stalinist system and the totalitarian regime provoked massive protests among the population in many regions of the USSR, including Kazakhstan. In the years 1918–19 the Alash-Orda waged a struggle against Soviet power; in the years 1929–31 there were 372 uprisings against forced collectivization; in the 1920s representatives of the national-democratic intelligentsia (mainly the former leaders and ideologues of the Alash movement), through their scholarly research and artistic endeavours, offered powerful resistance to the totalitarian system's line in science, literature and art; and in 1986 Kazakh youth openly demonstrated against the tyranny of the totalitarian regime and presented their political demands to the authorities.

The twentieth century, however, especially the 74 years after the October 1917 revolution, should not be considered a lost period for Kazakhstan and its people. On this subject, the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbaev, wrote in his work 'Preserve Memory, Strengthen Accord':

My personal experience has led me to the deep conviction that the post-October years did not count for naught. The native system of material production, the people's greatly improved educational level, the harmonization of relations between society's various social groups ... the breakthrough to outer space – this and much else can be listed among the assets on our historical balance-sheet.¹

During the Second World War, Kazakhstan was the front's arsenal. About 1.2 million Kazakhs took direct part in military action against Nazi Germany. On the eve of and during the war, 102,000 Poles from the western regions of the USSR, more than 360,000 Germans from the Volga regions, hundreds of thousands of Koreans from the Far East, Chechens, Ingush, Karachays and Balkaretses from the Caucasus, Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks were all deported to Kazakhstan.

THE ECONOMY

In Kazakhstan, during the years of the pre-war five-year plans, the Turkistan–Siberian Railroad was built, linking Central Asia to regions of Siberia and leading to a boom in the economy and culture not only of Kazakhstan but of all the eastern regions of the USSR. The mines of Karaganda, the oil refineries of Emba, the Chimkent lead factories, the Balkhash and Zhezkazghan mining and metallurgical combines, the polymetal enterprises in the Rudnyi Altai, food and light industrial enterprises – all these were built.

As before the 1917 revolution, preferential treatment was given to the traditional branches of the extraction industry during the years of industrialization. Kazakhstan, along with Siberia and the Urals, was the USSR's leading producer of zinc, copper, lead and other strategic materials. There were also machine-building, metallurgy and defence-industry enterprises, but the energy base and the construction materials industry lagged far behind and Kazakhstan remained a supplier of raw materials for the industry of the central USSR.

Industrialization was accompanied by forced urbanization. Dozens of towns and urban settlements sprang up. Nonetheless, the proportion of Kazakhs in the working class and among the urban population rose slowly. On the eve of the Second World War, only 16 per cent of Kazakhs lived in towns and urban settlements. Kazakhstan's urban population rose due to the workers, both engineers and technicians, who came from Moscow, Leningrad (St Petersburg), Kiev, Kharkov, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg) and other cities.

¹ See *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 16 Jan. 1998.

By the mid-1930s, the administrative-command system had taken final shape in the country; Stalin's barracks socialism had won out. The land, factories and plants, and *kolkhozs* (collective farms) and *sovkhozs* (state farms) became state property. On the one hand, public ownership of the means of production was asserted; on the other, the peasantry was alienated from the land. Workers remained a proletariat without rights, divorced from centralized state property. The Kazakh ASSR, which became a Union Republic in 1936, enjoyed no sovereignty and was deprived of the legislative initiative, a condition facilitated by the dictates of the centre.

The years 1937–8 saw the peak of the mass political repression. During these years not only opponents of Soviet power were subjected to repression, but also those who fought for communist ideas and those who had actively participated in establishing and strengthening Soviet power. New branches of the sinister Gulag (State Camps Administration) appeared and spread on the map of Kazakhstan, including the Karaganda special regime corrective labour camp (Karlag) and the Akmola camp for the wives of traitors to the homeland (Alzhir).

During the post-war years in Kazakhstan, as before, it was mainly the extraction industry that was developed. The republic's economy specialized increasingly in the production of raw materials. The period from the 1960s through the 1980s was a time of major changes in Kazakhstan's economy: fuel and energy complexes were created in Pavlodar's Priirtysh, the Karaganda GRES-2 (regional hydroelectric power plant) and Bukhtarminsk GES (hydroelectric power plant) went on line, new industrial zones were created and developed, there was intensive construction of railroads, and oil deposits on the Mangystau peninsula were developed at accelerated rates. Despite all this, the economy retained its raw materials orientation. Machine-building in Kazakhstan was given the opportunity to produce only simple metal-consuming machines and was used primarily for assembly purposes.

ECOLOGY

In the 1950s Kazakhstan started turning into a zone of total ecological disaster. The nuclear test ground in Semipalatinsk *oblast'* was one of the largest sites of its kind in the world. From 1949 to 1963, 113 nuclear explosions of various magnitudes were carried out above ground; and between 1964 and 19 October 1989, there were 343 underground explosions with a magnitude of up to 150 kilotons. The number of nuclear waste burial sites in the Kazakhstan earth exceeds 300. The drying up of the Aral Sea is an ecological disaster not only for Kazakhstan but for all of Central Asia as well. The ecological situation was exacerbated in Almaty, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Temirtau and several other cities.

TABLE 1. Populations in Kazakhstan (1926–89) ²

	1926		1959		1989	
	<i>Total no.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Total no.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Total no.</i>	<i>%</i>
All population	6229.9	100.0	9294.7	100.0	16464.5	100.0
Kazakhs	3627.6	58.2	2787.3	30.0	6534.6	39.7
Russians	1274.0	20.5	3972.0	42.7	6227.5	37.8
Ukrainians	860.2	13.8	761.4	8.2	957.5	5.8
Germans	58.7	0.9	659.7	7.1	957.5	5.8
Others	408.5	6.6	1114.3	12.0	1848.7	11.2

AGRICULTURE

The situation in agriculture remained difficult. In the 1950s and 1960s, a large-scale effort was made to open up virgin lands in Kazakhstan and also in a few other eastern regions of the USSR. Developing the virgin soil had both positive and negative consequences. The land immediately yielded the quantity of grain needed to solve the problem of supplying the population with bread. Even today, ‘virgin soil grain’ is a very important hard currency, allowing Kazakhstan to resolve specific problems within the framework of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and even with countries further afield. However, there are other factors that should be mentioned in connection with developing the virgin land: these relate to the ecology and the linguistic and demographic situation in Kazakhstan.

POPULATION

The migration of people from Russia made Kazakhs a minority in their own land. The percentage of Russians had increased by as much as 40 per cent in the 1950s–60s. In the late 1950s Kazakhs made up only one third of the total population, whereas Russians and Ukrainians constituted more than half (see [Table 1](#)). Slavic peoples lived predominantly in the northern and eastern parts of Kazakhstan and in the capital Alma-Ata. In the 1970s–80s, however, the non-Kazakh population started decreasing steadily because of the outmigration of Russians, Ukrainians and Germans and their low birth rate.

EDUCATION AND CULTURE

The 1920s and 1930s were marked by complex and highly contradictory processes in Kazakhstan’s culture. Culture was being created and destroyed at the same time as its most prominent representatives were being exterminated. On the one hand, illiteracy was

² Masanov, Abylkhozhin et al. (eds.), [2001](#), pp. 380, 403.

rapidly being eliminated, universal compulsory elementary education was being introduced, institutions of higher and specialized secondary education were being created, and more and more new detachments of the intelligentsia were being formed. On the other, the terror spared no one, and there was an attempt literally to wipe out the national intelligentsia. Culture suffered a tremendous loss from the total ideologization of art, science and education.

The development of culture was difficult and contradictory. On the one hand, the republic achieved substantive results in secondary and higher education in the sciences and in culture as a whole. The republic's Academy of Sciences, established in 1946, became one of the foremost centres of scientific thought in the USSR, an entire multi-branch network of higher and specialized secondary educational institutions was created, and literature and art achieved definite successes.

On the other hand, obvious signs of crisis were observed in Kazakhstan's science. Political and social science reached a dead end. Language study came to mean the Russian language, and little research was published on the Kazakh language. The dictates of communist ideology and the presence of censorship limited creative opportunities for the intellectual elite.

Prior to independence

By the early 1980s a gloomy socio-economic situation prevailed in virtually all the republics of the USSR. Society's political organization and system of economic relations had failed dismally and the country was facing a grave crisis. The pre-crisis condition had manifested itself in the former leadership's inability not only to do anything about existing problems but even to admit that anything needed to be done.

Together with his team, Mikhail Gorbachev, who took over the leadership of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the Soviet state in the spring of 1985, proclaimed a course to improve the country's socioeconomic development and public-political life. From the very beginning, this effort to revive the country, later dubbed perestroika (restructuring), was thwarted, and ultimately it failed. The root cause of this failure lay in the old administrative-command system, the inefficient political institutions, which were so alienated from the people, and the economic structure's lack of vitality, which basically made it disadvantageous to work.

In addition, the country's leaders, under Gorbachev, were not consistent about implementing perestroika and could not put democratic processes into practice as they should have done. Acting within the usual framework of communist dogma, they created

favourable conditions for violations of human rights and the breakdown of law and order, as was demonstrated during the December 1986 events in Almaty and several other cities of Kazakhstan.

The negative phenomena that had been building up over dozens of years – the serious shortcomings in the public-social and cultural spheres, the exacerbation of the nationality issue – led to anger and indignation among the young people of the republic, the most dynamic segment of the population, and forced them to resort to decisive methods of struggle. The removal of D. A. Kunaev, the republic's first secretary for many years, on 16 December 1986 and his replacement by a native Russian, G. Kolbin, triggered the open expression of mounting mass dissatisfaction that took place on 17–19 December 1986. The protest was expressed in a peaceful demonstration that did become political but was not aimed at overthrowing the existing state power. The leadership of the republic and the USSR did not believe it necessary to take the young people's opinion into account and considered the political protest to be a threat to the state. The young people's demonstration was mercilessly suppressed by MVD (Internal Affairs Ministry) troops and special units using clubs, small digging tools and dogs; 8,500 people were arrested.

Numerous and extremely crude violations of the law were committed during the legal investigation into the criminal cases opened against the participants in the events. Ninety-nine people were sentenced to various terms; over a short period of time more than 1,000 people were fined various sums for their participation in the December events; 271 people were expelled from their educational institutions; and hundreds of people were forced to resign from their jobs. A July 1987 resolution of the CPSU Central Committee called the December events 'a manifestation of Kazakh nationalism'.

On the threshold of the 1980s and 1990s, the historical process of the USSR's collapse became irreversible. The national republics proclaimed their demands for economic independence with increasing persistence, inasmuch as it had become disadvantageous to remain in the Union and subject to the tyranny of the mother country.

Circumstances developed such that the doctrine of sovereignty increasingly began to give way to the concept of ethnicity. The first public-political associations and movements appeared (Nevada- Semipalatinsk, Azat, Kazak Tili, Zheltoksan and others), some of which later became political parties, and the issue of Kazakhstan's independence was raised from various positions. The institution of the presidency that had been established in Kazakhstan in April 1990 (when federal rule from Moscow still essentially existed) shifted the burden of power to Almaty, where a fairly independent political centre had already taken shape under the leadership of N. A. Nazarbaev.

Independence

By October 1991, the August 1991 putsch in Moscow, which hastened the collapse of the USSR, had encouraged the majority of the former Union Republics to declare independence. The final stage in the transformation of Kazakh statehood in the twentieth century was connected with the collapse of the Soviet empire and the formation of post-Soviet states on the former territory of the USSR. On 16 December 1991 the Constitutional Law on the Independent Statehood of the Republic of Kazakhstan was passed, and on that basis state independence was declared. Independent Kazakhstan was founded as a democratic, secular and rule-of-law state. Political parties and public associations could now be formed. The media were freed from ideological control and censorship. ‘Gaps in history’ were filled in, victims of political repression were rehabilitated, and the scientific and artistic heritage of cultural figures who had perished for no reason was restored to the people. For the Kazakh people and for all citizens of Kazakhstan, the twentieth century was an important historical period of hopes and doubts, full of struggle at various levels and with very diverse consequences.

11

KYRGYZSTAN*

*A. Tabyshalieva***Contents**

The Kyrgyz under Russian colonial rule (1850–1917)	258
Soviet Kyrgyzstan (1917–91)	265
Economic developments	271
Population and social developments	274
Afterword	280

Russian rule over Kyrgyzstan lasted almost 140 years, and the tsarist colonization of the nineteenth century continued under the Soviet Union. The people of the post-Soviet Kyrgyz Republic look back on their Russian colonial and Soviet past with conflicting emotions. In retrospect, the major events of the country's 74-year Soviet history – forced sedentarization of the nomads, Sovietization accompanied by Russification and de-Islamization, and remarkable progress in education, women's liberation, housing and health care – have had long-lasting and far-reaching consequences for Kyrgyzstan, although the Soviet ideology was short-lived and ultimately proved alien to the peoples of the country.

The Kyrgyz under Russian colonial rule (1850–1917)**ESTABLISHMENT OF COLONIAL RULE AMONG THE KYRGYZ TRIBES**

In the mid-nineteenth century, a majority of the Kyrgyz tribes conquered by the Kokand khanate sporadically united with each other and organized uprisings against some Kokon khans and their tax-collectors. Besides their principal enemies – the rulers of the Kokand khanate to the west and China to the east – the Kyrgyz tribes were frequently at war with

* See Maps 1 and 2.

each other. External forces would take advantage of these intra-Kyrgyz feuds, and then the tribes that had previously been at war with each other had to fight jointly against the outside adversary, whether Kokand, China or Russia.

Because of the threat from the Kokand khanate, China and neighbouring kin tribes, some Kyrgyz leaders made the decision to ask for protection from Russia. The Kyrgyz tribe Bugu from Issyk-kul, with 10,000 households, voluntarily joined the Russian empire in January 1855. In 1863 the permanent Russian garrison in Issyk-kul defended the Kyrgyz from raids by the Kokand khanate to collect taxes. Anti-Kokand uprisings by the Kyrgyz tribes in the Chu valley facilitated the Russian conquest of northern Kyrgyzstan. The Russian troops seized Pishpek, near the Kokand fortress, only after the second campaign in 1862. Such was the despotism of the Kokand rulers that, even after they had retreated, the Kyrgyz levelled their settlements to the ground and erased all traces of their presence.¹ Some Kyrgyz tribes – the Solto, Sarybagysh, Cherek and Sayak – joined Russia in order to escape the yoke of the Kokand rulers, but many other groups fiercely resisted the Russian conquest.

In their struggle for domination over southern Kyrgyzstan, Kokand and Russia attempted to attract the various Kyrgyz tribes to their side. Both gave honorific titles to Kyrgyz leaders. The Russian conquest of the Kokand khanate was facilitated by the anti-Kokand war led by Pulat Khan, who united the Kyrgyz and Kipchaks to fight against the Kokand ruler Khudoyar Khan (1873–6). The tsarist administration supported the Kokand khan, who fled to Tashkent in 1875; following that, Pulat Khan declared *gazavat*, a holy war against non-Muslims, in this case, Russia. After the rebels' defeat by Russia, the significant territory of the Kokand khanate was joined to Russian Turkistan and renamed Ferghana *oblast'* (province). The Kyrgyz of the Pamirs and Alai mountains, led by the Alai 'queen', Kurmanjan Datkha (1811–1907), initially strongly defended their lands against the tsarist troops. After the death of her husband Alymbek Datkha, the first vizier of the khan of Kokand, in 1862, Kurmanjan successfully ruled the Alai and other parts of southern Kyrgyzstan. As a political leader, Kurmanjan Datkha skilfully negotiated with both the Kokand and tsarist leaders. The Russian conquest of the Kyrgyz lands ended with the inclusion of the Alai in the Russian empire in 1876.

The tsarist government established an administrative division that completely disregarded the tribal organization and political economy of the Kyrgyz. The modern territory of Kyrgyzstan under the governor-generalship comprised three *oblast'*s of Russian Turkistan: Semirechye, Ferghana and Syr Darya. As a result of the Russian laws on non-Christians, the participation of Muslims in municipal councils was insignificant in comparison with

¹ Bartol'd, 1927, p. 166.

their share among the urban population (Fig. 1).² In the largest city Osh, with 34,200 inhabitants, agriculture was the main source of income for half the population (17,700).³ First, Tokmok was the administrative centre of the south-western *uezd* (district) of Semirechye, then, in 1878, the *uezd*'s administration moved to Pishpek near the Kokand fortress and the *uezd* was renamed Pishpek (Russian transliteration of Bishkek).⁴ Another city, Karakol, was renamed Przheval'sk after the death of N. M. Przheval'skiy (1888), a Russian geographer and major-general who explored the possibilities of colonization.

Called *jarym padsha* (half-tsar) by the local population, the governorgeneral exercised nearly unlimited power. The tsarist authorities declared that all the nomads' lands were to become state property, thus providing a legal basis for the confiscation of native territories.⁵ Immediately after the conquest of the Kyrgyz lands, the Russian administration encouraged Russian peasants and military men, Cossacks, to move to Kyrgyzstan by offering them the best fertile lands along major roads and rivers. By confiscating Kyrgyz lands in the valleys, the tsarist administration forced the pastoral nomads to change their traditional system of transhumance. Russian peasants used the new lands for farming, expanding the areas sown




FIG. 1. Ferghana valley. A village in the Isfara valley. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

² Ibid., p. 168.

³ *Kirgiziya v tsifrakh*, 1963, p. 6.

⁴ Bartol'd, 1927, p. 169.

⁵ *Istoriya Kirgizii*, 1956, p. 295.

to wheat, cotton, tobacco and vegetables. In the 1890s the number of Russian immigrants greatly increased because of a famine in Russia. In 1916, in Przheval'skiy *uezd* (Issyk-kul region), Russians and Ukrainians, who made up only 24 per cent of the total population, owned more than 67 per cent of all arable land. A similar situation occurred in Pishpek *uezd*.⁶ Besides Russians, between 1877 and 1888 thousands of Muslims (Dungans and Uighurs) fled from China to the Kyrgyz lands because of the repression of the anti-Chinese rebellion. In the 1880s small groups of Sart- Kalmuks (Muslim Oirats) moved to the Issyk-kul region (Böry Bash and Chelpek villages).

ANTI-RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS

The Andijan revolt of 1898 and rebellion of 1916 had a major impact on national development. Led by the Naqshbandi *ishān* (headman) Madali Dukchi (1858–98), the Andijan revolt, together with the mass discontent against tsarist military rule in the Ferghana valley, united various social and ethnic groups. The thousands of rebels declared *gazavat*. According to Sokol:

In this economic motivation, the uprising was a measure of the despair of the poor over the cotton crisis, which had seized Ferghana in 1897 and 1898 as a consequence of the fall of world cotton prices. The years of crisis sharply worsened the position of the peasantry and brought them to the side of the *ishān*.⁷

The tsarist military administration arrested 777 people, executed all the active participants and exiled hundreds to Siberia.⁸

In the summer of 1916, the tsarist order for the mobilization of native men for rear work during the First World War triggered the Kyrgyz rebellion (*Urkun*). This spontaneous revolt of the Kyrgyz against colonial exploitation and the confiscation of their lands started by killing Russian soldiers, officers and peasants. The 1916 rebellion spread across Russian Turkistan, with the most violent resistance and ensuing repression occurring in northern Kyrgyzstan. The better-equipped Russian troops defeated the rebels and killed thousands of unarmed civilians. Large numbers of Kyrgyz fleeing to China in wintertime perished on the high mountainous passes. As a result of the rebellion, some 200,000 Kyrgyz died, the indigenous population of northern Kyrgyzstan decreased by 41.4 per cent,⁹ and 60 per cent of the livestock were lost.¹⁰ By 1 January 1917, the number of Kyrgyz households in Pishpek *uezd* had decreased by 43 per cent; in Issyk-kul region, Przheval'skiy

⁶ Koychuev (ed.), 1995, p. 153.

⁷ Sokol, 1953, p. 58.

⁸ Chotonov and Nur uulu (eds.), 1998, p. 9.

⁹ Asankanov and Osmonov, 2002, p. 273.

¹⁰ Baktygulov and Mombekova, 1999, p. 274.

uezd, 70 per cent of households vanished.¹¹ Huge losses and impoverishment generated hopes among the Kyrgyz refugees in China that, after the collapse of tsarist rule and the establishment of Soviet power, they could return to their homeland. Most of the Kyrgyz refugees started returning in early 1918. The communist administration set up special aid committees and organizations to provide them with food, but did not return their confiscated lands.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

In the Kyrgyz ethnic structure, two wings and a separate group of Ichkilick include various tribes. Each tribe is divided into subtribes (*uruus*) and kin groups (*uruks*). The fluctuating boundaries between the areas of different tribes and subtribes led to numerous disputes over the possession of land. A pastoral economy indicated a sign of wealth; the richest Kyrgyz used four pastures according to the seasons of the year. Only well-off Kyrgyz with thousands of sheep and horses took advantage of the whole cycle of transhumance. In the winter camps of the Kyrgyz (*kyshtoos*), typically located in the lowlands, some farmers would grow wheat and vegetables. Standing higher than 3,000 m above sea level, summer pasture (*jayloo*) was combined with spring pasture (*köktoos*) and autumn pasture (*küzdoos*). Despite well-elaborated techniques of pastoral economy, the lack of hay and fodder in winter made nomadic households very vulnerable and totally dependent on weather conditions. The main wealth of the Kyrgyz was based on their livestock; and relationships were built on the number of sheep and horses ('currency' in the nomadic economy) (Fig. 2). In marriage, the Kyrgyz included livestock in the *kalym* (bride-price).

In 1867 the nomadic population constituted 84 per cent of the people of Turkistan; after joining with Ferghana in 1877, it was 47 per cent.¹² In the late nineteenth–early twentieth centuries, with economic differentiation among the Kyrgyz, many poor people converted to a settled life and set up winter villages (Fig. 3). Unable to continue transhumance, the poor Kyrgyz turned to farming. Overall, 200,000 Kyrgyz, 65 per cent of them from Ferghana *oblast'*, were settled and engaged in farming.¹³ Husbandry was combined with farming and hunting; in 1913 about 93 per cent of the Kyrgyz households of Pishpek *uezd* were engaged in arable farming.¹⁴ At the same time only 15 per cent of the Kyrgyz households were settled.¹⁵ In the south, coal mining and the oil industry gradually

¹¹ *Istoriya Kirgizii*, 1956, p. 406.

¹² Bartol'd, 1927, p. 121.

¹³ *Istoriya Kirgizii*, 1956, p. 325.

¹⁴ *Materialy po obsledovaniyu tuzemnogo i russkogo starozhilcheskogo khozyaystva . . .*, 1916, p. 274. Cited in Abramzon, 1990, p. 100.

¹⁵ Abramzon, 1990, p. 100.



FIG. 2. Ferghana valley. Caravan of Kyrgyz nomads. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

developed. Imported Russian commodities greatly changed the everyday life of the indigenous people. With integration into the Russian empire, barter continued to flourish, with the Kyrgyz exchanging animals, leather, felt, wool and fur for fabric and metal goods from Russia.

Known as skilful hunters using hawks, eagles and greyhounds (*taygans*), the Kyrgyz exchanged fur for cotton or metal commodities. Hunting also helped them to survive in times of early snow and frost, and epizooties. National games (*alaman bayga*), long-distance horse races and many others were highly popular among the Kyrgyz. Awards for participation could be very high; thus, in the late nineteenth century, one Issyk-kul rich man (*bay*) put up 1,000 horses as the first prize.¹⁶

At the end of the nineteenth–early twentieth centuries, Russian-native and Tatar new-method schools were opened across Kyrgyzstan. By 1914 there were 107 schools, including 103 primary schools, with 7,041 students, only 547 of whom were Kyrgyz¹⁷ children of the local elite. Local religious schools also offered some basic education. But on the whole, the majority of Kyrgyz families had little access to education.

The popular Kyrgyz poets Kalygul and Arstanbek were outspoken in their criticism of the Russian impact on Kyrgyz political and cultural life. They called the colonial era

¹⁶ Simakov, 1980, p. 116.

¹⁷ *Kirgiziya v tsifrakh*, 1963, p. 7.



FIG. 3. Ferghana valley. Settled people in a village in the Isfara valley. G. and L. Gain expedition to Central Asia. 1914. (Photo: © mimdi.)

Tar Zaman or *Zar Zaman* (the 'Era of Grief'). Another famed improviser and writer Moldo Kylych (1866–1917) continued that theme in his poems and verses. The poet Toktogul Satylgan uulu (1864–1933) was exiled to Siberia for his participation in the Andijan rebellion. After his return, he called on the Kyrgyz to focus on the positive sides of Russian rule and to integrate into Soviet society. Togolok Moldo (Baiymbet Abdrakman uulu, 1860–1942), from Naryn, was the first poet to write down folkloric stories. Both Toktogul and Moldo accepted Russian tsarist power and Soviet innovations. They were welcomed and their names were included in the annals of Kyrgyz classic literature by the Soviet establishment. Their contemporary, Osmonaly Sydyk uulu (1875–1940), wrote a history of the Kyrgyz tribes based on traditional genealogical stories (*sanjyres*).

Before the Soviet era, *sharī'a* (Islamic law) and *ādat* (customary law) dominated among both the settled and the nomadic people. Islam had deep roots in this region, compared to the north; in Osh *uezd* alone, there were 88 *madrasas* with 1,178 students in 1914;¹⁸ and 154 mosques, 7 *madrasas* and numerous shrines were located in Osh city, one of the most important religious centres in the Ferghana valley. Well-organized Sufi

¹⁸ *Istoriya Kirgizskoy SSR*, 1968, p. 553.

communities were very influential and popular among a part of the Kyrgyz. Local *ishāns* had close links with Kashghar Sufi communities that dated their genealogy to Appak Khoja.¹⁹

Mazārs (holy places) – Suleiman Mazar in Osh, Azret Aub hot springs in Jalalabad, Ydris Paigambar mausoleum in Chatkal and many others – attracted Muslim pilgrims across Central Asia. Local Muslims regardless of ethnic affiliation venerated the *mazārs*, ascribing to them healing powers. Besides, *mazārs* preserved ecologically important landmarks and territorial boundaries between communities. The *mazārs* were also significant points for local history, places to contemplate ancient legends and epics.²⁰

The Kyrgyz widely observed fasting and celebrated Muslim holidays. The end of Ramadan (*Orozo* in Kyrgyz, the Muslim month of fasting) was marked by the funeral repast of ancestors and the cooking of ritual food (*boorsok*). The Kyrgyz had their own traditional methods of healing cattle and sheep. Often they ascribed animal diseases to evil forces and used juniper for magic smoke; they would drive the livestock to *mazārs* where they organized mass prayers and sacrificed animals to their protectors of livestock.²¹ Some Kyrgyz venerated *Umay ene* (mother), the ancient Turkic goddess, a protector of children and fertility. Appeals to *Tengir* (Sky) and *Jer–Suu* (Earth–Water), the supernatural forces of pre-Islamic Turkic beliefs, were integrated into the traditional Islam of the Kyrgyz. Besides, numerous *bakshylar* (shamans) practising healing and fortune-telling presented their performance as Muslim rituals. The Russian administration did not dare to spread the Orthodox Christian faith among the Muslim population, fearing a backlash against non-Muslim newcomers.

Soviet Kyrgyzstan (1917–91)

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Soviet state-making

The communist planners replaced Turkistan governor-generalship by the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR, March 1918–October 1924), which included the territory of modern Kyrgyzstan. In the 1920s, when the struggle over the creation of new republics intensified among the national elites, the Kyrgyz leaders attempted to create the mountain Kyrgyz Republic, including the north part of Kyrgyzstan; discussion about the status of the south of the country was postponed because of

¹⁹ Abramzon, 1990, p. 289.

²⁰ Tabyshalieva, 2000, p. 28.

²¹ Abramzon, 1990, p. 93.

the ongoing civil war. As a result, in 1922 the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Turkistan made a decision to set up this republic within the Turkistan ASSR. An organizational committee for the establishment of the Mountainous Kyrgyz Republic was formed, with Abdykerim Sydykov (1889–1938) as chairman; however, feuds among the national elites prevented the implementation of this plan. Subsequently, Kara-Kyrgyz autonomous *oblast'* was created; it was incorporated into the Russian Federation (14 October 1924), and later renamed Kyrgyz autonomous *oblast'* (25 May 1925). Overall, state boundaries in Central Asia were created in a hasty manner, disregarding the seasonal migrations of the nomadic Kyrgyz (who were absent in summer from the lowlands and returned there in winter) and any discussion or serious investigation of ethnic issues. The status of the *oblast'* was elevated and it was transformed into the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on 1 February 1926, then on 5 December 1936 into the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic, a full-fledged Union Republic. In 1926 the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Pishpek, was named after the commander-in-chief of the Turkistan Front, Mikhail Frunze; it only changed its name back to Bishkek in 1990.

Resistance to Soviet power

The most violent resistance to Soviet power, known as the Basmachi movement, spread in the Ferghana valley. Anti-Soviet rebels, both Muslim natives and Russians, united and established an interim government with a head, Madamin Bek, and his Russian deputy, general-in-chief, Monstrov, General Mukhanov, Khal-Khoja, Kur Shirmat Irgash and others. The majority of the common people did not support either of the belligerent parties: the Basmachis and the Red Army terrorized the civilians and performed acts of great cruelty in killing each other and the peaceful population.

The Soviet leadership had to create the Turkistan Front in 1919 and appointed Mikhail Frunze as chief. In the same year, Basmachis and joint units of White Guards and *kulaks* (well-off Slavic farmers) were defeated in Osh and Jalalabad. For several years the Red Army detachments could not penetrate the Pamirs and the Alai mountains, the Basmachis' stronghold. Groupings of Basmachi fighters skilfully used the mountainous terrain of the Pamirs and Alai. It took some time for the Red Army to eliminate the largest groups of rebels in Kyrgyzstan in 1923, and the liquidation of the Basmachis was only reported in the 1930s.

Facing fierce resistance in an unfamiliar environment, the Soviet leadership had to create military units which included natives who knew the local languages: in the Ferghana valley in 1920 the First Tatar Brigade and later the Kara-Kyrgyz Division were formed.

About 25,000 natives of Turkistan were recruited into the Red Army.²² In order to encourage Sovietization and prevent resistance by the indigenous people, Moscow launched a policy of nativization (*korenizatsia*), inviting and promoting local cadres in the party establishment. At the same time, mutual suspicion between natives and the Russian leadership persisted. From Jalalabad, Frunze wrote a telegram to Lenin: 'The matter will not progress if you do not send from Russia at least ordinary middle-class workers.'²³

Besides indigenous resistance to the radical expropriations of private property, Russian and Ukrainian *kulaks* fiercely revolted across the country.²⁴ Kyrgyz refugees coming from China intended to return to their fertile lands confiscated by Russian farmers during the 1916 rebellion. Attempts at a fair redistribution of land led in 1918 to uprisings initiated by the Russian settlers, which were suppressed but attained their goal, in as much as the Soviet authorities decided not to change the situation on land issues after the 1916 rebellion.²⁵ In the course of collectivization in the late 1920s–30s, the expropriation of lands and livestock triggered anti-Soviet resistance by the indigenous population.

Purges

In 1925, 30 Kyrgyz party and Soviet officials wrote a letter to the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party complaining about the style and methods of party work. This attempt by the Kyrgyz communist elite to resist the irrational way of governance and to offer policy recommendations was ruthlessly repressed: all of them were dismissed and expelled from the party.

From the very first years of the Kyrgyz communist organization, Kyrgyz intellectuals were accused of participating in the alleged Socialist Turan Party and planning the creation of the Turan (Central Asian) Federative Republic, including the Turkic-speaking peoples. Several purges of party activists led to an atmosphere of fear and denunciation among the bureaucracies. The party purges were conducted on the pretext of re-registration of members. The first purge started as early as 1919, and was followed by others in 1922–3, 1925, 1929 and 1933–6.²⁶ Nationwide purges repressed thousands of activists: from 19,932 members of the Communist Party in 1933, only 6,385 were left by 1935.²⁷ In this small

²² Chotonov and Nur uulu (eds.), 1998, p. 34.

²³ 'Delo ne prodivnitsia vperyod yesli vy ne poshlyote iz Rosii khotia by prostykh seredniakov-rabochikh', *Istoriya Kirgizskoy SSR*, 1967, p. 184.

²⁴ Riots by Russian farmers broke out in late August 1918 in Talas, December 1918 in Belovodskoe, July 1919 in Tup, September 1919 in Kurshab, Bazar-Kurgon and Kugaart provinces (*volost's*) and November 1920 in At Bashi (Naryn province).

²⁵ Shukurov and Tabyshalieva, 1997, p. 23.

²⁶ Koychuev (ed.), 1995, p. 75.

²⁷ Ploskikh (ed.), 1998, pp. 218–19.

republic more than 40,000 people, regardless of their ethnicity, were repressed.²⁸ Many political leaders and officials, scholars and writers perished or were exiled during Stalin's repressions. Almost all the leaders of the communist establishment in the 1920s–30s were tortured to death. Later, in the post-Soviet era, a mass burial site was found in Chon Tash, near Bishkek, where 137 people – the most well-known state and party officials of Kyrgyzstan – were put to death during celebrations in 1938 marking the twenty-first anniversary of the October revolution.²⁹

Party leadership

Iskhak Razzakov (in office 1950–61) was the first Kyrgyz leader of the Kyrgyz Communist Party. Before him, the first secretaries of the Kyrgyz Communist Party – M. Belotskii,³⁰ M. K. Amosov (1937–8), A. V. Vagov (1938–45) and N. S. Bogolubov (1945–50) –, all non-Kyrgyz, were appointed by Moscow and sent from Russia. In the Stalin period, the Kyrgyz Republic had very restricted rights. Later, Nikita Khrushchev (1953–64) and Leonid Brezhnev (1966–82) slightly increased the rights of the national government to plan and develop some branches of its own industry and agriculture. But major ministries and branches of the economy were always under the strict control of the central government in Moscow. Under Khrushchev some steps towards decentralization and local initiatives in the economy were undertaken. Razzakov struggled for more independence from Moscow and tried to resist the rapid Russification of the youth. His attempts to introduce the Kyrgyz language into the curricula of high schools were condemned by the party leadership as nationalism. In 1959 both Razzakov and K. Dikambaev (prime minister) were dismissed by the Kremlin for violation of state discipline and localism (*mestnichestvo*).

Razzakov's successor, Turdakun Usubaliev (1961–85), governed the country for 25 years and loyally served the interests of the Kremlin. Under his rule, the policy of Russification was intensified and the importance of national culture and history was reduced. The only school teaching in Kyrgyz was in the capital; the Kyrgyz language and Kyrgyz history in the national curriculum were not permitted in Russian-language schools. To impose stricter controls over non-Russians, Khrushchev's leadership demanded steps to encourage a better knowledge of Russian and promoted further Russification.

²⁸ Asankanov and Osmonov, 2002, p. 351.

²⁹ Koychuev (ed.), 1995, p. 77.

³⁰ He was the first secretary of Kyrgyz Obkom VRP (b) (Oblast'noy Komitet Vserossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii Bolshevikov) in 1934–6 and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan in 1936–7.

The position of first secretary (in fact, president) depended not only on personal relations and loyalty to the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), but the ability to repress all resistance to communist policy and the local dictatorship. The political leadership, under the watchful eye of the second secretary of the Communist Party (always an envoy of the Kremlin), could not make any serious decisions without the approval of Moscow. Under Brezhnev, bureaucratization and corruption reached a peak. The first secretary enjoyed almost unlimited powers nationwide, and nepotism and tribalism thrived from top to bottom. The ruling elite distributed power among several territorial groupings and loyal supporters. A clan-tribal division perfectly fitted the hierarchical structure of the Soviet state and the totalitarian bureaucratic regime.

Yuri Andropov (1982–4) and later Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–91) replaced the Brezhnev-appointed elites in all the Central Asian states, including Kyrgyzstan; Usubaliev was dismissed in November 1985. Moscow appointed Absamat Masaliev (1985–90), who severely criticized Usubaliev for his policy of kinship and nepotism and deviation from the party line. Although Andropov and Gorbachev intended to replace the corrupt cadres of the Brezhnev era, they (like the previous Moscow rulers) did not trust the local leaders. The Gorbachev administration appointed (even more than before perestroika, or restructuring) Russian cadres to key positions, including the KGB and the notorious position of second secretary.

Only after the declaration of perestroika and glasnost (openness) in Moscow, and First Secretary Usubaliev's dismissal in 1985, did Kyrgyz intellectuals and politicians dare to criticize Soviet authoritarianism, to publicize information on political repression, and to mention national heroes and poets who had been anathema during Soviet times. After 1985 changes in the political climate encouraged intellectual freedom: many hot topics previously discussed behind closed doors started openly being debated in newspapers and forums for public discussion. For instance, Razzakov's name as a prominent leader could now be mentioned in public, because under Usubaliev any mention of him had been taboo. The renewed interest in local heroes and leaders, writers and anti-Soviet rebels led to numerous publications and talks.

Despite glasnost and perestroika, Masaliev was too cautious to initiate any serious reforms in the country. Moreover, his passivity during the ethnic conflict in Osh province in 1990 made him unpopular. His successor, Jumgalbek Amanbaev (April–August 1991), was only in office for several months because the Kyrgyz Communist Party was banned. In the atmosphere of glasnost, people expressed their open distrust of the Communist Party leadership and its local bosses. The increased freedom in political life led to the creation

of various democratic and nationalistic movements calling for democratic reforms and the redistribution of power in the country.

In the wake of the Cold War, the perestroika process triggered ethnic conflict in Osh province in 1990,³¹ which facilitated the redistribution of resources and a new balance of elites. The conflict was rooted in the internal social and political conditions inherited from Soviet times. Although the clashes were marked by ethnic rivalries, the underlying causes were more complex than simple inter-ethnic hostility. While riots were taking place in Osh, Uzgen and some rural areas, in Bishkek groups of young people marched in front of Government House demanding the immediate resignation of the communist leadership.³² The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK) called for the leadership to resign and criticized its inability to manage the situation in the country and prevent ethnic conflict in Osh.

The end of communist rule

Public opinion supported Askar Akaev, a 46-year-old physicist and president of the National Academy of Sciences, who promised democratic reforms and distanced himself from the Communist Party and its local bosses. As the power of the party weakened in 1990, the national parliament elected Akaev as president of the Union Republic, the real head of state. After anti-Soviet riots in the Baltic states, Gorbachev initiated an All-Union referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union on 17 March 1991. In Kyrgyzstan, an overwhelming majority of the voters backed the proposal to retain the USSR as a 'renewed federation'. During the August 1991 coup in Moscow, however, Akaev, supported by many people, condemned the pro-communist attempts to restore the authoritarian USSR. After the failure of the coup, the superiority and ominous power of the Communist Party was ended for ever. Akaev publicly resigned from the CPSU and called for the nationalization of all its property in the country. The Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan was prohibited and outlawed on the pretext that it had supported the August coup hardliners.

On 31 August 1991 the Kyrgyz parliament declared the country's independence from the Soviet Union. Thus, after the break-up of the USSR, the Kyrgyz experienced a peaceful transition to national independence and sovereignty. In October 1991 Akaev was elected as first president of the newly independent state – the Kyrgyz Republic.

³¹ See more in Tabyshalieva, 1999, pp. 20–2.

³² Tabyshalieva, 1999, p. 21.

Economic developments

The most painful experience of the Soviet period is considered to be the forced sedentarization of the Kyrgyz nomads within a short period of time. In 1927, 62 per cent of the 145,114 Kyrgyz households were nomadic or semi-nomadic.³³ Between 1918 and 1937, 142,000 households, or almost 600,000 people, were forcibly sedentarized.³⁴ The rapid sedentarization and collectivization of the nomadic and semi-nomadic households severely damaged the social fabric of the traditional society and the national economy. The transition to a sedentary way of life in the first years of Soviet power and the new nation-building, in spite of all the communist rhetoric, strengthened tribalism and clan divisions. Newly established settlements and collective farms became homogeneous in their tribal composition. In addition, impediments to traditional movements led to the greater isolation of tribes and clans.³⁵

The eradication of the pastoral system led to famine and huge economic losses, the true scale of which is still unknown. In 1932 a severe famine spread throughout Kyrgyzstan; furthermore, 130,000 refugees from Kazakhstan and Siberia arrived to settle there. The head of government, Jusup Abdrakhmanov (1901–38),³⁶ deliberately allowed famished farmers to disregard the state plan for the provision of wheat. In 1933 he was dismissed and banished from the Communist Party.³⁷ The number of horses in 1928 before sedentarization and collectivization has never been regained; the size of cattle herds was restored only in the second half of the 1960s, and that of sheep and goats in the mid-1950s.³⁸ All these processes of sedentarization and collectivization had long-lasting consequences and affected almost all Kyrgyz and non-Kyrgyz households.

In 1928 the rich Kyrgyz (*bay-manaps*), representing about 10 per cent of all rural households, were uprooted as a class; many of those with families fled or went into exile.³⁹ To comply with an unfeasible plan on the mass and fast liquidation of *kulaks* and *bays*, the local leadership had to repress people with average incomes. In June 1931 farmers and nomads of the Naryn and Issyk-kul regions put up armed resistance to forced collectivization.⁴⁰ In

³³ Chotonov and Nur uulu (eds.), 1998, p. 70.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 73.

³⁵ Shukurov and Tabyshalieva, 1997, p. 23.

³⁶ Chair of the Sovnarkom (Soviet of People's Commissars) of the Kyrgyz ASSR, 1927–33.

³⁷ Koychuev (ed.), 1995, p. 205.

³⁸ Koychuev, Mokrynin and Ploskikh, 1999, p. 71.

³⁹ Baktygulov and Mombekova, 1999, p. 275.

⁴⁰ Baktygulov and Mombekova, 1999, p. 250.

some places it led to a mass migration of the Kyrgyz; for instance, 3,000 households from Naryn (Atbashi) fled to China to save their lives and livestock.⁴¹

In a move designed to overcome the severe resistance to rapid Sovietization, the Kremlin presented the new campaign as a gesture of support from the working class to the villages: thousands of professional workers (*dvadtsatipyatitsyachniki*, or ‘25,000 people’) were sent to various regions of the Soviet Union. Between January and March 1930, 219 workers from the movement of ‘25,000 people’ arrived in Kyrgyzstan. Industrial workers – generally communists lacking all knowledge of the region and any agricultural skills – were appointed to managerial positions in agriculture; some of them became heads of collective farms (*kolkhozs*). In order to develop agriculture, women’s labour was greatly encouraged by the Communist Party leadership. For instance in the 1940s–50s, Zuurakan Kainazarova harvested a record crop of sugar beet; she was twice honoured by being awarded the title ‘Hero of Socialist Labour’, and ‘elected’ a deputy in the parliament of the USSR.

In agriculture, cattle-breeding and farming were the main sources of income for collective and Soviet farms. Ten large water reservoirs built across the country greatly increased the efficiency of irrigation and therefore the production of cotton, tobacco and wheat. Though they had 10 million sheep and 1 million cattle, the highest per capita and per hectare production of meat in the USSR and fewer than 3–4 million people in the 1980s, there was a permanent shortage of meat in Kyrgyz state grocery stores because the meat products were sent to Russia. The average per capita meat consumption in Kyrgyzstan was 1.5 times lower than that in the Soviet Union. The high density of livestock led to the erosion of pastures and over-grazing; 60 per cent of these pastures were drained and by 1985 sheep farming had become a lossmaking activity.⁴² Disregarding these negative environmental trends, Moscow demanded higher meat output and productivity.

Overall, despite huge investment, the collective and state farms proved to be an ineffective form of management. Rapidly developed private farming played the most important role in food supplies for the local population. In Kyrgyzstan, the private sector produced 57 per cent of the potatoes, 50 per cent of the vegetables, 28 per cent of the meat, 32 per cent of the milk and 42 per cent of the eggs.⁴³

During the Second World War, about 60 military-related plants and factories with skilled workers from Russia and Ukraine were evacuated, mainly to the north of Kyrgyzstan, in Frunze. New enterprises contributed greatly to industrial development in the country. During the war, particular attention was paid to the mining industry, which supplied strategic

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 252.

⁴² Koychuev (ed.), 1995, p. 262.

⁴³ Rumer, 1989, pp. 125–6.

materials for military equipment. Antimony from Kadamjay plant, mercury from Khaidarkhan industrial unit and other rare metals were all sent to Russia. By the end of 1941 Kyrgyzstan produced 85 per cent of all the antimony produced in the USSR.⁴⁴ In addition to the development of non-ferrous metallurgy, Kyrgyzstan extracted 40 per cent of the stone coal in Central Asia in the 1980s.⁴⁵

Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin's (1964–80) reforms produced some positive results: during 1965–85 the national income of the Kyrgyz Republic increased almost threefold, energy production fivefold, and more than 150 industrial enterprises were built.⁴⁶ In the last decades of Soviet Kyrgyzstan, machinery building and non-ferrous metallurgy were the major industries, both heavily dependent on the Russian Federation and other Union Republics. Part of the production, mainly agricultural machinery, was exported to other socialist countries.

Energy and water were the most important areas of the Kyrgyz economy. In the mid-1970s, the largest hydro-power station in Central Asia, the Toktogul HPS, with 19.3 billion m³ reservoirs on the Naryn river, was constructed. It accumulated and regulated the water of the Syr Darya river for the downstream countries, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The electric power generated by this HPS was transmitted and distributed through the Central Asian energy network. Soviet planners in Moscow saw irrigation in Central Asia as of crucial importance and they set the rules for water and energy management, and all prices for fuel and energy in the region.⁴⁷

Agriculture and industry developed extensively and productivity increased. However, from the mid-1970s a gradual slowdown of economic development in the country led to stagnation in many sectors of industry and agriculture. Despite having the status of Union Republic, in reality, the leadership of Soviet Kyrgyzstan could not have its own strategy for economic development; Moscow ran the major ministries and closed its eyes to local needs, though direct budget transfers from the central Soviet government to Kyrgyzstan were substantial. In the 1960s–80s in Kyrgyzstan, as everywhere in the Soviet Union, corruption became a part of everyday life and the share of the black economy increased substantially.

⁴⁴ Koychuev (ed.), 1995, p. 228.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 256.

⁴⁶ Koychuev, Mokrynin and Ploskikh, 1999, p. 85.

⁴⁷ Iskakov and Tabysheva, 2002.

Population and social developments

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

The population of Kyrgyzstan increased fivefold – from 863,900 in 1913 to 4,463,000 in 1991. The highest rate of population growth took place in the 1950s–60s, due to migration from the Russian Federation and a high birth rate. The share of the urban population steadily expanded: in 1913 it was 12 per cent, but by 1989 it had risen to 38 per cent.

The Second World War greatly affected the demographic situation: 360,000 people from the Kyrgyz SSR fought in the war; every fourth citizen went to the front.⁴⁸ Besides, 36,300 people, 85 per cent of whom were Kyrgyz, were mobilized for Russia's industrial enterprises.⁴⁹ At the same time, the Stalin administration deported thousands of Turks, Chechens, Kabardins, Kurds and other peoples from the Caucasus, Crimean Tatars, Poles and Germans to Kyrgyzstan as 'unreliable' peoples. During the war, more than 300,000 people arrived there.⁵⁰ The young men of Kyrgyzstan were regularly recruited into the Soviet army; of the 7,141 Kyrgyz soldiers sent to the war in Afghanistan (1979–89), 259 were killed, 1,500 injured and 504 permanently disabled.⁵¹

The Kyrgyz traditionally inhabited the mountainous zone; almost all the ethnic minorities lived in the lowlands and in cities. Russians were settled in the north of the country and in cities, especially Bishkek, where they constituted the majority of citizens with an urban residence permit, whereas the Uzbeks lived mainly in the southern provinces. The Kyrgyz slowly moved to the cities: only 1 per cent lived there in 1926, and 11 per cent in 1959.⁵² During the Soviet era, the capital remained a mainly Russian-dominated city, where the Kyrgyz made up a minority. To develop heavy industry and strengthen the periphery of the Soviet Union, thousands of Russians were invited to settle in cities as skilled personnel, industrial workers and simply as 'reliable' citizens for the Soviet leadership in Moscow. The *propiska*, the Soviet-style residence permit, greatly restricted the movement of labour and impeded the migration of the rural Kyrgyz to the cities, where living standards were higher than in the high mountainous zones. Only in the late 1980s, when the pressure of Russian rule weakened, did thousands of Kyrgyz young people and their families move from rural areas to the cities. Some of them united in the *Ashar* (Mutual Support) movement and demanded plots of land around Frunze (Bishkek). The authorities tried to satisfy these requests by building new neighbourhoods around the capital. In the south, unlike the

⁴⁸ Ploskikh (ed.), 1998, p. 224.

⁴⁹ Koychuev (ed.), 1995, p. 228.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 234.

⁵¹ 'Esche raz pro "Afghan"', *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, 14 Feb. 2003, p. 10.

⁵² Kozlov, 1975, p. 84.

TABLE 1. Ethnic structure of largest ethnic groups in the Kyrgyz SSR (per cent; 1926–89)

	1926	1939	1959	1979	1989
Kyrgyz	66.7	51.7	40.5	47.9	52.4
Uzbeks	11.1	10.3	10.5	12.1	12.9
Russians	11.7	20.8	30.2	25.9	21.5
Ukrainians	–	9.4	6.6	3.1	2.5

TABLE 2. Ethnic structure in the Kyrgyz SSR (1989)⁵³

Ethnic groups	Total number	Per cent
Kyrgyz	2 229 663	52.4
Russians	916 558	21.5
Uzbeks	550 096	12.9
Ukrainians	108 027	2.5
Germans	101 309	2.4
Tatars	70 068	1.6
Kazakhs	37 318	0.9
Dungans	36 928	0.9
Uighurs	36 779	0.9
Tajiks	33 518	0.8
Turks	21 294	0.5
Other ethnic groups	116 197	2.7

north, the ill-advised redistribution of irrigated land near Osh city triggered a bloody ethnic conflict between Uzbek and Kyrgyz youth groups in June 1990.

ETHNIC STRUCTURE

Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic state, with the largest ethnic groups being Kyrgyz, Russians and Uzbeks (Table 1). Together with these three ethnic groups, Ukrainians, Germans, Uighurs, Koreans, Dungans (Chinese Muslims), Tatars and many other minorities greatly contributed to the development of the local economy and culture. The share of the Kyrgyz in the total population decreased after the Second World War and correspondingly the migration of Russians and Ukrainians increased in the late 1950s–60s, when they made up one third of the country's population (Table 1). But in the 1980s, with the deteriorating economic conditions and lack of employment opportunities, Russians and Russian-speaking groups started leaving for Russia. The ethnic structure as of 1989 is shown in 4, Table 2.

⁵³ *Osnovnye itogi pervoy natsional'noy perepisi naseleniya Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki 1999 goda*, 2000.

TABLE 3. Human development and health indicators in the Kyrgyz Republic (1991)⁵⁵

Male life expectancy at birth (years)	64.6
Female life expectancy at birth (years)	72.7
Mortality rate per 1,000	6.9
Child mortality per 1,000 live births	29.7
Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births	55.6

SOCIAL PROTECTION AND HEALTH CARE

Under the Soviet regime, there were undeniable achievements in the social protection of many population groups, including mothers with children, senior citizens and children; this partly explains the post-independence nostalgia for the socialist era among ordinary people. Free health care and education, decent allowances and pensions maintained minimum living standards, and what amounted to symbolic payments for housing and utilities were widely associated with the benign care of the Communist Party. While compared to the developed countries, the standard of living in Soviet society was not high, the relatively good provision of essential services and access to education, employment and culture created confidence that certain minimum conditions of life would continue to be guaranteed.⁵⁴ Human development indicators for 1991 (Table. 3) demonstrated a convincing success for the developing country after independence.

By the end of the Soviet era, the Kyrgyz Republic, like other former Soviet countries, had well-developed medical institutions, hospitals and specialized dispensaries. The number of doctors stood at 15,354 (1991),⁵⁶ or 1 physician per 291 people, although the high number of specialists meant the inadequate preparation and distribution of medical workers for primary health care. Epidemics such as cholera and malaria have either disappeared or been contained. Social protection and the health-care system deteriorated greatly in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, if the indicators of human development during the Soviet and post-independence periods are compared.

EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE

Remarkable achievements in the overall literacy of the population and the creation of a wide network of schools and universities changed the nation considerably over a short period. By the end of the 1930s, 70 per cent of the population above the age of 9 and 63

⁵⁴ Shukurov and Tabyshalieva, 1997, p. 16.

⁵⁵ Tabyshalieva, 2001b, pp. 64, 113, 114.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 117.

per cent of women were literate. Compulsory schooling led to universal literacy, and free higher education opened remarkable opportunities for almost any student in the country. At the same time, a noticeable gap in the quality of teaching between native Kyrgyz schools and Russian schools significantly impeded the access of rural Kyrgyz youth to higher education and better employment opportunities in the cities.

Soviet language policy played an important role in overcoming illiteracy and monitoring political and cultural activities. As it was the most convenient for the Turkic languages, the Latin script was adopted instead of the Arabic alphabet that had been in use before 1928. However, in 1940–1, under pressure from Moscow, the Latin script (well suited for the Kyrgyz language) was replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet.

A standard literary language of the Kyrgyz was developed, and the first newspapers, textbooks and documents were widely published. Kasym Tynystanov (1901–38), a poet and philologist, greatly contributed to the development of Kyrgyz orthography and contemporary principles of language. The first Kyrgyz newspaper *Erkin-Too*, later renamed *Kyzyl Kyrgyzstan* (1924), mobilized the indigenous population to build a new Soviet society. In 1989, following glasnost, a new law on the state language was adopted in the republic: for the first time, the Kyrgyz language was given significance at national level.

CULTURE AND SCIENCE

The most important positive aspect of the Soviet regime was the creation of a learned intellectual elite and the general education of all the populace within several decades. Cohorts of scholars, writers, musicians, performers, artists and many others studied in Moscow and Leningrad (St Petersburg), and European art, drama, cinema, ballet and opera were remarkably developed. Despite strict censorship by the party administrators and persistent ideological pressure to promote ‘socialist realism’ in literature and art, many talented writers and artists were able to create masterpieces popular in both Soviet times and the postindependence era. Published during the Soviet era, the famous novels of the writer Tchingiz Aytmatov (b. 1928) describe the everyday life of the rural Kyrgyz and the harsh realities of Soviet innovations and domestic traditions. In 1959, when Louis Aragon translated *Jamila* into French, the name Aytmatov became famous beyond the Soviet Union. His novels *The White Ship*, *Jamila*, *Farewell*, *Gulsary* and others have been translated and published in many languages worldwide. Among the most popular Kyrgyz of the Soviet era were the talented ballerina Bübüsara Beishenalieva, the opera singer Bulat Minjilkiev, the writer Tugelbay Sadykbekov, the film director Tölömush Okeev, the actor Süymönkul Chokmorov and many others.

There were major contradictions within Soviet policy, however. On the one hand, Kyrgyz culture and language were promoted, *Manas* and other epic poems were written down, and the study and conservation of ancient monuments were encouraged; on the other hand, the essence of folk culture was greatly distorted by ideological demands to create a new socialist culture, and by the imperial revision of the imperfect ‘backward’ past of the Kyrgyz. For instance, new Kyrgyz ‘ethnic dances’ were invented to demonstrate the national traditions of one of the 15 ‘equal’ Union Republics. On the whole, ‘the cultures of the local peoples were asserted merely as material for transformations and integration into the Soviet socialist culture, and an independent value behind them was not recognized.’⁵⁷

The Kyrgyz branch of the Academy of Sciences (created in 1943) was transformed into the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz SSR in 1954. In the 1980s the academy included 17 institutes with 3,500 scientists. Working under the persistent threat of party intervention and punishment, the social scientists had to avoid many themes in their research. In the Russian-dominated Soviet state, all mention of political leaders or distinguished persons from the past who might be a pattern for national rebirth was forbidden. Only those poets and national heroes who welcomed the Russian presence (even in the nineteenth century) and the Soviets could be included in historical chronicles and textbooks. Scholars who dared to discuss or publish alternative views were severely attacked by the local party leadership; researchers were discouraged from discussing many taboo questions, especially regarding their own ethnic history. For instance, in the 1970s, K. Nurbekov’s publications on the history of Kyrgyzstan and S. M. Abramzon’s books and articles on tribal structure were considered ‘incorrect’ by the party leaders of Kyrgyzstan.⁵⁸

RELIGIOUS SITUATION

In the late 1920s the ‘Union of Militant Godless People’ (*Soyuz Voinstvuushchikh Bezbojnikov*) was created across the Soviet Union; its Kyrgyz branch had more than 11,500 members. In Kyrgyzstan 12 churches and 90 mosques were shut down in 1940. Khrushchev’s anti-religious decrees led to another destruction of mosques and *madrasas* in the early 1960s.

During Soviet times Islam was de-intellectualized and survived mainly in its ritual and traditional forms. The Soviet system prevented Islam from being modernized, since most progressive Islamic leaders were silenced. As a result, the role of holy places (*mazārs*) increased considerably. The most popular *mazārs* were linked to hot springs and waterfalls, medieval mausoleums and some ecologically important sites. However, the Soviet

⁵⁷ Shukurov and Tabyshalieva, 1997, p. 15.

⁵⁸ Tabyshalieva, 2001a, p. 5.

prohibitions on religious practices could not stop the centuries-old pilgrimage to Suleiman Too (mountain) in Osh city, Aub and Arstan Bab in Jalalabad, Shah-Fazil in Alabuka, Manas Kümböz (mausoleum) in Talas and many other *mazārs*, all ideologically and culturally influential shrines among native Muslims. The Suleiman *mazār* in Osh city – a very popular site attracting thousands of pilgrims – was blown up one night in 1963 and replaced by a poster reading, ‘Long live the CPSU’. Despite Soviet attempts to demolish and destroy the *mazārs*, they survived this destructive period of history.⁵⁹

Although the Communist Party leadership implanted atheism and attempted to create a new society free from religion, any cemetery throughout the settlements of Central Asia clearly proved the unspoken division of society into Christian Slavs/Europeans and Muslims (the indigenous inhabitants). Even with thousands of ideological workers, and the massive and systematic anti-religious propaganda against Islam, the population remained overwhelmingly Muslim. The post-independence revival of Islam demonstrates the failure of a 70-year state policy of atheism that has been unable to replace Islam with the utopian Soviet ideology.

THE KYRGYZ OUTSIDE OF KYRGYZSTAN

Large groups of Kyrgyz outside the Kyrgyz SSR live in the Kyzyl-Su Kyrgyz autonomous prefecture in Xinjiang, which was created in February 1955; it gained the status of province, with Artysh as the administrative and cultural centre.⁶⁰ By the end of the Soviet period, 140,000 Kyrgyz inhabited this province. Besides the Kalmuk-Kyrgyz, a small group close to the Mongols observed Lamaism and spoke in Kazakh with elements of Kyrgyz.⁶¹ Among the most well-known Kyrgyz in Xinjiang are Yusup Mamay, who wrote down the epic *Manas*, and the historian Anvar Baitur, whose lectures on Kyrgyz history were published in Bishkek. The largest diaspora is located in neighbouring Uzbekistan. In 1989, 174,907 Kyrgyz lived mainly in the Ferghana valley and in Jizak province of Uzbekistan.²

Another group of Kyrgyz roam the Pamirs and Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan. According to information provided by Vakhan Turdy Ahund, the representative of the Kyrgyz community in the *loya jirga* in 2002, the population of the Afghan Kyrgyz numbers about 30,000 people, or 5,500 households. They occupy the lands of the Wakhan corridor in Badakhshan province in the north-east of the country.⁶³ Rakhmankul Khan (1912–90) fled to Afghanistan in the late 1940s and became khan of the Pamiri Kyrgyz. He protected

⁵⁹ Tabyshalieva, 2000, p. 28.

⁶⁰ Asankanov and Osmonov, 2002, p. 562.

⁶¹ Abramzon, 1990, p. 40.

² Yalcin, 2002, p. 128.

⁶³ See <http://www.kyrgyz.ru/?page=12>.

the Afghan borders with China and the USSR and was a representative of the Kyrgyz in the *loya jirga*. After the 1978 coup and civil war in Afghanistan, Rakhmankul Khan with 1,300 people (280 households) had to flee from the Pamirs to Pakistan, but they later returned to the Pamirs.⁶⁴ In 1982 another group with Rakhmankul moved to Turkey and settled near the city of Van in Kara- Kunduz.⁶⁵ The Kyrgyz traditionally lived in Karategin, Jergital and the Pamirs of Tajikistan. During the Tajik civil war (1992–6) and the ensuing insecurity, thousands fled to Kyrgyzstan and have been granted Kyrgyz citizenship.

Afterword

When Russia unexpectedly retreated from Kyrgyzstan, the country embarked on the long and painful route to real independence. Kyrgyzstan's postindependence history is also a history of the loss of the major achievements of Soviet times: universal education, the triumph over epidemics, accessible health care, state protection for mothers and children, a wide safety net, and agricultural and industrial development. Thousands of people, especially senior citizens, who are now surviving on the edge of starvation regret the decent living standards achieved in the 1960s–80s. Following their society's return to normalcy, the majority of Kyrgyz young people know very little about Soviet rhetoric and party doctrine. By and large, the post-independence period in Kyrgyzstan is a new era in the development



FIG. 4. Kyrgyz men going hunting with falcons. (Photo: © A. Abdygulov.)

⁶⁴ Asankanov and Osmonov, 2002, p. 564.

⁶⁵ Ibid.



FIG. 5. Kyrgyz women in national costumes. (Photo: © A. Abdygulov.)



FIG. 6. Kyrgyz men demonstrating their skilled horsemanship. (Photo: © A. Abdygulov.)

of the Kyrgyz nation, which is benefiting greatly from the new freedom and civil liberties and its integration into the international community (Fig. 4, 5 and 6).

12

TAJIKISTAN*

*M. Dinorshoev***Contents**

Political history	282
Economic and social development	286
Culture and science	294
Independence	295

The earliest inhabitants of Central Asia – the Tajiks and their forebears (the Bactrians, Sogdians and Khwarazmians) – were the founders of the region's first organized states. But as fate would have it, they had to endure a multitude of trials and tribulations virtually throughout their history. The fall of the Samanid state (ninth–tenth centuries), which they established after the Arab invasion, was a great tragedy for the Tajik people. Thereafter they were deprived of a national state for a thousand years, living under the rule of a variety of foreign states.

Political history

Only after the triumph of the October revolution in Russia (1917) did conditions ripen for the establishment of a sovereign Tajik state within the framework of the USSR: the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) (1924),¹ which then became the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (1929).

* See Maps 1 and 2.

¹ The ASSRs were viewed not as sovereign states but as self-governing regions, often with specific ethnic affiliations, within a Union Republic. The 15 Union Republics were the major administrative divisions in the USSR, where they were viewed as equal sovereign states, each representing a significant nationality (Russians, Ukrainians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.) and all voluntarily united in the USSR. [*Trans.*]

The establishment of the Turkistan ASSR (1918) as part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)² was the first step towards creating Soviet national statehood for the Central Asian peoples. The establishment of the Khwarazm and Bukhara People's Soviet Republics (1920)³ showed that the national and territorial dispersion of the peoples was creating difficulties for the consolidation of Soviet power in the region and hampering the peoples' economic and cultural development. Further, nationalist deviations and tendencies had already arisen which could only exacerbate national discord and tensions or – worse – enmity. In these circumstances, to divide Central Asia into national states was thought to be the only true solution to the region's national question.⁴ Thus, after the appropriate steps had been taken, a session of the USSR National Executive Committee (NEC) on 27 October 1924 adopted a decision dividing Central Asia into national states. On the basis of this decision, the Tajik ASSR was formed as part of the Uzbek SSR, and a number of regions of Turkistan and Bukhara solidly populated by Tajiks were included in it.

Although this act was of great importance for the Tajiks' destiny, the powerful influence of Pan-Turkism – whose partisans refused to recognize the Tajiks as a nation in their own right – led to a crude and drastic national and territorial segregation. The Tajiks were artificially deprived of their historical cultural centres, which in the Middle Ages had played a decisive role in the region's civilization. Not a single major city or administrative and cultural centre was included in the Tajik ASSR. A small mountain republic, with just 7 per cent of its total area suitable for cultivation, was set up in the most backward and sparsely populated mountains of the former emirate of Bukhara and the Pamirs. Nonetheless, the establishment of the Tajik ASSR was of huge historical significance for a people deprived of an independent national state since the fall of the Samanids in 999.

The Revolutionary Committee was the supreme organ of state power in the republic. People's Commissariats were set up to lead the different areas of public life. Locally, *kishlak* (village or settlement) revolutionary committees were active; they remained in existence until early December 1926. As of 12 December, power was handed over to the Central Executive Committee (CEC).

In those years there was an upsurge in the political activity among the masses. The ranks of the Communist Party of Tajikistan were swollen: by October 1927 party members numbered more than 1,147, and the trade unions had more than 5,000 members. The essential conditions were in place for the Tajik ASSR to become the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.

² The RSFSR was the largest of the 15 Union Republics, embracing European Russia and Siberia. [Trans.]

³ See *Istoriya Bukharskoy i Khorezmskoy Narodnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki*, 1971.

⁴ *Istoriya Bukharskoy i Khorezmskoy Narodnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki*, 1971, pp. 223–4.

On 16 October 1929 the Third Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of Tajikistan adopted a declaration on the establishment of the Tajik SSR. The congress delegates unanimously declared that the republic voluntarily joined the USSR with full membership rights.⁵

Two factors were decisive in the transformation of the Tajik ASSR into a Union Republic. The first was the country's great success in economic, social and political affairs over the five years since its creation. In that period the Basmachis (Muslim insurgents opposing the introduction of Soviet rule in Central Asia) had been almost completely routed and major successes had been achieved in rebuilding the wrecked economy and in developing culture. The second factor was that, on the basis of a decision by Khujand *okrug* (administrative division roughly corresponding to a region) soviet to include Khujand *okrug* (until then part of the Uzbek SSR) in the Tajik ASSR, and a decision by the Third Congress of Soviets of the Uzbek SSR on 10 May 1929 to transfer Khujand *okrug* to the Tajik republic – as confirmed by the CEC of the soviets of the Uzbek SSR (7 September 1929) and the Tajik ASSR (2 October 1929) – Khujand *okrug* was included in the Tajik ASSR. In practice, this act of justice sealed the transformation of the Tajik ASSR into the Tajik SSR.

At that time, Khujand *okrug* was economically and culturally more advanced than other parts of Tajikistan. Soviet rule had been installed earlier there, significant socialist change had been brought about and a large working class had been formed, together with a progressive intelligentsia and, indeed, the appropriate political leadership, which naturally could not fail to exert a decisive influence on accelerating economic growth and on the solution of social problems and cultural change. For Tajikistan to receive Union Republic status within the USSR was an outstanding event in the history of the Tajik people. Essentially, it signalled the rebirth of Tajik statehood. The uniting of some if not all Tajiks in a single state, a single family, considerably accelerated their development into a nation.

After the Tajik SSR was formed, the state apparatus was significantly strengthened. To train the necessary staff, six-monthly courses for Soviet and party activists were held in Stalinabad (now Dushanbe), Khujand, Khorog and some other *okrug* centres in 1930 and permanent Soviet and party schools were opened. An important part in improving the work of the state apparatus was played by the People's Commissariat of Worker and *Dehqān* [peasant] Intelligentsia (NKREDI). The departments of this commissariat fought implacably against bureaucracy, condescension to the working masses and mismanagement in the Soviet apparatus. To simplify the administrative system, in July 1930 the CEC of the Soviets of Tajikistan adopted a decree abolishing *okrugs* in the republic and making the *rayon* the basic administrative unit, to be led by *rayon* executive committees directly subordinate to the CEC of the soviets of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.

⁵ Fanyan, 1940, pp. 141–3.

The establishment of the Tajik SSR was legislatively enshrined in its constitution, adopted on 24 February 1931 at the Fourth Congress of the Republic's Soviets. The constitution specified the political, economic, social and ideological foundation of the new socialist society in the newly established Tajik state, and also the rights and freedoms of the citizen and the individual.

In December 1936, with the completion of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, the Eighth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of the USSR adopted a new constitution of the USSR. In Tajikistan, as in all other republics of the Union, work commenced on preparing and adopting a new constitution. The Sixth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of Tajikistan adopted the republic's new constitution on 1 March 1937, in what was an historic event. The new constitution affirmed the political and economic foundations of the Tajik SSR as a new nation-state within the USSR. On the basis of that constitution, executive, legislative and judicial authority was formed. Despite its totalitarian nature and the institution of party dictatorship over the state and society, the constitution played a significant role in establishing democratic norms and legality and in expanding secular processes in society.

The 1978 constitutional reform also played a significant role in the political development of the Tajik SSR. The constitution of the Tajik SSR, elaborated in the spirit of the 1977 USSR constitution and adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet (parliament) on 14 April 1978, encapsulated Tajikistan's history over the 60 years of Soviet rule and determined the foundations of the political, economic, social, cultural and education systems of Soviet Socialist Tajikistan. Summarizing the experience of the building of socialism in the republic, it established that the Tajik SSR was a socialist state of the entire people, proceeding in its action on the basis of democratic centralism. The basis of its economic system was socialist ownership of the means of production in the shape of state (national) or cooperative ownership; its social foundation was an inviolable union of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia; the highest body of state authority was the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR and the republic's Council of Ministers.

However, the constitution affirmed that the leading and guiding force in Soviet society, the core of its political system and its state and public organizations, was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Article 6). That meant that the constitution imposed a party and state political system in which the decisive role was played by the party apparatus, without whose sanction no state or public decision of the slightest importance could be adopted or implemented. Given the single-party state, the non-separation of powers, the lack of pluralism of opinion, and the subordination to the CPSU of all public organizations

and structures of power, this article of the constitution opened a highway for the further consolidation of totalitarianism and the imposition of the party leader's personal rule.

But regardless of all that (and perhaps despite what has been said), the 1978 constitution of the Tajik SSR considerably expanded the citizens' rights, responsibilities and freedoms. It particularly emphasized the equality of all the republic's citizens, regardless of their origin, social and property status, language, religious and racial affiliation, gender and so on. The new constitution established – alongside freedom of speech, the press, conscience and religion – that each citizen had the right to work, leisure, health care, material provision for old age and during unemployment, disability or loss of the breadwinner, the right to accommodation, to avail oneself of cultural achievements, freedom of scientific, technological and literary creativity, to participate in the running of the state, etc. On that basis, it may be said that despite the generally totalitarian nature of its political system, the Tajik SSR had achieved considerable success in proclaiming the democratic principles of public life.

Economic and social development

Formed in eastern Bukhara, Tajikistan inherited an extremely backward economy. The mere fact that in 1924–5 the area under crops (not including Khujand *okrug*) was 46.12 per cent of the 1914 level, the wheat harvest 51.8 per cent, the cotton harvest 50.2 per cent and the numbers of livestock 51.1 per cent is indicative of the reborn country's colossal backwardness. The government took a number of priority steps aimed at stimulating the country's economic development: it exempted the population of former eastern Bukhara and the Pamirs from agricultural taxes for two years (1925–7) and from interest on loans issued by it in 1924–5; it organized the return of civil war refugees to their homes; it carried out preparatory work for moving some inhabitants from the mountains to the lowlands; it allocated large sums to setting up irrigation installations, etc. This action helped to bring about a rapid upturn in the country's economy.

In 1924–9 the first large-scale industrial enterprises were built. Specifically, in 1926–8 cotton-cleaning mills were built in Jillikul, Kurgan-tepe, Kulab, Shahrtuz, Farhar, Khujand, Sarai-Kamar, Regar and Dushanbe. Craft industries were stimulated. The republic was preparing for major industrialization. Unlike the rest of the USSR, where priority was given to heavy industry, Tajikistan's socio-economic situation and its weak technical base gave industrialization certain specific features. Here the establishment of light industry was considered the key. Thanks to a grant from the Union Government, 82,900,000 roubles⁶

⁶ Sharipov, 1960, p. 20.

were allocated to industrial construction in the republic during the first five-year plan. Specialists from the fraternal republics⁷ of the Union were sent to Tajikistan. With this support, 17 large-scale industrial enterprises were built in the republic in 1928–32.⁸

Existing fuel industry enterprises were reconstructed, resulting in a significant increase in oil and coal extraction.⁹ A poly-metallic ore-processing industry came into being. Building work started on the first metal-working enterprises, the hydroelectric station on the Varzab, and the Shurabad, Panjikent and other power stations. A printing industry was successfully established and developed. In 1931 the construction of a press centre was started in Dushanbe and eight regional printing presses were established. Tajikistan's natural resources were studied intensively. An expedition to the Pamir mountains by the USSR Academy of Sciences discovered a number of new deposits of various minerals. New railways were laid during the five-year-plan period. In early 1930 the Termez–Dushanbe railway was extended to Yangi-Bazar (now Vakhdat). Considerable progress was made in building railways and roads and developing communications.¹⁰

All this led to the intensive training of local young people as workers through the factory apprenticeship (FZU) and factory educational schools (FZO) systems. A special role in this training was played by workers and specialists from Russia and other more advanced regions of the USSR. For example, in 1931 the Moscow 'Stroiob'edineniye'¹¹ Trust trained 47 building materials production specialists, textile factories trained 109 spinners and weavers, and engineering factories trained 40 fitters, turners and foundry workers.¹² During the first five-year plan the number of industrial workers in Tajikistan rose to 5,600, and the number of workers in construction companies also rose.

One requirement for the socialist reconstruction of the economy was the collectivization of agriculture. Because of Tajikistan's economic backwardness and the preservation of feudal patriarchal and tribal relationships, collectivization fell well behind the more advanced republics and proceeded slowly. In the enforced collectivization, significant oversights and crude mistakes were permitted, resulting in excessive administrative meddling in the collectivization process and an ill-considered policy of destroying the *kulaks* (rich peasant farmers).¹³

⁷ Meaning the other Union Republics such as Russia or Uzbekistan. [Trans.]

⁸ *Istoriya Tajikskogo naroda*, 1965, Vol. 3, Book 1, p. 244.

⁹ *Narodnoe khozyaystvo Tajikskoy SSR. Stat. sborn.*, 1957 p. 22.

¹⁰ *Istoriya Tajikskogo naroda*, 1964, Vol. 1, Book 1, pp. 227–8.

¹¹ Abbreviated Russian term meaning construction association. [Trans.]

¹² *Istoriya Tajikskogo naroda*, 1964, Vol. 1, Book 1, p. 230.

¹³ Throughout the USSR the Russian word *kulak* – literally a fist – was the term given to richer peasant farmers who were considered to exploit poorer peasants and to oppose collectivization. [Trans.]

While just 14 collective farms had been organized in the republic in 1928, by 1932 their number had risen to 1,848¹⁴ and included 41.9 per cent of all *dehqān* farms. In total, 65.3 per cent of the sown area belonged to collective farms.¹⁵ For cotton-growing districts that figure stood at 70.2 per cent. The construction of state farms also gathered pace. From 1929 to 1932 the number of state farms in the republic rose from 5 to 26.¹⁶

Collectivization also called for the technical re-equipping of agriculture and the extensive use of machinery in working the land. Starting in 1930, machinery and tractor stations (MTS) were set up: by the end of 1932 there were 18 of them, with a total fleet of 1,085 tractors and other farm machines. In general, collectivization strengthened the economic foundations of Soviet rule in the countryside. In this way, the foundations were laid for Tajikistan's further political, socio-economic and cultural development.

Between 1933 and 1937 the volume of capital investment in the economy almost doubled in comparison with the previous period. Investments were distributed as follows: 32 per cent to agriculture, over 25 per cent to industry, 19 per cent on building schools, hospitals, communal enterprises and housing, and 16 per cent on building roads and purchasing transport. Spending almost quadrupled on education and doubled on industry.¹⁷

Analysing the geographical distribution of industry, it can readily be observed that the first major industrial enterprises began to be built in the republic's capital, Dushanbe (renamed Stalinabad in 1929 and given back its name of Dushanbe in 1961). Consequently, by the start of the Great Patriotic War (1941–5)¹⁸ Stalinabad had become a major industrial centre, with 44 per cent of industrial enterprises concentrated in it and the surrounding area. Of the remaining volume of industrial output, in 1942, 32 per cent was produced in Leninabad *oblast'* (province),¹⁹ 14 per cent in the Vakhsh valley and 6 per cent in Kulab *oblast'*. In 1949 the industry of Garm *oblast'* amounted to some 2.5 per cent of the republic's total industry, while that of mountainous Badakhshan (Badakhshan-i Kuhi in Tajik, Gorny Badakhshan in Russian) *oblast'* amounted to some 1.5 per cent.

This imbalance in the geographical distribution of industry was probably initially caused by the need to make use of the most convenient opportunities for developing it quickly (taking account of the proximity to the main railway, the availability of a workforce, the adequacy of raw material resources, etc.). It was then entrenched by the chronic economic

¹⁴ Yakhyayev, 1956, Vol. 15, Issue 2, p. 34.

¹⁵ *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo Soyuz SSR (1933–1938). Stat. sborn.*, 1939, p. 189.

¹⁶ *Kommunist Tajikistana*, 21 Aug. 1933.

¹⁷ *Tajikistan za 20 let*, 1949, p. 15.

¹⁸ The Great Patriotic War is the Russian and Soviet term for those parts of the Second World War in which the USSR was directly engaged to liberate its territory and help to overthrow Nazi Germany. [Trans.]

¹⁹ The *oblast'*, or province, was the basic administrative unit into which the Union Republics were divided. [Trans.]

and social backwardness of the mountain regions. This very lack of balance in the country's economic development and the distribution of industry became one of the causes of the political crisis in the republic in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The increasing tempo of the republic's industrial development before the war is evidenced by the fact that while the average annual increment in the volume of industrial output prior to Tajikistan's transformation into a Union Republic was 360,000 roubles, in the following 11 years – up to 1940 – it amounted to 26.3 million roubles.²⁰

This rapid rate of development could be seen in all branches of industry and agriculture. This is confirmed by the results²¹ achieved: under Soviet rule and until 1940, 8 cotton-cleaning plants were built and 1 was reconstructed. On that foundation, cotton fibre output rose more than 13.5-fold (1,250 per cent) from 1928, and in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period it rose 97-fold (9,600 per cent). Labour productivity over the same period rose more than 10-fold (900 per cent). In 1940, as compared with 1933, as the first state enterprises came fully on line, the silk-processing industry increased its overall volume of output almost 5-fold (400 per cent), output of raw cotton 3.8-fold (280 per cent) and output of silk fabrics almost 12-fold (1,100 per cent), while labour productivity rose 2.6-fold (160 per cent). Coal production rose almost 16-fold (1,500 per cent), oil production 2.8-fold (180 per cent), and in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period those indicators rose 41-fold (4,000 per cent) and 3.6-fold (260 per cent) respectively. In comparison with 1913, the building materials industry's output rose 5.5-fold (450 per cent) in 1940. In that period a large number of non-ferrous and precious metal deposits were discovered, ore extraction commenced and the construction of mines and processing plants was started.

Prior to the revolution, there was no light industry other than an embryonic textile production: by 1933 several enterprises had been built (two sewing factories, a leather works and a footwear factory in Stalinabad, a knitwear factory and a footwear factory in Leninabad, etc.) and by 1940 their number had tripled. The gross output of the food industry, including the meat and dairy branch, expressed in value terms, rose more than 940-fold (93,900 per cent) from 1927 to 1940. Production of confectionery products rose 81.5-fold (8,050 per cent) from 1933 to 1940, and that of wines rose 375.5-fold (37,450 per cent). Available data suggest that in pre-revolutionary Tajikistan the overall numbers of craft workers were no higher than 9,000. Under Soviet rule they came together into a cooperative system which increased almost 50-fold (4,900 per cent) between 1928 and

²⁰ *Tajikistan za 20 let*, 1949, p. 22.

²¹ Facts cited according to State Planning Committee data. See *ibid.*, pp. 24 et seq.

1940. Its share of the overall volume of industrial production stood at 9.6 per cent. Craft cooperatives employed 18.8 per cent of the total number of industrial workers.

Together with these indicators of industrial development came a growth in the numbers of the working class: from 1928 to 1940 alone the number of workers rose 64-fold (6,300 per cent). Twenty-seven per cent of the total were managerial staff, and they included women. Young people from the local ethnic groups learned complex worker professions with great enthusiasm.

The socialist restructuring of agriculture in the republic was complete by 1940, by when there were 3,093 collective farms (bringing together 195,800 farms). In 1940 the basic assets of the machinery and tractor stations had risen 4.5-fold (350 per cent). The numbers of industrial staff in agriculture also rose. Particular attention was paid to building irrigation installations. By late 1939 the republic's irrigation network comprised some 4,000 km of main canals and 1,200 km of distribution network. The number of structures in the irrigation system exceeded 4,000. The change to these new ways of farming ensured a constant increase in animal farming. Similar success was to be observed in the development of silk farming, fruit- and wine-growing, plant-growing and other sectors.

Industrialization led to a large increase in the urban population. Together with the capital, Dushanbe, cities such as Leninabad, Kurgan-tepe, Kulab, Kanibadam, Ura-tepe and Khorog also grew and developed. Great success was achieved in developing transport, roads and communications. Until Soviet rule was established, Tajikistan had not a single kilometre of railway outside Leninabad *oblast'*. In 1929 the first train reached Dushanbe station. A year later the railway was extended to Yangi-Bazar station (Orjonikidzeabad – now Vakhdat). By 1936 the overall length of the broad-gauge railway network in Tajikistan was 253 km. Construction of narrow-gauge railways for internal use also developed: by 1941 the overall length of the narrow-gauge railway network was 314 km.²²

Prior to 1926 Tajikistan, except in its northern districts, had no transport roads other than pack-animal tracks. By the start of 1928 it had 1,644 km of motor roads, and by 1933 the overall length was 4,004 km, of which 182 km were surfaced. In 1935 traffic opened on the Stalinabad–Ura-tepe road. In 1937 the building of the Pamir road was completed, with the help of 24,000 collective farm workers who executed a total volume of 5 million m³ of earthworks. By 1941 the network of republican and local motor roads was 8,203 km long. In 1929 only 29 goods vehicles were in use in the republic (there were no passenger cars). By the start of 1941 the republic already had thousands of vehicles which carried both goods and passengers. Large vehicle factories had sprung up and staff had

²² The broad-gauge (1.5 m as distinct from the standard 1.435 m) track was adopted by the Russian imperial railway system and later used for inter-Republic rail communication throughout the USSR. [*Trans.*]

been trained. Communications also grew at a rapid pace. By 1940 there were 259 communication enterprises and several thousand radio-relay points and inter-urban telephone and telegraph communications serving the needs of the population.

But this peaceful creative work by the people of Tajikistan – like that of the other peoples of the Soviet Union – was interrupted by the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War in 1941. And yet the republic's economic development did not stop. During the war 20 new enterprises and workshops came on line. Industry employed 42,400 blue- and white-collar workers and the volume of production rose by all indicators.²³

During this period the sown area increased by 16,400 ha. In view of the need for food at the front, the area sown to cereal crops was increased at the expense of cotton. More than 2.2 million *poods* (1 *pood* = 16.38 kg) of meat were handed over to the state, and 151 railway wagonloads of food products were sent off to help meet the needs of the front. More than 75 million roubles and 40,750 *poods* of grain were collected for the defence fund. More than 84 million roubles came in to build the 'Tajikistan Collective Farmer' tank column, 35,200,000 roubles to build the 'Soviet Tajikistan' squadron, and so on. During the war the republic's working people purchased state loan bonds to the tune of 584 million roubles and lottery tickets worth a total of 130 million roubles.²⁴

Although Tajikistan was far from the front line, the war caused its economy a tangible loss. The building of some facilities was curtailed, the area sown to cotton was reduced and its yield dropped, while some irrigation structures fell into disrepair. These tasks had to be resolved in a very short period. In the course of the five-year plan for the reconstruction of the economy (1945–50), all these tasks were resolved ahead of target. The level of industrial production exceeded the pre-war level by 1.5-fold (50 per cent). The area sown to cotton rose by 31 per cent and the gross yield 3.3-fold (230 per cent). Very good results were achieved in animal farming. In 1950, as compared with 1940, the yield of cereal crops had risen by 38 per cent and the gross harvest by 34 per cent.²⁵ All this led to a growth in the people's welfare. In 1947 the rationing system was ended. In 1948–50 prices for foodstuffs and industrial goods were reduced three times. Social security for the working people was improved.

But Tajikistan achieved its greatest economic development in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, around 200 modern enterprises and workshops were built and brought into service, including the Golovnaya hydroelectric station, new phases of the Dushanbe heat and power station, a cement and slate combine and a meat combine in Leninabad, an oil

²³ Sechkina, 1984, pp. 120–1.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 122.

²⁵ Sultanov and Akhmedov, 1984, p. 123.

extraction factory and a canning factory in Kurgan-tepe and many others. This is when construction of the Nurek hydro-power station, that giant of the power industry, the Vakhsh nitrogenous fertilizer factory, the Regar aluminium works and other such facilities was started. New industries – mechanical engineering and electrical engineering – were founded. From a strictly importing republic, Tajikistan started to become an exporting republic, with its industrial products being exported to more than 35 countries.

The material and technical infrastructure of agriculture strengthened considerably during those years. Electricity consumption increased more than 9-fold (800 per cent), from 69.5 million kWh in 1958 to 643.9 million kWh in 1965. From 1959 to 1970, 200,000 ha of irrigated land were brought into service.²⁶

The establishment in 1971–5 of the South Tajik Regional Production Complex, which in its scale and importance was an All-Union project,²⁷ was an important milestone in the republic's economic development. It had a radical influence on the infrastructure of the entire Central Asian region. In the 1970s and 1980s the complex, which included more than one third of Tajikistan's territory and a population of 2.6 million people, accounted for two-thirds of the republic's entire economic product. As part of the complex, 150 new industrial enterprises were built. Its kernel was the Nurek hydro-power station, the start-up of which increased electricity output several times over.

Despite all these successes, even by the start of the 1980s a clear trend towards stagnation had set in both in the USSR as a whole and in Tajikistan in particular. For instance, during the eleventh five-year-plan period (1981–5), 25 per cent of the basic assets remained uncommissioned, and this had a detrimental effect on output growth rates. Almost one enterprise in seven failed to fulfil its plan for output volume and product marketing. As a result, labour productivity growth rates fell by two-thirds in comparison with the eighth five-year plan. Incremental national income was obtained only by increasing the workforce – i.e. without any element of intensification.²⁸

In the 1960s and 1970s much attention was paid to the development of agriculture. Gradually, the technical equipment of agricultural production was raised to the same level as industry. Collective and state farms were essentially turned into agro-enterprises with advanced industrial standards and production skills. A good deal of attention was given to bringing new lands into use through mechanical irrigation. In 1970, 109,200 ha of farmland were irrigated in this way, whereas 218,700 ha were mechanically irrigated in 1985. The supply of electricity to rural areas was increased at a rapid pace. This was helped

²⁶ Marsakov, 1984, p. 127.

²⁷ In other words, a project recognized by the Soviet authorities as important to the whole of the USSR rather than just to Tajikistan or Central Asia. [*Trans.*]

²⁸ Khaidarov, n.d., pp. 288–9.

by increased electricity production, which rose by 12 billion kWh between 1965 and 1980.²⁹ By the late 1980s more than 33,000 tractors, over 4,000 cotton-harvesters and many other machines were employed in Tajikistan's agriculture.

As well as successes there were shortcomings, however. They appeared in the failure to secure a rapid increase of capacity through technical re-equipment of enterprises, in irrational use of equipment, in the long replacement cycle of the engineering machine-tool stock, in the inefficient use of transport rolling stock and in the poor quality of the training given to skilled workers.

These inadequacies were to be seen to a greater degree in the agrarian sector, where production was mainly developed extensively – i.e. chiefly by bringing new lands into use and establishing new agricultural enterprises. Many upland farms remained unprofitable. But all these inadequacies appeared insignificant against the background of the grandiose achievements discussed above: they were not taken into account and were not dealt with. As a result, they piled up and were the cause of stagnation in all spheres of the Soviet system. The economy was chiefly developed extensively, and a fall in labour productivity was to be seen. National income fell year on year (for instance, while it rose 50 per cent in the 1960s, in the first half of the 1970s it rose 17 per cent, in the second half of the 1970s it rose 5 per cent, and in 1981–5 it rose 3 per cent), lagging behind population growth.

These trends were seen in the economic development of all republics in the USSR. In Tajikistan, for example, gross social product in 1988–9 stood at 98.9 per cent, national income at 97 per cent, agricultural output at 89 per cent, labour productivity at 94.9 per cent, etc.³⁰ This is also noticeable in the average yearly growth rates for the basic socio-economic development indicators of the Tajik SSR. For instance, while the growth rate of the gross social product was 5 per cent in 1976–80 and 3.1 per cent in 1981–5, it was only 2.5 per cent in 1986–9. A fall in indicator level could also be seen in produced national income, in the basic production assets of all sectors of the economy, in industrial and agricultural output, in real per capita income, etc.³¹ The mere fact that by the end of the 1980s almost 40 million of the USSR's population were below the poverty line speaks volumes not just about the ineffectiveness of perestroika (restructuring), but also about a profound crisis within the Soviet system.

²⁹ Khaidarov, [n.d.](#), pp. 290–1.

³⁰ *Narodnoe khozyaystvo Tajikskoy SSR v 1989 g.*, 1991, p. 6.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

Culture and science

During Soviet rule, Tajikistan took energetic steps to lay the foundations of socialist culture. The republic started with the creation of a new education system and the eradication of illiteracy. As a result of setting up the new type of schools, by 1926 the population of the Tajik SSR had achieved a 20 per cent literacy rate. In the 1927/8 school year, 328 primary schools, 4 seven-year schools, 3 secondary schools and 9 boarding schools were already operating in the republic, with 14,000 children studying there. There was also an extensive network of adult literacy schools. In the 1928/9 school year, there were 318 literacy schools, teaching 9,400 people, including 100 women. During the 1930s an extensive network of schools and higher education establishments was set up, and secondary and higher teacher education was also developed. In 1940 teaching staff were trained at 2 teacher-training institutes, 3 teacher institutes and 11 teacher-training colleges. The opening of the Tajik State University in 1948 and the development of a network of higher education establishments marked a significant development in the country's cultural life. From the 1960s to the 1980s, as many as 60,000 students were educated at the country's dozens of modern higher education establishments.

From the 1920s to the 1980s, a solid foundation was laid in Tajikistan for the establishment and development of science. The forebear of the republic's scientific establishments was considered to be the Society for the Study of Tajikistan and the Iranian Ethnic Groups outside its Borders (1925). A decisive role in its establishment was played by the famous Russian orientalists V. V. Bartol'd, A. A. Semyonov, M. S. Andreev, N. L. Korzhenevsky, et al. Such world-famous academics as A. E. Fersman, D. I. Shcherbakov, V. M. Vernadsky, E. N. Pavlovsky, B. N. Nasledov, B. A. Fedchenko, N. P. Gorbunov and others, sent to Tajikistan at the initiative of the USSR Academy of Sciences, not only did much work in their own specialist research fields but went out of their way to attract young local nationals into scientific careers. The establishment in March 1932 of the Tajik base of the USSR Academy of Sciences (led by Academician S. F. Oldenburg) was a hugely important event in the history of science in the republic. It brought together the 14 established research establishments into a single centre. The Tajik base made an inestimable contribution to the establishment and further development of science and shaped its priority lines of orientation.

In 1934 a history, language and literature section was set up in the Tajik base of the USSR Academy of Sciences and in 1941, when the base was reorganized as the Tajik branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the section became the Institute of History, Language and Literature. In 1937 a geology section was organized, which in 1941 became the

Geology Institute. In 1951 the Tajik branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences became the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik SSR. From the 1950s to the 1980s, its 20 institutes carried out research into contemporary problems of physics, mathematics, technology, chemistry, geology, biology, medicine, philosophy, economics, sociology, the humanities and philology. Together with academic science, Soviet Tajikistan gave particular encouragement to the development of science in higher education institutes and agencies. Extensive agricultural research was carried out by the Tajik Agricultural Academy.

As science and scientific establishments grew in Tajikistan, so did a pleiad of highly qualified academics. By the mid-1980s, 5,000 candidates and doctors of science in a range of specialist subjects were at work in the country's research establishments.

The birth and development of Tajik Soviet literature, of which Sadriddin Aini was the originator, must be viewed as a major cultural achievement. Aini produced the first works in genres such as the short story and the novel, which were new to Tajik literature. His *Dokhunda*, *Slaves* and *Reminiscences* played a decisive role in establishing the genre in Tajik literature. Tajik socialist realism was well developed in the works of A. Lahuti, Jalal Ikromi, Hakim Karim, Rahim Jalil, Tursunzoda, Mirshakar, Ulughzoda, Foteh Niyozzi and others. The works of all these authors and poets have great artistic merit but suffer from a heavy dose of 'political commitment'. A new phase in the development of Tajik Soviet literature is linked with the names of Mu'min Qana'at, Loiqli Sherali, Gulruksor and others who entered the literary scene in the 1960s. A particular feature of their creative works is a marked retreat from political commitment.

As well as science and literature, extensive encouragement was given in Soviet Tajikistan to architecture, art, theatre, radio and television broadcasting, the press, health care, physical culture and sport.

Independence

Despite the fact that the Soviet Republics were considered as sovereign and independent within the USSR, they nonetheless acquired genuine independence only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Tajikistan declared independence on 9 September 1991 and formed the Republic of Tajikistan. That independence was, however, threatened by the civil war of 1992–7, as a result of which the country found itself on the brink of a national catastrophe – the loss of its statehood and the complete ruin of its economy and its political and cultural life. Peace and national accord negotiations between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik opposition started in 1993 and ended on 27 June 1997 with the signing of a joint protocol on the principles for establishing peace in Tajikistan. The long-awaited

peace was achieved thanks to the efforts of Tajikistan's government, the goodwill of the opposition and the support of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and friendly countries. These authoritative organizations recommended the inter-Tajik peace-building experience as a model for solving similar conflicts in other countries.

The 1992–7 civil war caused major damage to Tajikistan's economy. The country slid back on all economic indicators to the level of the 1950s, as the result of a massive flight of specialists from the economy and the stoppage of factories, plants and other industrial and agricultural enterprises. The people's welfare also fell sharply: up to 85 per cent of the population were below the poverty line, which indicates the profound economic and social crisis that had gripped Tajikistan. The crisis in the economy and society inevitably had a negative influence on the state of science, education, the arts, health care, physical culture and sport. The funding of these activities fell sharply, their staffing and equipment were reduced and their established way of functioning was destroyed. The solution was thought to be not only to end the civil war as soon as possible, but also to transform radically the entire previous social system. Consequently, especially after national peace had been achieved, a policy was adopted of building up civil society. As part of that strategic policy, state property was privatized on both the small and the large scale, and the systems of education, science and health care were reorganized in line with international standards. All these measures were designed to take Tajikistan out of its systemic crisis and to ensure its stable and durable development within the next decade.

13

TURKMENISTAN*

*M. Annanepesov and M. Moshev***Contents**

Political developments (1850–60)	301
The Russian conquest	307
The Soviet era	310

In the mid-nineteenth century, as in earlier times, Turkmenistan was economically and politically fragmented as it lacked statehood. The territory was divided up into several parts: the south-western Turkmens (as now) belonged to Iran, the northern to the Khiva khanate, the eastern to the Bukhara emirate and the south-eastern (as now) to Afghanistan. Only the southern Turkmens of Merv, Tejen, Akhal, Teke and Prikaspiya retained relative independence and comprised what was known as Free Turkmenia (for the previous history of the Turkmens, see Volume V of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*). Nonetheless, for centuries all these Turkmens had traded and communicated more or less freely among themselves, for there had never been strictly defined, let alone guarded, borders. However, the rulers of the neighbouring states – Khiva, Bukhara and Iran – adopted a ‘divide and rule’ policy and attempted to artificially promote alienation and even hostility among the Turkmens by setting them against each other.¹

Even in this unfavourable situation, the mass of the population maintained their economic activities through their ordinary daily labour and met their basic needs: they built dams and main irrigation canals; they expanded the area of irrigated lands; they opened up new pastures by building deep and super-deep wells in the Kara Kum; and using time-honoured selection methods, they raised special breeds of racehorses (Bedev), camels

* See Maps 1 and 2.

¹ *Istoriya Turkmenskoy SSR*, 1957, Vol. 1, Part 2, pp. 65–92.



FIG. 1. Akhal-Teke horses. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

(Arvana) and large white-wool (Saraja) and Karakul sheep (Fig. 1 and 2). In agriculture they had long cultivated Turkmen types of white (winter) and hard red (spring) wheat and quick-, average- and late-maturing (winter) melons (Zaamcha, Chalmesek, Gurbek, Vakharman, Gulyabi, Payandeki, Karry Gyz). Turkmen in all the irrigated oases kept gardens and cultivated excellent delicate winter and sultana grapes (Ladyfinger, Bidana, Khalili, Monty, red and pink Taifi) and a variety of fruit-trees (apricot, peach, fig, cherry-plum, plum, quince, pomegranate).²

In a desert-steppe zone with a hot climate, artificial irrigation is of the utmost importance for agriculture (Fig. 3). Turkmenistan's cultivated oases were covered by a dense and complex irrigation network whose hundreds and thousands of branches supplied irrigation water to the sown fields. In addition to ground irrigation, the Turkmen in the foothills zone had long since built underground galleries (*kārezs*) to supply the fields with spring water. Dozens of these complex and very labour-intensive systems irrigated the fields of southern Turkmenistan's.³ This ancient system of irrigation was widely employed in all the countries of Central Asia. In broken terrain, where the topography did not permit gravity-aided irrigation, the population made use of water pumps (*chigirs*), as well as primitive arrangements (*depmenovas*) for watering small plots of land. In those regions where oil-seed crops

² Alikhanov-Avaskiy, 1883, pp. 36–7; Annanepesov, 1972, pp. 109–11.

³ Bartol'd, 1965, pp. 115, 121–84; Zhukovskiy, 1894, p. 86.



FIG. 2. Camels in the Kara Kum desert. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)



FIG. 3. Kara Kum desert near the Amu Darya river. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

(sesame and *zygr*) were raised, they used oil-presses (*juwāzs*). The *chigirs* and *juwāzs* were powered by livestock (camels and horses).⁴

⁴ *Ocherk doliny Amu-Dar'i ...*, 1880, p. 14; Kostenko, 1880, Vol. 3, pp. 12–13.

In the nineteenth century, artisanal production was one of the economy's most important branches and was closely linked to agriculture, livestock raising and other forms of productive activity. In addition to hand weaving, the most ancient type of artisanal production, the Turkmens noticeably increased their production of jewellery, wooden yurts, horse harnesses, household utensils, decorative embroidery and farm implements. Among the craft workers there were quite a few silversmiths, blacksmiths, carpenters, gunsmiths, potters, tanner-shoemakers, and soap-makers, to say nothing of carpet-makers. All of this speaks to the exceptional level of specialization in artisanal production.

European travellers had always held the art of the Turkmen female carpetmakers in high esteem. Marco Polo characterized Turkmen carpets as the most 'refined and handsome in the world'. After the Venetian, many other authors considered Turkmen carpets 'the best Turanian work'. They remarked on the 'instinctive taste' of the Turkmen women in manufacturing woollen goods, commenting that they 'know how to use wool in a thousand ways'.⁵ The nation's ancient heritage travelled through the ages virtually unsullied in Turkmen carpets (Fig. 4). Decorative weaving was powerfully influenced by the wealth of creative thought and refined taste of the nation's expert weavers, women who passed their art on from generation to generation. In their carpetmaking, they used the most varied patterns of the Turkmen tribes: Teke, Yomut, Salor, Ersari, Saryk and other designs. 'Each family has its own drawing,' wrote the French artist Couliboeuf de Blocqueville, 'which is handed down from generation to generation, from mother to daughter.'⁶ The carpets served many generations, which is why the Turkmens manufactured them so painstakingly and treated them so carefully (see Chapter 25 below). In the words of the famous ethnographer V. G. Moshkova:

How could the Turkmens not create one of the most beautiful carpets in the world when their first steps in childhood begin on children's rugs and in a *sallanchak* (woven hanging cradle) and the dead are mourned and borne away on their final journey to the cemetery in a funerary carpet – an *ayatlyk*?⁷

The Turkmens also produced many flat woven patterned carpets, known as *palas*, which were laid out over a felt mat. After Russia conquered Turkmenistan in the late nineteenth century:

there was considerable excitement generated over Teke carpets: the victors fell on such 'exotica' and began acquiring carpets by the hundreds ... as a tribute in kind from conquered to conqueror.⁸

⁵ Couliboeuf de Blocqueville, 1867, p. 27; Bode, 1856, Vol. 8, p. 94.

⁶ Couliboeuf de Blocqueville, 1867, p. 27.

⁷ Moshkova, 1946, p. 146.

⁸ Batser, 1929, pp. 11–13.



FIG. 4. Turkmen carpet. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

Turkmenistan had also long been famed for its felt wares, which were used to decorate the home, for the outer covering of yurts, for horsecloths and so on. Nineteenth-century authors comment on the high level of development in the production of large felt mats in every corner of Turkmenistan, as well as their excellent quality. Felt wares could be patterned, white, grey or black, depending on their purpose. Patterned felt mats were laid on the floor of the home (Fig. 5). Turkmen felt mats were highly esteemed in the markets of Merv, Khiva, Herat, Mashhad and Astarabad.⁹

Political developments (1850–60)

In the mid-nineteenth century, Khiva and Iran stepped up their military expansion with respect to the southern self-governing Turkmens. Nearly every year, the Khiva khans mounted pillaging campaigns against the Turkmens of Merv, Akhal, Teke and Tejen. The rulers of Iran's border provinces mounted campaigns against the Turkmens of Atrek, Gorgan, Akhal, Sarakhs and Merv. In this regard, Naser al-Din Shah (1848–96) and Khiva's Madamin (Muhammad Amin) Khan stand out in particular. Between 1847 and 1855, Madamin mounted seven campaigns against the Turkmens of Merv, Sarakhs, Tejen and Akhal. His troops included not only Uzbeks but also Khiva Turkmens (Yomuts, Chaudurs, Goklens, Yemrels, Qaradashlis, Al-elis, Atas, etc.), whose cavalry detachments could total as many as 10,000 vassals. They engaged in plundering and livestock rustling,

⁹ Bode, 1856, pp. 94–6.



FIG. 5. Turkmen felt carpet. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

committed fields of ripe wheat to the flames, and trampled melons and gourds. For example, in 1852 they killed Saryk herders in Merv and drove off 40,000 camels and 80,000 sheep.¹⁰ The shah's troops rustled 60,000 head of cattle, 10,000 mares, 20,000 camels and hundreds of thousands of sheep from the Atrek-Gorgan Turkmen.¹¹ The escalation of tyranny and pillaging naturally evoked a reaction from the Turkmen, who began offering organized resistance and who delivered a spirited rebuff to the military actions of neighbouring states.

At the turn of 1854–5, Madamin Khan headed out on his seventh campaign against the Turkmen of Merv and Sarakhs, but this was to be his last campaign. Previously, he had dealt harshly with one of his prominent military leaders, Amanniyaz Sardar, the marshal of the Yomut cavalry, because he and his detachment had refused to join the campaign against their southern con-geners and he had taken it upon himself to return to Khiva from Tejen. The khan ordered Amanniyaz Sardar tied up and thrown from a tall tower. Then, as he lay in terminal convulsions, he was finished off with sticks. This incident was noted by the

¹⁰ *MITT*, 1938, pp. 531–41.

¹¹ *Russko-Turkmenskiye otnosheniya v XVIII–XIX vv ...*, 1963, p. 321.

interpreter for the Turkistan governor-general, who wrote that the Turkmens had vied with Khiva to kill Amanniyaz Sardar:

who enjoyed great respect and popularity among the Turkmens. He was killed in the most ignominious fashion: thrown from the minaret of the mosque of Hazrati Palvan in Khiva.¹²

Madamin's action soured relations with the Yomuts – his military bulwark – for a long time to come.

In early March 1855, the troops of Madamin Khan, consisting of Khiva Turkmens, Uzbeks and Karakalpaks, approached the Teke citadel in Sarakhs and began to bombard it. Inside the well-fortified citadel, which had two gates, the people of Teke, led by their recently elected, energetic khan, Koushut, assembled not only their fighters but their women and children as well. The citadel was fired upon every day. Koushut Khan sent his truce envoys to Madamin, offering to pay all taxes and tribute, but Madamin refused to negotiate. Nonetheless, Koushut Khan was able to meet the Mekhter, face to face but after listening to the cursed the vizier, turned his horse around and returned to the citadel.¹³ After this, the citadel's and southern gates and for five hours fought on the open battlefield. Their cavalry and infantry detachments fought to the death.

In this dangerous situation, Koushut Khan, informed of the Khiva Yomuts' hostility towards Madamin over the execution of Amanniyaz Sardar, took one final diplomatic step. He sent a letter to the detachment of Khiva Yomuts:

Brother and fellow Yomuts, we hope that you will not allow our women and children to be trampled and will defend their honour. We will deal with the khan of Khiva ourselves.

The cavalry detachment of Yomut fighters reacted quickly to the Teke request and deserted the battlefield. The Yemrels and other Turkmen detachments of the Khiva troops followed. Thus Madamin watched the Turkmens among the Khiva fighters quit the battlefield, detachment after detachment, thereby determining the battle's outcome. On 19 March the citadel's defenders moved over to a decisive offensive and with their lightning strikes routed the Khiva troops. Before Madamin (who was observing the battle from his richly adorned horse) knew what was happening, he was knocked off his mount by the first blow of a sabre and his head was then cut off, as were the heads of 32 of his commanders and entourage. The heads were sent to Tehran and their bodies carried to Khiva. The defenders collected trophies from the battle at Sarakhs: 19 cannon, 24 falconets, many rifles and other weapons, and 4 of the khan's battle standards. On 19 March alone, about 3,000 Khiva

¹² Ibragimov, 1874, No. 9, p. 136.

¹³ *MITT*, 1938, p. 543.

men fell.¹⁴ Koushut Khan and his comrades-in-arms demonstrated personal heroism and military talent and exercised sage diplomacy.

The rout of the Khiva forces and the death of Madamin outside Sarakhs led to a drastic deterioration in relations between the Khiva Turkmens and the khanate, to say nothing of a weakening of the khanate and dynastic disputes among its elite. The day after the débâcle, right outside Sarakhs (20 March 1855), ‘Abdullah was declared khan; upon his return to Khiva, he mounted a punitive expedition against the Yomuts, who, of course, had guessed what awaited them at home and had prepared for the worst. At a battle in late August 1855 (near Ilanly), Turkmen fighters joined them in fighting against the Khiva troops, ‘letting their sabres and rifles have their way. Words cannot convey what went on here.’¹⁵ The Khiva troops were routed, ‘Abdullah Khan was killed, together with many of his commanders, and serious injury was inflicted on the future khan, Kutlumurad.

This marked the beginning of the long rebellion by the Khiva Turkmens against the tyranny of the Khiva authorities, a rebellion that lasted until 1867. The rebellion was led by the brother of Amanniyaz Sardar, Atamurad Khan. In February 1856 the Yomut elders, led by one of Kutlumurad Khan’s relatives, hatched a plot and arrived in Khiva in order to ‘congratulate’ him on his ascension as khan. During the ceremony, as his relative embraced him, the khan was murdered.¹⁶ And so, in less than a year, the Turkmens became responsible for the deaths of three Khiva khans, and their rebellion reached its culmination.

Sayyid Muhammad Rahim Khan, the next khan (1856–65), did everything he could to disrupt the rebels’ ranks and to set them against each other. He shut off their canals and irrigation channels and gradually moved on to taking cruel retribution against them. In 1863 the Hungarian scholar Arminius Vámbéry was witness to the rebels’ execution:

I found myself in the middle of 300 captive Chaudur soldiers clothed in rags; they were in such an agony of terror over their imminent fate and the several days of starvation they had endured that they looked like dead men. They were divided up into two groups: the young, under 40 years old, were shackled together with iron neck-bands in groups of 10–15 and taken away to be sold into slavery; and the grey hairs and leaders awaited execution . . . I saw eight old men lie down on their backs at the executioner’s signal. Out their eyes one by one, kneeling on the unfortunate men’s chests to do this; after each operation he wiped his blood-drenched knife on the unfortunate blind man’s beard . . . After each terrible act was complete, the victim was freed and began pulling himself along by his arms, feeling the ground with his

¹⁴ *MITT*, 1938, pp. 258–66, 542–5; Bayani, n.d., pp. 352a–b; Bregel, 1960, pp. 197–200; Gulyamov, 1960, p. 227.

¹⁵ *MITT*, 1938, pp. 546–51.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 560.

feet. Many immediately fell upon one another, collided, and again fell to the ground, emitting quiet moans, the memory of which will make me shudder for the rest of my life.¹⁷

Many were taken away to the block or the gallows, and the next morning Vámbéry saw about 100 horsemen driving captive children and women tied to the tail or saddle of horses and carrying huge sacks of enemy heads – testimony to their heroic feats:

They untied the sacks, grabbed them by the two lower corners as if they were shaking out potatoes, and rolled out the bearded and unbearded heads in front of a clerk, who tallied them and kicked them aside, where they soon formed a huge stack of several hundred heads.¹⁸

Such were the brutal ways of the time.

The rebels continued to resist for a long time; they would escape into the sands from persecution and then return once more. But their ranks thinned and their strength was sapped. In late 1867 Atamurad Khan took the remainder of his detachments and went to his congeners in Krasnovodsk and Cheleken. He wrote to the Russian authorities asking them to accept the Khiva (northern) Turkmens as citizens of Russia and reported that in his fighting with the Khiva khans he had lost five of his brothers and, ultimately, everything. He was a wise man and had come to the unsettling conclusion that the battle was lost and pointless and that, in general, a ruler was not to be had from among the Turkmens themselves any more than an oven could be built from a tree.¹⁹

In the mid-nineteenth century, the battle against expansion by neighbouring states and for independence was waged in southern Turkmenistan as well. At that time in Iran, Khiva and Bukhara, Turkmens were commonly depicted as robbers, highwaymen and cut-throats. Of course, raiding did have a place in Turkmen history, but it was essentially a response to actions by neighbouring states and was scarcely the principal occupation of a people who for the most part were engaged in agriculture, livestock raising, crafts and trade. Who the real cut-throats were is attested to by the excerpts from Vámbéry quoted above.

One example of neighbouring states trying to expand in the direction of the Turkmens is the campaign by the Kurdish ruler Bojnurd in 1858. On the orders of Naser al-Din Shah, he mounted a campaign against the Goklens and fired his cannon on their citadel at Karakala. The Goklens turned for help to their fellow Tekes of Akhal and the Yomuts of Atrek and Gorgan, who rushed to their aid, led by Nurberdy Khan and Mahmud Ishan. The combined forces of the Goklens, led by Durdy Khan, together with the Tekes and Yomuts, routed Jafar Quli Khan's detachment and seized his cannon, after which they marked their victory together and dispersed to their homes.²⁰

¹⁷ Vámbéry, 1865, pp. 72–3.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁹ *Russko-Turkmenskiye otnosheniya v XVIII–XIX vv . . .*, 1963, pp. 522–30.

²⁰ Kazi, 1992, pp. 40–64.

The Persian commanders' military reputation was even more soundly undermined after the Merv Turkmens routed Persian troops in 1860. The most reliable information about this battle comes from participants in the campaign – Couliboeuf de Blocqueville, Sayyid Muhammed 'Ali al-Husseini and the Turkmen poet Abdusetdar Kazi.²¹ According to al-Husseini, the troops numbered 21,000 men, and General N. I. Grodekov reports 13,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 33 artillery pieces.²² The troops were commanded by the governor of Khurasan, Hamze Mirza, and his aide, Mirza Mamed. The detachment was unwieldy; it was trailed by a great many carts and pack animals (camels, horses, oxen, mules) and a herd of goats and sheep, all of which advanced in the greatest confusion. When al-Husseini asked Hamze Mirza about the absence of order, he replied: 'I've never seen such disorderly troops either'.

It took the detachment three months to travel from Mashhad through Sarakhs to Merv. On 6 July 1860 it crossed the border to Merv and, on 19 July, triumphantly, to music, entered the citadel, which subsequently, after the detachment's rout, was given the name *porsukala* ('stinking citadel'). Mean-while, the Turkmens led by Koushut Khan managed to occupy commanding positions, flooded the entire surrounding area and dismantled the bridges. Following familiar paths and moving through the rushes, they 'extended their impudence to the point of beheading sleeping guards', setting up ambushes, stealing rifles and driving off livestock. Infectious diseases broke out among the troops, so they did not leave camp for the Teke fortification of Kosha-senger until 10 September.²³

Koushut Khan attempted to hold talks with Hamze Mirza, who kept delaying and vacillating. Decisive battles took place in late September, when the Qajars fired 800 rounds every day. The daily battles on the open field lasted for 4 or 5 hours and continued for 18 days. The Turkmens made daring forays, delivered surprise blows to the flanks and captured cannon and foragers: 'This feat by the Turkmens completely unnerved the Persian troops and reduced them to total despair.' On the night of 3 October, the Persians set out in two columns to go home and at four o'clock in the morning:

were suddenly subjected to such an energetic assault by the Turkmens that after the battle, which lasted less than a quarter of an hour, the troops streamed away in confusion to join the lead column. At the same time, the convoy ... was ambushed by the Turkmens and taken captive.

Among those captured was Couliboeuf de Blocqueville. The Persian troops:

²¹ Couliboeuf de Blocqueville, 1867; al-Husseini, 1990; Kazi, 1992.

²² Grodekov, 1883, p. 40.

²³ Couliboeuf de Blocqueville, 1867, p. 18.

suffered the gravest losses ... the dead and wounded lay all around, in different places, and the ditches were filled with pack animals; in the distance you could see the Turkmens leading away our entire wagon train.

Prisoners were taken by the thousands; even the women drove them to their villages, shackled them all together or in pairs, fed them some meagre sustenance²⁴ and then drove them in packs to the slave markets of Bukhara and Khiva, 'so that all the bazaars of the Muslim countries were overflowing with prisoners and slaves'²⁵ and prices for them fell sharply. The Turkmens brought back many trophies, including 32 cannon. Hamze Mirza and Mirza Mamed survived and managed to avoid a bitter fate 'only by paying a ransom to Persia to redeem themselves for everything'.²⁶ So ended these ill-starred events of 1860, which went down in the nation's memory as the 'Qajar war'.

The Russian conquest

The 1870s and 1880s were marked by even more tragic events in the history of the Turkmen people in connection with Russia's conquest of Central Asia. The Russians themselves termed tsarism's policy in the east aggressive and predatory and branded it a disgrace; there is a rich historiography on this subject that details the essence of Russia's crude and insolent policy.²⁷ In the Soviet era, works appeared that advanced the tendentious notion that Russia's conquest of Central Asia, and even the voluntary incorporation of Turkmenistan, were progressive developments, a notion that was quickly dispelled.²⁸ Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia had been trying to transform the Caspian Sea into its own internal sea and had sent one military expedition there after another. In 1869 it began the conquest of Turkmenistan in earnest by disembarking a landing party at Krasnovodsk. The conquest took 16 years and ended in 1885 in a battle with the Afghans on the banks of the Murghab. During this period, the Turkmens offered the Russians stubborn resistance, which led to the *gazavat* (holy war against the non-Muslims) tragedy in the north (1873) and the siege of Geok-tepe (1881) in the south of Turkmenistan.

After conquering the Khiva khanate, the troop commander General K. P. von Kaufman announced to the khan that the Turkmens had grown accustomed to playing the role of praetorians and Janissaries, they had elevated khans and laid them low, and they had dealt

²⁴ Couliboef de Blocqueville, 1867, pp. 19–22.

²⁵ *MITT*, 1938, pp. 601–4.

²⁶ Couliboef de Blocqueville, 1867, p. 19. Blocqueville's abductors received a ransom of 1,867 *tumans*, and in late 1861 he was freed and left for Tehran.

²⁷ Grodekov, 1883; Kuropatkin, 1899; Terent'ev, 1906; Alikhanov-Avarskiy, 1883; MacGahan, 1875; O'Donovan, 1883; Maksheev, 1890.

²⁸ Annanepesov, 1989, pp. 70–86.

with the khanate as if they were its real masters. In view of this, he had decided 'to impose a final solution of the Turkmen question in the khanate which had been bothering him greatly, either by subduing the Turkmens or by utterly annihilating them'.²⁹

The sole correspondent from an American newspaper, *The New York Herald*, Januarius A. MacGahan, who was a witness to the events, concluded:

The Turkmens continued to do battle. Had all the other Khiva peoples shown the same kind of courage and persistence as the Turkmens, the campaign's results would have been quite different.

However, General Golovachev's punitive detachment wiped out the Khiva Turkmens and set fire to their homes. MacGahan witnessed the savage spectacle of retribution against the Turkmens and their wives and children and describes it all in the chapter of his book entitled 'Carnage', where he writes: 'This was a war the likes of which I have never seen and is rarely to be seen in our day and age.' Terent'ev also illuminates these events in detail.³⁰ The Khiva khan congratulated von Kaufman on the 'Yomuts' defeat'.

The southern Turkmens' turn came in 1879. After the landing party disembarked at Krasnovodsk, the Russian expeditionary corps gradually moved eastward, deep into Turkmenistan, conquering more and more new territory. In August 1879 this corps under General Lomakin failed in an attempt to storm the Akhal Tekes' main citadel – Geok-tepe. The citadel's defenders displayed heroism and steadfastness, and the Russian troops were forced to retreat. After this, the press raised a chauvinistic furore about the honour of Russian arms and preparations began immediately for a second expedition, whose command was assigned to General M. D. Skobelev. Skobelev took literally everything out of the arsenals, repeating: 'Everything comes in handy against savages. To defeat them we must amaze them; we must strike at their imagination.'

O'Donovan, who was in the area about this time, spread rumours about the fate the Russians were preparing for the Tekes: 'Slit the men's throats and give the women to the soldiers and the land to the treasury.'³¹ Assembled in readiness for the siege and storming of the citadel were 38 companies, 21 squadrons, 83 artillery pieces and rocket mounts, 30,000 shells, 150 *poods* of gunpowder (1 *pood* = 16.38 kg) to blow up the citadel walls, and more than 1 million cartridges. The weapons of the citadel's defenders were primarily cold steel, and they made only night-time forays. In response, the besiegers fired salvoes from 72 artillery pieces and the inside of the citadel was transformed into an inferno: 'You

²⁹ *Prisoedineniye Turkmenii k Rossii ...*, 1960, pp. 116–17.

³⁰ MacGahan, 1875, pp. 168, 257–94; Terent'ev, 1906, Vol. 2, pp. 273–8.

³¹ Terent'ev, 1906, Vol. 3, pp. 53, 148–50; Vol. 2, p. 140.

could see tents with as many as 15 corpses inside. They simply stopped burying the dead and piled them up.’³²

Skobelev achieved his goal and after the fall of the citadel he personally led the cavalry in pursuit of the citadel’s defenders over a distance of 15 *versts* (1 *verst* = approx. 1 km) until darkness fell, and the next day he arranged a parade for the victors. The Geok-tepe tragedy was the result of Skobelev’s ambition to ‘shine’ with another victory after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8. He said: ‘Power is in my hands. I will annihilate my enemies. For every drop of Russian blood, I will spill rivers of the enemy’s.’³³ This was the leitmotif of Skobelev’s campaigning.

The Geok-tepe tragedy virtually sealed the fate of the rest of southern Turkmenistan (see Chapter 1 above). On 12 January 1884 the Merv oasis was peacefully annexed. Then the Russo- Iranian and Russo-Afghan boundaries were established. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, the Turkmens, like other peoples, found themselves at the crossroads of the interests of large states and shared the fate of the so-called divided nations. The borders, drawn not along ethnic lines but along river valleys and the peaks of mountain ranges, were negotiated and signed in London by Britain and Russia in 1885.

Russia gradually gained control of the newly conquered lands and built a railway. Cities rose up with newly arrived populations. Russian settlements were created, cotton production was encouraged for the textile industry, oil deposits were brought into production, and a chauvinist colonial policy was implemented with respect to the ‘natives’, who during the First World War, in 1916, raised a rebellion against these structures which was brutally suppressed. This was a manifestation of the national liberation movement that gripped almost all of Russian Turkistan. The revolutions which took place in Russia in February and October 1917 were soon to shake the entire country all the way to its colonial periphery.

News of the ‘White Tsar’s’ overthrow spread quickly, even though the local authorities did their best to conceal the event from the population. The newspaper *Ashkhabad* wrote about the mood in the Turkmen countryside at the time:

The news of the old government’s overthrow spread quickly through all the villages ... the yurts are all full of memories and indignation at the police officers, district officials and elders.³⁴

The joys and hopes of the common people were quickly dashed, however. The Provisional Government refused to grant the Turkmens, or any of the other peoples of Central Asia, the right to self-determination and maintained their former, above-mentioned

³² Grodekov, 1883, Vol. 4, p. 7.

³³ Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 44.

³⁴ *Ashkhabad*, 28 March 1917.

territorial dissociation. As under tsarism, representatives of Turkmen workers were not given access to the organs of government.³⁵

The Provisional Government proved unequal to the basic tasks of democracy and nationhood³⁶ (peace, land, the struggle against economic collapse and famine, and the worker and national questions). It essentially pursued the same policy as had the tsarist autocracy. As a result, in the autumn of 1917, Russia was brought to the brink of national disaster: economic dislocation had reached unprecedented proportions, and rail transport was in total disarray.³⁷ All this became the domestic mainspring for the revolutionary process nationwide as well as on Russia's ethnic periphery.

The Soviet era

In October 1917 the Bolshevik revolution triumphed in Petrograd, and that victory reverberated in the distant land of Turkistan. By 15 November Soviet power had been established in Tashkent, and by early December in Ashgabat. Thus, Turkmenistan once again found itself under Russian-Soviet rule.

In November 1917, in order to stifle centrifugal tendencies among the peoples of the ethnic periphery, Soviet power approved two important documents: the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia; and the Soviet Government's appeal 'To All Muslim Workers of Russia and the East'. These documents proclaimed the main principles of the Soviet policy on nationalities: equality and sovereignty for the large and small nations of Russia; their right to self-determination; free development for the national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting Russia; and the abolition of any and all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions. In the words of Lenin:

Arrange your own national life freely and without hindrance. You have the right to do this. Know that your rights, like the rights of all the peoples of Russia, are protected by the full force of the revolution and its agencies.³⁸

This policy was laid out in the above-mentioned appeal of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). However, under the new conditions, the Turkmens encountered many difficulties and contradictions as they tried to establish a national life. In addition, the first steps in this direction had to be taken in the midst of the civil war that broke out in Transcaspian *oblast'* after the July coup (1918) and the overthrow of Soviet power. The alienation and hostility during the civil

³⁵ *Voyna v peskakh*, 1935, p. 51.

³⁶ Vert, 1992, p. 99.

³⁷ Rotkovskiy and Khodyakov, 1999, p. 26.

³⁸ Lenin, 1960, p. 358.

war years, when in a short time power passed from one set of hands to another and back, expressed itself in monstrous forms of mutual destruction. The civil war in Transcaspian *oblast'*, better known among the Turkmens as the war for power between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, lasted until early 1920 and ended in victory for the Bolsheviks and the reinstatement of Soviet power. At that time the so-called Sovietization of the region began in earnest everywhere.

During this period, the political and economic situation deteriorated sharply in the Khiva khanate, and inter-ethnic tensions increased. In the summer of 1918, the former tsarist military units that had been stationed in the khanate left Khiva. One especially noteworthy individual at this time was Junaid Khan, a leader of the Turkmen tribes who seized power in the khanate, although at first he left the Khiva khan on the throne (1918–20). However, Junaid Khan was unable to ease Uzbek–Turkmen relations, which were founded exclusively on the issue of water use. Nor was he able to preserve unity among all the Turkmen tribes. As a result, the economic crisis worsened, and it was not long before upheavals and armed actions began in the khanate. The rebels, among whom Kochmamed Khan, Qulamali, Shamyrat Bagshy and other Turkmen clan leaders distinguished themselves, appealed to Soviet power in Turkistan for assistance. This was a pretext for Red Army units to enter the khanate. With their assistance, the rebels deposed Khiva's khan, Sayyid 'Abdullah Khan, and the actual ruler, Junaid Khan, who retreated with the remnants of his troops deep into the Kara Kum.³⁹ Subsequently, for nearly 10 years, Junaid Khan waged a relentless struggle to restore his lost power. In 1928 he was defeated, left the republic and crossed into Afghanistan, where he died in 1937.

On 27–30 April 1920 the first All-Khwarazm *Qurultay* (Council) of People's Representatives proclaimed the creation of the Khwarazm People's Soviet Republic (Khwarazm NSR) and ratified its constitution. On 13 September of that same year an agreement was reached in Moscow between the RSFSR and the Khwarazm NSR according to which the Government of the Russian Republic recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Khwarazm and annulled all agreements foisted on the Khiva khanate by tsarist Russia.⁴⁰

Events followed more or less the same scenario in the Bukhara emirate. In the summer of 1920, an armed uprising against the emir began in the emirate's Turkmen areas under the leadership of 'Abdulkhakim Kulmuhamedov and Byashim Sardar. The rebels appealed to the Red Army units standing at the ready in Kagan and on 2 September 1920, through joint efforts by the Red Army units, the First Eastern Muslim Regiment and the rebels,

³⁹ Mukhammedberdyev, 1986, pp. 82, 84; Mukhammedberdyev and Orazgylyzhov, 1997, p. 31.

⁴⁰ Gafurova, Mukhammedberdyev, Nepesov et al., 1971, pp. 95–107, 139–75.

Bukhara's emir, Sayyid 'Alim Khan, was deposed. The commander of the Turkistan front, Mikhail Frunze, telegraphed Lenin: 'Bukhara has fallen. The Red Banner of world revolution is waving victoriously over the Registan.'⁴¹ On 6 October 1920, in Bukhara, the first All-Bukhara *Qurultay* proclaimed the formation of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (Bukhara NSR).⁴²

Between 1920 and 1924, relations between the Khwarazm and Bukhara NSRs and Russia were based on treaties, which gradually bound these republics to the RSFSR (as of 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR) and narrowed their sovereignty and spheres of competence. Thus, the revolutions and civil war ended up favouring the Bolsheviks. In Turkistan and its Transcaspian *oblast'*, in Khiva and Bukhara, and in their Turkmen regions, Soviet power was established with the direct participation of Red Army units. The full brunt of these tragic events was borne by the working population: what emerged was not at all what they had fought for. This immense, multiethnic country, having decisively shattered the fetters of the past, put on the new fetters of proletarian dictatorship.⁴³

In the latter half of 1920 and early 1921, a wave of anti-Soviet peasant actions and uprisings rolled over the entire country, the so-called Basmachi movement of Central Asia (Muslim insurgents opposing the introduction of Soviet rule in Central Asia), which presented a real threat. Under these conditions, Soviet power was forced to find a 'common language' with the peasantry, which comprised the overwhelming majority of the country's population at the time. This 'language' was the New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced by the Soviets in March 1921 to replace the policy of war communism, under which the entire harvest was confiscated.⁴⁴

With the transition to peaceful construction, the issue of nation-states for the peoples of Central Asia arose once again. Each people, each nation, wanted clarity and wanted to see prospects for their own development. Up until 1924, these peoples comprised three republics: the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) (1918) and the Khwarazm and Bukhara NSRs (1920). Yet none of the Central Asian peoples formed a solid majority in any of the republics, and they remained disconnected. For example, of all the Turkmens populating Central Asia, 43.2 per cent lived in the TASSR, 27 per cent in the Bukhara NSR and 29.8 per cent in the Khwarazm NSR.⁴⁵

Certain leading figures and segments of the national intelligentsia proposed the creation of a single Turkic state that would unite the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Soviet Union.

⁴¹ Frunze, 1941, pp. 328–9.

⁴² Ishanov, 1969, pp. 213, 215.

⁴³ *Istoriya Rossii*, 1994, pp. 51–2.

⁴⁴ *Istoriya Sovetskogo Turkmenistana*, 1970, p. 176.

⁴⁵ *Istoriya Turkmenskoy SSR*, 1957, p. 249.

Concerned about such a turn of events, especially in light of domestic and foreign circumstances, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided to take the initiative in delineating the ethnic groups in Central Asia and guiding this complex and difficult process into an acceptable channel. On 12 June 1924 the Politburo of the Central Committee approved a resolution 'On National Delineation among the Republics of Central Asia (Turkistan, Bukhara and Khwarazm)'.

On 27 October 1924, as a result of this policy, the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (Turkmen SSR) was created, combining previously separated segments of the Turkmen people in their own republic.⁴⁶ Of all the Turkmen residing at the time in the USSR, 94.2 per cent found themselves in the Turkmen SSR, making up 71.9 per cent of the republic's entire population⁴⁷ and giving the new republic its name. The necessary state institutions of administration were created, and the constitution and state symbols were approved.

N. Aytakow was selected as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkmen SSR, G. Atabayev was appointed as chairman of the government. For the first time in many centuries, the word 'Turkmenistan' was written on the political map of the world.

Of course, the Turkmen SSR's formation did not mean that the Turkmen people had actually acquired full independent national statehood. From the moment of its proclamation until 1991, the Turkmen Republic, as a part of the USSR, was nominally sovereign but in fact dependent on Moscow. This began to be most obvious in the mid-1930s. When fateful issues in the life of the republic were being decided, the rules of the game were always dictated by the Kremlin, and Turkmen SSR independence was gradually transformed into a fiction. Nonetheless, the formation of the Turkmen SSR was an important milestone in the centuries-long history of the Turkmen people: in the harsh struggle between socialism and capitalism, the Turkmen people could scarcely have preserved their national freedom and territorial integrity had they tried to exist outside the Soviet Union.

The New Economic Policy and the establishment of the Turkmen SSR contributed to the restoration of the economy and led to a revival of trade. The irrigation system, the foundation of the republic's economic life, which had been destroyed during the war years, was reinstated. Also constructed were some major irrigation systems, such as the Bossaga-Kerkinsky and Ersarinsky canals, and the old irrigation system was reshaped. All this significantly improved the supply of water for agriculture in the republic. In the 1920s land and water reforms were carried out to eliminate the remnants of colonialism in agrarian

⁴⁶ *Obrazovanie Turkmenskoy SSR ...*, 1966, pp. 79, 85, 89, 101–2.

⁴⁷ Central State Archives of Turkmenistan, fol. 616, inv. 1, file 1, ll, pp. 280–1; *Turkmenistan za 50 let*, 1975, p. 17; *Revolutsionniy vostok*, 1927, No. 5, pp. 115–16.

relations. Once the obstacles to an expansion of agriculture were removed, the reforms helped develop its main branches, especially cotton production, which was important for the entire Soviet Union.⁴⁸ The land and water reforms of the period 1925–7 would undoubtedly have proved beneficial had it not been for collectivization and the harsh administrative management of economic life that swiftly followed their introduction.⁴⁹ From the late 1920s, it became Soviet policy to transform the Turkmen SSR into one of the country's cotton-producing bases, which were meant to supply raw materials to the central, industrially developed regions of the USSR.

Forced collectivization began in early 1930; in Turkmenistan, this complex social issue was subordinated to the task of making the USSR independent of the cotton market in the shortest time possible. Collectivization was accelerated under the pretext that only large collective farms with a technical supply and maintenance base could meet this important goal. Violent methods sometimes led to tragic consequences, as was vividly manifested in the elimination of the *kulak-beys* (rich landowners) as a class. Many farms owned by peasants of average means, and even very poor farms, were affected as well as genuine *kulak-bey* farms. In 1930 and 1931 alone, more than 3,000 *kulak-bey* farms were eliminated, of which 1,900 farm households were sent to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the northern Caucasus and Ukraine.⁵⁰ All this aroused profound indignation among the *dehqāns* (peasants) and led to anti-*kolkhoz* (collective farm) demonstrations. A number of *dehqāns* were forced to emigrate to Afghanistan and Iran.

Collectivization encountered especially desperate resistance in the republic's nomadic and semi-nomadic regions. In the autumn of 1931, in the Kara Kum, an armed uprising broke out that was cruelly put down by regular units of the Red Army and GPU (State Political Administration) detachments. The property and livestock of the uprising's participants were confiscated. Forced communalization of livestock triggered a massive slaughter and an unprecedented sell-off. During the years of collectivization, more than one third of the horses, half of the cattle, two-thirds of the sheep and three-quarters of the camels were destroyed or driven beyond the republic's borders.⁵¹ Nonetheless, the resistance of the *dehqāns* and herders was broken, and the small *dehqān* farms were combined into large collective farms. In 1937 the republic had 1,711 collective farms, which accounted for 95.5 per cent of the *dehqān* farms.⁵²

⁴⁸ *Istoriya Sovetskogo Turkmenistana*, 1970, pp. 267–77.

⁴⁹ Yakovlev, 1993, p. 101.

⁵⁰ Mukhammedberdyev and Orazgylyzhov, 1997, p. 79.

⁵¹ Mukhammedberdyev and Orazgylyzhov, 1997, p. 84.

⁵² *Kollektivizatsiya sel'skogo khozyaystva Turkmenskoy SSR*, 1968, Vol. 2, p. 621.

The cotton-growing republics ensured the USSR's independence from the world cotton market. The technical equipment of the collective farms, especially the cotton-growing farms, improved markedly. However, all this cost the peasantry dearly. The cotton monoculture inflicted tremendous damage on the traditional branches of agriculture – grain production, vegetable and melon growing, and especially animal production – from which they had barely recovered by the late 1950s. The collective farms, which had been created in a fundamentally coercive manner, were unable to realize the benefits of collective labour due to their own illegitimacy. They depended wholly on the administrative-command system. Collectivization changed the psychology of the peasantry and its way of life. Torn from the land and divested of the means of production, the owner of the land was transformed into a day labourer. Herein lay the main reason for the backwardness of agriculture during the Soviet era.

During the years of the country's industrialization, industrial construction in the republic pursued Union-wide interests and focused primarily on the extractive branches. In the 1930s promising major oil deposits were discovered and the Nebitdag oil refinery went into operation, as did an experimental soda factory in Kara-Bogaz-Gol and a sulphur factory in Darwaz. Production of oil, sodium sulphate, mirabilite, ozokerite and salt increased. In 1938 a glass combine was opened in Ashgabat that supplied the other republics of Central Asia with its output as well.

In the course of industrial construction, many former *dehqāns* and herders took up industrial labour. Industry's development led to urbanization and the growth of cities and urban workers' settlements. The first detachments of the working class and the scientific and technical intelligentsia made their appearance. Overall, though, the republic's industry remained weak.

In the late 1920s and 1930s, the social and political situation in the country changed drastically and administrative-command methods of governance came to the fore. The cult of personality intensified, and this excessive personalization of power led to lawlessness, tyranny and the massive repression of innocent people. Following the Russian example, Turkmenistan began the search for its own 'enemies of the people'. Purposeful measures were taken to eradicate the people's historical memory and national spirit. In the 1930s the totalitarian regime in Turkmenistan took firm hold in all spheres of life, assuming monstrous forms and bringing with it the tragic events of forced collectivization and the political repressions of 1937 and 1938. In a far-fetched and fabricated case concerning an underground organization called Turkmen Azatlygy (Turkmen Freedom), a number of prominent party and state figures, such as G. Atabaev, N. Aitakov, A. Mukhammedov,

K. Sakhatmuradov, C. Vellekov, G. Sakhatov and D. Mamedov were arrested, and nearly all were executed.⁵³

Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR in 1941 was a mortal threat to the land of the Soviets. The soldiers of Turkmenistan and the other republics fought fierce battles against the fascist aggressors on every front of what is known as the Great Patriotic War. Their courage was highly appreciated: more than 70,000 Turkmen soldiers were awarded battle orders and medals for heroism and bravery, more than 100 soldiers were given the high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 15 soldiers became cavaliers of the Order of Glory 3rd Class.⁵⁴ During the war years, Turkmenistan was an important rear base for the country. The port of Krasnovodsk and the Ashgabat railway were in continuous operation. During the first stage of the war, they were of primary importance. The evacuated population and the equipment of the plants and factories from the front regions passed through on their way to Central Asia and Western Siberia, and military units and military shipments transited in the opposite direction. The development of industry's fuel branches was of special importance. The republic's agriculture underwent difficult trials, and the full brunt of agricultural work fell primarily on the shoulders of the women and children.

Despite the tremendous difficulties of wartime, the widespread hunger and the high mortality rate, rural labourers on the whole managed to cope with the challenges of the war years and did what they could to provision the army with food and industry with raw materials. The Turkmen people took an active part in creating various defence funds. Turkmen women donated 7.4 tonnes of gold and silver family jewellery to a defence fund,⁵⁵ and the republic's workers contributed 170 million roubles and more than 110 million in rouble bonds to the fund. Moreover, personal gifts weighing a total of 160 tonnes were sent to the front.⁵⁶ Timely assistance was rendered to injured soldiers and invalids by the evacuation hospitals located in the republic.⁵⁷

On the night of 5–6 October 1948 an earthquake of tremendous destructive force struck Ashgabat and the neighbouring regions, and tens of thousands of people perished. Immediately after the earthquake, work began to clean up its devastating consequences, work in which all the peoples of the USSR rendered great and diverse assistance. Despite the earthquake's terrible aftermath, by early 1950 the pre-war level of economic development

⁵³ Mukhammedberdyev and Orazgylyzhov, 1997, pp. 100–12.

⁵⁴ *Khatyra (Pamiat')*, 1999, pp. 26–7.

⁵⁵ *Materialy X s'ezda KP(b)T*, 1950, p. 8.

⁵⁶ *Istoriya Turkmenskoy SSR (1917–1957 gg.)*, 1957, p. 514.

⁵⁷ On 4 May 2000 President Niyazov issued a decree declaring 8 May of every year to be the Day of Memory for the nation's fallen compatriot heroes, and 9 May to be Victory Day, the national holiday of the Turkmen people. See *Neytral'niy Turkmenistan*, 5 May 2000.



FIG. 6. Kara Kum canal. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

had been regained. These successes were achieved thanks to the workers' enthusiasm in the wake of the great victory in the war. The standard of living of Soviet people, especially the collective-farm peasantry, remained low, however, although the bread rationing system was ended in 1947.⁵⁸

Definite advances were made in economic development in the 1950s and 1960s. More than 70 per cent of capital investments went into developing the oil sector. In 1970, 14.5 million tonnes of 'black gold' were produced. The natural gas industry developed. On 5 October 1967 Turkmen natural gas began flowing to Russia through the 2,750-km Central Asia–centre pipeline.⁵⁹ The Maiskoe–Ashgabat–Bezmeyn pipeline went into operation. From the 1950s through the 1970s, a unique and crucial hydraulic structure was built, the 1,100-km Kara Kum canal (Fig. 6).⁶⁰ All the republics of the USSR helped to build this artificial canal-river. Subsequently, by decree of Turkmenistan's President Niyazov, the canal was renamed Garagum Deryasy (Kara Kum river). Agriculture as a whole developed thanks to the expansion of sowed land, i.e. by extensive means.

The 1970s and 1980s have been called the period of stagnation, but in 1975 the republic produced 15.543 million tonnes of oil and 51.8 billion m³ of natural gas. The economy was far from being cost-effective, however. For the most part, the extractive industries were developed to the detriment of the processing industries. Agriculture specialized in

⁵⁸ *Istoriya Sovetskogo Turkmenistana*, 1970.

⁵⁹ *Turkmenistan za 50 let. Statisticheskiy sbornik*, 1974, p. 53.

⁶⁰ Mukhammedberdyev and Orazgylyzhov, 1997, p. 157.

the production of raw cotton alone.⁶¹ During all the time it was part of the USSR, the republic was never able to alter the economy's focus on the production of raw materials. President Niyazov has emphasized that:

in the Soviet era, enterprises that yielded real income were intentionally made a part of the Union-wide system. The profit from the sale of oil and natural gas and the output of chemical enterprises – in short, all the highly profitable areas of production – was concentrated in Moscow, and we were blamed for being dependent on the centre. Such was the double standard then.⁶²

Nearly all the wealth – both on and under the ground (oil, gas, cotton, wool, silk and other raw material resources) – was sent to satisfy the needs of the Soviet state.

Contradictory processes were at work in national culture as well. On the one hand, adult illiteracy was eliminated and general, specialized secondary and higher educational institutions were opened that served a steadily increasing proportion of young people. National cohorts of the creative, scientific and technical intelligentsia took shape. On the other hand, culture developed under strict control. Prominent representatives of the national intelligentsia were subjected to humiliating persecution and oppression, and many of them were killed during the repression of the 1930s and subsequent years. The public functions of the Turkmen language were gradually curtailed. Some young people who lived in the cities lost all knowledge of their native language and all official business was conducted in Russian.

The Soviet authorities demonstrated particular intolerance for Islam. Although freedom of conscience was proclaimed many times, the authorities persecuted members of the clergy and subjected them to all kinds of reprisals, up to and including physical elimination. Mosques and *madrasas* were closed, and national traditions and rituals were virtually forbidden. 'Our customs, language and faith were all on the brink of disappearance,' noted Turkmenbashi (Father of the Turkmens).⁶³

Administration was over-centralized in the USSR. Uniformity, i.e. the inculcation of 'the communist way of life', was the rule everywhere. The administrative-command system that dominated the country served the interests of the military-industrial complex and depleted the country. As a result, Soviet society fell into a grave crisis. The policy of reform known as perestroika was intended to solve these problems, but it failed, and what followed was the break-up of the USSR.

⁶¹ Durdyev, 1989, p. 65.

⁶² Turkmenbashi, 4 May 1999.

⁶³ *Turkmenskaya iskra*, 26 March 1989.

THE SAYAN - ALTAI MOUNTAIN REGION AND SOUTH- EASTERN SIBERIA*

D. Vasilev

Contents

Khakassia	319
Tuva	323
Altai	328
Buriatia	332

The Altai geographical region, which makes up the greater part of southern Siberia, comprises the Sayan-Altai mountain system, the basin of the Upper Yenisei, the Minusinsk basin, the Abakan steppe, Koibal steppe and Gorny Altai.¹ The native inhabitants of the Sayan-Altai are the Turkic-speaking Tuvans – the Sagai, Kacha, Koibal, Kyzyl and Beltir – and Altais – the Altai-kizhi, Kumanda, Chelkan, Tubalar, Teleut, Shor, Teles and Telengit. The eastern part of southern Siberia is inhabited by the Mongol-speaking Buriats, who settled in this territory at the end of the thirteenth century.

Khakassia

In keeping with the Russian empire's administrative reforms drawn up in 1822 by Mikhail Speransky,² East Siberian governorate-general included an independent Yenisei *guberniya* with Krasnoyarsk as its centre. It comprised five *okrugs* (districts), of which three,

* See Maps 1 and 2.

¹ The Gorny ('mountainous') Altai, administratively the southern part of the Altai region (*kray*) and now called the Altai Republic. [*Trans.*]

² Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky, governor-general of Siberia, 1819–22. [*Trans.*]

Minusinsk, Kansk and Achinsk, embraced the whole territory inhabited by the Khakass people. A document regulating the relationship between the authorities and the non-Russian population, the 'Statute on the Administration of the *Inorodtsy*', categorized the *inorodtsy* (native population, lit. 'people of different birth') as 'settled', 'nomadic' or 'roaming'.

The Khakass, who like many other peoples of tsarist Russia were called Tatars,³ were treated as 'nomadic', for whom the following structure of authority was established: the *ulus* (clan), headed by a *noyan* (prince), and the Steppe *duma* (assembly), which was the highest level of administrative authority of the nomadic *inorodtsy*. Four Steppe *dumas* were set up for the Khakass – Kacha *duma*, Koibal *duma* in Minusinsk *okrug*, Kyzyl-Achinsk *duma* and the *duma* of United Miscellaneous Tribes. The name Khakass, taken from medieval Chinese chronicles and reflecting the Chinese pronunciation of the name of the Yenisei Kyrgyz,⁴ was officially adopted in the early years of Soviet power as the single designation for the whole native population of the region (*kray*).

After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, the border areas of the Russian empire inhabited by national minorities were actively brought into the process of economic and social development. This was powerfully influenced by the mass settlement in Siberia of Russian peasants from European Russia. Besides peasants, qualified workers were invited from Siberian towns and factories in the Urals to areas of the Sayan-Altai that were rich in mineral resources. The development of industry was also promoted by the participation of exiled settlers, at that time predominantly participants in the Polish rebellion of 1863. As a result of the influx of Russian settlers, the population of Minusinsk *okrug* increased by more than 50 per cent between 1861 and 1891 to reach 135,200.

Changes in the ethnic situation led to the need for change in the region's administrative structure. The Steppe *dumas* had become outdated and were abolished. They were replaced by *inorodtsy* boards (*upravy*). By the end of the nineteenth century, the Khakass clans had been placed under the jurisdiction of three *inorodtsy* boards – Abakan, Kyzyl and Askiz, and two districts (*uezds*) – Achinsk and Minusinsk. Despite the introduction of these administrative divisions, the Khakass continued with their traditional clan and tribal divisions (*seoks*). Feudal clan relations remained important in the public life of the native population until the end of the nineteenth century. The administrative changes led to some limitation of local self-government. Moreover, the Khakass had now become a 'taxable class of the *inorodtsy*' and were obliged to pay *yasak* (tribute, tax) in money or furs to the tsar's treasury and bear the expense of maintaining public buildings, officials and the clergy.

³ Abakan Tatars or Minusinsk Tatars. [Trans.]

⁴ They inhabited the territory of Mongolia and Tuva from 840 to 920. [Trans.]

In the second half of the nineteenth century the majority of the region's native population adopted a settled way of life. Besides livestock-raising, the traditional occupation of the Khakass, crop-growing became more and more widespread. Under the influence of Russian agricultural methods the area sown to crops grew rapidly. Over 70 per cent of the Sagai – the largest ethnic group of the Khakass – took up land cultivation, vegetable growing and bee-keeping in addition to livestock-raising. The replacement of nomadism by settled life led to changes in the traditional extensive livestock-raising: the herds of cattle increased in size, land was set aside for hay-making, winter quarters for cattle were built and artificial irrigation was developed. Farm and mine production was now developed for the internal market, not just for self-sufficiency. The increased numbers of the population engaged in industry with agricultural produce, primarily from livestock-raising, promoted a rationalization of the economy of the Khakass and accelerated the development of commodity-money exchange in the region. The emerging situation accelerated the decay of patriarchal-feudal relations among the Khakass.

The settlement of Russian peasants from European Russia, poverty-stricken and landless Ukrainians, Finns and Estonians, as well as representatives of numerous religious sects persecuted by the religious and secular authorities, which became a large-scale phenomenon in the first half of the nineteenth century, was of great importance for the opening up of unused land and the enrichment of the local culture of land management. There were changes in the material culture of the Khakass. The type of housing changed: yurts covered with felt or birch bark gave way to yurt-shaped log cabins and plank huts. The traditional clothing, footwear and food of the Khakass began to acquire Russian elements.

The settlement in Khakassia (the Khakass region) of political exiles from the industrial centres of Russia was of great importance to the local population. Mines and gold mines developed rapidly. The Abakan iron mine and foundry, from which the settlement of Abaza derives its name,⁵ became the largest industrial enterprise in the region and famous throughout Siberia. Building was done by workers invited from industrial centres in the Urals, exiled participants in the Polish rebellion, Russian settlers and the local inhabitants, the Khakass (130 of whom were working at Abaza in 1890). Moreover, copper smelters and salt works were built in Khakassia and gold mining, including industrial extraction, was actively pursued.

The teachers of the Khakass at the beginning of the nineteenth century were exiles and priests. Khakass children began to read and write in Russian at parish schools in the second half of the century. At the end of the nineteenth century, priests drew up for the Khakass their first alphabet with 34 letters based on the Cyrillic alphabet. At the beginning

⁵ In Russian, Abakanskiy zavod. [*Trans.*]

of the twentieth century, despite the changed demographic situation in the territory and the widespread use of Russian, practically the whole (Khakass) population still spoke their own language.

In the course of the nineteenth century all the Khakass adopted Orthodox Christianity. The last official baptism took place at the village of Askiz on 15 July 1876, when 3,003 people were baptized. The men were all christened Vladimir and the women Maria. Although missionary work had some success in the struggle against shamanism,⁶ the majority of Siberian *inorodtsy* tried to combine the two religions. As noted by many researchers, the Khakass and Altai widely practised indigenous shamanism together with Christian rituals and at the beginning of the twentieth century shamanism still retained all its attributes.

Minusinsk People's Museum and its library, founded in 1877 by N. M. Martyanov, became the centre of cultural and scientific life in Khakassia. Many Russian and foreign scientists have studied the museum's collections. The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth were a period of active scientific study of the region. Expeditions of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Finno-Ugrian Scientific Society and the Yenisei Statistical Committee worked in Khakassia. The publications of the expeditions and of individual researchers of local lore are sources of enormous value and their scientific potential has not been exhausted to this day. Educated people and a scientific intelligentsia emerged among the Khakass. Nikolai Fedorovich Katanov, a Sagai Khakass, became a world-famous Turcologist. While holding an important post in the Russian state service, he made a fundamental contribution to the study of the philology, history and ethnology of the peoples of southern Siberia.

Relations between the Khakass and the political exiles came to a head during the 1905 revolution.⁷ In response to the rise of the national liberation movement, under the reforms introduced by Petr Stolypin⁸ the *inorodtsy* boards were replaced in 1913 by *volost's* (district jurisdictions of several parishes). The first legislative act published by the local Soviet authorities in April 1918 was the 'Statute on Khakass Steppe Self-Government'. After a counter-revolution in Minusinsk *uezd* in June the same year, a Siberian Provisional Government came to power and the statute was abolished. During the civil war (1918–20) the Soviet authorities in Khakassia not only fought against various units of the White Guards

⁶ The traditional Siberian form of spiritualism practised through ecstatic experience by a shaman. [Trans.]

⁷ The shooting of workers demonstrating for bread in St Petersburg in January 1905 led to widespread strikes and mob violence. [Trans.]

⁸ Petr Arkadiyevich Stolypin (1862–1911), prime minister of Russia from 1906 to 1911, when he was murdered. [Trans.]

but also struggled against the local population's resistance to the new order.⁹ The Khakass were drawn into these events and fought on both sides. They are known to have participated in the Red Partisan (communist guerrilla) movement and also to have helped Admiral Kolchak.¹⁰ The cruel punishment administered by Red Army detachments to Kolchak's units in Khakassia was widely publicized and even the Soviet authorities reacted to it negatively.

The Khakass were unified administratively for the first time in 1923 on the formation of Khakass *uezd*, which in 1930 was renamed Khakass autonomous *oblast'* (province). The next stage of Khakassia's political development took place only recently, when on 3 July 1991 the Russian Supreme Soviet adopted a law making Khakassia a republic.

During the Soviet period Khakassia became a developed industrial-agrarian and energy-producing region of Russia. Industrial development was in many ways a result of the great influx of population: famine victims from the Volga valley, inhabitants and industrial workers evacuated from territory occupied during the Great Patriotic War (1941–5) and the victims of mass repression, including ethnic Germans, Kalmuks (Mongols from the Caspian steppe) and Balts. By 1989 the Khakass accounted for only 12 per cent of the population of the autonomous province. The national movement in Khakassia developed at the end of the 1980s and a congress of the Khakass people was held in 1990. The political national organization of the Khakass, 'Toon' (the Vanguard), aims to preserve the ethnic group, maintain and develop its cultural heritage, increase the number of 'national' schools (where the language of instruction is Khakass) and use the Khakass language more widely (some functionaries are even discussing giving up the Cyrillic script in favour of the ancient runic script of the Türks).¹¹

Tuva

On its relatively small territory¹² the natural features of Tuva combine various types of landscape: mountain-steppe in the west, centre and south, and mountain-taiga in the north and north-east. Natural conditions predetermined the formation of three cultural groups. In the mountain-steppe zone dwelt nomadic livestock-herders whose way of life was similar to that of the livestock-herding Mongol, Buriat and Khakass population. The eastern Toja

⁹ The Bolshevik revolution of November 1917 led to a prolonged struggle for power all over Russia between the Bolsheviks and their opponents, including the White Guards, army units loyal to the tsar. [Trans.]

¹⁰ Admiral Aleksandr Vasilyevich Kolchak, who styled himself the 'Supreme Ruler of Russia' in Omsk in November 1918, was executed by the Soviet authorities in Irkutsk in February 1920. [Trans.]

¹¹ The runic script found on monuments of the Turkish khanate from 546 to 743 in Mongolia's Orkhon valley and on the Yenisei. [Trans.]

¹² Tuva has an area of 170,500 km², Khakassia 61,900 km² and the Altai Republic 92,600 km². [Trans.]

Tuvans (named after Lake Toja) were engaged in hunting fur-bearing animals and herding reindeer. This economic activity was also pursued by the Tofalars, Shors and other ethnic groups dwelling in the mountain-taiga regions of the Sayan-Altai.

The herder-hunters who lived on the border of the two natural zones and combined hunting with pastoral livestock-herding were not numerous. The first group dwelt in felt yurts, while the second and third groups dwelt in *chooms* (tepees) which were covered with birch bark, larch bark or animal skins according to season. The herdsmen mainly raised sheep, cows and horses, more rarely yaks or camels. The livestock were maintained on natural grazing land the year round. This was no guarantee of stability and in the 1880s there were massive losses of livestock from starvation in the severe winters. Primitive cultivation methods were improved considerably only after the arrival of Russian settlers. Hunting and trade occupied an important place in the economy. The constant demand for furs from the Manchu authorities and Russian traders led to the destruction of valuable species of wild animals.

Tuva was incorporated into the Qing (Manchu) empire after the defeat of the Dzungarian khanate.¹³ However, this incorporation was in many ways only nominal since there were no Qing authorities on the territory of Tuva. The governor-general considered to be in charge of Tuvan and Mongol affairs was resident in Uliasutai (Mongolia). The Tannu-Ola Tuvans were subjected to administrative-territorial division into five *hoshuus* (banners), each led by a Mongol *noyan* appointed by the Chinese (i.e. Manchu) authorities. The Tuvans lived in these banners, in the domains of *noyans* in northern Mongolia and also nomadized in the Mongol Altai and Gorny Altai and on the southern slopes of the Tannu-Ola.¹⁴ These administrative divisions remained practically unchanged until 1907.¹⁵

Having divided up Tuvan lands into administrative banners, the Qing authorities placed these territories and their population under the control of hereditary rulers – Tuvan and Mongol feudal property owners. The Tuvans had no right to move from one banner to another. Tithes from the population were in the form of duties (*albans*), taxes to support officials (*iündürigüs*), or in the form of labour as shepherds for the feudal lord and care of his livestock. The poor were helped by rich Tuvans temporarily transferring livestock to them for grazing, with the right to use the dairy produce obtained. Social protest reached its peak in the period after the suppression of rebellions by the peoples of the Qing empire. In the 1870s and 1880s competition grew between Russian and Chinese trading posts for the leading position in the fur market in Tuva. The Qing authorities' levies on the Tuvans

¹³ The khanate of the Oirats (western Mongols), eliminated in 1757. [Trans.]

¹⁴ These mountains formed the geographic boundary between Tuva and Mongolia but the international border now lies far to the south. [Trans.]

¹⁵ Russian and Mongol accounts of the administration of Tuva differ. [Trans.]

grew and this aroused the dissatisfaction of the ordinary people of Tuva, the *arats* (herdsmen). Chinese officials and rich herd-owners were attacked during large-scale demonstrations in 1876–8 and the rebellion of the ‘60 Heroes’ of 1883–5.¹⁶ These rebellions were suppressed, but they played an important role in overcoming the archaic clan structure of Tuvan society and forming a common national self-awareness.

Tuva was little affected by Christianization. Here the competition was between the Buddhist Lamaist clergy, living in numerous monasteries, and the shamans. Lamaism, unlike Christianity – without the intervention of the state authorities – began to make inroads against shamanism. Lamaism did not rely on state support and the lamas, unlike the Orthodox missionaries, did not enjoy legal privileges. Nonetheless Lamaism spread quickly among the Tuvans. Its spread was promoted with the help of Tibetan medicine, which enabled the lamas to compete successfully with the shamans. Unlike the Christian missionaries, the lamas experienced no language difficulties in communication. Tuvan Lamaism demonstrated its flexibility: its doctrine was adapted to shamanism, which reflected the popular world outlook. Tripartition, the spiritualization of natural phenomena, the vital connection between human beings and the environment and the mediating role of the lamas and shamans determined the compatibility of the two faiths in people’s minds.

The national liberation movement which began in Mongolia after the overthrow of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1911) was supported in Tuva. The Chinese trading posts were destroyed and the Chinese driven out of the country. In 1912 over 1,000 armed Tuvans joined the Mongols under the command of Magsarjav¹⁷ in military operations against the Manchu-Chinese troops in western Mongolia. The fortified town of Kobdo (Hovd) was captured. The tsarist government played a waiting game and pursued a policy of nonintervention, although in diplomatic correspondence it did not conceal its intention, through the peaceful settlement of Russians in Uriankhai (as Tuva was then called), of ensuring its right to establish a protectorate and annex the territory to Russia.

After a congress of banner representatives held in 1912, the *amban-noyan* Kombu-Dorju¹⁸ and other senior officials sent a petition to Tsar Nicholas II (1868–1918) declaring the independence of Uriankhai and requesting Russian protection for Tuva. There was no official response at the time, as Russia was engaged in negotiations with China about the situation in Mongolia and it would have been risky to complicate them by discussion of

¹⁶ The ‘Aldan Maadyr’ against feudal oppression were rounded up and their leaders, the *arat* Sambazhyk and a local official named Dazhimaa, were beheaded. [Trans.]

¹⁷ Khatanbaatar Sandagdorjiin Magsarjav (1877–1927), Mongolian minister of the Western Border. [Trans.]

¹⁸ Prince (*noyan*) Gombodorj was the Mongolian governor (*amban*) of an *aimag* (league) of four banners ruled by hereditary Tuvan princes. [Trans.]

the Uriankhai problem.¹⁹ All the same, Russia set up administrative services in Tuva to observe the political situation in the region and care for settlers from Russia.

The completion of the negotiations with China enabled Russia to activate its policy, which it was now keen to do, especially as some banner rulers had expressed the wish to be subordinated to the *qutuqtu*,²⁰ the spiritual leader of Mongolia. Russia's change of attitude, and the danger of the Tuvans being split, moved the *gün-noyan* Buyan-Baldyrgy to send the tsar a new petition. He noted the historical fact that in 1616 the Tuvans nomadizing in the Khemchik valley (western Tuva) had sworn an oath of allegiance to Russia before Vasily of Tyumen, the envoy of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov. In April 1914 the Uriankhai region was officially taken under Russian protection and its population was promised that the Buddhist faith would be preserved, although the borders of the region required clarification.²¹

The peasant colonization of Tuva created sharp divisions between the Russian settlers and the Tuvans as well as between the older generation of Russian landowners in Tuva and the new landless settlers. At the same time, the Russian administration of Tuva developed and strengthened the region's economic links. The building by Russian workers of the first town, Belotsarsk (now Kyzyl),²² was an important event for the further colonization of the region.

Immediately after the revolutionary events (of 1917) in Russia, a political struggle for the fate of the territory began in Tuva, where a regional soviet was active until mid-1918. At a joint session on 18 June 1918, a congress of the Russian and Tuvan population adopted an agreement on the self-determination of Tuva which included an article about the rights of Russian citizens. A counter-revolutionary coup in Minusinsk and the formation of the government of Admiral Kolchak brought about resistance in Tuva not only from political opponents but also from the *arats* of western Tuva, who staged a rebellion. The partisan movement expanded in the rear of Kolchak's forces. A partisan army under the command of

¹⁹ In the Russian-Mongolian agreement (1912), Russia supported Outer Mongolia's autonomy but rejected its claim on Uriankhai. The Russian-Chinese declaration of 1913 agreed to autonomy excluding Uriankhai, so Mongolia refused to recognize it. The Mongolian draft of the treaty of Kyakhta (1915, with Russia and China) included Uriankhai as part of Mongolia, but under Russian pressure it was deleted from the final text. [Trans.]

²⁰ The 'Living Buddha' of Urga, Bogd Khan (Holy Emperor) of Autonomous Outer Mongolia. [Trans.]

²¹ In 1916 Buyan Badarkhüü, chief of Khemchik banner, the largest in Uriankhai, called on China to accept the submission of his banner. [Trans.]

²² Also called Khem-Beldyr from 1918 to 1926. [Trans.]

A. D. Kravchenko²³ was obliged to withdraw into Tuva. The partisans occupied Belotsarsk and a decisive battle against Kolchak's forces was fought in its suburbs on 29 August 1919.

After the departure of the partisan army, the lack of a stable authority in Tuva led to a difficult situation: armed attacks were carried out against settlements by a Mongolian occupation detachment, by formations of Chinese and by Kolchak's forces. In 1920 and 1921 units of the Red Army were brought into Tuva and, in joint actions with the partisan detachments of Sergei Kochetov²⁴ and detachments of Tuvan *arats*, the remnants of the interventionists²⁵ and counter-revolutionaries were destroyed. In August 1921 an All-Tuvan *khural* (assembly),²⁶ attended by delegations from Russia, Mongolia and the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern (Communist International), proclaimed the independence of the Tuvan state – the People's Republic of Tannu-Tuva.²⁷

The republic had been proclaimed and a start was made on the building of the state, but the feudal chiefs and clergy continued their actions against the new transformations. At sessions of the Great *Khural* (national assembly) of the Tuvan People's Republic, feudal privileges were abolished and replaced by legislative order and constitutional norms. The state, economic and internal political measures of Soviet Russia were taken as the model and applied on the scale of the rather small republic. Among the most important events connected with the formation of the new national self-awareness were the creation of a Tuvan script²⁸ and the development of a national education programme, and the appearance of literary works by Tuvan authors, of which the most famous was the novel *Word of an Arat* by Salchak Toka.²⁹

When the Great Patriotic War began, recruiters from Tuva were sent to the front and assistance was organized in the form of foodstuffs and gifts for the troops. The first appeal

²³ Aleksandr Deomidovich Kravchenko (1880–1924), Bolshevik who set up the Achinsk soviet in 1917. [Trans.]

²⁴ Sergei Kuzmich Kochetov was a member of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee and later fought in the Great Patriotic War against Germany (1941–5). [Trans.]

²⁵ The interventionist forces were the US, British, Japanese and other foreign troops sent into Siberia to aid the fight against the Bolsheviks in the civil war. [Trans.]

²⁶ This was called the First Congress of Representatives of Tuvan Banners and was held at Sug-Baidzh near Atamanovka (later renamed Kochetovo). Kochetov and 17 other members of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee were among those present. [Trans.]

²⁷ Tuva, the former Uriankhai (Tannu-Uriankhai), was called the People's Republic of Tannu-Tuva from 1921 to 1926, when it became the Tuvan People's Republic and was finally recognized by Mongolia. [Trans.]

²⁸ The first alphabet of the Tuvan language, using Latin letters (some modified), was launched in 1931–2 to supplant the use of Mongolian ('language of the oppressors') and its classical script in Tuva. [Trans.]

²⁹ Salchak Kalbakhchekovich Toka (1901–73), Tuvan minister of culture, first secretary of the Tuvan People's Revolutionary Party, from 1944 first secretary of the Tuva *oblast'* committee of the CPSU (the Soviet Communist Party, which he had joined in 1929), later member of the CPSU Central Committee. [Trans.]

by the Tuvan People's Republic to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to join the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was made in April 1941. Because of the beginning of the war the matter was postponed. The final adoption of a declaration on joining the USSR took place in 1944 at a session of the Little *Khural* (government council) of the Tuvan People's Republic.³⁰

Altai

The Turkic-speaking tribes of the Gorny Altai were absorbed into the Russian state in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The northern part of the Altai region was drawn into the process of the Russian advance into and conquest of Siberia, which met with resistance from the Kyrgyz and Dzungarian princes who had previously collected tribute from the population of this region. The southern part of the Altai was acquired by Russia immediately after Qing China's defeat of Dzungaria when the Altai *zaisans* (clan chiefs), afraid of the Chinese troops, requested acceptance as subjects of the Russian emperor. For the Altai, submission to Russia was the best way out of a very difficult situation after the defeat of Dzungaria, when they were persecuted by Chinese and Mongol troops and faced with the threat of annihilation.

After Speransky's reforms of 1822 and the application of the 'Statute on the Administration of the *Inorodtsy*', the Altai region was administered by the police chief in Biisk and the 'separate Altai assessor' in Ulala (the modern Gorno-Altai).³¹ The Altai remained subject to the powers of the *zaisans*, who controlled particular groups of clans rather than territory. Wherever the ordinary Altai nomadized they were subject only to their own *zaisan*, to whom they paid *yasaq* (tribute) and from whom they obtained legal judgments. In that sense the powers of the *zaisans* were virtually unlimited. In 1880, by decree of the tsar, the *zaisans* were banned from holding office for life. The *zaisans* had assistants called *demichs* whose number matched that of the clans under each *zaisan*. The lesser officials subordinate to the *zaisans* were called *shulengs*, *arbanakhs* and *boshkos*.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the Russian administration received numerous complaints from the *zaisans* about unauthorized settlement and land seizures by Russians

³⁰ The April 1941 appeal was issued by the Politburo of the Tuvan People's Revolutionary Party the day after the Russian colonists were given Tuvan citizenship. After the 1944 (August) declaration issued in the name of the 'Little *Khural* of Working People of the TPR', a Tuvan delegation headed by Salchak Toka went to Moscow where they waited a month before presenting it. On 11 October the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet accepted Tuva into the USSR and requested its admission to the RSFSR as an autonomous *oblast'*. It was upgraded to the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in October 1961. Since the 1990s it has styled itself the Republic of Tuva (or Tyva, reflecting the Tuvan Cyrillic spelling). [Trans.]

³¹ Called Oirat-Tuva from 1932 to 1948. [Trans.]

in the northern part of the Gorny Altai. However, the inflow of settlers into the Altai region was not as massive as that into Khakassia and the Minusinsk basin. Organized colonization was carried out only by the Altai Spiritual Mission at that time. The expansion of its work and programme of action were drawn up by the outstanding missionary Archimandrite Makary, who created the methodology for the missionary cause in the Altai region.

Makary proposed making baptised Altais settle down and learn to read and write to prepare them for the transition to a cultured way of life, and freeing them from taxes and duties for the initial period after baptism. The organization of instruction for newly baptized Altai women in housework, cleanliness and hygiene, medical treatment, midwifery, sewing, spinning and baking had an enormous impact. Makary organized free schools for boys and girls. He led conversion to Orthodoxy, prayers and services in the Altai language. The creation in the Altai region of settlements of newly baptized Altais is linked with the name of Makary and his followers. The missions were expanded and set up among the Teleuts, Shors and Kumandas. There was some resistance to the missions, however, especially among the southern Altais who refused to be baptized.

By the end of the nineteenth century the Altais had acquired Russian agricultural tools and techniques. Their diet became more varied, thanks to the development of vegetable-growing under Russian influence. Hunting and nut-gathering became auxiliary activities. The methods of tanning and felt-making remained traditional. As a rule, livestock produce was for the herders' own use and not for the market. In the 1860s the whole Gorny Altai was embraced by the activities of the Russian traders and a trade fair was inaugurated in Kosh-Agach, near the border with China. In his letters from Siberia, V. V. Radlov³² says that the Altais were badly cheated by the traders.

After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, many mining enterprises began to hire workers and this reduced the income of the owners and the state. The decision to allow the settlement in the Altai region of peasants from Russia's internal provinces came into force in 1865. However, the planned colonization of the Altai region to create Russian settlements in the border zone began only in 1873. As colonization progressed, the illegal seizure of land became more common. This led increasingly to landless settlers and poor Altais hiring out their agricultural labour to prosperous Russian early settlers of the Altai region. This was the subject of complaints by several *zaisans* who set off for the tsar's

³² Vasily Vasilyevich Radlov (1837–1918), prominent orientalist, inspector of minority schools in Kazan 1872–83, president of the Russian Committee for the Study of Central and Eastern Asia from 1903, co-founder of the Buddhist temple in St Petersburg. He used the name Friedrich Wilhelm Radloff for works published in German. [*Trans.*]

court in St Petersburg.³³ This resulted in an instruction of 1894 banning settlement and the allocation of free land in the Altai region.

It was thanks to the activities of the Orthodox mission that the first Altais were educated. Some of them were sent to Kazan³⁴ to complete their ecclesiastical education. Meanwhile, the mission pursued philological studies to describe the Altai dialects and drew up a script. Political as well as religious tasks were dealt with. Wide use was made of the practical skills of the learned missionary N. I. Ilminsky in converting the *inorodtsy* in their own language with the help of teachers from the same tribe. For the training of these personnel a catechetical college was opened in Biisk; its activities ranged far beyond the Altai region. The first Altai writer, the priest M. Chevalkov, was a product of this college; he was awarded a gold medal by Tsar Alexander II (1855–81).

Despite the efforts of the Orthodox mission, in 1904–5 a religious-political movement called ‘Burkhanism’, or the ‘White Faith’, appeared in the southern livestock-herding areas of the Altai region. The preacher of the new faith, Chot Chelpanov, and his daughter Chugul, called on the Altais to give up shamanism, which was entrenched in their daily life, not to seek help from the shamans, and at the same time to avoid friendly contacts with Christians and not to share food with them or speak to them. They preached the early coming of the new tsar, Oirot-Yapon.³⁵ News of the new faith spread quickly and it became popular among the Altais. The Altais who gathered to hear the sermons were unaffected by the admonitions of Russian officials. Envoys of Chelpanov travelled the Altai settlements and used violence against those who opposed the new faith. Researchers into these events consider that they were organized by Mongol lamas and Japanese emissaries in connection with the Russo-Japanese war (1904–5).

The authorities were concerned about the big gatherings of Altais attracted by the sermons and, to detain the false prophet and his supporters, they mobilized police and soldiers called in by the missions. Chelpanov, his daughter and several *zaisans* and *bays* (rich men) as well as a Mongol lama were arrested. The expert witness at their trial in Biisk was a

³³ Called Petrograd from 1914 to 1924, then Leningrad until the 1990s, when it reverted to St Petersburg. [Trans.]

³⁴ City on the River Volga, now capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, captured by Tsar Ivan the Terrible in 1552. Centre of the Orthodox mission to the Tatars and of Siberian studies at its university. The great Mongolist Osip Mikhailovich Kovalevsky (Kowalewski) was exiled there for participation in the Polish freedom movement. [Trans.]

³⁵ The name links Japan (or the Japanese) with the Oirats, the native inhabitants of the Gorny Altai related to the western Mongol Oirats. [Trans.]

political exile, the well-known ethnographer D. A. Klements,³⁶ who had participated in Radlov's Orkhon expedition. Thanks to the lawyers' efforts, the political and nationalistic side of the case was not examined. Chelpanov returned to the Altai region and continued to preach in favour of its separation from Russia and annexation to Japan, which had 'beaten the White Tsar and conquered all the towns as far as Irkutsk'.

The support for Burkhanism and separatism by the *zaisans* and *bays* was a result of the success of the Christianization and Russification of the Altai population who, once baptized, ceased to pay taxes to the local nobility. Changes in land management and the administrative structure took place from 1911 to 1913. The *zaisans* were abolished and the general Russian territorial scheme of *volost's* (districts) was introduced. At the end of 1916 the male population of the Altai was mobilized for service in the rear and at the front (in the First World War). However, mobilization gave rise to mass protests and opposition by the Altaians and conscription did not take place.

Messianic ideas spread again in the Altai region after the February 1917 revolution.³⁷ This time they figured the legendary hero Amyr-Sana,³⁸ who would win the Altai back from Russia. The overthrow of autocracy created a wave of the nationalist movement under the leadership of the Altai intelligentsia raised by the missionaries. In June 1917 a congress of delegates of the native authorities of the Altai region, Shoriya and Achinsk was held in Biisk. The leadership of the congress was in the hands of the Socialist Revolutionaries,³⁹ who proposed self-determination for the *inorodtsy* of the Altai, the formation of an independent elected district council (*zemstvo*) and the creation of an Altai mountain *duma*.

After the October revolution,⁴⁰ the Altai intelligentsia were drawn into the political struggle developing in the towns of Siberia. Having failed to obtain approval from the district council in Biisk, Altai mountain *duma* prepared for its founding congress in Ulala in February 1918. The congress resolved to separate the Altai to form an independent district and emphasized its adherence to Orthodoxy. The ethnographer V. I. Anuchin delivered a report providing the historical justification for uniting the lands of the 'legendary Oirot

³⁶ Dmitry Aleksandrovich Klements (1847–1914), prominent ethnographer who studied in Kazan and St Petersburg, was a leader of the Narodniki and was exiled to Siberia in 1897. Head of the ethnographic department of the Alexander III Museum in St Petersburg from 1900. [Trans.]

³⁷ Following strikes and bread shortages in St Petersburg, the autocratic state apparatus disintegrated and a Provisional Government was formed to keep Russia in the war against Germany. [Trans.]

³⁸ Amarsanaa, an Oirat khan who fought for independence but was defeated by the Manchu army in 1757. [Trans.]

³⁹ The SR, a peasant-oriented party, supported the Mensheviks against an attempted Bolshevik coup in Petrograd in July 1917. [Trans.]

⁴⁰ On 25 October 1917 (modern calendar date, 7 November) Lenin's Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government led by Aleksandr Kerensky and proclaimed a Soviet government; civil war followed. [Trans.]

state' in a single republic. The people of the Russian and Mongol Altai, Khakassia, Tuva and Dzungaria were to join it. The congress resolved to set up the Oirat Republic at a special *qurultay* (tribal assembly) in Kosh-Agach near the border with Mongolia. A special commission headed by a *kaghan*⁴¹ was appointed to discuss the establishment of the Oirat Republic. Anuchin was elected *kaghan* and the Karakorum⁴² Altai board (*uprava*) became the body ruling the Altai region.

After the establishment of the Provisional Government in Siberia, officers from Kolchak's forces took charge of the board. Under the slogan 'The Altai for the Altais!', the formation began of a 'native division', a company of which even became Kolchak's personal guard. In December 1919 partisan detachments joined forces with Red Army units on the Chuya *trakt*.⁴³ Soviet power was established in the Altai region and three administrative districts (*rayons*) were formed: Ulala, Shebalino and Uimon. However, armed resistance by various detachments of the White Guards continued in the Altai region right up to 1922.

On 1 June 1922 the Oirat autonomous *oblast'* was formed as part of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic); it was renamed the Gorny Altai autonomous district on 7 January 1948; and transformed into the Altai Republic after 1991.⁴⁴

Buriatia

As in the contiguous regions of southern Siberia after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, and the mass peasant colonization that followed, there were changes in the mining and agricultural sectors in Buriatia.⁴⁵ Gold mining became the leading branch of industry in the 1880s. Settlement of the land proceeded unsatisfactorily because of the lack of plans for land management. When construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway began in 1891, there was a sharp growth in the influx of population. In 1908 alone the number of settlers reached 750,000. By 1900 the builders of the Trans-Siberian Railway were approaching Lake Baikal from both west and east. Initially the trains crossed the lake on ferries, the tracks along the banks of Lake Baikal were completed only five years later. The operation and servicing of the railway required the speedy development of all sectors of industry. New skills appeared, the social structure of the region's population changed and even the local aristocrats, the *noyans* (princes, nobles), began to engage in industrial enterprise.

⁴¹ The word *kaghan* is derived from the old Mongolian form of 'khan'. [Trans.]

⁴² Karakorum being the ancient Mongol capital Kharkhorin. [Trans.]

⁴³ The Chuya *trakt* was a caravan route following the course of the River Chuya up to Kosh-Agach and the Mongolian border. [Trans.]

⁴⁴ The USSR was dissolved in December 1991. [Trans.]

⁴⁵ The lands of the Buriats, Mongols living east and west of Lake Baikal in Siberia, the modern Buriat Republic. [Trans.]

Wealthy Buriats became accomplished at trade and invested in industrial undertakings and banks. Besides Irkutsk, which became one of the richest towns of Siberia, the Transbaikalian towns (on the eastern side of the lake) grew quickly.

As the towns grew, agriculture developed too. By the end of the 1880s the area of land sown to crops by the Buriats in Irkutsk *guberniya* exceeded that of the Russians. The Transbaikalian Buriats occupied the leading position in livestock-raising. Buriatia was the only region of southern Siberia noted for its high standards of livestock care and selection of highly productive and fine-fleece animals. Horse-drawn agricultural equipment and machines were delivered by rail. All this ensured the growth of labour productivity on peasant farms and of income from the produce.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the number of secular schools and colleges for Buriat children began to exceed that of lama schools. As well as Buriat schools an Evenk⁴⁶ school was opened. The lama schools predominated in the Transbaikalian area, where there were many monasteries and *datsans* (lamasery colleges). The Orthodox mission in Irkutsk was quite active and opened missionary and parish schools in many places. By 1903 they were teaching almost 1,500 Buriats. For this reason the formation of the national intelligentsia proceeded more quickly than in contiguous regions. Tsyben Jamtsarano,⁴⁷ a representative of one of the tendencies of Buriat national ideology, fought for the development of secular education in the *datsans*, for reform without intensifying the class struggle and for the unification of the nation on the basis of a single religion, reformed Buddhism. The reform movement among the lamas grew considerably in scale.

Proclaiming the ideas of the Narodniki,⁴⁸ Jamtsarano set out the following basic tasks of the organization called the 'Banner of the Buriat Nation': establishment of national schools, enlightenment of the masses, and national self-determination and autonomy for the Buriats. Another tendency called the Zapadniki criticized Jamtsarano for proposing to replace shamanism with Buddhism and maintained that the *datsans* were incapable of replacing education in secular schools. Their main objection was to the creation of a separate Buriat *zemstvo*.

⁴⁶ The Evenks are a Tungusic people called Khamnigan by the Mongols. [Trans.]

⁴⁷ Jamtsarano (1880–1942) was assigned by the Russian Committee for the Study of Central and Eastern Asia to collect folk literature and study shamanism in Buriatia and taught Mongol at St Petersburg University. Jamtsarano had attended the St Petersburg Buriat school set up by Petr Aleksandrovich (Jamsaran) Badmayev, specialist in Tibetan medicine and the tsar's adviser on East Asia. Jamtsarano was a founder member of the Mongolian People's Party who drew up its 'Proclamation to the People of Outer Mongolia' and the appended 'Ten Principles' (1921). He founded the Mongolian Institute of Scripture (forerunner of the Academy of Sciences) but was purged in the 1930s, sent to Leningrad and died in prison. [Trans.]

⁴⁸ Populists, supporters of peasant land reform without class conflict, eventually absorbed by the Socialist Revolutionaries. [Trans.]

As in contiguous regions of Siberia, the national movement of the Buriats was connected with the implementation of administrative and land reform. The conservative tendency was in favour of the old institutions of the *noyan* and the Steppe *duma*. The national (Buriat) bourgeoisie was in favour of cooperation with the Russian administration. The reformist ideas of the Narodniki, to improve the clan community⁴⁹ of the Buriats as the basis of a socialist society, were quite popular among the Buriats. The development of industry and railway communications influenced the emergence of an organized workers' movement. Revolutionary political groups prepared public actions by the workers. As well as strikes there were armed insurrections. In 1866 the Polish exiles working on the railway rebelled. The rebellion was suppressed and its leaders were shot. Strikes in the gold mines were put down by force. The number of strikes grew considerably in the period from 1905 to 1907. The political exiles participated actively in these events, armed detachments of workers were formed and the management to all intents and purposes evaded its responsibilities. The first soviet of deputies of soldiers and Cossacks⁵⁰ was set up in Chita, and historians call the period from November 1905 to January 1906 the period of the 'Chita Republic'. Revolutionary actions continued in south-eastern Siberia right up to the end of 1907 with the participation of Buriat students.

The creation of united Social Democratic organizations followed the news of the February revolution (1917) and the overthrow of autocracy. An executive committee of public organizations was set up in the Transbaikal region. There was no irreconcilable armed confrontation between the factions in the region, unlike most of revolutionary Russia. In Chita at the end of April 1917 Buriats from the Transbaikal area and Irkutsk *guberniya* held their first national congress, which elected a Buriat national *duma*. It was decided that Buriat autonomy would be based on the administrative structure *sum-hoshuu-aimag*.⁵¹

The Social Democrats in Chita considered the October revolution in Petrograd to be illegal. They set up a committee to save the revolution and demanded the creation of a socialist government. Soviets were established in February 1918 with the participation of Cossacks who had arrived from the front.

The uprising of the Czechoslovak corps on the Trans-Siberian Railway brought about the collapse of Soviet power, and Irkutsk, Verkhneudinsk and Chita were captured. The Transbaikal region was occupied by the army of *Ataman* Semenov⁵² with the support of

⁴⁹ The Buriats included in Irkutsk *guberniya* the Bulagat, Ekhirit and 10 other tribes and in Transbaikal *oblast'* the Barguzin, Selenga, Khori and others comprising altogether over 100 clans. [Trans.]

⁵⁰ Russians allowed to settle freely in southern Russia and Siberia in return for contracted service to protect the frontiers. [Trans.]

⁵¹ That is, district–banner–league (province). [Trans.]

⁵² Grigory Mikhailovich Semenov (1890–1946), self-proclaimed *ataman* (Cossack chief). He set up a Buriat autonomous republic in Chita in 1919 and had plans to establish a pan-Mongolian state, but was not

Japanese and American units. The Buriat national regiment named after Dordzhi Banzarov⁵³ was formed there. On the whole, however, the Buriats tried to preserve their neutrality in political and military confrontations.

A powerful partisan movement which developed at the end of 1919 succeeded in defeating the forces of Semenov and Kolchak. However, Chita remained under occupation by Japanese troops and this hindered communication between central Russia and the Far East.⁵⁴ This is why a founding congress held in Verkhneudinsk in April 1920 resolved to set up the Far Eastern Republic. Two Buriat-Mongol autonomous *oblast*'s were created, a western one within the RSFSR and an eastern one within the Far Eastern Republic.⁵⁵ The army of the Far Eastern Republic and partisan detachments took joint action to force the remnants of the White Guards into Manchuria and the Japanese command was obliged to sign an armistice.

The final stage of events in the civil war was the declaration of the incorporation of the Far Eastern Republic into the RSFSR. As a result Buriatia, which had been divided by the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic, was reunited. On 30 May 1923 it was resolved to form the Buriat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic⁵⁶ with its centre at Verkhneudinsk.⁵⁷ The name Republic of Buriatia was adopted in 1990.

supported by Outer Mongolia or Japan. In 1920 he was forced by the Bolsheviks to retreat into Manchuria and fled to the US but was deported and lived in Dairen (Dalny, Dalian), a Chinese commercial port leased by Russia in 1897 with the naval base of Port Arthur (Lushun). He was captured by Soviet troops in August 1945, tried by military tribunal in Moscow and executed. [Trans.]

⁵³ Dordzhi Banzarov (1822–55), Buriat philologist and ethnographer, graduate of Kazan gymnasium and Kazan University, St Petersburg scholar, was released from Cossack service by order of Tsar Nicholas I to work under the governor-general of eastern Siberia, Count Nikolai Nikolayevich Muravyev-Amursky, from 1851. [Trans.]

⁵⁴ The Russian Far East, particularly the Maritime (Primorsky) region. [Trans.]

⁵⁵ The Buriat *aimags* were Tunka, Selenga, Ekhirit-Bulagat, Bokhan and Alar (in the RSFSR) and Aga, Barguzin, Khorii and Chikoi (in the FER). Administrative changes in the 1930s culminated in the separation of Aga and Ust-Ordynsky national *okrugs* and their subordination to Irkutsk and Chita *oblast*'s respectively in 1937. [Trans.]

⁵⁶ The word 'Mongol' was dropped in July 1958. [Trans.]

⁵⁷ Renamed Ulan-Ude in 1934. [Trans.]

15

MONGOLIA*

*T. Nakami, Ts. Batbayar and J. Boldbaatar***Contents**

MONGOLIA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TO 1919	337
The rise of the Qing empire and the dissolution of the world of Central Eurasia . . .	337
Qing rule over the Mongols: organization and institutions	339
Mongol society in decline (from the mid-nineteenth century)	341
Mongolia in Russo-Qing relations (from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century)	343
Mongolia during the final years of the Qing	345
The 1911 Mongol declaration of independence and international relations	348
THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION OF 1921 AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1924–46)	353
The birth of the People's Republic	353
The suppression of Buddhism	356
Soviet purges in Mongolia	358
The MPR during the Second World War	359
THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	361
On the path to democratization and the free market	366

* See Map 3.

Part One¹MONGOLIA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
TO 1919

(T. Nakami)

The rise of the Qing empire and the dissolution of the
world of Central Eurasia

In the second half of the sixteenth century Nurhachi, the leader of a tribe of the Tungusic Jurchens (or Jushens) in present-day north-eastern China, extended his power and in 1588 formed a state called the 'Manju' (Manju gurun); in 1616 he unified all the Jurchens. He then advanced into the Liaodong plain and also brought under his control the Mongol groups living to the east of the Hsingan mountains. Nurhachi's successor Hong Taiji launched a military campaign in 1632, attacking the Chahars (Caqars), direct descendants of the imperial family of the Mongol-Yuan dynasty, and placed Inner Mongolia under his rule. On this occasion the state seal of the emperors of the Mongol-Yuan dynasty, which had been passed down to the leader of the Chahars, is said to have come into the possession of Hong Taiji. This was of symbolic significance, for it meant that the khanate of the Mongol empire – that is, the right to rule over China and Central Eurasia – had been transferred from the descendants of the Mongol Chinggis Khan to the Manchu Hong Taiji. Then in 1636 Hong Taiji was installed as emperor by the Manchus, Mongols and Han Chinese under his dominion, resulting in the establishment of the Qing empire, which in its early stages represented a union of these three ethnic groups.

The Qing forces stepped up their military offensive, first bringing the Korean peninsula under their control and then attacking China proper. During the reign of Hong Taiji's successor Shunzhi (1643–61), the Qing took advantage of the confusion into which the Ming dynasty had been thrown and extended their rule to cover all of China, moving their

¹ For the latest research trends and newly discovered historical sources on the modern history of the Mongols, see Nakami, [1999a](#), pp. 7–39.

capital from Mukden (Shenyang) to Beijing as they did so. The next emperor, Kangxi, consolidated the domestic rule of the Qing regime and also held back Russia, which was aiming to advance along the valley of the Amur river (Heilongjiang). In 1689 the Nerchinsk treaty was concluded between the Qing and Russia. Around the same time, the Qing intervened in a dispute among the Outer Mongolian nobles. Then the Kangxi emperor himself assumed personal command of a campaign against Galdan of the Dzungars, who had invaded Outer Mongolia. Galdan's troops were routed in 1696, and this incident provided the occasion for the incorporation of Outer Mongolia into the territories of the Qing dynasty.

Under the Yongzheng emperor, Kangxi's successor, efforts were made to consolidate the emperor's power and reform the political structure. The enormous apparatus of rule by the absolute autocracy of an emperor supported by the machinery of an administrative bureaucracy was set in motion. Yongzheng extended his rule over Qinghai (Köke nighur) and Tibet, as well as strengthening his rule in the non-Han regions of south-western China, and the border with Russia in the Mongol regions was demarcated by the Kiakhta treaty. The Qing's territorial expansion culminated during the reign of Yongzheng's successor Qianlong, resulting in an enormous empire of unrivalled size. By the mideighteenth century the Qianlong emperor had succeeded in crushing the Dzungars, until then the greatest counterforce to the Qing in the north, thereby placing East Turkistan and the oases to the south of the Tian Shan (Tianshan) mountains under his control and extending his influence to present-day South-East Asia, Nepal and the countries of Central Asia.

This period, from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century, saw the rise of what might be called 'regional world empires' throughout the Eurasian continent. These included the Ottoman dynasty in the Middle East, the Mughal dynasty in India, the Romanov dynasty in Russia, and the Habsburg dynasty in Central Europe. At the same time, under the mercantilism of Great Britain, the East India Company began its advance into Asia. The emergence of the enormous Qing empire in East Asia can also be situated within this worldwide movement. What influence did it have on Central Eurasia?

Until this time, Central Eurasia had been the artery linking the East and the West, with oasis towns dotted along its length. Behind it lay a vast nomadic region, and it was along this artery that contact and trade between East and West had been maintained. The Mongol empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had arisen from this arena in Central Eurasia; it had been in part the consequence of a demand for the management of this arterial route to come under unified control. The establishment of this world empire had, moreover, been made possible by the outstanding military strength of its nomadic cavalry. The Manchus, on the other hand, who appeared on the stage of history in the late sixteenth

century, emerged from the easternmost extremity of Central Eurasia, and opinion is divided as to whether, historically speaking, they can be regarded as Central Eurasians. But when one considers the process behind the expansion of their power, it is clear that their establishment of a regional world empire was made possible only through their assimilation of the military strength of the Mongol horsemen. It might be noted that the Mughal dynasty, the founding of which predated that of the Qing by some 100 years, also had its origins in Central Asia.

Although during the course of the growth into a regional world empire the Qing gradually brought Mongolia, Tibet and East Turkistan under their control, their goal was not to unify Central Eurasia, as Chinggis Khan and his successors had done, but to establish an empire holding sway over the regional world of East Asia. Consequently, through the incorporation of these regions into the territory of the Qing, the eastern half of Central Eurasia took on the character of a peripheral part of an East Asian world empire. Furthermore, the conclusion of the treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta and the demarcation of a 'frontier' with Russia, the newly emerging empire to the north (which was in reality an absolute monarchic autocracy like the Qing), clearly showed that Central Eurasia was a peripheral region lying between two regional world empires, and during the nineteenth century this state of affairs became even more apparent. In former times, powerful nomadic cavalries had appeared as a force for the overthrow and reform of the historical status quo. But even during the period before the adoption of the name 'Qing', when the dynasty had been called the 'Latter Jin' (*Amaga Aisin Gurun/Hou Jin*), Qing troops had used Portuguese muskets when fighting the Ming army, and in their life-or-death struggle with the Dzungars too considerable use had been made of firearms, thus indicating that the mounted troops had entered their twilight years as a military force.

Meanwhile, the historical significance of the Mongols' submission to the Qing lay in the fact that they lost their political sovereignty and independence for the first time since they had emerged as a group in the thirteenth century. Furthermore, the majority of Mongols were confined to the Qing side of the 'frontier' established by the treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta and so had their sphere of activity delimited by this 'frontier'.

Qing rule over the Mongols: organization and institutions

The Qing empire (mid-eighteenth century to 1911), headed by the Manchu emperor, is said to have been 'the last empire of the Middle Kingdom'. It is true that it inherited the system of rule employed by traditional Chinese dynasties, but in keeping with the differing

circumstances of its far-ranging territories its mode of rule was not uniform but multi-layered. According to the logic of the Qing dynasty, the authority of the Qing emperor extended to every part of the world, and even in relations with states and regions outside his domains there existed no notion of ‘diplomacy’ or ‘international relations’ in any modern sense. As if to envelop China proper and north-eastern China, the birthplace of the Manchus, which were both under the dynasty’s direct control, there stretched to the south-east the ‘south-eastern crescent zone’ of tributary states such as Korea, the Ryukyus and Vietnam, belonging to a cultural sphere characterized by Confucianism and agriculture, while to the north-west there existed the ‘north-western crescent zone’ of Mongolia, East Turkistan and Tibet, which were subject to more direct rule by the Qing and formed a non-Confucian and nomadic cultural sphere. Together these constituted the regional world of East Asia, made up of dissimilar cultural spheres.²

In the Qing’s relations with the tributary states that shared a Confucian culture, order was indicated in relations between the ‘emperor’ of the Middle Kingdom and their respective ‘kings’. With respect to Mongolia and Tibet, however, which belonged to the cultural sphere of Tibetan Buddhism, the existence of the emperor was explained as an incarnation of the Bodhisattva Manjushri. In addition, relations between Tibet and the Qing emperor were likened to the relationship between the Buddhist church and a patron, while relations with Mongolia were deemed to be those of a lord–vassal relationship between the Manchu emperor, who had inherited imperial authority going back to Chinggis Khan, and the Mongol nobles. It could be said that, by making skilful use of each ‘culture’, the Qing created different fictions to prove the legitimacy of their rule.

The basic unit in the structure of Mongol society under Qing rule was the ‘banner’ (*qosigun* or *qosighun*), each of which constituted a sort of petty kingdom with a high degree of autonomy and was ruled by a *jasagh* (chief official). Over and above the banners there existed ‘leagues’ (*chigulgan* or *cighulghan*), with the league chiefs being appointed by the Qing from among the *jasaghs* belonging to each league, and matters falling outside the jurisdiction of banners were dealt with at a triennial assembly of the *jasaghs* belonging to the league. Each banner was composed of a number of *sumus*, with 1 *sumu* consisting of about 150 households. An examination of the organization of Mongols into banners by the Qing reveals that while in Inner Mongolia it was fairly strictly enforced as a precaution against the reunification of the Mongols, more lenient measures were initially adopted towards Outer Mongolia, which had submitted to the Qing as a result of the above-mentioned incursions by Galdan. But by establishing the boundaries of banners, and thus the extent of their pastures, and by limiting the number of banner troops and

² Mancall, 1968, pp. 63–89.

seizing control of the personnel attached to the Mongol nobles, Qing authority slowly but steadily penetrated among the Mongols. Since ancient times political power on the Mongolian plateau had been exercised through the demarcation of pastures and the organization of armed corps, and changes in power had also taken place through competition within Mongol society. But under the supervision of the Qing, Mongol society was divided into banners, which became fixed, thus eliminating any possibility of change from within.

The Qing government agency responsible for the non-Chinese border areas of Mongolia, Tibet and so on was the Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifanyuan*). Ministers and officers sent by the central government were stationed in important centres in Outer Mongolia such as Uriyasutai, Khovd (Qobdu) and Urga (Khüriy-e, today's Ulaanbaatar), where they oversaw the Mongol banners under their command. As for the legal system,³ the nomadic societies of Central Eurasia had originally had their own systems of law, but in 1643, not long after the Qing had brought Inner Mongolia under their control, the *Menggu lüshu*, based on Mongol customary law, was promulgated. Eventually, after the enactment of a legal code for China proper (*Da Qing lüli*), a special code for Mongolia (*Menggu lüli*) was drawn up. The codification of customary law also took place in Outer Mongolia with the formulation of the *Qalq-a jirum*, but later the *Lifanyuan zeli* was promulgated in 1816, absorbing existing laws and also completing the systemization of Mongol indigenous law under Qing guidance.

It was noted above that the Mongol nobles were bound to the Qing emperor by a lord–vassal relationship, and the more powerful among them entered into matrimonial relationships by marrying women from the Qing imperial clan. There also existed a system, similar to that of ‘alternate attendance’ (*sankin kotai*) by *daimyos* in Edo Japan, whereby Mongol nobles were required to reside in Beijing at regular intervals. It was through channels such as these that the court culture of Beijing and information from the capital spread among the Mongol nobility.

Mongol society in decline (from the mid-nineteenth century)

Initially the aim of Qing rule in Mongolia had been to preserve Mongolia's traditional pastoral society by allowing as little contact as possible with Han Chinese society and to mobilize its armed forces in times of emergency as allies of the Manchu emperor. But while Mongol nomadic society and Chinese agrarian society moved from their earlier

³ For the legal system in Mongolia under the Qing's rule, see Shimada, 1982; Shimada, 1992; Hagiwara, 1993, pp. 623–56.

relationship of confrontation and tension to one of reconciliation as they came under Qing rule, eventually Chinese influences, going beyond the intentions of the Qing, began to advance across the Mongolian plateau. When compared with Chinese agrarian society, the structure of Mongolia's nomadic society was not geared to the amassing of wealth or the accumulation of surpluses; moreover, the business category of 'commerce' was itself virtually non-existent in Mongol society. At first, the Qing administration tried to regulate the activities of Chinese merchants on the Mongolian plateau by imposing various restrictions, but the influence of these merchants gradually made itself felt in Mongol society. Through an external force in the form of Chinese merchants, a commercial network was formed in Mongolia for the first time. Mongol products were taken to the outside world as commodities via the networks of Chinese merchants, while large quantities of consumer goods were also brought to Mongolia by the same Chinese merchants. In this fashion, Chinese merchants (known as 'Inland Chinese') seized control of Mongolia's economy, and all Mongols, from the nobility down to ordinary herdsmen, suffered under their exploitation.

Chinese merchants in Mongolia were broadly divided into the *jingbang* based in Beijing and the *xibang*, who were chiefly from Shanxi. Some of them conducted their business activities by setting up shops, while others travelled among the nomads as itinerant traders. The Qing regime stationed officials and troops at strategic places in Mongolia, and these localities inevitably became centres for the collection and distribution of goods, resulting in the creation of markets and settlements. Under the patronage of the Qing, the Buddhist church also extended its influence, and the increase in the number of monks led to a decline in the population of effective producers. The enormous monasteries were in themselves centres of great consumption, and market places for pilgrims sprang up in their vicinity, becoming places of barter and social intercourse. In this manner there emerged on the Mongolian plateau urban settlements centred on government offices and monasteries and located at strategic points in the transport network, becoming nodes for the movement of people, information and goods.

Within the Mongolian plateau, a still more serious situation was developing to the south of the Gobi desert in Inner Mongolia, in the region near the Great Wall line bordering the Chinese agricultural zone. Farming had originally been carried out in parts of Inner Mongolia, but the stabilization of Qing society resulted in a rapid rise in the population of China proper, and this excess population crossed the Great Wall line and flooded into Inner Mongolia, settling in the Mongol pastures. The opening up of Mongol pastures initially began with the recruiting of Chinese peasants by Mongol nobles, but the cultivation of the impoverished soil of the Mongol pastures inevitably led to the degradation of the land. There was no halt to Chinese migration, however, and the devastation of land and the

diminution of pastures advanced. In parts of Inner Mongolia bordering China proper, some banners became predominantly Chinese in their composition, and administrative agencies such as departments (*zhous*), prefectures (*fus*) and districts (*xians*) were established to govern them, with these agencies taking the initiative in encouraging even more peasants to settle in these areas. In such regions the Mongol nobles became parasitic 'feudal' landowners, and the former Mongol nomads found themselves surrounded by Chinese peasants and forced to engage in unaccustomed farm work, while their debts to Chinese merchants also weighed heavily on them.

Under such circumstances there were instances of ethnic conflict between Mongols and Chinese. In particular, the anti-Chinese uprisings that broke out throughout Inner Mongolia under the late Qing were in one respect an expression of resistance against the Mongol landlords who had encouraged the influx of Chinese peasants, as well as involving attacks on Chinese peasants and merchants. Under continuing Qing rule, any possibility of endogenous change on the Mongolian plateau, which had formerly been the sphere of nomadic horsemen, was institutionally curbed; and with the penetration of Chinese influence, social conditions changed and regressed.

Mongolia in Russo-Qing relations (from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century)

Mongolia was situated in the 'north-western crescent zone' of the Qing empire, but once the Russian empire began to promote the development of Siberia in earnest and to plan its advance into East Asia as well, shifts in power relations between the two empires came to have an enormous influence on the moves of the Mongols. Russia pushed its influence eastwards chiefly via the rivers of Siberia and had reached the Amur river valley by the mid-seventeenth century. This led to conflict with the Qing, and eventually the frontier with the Qing in the Amur region was determined with the conclusion of the Nerchinsk treaty in 1689, and Russian merchants were allowed to start trading in Beijing. The boundary between Outer Mongolia and Siberia was later established by the Kiakhta treaty, ratified in 1728, and with the signing of these two treaties relations between Russia and the Qing were stabilized. The Qing's power was then at its height, and relations between the two empires were determined more or less in accordance with the Qing's wishes. Trade between the two took place at the border town of Kiakhta and grew steadily from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century.

However, a definite change in international relations was taking place. Britain, which had grown into a world empire, was trying to extend its power to East Asia from its base in

India, and these ambitions inevitably took the form of a challenge to the 'tribute system' upheld by the Qing. Following the British victory in the Opium War, Britain in 1841 concluded the treaty of Nanking (Nanjing) with the Qing, which resulted in the coexistence of the tribute system and the treaty system in the Qing's foreign relations. At this stage Russia had no intention of revising the principles of its relations with the Qing, confirmed by the treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta. But with the signing of the treaty of Kuldja in 1851, Ili and Tarbagatai (Tarbaghatai) were opened to Russian traders, and Russia began to plot the further spread of its influence into East Turkistan and Mongolia.

The confrontation between Britain and Russia occasioned by the outbreak of the Crimean war also had repercussions in East Asia, and as 'the *Arrow* incident' unfolded in China proper, Russia succeeded in acquiring from the Qing vast swathes of land along the north-eastern frontier through the treaties of Aigun and Tientsin (Tianjin) in 1858 and the treaty of Beijing in 1860. Relations between Russia and the Qing had swung completely in Russia's favour, and this marked the official start of 'modern foreign relations' based on theoretically equal relations between two sovereign states. Whereas Western powers such as Britain and France mounted attacks on the Qing from the sea, Russia began an actively imperialistic invasion by land, that is, in East Turkistan and Mongolia, and the inhabitants of Central Eurasia found themselves caught up in the maelstrom of international relations regardless of their own wishes.

It was in the context of this global struggle for dominance by the British and Russian empires and the weakening of the Qing empire that a series of events occurred that included Ya'qub Beg's uprising in East Turkistan, the Russian occupation of Ili, the Qing's counter-offensive and the subsequent establishment of Xinjiang province in 1884. During this period Han Chinese bureaucrats came to the fore in the Qing government and seized the initiative. From their perspective of the defence of the 'frontier regions' of the Qing in its capacity as the Middle Kingdom, they viewed these events with great concern. With regard to the 'Ili crisis', they feared that if the Qing took any conciliatory action, Russia would next set its sights on Mongolia. In fact, the economic activities of Russians in Mongolia increased in the second half of the nineteenth century, and Chinese merchants found themselves competing with Russian trading companies.

Contrary to the fears of Qing officials, however, the scene of the next dispute between the Russian and Qing empires was not Mongolia, but northeastern China, the birthplace of the Qing Manchu empire, which was known to Westerners and the Japanese as 'Manchuria'. This was bound up with the construction of railroads, representing a technology symbolic of the modern age. In 1891 Russia began constructing the Trans-Siberian Railway, and it also won from the Qing a concession to build the Chinese Eastern Railway, a branch

of the Trans-Siberian Railway cutting across north-eastern China, to facilitate transportation to Vladivostok. This offensive by Russia caused tension with Japan which, since the Meiji Restoration, had been working towards building a modern state and was seeking to extend its influence on the Korean peninsula. In the event, shifts in international relations in North-East Asia, with Japan and Russia's Far East and Siberia representing two poles and the interjacent regions of north-eastern China and the Korean peninsula acting as a buffer zone, led to fresh conflict.

With its victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5, Japan succeeded in putting an end to Qing suzerainty over the Korean Yi dynasty, but Russia then set about trying to extend its own influence on the Korean peninsula in place of the Qing. Worthy of particular attention is the fact that in 1901, some time after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese war, the Qing government redivided Manchuria into three provinces and set about strengthening its control over the region. The administrative unit known as 'North-East China' officially began from this time, and it included moreover a considerable portion of the life space of the Mongols. Furthermore, the development of a railway network in these three north-eastern provinces led to a large influx of Chinese immigrants from China proper. Russia's aggressive expansion of its influence and, in particular, the actions taken by Russian troops during the Boxer Rebellion produced a sense of crisis in Japan, and eventually the Russo-Japanese war broke out in 1904. The war itself ended in a limited victory for Japan, and thereafter Russia and Japan moved from confrontation to reconciliation, with each recognizing the other's special interests in North-East Asia and moving towards the establishment of respective spheres of influence. This began with the first Russo-Japanese Entente in 1908, as a result of which it was recognized by Japan and then by other foreign powers that Outer Mongolia fell within Russia's sphere of influence.

Mongolia during the final years of the Qing

By the start of the twentieth century it had become obvious that the Qing empire, headed by a Manchu emperor, was in decline owing to incursions by foreign powers from without and the rise of Han Chinese forces within. But when viewed in a broad perspective, both the foreign powers and the Chinese officials who wielded power within the administration shared the common goal of preserving their own interests by propping up the Qing dynasty rather than undermining it. The situation in Mongolia was far removed from the ideals that the Qing had initially espoused for its rule there. But when considered in institutional terms, there had been no great changes since the start of the Qing, especially in Outer Mongolia. The reforms of the Qing bureaucracy, which began in 1906, represented a major political

and administrative upheaval, with the very survival of the Qing dynasty at stake. As part of these reforms, a fundamental change in policy towards Mongolia was mooted. A broad range of measures was planned, including the reform of the administrative organization and institutions and the introduction of new institutions, in particular the deployment of a modern army and the establishment of schools and of health and sanitary facilities. It is noteworthy that when, during deliberations on these new policies, Prince Su Shanqi (1866–1922), who was in charge of the process on the Qing side, visited leading Mongol nobles in Inner Mongolia to solicit their views, the majority of the nobles expressed their support. This indicates that in those parts of Inner Mongolia where Chinese settlement was especially advanced, the fate of the Mongol princes was inseparably linked to that of the Qing dynasty on account of the fact that they had become local ‘feudal’ lords.

But in contrast to these moves among the Inner Mongol nobles, in Khalkha (Qalq-a) in Outer Mongolia there were considerable qualms about and opposition to the Qing’s new policies towards Mongolia, chiefly among the nobility and the Buddhist priesthood, who constituted the leaders of Mongol society at the time. In their view, should the new policies be implemented in their current form, Mongolia would eventually become indistinguishable from a ‘province’ of China proper, and in parts of Inner Mongolia there were dangerous indications that this was already happening. They were also concerned that real power in the Qing administration was held by Chinese officials and that they were behind these new policies. In other words, the Mongol leaders were preparing to rise up in defence of Mongolia’s traditional social structure and life environment, and the seeds of distrust of the Qing regime had begun to sprout. The Khalkha Mongol princes who had been chosen as members of the newly established parliament in Beijing entered into negotiations with the Qing administration for the suspension of its new policies, but the government refused to retract its intention of implementing them, and in 1908 they were forcibly implemented over Mongol opposition by Sandoo (Sandowa), a Mongol bannerman, who had been appointed minister in Urga (*Amban/Kulun banshi dachen*).

Upon his arrival in Urga, Sandoo implemented in rapid succession measures based on the new policies, and there gradually developed a pattern of conflict between the Qing officials, sent from Beijing and headed by Sandoo, and the local nobles and monks of Khalkha. Seeing no prospect of resolving the situation, in the summer of 1911 the Mongols held talks on the occasion of a religious service in Urga and decided that a delegation should be sent secretly to Russia to ask for help against the Chinese. Those chosen for the mission included Prince Khanddorji (Qanddorji), one of the most influential of the Mongol princes; Cherengchimed (Cerengcimed), an aide of the Eighth Jebcundamba Khutukhtu (*Qutughtu*, a Tibetan ‘Living Buddha’ of Urga who was widely revered not

only in Khalkha, but throughout Mongolia); and Khaisan (Qayisan), an Inner Mongol. They were all strongly anti-Chinese and intent on Mongol independence. They bore a secret missive for the Russian emperor signed by the Jebcundamba Khutukhtu and the four Khalkha khans (*qans*), but what exactly the Mongols wanted of Russia is problematic.

According to the archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian empire, which have to a large extent been made public in recent years, the secret missive addressed to the Russian emperor merely listed the problems caused by the new policies and sought Russian intervention in purely abstract terms. This indicates that while there was agreement among the Mongols who had sent the delegation regarding their desire to put a stop to the new policies through Russian intervention, there was no consensus beyond this about the future of Mongolia. But the men who carried the missive were all desirous of Mongolian independence and were risking their lives by violating a government ban on travel to Russia. Once they arrived in St Petersburg they requested Russian aid in achieving independence. It is clear from the Russian archives that the Russian consulate in Urga did not necessarily have an accurate understanding of the motives behind the delegation's dispatch, and there were also misunderstandings in the consulate's communications with the Russian foreign ministry.⁴

However, while Mongol society had undergone definite changes during the long period of Qing rule, there still existed in Outer or Khalkha Mongolia a certain degree of regional unity or regional ties, and the universal recognition that there was a crisis had prompted the secret mission to Russia. The inclusion of an Inner Mongol, Khaisan, in the delegation was an attempt to show that there were sympathizers in Inner Mongolia too. The Russian Government was placed in a dilemma as to how to receive the delegation: it was concerned that the new policies being pursued in Mongolia by the Chinese would upset the balance of power along the Russo-Chinese frontier. In the end, the Russians persuaded the delegation that 'independence' was impossible, but at the same time they decided to ask the Qing Government through their minister in Beijing to suspend the new policies in Mongolia. In September the Qing, under diplomatic pressure from Russia, declared the suspension of these policies. But shortly afterwards, on 10 October 1911, the Wuchang uprising occurred, leading to the collapse of the Qing dynasty. Mongolia, with the members of the delegation (who had by now returned home) at the helm, embarked on the path to independence.

⁴ Nakami, 1999c, pp. 69–78.

The 1911 Mongol declaration of independence and international relations

The question of when the germs of ‘nationalism’ in the modern sense can be sought in the case of the Mongols is unexpectedly difficult to answer. The reunification of the Mongols had been held in check under the astute policies of the Qing, but the period following the Opium War saw incursions by Western powers into Qing territory, changes in the system of Qing rule itself, the expansion of Chinese influence on the Mongolian plateau and the retrogression of Mongol nomadic society. As the twentieth century dawned under these conditions, there gradually developed among the Mongols a sense of crisis regarding the survival of their distinctive society and culture and even their very survival as an ethnic group. This led to an ‘anti-Qing’ or ‘anti-Chinese’ movement aimed at protecting their traditional system of values. But the Mongols were fragmented, and the questions of how to achieve unification once again or anew and on what basis and within what geographical bounds, how to define the ‘Mongols’, and how to establish an independent political system became the issues for Mongol ‘nationalism’ in the modern world.

As the Qing establishment began to falter as a result of the 1911 revolution, the anti-Qing movement that had been growing in Khalkha during the late Qing moved all at once towards independence. In Urga, which was the main centre of Khalkha and the base of Qing rule in Outer Mongolia, Qing officials were expelled and on 1 December 1911 independence was proclaimed. This move was driven by the upper echelons of the nobility and priesthood in Khalkha, and they formed a government (the so-called Bogdo Khaan [hereafter Khan] government), with the Jebcundamba Khutukhtu as emperor, i.e. Bogdo Khan (*Boghda qaghan*). The initial goal of the Bogdo Khan government was the reunification of the Mongols in former Qing territory and the formation of an independent state; the Mongols in Imperial Russian territory, like the Buriats, were therefore not included in its plans.

The line of reasoning adopted by the Mongols in declaring independence was that, with the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the former lord–vassal relationship that had existed between the Qing emperor and the Mongol nobles, and also the Mongol people as a whole, had been extinguished and the Mongols had accordingly recovered their political independence. In other words, regardless of the advancing Sinicization within government circles, in the view of the Mongols the Qing dynasty was a regime headed by a Manchu emperor, and they did not look upon the Qing dynasty as a Chinese dynasty, nor did there exist any notion of a ‘Middle Kingdom’. Therefore, the Republic of China that had been newly established in China proper was no more than a Chinese regime completely unrelated to

themselves; they found it unconscionable that the Republic of China could make any claim to inherit the Qing's right to govern the Mongols.⁵ The Jebcundamba Khutukhtu was in fact of Tibetan birth and may seem an inappropriate choice as emperor of an independent Mongolia. But Tibetan Buddhism was deeply entrenched in Mongol society, and since the Jebcundamba Khutukhtu was widely revered by the Mongol masses, he was considered to be a more fitting symbol of Mongol unity than any Mongol noble descended from Chinggis Khan.

The Bogdo Khan government began by establishing five ministries (home affairs, foreign affairs, finance, justice and military affairs) and an office of religious affairs for overseeing Buddhist circles, as well as the post of prime minister, a prime minister's office and two houses of parliament, thereby laying the foundations of the administration. Initially leadership was seized by Cherengchimed, the minister of home affairs who had been a member of the aforementioned secret delegation to Russia and whose long-cherished wish was to establish a Greater Mongolia incorporating Inner Mongolia. Large numbers of Inner Mongols also came to Urga to take part in the Bogdo Khan government. By 1912 it had brought all of Qing Outer Mongolia, including Khalkha, Khovd and Uriyasutai, under its effective control and was also attempting to extend its influence into Inner Mongolia.

The Bogdo Khan government, established as it was during the confusion occasioned by the unexpected collapse of the Qing dynasty, had a fragile base, and consequently it was hoped that assistance would be provided by an outside power, namely, tsarist Russia. In Western research, Mongolia's declaration of independence in 1911 has until quite recently been attributed to Russian incitement, and Chinese and Taiwanese researchers still believe this to have been the case, although it does not accord with the facts. The Russians had no desire for Mongol independence, and events unfolded in a way that far exceeded Russian calculations. Russia initially tried to resolve the question of Mongol independence by bringing the Bogdo Khan government and the Beijing Yuan Shikai government to the negotiating table through its own mediation, and it was prepared to accept Chinese sovereignty over what had been Outer Mongolia under the Qing. But as the Bogdo Khan government steadily extended its effective control and consolidated its organization, the Russians were compelled to reconsider their policy.

Closely watching the unfolding situation in Mongolia was Japan, which had already established its own sphere of influence in south Manchuria and was aiming to extend its influence in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia as well. Japan recognized Outer Mongolia as falling within the Russian empire's sphere of influence, but there was no agreement between Japan and Russia regarding Inner Mongolia, and Japan feared that Russian

⁵ Nakami, 1984, pp. 129–49.

influence would spread to Inner Mongolia through the Bogdo Khan government. Russia, on the other hand, had since the end of the Russo-Japanese war abandoned its earlier aggressive policy of expanding its influence into East Asia and was desirous of cooperating with other imperialist powers, especially Japan. In addition, the United States was a strong advocate of 'China's territorial integrity' so as to curb any territorial ambitions that Japan and Russia might have espoused since the collapse of the Qing dynasty.

It was inconceivable that the Russian empire would support the independence of all of Mongolia, including Inner Mongolia, as called for by the Bogdo Khan government, and at working-level meetings held in May 1912 a high degree of autonomy for the Bogdo Khan government under Chinese suzerainty within the region limited to Outer Mongolia was proposed as a solution to the problem; it was also decided that Russia would acquire special economic rights and interests in Outer Mongolia. Russia first concluded the third Russo-Japanese Entente, which established Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Inner Mongolia. Next, seeing that the Beijing government remained unyielding in its stance towards the Mongol question, Russia concluded the Russo-Mongol agreement with the Bogdo Khan government in November 1912. This recognized the autonomy of the Bogdo Khan government, but at the same time the latter was forced to recognize Russia's wide-ranging economic rights and interests. With the conclusion of this Russo-Mongol agreement, the Beijing government was also compelled to agree to talks with Russia, and in November 1913 a Russo-Chinese declaration on the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was issued. In return for recognition of its suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, China gave Russia a guarantee regarding the autonomy of the Bogdo Khan government.

The site of the final resolution of the problem was Kiakhta, where a tripartite conference with representatives of the governments of Bogdo Khan, Russia and China was held in September 1914. The Kiakhta agreement was concluded in July of the following year. Thus the question of Mongolia's independence was finally resolved through careful behind-the-scenes manoeuvring by Russia. While it represented a major backdown for the Bogdo Khan government when compared with its initial hopes for pan-Mongol independence, it had no option but to follow the course laid down by Russia. Meanwhile, the Beijing government only gained recognition of its largely nominal legal right of 'suzerainty', and Outer Mongolia became in effect a region outside its political control. But all the same it had to be content that it had succeeded in averting the 'worst-case scenario' of Mongol independence.

Following this political process, there occurred a regional restructuring regarding post-Qing Mongolia. The territory of the Bogdo Khan government recognized by the Kiakhta agreement corresponded to Outer Mongolia during the Qing and Darigangga

(Dariganggh-a) of Inner Mongolia, and this became the basis of the national territory of the present independent state of Mongolia. The exclusion of Inner Mongolia except Darigangga from the sphere of the Bogdo Khan government's autonomy was by no means due solely to Russian policy and international relations. Not long after the declaration of independence at Urga, large numbers of Inner Mongols had arrived to take part in the new government, and many banners in Inner Mongolia are said to have desired to various degrees to join forces with the Bogdo Khan government. Especially keen to do so was the region of Barga (Kölün Buyir). But because the Chinese Eastern Railway crossed this region, it was excluded from the territory of the Bogdo Khan government owing to diplomatic considerations on the part of Russia. Instead Russia and the Beijing government signed a separate agreement to guarantee its autonomy, which remained in force until the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was terminated by Chinese warlords in 1919.

There were, however, considerable differences between conditions in Outer and Inner Mongolia. Even under its long period of Qing rule, Khalkha had preserved a degree of regional solidarity and unity. It was for this reason that, within a short time after the collapse of the Qing dynasty, local Mongol political leaders succeeded in establishing a new political regime headed by the Jebcundamba Khutukhtu. Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, was largely fragmented, with many banners including large numbers of Chinese settlers, while large areas of pasture had been converted into farmland; the situation therefore differed from that in Outer Mongolia, a traditional nomadic region. Consequently, the Inner Mongols were unable to act in unison and were forced to respond individually to the changing situation, with each banner finally succumbing to pressure from the Beijing government.

Güingsügnorbu of Kharachin (Qaracin) was a typical example of an Inner Mongol noble. He was related by marriage to the Qing imperial family, his position and rights were guaranteed by the authority of the Qing dynasty and he identified his own fate with that of the Qing. But even he was sympathetic to the idea of a Greater Mongolia (unifying Inner and Outer Mongolia) as proposed by the Bogdo Khan government, and he sent a private messenger to Urga. But the feeling gained by the messenger was that of an enormous gulf between Khalkha Mongolia, which still preserved scenes of a traditional nomadic society, and Kharachin, which had become almost entirely agrarian. In the end, after having unsuccessfully probed the possibilities of joint action by the Inner Mongol nobles, Güingsügnorbu succumbed to coercion and placation from the Beijing government and was appointed head of the newly established Bureau of Mongol-Tibetan Affairs in Beijing.

Babuujab⁶ of the East Tümed met a more tragic end on 8 October 1916. He was known as a leader of the struggle against Chinese immigrants, and once independence was proclaimed in Khalkha, he went to Urga and eventually became one of the commanders when the army of the Bogdo Khan government launched military action against Inner Mongolia in 1913. This action had to be abandoned because of pressure from the Russian Government, but Babuujab remained in the border region between Inner and Outer Mongolia together with his own troops composed of Inner Mongols, awaiting the outcome of events. With the establishment of an autonomous Outer Mongolia as a result of the Kiakhta agreement, and the resultant exclusion of Inner Mongolia from the new regional order, the presence of Babuujab and his troops became a source of concern for both the Bogdo Khan government and the Chinese warlords. It was decided through Russian mediation that his troops should be disbanded and settled in different parts of Outer Mongolia.

It was at this point that Babuujab was approached by a Japanese civil adventurer from Hailar in north-eastern China. This was the start of the relationship between Babuujab and the Japanese expansionist groups. Rather than settling in wretched circumstances in Outer Mongolia, Babuujab accepted the offer from the Japanese. Inner Mongolia was his home, and its future was of the utmost importance to him. Some members of the Japanese army hoped to use him in their campaign against Yuan Shikai, the president of the Republic of China. But warnings to the Japanese from the Russians, and then the sudden death of Yuan Shikai, led the Japanese military authorities to ban all such activities. Nonetheless Babuujab began advancing with his troops in order to show up the Japanese army that had abandoned him, but he suffered a surprise attack in Chinese territory from troops belonging to the warlord Zhang Zuolin, and so ended a chequered life in 1916.

In this fashion, following the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the Mongols aspired to independence, but in the end they managed to gain only autonomy limited to Outer Mongolia under the suzerainty of the Republic of China. The resulting political system was one in which religious and political authority were intermingled, with a Tibetan ‘Living Buddha’ as emperor, and its existence was moreover guaranteed by the Russian empire. Once the tsarist empire fell apart after the 1917 revolution, the political situation surrounding Mongolia quickly changed. The autonomy of Outer Mongolia recognized by the Kiakhta agreement was unilaterally revoked in 1919 by the forces of a Chinese warlord dispatched from Beijing.

When one looks back today, however, of all the territories within the former Qing empire, the only region to have succeeded in creating a nation-state was Mongolia. The starting point on this long path was the declaration of independence in 1911, while the

⁶ Nakami, 1999b, pp. 137–53.

origins of the national territory of present-day Mongolia can also be sought in that of the Bogdo Khan government. In this sense, the declaration of independence and the establishment of the Bogdo Khan government in 1911 may be seen as an important turning-point in Mongol history. For the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, the issues that faced them in the subsequent period were how to overcome their state of fragmentation, which forces would assume leadership, and within what bounds they would rebuild the territory of 'Inner Mongolia'.

Part two⁷

THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION OF 1921 AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1924–46)

(*Ts. Batbayar*)

The birth of the People's Republic

The years 1919–21 in Outer Mongolia can best be characterized as 'the turbulent period'. Russia retreated from Outer Mongolia because of its involvement in the First World War and the turmoil caused by the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. The Chinese warlord government in Beijing used this opportunity to annul the autonomous status of Outer Mongolia and regain its lost position there. The autonomy of Outer Mongolia was abolished by force in November 1919.

The abolition of its autonomy in 1919 greatly stimulated Mongol nationalism during this turbulent period. Two secret groups emerged in Khüriye (Urga) in the autumn of 1919. The 'Russian Consular Hill group' was headed by the well-educated Dogsomyn Bodoо (1885–1922) and included D. Chagdarjav, O. Jamyan, D. Losol, Kh. Choibalsan and others. The 'Dzüün Khüriye (East Urga) group' was headed by the former Bogdo Khan government official, Soliin Danzan (1885–1924), and included D. Dogsom, D. Sükhbaatar,

⁷ For the latest research trends and newly discovered historical sources on the modern history of the Mongols, see Nakami, [1999a](#), pp. 7–39.

M. Dugarjav, O. Dendev and others.⁸ The two groups merged into one party, called *Mongol Ardyn Nam* (People's Party of Mongolia), in June 1920 and adopted their first charter. The People's Party was against collaboration with the Chinese and set as its goal the restoration of Outer Mongolia's autonomy. The party sent a seven-member mission to Soviet Russia to seek money and weapons. In Irkutsk in August 1920 they met representatives of the Siberian branch of the Bolshevik Party and the Fifth Red Army and submitted the People's Party programme. The mission was instructed to proceed to Moscow.

Soon the Russian civil war spilled over into Outer Mongolia when anti-Bolshevik Russians headed by R. F. Ungern-Sternberg (1885–1921) invaded from Siberia. His advance into Khüriye, and his first unsuccessful attempt to drive the Chinese troops from the city in November 1920, created an entirely new situation in Mongolia which immediately attracted the attention of Moscow. Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin's offer to dispatch the Soviet Red Army was rejected by the Beijing government, which regarded this as intervention in Chinese internal affairs. However, in February 1921, Ungern-Sternberg's troops succeeded in taking Khüriye and the remainder of the Chinese garrison fled to Kiakhta on the Soviet border.

Soviet support for the Mongolian People's Revolution between November 1920 and February 1921 was ambivalent, primarily because of Moscow's overriding commitment to establishing full diplomatic relations with the Beijing government. However, the seizure of Khüriye by the Ungern-Sternberg forces and the improved Soviet position in Siberia permitted Moscow to instruct Red Army troops to enter Mongolia. The People's Party held its first congress in March 1921 in Troitskosavsk, on the Soviet border, and elected S. Danzan as its chairman. At the same time, a provisional Mongolian government was formed and national army units were established.

The Soviet Red Army, the troops of the Far Eastern Republic and the Mongol soldiers had captured Khüriye by early July 1921 and installed the new People's Government of Mongolia. D. Bodoo was named premier and foreign minister, D. Sükhbaatar was minister of war and commander-in-chief, S. Danzan was minister of finance, Da Lama Puntsagdorj was minister of interior and Beil Magsarjav was minister of justice.⁹ B. Shumyatskiy, chairman of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern and one of the architects of the Mongolian revolution, sent a letter to Chicherin on 12 August 1921 which stressed the

⁸ Official propaganda created the myth that Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan were two founding members of the party who contributed more to the revolution than other men, especially Bodoo and Danzan. Almost from the moment of their executions in 1922 and 1924, and particularly during the Choibalsan years, Bodoo and Danzan were stigmatized by official historians as traitors and counter-revolutionaries and their services to the revolution have for the most part been ignored or neglected.

⁹ Magsarjav, 1994, pp. 218–19.

importance of revolutionary Mongolia as an ally who would defend 'the most vulnerable stretch of Soviet Russia's thousands-of-kilometres-long border with China'.¹⁰

The legitimacy and power of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia was overwhelming at that time. The Oath-Taking treaty of 1 November 1921 imposed strict limits on the Living Buddha Jebtsundamba's secular power while granting him unlimited power in religious affairs. The unity between moderates and radicals within the People's Government on this and other issues did not last long, however. In August 1922 Premier Bodoo and 14 others were executed by radicals on charges of a 'counter-revolutionary plot' to restore the monarchy.

The next two years witnessed key leadership changes which facilitated radical political developments. In February 1923 the commander-in-chief Sükhbaatar died of an illness (he was later elevated to the status of national hero by official propaganda), and in the summer of the same year, Premier Jalkhanz Khutagt Damdinbazar, who had succeeded Bodoo, also died of an illness. Next, Jebtsundamba died on 27 May 1924, and the People's Party, which was instructed by the Bolsheviks to form a republic, forbade the traditional search for the reincarnation of the deceased ruler. This move eliminated the theocratic symbol of Buddhist Mongolia.

Russia's diplomatic missions to the Beijing government, headed by A. K. Paikes in December 1921 and by A. A. Joffe after July 1922, failed to convince the Chinese authorities of Soviet Russia's sincere intentions towards Outer Mongolia. Thereafter, a Soviet representative, L. M. Karakhan, who came to Beijing in September 1923, dismissed the question of Outer Mongolia as 'meaningless' and hurried to normalize official relations between Soviet Russia and China. The fifth article of the Soviet treaty with China of 31 May 1924 mentioned Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Republic of China. At the same time, Karakhan officially expressed the Soviet Government's readiness to withdraw its troops from Outer Mongolia.¹¹

The third Congress of the People's Party of Mongolia met in Khüriye from 4 to 31 August 1924. The congress recommended the Soviet style of government and the non-capitalist road to development. The Great State *Khural*,¹² the new national assembly, convened its first session from 8 to 25 November 1924 in Khüriye. The *Khural* adopted the country's first constitution and promulgated the Mongolian People's Republic (hereinafter referred to as the MPR).¹³ The constitution outlined the functions of the Grand *Khural*, the Little *Khural* (standing legislature) elected by the former, the presidium and the government. The right to vote and be elected was accorded to citizens over 18 years of age living

¹⁰ Luzianin, 2000, pp. 99–100.

¹¹ Luzianin, 2000, p. 118.

¹² *Khural* means 'gathering' in Mongolian.

¹³ *Mongol Ulus-iin Tüükh*, 2003, pp. 153–5.

by their own labour, but the constitution disenfranchised ‘secular and ecclesiastical feudals’ and lamas (Buddhist priests) who were permanently resident in monasteries. Khüriye was renamed Ulaanbaatar (‘Red Hero’ in Mongolian).

In compliance with the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924, Soviet troops were withdrawn from the MPR until 1925. At the same time, the MPR recognized the independence of the Republic of Tuva (also known as Tannu-Tuva or Uriankhai) in 1925 and concluded a treaty of friendly relations in August 1926 that led to the exchange of diplomatic representatives.¹⁴

Until 1928, the year which marked a radical turn in its development, the MPR experienced a short but effective wave of modernization. A joint Mongol-Russian Bank of Trade and Industry was established in June 1924 and a national currency system was introduced. In 1925 the state budget, tax collection and customs tariffs were started. These moves were part of the attempt to establish ‘national’ integration over the economy of the MPR. Trade delegations were sent to West European countries in 1926, while some 500 Chinese firms and a dozen British and American firms operated in Mongolia. Foreign firms accounted for 86 per cent of the country’s exports and 87 per cent of its imports.

Western specialists also established small factories and power stations. The first Mongol atlas was designed and printed in Germany and for a short period the Swedish YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Association) operated a school and hospital in Ulaanbaatar.

Modern education and health systems were introduced. The first secondary school opened in 1923 in Ulaanbaatar with 40 pupils. Its best students were sent abroad, mostly to Russian cities like Leningrad and Irkutsk. In order to learn from the West, some 45 students were sent to Germany and France. The minister of education, Erdeni Batukhan, was actively involved in this programme and he himself accompanied the students to Berlin.

The suppression of Buddhism

In early 1928 the Comintern sent its new representative Josef Raiter to Mongolia and started pressing the Mongolian leadership to accept Comintern policy guidelines. Raiter presented a letter from the Comintern which warned about ‘the danger of rightism’ threatening the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. The MPRP chairman, Tseren-Ochiriin Dambadorj, went to Moscow in May 1928 to meet the Comintern leadership. However,

¹⁴ In December 1921, as a result of Soviet insistence, the Uriankhai region of north-western Mongolia became the Tannu-Tuva People’s Republic, the independence of which was recognized by the MPR in 1926. In 1944 it was annexed by the Soviet Union as the Tuvian *oblast*’ of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and in 1961 it became the Tuvian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

he failed to convince them that Comintern policy guidelines were not suited to the actual situation in the country and that it was premature to implement them in the MPR.¹⁵

Further developments in the MPR closely paralleled those in Soviet Russia. By August 1928, Stalin had defeated Bukharin's group in the Comintern and imposed upon it his tactics of confrontation with the Social Democrats. The following month the Comintern sent a seven-member delegation (headed by the Czech communist Bogumir Shmeral) to Ulaanbaatar to orchestrate the struggle between 'leftists' and 'rightists' in the MPRP.

After 48 days of debate, the seventh Congress of the MPRP, held from October to December 1928, expelled Dambadorj and others as 'rightists' and ratified the Comintern-drafted programme presented by the so-called left wing of the party. This programme called for the confiscation of private property, especially those of nobles and high-ranking priests, the collectivization of herders and the implementation of the Soviet trade monopoly.¹⁶

During the winter of 1929–30, the property of more than 920 religious and secular leaders of the 'feudal' category was confiscated. Those called 'feudal' were ruling and non-ruling nobles, officials under the old regime, and Buddhist priests including the Living Buddhas. Property worth 5.2 million *tögrögs* (the Mongolian national currency) was confiscated from 729 of the 920 'feudals'. The second stage of expropriation was carried out in 1930–2, when another 4.5 million *tögrögs* worth of property was confiscated from 825 'feudals'.¹⁷

The party and government of the MPR fiercely attacked the religious establishment, which held a large share of the country's wealth. The economic units (*jas*) of monasteries were estimated to be holding about 3 million head of livestock. Heavy taxes were imposed on monasteries and most *jas* livestock was expropriated and handed over to newly created communes. Ordinary priests were forcibly converted into laymen and young men under 18 were prohibited from becoming priests. According to a government report, the number of priests was reduced from about 100,000 to 75,000 during 1930–1.¹⁸

A massive shift from private to public property was under way. By the end of 1931, more than 752 communes had been established; these included about 33 per cent of all herders. Mongolia's economy, which rested entirely on animal husbandry, was severely affected by the disruption of the traditional private management of livestock. By early 1932, the Mongols had lost 8 million head of livestock, a third of the total.

The Comintern extremism brought the nation to the verge of civil war. The first revolts occurred in the monasteries of Tögsbuyant and Ulaangom in March 1930. By mid-1932

¹⁵ Roshin, 1999, pp. 171–8.

¹⁶ Roshin, 1999, pp. 194–212.

¹⁷ *Mongol Ulus-iin Tüükh*, 2003, pp. 173–5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 178–9.

this discontent had mushroomed into a large-scale uprising including several thousand armed rebels and spreading across four western *aimags* (provinces in Mongolian administrative terminology). According to eyewitnesses, in that period the strength of the revolt grew continuously from day to day.

The Central Committee of the MPRP formed a five-member special government commission headed by Jambyn Lhümbe – one of its secretaries – and dispatched it in April 1932 to Khövsgöl *aimag*, which became the fulcrum of the uprising. Minister of Industry Gombyn Sodnom was sent to another trouble spot, Arkhangai *aimag*, where he met his death. Finally, the People's Government called in the regular army and tanks in May 1932, and during June and July it brutally suppressed the armed rebellion in western Mongolia. In Khövsgöl *aimag* alone, 614 rebels were shot dead and another 1,500 were arrested during the course of 15 battles.¹⁹

Soviet purges in Mongolia

The armed uprising of 1932 proved that the Comintern had failed to implement its communist experiment in the MPR. Stalin and two other Comintern leaders sent an urgent letter to the MPRP leadership in May 1932 urging them to change course and abandon their extremist policies.²⁰ At the end of the following month, the MPRP denounced its previous policy as 'leftist deviation' and accepted the policy of socio-economic gradualism known as the 'New Turn' policy. In July 1932 Agdanbuugiin Amar became chairman of the Little State *Khural*, and Peljidiin Genden became premier.

After 1932 the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) replaced the Comintern as 'sole instructor' for the Mongol leadership, and Stalin became personally involved in Mongol affairs. For Stalin, the MPR became an important 'buffer' against Japanese aggression because Japan had built its puppet state of 'Manchoukuo' in north-eastern China. In order to make the MPR a stable buffer, Stalin needed to eliminate all 'class enemies' inside Mongolia. His principal target was the Buddhist church, which still controlled some 800 monasteries with 90,000 priests in the mid-1930s. In his two meetings with Premier Genden in November 1934 and December 1935, Stalin urged the leaders of the MPR to intensify their anti-religious campaign and eventually to destroy the Buddhist church. Stalin maintained that the MPRP and the Buddhist church could not coexist in Mongolia. As a result, most of the 800 monasteries were ruined, and 16–17,000 high-ranking priests were killed in 1937–8.

¹⁹ Batbayar, 2002, pp. 40–1.

²⁰ *Komintern ba Mongol*, 1996, pp. 393–8.

To accomplish his goals, Stalin decided to install a trusted person and a repressive organ like the Soviet NKVD (People's Commissary for Internal Affairs) in the MPR. In February 1936 the Mongolian secret police (called the ministry of interior) was created as a copy of the NKVD, with Khorloogiin Choibalsan as its head. Premier Genden was purged in March 1936 for his resistance to Stalin's demands to fight the Buddhist church. Between 1937 and 1939 Genden's rival Choibalsan became minister of interior, minister of war, minister of foreign affairs and finally, in March 1939, premier.

On 27 November 1934 the MPR–Soviet 'gentlemen's agreement' was reached that provided for mutual assistance in the face of Japanese advances in north-eastern China and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. In January 1935 Soviet troops re-entered the MPR on the grounds that the Japanese Kwantung army was probing the MPR–Manchoukuo border. On 12 March 1936, the 1934 agreement was upgraded with the signing of a 10-year mutual defence protocol. The protocol did not mention Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, and Moscow ignored Chinese protests.

After the start of the 'Great Terror' in the Soviet Union in June 1937, the MPR fell victim to the same terror starting in August 1937. On 24 August the Soviet NKVD vice-minister M. Frinovskiy personally came to Ulaanbaatar to crack down on an alleged 'big plot of Japanese collaborators endangering the country'. Frinovskiy and his Mongolian counterpart Choibalsan spent several days compiling a list of the 115 most important 'class enemies'. They included party and government leaders, army commanders, and representatives of trade and industry. The mass arrests started in the night of 10 September 1937. About 80 per cent of the army high command and almost the entire party leadership, elected by the ninth Congress of the MPRP in 1934, became victims of the Great Terror in the MPR.²¹

Soon Choibalsan and his Soviet instructors targeted former Premier Genden (exiled in 1936 to Crimea in the Soviet Union) and War Minister Gelegdorjiin Demid as the main victims of their bloody terror. Genden was arrested in the USSR and sentenced to death, while Demid is believed to have been poisoned at Taiga railway station on 18 August 1937. During 1937–9, some 56–57,000 innocent people were arrested all over the MPR as participants in the (entirely fictitious) 'Genden–Demid spy network'.

The MPR during the Second World War

The 1936 defence protocol with the MPR, and the subsequent entry of Soviet troops onto its territory, consolidated the Soviet position in the MPR as never before. Stalin's choice

²¹ *Horidugaar Zuunii Mongol*, 1995, pp. 70–3.

of Choibalsan as leader of the puppet regime in Mongolia was indicated by the latter's full cooperation when the NKVD and its Mongolian counterpart plunged the country into a reign of terror and destruction in 1937–9.

The first real test for the Stalin–Choibalsan alliance came in mid-1939, when a four-month-long battle (known as the 'Nomonkhan incident' in Japan) broke out along the Khalkha river on the MPR's eastern border with Manchoukuo. Concerned with its vulnerability in the Soviet Far East, the USSR was determined to protect the borders of the MPR as if they were its own. Superior Soviet forces under General G. K. Zhukov easily drove the Japanese and Manchoukuo armies from the disputed border area. Choibalsan went to Moscow in December 1939 to demonstrate his loyalty to Stalin and to request advice on Mongolia's new draft constitution and the new programme of the MPRP. Stalin met him on 3 January 1940 in the Kremlin and talked about how better to develop livestock breeding in Mongolia.

Throughout the Second World War, Choibalsan followed Moscow's directives. Mongolia supported the Soviet Union with livestock, raw materials, money, food and military clothing. It supplied Moscow with approximately 740 freight cars of food and clothing, a tank regiment and a fighter squadron. The Mongol army remained intact during the war; it served as an important buffer force in the Soviet Far East defence system.

In early July 1945 Choibalsan flew to Moscow at the urgent invitation of V. M. Molotov, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs. Choibalsan was informed about the ongoing negotiations in Moscow between the Soviet and Republican Chinese government leaders on a number of questions including the recognition of the MPR by the Chinese Government. Stalin assured Choibalsan that the MPR would finally be recognized by China, although the negotiations were difficult. The second issue raised during the meeting was the participation of the MPR army in the Soviets' forthcoming military campaign against Japan.²²

On 10 August 1945, two days after the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan, the MPR also declared war on Japan. The Mongol army, some 80,000 strong, joined Soviet troops in invading north-eastern China and Inner Mongolia. On 14 August 1945, with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance, Republican China agreed to recognize the independence of the MPR within its 'existing boundaries' provided that a plebiscite confirmed the Mongolian people's desire for independence. The MPR obliged, and in the 20 October referendum nearly 100 per cent of the electorate voted for independence from China.²³

²² Bat-Ochir, 1996, pp. 173–5.

²³ *Mongol Ulus-iin Tüükh*, 2003, pp. 254–7.

On 5 January 1946 Republican China recognized the MPR's independence and, on 14 February, agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives. None, however, were exchanged. The ensuing Chinese civil war and the victory of the Chinese communists over the Republican forces in 1949 led instead to the MPR's recognition of the new People's Republic of China.

In February 1946 Choibalsan led a government delegation to Moscow to conclude a 10-year treaty of friendship and mutual assistance and the first agreement on economic and cultural cooperation. In accordance with the latter agreement, the Soviet Union was now ready to assist Mongolia in developing modern mining, industrial, transportation and communication sectors.

Part Three

THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND ITS CHALLENGES (1945–90)

(J. Boldbaatar)

In the post-war years, the Mongolian People's Republic launched a policy of modernization on the Soviet model, based on public ownership and a centrally planned economy and enforced by slogans proclaiming the building of socialism. The major focus of such a policy included the collectivization of individual herders, the elevation of farming into a distinct agricultural sector, nationwide industrialization and urban development and urbanization.

Perhaps the most important change occurred in the second half of the 1950s, with the Soviet-inspired collectivization of individual herders. Despite the original propaganda that stressed the voluntary nature of collectivization, in practice it relied on coercion. Various measures, both material and psychological, were taken against individual herders who declined to join the cooperatives – ranging from tax increases to the seizure of pasturelands. Consequently, some decided to join the cooperatives against their own will, while others sold their entire herds of livestock and moved to urban areas. Thus by the end of 1959 a

total of 184,800 households, or 99.3 per cent of all herders, had become members of the cooperatives, with 73.8 per cent of the livestock becoming public property. This campaign eliminated private ownership and introduced the domination of public property.

Yet the evolution of the cooperatives did not follow the intended goals, necessitating the introduction of further rigid measures. In the summer of 1959 the remaining privately owned livestock of cooperative members was once again collectivized. Furthermore, under the slogan of 'Strengthening public property', the ratio of private livestock per household was reduced several times, thus providing no incentive for the herders to be productive. Disregarding the wishes of cooperative members, the government pushed through a series of harsh new steps, such as turning the newly formed cooperatives into state farms, merging local government administration with cooperative managerial structures and directly interfering in the cooperatives' internal affairs. According to the then-Mongolian leader Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, 'Integrating the individual herders into the socialist economy was as historic and important an event as the People's Revolution of 1921'²⁴ – an unrealistic overestimation of the importance of collectivization (in fact, his words were a mere literal translation of Stalin's praise of the collectivization of Soviet peasants).

Such an abrupt process of collectivization caused enormous damage to the nomadic way of life, the core of the society's traditional technology and values. First, as about half of the national population was turning from a nomadic to a semi-sedentary way of life, the encampment system of a few households (*khot ayls*) was replaced by a system of households – members of the cooperatives, each herding a unit called *suuri*, based on the classification and separation of livestock by breed, age and gender. Thus the practice of attaching exclusively one category of livestock (horses, cows, sheep, or the males and females of each category, or their young) to a member household undermined the traditional efficient breeding ratio involving all available stock.

Second, even if some obvious progress followed the collectivization – for example, the penetration of modern scientific and technical innovations into herding, the introduction of a veterinary service, the construction of fences and shelters, the collectivization of grass-harvesting labour – collectivization nonetheless undermined the cost efficiency of the pastoral economy, in other words animal husbandry became a more costly and labour-intensive venture.

Third, by expecting the cooperative to intervene, invest and provide a ready service in all such matters, herders lost their traditional self-reliance, even when building fences and shelters, digging wells and harvesting grass. When moving to new pastures, they began to look upon the authorities to provide not only transportation, but also directives as to where

²⁴ Tsedenbal, 1976, p. 110.

and when to move. All these jeopardized the self-dependent, proactive values of a nomadic way of life.

Fourth, the herders' traditional multifaceted professionalism gave way to specialization according to breed, such as sheep-herder, cattle-breeder, camelherder and horse-herder, thus narrowing the traditional complex knowledge about livestock and climatic and geographical conditions. Fifth, as a consequence of industrialization, the utilities formerly produced by a family now became available from factories located in urban centres, thus ending the household manufacturing.

Sixth, although the traditional dwelling (*ger*) became more comfortable, with a white linen or fabric top, timber floor, closed metal oven with smoke pipe that replaced the open fireplace, and in some places with an electric fan, solar batteries, radio and TV set, it nevertheless lost its mobility and compactness; the traditional felt-making technology was forgotten and its industrial production was inaccessible.

Finally, as the children of herders were enrolled at school during the exact age that they would traditionally have gained experience in animal husbandry, and as many of them were drafted for army service after school, the upcoming generations, with many migrating to urban areas and only a few remaining rural herders, were losing their expertise. This ultimately caused the breakdown of the efficient livestock ratio and damaged its reproduction, eventually leading to the bankruptcy of 105 of the 255 cooperatives, thus fulfilling Owen Lattimore's 1940 prediction that 'the nomads will always remain poor'.²⁵

Another colossal task of the late 1950s–early 1960s was the exploration of 'Virgin Lands', making farming a separate agricultural sector. With the establishment of many state farms, large numbers of young people volunteered for labour there. The 'Virgin Lands' campaign gained even greater momentum in the 1960s as the second stage of explorations was under way. This led to a development of the farming sector, mainly focusing on growing wheat, vegetables and hay. As a result, from a consumer of agricultural products, Mongolia became a producer. This campaign introduced new social strata, namely, farmers, mechanics, engineers and technical personnel. However, there were negative consequences, such as the shortage of pastureland due to the cultivation of large landmasses not suitable for planting wheat and vegetables.

A qualitative change in the traditional nomadic lifestyle of the Mongols occurred between the 1950s and 1980s, resulting from industrialization and urbanization. During this period the Soviet Union and other socialist countries assisted Mongolia in constructing the Darkhan Industrial Complex and developing the city of Choibalsan into the industrial centre of eastern Mongolia. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s the Erdenet Copper

²⁵ Lattimore, 1940.

and Molybdenum Mine and Processing Plant, one of the 10 largest facilities of this kind in the world, was built and utilized. A policy of advancing the fuel and energy sector resulted in the construction of several large thermoelectric plants and the creation of a centralized energy system. Its merger with the Soviet energy system in 1976 increased Mongolia's economic dependence on the USSR.

The food and light- industry sectors were also expanding throughout this period. By the late 1980s Mongolian tanned hides, cashmere and wool had reached international standards. Factories built in collaboration with, and with the assistance of, the Comecon²⁶ countries, especially the USSR, played the dominant role in the net productivity of the country's industrial capacity. By 1988 Soviet-sponsored facilities constituted 95 per cent of the total in the energy sector and 85 per cent in the fuel sector, whereas Czechoslovak assistance was crucial in 56 per cent of the total number of leather-processing and shoe factories. Likewise, during this period the communist countries accounted for 96.6 per cent of Mongolia's net volume of trade, with the Soviet Union taking up 81.8 per cent. The developed capitalist nations accounted for only 3.3 per cent of Mongolia's trade.²⁷ However, the Soviet Union, which had made Mongolia totally dependent on it, was itself lagging far behind the wealthy nations of both West and East.

The social consequences of industrialization and urbanization in the MPR can be summarized as follows. First, metropolitan areas such as Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan, Erdenet and Choibalsan grew in accordance with global patterns of urban development, with many administrative, civic and residential constructions, paved roads, squares and civic engineering systems changing their appearance. Second, the forced collectivization via punitive measures and economic pressure speeded up the process of internal migration from rural areas to urban centres; thus the period from the 1950s to 1990 witnessed a fivefold increase in the urban population.

Third, this was also a 'baby-boom' period in Mongolia, rapidly making the urban population younger – by the late 1980s, those aged between 20 and 29 dominated the population of metropolitan areas. Especially in this regard, Darkhan was considered to have the largest number of young residents.²⁸ It is noteworthy that the gender composition of the urban population maintained a normal ratio at that time.

Fourth, a majority of urban residents began to own a radio and a TV, and many acquired telephones, refrigerators and washing machines (although residents of provincial capitals had fewer such items than residents of the national capital and other large cities). Radio

²⁶ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (an economic association of East European communist countries).

²⁷ Sanjdorj (ed.), 1995, p. 185.

²⁸ Census: 1956 and 1989.

broadcasting reached virtually all corners of the country, and many county and village communes to which power lines were extended were able to watch nationwide TV programmes. The capital city was connected via telephone lines with provincial capitals, county centres and village communes. Despite these gains, the private ownership of motor vehicles was considered a rare luxury; individuals possessing a vehicle or a few livestock were labelled as having 'a personal interest'.

Fifth, although the policy of equality levelled the societal strata, without a visible gap between the wealthy and the needy, it nonetheless did not make the entire population equally happy. People made ends meet, as the Mongolian saying goes, 'without two meals a day but without hungry nights'. The majority of the population were denied what they saw as luxuries, and their basic needs, such as clothing, were barely met. A very few brands of most goods contributed to this shortage; and even domestically produced meat and dairy products were not available in sufficient quantities.

Finally, workers began to dominate the social strata in metropolitan areas. They lived and worked under the principle 'one for all, and all for one', elaborating the new societal institution called the 'labour collective'.

Although during the aforementioned period the MPR considered itself to be an independent, sovereign state, in reality it was a satellite state of the Soviet Union. According to Charles R. Bawden, 'the price for Russian domination was the separation of the new Mongolian state from the Mongols in other countries, as well as from the entire world'.²⁹ However, there were undeniable successes, such as Mongolia's accession to membership of the United Nations in 1961 and the formal diplomatic relations established with nearly 100 nations by 1990.

The constitution of the MPR, promulgated in 1960, legitimized the monopoly of the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). As the propaganda declared that socialist ideas had become the basis of the intellectual life of the people, all dissent was brutally suppressed. Representatives of the intelligentsia who criticized the official party line and state policies, and/or advocated the protection of the national history and cultural heritage, were labelled 'nationalist', 'nihilist', 'anti-party elements', etc.; they were arbitrarily sent into internal exile and denied their basic rights and liberties. Thus, during this period Mongolian society endured a harsh totalitarian regime. Scholars argue as to whether totalitarianism in Mongolia was gradually replaced by a more benign, authoritarian regime in the 1960s or whether it actually continued up until 1990. Regardless of the label, it was a centralized regime, based on its distrust of the people and any democratic procedures for governing them.

²⁹ Bawden, 1989.

On the path to democratization and the free market

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, on the eve of Mongolia's transformation, the situation could be described as follows. First, the country's political system was essentially a one-party dictatorship. Second, it was a command economy under rigid central planning, which tolerated no other forms of property, including private ownership, and denied any forms of market regulation mechanism. Third, intellectual life was guided by one official ideology. And, fourth, the foreign policy of the MPR was one-sided and 'unipolar' in nature, confined within the existing framework of cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries.

All these conditions led to internal demands for change, whereas the fall of the world socialist system and the disintegration of its main pillar, the Soviet Union, served as its external prerequisites. Thus, during late 1989, the newly born democratic forces underwent a state of institutionalization, creating the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) and other political organizations. Thus were laid the foundations of the emerging multi-party system.

The MDU, along with other political opposition groups, organized several mass rallies criticizing the slow progress of MPRP-initiated reforms. When endorsing one such rally at Liberty Square, one of the leaders of the democratic movement, Tsakhia Elbegdorj (the prime minister of Mongolia) said: 'A benevolent era has come. It is a time when everyone will live as they wish, not by the "will or power" of others.'³⁰ The demonstrators urged the ruling party to conduct a radical democratization of society and demanded an immediate and decisive shift to the free market. The rulers' reluctance to meet these demands led to a hunger strike, chosen as a last-resort protest measure by the democratic opposition, which began at 2 p.m. on 7 March 1990 in Sükhbaatar Square. As the situation deteriorated, the ruling MPRP took a more flexible stance and negotiated with the opposition. As a result, the Politburo of the MPRP Central Committee resigned *en masse*, thus creating favourable conditions for a practical transformation of the entire political system.

The clause legitimizing the MPRP's leading role was deleted from the constitution soon afterwards. Several new political parties were formed and the proper legal environment for a multi-party system was forged. In addition, a presidency was created and inaugurated as a separate government institution. After 76 days of deliberations at the second session of the twelfth Great State *Khural* of the MPR, Mongolia's new constitution, based on universally recognized principles of democracy, human rights and liberties, was promulgated on 13 January 1992.

A unicameral legislature – the Great State *Khural* – is evolving after four free parliamentary elections (1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004). The election results show the emergence of a

³⁰ Elbegdorj, n.d. [1999], p. 17.

bipartisan system. The nation's parliament has successfully been implementing legislative reforms. The population is becoming more socially and politically active: currently there is a ratio of 1 NGO to every 800 people, and as many as 1,100 newspapers and magazines are published on a regular basis. Mongolian society has fully accepted and recognized pluralism, as political and civil liberties, and freedom of speech and conscience have become the norm. Present trends in the development of the political system include efforts to secure the rule of law and increase the involvement of civil society.³¹

In the transformation, the deep-rooted centrally planned economy has been replaced by the free market. In May 1991 the Mongolian parliament adopted the Privatization Act, a vital step in transforming the nation's economy. The majority of previously state-owned enterprises, together with their assets, and over 90 per cent of the country's livestock has been returned to private ownership. Apartments in urban areas have also been privatized and now the task of land privatization is under way at full speed. The core elements of the market transformation have been: a liberalization of the exchange rate, a reform of monetary policy, tax reforms, and decreasing government interference and regulation of the economy.

In contemporary Mongolia, the tides of democratization and market reforms have brought changes in urbanization, industrialization, modernization, population migration and social stratification. As the Mongolians free themselves from the dictatorship of communist ideology and are able themselves to think openly and create, the nation has seen the revival of Buddhism along with a penetration of the world's other major religions, making Mongolia a land of religious pluralism. Thus it has become a universal and fully accepted norm in contemporary Mongolia to respect human rights and dignity, to safeguard the freedoms of speech and conscience and the choice of a preferred way of life. Today Mongolia enjoys diplomatic relations with more than 140 nations and actively participates in the activities of the United Nations and other prominent international organizations.

³¹ Kaplonski, [2004](#), p. 48.

WESTERN CHINA (XINJIANG)*

*Qin Huibin***Contents**

From the mid-nineteenth century to 1911 revolution	369
The republican period (1912–49)	376
A new chapter in Xinjiang's history (October 1949 to 1990)	388

Xinjiang is located in the north-western part of China and is now a province of the People's Republic (a full province and a national minority self-administering area). According to a number of Western scholars it is, in the broadest sense, simply part of the Central Asian region.

At the time of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the central government installed a military administration in Xinjiang after the mid-eighteenth century; the Qing court appointed a 'commander-in-chief of Ili and the surrounding regions' when it stationed a garrison in the remote Hui Muslim settlement of Ili. This was to allow a more integrated and effective military, administrative and political governance of Xinjiang. In some northern districts of Xinjiang, a prefecture and county system was established. In nomadic Kazakh areas, chieftains were invested as khans, petty kings, dukes and other nobles, thus allowing the Qing to control the area through these leaders. In areas inhabited by the Uighurs (in southern Xinjiang), civil affairs were in particular dealt with at village level through the direct imposition of *bokhs* (equivalent of *begs* or *beys*, dignitaries). The *bokhs* of this time differed from those of the past in that their traditional hereditary system was altered to allow only the direct appointment of office-holders. At Hami (Kumul) and Turfan (Turpan), the *yasaq* (tax, tribute) system was installed.

* See Map 3.

The ‘generalissimo of Ili and the surrounding areas’, simplified to the ‘general of Ili’, was a so-called ‘roving ambassador’; in other words, he assumed the office of a fully fledged official of the royal court. In order to consolidate the north-western margins of the territory, the Qing government dispatched a regiment from China proper to garrison each of the frontier regions, with the heaviest troop concentrations guarding checkpoints and passes. The Qing also encouraged native Chinese to move to and set up administrative systems within Xinjiang so as to have a positive impact upon the region’s development.

From the mid-nineteenth century to 1911 revolution

THE SUPPRESSION OF REBELLIONS LED BY THE KHAN OF KOKAND’S DESCENDANTS

From 1820 to 1870, within the space of half a century, every ethnic grouping within Xinjiang was rent by dissension and conflict and numerous large and small-scale rebellions were instigated by descendants of the khans of Kokand (such as Bolonid and Hojijan). These often spread outside the confines of the area involved in the original dispute.

In the summer of 1826 (the sixth year of the reign of the Qing emperor Daoguang), Bolonid’s grandson, Jahangir (Janghur), mustered more than 500 Dzungars (*Bloots*, in Chinese) from Kokand (Haohan in modern Chinese) and invaded Xinjiang. In 1828 (the eighth year of the reign of Emperor Daoguang), Jahangir once again stirred up rebellion, was defeated and later captured, and then sent to Beijing in chains to be executed.

In the autumn of 1847 (the 27th year of Emperor Daoguang’s reign), Jahangir’s nephew Qatatya and ‘Ali (Woli) Khan initiated seven Kokand rebellions, leading more than 1,000 crack cavalry in a surprise attack on Kashghar (Kashi) from Kokand. Several months later, the soldiers of these rebellions hastily disbanded and dispersed and headed across the border.

In the summer of 1857 (the seventh year of the reign of Emperor Xianfeng), ‘Ali Khan once again rallied troops from Kokand and invaded Kashghar, attacking and occupying Kashghar and Yengi Hisar, the two ‘Hui Muslim cities’, step by step. From within his base area, he established a ruthless and inhuman administration that relied on murder and arson, extortion and tax racketeering. One wrong action, one misplaced word, even one rumour: all these were punishable by death. The khan was extremely despotic and derived pleasure from killing people with his own hands. He also consolidated religious control: women who did not cover themselves from head to toe in public with a *burqa* (veil) or who disobeyed the harsh laws were mercilessly flogged. Males over 6 years old had to tie up their hair and attend the mosque five times a day to pray.

By the beginning of autumn 1857 the Qing had amassed more than 5,000 government troops from Ili, Urumqi (Dihua in modern Chinese) and the surrounding areas; they then marched their army towards Yengi Hisar, recapturing this ‘Muslim city’ not long afterwards. Subsequently, the Qing Army advanced towards Kashghar, also retaking the ‘Muslim city’ there. The khan of Kokand and his aides carried off the plundered wealth they had extorted from the population of over 10,000 Uighurs and withdrew to Kokand. The khan’s rebellion did not capture the public imagination, however. Having encircled and suppressed the rebellion, the Qing thereby managed to gain the support of the native populations of Xinjiang, and in particular that of the Uighurs.

AN INVADER WHO HOISTED THE BANNER OF RELIGION – AGBOR

At the beginning of spring 1865 (the fourth year of the reign of Emperor Tongzhi), Agbor seized his chance and led his soldiers in an invasion of Chinese Xinjiang. Agbor was originally a bandit from the khanate of Kokand, but by currying favour with the authorities and relying on the influence of his female relatives, he eventually became a high-ranking official. By the summer of 1864 (the third year of Emperor Tongzhi’s reign), the Kyrgyz chieftain Unduq had seized and occupied the ‘Muslim city’ of Kashghar. Since he had for some considerable time been in occupation of the aforementioned city and was engaged in a war of attrition with the Qing Army, he sent envoys to Kokand to request military assistance. In order to eliminate the threat Agbor now posed to his ambitions, the khan of Kokand sent Buslukh (the great-grandson of Bolonid, the rebellious khan of Kokand) to invade Xinjiang. In the autumn of 1865, however, Agbor stormed and captured the Chinese settlement at Kashghar. By the end of that year, Agbor had by deception gained the town of Khotan (Hotan). By 1867 (the sixth year of Emperor Tongzhi’s reign), Agbor had successively captured and occupied Kuqa, Korla (K’uerh le) and Kalasar and their surrounding areas.

At this time, Agbor’s inclination was to ‘contain his aspirations and be satisfied’ with his conquests, so he styled himself the ‘Bidiao’ult Khan’ (‘King of Great Good Fortune’). By 1869 (the eighth year of the reign of Emperor Tongzhi), Agbor had driven out his puppet Buslukh. In the spring of 1870 (the ninth year of Emperor Tongzhi’s reign), Agbor began to push northwards. By the end of the year he controlled most of northern Xinjiang. In order to consolidate his rule, Agbor attempted to internationalize the situation. He collaborated with the British and with tsarist Russia and allowed them to extend their influence over the region. He concluded separate trading agreements with Russia and Britain in 1872 and 1873 respectively, thus directly bolstering foreign colonial influence within the areas he controlled. Agbor’s invasion was resisted by each nationality in Xinjiang; the peoples of

Khotan, Turfan and Urumqi en masse, and in succession, instigated armed insurrections and, with the support of the Qing army, together beat back the invaders.

In 1875 (the first year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), the Qing appointed Zuo Zongtang as imperial commissioner to supervise military operations in Xinjiang. At the end of spring 1876 (the second year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), Zuo Zongtang rode out from Lanzhou towards Suzhou (in modern Gansu province), leading his army towards Xinjiang. His military strategy was to 'seize the north and then take the south', first recapturing northern Xinjiang, then recovering southern Xinjiang. By October of the same year, all of northern Xinjiang had been recaptured. At the end of spring 1877 (the third year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), the Qing general Liu Jintang led his forces from Urumqi and mounted an assault on Turfan. In the resulting battle, more than 2,000 men were taken prisoner and no fewer than 10,000 of the enemy surrendered, thus destroying Agbor's royal power. As a result of the Uighurs' resistance and the Qing Army's victory, Agbor had reached an impasse, and he committed suicide at Korla military camp.

After Agbor's death, his son Bokh Koli continued the struggle. At the end of the summer of 1877 (the third year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), the Qing general Liu Jintang's detachment entered the hinterland of southern Xinjiang. In the autumn of the same year, the Qing Army recaptured the four towns of Korla, Baicheng (Bay), Aksu and Wushi (Uqturpan) in the eastern sector of southern Xinjiang. Subsequently, the army made for the four major towns in the west and by February 1878 (at the beginning of the fourth year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu), had reoccupied all of Kashghar, Yeqiang (Kargilik), Yengi Hisar and Khotan. Bokh Koli and his cronies fled across the border into Russia.

Agbor had invaded in February 1865 (the first month of the fourth year of Emperor Tongzhi's reign) and it took until February 1878 (the beginning of the fourth year of Emperor Guangxu's reign) for the Qing forces to recover the whole of Xinjiang. Agbor's influence over Xinjiang had lasted 13 years. Within his base areas, Agbor had established many halls of religious instruction, undoubtedly widening and strengthening the power of religious doctrine. He also set up a secret police force and the 'Ra'is' Islamic sect (adherents were his agents) to monitor people's movements. He introduced a multitude of taxes, which the people in his base areas saw as sucking the life-blood from them through ruthless exploitation and pillage. Although such cruelty allowed his wealth to increase daily, the Muslims lost much of their fortune, descending into abject poverty. Moreover those in the upper echelons of the religious structure gained enormous benefits from being within the government and business structure, and as a result they willingly served the rebel government. Agbor compelled non-believers to adopt Islam; those who obeyed survived and

those who demurred were disposed of – it is likely that over 40,000 people who refused to convert to Islam were systematically exterminated.

It was the fervent hope of all the peoples of Xinjiang that Agbor's tyrannical influence be wiped out, restoring to them their original and rightful interests. According to historical records, when Zuo Zongtang led his Third Route Army towards Xinjiang, he received an ecstatic welcome from all the people he came across: 'In tune with the road, the army marches straight on, either as the guide, or as compatriots in war, always ready to serve.' At the time that Zuo Zongtang led his army into Xinjiang, he crushed the colonialists who wished to divide China, ensuring that its territory and sovereign powers remained intact and unified.

THE XINJIANG PEOPLES' STRUGGLE AGAINST FEUDALISM

One of the effects of the uprisings of the Hui Muslims of Sha'anxi and Gansu and the revolutionary movement or the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom within China proper was that the peoples of Xinjiang, and in particular the Uighurs, started to oppose the endless intrigues between the imperial Qing officials and the local *bokhs*, thus attacking the feudal system of serfdom.

In 1857 (the seventh year of Emperor Xianfeng's reign), Uighur peasants from Kuqa started an uprising against the leadership at Maimaishli. The uprising was cruelly suppressed on this occasion by Wu'erqing, the imperial secretary; the leaders and workers of the Maimaishli peasantry were rounded up and unceremoniously put to death. The Qing government, furthermore, as a result of the unprofitable returns on his employment, said of Wu'erqing that 'he who makes decisions may also be removed from office', and accordingly the local *bokhs* were also penalized.

In 1864 (the third year of the reign of Emperor Tongzhi), the Kuqa peasantry started a massive uprising. Under the command of a peasant called Tohudiniyaz, a makeshift army captured the town of Kuqa, put to death the imperial secretary Salinga, the *bokh* of Ajim and others. The *yasaq* ruler of Kuqa tried to persuade the army to abandon its military struggle, using the argument of 'imperial beneficence wiping the slate clean' – with the result that he was also put to death. The supporters of the uprising then elected Rexiding Hoxho (c. 1808–67) as their leader, naming him 'Hoxho Khan' (he is called the 'Yellow Hoxho' in Qing dynasty literature). Before long, the influence of the peasant army was felt as far afield as Wushi, Aksu, Turfan, Korla and other areas. In the same year, the Hui chieftain Toming and the commander-in-chief of the regular army Suo Huanzhang began an uprising in the regional capital, Urumqi, subsequently capturing that city. Toming was no more than a petty overlord, building palaces and fixing weights and measures. He styled

himself 'King of Bright Truth'. Towards the end of the same year, the Huis and Uighurs began a counter-uprising and succeeded in capturing the capital city, shooting dead the rebel minister Tokto. In the spring of 1866 (the fifth year of Emperor Tongzhi's reign), a peasant army from Ili stormed and captured the quarters of the Ili general at Huiyuancheng (town of Ili) and the Ili general Ming Xu and his subordinates were slaughtered. Ming Xu's second-in-command, General Chang Qing, was also taken prisoner. In 1865 (the fourth year of the reign of Emperor Tongzhi), the Ili army's Maizmuzat seized the reins of power, calling himself 'Su Dan' and establishing a harsh system of control in a vain attempt to set up a separatist regime in the region.

In the 1860s the anti-feudal struggle by every nationality within Xinjiang raged north and south of the Tian Shan (Heavenly Mountains). But any authority such a struggle might have possessed was in turn usurped by regional and religious leaders; the success of the struggle was subsumed by these people's desperate race to serve their own ends, with the result that none of the ethnic peasant uprisings led to any real gains.

In 1876 (the second year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), the Qing moved their troops into Xinjiang. By 1878 (the fourth year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), the Qing forces had wiped out the effects of Agbor's insurgency and that of all the local feudal separatist movements. The Qing were now back in full control of Xinjiang.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF XINJIANG AGAINST INVADERS

After the Opium War of 1840, Britain sought to infiltrate Xinjiang through India and Afghanistan. Several Central Asian overlords took on the status of vassals, or 'British dependants', by allowing missionaries and merchants to enter Xinjiang through their territories, thus extending Britain's influence and control over Xinjiang. Before the end of 1882 (the eighth year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), five areas of Xinjiang were completely under Britain's sway and another three were 'British dependencies'.

At the time of Agbor's invasion of Xinjiang, the British, Turks, Russians and others controlled the border posts. All of them then entered into 'official diplomatic relations' with Agbor, giving him direct aid, and, through these treaties, seized a share of the region's rights and interests. By granting diplomatic recognition to Agbor and legitimizing his control over the occupied regions, his despotism spread throughout Xinjiang, crushing in its turn the power of the imperialists with sundry local plots.

In 1864, and again in 1883, Russia compelled the Qing to conclude separate border treaties, such as the 'Sino-Russian pact on the allocation of the north-western border' and the 'Sino-Russian border treaty for Tajikistan' and others, which annexed huge areas of the Qing empire. Included in this territory was the homeland of the nomadic Kazakhs,

who did not agree with the policy of ‘the people complying in order for their land to be returned’; bit by bit they moved into new areas within the regions of China proper. But when Russia attempted to suppress this migration, the Kazakh tribes rose in the ‘Great Banner Military Revolt’. In 1871 (the tenth year of Emperor Tongzhi’s reign), Russian armies invaded Ili. They encountered the firm resistance of the imperial Qing garrison and the local Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uighur and Hui tribes, under the slogan: ‘Alone we anticipate the common soldier’s early departure, but together we shall recover our land.’

After the cruel authority of Agbor had been dismantled, Zuo Zongtang implemented a series of measures to deal with the effects of this disaster in Xinjiang. He placed special emphasis on the revival of the economy of Xinjiang, enforcing the proper regulation of taxes and levies, and adopting other policies of reconstruction and rehabilitation in order to quicken the pace of economic development. At the same time, Xinjiang became a province of China. In view of Xinjiang’s new situation, Russia concluded the ‘Sino-Russian Ili pact’ (the ‘Sino-Russian treaty rewritten’) with the Qing government in February 1881 (the seventh year of Emperor Guangxu’s reign), and China recovered Ili.

XINJIANG BECOMES A PROVINCE OF CHINA

Before Xinjiang became a Chinese province, it had usually been called Xi Yu (the Western Territories). In 1762 (the 27th year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong), the Qing had invested a ‘generalissimo of Ili’ with the power to conduct all government business in the region. Urumqi was established as the administrative capital and imperial counsellors were installed at Ili, Tacheng (Qoqek) and Kashghar; other places were run by administrators or chieftains. In northern Xinjiang, some areas instituted a system of counties and prefectures; at Hami, Turfan and each Mongol area, a *yasaq* system was established; in southern Xinjiang’s other areas, the *bokh* system was introduced.

In 1877 (the third year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu), Zuo Zongtang was appointed by the Qing and promoted to be chairman of the Xinjiang provisional provincial government. In 1878 Zuo Zongtang once more put forward arrangements for Xinjiang’s institution as a province and these suggestions were largely endorsed. In 1882 (Guangxu’s eighth year), in the summer and autumn, the governor-general of Sha’anxi and Gansu, Tan Zhonglin, and the superintendent of military affairs in Xinjiang, Liu Jintang, individually and successively submitted a jointly considered letter to the Qing that attached great importance to the arrangements suggested for Xinjiang’s establishment as a province. The letter also lauded the pilot projects implemented in southern Xinjiang. These pilot projects were similar to structures in China proper which established administrative rule on the county

and prefecture pattern, with county and prefectural officials implementing the system of appointments according to the regulations.

At Aksu and Kashghar, superintendents had been appointed. Under the Aksu superintendent's direct supervision, subordinate *tings*¹ were set up at Kalasar, Kuqa and Wushi, with a subordinate *zhou* (prefecture) at Wensu and, similarly, a *xian* (county) at Baicheng. Answering to the Board of Corrections at Kashghar was a subordinate *ting* at Yengi Hisar, with subordinate *zhous* at Shule (district of Kashghar), Yarkand (Shache) and Khotan, and then subordinate *xians* at Shufu, Yecheng and Yotan. As a direct result of the *bokh* system, the Qing afterwards decided that 'those areas with all manner of *bokh*-type systems should completely discard them'. The *bokh* system was thus eliminated, a move of great significance in accelerating the development of Uighur society in Xinjiang.

In 1884 (the tenth year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), the Qing ratified the change in Xinjiang's status and declared it a province. On 17 November 1884 (the ninth month in the tenth year of Emperor Guangxu's reign), the imperial government sanctioned the establishment of a police commissioner and chief civil servant for Xinjiang. On 19 November 1884 the court appointed Liu Lintang as commissioner of police and as a leading imperial envoy with the rank of ambassador to oversee the day-to-day running of Xinjiang; Wei Guangshou was appointed head of the civil service. In 1885 Liu Lintang and Wei Guangshou in turn established their headquarters at Urumqi and used Urumqi for provincial meetings, setting up the *wumen*, or headquarters of the police and civil service, there too. In line with the stated policy of 'a new deal for ancient lands', the old name of Xi Yu was changed to Xinjiang (the New Territories). The new provincial mechanism for Xinjiang was put into action.

When Xinjiang became a province, the imperial Qing government made fundamental reforms to the administration of Xinjiang compared with previous dynasties. Henceforth, whether in policing or administration, the entire army of Xinjiang became in theory an instrument of civil government and the central headquarters of the Xinjiang Army were moved from Ili to Urumqi. Up until 1909, Xinjiang was divided into 4 regions, with each region being subdivided into 6 garrisons, 10 *tings*, 3 prefectures and 21 *xians*. Thus the government of Xinjiang was brought into line with the system operating in the rest of China. When Xinjiang became a province, the Qing government made root-and-branch changes to the administration of the area, strengthening its ties with the motherland and between each of its numerous nationalities and the Han in the political and economic fields, thus enabling its society to progress and develop. The literature was codified and the national defence of

¹ *Tings*, or 'halls', were government departments at provincial level. [Trans.]

the border regions was consolidated. All these matters were of tremendous significance for the region.

The republican period (1912–49)

THE XINHAI (1911) REVOLUTION

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Qing emperor Guangxu issued an edict entitled ‘Constitutional Reform and Modernization’.² The general of Ili, Zhang Geng, proposed a plan for the Xinjiang government that addressed five issues, namely, military training, livestock conservation, technology (including handicrafts), business and the promotion of education. When it was commended to Emperor Guangxu, the emperor himself commented that it was ‘to be taken seriously and preparations made, devoting one’s efforts to accepting the recommendations and striving to follow the examples’. But because the clique bitterly opposed to change then seized the reins of power, the reform movement was quashed.

On 10 October 1911 representatives of the Wuchang Alliance and members of the Revolutionary Party embarked on a military revolt. Following this, revolutionaries torched huge swathes of China. The feudal imperial rule of the Qing dynasty was finally overthrown and a new republican government – the Republic of China – was declared. China’s Nationalist revolution had gained its first victory. In the Chinese calendar, 1911 was the Xinhai Year, and so it was called the ‘Xinhai revolution’. The following year, Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yatsen) was appointed president of the Republic of China and this year was fixed as the inaugural year of the new state.

Before the 1911 revolution, Alliance members and revolutionaries had formed Nationalist revolutionary cells in Xinjiang, especially at Ili and Urumqi, to disseminate propaganda. After the putsch in Wuchang, on 28 December 1911 the revolutionary Liu Xianjun and others raised their flags and launched an armed uprising. The plot could not have succeeded as, owing to the betrayals of traitors, the Qing Army already had wind of the insurrection and was alerted to its intended strategy of striking the imperial army barracks. The Xinjiang commissioner of police, Yuan Dahua, cruelly suppressed the uprising. Liu Xianjun and other conspirators as well as many people involved in the uprising were executed.

Ten days after the failed Urumqi uprising, on 7 January 1912, revolutionaries at Ili initiated a second armed revolt. The uprising erupted at Ili, the garrison of the general of Ili, and Yang Zuanxu was appointed commander-in-chief of the rebellion. At that time, everyone in Xinjiang harboured the same opinions about this new militia and aided it financially

² This edict was in fact promulgated in 1898. [Trans.]

and, moreover, supplied it with food, drink and shelter. This unofficial army very soon seized and occupied the imperial army barracks, arsenals, the general's official residence and other important posts; the general of Ili vaulted over the wall and fled. The very next day, the militia captured General Zhi Rui, who was immediately put to death.

The Ili revolt soon spread. On 8 January 1912 the rebels proclaimed the Ili provisional revolutionary government. The National Republican Army was to be almost entirely administered in Xinjiang, but before a chief superintendent of the vast resources of Ili could be appointed, General Yang Zuanxu was named as commander-in-chief of general staff headquarters. At the same time, the leadership set up the 'Republic of Five Nationalities' and a 'Nationalities Forum'. The provisional government issued bulletins and proclaimed the equality of all nationalities: 'With one glance we all accept our common humanity.' The Xinjiang commissioner of police, Yuan Dahua, and other imperial loyalists tried in vain to destroy the provisional government by military force.

On 21 January the Eastern Revolutionary Army called the Loyalist Army into battle and the latter was utterly defeated. On 12 February the Qing emperor Xuantong issued a decree of abdication. Yuan Dahua saw how things were going and realized that he would never now be able to declare his commonwealth of a 'Xinjiang acknowledging its compliance with the wishes of the literati and the military'. Yuan Dahua chose Xinjiang's 'law officer and guardian of the Urumqi road', Yang Zengxin, as 'superintendent of the capital'. In July, the provisional government formally acknowledged Yang Zengxin as 'superintendent of the capital'. Thus the positive consequences of the 1911 revolution in Xinjiang were almost immediately usurped by the former royal official, Yang Zengxin.

THE YANG ZENGXIN PERIOD (1912–28)

Yang Zengxin, a naturalized Mongol from Yunnan, had, on account of his success in the foremost imperial examinations, been catapulted into government as a middle-ranking county official in Gansu. This was in 1896. There he served as magistrate of Hezhou (also called Linxia). Hezhou had been heavily settled by Muslims and so was also referred to as 'Little Mecca'. In 1907 Yang Zengxin was seconded to Xinjiang. In 1912 he became chief superintendent of republican Xinjiang. After Yuan Shikai had betrayed the aims of the Xinhai revolution, Yang Zengxin, in league with Yuan Shikai's secret agents, began to eradicate the effects of the Nationalist revolution in Xinjiang. He expelled Yang Zuanxu and others and executed various other revolutionaries. He encouraged the provincial political establishment to carry on much as it had done under the Qing. On 7 July 1928 Yang Zengxin was assassinated by a section commander of the military bureau called Fan Yaonan. This event brought to an end his separatist 17-year dictatorship in Xinjiang.

When Yang Zengxin ruled Xinjiang, he promoted the twin government policies of ‘control’ and ‘containment’. In practice, ‘control’ simply meant taking advantage of the upper strata of each nationality and of the higher echelons of the religious establishment, in particular to foster a broad consensus of believers who would ‘serve one’s heart and harness one’s strength’. However, Yang Zengxin understood that excessive stifling of religious freedoms could lead the Central Asian peoples of a common faith to join in opposition to his rule. The policy of ‘containment’ was thus one of supporting one clique while hitting another hard. He used this policy in his military strategy, too, by employing Muslim Hui troops to suppress other nationalities. Yang Zengxin was, nevertheless, an intelligent and far-sighted politician. He considered it imperative to protect the stability of society and Xinjiang’s economic development. He was keen, moreover, to cultivate the work of Xinjiang’s national religions and to put his other policies into practice.

At the beginning of 1912, the Hami’ite Taymour led 500 able-bodied peasants in an armed insurrection; the first target of his militia was Shamo Xusut, the king of Hami. The peasant militia then held out for a considerable time against the Han at the outpost of Barkol, gaining great fame and prestige in the process. In the autumn of 1912, Mu Yideng from Turfan also led a local peasant uprising. The two militias joined forces and created shock-waves throughout the region. Yang Zengxin adopted a conciliatory approach to the situation and invited representatives of the two militias to join the regular army administration, bestowing upon Taymour and Mu Yideng the leadership of one battalion each and then moving the troops of these two battalions far from their original encampments. Furthermore he ennobled the two leaders and left their specific powers intact. Afterwards he had Taymour and Mu Yideng and the majority of their militiamen unceremoniously slaughtered.

There was a fairly large Uighur population in Xinjiang, but within his military administration Yang Zengxin relied heavily upon Hui nationals to manage and run the new army (‘the Hui contingent’). Yang Zengxin used these crack Hui troops to suppress political parties and get rid of dissidents.

Yang Zengxin handled the Islamic question in Xinjiang with great care; he knew that in the past it had been much meddled with and that restrictions placed upon it had at times been extremely severe. He knew, too, that the repression of Islam was one of the after-effects of the First World War. The 17 years during which he headed the government of Xinjiang were relatively peaceful, however, and this caution was one reason why. Nevertheless Yang Zengxin did issue some regulatory province-wide orders covering religious practices. The first was that religious services could only be held in recognized places of worship; the second was that only ‘classical’ Islam and the accompanying religious

instruction were ‘justifiable according to Heaven’; the third was that imams and mullahs were forbidden to leave their immediate localities to preach on other circuits, and imams from Gansu and other areas were prohibited from travelling around Xinjiang, while foreign Muslims (‘fundamentalists’) were strictly barred from being invited to Xinjiang to fill posts as religious teachers; the fourth order restricted the pilgrimage to Mecca; the fifth banned ‘cults’ and ‘private sects’ in order to prevent rivalry between religious cliques which could destabilize the government; and the sixth prevented the erection of new mosques as ‘it is impossible to add one new mosque without a thoroughgoing overhaul of the methods employed’.

When Yang Zengxin was in charge of Xinjiang, the political situation vis-à-vis the provincial borders was fairly turbulent. The influential colonial powers, Britain and tsarist Russia, both attempted to destabilize the Xinjiang government by seizing land. In particular, the October 1917 revolution in Russia caused no small difficulties for the administration of Xinjiang. The government policy towards so-called Soviet ‘extremism’ was to suffocate any influence it had, with the result that these events had little real impact in Xinjiang.

In May 1918, acting upon the advice of the British, the potentate of Ili and the khan of Maimaishli instigated a rebellion that was ruthlessly crushed by Yang Zengxin.

In the spring of 1912, Supurga (from the Qol settlement at Yotan) and many others went to the local county government and complained that Russia was relying on the comprador Saa’ed to bully and oppress the peasantry and interfere in the smooth running of the government in order to overthrow the state. While dealing with this affair, the conscripted army was besieged by Saa’ed and suffered casualties among the ordinary soldiers and local peasantry. Driven to despair by this situation, the local inhabitants then attacked Saa’ed and set his hideout on fire. Saa’ed was lucky to escape alive. The Russians despatched mercenaries to invade Kashghar and harass the settlement at Qol and neighbouring areas. When the turncoat government of Yuan Shikai blamed faults in regional administration for a lack of government resources, Yang Zengxin and other leaders yielded to each and every one of Russia’s demands.

At the beginning of 1920, the Soviet Red Army and the remnants of the White Army joined battle on the northern frontier of Xinjiang. Yang Zengxin issued a ‘statement of non-interference’, following his policy of ‘conciliation with foreigners for the stability of China’. At the same time, he reinforced his military machine to prevent White Army raids into China. In the autumn of 1921, the Soviet Red Army and Yang Zengxin reached an agreement that would allow the Red Army to cross the border to pursue and eliminate rogue elements of the White Army. Nevertheless, Yang Zengxin was unwilling to repatriate these

fugitives or expel members of the White Army from his territory: he simply confiscated their weapons and restricted their movements.

THE JIN SHUREN (1928–33) AND SHENG SHICAI (1933–44) PERIODS

On 7 July 1928 Yang Zengxin was assassinated by Fan Yaonan, bringing to an end his governance of Xinjiang. Fan Yaonan had been studying abroad in Japan when he was appointed as a military attaché in Xinjiang and he arrived in his new post with certain progressive ideas. He did not admire Yang Zengxin's government policy of keeping the people in ignorance and supported a *coup d'état*. Jin Shuren, on the other hand, skilfully maintained his neutrality over any change in government and was duly elected to the position of provincial chairman. On 12 April 1933, Jin Shuren was himself overthrown in a coup at Urumqi. Jin Shuren gave up any idea of a struggle and was forced to hand over the reins of power, whereupon he returned home via the Soviet Union.

Jin Shuren was originally from Hezhou (Linxia) in Gansu province and he shared a 'master–pupil relationship' with Yang Zengxin. Because Jin Shuren was 'steeped in literature and long immersed in official documents', he relied heavily on Yang Zengxin. After entering Xinjiang he was a magistrate for several regional county councils, and in 1926 was promoted to be a civil administrator of the provincial government. He found public affairs stultifying and took little interest in the popular will as he was both self-willed and opinionated, so he shunned public affairs. His governance of Xinjiang relied completely on the 'home village faction', and the members of the 'Linxia delegation' were considered to be the 'inner cabinet' of the Xinjiang provincial government.

Jin Shuren's government policies differed from those of Yang Zengxin and placed blind faith in military might, although he himself employed an identical military strategy in his administration of the army. It was said that, in Jin Shuren's eyes, 'three words of praise are inferior to two horsewhips'. He remodelled the Hui contingent and, using the 'Linxia petty clique', he replaced most of the military officials in the Hui battalions. At the beginning of 1933, he confiscated the lands of the king of Hami, Shamo Xusut, and announced the abolition of the nobility, putting into effect land-reform and water conservation measures. Nevertheless, the Uighur peasantry did not feel any practical benefits. The soil was plundered by Jin Shuren's policies and he transferred the cultivation of the land to needy natives of Gansu, thus stirring up resentment among the indigenous Uighur peasantry, who considered this to be 'unfair treatment'.

In February 1931 the so-called 'Reform of Muslim Hami' occurred when Jin Shuren used the fuse of the 'Little Fortress incident' to justify his methods. The incident at Hami had initially been a spontaneous armed revolt, but later, under the direction of Hoxhanyaz

and others, it grew into a sustained armed uprising with troops of its own. In order to extend the conflict, Hoxhanyaz decided to move his troops and station them at Jiuquan in Gansu with the young Hui separatist army of Ma Zhongying ready to invade Xinjiang. Jin Shuren encircled and suppressed these forces several times but could not quite achieve victory, so he had no choice but to employ more than 2,000 former Russian mercenaries as his ‘army of reclamation’; opening up a front line, he confronted the militias. At this time quite a number of regions in Xinjiang experienced armed rebellions, so much so that the provincial administration at Urumqi was shaken. Jin Shuren led the Xinjiang government for nearly five years, but within three years the region had become embroiled in conflict.

On 12 April 1933 there was a military coup at Urumqi. Following this, Sheng Shicai became in effect the supremo of Xinjiang and commander-in-chief of its army. Sheng Shicai, originally from Liaoning province, had studied economics and military strategy as a foreign student in Japan. He came to Xinjiang in 1930, in the first instance as an education officer in the army. After the ‘Reform of Muslim Hami’, he was promoted and became chief of security in the Eastern Sector. After the coup at Urumqi, Liu Wenlong became chairman of the provincial government. Sheng Shicai’s military power coerced the committee members of the government and he was made sole superintendent. After this, he established a military council for every area in Xinjiang, and as one by one the posts of provincial chairmen fell vacant, the great powers of the real military committees were manipulated in his favour and all power to oversee the borders came to rest in the hands of one man, namely Sheng Shicai. After 1940, Sheng Shicai held both posts of superintendent and provincial chairman. In September 1944 Sheng Shicai was expelled from Xinjiang by the power of the Nationalist Party, or Guomindang,³ and was thereafter appointed director of forestry and farming in the Nationalist Government at Chongqing. The 10 years and more that Sheng Shicai had ruled Xinjiang were over. On 13 July 1970 Sheng Shicai died in Taiwan.

On 12 April 1934, a year to the day after the 1933 coup, the Xinjiang provincial government issued a manifesto which put forward an eight-point administrative plan called the ‘Great Eight-Point Manifesto’. The first and second substantive points concerned ‘the realization of equality for all nationalities’ and ‘the protection of the rights of believers’. In this atmosphere, the cause of national religious cultures was greatly advanced, and the Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tatar, Hui and Han nationalities among others saw their national cultures and identities promoted and successfully established. In 1935 Sheng Shicai convened the Second Great Provincial Congress for all the peoples of the province. At this conference, he announced the publication of a *Bulletin for All the Peoples of Xinjiang*,

³ Or, as is usual in Western publications, the ‘Kuomintang’. [Trans.]

and implemented the policies of ‘equality of nationalities’, ‘liberties of believers’, ‘safeguarding the nobility and providing special educational measures’ and ‘protecting private enterprise’. During this private conference, moreover, some of the Muslim national minorities had their names determined and officially written down using Chinese characters, such as the ‘Uighur nationality’, the ‘Kyrgyz nationality’, the ‘Tatar nationality’ and the ‘Tajik nationality’

Before 1942, Sheng Shicai had implemented the so-called ‘Six Major Policies’ of ‘anti-imperialism; friendship with the Soviet Union; equality of nationalities; freedom from corruption; peace; and nationhood’. At the same time, all the peoples of China had united in their common struggle against Japan and in Xinjiang some official government literature as well as some grassroots organizations approved the appointment of a tranche of Chinese Communist Party members as the mainstay of the local leadership. Little by little, a number of the intelligentsia from enemy-occupied areas filtered through to Xinjiang: at that time formal contacts between the Soviet Army and Xinjiang still existed and the region remained loosely under the protection of the Red Army. In these circumstances, Sheng Shicai had no choice but to adopt a progressive attitude and employ ‘opportunistic’ methods. Everything he did was carefully designed to safeguard and consolidate his military hegemony.

After 1937 Sheng Shicai decided that he should supervise personally the defence of the frontiers and so he occupied this post himself and began to wipe out local separatist regimes and disband any remnants. In April 1937 the divisional commander of the reorganized Sixth Division, Ma Muti (the ‘Shuangfan or opportunist element’), stirred up a rebellion at the Kashghar garrison, but the Sheng Shicai faction within the provincial army put down the rebellion. Simultaneously, Ma Hushan, the regimental commander of the 36th Division at Khotan (a survivor from Ma Zhongying’s days) joined the fight. Ma Hushan concluded a mutual agreement with Ma Muti and they united against Sheng Shicai. At the same time the garrison commander at Hami, Yao’ulbos, also started a rebellion. In May 1937 Sheng Shicai sent the provincial army to suppress Yao’ulbos’ forces; Yao’ulbos himself escaped to Nanjing.

In October 1937 Sheng Shicai again quelled Ma Muti and Ma Hushan’s forces: one after the other, Ma Muti and Ma Hushan escaped to India. Sheng Shicai also used the Mas’ revolt as an excuse to initiate throughout Xinjiang a campaign to track down and arrest people suspected of belonging to the ‘group of insurrectionary conspirators’ – those involved from among the government officials, local dignitaries and the upper echelons of the religious elite came to more than 2,000 people. In 1940 Sheng Shicai also manufactured an ‘insurrectionary plot’ and more than 1,000 people were arrested, chiefly people’s

representatives and members of the radical youth movement. He organized extensive secret service networks, and targets for imprisonment included officials from every branch of the government, members of the ruling councils of the national religions, dissident scholars, members of the Communist Party and even members of the public.

It should be said that Yang Zengxin had extended his authority even down to the lowest ranks within the civil and military administration and he supervised every appointment made in his two departments.

By the early 1930s only one operational cell of Communist Party members had been organized in Xinjiang. In May 1937 Central Committee member Cheng Yunshou was recalled to Xinjiang from the Soviet Union and entered into an agreement with Sheng Shicai that would allow some divisional commanders of the Western Sector Fourth Field Army (part of the workers' and peasants' Red Army) to be stationed at Urumqi. In September 1937 Deng Fa went to Xinjiang to take over Cheng Yunshou's work there. In October 1937 the offices of the Eighth Route Army were established at Urumqi. During the course of 1937 and 1938, Mao Zemin, Lin Luji, Chen Tanqin and over 100 others travelled separately to Xinjiang to work. Mao Zemin was appointed controller of public finances for the province, and Lin Luji as chancellor of Xinjiang College and county councillor for Kuqa. In 1942, following the change in the international situation, Sheng Shicai finally revealed his real intentions and openly displayed his anti-socialist colours. He arrested every member of the Communist Party working in Xinjiang, and on 27 September 1943 had Chen Tanqin, Mao Zemin, Lin Luji and others secretly murdered. At this same time, some progressive scholars also came cruelly to grief at Sheng Shicai's hands.

In the autumn of 1942, Sheng Shicai left Xinjiang for Chongqing to report on his work to the Nationalist Government of Jiang Jieshi.⁴ In the spring of 1943, Sheng Shicai returned to Xinjiang carrying Jiang Jieshi's 'personal commendation' and began to restructure the provincial government. Nationalist Party members were given the vast majority of posts and privileges within the new government. The Xinjiang section of the Nationalist Party was also established that year. In the autumn of 1943, the 29th Division of the Nationalist Army was divided to create the Second and 42nd Armies which were, in quick succession, stationed in Xinjiang and in matters of military defence thus supplanted Sheng Shicai's provincial army. After Sheng Shicai was transferred to the post of director of forestry and farming for the Nationalist Government, in August 1944, the Nationalist Government revoked the office of superintendent of frontier defence and appointed Wu Zhongxin as chairman of Xinjiang province. The Nationalist Government began directly to run Xinjiang's affairs.

⁴ Known in the West as Chiang Kaishek. [*Trans.*]

‘THE ISLAMIC KINGDOM OF KHOTAN’ AND ‘THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF EASTERN TURKISTAN’ AND THEIR COLLAPSE

At the beginning of 1933 the ‘opportunistic’ Grand Mullah Muhammad Imin and Grand Mullah Shabti began an armed uprising in Moyu county near Khotan and seized control of Moyu. Not long afterwards, they attacked and occupied Khotan. In April, Muhammad Imin proclaimed the foundation of the ‘Islamic Kingdom of Khotan’, installing himself as ‘king of Khotan’ and organizing a government for each of the occupied areas. After occupying Kashghar, Grand Mullah Shabti planned the establishment of an ‘Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan’ with the support of a forcible occupation of Aksu by Hojaniyaz.

On the night of 12 November 1933, the ‘Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan’ was inaugurated with a ‘constitution’ and ‘guiding principles of governmental organization’. In the ‘constitution’, it was stated that this so-called ‘nation’ was founded upon the teachings of Islam and that this would inform its political doctrine. The state would appoint heads of education and tribal matters and the imams and they would, in turn, deliberate upon matters of policy, supervise and dispense justice, and hold government authority. In the ‘guiding principles of governmental organization’, it was decided that the central government would appoint one person as president and that beneath him there would be national ministries, each led by one person with two deputies, one each for internal affairs, foreign relations, military matters, public finances, education, religious law, trade and commerce, agriculture and safety. Hojaniyaz was appointed ‘president’ and Grand Mullah Shabti as ‘prime minister’. This government sought support for its legitimacy from Afghanistan, India, Iran, Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan, Germany, Italy and the United States of America as well as supplies of weapons.

By the beginning of 1934, after the Ma Zhongying faction had been attacked and destroyed at Urumqi, they fled to southern Xinjiang. On 6 February 1934 the forces of Ma Zhongying took control of Muslim Kashi (Kashghar) and completely wiped out the authority of the ‘Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan’. The ‘prime minister’, the Grand Mullah, fled to Yerqiang but was arrested there. He was escorted under guard to Urumqi and later died in prison. ‘President’ Hojaniyaz had helped with Shabti’s arrest and earned Sheng Shicai’s gratitude, later becoming vice-chairman of the provincial government. In July 1934, the remaining forces of Ma Zhongying and Ma Hushan seized and occupied Khotan, utterly destroying the ‘Islamic Kingdom of Khotan’ run by Muhammad Imin and his brothers. And so the fleeting breakaway states of these two ‘opportunists’ and their political ideals came to a tragic end.

THE THREE REGIONS' UPRISING

In the autumn of 1944, an armed rebellion of many years' standing in the Ashan region of Xinjiang organized and established a provisional government and elected Uzman as head of that government. The Ashan region's resistance movement against the Guomindang's (Nationalist Party's) authority attracted vigorous encouragement and material and financial aid from the USSR and Mongolia.⁵ In that same autumn, the three regions of Ili, Tacheng (Qoqek) and Ashan (in the Altai region) took part in a large-scale armed uprising against the Nationalist Government. In September that year, the village elders of Gongha county raised the 'banner of righteousness and justice' and in October occupied Gongha township. In November, the people of Yining rose up, snatching victory. Subsequently the military wings of each uprising met in conference at Yining. The conference decided to establish a 'provisional government' (the 'provisional government of the Republic of Eastern Turkistan') and elected Ili Khan Tulye (a Russian émigré) as chairman of the provisional government and Ajim Buqqaja as vice-chairman. The provisional government also invited a group of Soviet bureaucrats to work as advisers and among these were military specialists. Ili Khan Tulye and Ajim Buqqaja were both 'opportunistic separatists'. As a result of their actions, the provisional government published in 1945 a 'Nine-Point Bulletin' which established a framework for its secession from China. In April 1945, following advice from Soviet Army consultants, the provisional government organized a complete military infrastructure and regular, armed troops known as the 'Nationality Army'.

In September 1945 an armed uprising overran and seized the three regions of Ili, Tacheng and Ashan. At the conference that had been convened to organize this uprising, it was decided to reform the provisional government at Yining and establish instead a fresh provisional government with jurisdiction over all three areas of Ili, Tacheng and Ashan. Within the Three Regions' Government considerable powers were delegated to Ahmet Jiang, Absouf and others. They were soon engaged in a bitter struggle with the head of Ili Khan Tulye's separatist forces and redressed some of the fundamental errors made during the first period of regional government. In June 1946 the leaders of the Three Regions' Government, namely Ahmet Jiang, Absouf and others, smashed Ili Khan Tulye's hold on power and changed the 'Eastern Tujuestan [Turkish] Republic' (or 'Eastern Turkistan') to the 'Ili Sub-Prefectural Standing Conference'; the separatist forces thus received their death knell.

⁵ That is to say, Outer Mongolia. Inner Mongolia is also now a self-governing province within the People's Republic of China. [*Trans.*]

In an echo of the Three Regions' uprising, on 15 August 1945 in southern Xinjiang at Puli an armed uprising was ignited. After the Three Regions' Government and the Nationalist Government had signed a 'peace accord', the Puli bloc agreed to arrange a similar provision.

In October 1945, delegates from the Three Regions' Government met with the Nationalist Central Government delegation led by Zhang Zhizhong in the Soviet Union; with the Soviets using their good offices as intermediaries, they entered into arbitration. Accompanying the Nationalist Government delegation from Urumqi were also Commissioner Masoud from the Central Coordination Bureau, Legislative Councillor Isha, and Commissioner presumptive Muhammad Imin from the Nationalist Central Prisons Inspectorate. In the spring of 1946, Wu Zhonggxin turned down the post of chairman of the Xinjiang provincial government and Jiang Jieshi appointed Zhang Zhizhong to hold concurrently his central government post and that of chairman of the Xinjiang provincial government. From January to June 1946, two separate sets of negotiations resulted in the 'peace accord' and the 'preservation of culture'. According to these two documents, the armed faction of the Three Regions' Government would be transformed into a 'regular regiment of the Nationalist Army', and by way of attaching importance to the provincial government, the Three Regions were guaranteed six administrative members. In the course of the negotiations, the Three Regions' delegate, Ahmet Jiang, renounced his 'national status' and took on the title of 'people's representative for the rebellious regions of Xinjiang'. This was a well-directed and principled change of position.

In July 1946 a united Xinjiang government was established and Ahmet Jiang was appointed as both the leader of the Three Regions' delegation and vice-chairman of the Committee for a United Government; Absouf was appointed both commissioner and deputy secretary; Saifuding as commissioner and minister of education; and Uzman as commissioner and deputy commissioner for Ashan. The guarantor of the Seven Regions, Bao'erhan, was appointed commissioner and vice-chairman. The original 'Government of the Islamic Republic of Turkistan' was disbanded, regional powers were handed back to the leaders of the Xinjiang provincial government and the area was once again under the direct jurisdiction of the latter administration.

In 1947 Urumqi experienced the bloody events of 25 February. Because of the Nationalist Politburo's premeditated violations of the agreement, the Three Nations' delegation could no longer continue its work at Urumqi and in the summer of 1947 it withdrew from the united government, one member after another in quick succession, and returned to the Three Regions. In May 1947 the Nationalist Government in Nanjing appointed the 'opportunist' Masoud to replace Zhang Zhizhong as commissioner and chairman of the Xinjiang

provincial government and the ‘opportunist’ Muhammad Imin was installed as commissioner and vice-chairman of the same government; moreover, the ‘opportunist’ Isha Yusuf was appointed provincial government commissioner and grand secretary.

Masoud had been comptroller-general of military affairs for the ‘Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan’ (in southern Xinjiang) and had held a position in Ma Muti’s army; after the separatist movement was crushed, he had fled to India. At the end of 1934, he had returned to China. Afterwards he served as a national delegate and as commissioner in the Central Coordination Office. Following victory in the War of Resistance (against Japan), Masoud returned to Xinjiang where he became chief of the ‘opportunist’ faction. Muhammad Imin and his younger brother became the ringleaders of the ‘Islamic Kingdom of Khotan’; after their separatist movement was destroyed, he also fled to India. While he was there, he collaborated with Japanese spies and betrayed the national minorities. In 1938 he returned to Chongqing and with Masoud, Isha and others started a publication entitled *Opportunist Thoughts*. When the War of Resistance was over, he returned to Xinjiang. In mid-1934 Isha and Masoud sought refuge with the Guomindang. After the end of the Second World War he also returned to Xinjiang. On the eve of the peaceful liberation of Xinjiang in 1949, Muhammad Imin and Isha escaped over the border and continued to broadcast their ‘opportunist’ way of thinking and their separatist ideals.

In the summer of 1947, instigated by the Nationalists, Uzman’s regional forces attacked the Three Regions’ Government and occupied their territory. In 1948 Uzman established a ‘Commission for the Protection of the Republic’.

In January 1949, on the eve of the collapse of the Nationalist Government’s authority, bowing to universal opposition from every nationality in Xinjiang, the Nationalists dismissed Masoud from his post, reformed the provincial government and appointed Bao’erhan as chairman of the Xinjiang Authority.

THE LIBERATION OF XINJIANG

In August 1949 the Central Committee member Deng Likun was recalled from the Soviet Union and sent as a liaison officer to the seat of government for the Three Regions at Yining, establishing a direct line of communication between the two bodies. After this, the Central Committee transferred Deng Likun to Urumqi, where he established relations with Bao’erhan and others and jointly worked towards a peaceful resolution of the Xinjiang question.

In August 1948 the Central Committee urgently requested the leaders of the Three Regions in Xinjiang to come to Beijing to attend the First Political Consultative Conference of the Chinese People’s Government. Ahmet Jiang, Absouf and others travelled via

the USSR to Beijing, but the plane crashed over the Soviet Union and Ahmet Jiang, Absouf and their compatriots perished. Subsequently the people of the Three Regions chose Saifuding as their delegate to attend this conference. On 21 September 1949 the entire caucus of the First Political Consultative Conference of the Government of the People's Republic of China met in plenary session.

On 25 September 1949 the high commissioner of the Xinjiang police, Tao Zhiyue, deserted the Nationalist Government by telegram. On 26 September the chairman of the Xinjiang provincial government, Bao'erhan, also rebelled via telegram. They stated that they had left the Nationalist Government in Guangzhou and acknowledged the leadership of the new central government in Beijing.

A new chapter in Xinjiang's history (October 1949 to 1990)

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUTONOMOUS, SELF-GOVERNING REGION

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was established. This opened up a new chapter in the country's history. In September 1949 Xinjiang was brought under the control of the People's Republic of China. In October of that year, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Xinjiang and on 20 October occupied the provincial garrison at Urumqi. By the end of 1949 the PLA had totally secured Xinjiang's borders. In December 1949 the armed wing of the Three Regions' Nationality Army joined forces with the PLA at Urumqi and was then transformed into a unit of the PLA. On 17 December 1949 the Xinjiang People's Government was inaugurated at Urumqi; Bao'erhan became chairman of the provincial government and Saifuding its vice-chairman. The same day, to celebrate the founding of the Xinjiang People's Government, a united corps of PLA troops who had entered Xinjiang, members of the Three Regions' Nationality Army and troops from Nationalist rebellions held a meeting at Urumqi and then entered the city as one.

When the People's Republic of China had been established, the Chinese Government wanted to achieve equality between its different nationalities and unite their peoples round common goals; accordingly, it passed a series of measures for the ethnic minorities and various diktats on religion. Such measures were designed: to put into practice Xinjiang's status as an autonomous, self-governing national minority area within China; to carry through in their entirety the central government's policies on ethnic minorities and religion; to safeguard the different nationalities' fundamental freedoms; to form, develop and consolidate

equality; and to unify and mutually support the new pattern of relationships between the diverse nationalities

On the day of its foundation, the Xinjiang People's Government published an administrative programme which promoted the equality of different ethnic minorities within the province, opposed the dominance of the more populous minorities, banned narrow and self-interested nationalism, established freedom of religious belief, developed national languages and literature, prohibited separatist ethnic movements and advanced unification. The Xinjiang People's Government was allowed to issue its own government orders; it abolished insulting titles and place names, for example changing 'Dihua' to 'Urumqi' and 'Zhenxi' ('The Utmost West') to 'Barkol'. Some national minorities, although their spoken names did not appear derogatory, nevertheless wished to put changes into effect on the basis of their self-determination: in 1958, for example, according to the wishes of the Da'ur (Tahur) nationality, 'Da-h-ur' was altered to 'Da'ur'.

Before the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' of 1966, there were two great topics of debate within the government, namely the 'Democratic Revolution to Overthrow Feudalism' and the 'Establishment of Autonomous Regions within Xinjiang'.

In 1950 the Xinjiang People's Government began to dismantle the foundations of the *bao-jia* system⁶ and the 'system of nobles and princes'. The old administrative power bases were transformed into regions, counties, cities, districts, townships and villages so as to establish democratic power structures throughout the province and a movement was launched to reduce rent and interest and oppose the landlords. In 1952 throughout Xinjiang the Land Reform Movement was launched: this nearly or completely prevented landlords monopolizing land and livestock and then distributed it to those peasants who had little or no land. Before the Democratic Revolution, approximately 8 per cent of the rural population were landlords and between 40 and 50 per cent were rich peasants, but between them they owned over 80 per cent of the land. By the end of 1953, Xinjiang had completed its programme of land reform, encompassing more than 74.2 million ha of land, over 70,000 herds of livestock, 60,000 farm tools, 200,000 homesteads and 70 million kg of grain distributed among 33.2 million peasants. In nomadic regions, it was not possible to implement government policies because of the nomads' opposition to fixed settlements, but the government did dismantle their feudal powers.

In 1952 working parties of specialist advisers were set up to prepare Xinjiang's self-governing regions.⁷ On 13 September 1955, at the 21st National People's Congress, the

⁶ An administrative system organized on the basis of households, each *jia* being made up of 10 households, and each *bao* of 10 *jias*.

⁷ In 1954 the Hui Muslim autonomous county of Yanqi was established (and transformed into a fully fledged county in 1955), as was the Xibe (Sibo) nationality autonomous county of Qapqal (becoming a

proposal by State Council President Zhou Enlai to make Xinjiang a Uighur Autonomous Region was discussed. On 1 October 1955 the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang was inaugurated and Saifuding was elected as chairman of the regional People's Committee.

In 1950 there were about 3,000 cadres of ethnic-minority extraction in Xinjiang. By 1955, at the time of its institution as the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, there were 46,000 cadres from the ethnic minorities. The number now stands at 348,000, a region-wide proportion of 51.8 per cent of cadres being from the ethnic minorities; just over 46 per cent of the female cadres within the province are from the ethnic minorities. These ethnic minorities have ample representation on each of the People's Congresses. In order to safeguard rigorously the rights of the ethnic minorities among the delegates to the different People's Congresses of the autonomous regions, the proportion of delegates from the ethnic minorities is 4 per cent higher than their actual population would warrant were a proportional representative sample of the population taken. From among the Xinjiang delegates to all previous National People's Congresses, those from the ethnic minorities who have been assigned to attend from this region amount to more than 63 per cent of the total, averaging a higher representative proportion than within the general population of Xinjiang.

In 1984 the state promulgated the 'Laws for the National Autonomous Regions of the People's Republic of China'. This safeguards the ethnic minorities' national, self-governing areas, their constitutional rights and their basic laws, thus attaching great importance to these specific nationalities' areas within Xinjiang.

RELIGION IN XINJIANG IN RECENT TIMES

After the Cultural Revolution (1977 onwards) Xinjiang, along with the rest of the country, welcomed a return to economic construction as the focus for this new chapter in the country's history. In the light of these new circumstances, the government was vigilant in stressing a strengthening of unity of ties and purpose between the nationalities, protecting freedom of religious belief, maintaining public order and striking hard at any elements involved in either separatist or terrorist movements.

full county in 1955), the Mongol autonomous prefecture of Bayingol (becoming a fully fledged prefecture in 1955), the Mongol autonomous prefecture of Bortala (another full prefecture in 1955), the Kyrgyz autonomous prefecture of Kizilsu (full status in 1955), the Hui Muslim autonomous prefecture of Changji (full status in 1955), the Kazakh autonomous county of Mori (full status in 1955), the Mongol autonomous county of Hoboksar (full status in 1955), the Tajik autonomous county of Tashkurgan, the Kazakh autonomous county of Barkol (full status in 1955), and the Kazakh autonomous prefecture of Ili, along with 43 ethnic minority self-governing townships.

The great majority of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang are religious believers, with different nationalities holding largely to different religions – thus the Uighurs, Kazakhs and Huis are Muslims and the mass of Mongol, Xibe and Da'ur tribes are Buddhists. The rights of each and every nationality for their citizens freely to practise their religious beliefs is fully respected and orthodox religious movements all come under the protection of the law. Xinjiang now boasts 24,000 religious centres that are currently in use, among which are 23,753 mosques; there are 26,800 people involved in religious instruction and administration, of whom 26,500 are Muslim. Every year the government sets aside funds for the restoration of important temples and religious buildings such as the vital renewal of the Great Mosque in Urumqi, the Baytul mosque in Yining and the Jaimay ('Increasing Grain') temple in Khotan.

At present, at every People's Congress and each government planning meeting, those who are appointed to oversee Xinjiang's religious affairs number more than 1,800 people, among them 1 delegate to the National People's Congress and 4 delegates to the National Government; in the People's Congress for autonomous regions, there are 21 delegates from Xinjiang with this remit and 27 within the autonomous regional government. As representatives of the body of believers, they energetically participate in government and political affairs and the decision-making process, moreover ensuring that the government upholds its stated policy of freedom of religious belief. In order to safeguard religious figures who regularly carry out religious duties, the government addresses certain difficulties in their living conditions and provides a fixed payment towards living expenses. Since 1982 the region has seen the restoration and foundation of 88 religious communities, including 1 Muslim association in an autonomous region and 1 Buddhist society; in districts, prefectures and cities, 13 Muslim associations have been formed and 3 Buddhist communities, as well as 1 Christian 'Associated Movement of Patriotic Saints'; there are 65 Muslim associations in county settlements, 2 Buddhist communities and 2 Christian 'Associated Movements of Patriotic Saints'. Each religious community is fully within the limits permitted by the law and is allowed to develop its religious programme independently.

As far as the training of religious personnel, education and administration goes, as well as the establishment of religious schools and the development of international relations between the same faiths, each religious community is allowed to give free rein to its important work. In order to ensure an orthodox development of religious affairs, Xinjiang has established the Islamic Normal College, where specialists train Islamic personnel to a high standard. In order to improve the knowledge base of religious providers and to train a body of high-quality religious staff, a system of training has been set up at the three levels of autonomous region, district and county. The government uses subsidies from the public

finances to train religious instructors and support staff in rotation, organizes the regular attendance of religious providers at examinations, encourages a tolerant outlook and promotes the widening of knowledge.

In Xinjiang many types of religious literature are translated into, and published and distributed in, Uighur, Kazakh, Chinese and other languages, and editions of Islamic scriptures and holy texts such as the Qu'ran, *Selected Works of Wo'erzi* and *A New Collection of the Selected Speeches of Wo'erzi* are available, along with Buddhist and Christian sacred texts. The magazine *The Chinese Muslim* is published in both Uighur and Chinese editions. To make things easier for believers, every area has approved the institution of an information point where religious literature can be found. According to the statutes and laws of the autonomous government, these lay down the by-laws and regulations that have been promulgated such as 'temporary provisions for running religious centres in the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang'. Those who practise an orthodox religious lifestyle, according to the guidelines and etiquette of the religion in which they believe, are entitled to legal protection. As the general standard of living improves, several tens of thousands of Muslims are now able to travel to Mecca on pilgrimage; when students at the Normal College attend international and national competitions in the recitation of the Qu'ran, they achieve very good results.

ANTI -TERRORISM

Between April and May 1962, substantial numbers of the inhabitants of the border regions of Ili and Tacheng fled to Russia; this gave rise to the '5.29 incident' at Yining, where several hundred people mounted an attack upon the autonomous prefectural government of Ili and entered the city of Yining firing rifles. These fugitives were mainly people who had been involved in 'opportunist' movements across the border or extremist separatist movements.

After the revolution of 1949, the 'Eastern Turkish' forces were not completely mopped up. A fair number of them fled abroad and while there joined Xinjiang separatist cliques; others joined unofficial separatist movements within Xinjiang. In the international anti-Chinese climate prevailing at the time, they waited for their chance to be involved in violent separatist movements. In the middle of the Cultural Revolution in 1968, national separatist elements pieced together a 'People's Revolutionary Party of Eastern Turkistan', which scored some isolated victories in a few regions. By 1970 it had been suppressed. However, it remained a clandestine organization. Right into the 1990s, under the influence of religious extremism, separatism and international terrorism, both outside and within China's borders, the 'Eastern Turkish' forces could use the fear of violence as an important part

of their arsenal in their counter-revolutionary separatist movement. Some elements of this movement openly admit that they must make use of terror to strengthen their hand and promote the separatist agenda. Insurgencies and guerrilla actions often take place, and many deaths and casualties were caused by an armed revolt in Ba'ren township in Aktao county: this bloody incident caused serious damage to the lives, property, safety and social cohesion of every nationality within Xinjiang.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE XINJIANG ARMY FOR CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY

In 1954 the central government decided to form the Xinjiang Army for Construction and Productivity, using some of the troops already stationed in Xinjiang. These government soldiers were taken away from the task of national defence and used to open up wasteland. Later, this large unit of cadres, workers and their family members grew to be 24,538,000 strong, with 9,330,000 workers and 14 divisions (reclamation areas) altogether. The unit played an important role in consolidating internal stability and the frontier defence of Xinjiang, and upheld the principle of simultaneously engaging in productive labour and performing militia duties. In conjunction with the army, the military police and the masses, they established a 'four-branch' alliance of the 'army, police, militia and people' in the border regions which for nearly 50 years has countered and suppressed violent infiltrations by internal and external separatist forces, thus defending the stability and security of the Chinese border territory of Xinjiang.

NORTH INDIA (EXCLUDING PAKISTAN
AFTER 1947)*

Iqtidar A. Khan

Contents

Early colonial rule	394
The revolt of 1857	395
After 1857	396
Early nationalism	398
Nationalism and Indian capitalists	401
The coming of Gandhi	402
Mass mobilization, independence and partition	403
Independent India	407

Early colonial rule

The impact of British colonial rule in India down to the middle of the nineteenth century was marked by a general impoverishment of the peasantry and artisans as well as by the large-scale ruin of handicrafts. The decline of urban centres and recurring famines were accompanying phenomena.¹

The East India Company managed to extend and consolidate its rule in India by means of the ruthless state system it had built. The Bengal army, which, around 1857, had 139,807 native troops called sepoys, organized and equipped on modern lines under European officers, was the most important coercive organ of this state. As revealed during the revolt

* See Maps 4 and 5
¹ See Chand, 1961, Vol. 1, pp. 346–58, 364–79; Dutt, 1947, pp. 76–83, 99–106, 189–95.

of 1857, the sepoys of the Bengal army (comprising largely upper-caste peasants or small landowners recruited from Bihar, Awadh and the North-Western Provinces) had the potential of becoming the ‘general centre’ of Indian people’s resistance to British colonial rule.² A large body of the sepoys were apparently affected by the growing general disaffection in these regions during the first half of the nineteenth century. This disaffection, stemming from the economic ruin of the producing classes, acquired a cultural dimension on account of the popular impression that the colonial regime was intent on subverting the traditional values of the ‘natives’. Enlightened measures like the abolition of *sati*,³ the encouragement of widow remarriage, the prohibition of female infanticide and human sacrifice, even the introduction of a rudimentary health service and a system of schools offering a modern education, were widely perceived as designed to subvert the religions and culture of the Indian people. Such a perception was reinforced by the aggressive preaching of some of the Christian missionaries patronized by the Company’s government.⁴

Local uprisings during the early decades of the Company’s rule in India were the direct result of the prevailing disaffection. The Islamic militancy of the *Ahl-i Hadis* (people following the Prophet’s teachings) (dubbed Wahhabis by their opponents), led by Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi, was, perhaps, one of the more significant of these outbreaks. This movement emphasized the identity of the groups professing Islam in India as belonging to a single religious community, thus laying the basis of the separatist thrust that perceived Indian Muslims as a distinct nation. On the other hand, the same trend also generated among the Muslim religious elite a strong feeling of hostility towards colonial rule, encouraging them to make common cause on equal terms with the non-Muslim rebels in 1857.⁵

The revolt of 1857

The revolt of 1857 was an important landmark in the history of British colonial rule in India. As pointed out by Irfan Habib, this revolt ‘proved to be the greatest armed challenge to imperialism the world over during the entire course of the nineteenth century’.⁶ It was the first occasion on which different segments of the ‘native’ population in a large part of North and Central India were involved in a concerted attempt to overthrow colonial rule.

² Marx, 15 July 1857. For the strength and composition of the Bengal army in 1857, see Habib, [1998a](#), pp. 6–8.

³ The practice of burning a widow on the funeral pyre of her husband, practised among some Hindu communities and abolished in 1829.

⁴ S. A. Khan, [1986](#), pp. 119–23.

⁵ See Q. Ahmad, [1966](#), pp. 25–98; Ashraf, [1992](#), pp. 30–3; I. A. Khan, [2002](#), pp. 7–19.

⁶ Habib, [1998b](#), p. 22.

Different facets of the 1857 revolt are open to contradictory interpretations. The rebels' tendency to rally round the figure of the last Mughal ruler Bahadur Shah II (1837–58), as well as some of their declarations promising to preserve caste distinctions and the privileges of the hereditary chiefs, point to the revolt being an attempt to restore the old order. On the other hand, the rebels' attempts to mobilize public support by assuring different sections of the population that their interests would be protected clearly suggest that the sympathy and cooperation of the mass of the Indian people were seen by the rebels as the real source of power. Modern weapons and the military hierarchy often retained by the rebels of the Bengal army, and their general attitude of combining them with committees and *panchayats* (village councils) thrown up in the course of the revolt, or the famous constitution of the 'Court [of] Administration' at Delhi, were obviously aimed at a broad-based state structure represented by a kind of elective military rule.

The well-known proclamations of the Mughal prince Feroz Shah (August 1857 and December 1858)⁷ state that the ongoing struggle was between the English on one side and 'the people of Hindustan, both Hindus and Mohammadans' on the other. This seems to reflect a refreshingly modern concept of the Indian people, with similar connotations to those popularized later on during the struggle for independence. Such evidence suggests that the revolt of 1857 may have carried within it the seeds of the later nationalist mobilizations in which communal solidarity was always a cherished objective.

The defence of religion was one of the rallying calls of the rebels. This appeal to religious sentiment, however, did not lead to Hindu–Muslim recriminations. The rebel leaders went out of their way to promote the spirit of communal tolerance among their followers as well as among ordinary people. Even some of the so-called Wahhabis like Bakht Khan, 'commander-in-chief' of the rebel forces at Delhi, are known to have agreed to a prohibition on the slaughter of cows on the occasion of *Id uz-Zoha* (the Muslim feast) in July 1857. This was obviously aimed at preventing communal dissension in the rebels' camp.⁸

After 1857

The transfer of governing authority in India to the British crown in 1858 was followed by a significant shift in the pattern of colonial rule as well as its economic implications. This change further increased the tendency for the administration to be run for the benefit of the dominant classes, including of course the newly risen entrepreneurs in Britain. After the introduction of a submarine cable in 1870, this subordination of the colonial administration

⁷ See Feroz Shah's proclamations of August 1857 and December 1858, reproduced in English translation by Rizvi (ed.), 1957, Vol. 1, pp. 453–9.

⁸ Iqbal Husain, 1998, p. 33, note 71.

in India to the dictates of the ruling establishment in Britain greatly increased. There was, no doubt, an attempt to provide the appearance of legitimacy to a council presided over by the governor-general (1861) and to which a few Indians could also be nominated. The local bodies consisting of members nominated by district magistrates⁹ were initially nothing but instruments to collect additional taxes in the garb of local self-government. They became somewhat more representative, however, after the reforms introduced in 1882 by Lord Ripon, the governor-general.¹⁰

An important aspect of the changes related to the reorganization of the army. Up to 1857, Europeans in the Bengal army represented only 14 per cent of the total force. From 1859 onwards, the principle was established that Europeans should always constitute one third of the existing fighting strength of the army. Again, the artillery was placed entirely under European control. Recruitment to the army came to be increasingly influenced by the ideology of 'martial races' under which large numbers of new groups like Sikhs and Gurkhas were inducted into the army, leading to a radical change in its composition. The army no longer remained the preserve of high-caste men recruited from Bihar, Awadh and the North-Western Provinces. These changes helped to make the army of British India once again an effective tool for advancing Britain's overseas imperial interests.¹¹

Under the post-1858 colonial dispensation, while the drain of wealth as 'tribute' as well as in the form of profits from trade and other investments increased many times over, there was a limited spurt of industrial growth accompanied by some degree of commercialization of agriculture. Both these processes were basically oriented towards serving the interests of British industrial capital. The expansion of the railways, from only 695 km in 1859 to nearly 40,250 km by 1900, was perhaps the most important facet of this development. The rail network was necessitated by the requirements of British industrial capital for the commercial penetration of India. However, the construction of railways was also aimed at creating a market for the iron, steel and engineering industries in England. The wide railway network facilitated the large-scale export of agricultural products, including food-grains, to England. This contributed to a general rise in the price of food-grains in India. The recurring famines of the second half of the nineteenth century, causing 28 million deaths, cannot but be seen as linked to the increasing export of food-grains after the coming of the railways.¹²

⁹ The district magistrate (also known as the collector) was the head of the administration in the district, the smallest administrative and territorial unit of the colonial empire.

¹⁰ For a British conservative perspective on this change-over, see Keith, 1961, pp. 164–83.

¹¹ Sarkar, 1983, pp. 16–17.

¹² Dutt, 1947, pp. 106, 112–15.

The *zamindārs* (holders of hereditary superior rights over land) were generally given a free hand to increase rents as well as to exploit the cultivators in various ways. Even in *ryotwari*¹³ areas in Bombay and Madras presidencies,¹⁴ a sort of landlordism developed through the dispossession of the original cultivators by money-lenders and others who secured possession of their lands. This policy secured the enduring loyalty and support of large landowners all over the country for the colonial regime.¹⁵

Most of the 662 native rulers, the so-called Indian princes, had remained firmly loyal to the British in 1857. Some of them, like Scindia of Gwalior, had actively helped the British in putting down the revolt.¹⁶ To reward the princes for their loyalty, the policy of annexing the princely states on various pretexts was abandoned. They were now to be nurtured as a 'bulwark' of colonial rule in India. In 1876 Queen Victoria assumed the title of empress of India:¹⁷ this emphasized the special connection with the Indian princes, who came to be treated as agents of the British crown. The Indian princes continued to be loyal supporters of British colonial rule down to 1947.

Early nationalism

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the ideological ethos of the educated petty bourgeoisie in India was informed by numerous currents of thought and belief rooted in the experience of colonial rule. Foremost among them was the tendency to re-examine existing religious beliefs as well as the social customs and attitudes these promoted. The Brahmo Samaj (a Hindu reformist movement founded by Raja Ram Mohan Roy in 1829 and carried forward by Debendranath Tagore and Keshub Chandra Sen, who combined veneration for the *Vedas* and *Upanishads* with an attitude of applying reason as the ultimate criterion) was perhaps the earliest and most significant development of this nature. It was followed by similar but less radical ideas propagated by Paramhans Mandal (1840) and Gopal Hari Deshmukh (1840) in Maharashtra. A mystically inclined version of the same tendency was reflected in the teachings of Ramakrishna (1834–86). His disciple Vivekananda (1863–1902), who was more inclined towards social action, also advocated

¹³ Term for land revenue assessment system on the basis of holdings of direct cultivators called *ryots*; distinct from the *zamindari* system based on the rights of *zamindārs* who generally did not cultivate directly but held superior rights on the land.

¹⁴ Presidency: special term for the three large and very composite British colonial provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras.

¹⁵ For brief comments on the Maharashtra and Andhra outbreaks, see Sarkar, 1983, pp. 46, 50–1.

¹⁶ See Major Charles Macpherson's report to R. Hamilton Rust, agent of the governor-general of Central India, dated February 1858, in *Foreign Political Proceedings*, 1–8 October: see I. A. Khan, 1998, pp. 67–71.

¹⁷ Sarkar, 1983, pp. 64–67; see also Keith, 1961, pp. 213–21.

the coming together of ‘the two great systems, Hinduism and Islam’. The Arya Samaj of Swami Dayanand (1824–83) was equally unsparing in its re-evaluation of Hindu religious tradition.¹⁸

Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s attempts to reinterpret Islamic tenets in the early phase of the Aligarh movement, i.e. before 1875, may also be bracketed with the above tendency. During this phase, Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s emphasis was on there being no conflict between the ‘Word of God (the Qur’an)’ and the ‘Work of God (i.e. natural phenomena as interpreted by modern science)’. There was also an implicit suggestion that all the revealed religions hold similar values. It is worth noting that the Aligarh movement in its early phase was totally free from religious intolerance; it was in fact anxious to associate with its programme as many Hindus of aristocratic background as were prepared to join. Attempts to give the Aligarh movement a separatist orientation were successful only from 1884 onwards, when it was increasingly influenced by Theodore Beck and other Englishmen associated with Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College in various capacities.¹⁹

An equally important element contributing to the ideological ethos of the political process in India during the second half of the nineteenth century was the spread of the ideals of the European Enlightenment. This Western impact, combined with a new sense of pride inculcated by the rediscovery of India’s ancient past (largely an achievement of European scholarship) and a growing realization that India had a distinct cultural identity, helped to define the overall world-view of the leadership of the Indian National Congress during the first two decades of its existence. The moderates among them saw the British connection as beneficial for the Indian people. They perceived it as bringing a ‘higher civilization’ to India. The positive assessment of the British imperial connection, however, did not prevent them from evaluating critically the impact of the colonial administration on the life and conditions of the Indian people. They did not hesitate to put forward demands aimed at larger Indian representation in the Imperial Legislative Council and the civil service as well as a reduction in the tax burden on the middle classes. They were also sensitive to the plight of the peasants and often pleaded for a reduction of land revenue demands. Calculations of the drain of wealth from India as tribute, and of the increasing burden of land tax on the peasantry, were two very significant contributions of the moderate stalwarts, Dadabhai Naoroji and R. C. Dutt – they continue to inform the nationalist critique of British colonial rule to this day.

The nineteenth century also witnessed the gradual unfolding of the British policy of divide and rule. It was primarily aimed at preventing Hindus and Muslims from coming

¹⁸ Chand, 1990, pp. 391–429; Sarkar, 1983, pp. 65–76.

¹⁹ Chand, 1990, pp. 352–8, 364–76; Sarkar, 1983, pp. 76–8.

together on a manifestly anti-colonial platform. This was encouraged by fanning communal hatred between them in devious ways. One very effective instrument of this policy was the depiction of India's history prior to the establishment of the East India Company's rule as a series of never-ending conflicts between Hindus and Muslims. Elliot's translation of passages selected from Persian chronicles in a tendentious manner contributed enormously to the dissemination of this highly divisive version of Indian history.²⁰ Under its impact, literary works with a historical bias full of communal hatred came to be written in several Indian languages, particularly Hindi, Bengali and Marathi. Some of these works were acclaimed by the radical nationalists of 1890s as carrying a cultural resonance conforming to their own historical visions. One such literary work in Bengali, *Anand Math* (1882) by Bankim Chandra, carried the famous patriotic hymn of *Bande Mataram*: during the period of agitation against the partition of Bengal (1905–11), this came to be recognized as the anthem of the freedom movement. The divisive version of Indian history officially popularized through textbooks in the nineteenth century may thus be seen as contributing in a considerable measure to giving a revivalist tinge to the nationalist mobilizations of the pre-world war decades. This in turn facilitated the growth of Muslim separatism, which was systematically encouraged from about 1883 onwards by an influential lobby in the Government of India with the aim of dissuading Indian Muslims from joining the Indian National Congress in large numbers.²¹

The 'extremist' wing of the Indian National Congress was not reconciled to the moderate vision of slow constitutional development. They raised the slogan of *swaraj* (self-rule) and were generally inclined towards *swadesh* (lit. 'of one's own country')²² and self-help. In Bengal (1905–8) the Swadeshi movement and the boycott became the main forms of extremist agitation linked with terrorist activity spurred on by the 'Hindu nationalism' preached by Aurobindo Ghosh. The extremists tended to oppose any measure they perceived as aiming to impose Western culture under the garb of modernization and reform. Nor did they see any harm in using religious feelings or the attachment of the masses to their traditional way of living as a pretext for political mobilization.²³ This attitude of the extremists inevitably gave a Hindu revivalist tinge to the over-all ideological ethos of the freedom movement. But the Congress extremists, despite their social conservatism and revivalist leanings, always saw Indian Muslims as an inseparable part of the Indian

²⁰ Elliot, 1849, original preface, p. xxii, where the purpose of the translation is stated frankly.

²¹ T. Ahmad, 1994, pp. 168–78, 179–98.

²² Applied to the nationalist protest movement of 1905–11 against the partition of Bengal in 1905; also applied to protest movements of boycott of foreign goods.

²³ Sarkar's notices on 'Roots of Extremism' and 'The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal', 1983, pp. 96–100, 111–25.

people. In the first decade of the twentieth century, many Muslim young men were attracted to the militant nationalism of the Congress extremists. To Hasrat Mohani, a distinguished representative of MAO College (Aligarh)'s first generation, Balgangadhar Tilak had come to symbolize the true spirit of the freedom struggle.

Nationalism and Indian capitalists

The end of the First World War heralded a new phase in the history of India's struggle for independence. Subsequently, under Mahatma Gandhi's (1869–1948) overall leadership, the Indian National Congress registered unprecedented successes in mobilizing the masses. In its historic resolutions at its Lahore (1930) and Karachi (1931) sessions, the Congress also developed a new vision of a free, democratic and modern India. This phase ended in 1947 with the dawn of freedom accompanied by the tragedy of partition.

A considerable expansion of industrial production, principally in light industry during the First World War, marked the beginning of this phase. Such expansion was possible mainly because the pressures of the war situation had obliged Britain to abandon its former policy of discouraging the growth of industrial enterprises in which Indians were emerging in strong positions. As admitted in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, the British policy of encouraging limited industrial expansion during the war was aimed at modernizing India as Britain's base in the 'Eastern theatre of war.' During this short spurt of industrial expansion, the textile and jute industries, where Indian capital had a large presence, grew rapidly. As a result, the financial and political clout of the Indian capitalist class was noticeably enhanced. On the other hand, during the same period, the exploitation of India by British finance capital tended to become a dominant feature. This developed out of the existing industrial capitalist and trading exploitation of India. As compared to the first half of the nineteenth century, by the time war broke out in 1914 the burden of total tribute had increased several times over. In this new scenario, India's national bourgeoisie developed a perceptibly antagonistic relationship to British finance capital.²⁴

It is, therefore, not surprising that from 1917 onwards an important section of the Indian capitalist class should become interested in gaining influence in the affairs of the Indian National Congress so as to have their demands and aspirations articulated from its platform. Following the decision of the Congress in 1922 to allow the entry of Swarajists (from Swaraj, the name of a party formed in 1923 to participate in the elections) into the councils established under the Government of India Act (1919), this tendency became

²⁴ Dutt, 1947, pp. 122–8. Cf. Chandra, 1993, p. 45. A considerable indigenous capitalist class had been formed which feared that it would be submerged under the superior economic strength of the foreign capitalist class.

very pronounced.²⁵ The financial support for many Gandhian projects by industrialists like Ghanshyam Das Birla, Jamnalal Bajaj and Ambalal Sarabai may be seen in this perspective. This support for Gandhian projects, as well as for the Congress organization, continued throughout the succeeding phases of mass mobilizations when the Congress was usually in conflict with the colonial rulers. This was so despite the presence, from the late 1920s onwards, of a proactive leftist block within the ranks of the Indian National Congress. Evidently, neither Jawaharlal Nehru's socialism nor Gandhi's critique of modern industrial development and his idealization of the pre-modern social ethos of the village community adversely affected the Indian national bourgeoisie's support for the Congress.

The coming of Gandhi

Gandhi appeared on the Indian political scene in 1915 when the Indian National Congress, dominated by the moderates, was not yet geared to respond to the growing distress and militancy of the masses beyond resolutions and petitions in the old loyalist jargon. Around this time, general resentment at the high prices caused by the war was bolstered by an unprecedented recruitment drive, particularly in Punjab. Muslim theologians, who had come out against the war in the face of severe repression, viewed the Anglo-French military thrust against the Ottoman empire as an assault on the Islamic world and civilization.²⁶ This Pan-Islamic sentiment, combined with the general anti-imperialist upsurge triggered by the October 1917 revolution in Russia and growing popular resentment at colonial rule, created an explosive situation all over the subcontinent. The *rapprochement* between Congress moderates and extremists in 1916, and the accompanying League–Congress pact of the same year, had geared the entire freedom movement into a state of subjective readiness to face this situation. Britain tried to calm the unrest by promulgating the Government of India Act (1919), supposedly a step towards the evolution of 'self-governing institutions'. But this constitutional scheme did not meet the approval of even most of the moderates, though some of them were not averse to giving it a fair trial.

At this juncture Gandhi emerged as a charismatic leader of the Indian people, with his distinct world-view and vision of a future India defined by his principles of *ahimsa* (non-violence), *satyagraha* (soul force) and purity of means. He perceived Indian culture as a fusion of different religious traditions and rejected its identification with one particular faith. As may be seen from his *Hind Swaraj* written in 1909, he rejected the model of

²⁵ Sarkar, 1983, pp. 231–2.

²⁶ T. Ahmad, 1994, pp. 233–4, cites the Rowlatt Committee's report, which accuses the senior Deoband divine, Maulvi Mahmoodul Hasan, of declaring a *jihad* against Britain and of planning to set up a provisional government headed by Raja Mahendra Pratap.

modern industrial society and idealized the Indian village community as well as the small-scale handicraft production identified with it. The future India of Gandhi's vision was not necessarily to be a part of the British empire; being free of the British connection, it would also be cleansed of the accompanying modernism.²⁷

By 1919, when Gandhi first became involved in the mass protests against the Rowlatt Act,²⁸ was already an All-India figure. He formed the Satyagraha Sabha to oppose the government repression. The movement caught the imagination of the people, who, for the first time, had an opportunity to participate in the struggle beyond attending meetings and demonstrations. The people enrolled in the Satyagraha Sabha took a pledge to disobey the repressive Rowlatt Act, to court arrest and to undergo imprisonment willingly. It was a new form of struggle that created a tremendous spirit of empowerment among the common people.²⁹ They could now act against the government from a high moral ground. As the people responded wholeheartedly to Gandhi's call for *satyagraha*, the Indian National Congress fell into step with him. The movement was instantly transformed into an organization of mass political action. This was reflected in the new constitution of the Congress (adopted at the Nagpur session in 1920), which introduced mass membership and provincial³⁰ committees based on linguistic divisions.

Mass mobilization, independence and partition

From this time onwards down to the late 1930s, the history of the freedom struggle throughout its successive stages of Non-Cooperation³¹ and Khilafat³² (1920–2), as well as Civil Disobedience³³ (1930–4), carried the stamp of Gandhi's vision. It was during this period of mass mobilizations led by Gandhi that the idea of all the inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent being one nation with equal rights and a common destiny materialized.

²⁷ Parel (ed.), 1997, pp. 62–5, 88–99, 107–111.

²⁸ A notoriously repressive set of British colonial legislation in 1919, which provoked a major nationalist mobilization against it.

²⁹ In Jawaharlal Nehru's words, the Gandhian form of struggle involved 'enormous suffering' for the participants in the struggle, 'but that suffering was self-invited and therefore strength-giving': see Nehru, 1960, p. 368.

³⁰ Commenting on the new constitution of the Congress, Gandhi observed that it was aimed at ensuring that it would function 'on a country-wide scale' which would ensure the establishment of *swaraj* without delay: see *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 1990, Vol. 19, p. 461.

³¹ The name given to the nationalist mobilization led by Gandhi against colonial rule, 1920–2.

³² A movement coinciding with the Non-Cooperation movement of 1920–2, it was formally a protest against the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate, but it merged with the nationalist upsurge known as Non-Cooperation during those years.

³³ The name given to another phase of the Gandhian nationalist mobilization against colonial rule, 1930–1; it is also a general term for these forms of non-violent protest movements.

During the same period, the growth of the left within the Indian National Congress, as well as outside its ranks, seems to have contributed significantly to shaping the overall character of the freedom movement. The increasing participation of the peasantry in the nationalist mobilizations, particularly during the 1930s, may be related partly to the emergence of the left. In the 1930s, the peasant aspirations came to be increasingly reflected in the leftist advocacy of the abolition of semi-feudal land tenures and usages from the Congress platform as well as through the newly formed Kisan Sabha movement.³⁴ Some idea of the strength of pro-left sentiment within the Congress as early as 1926 can be seen from the fact that, despite Gandhi's opposition, a resolution to extend condolences on the death of Lenin was lost in the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) by just 63 votes to 54.

In the late 1920s, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945) came to be recognized as the spokesmen of the emerging left within the Congress. Their advocacy of the radical demand of *purna swaraj*,³⁵ as well as of a programme to establish a federal republic based on universal suffrage and the state's control of key industries, led to the radicalization of the Congress to an extent which would have been difficult to attain within the parameters of the Gandhian approach. However, to the abiding credit of Gandhi, one must concede that down to 1938 he did not allow his disapproval of socialist doctrines to interfere with his agreeing on many vital questions with the left within the Congress. Gandhi's support for the Karachi resolution (1931), embodying a socialistic blueprint for a free India advocated by Jawaharlal Nehru, illustrates the manner in which the ideologically opposed tendencies represented by Gandhi and the left would often cooperate during this period of mass mobilizations and heightened nationalist fervour.³⁶

In 1934 the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was formed. It included a large number of Congress activists influenced by Marxism, Jai Prakash Narayan and Acharya Narendra Dev being the outstanding figures among them. Following advice from the Comintern to the Indian communists in August 1935 to 'treat the Congress as a part of the anti-imperialist front', they dropped the facade of a Peasants' and Workers' Party and started operating through the CSP. The nomination of Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose as successive presidents of the Indian National Congress for the years 1936–7 and 1937–8 was an indication of the growing influence of the left within the Congress organization. It also

³⁴ In 1936, the U.P. Congress leadership was advocating the abolition of the *zamindāri* system: see Nehru, 1960, p. 375.

³⁵ Meaning complete independence, to distinguish it from Dominion Status, the position of Australia and Canada within the British empire and Commonwealth.

³⁶ Habib, 1998b, pp. 105–11; see also Sarkar, 1983, pp. 331–6.

shows Gandhi's readiness to accommodate the left, his ideological hostility to socialism notwithstanding.³⁷

This uneasy arrangement between the left groups and right-wing Congress leaders identified as followers of Gandhi came under serious strain during 1937–9, when Congress was running governments in a number of provinces. As the trade unions and Kisan Sabhas led by the communists raised issues relating to workers' and peasants' livelihoods, they clashed with Congress leaders running governments in the provinces. The communists were accused of fanning 'a class war by violent means'.³⁸

Henceforth, the Communist Party of India (CPI) struck out on an independent course which led to its separation from the CSP. Eventually, the CPI stoutly opposed the Quit India movement (the third and greatest nationalist upsurge led by Gandhi against colonial rule) of 1942 (in which the CSP were very active) on the grounds that it amounted to undermining the people's war against fascism in which the Soviet Union was at the forefront. The CPI's indirect justification of the Muslim League's separatist demand for Pakistan in terms of the Leninist thesis on the right to national determination led to its total isolation from the rest of the left forces, including followers of Jawaharlal Nehru within the Congress.

The growth of a strong separatist sentiment among Muslims during the 1930s and 1940s points to the tragic failure of the nationalist mass mobilizations of this period. Apparently, these mobilizations did not fully overcome the divisive tendencies that were being fostered systematically by the colonial authorities from as early as 1905.³⁹ The separatist movement grew despite Gandhi's bold espousal of communal amity and the Congress's drive, during 1936–8, to establish mass contacts with the Muslims.⁴⁰ The Non-Cooperation and Khilafat movements (1920–2) represented the high-water mark of Muslim participation in the freedom struggle. The October 1920 boycott of MAO College, the premier educational centre of Indian Muslims, by a majority of its students, along with a large number of teachers, as a response to the college's accepting financial support from government, was illustrative

³⁷ Habib, 1998b, pp. 111–17; Sarkar, 1983, p. 344, however, considers the left advance during 1935–7 as 'somewhat illusory and verbal'. According to him, right-wing consolidation was a more important development.

³⁸ Sarkar, 1983, p. 352.

³⁹ Nehru, 1960, pp. 357–8, regards the introduction of a separate electorate, proposed by the Simla Deputation (1905), as the beginning of Muslim separatism.

⁴⁰ The rise of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, closely allied with the Indian National Congress as a dominant political force in the Muslim-majority North-West Frontier Province during the 1930s, was an honourable exception to this general trend. Nehru, 1960, p. 386, characterizes the success of the Khudai Khidmatgars in mobilizing the Pathans in a non-violent movement as 'little short of miraculous'.

of the enthusiastic response of Indian Muslims to Gandhi's call for non-cooperation.⁴¹ But the sudden withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation movement in 1922 after the Chauri-Chaura incident,⁴² without consulting the Khilafat Committee, left many Muslims bewildered and confused.

Increasing communal tension during 1922–7 was reflected in a sharp difference of opinion within the Swaraj Party as well as between the All-India Muslim League and the Congress on the question of constitutional safeguards for the Muslim minority. During the boycott of the all-white Simon Commission (appointed by the British Government in 1927 in order to draw up a new constitution), an informal agreement was reached between the Congress and the All-India Muslim League on the stipulated constitution of India. It envisaged the Muslim League's eschewing a separate electorate in return for a joint electorate with reserved seats in the provincial and central legislatures. However, the final report of an All Parties Conference prepared by Motilal Nehru failed to confirm this accord. The author of the report, a nationalist stalwart with unimpeachable credentials, was browbeaten by the stringency of the Hindu Mahasabha's⁴³ contrary arguments endorsed by Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lala Lajpat Rai. It was a serious setback to the efforts that were being made to persuade the Muslim political leadership to agree to a joint electorate in the future constitution of India.⁴⁴

Again, the Muslim League had fought the 1937 elections to the provincial assemblies in an alliance with the Congress. But the differences between the two bodies, arising from the League's insistence on joining the government in Uttar Pradesh only as a coalition partner, led to a final break-up. Subsequently, the Muslim League resorted to a vicious campaign portraying Congress governments as discriminating against Muslims as well as undermining their culture. The League worked systematically to play on the insecurities of Indian Muslims over the constitutional arrangements for the future Dominion Status of India.

⁴¹ See *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 1990, Vol. 18, p. 369. In his letter to the trustees of MAO College dated 24 Oct. 1920, Gandhi admits that he was the 'originator of the idea of disaffection', leading to the establishment of a parallel Muslim University (Jamia Millia) at Aligarh.

⁴² A violent incident during the Non-Cooperation movement, when 22 policemen were killed at Chauri-Chaura in 1922. Gandhi called off the Non-Cooperation movement on the ground that he was committed to non-violence, or *ahimsa*.

⁴³ The All-India Hindu Mahasabha, a strongly Hindu nationalist organization, formed in 1915, but effectively active from 1922 to 1923.

⁴⁴ Sarkar, 1983, pp. 262–5.

These differences were further accentuated during the negotiations between the Cripps Mission⁴⁵ and Indian leaders (March 1942). The Muslim League had succeeded in persuading the British to include in their proposal of Dominion Status for post-war India a proviso allowing the provinces to secede from the stipulated federal union. This amounted to giving official approval to the Muslim League's demand for the creation of Pakistan, a demand first raised two years earlier at its Lahore session. Henceforth, Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah's advocacy of Pakistan became increasingly strident. The Muslim League's political clout further increased after it was able to form governments in Assam, Sind, Bengal and North-West Frontier Province (1942–3) with the help of British governors. This was possible as the majority of Congress members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) were in gaol in connection with the Quit India movement (May 1942).

These circumstances enabled the Muslim League to rally a large majority of Indian Muslims round their demand for Pakistan by the time the elections took place in 1946. They captured most of the Muslim seats outside Punjab and North-West Frontier Province.⁴⁶ The phenomenal growth of Muslim separatism had created a situation where the demand for Pakistan could have been ignored only if the post-war anti-imperialist upsurge revealed by popular support for the Indian National Army (INA)⁴⁷ and the rebellious cadets of the Royal Indian Navy, as well as by the peasant insurgency of Telangana, had been allowed to develop into a regular insurrection. This was, however, a prospect condemned by the entire Congress leadership. They had no option but to agree to the Mountbatten⁴⁸ Plan that envisaged the partition of the country along religious lines.⁴⁹

Independent India

The transfer of power on 15 August 1947 no doubt marked the fulfilment of a long-cherished goal of the freedom movement. But the accompanying partition along religious lines was a severe reversal of the idea of Indian nationhood as defined in the course of the freedom struggle. Gandhi's assassination on 30 January 1948 by a Hindutva fanatic was symptomatic of the tragedy that had occurred. However, the success of the central government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru in checking the riots and also in limiting the population

⁴⁵ A committee sent out by the British Government in March 1942 under Sir Stafford Cripps to negotiate with Indian political parties.

⁴⁶ Sarkar, 1983, pp. 385–8, 408–10.

⁴⁷ An anti-British force led from 1943 by a major nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, to fight for independence, but by using Japanese support.

⁴⁸ The last colonial governor-general of India.

⁴⁹ Cf. Sarkar, 1983, p. 421, where Wavel is quoted as suggesting that popular demonstrations in Calcutta on the INA during November 1945 were a 'turning-point' goading the Congress leaders to agree to 'at least a temporary detente'.

transfer to Punjab, as well as the largely peaceful absorption of the princely states into the Indian dominion, speak of the firmness with which the Congress leadership faced the challenging situation of the early years of freedom. It testified to the resilience of nationalist fervour nurtured during the preceding three decades. The same spirit was magnificently reflected in the constitution of India, promulgated in 1950. In spite of partition along communal lines, the Indian constitution provided for the separation of religion from state.

The Government of free India was drawn, from the very beginning, towards establishing special relations with the emerging Asian nations having a common history of struggle for freedom from the domination of the imperialist powers of the West. In April 1947 in New Delhi, an Asian Relations Conference was convened to which the representatives of post-war national governments as well as of popular movements were invited. At this conference the Provisional General Council of Asian Relations Organization was created, pledged to tackling the problem of Asian poverty with the cooperation of the United Nations Organization (UNO).⁵⁰ This proved to be the beginning of the process leading to India's emerging as a prominent member of the nonaligned bloc of nations whose common stand was defined by anti-colonialism and opposition to military alliances of the Cold-War period. India continued to play a leading role in the non-aligned movement down to the late 1980s.

During the 1950s, the developmental efforts of Congress governments, at the centre as well as in the various states, were geared to promoting industrial growth and the expansion of agricultural production. There was an attempt to establish state control over vital industrial sectors, giving rise to a mixed economy in which the public sector came to play a crucial role. For the first time, India developed a respectable heavy industry. Steel production and power generation increased 2.4 and 2.5 times respectively. Although the land reforms had an uneven course in the different states, they helped to weaken the rent-based landlordism, giving a boost to the rich peasant economy in many parts of the country. This economic upsurge led to a noticeable increase in the per capita availability of cloth and food-grains, and the average life expectancy increased from 32.5 to 41.2 years. The expansion of education during the same period was also remarkable: school enrolment increased from 25.5 to 44.7 million and that of universities from 10.4 to 10.5 million.⁵¹

From the late 1950s, however, a rightward shift became visible in the policies of the Indian National Congress. An early sign of this shift was the anti-communist rhetoric of the agitation leading to the dismissal of the E. M. S. Nambudiripad government in

⁵⁰ See Nehru's interview with the press on 26 Sept. 1946 (*Hindustan Times*, 27 Sept.), where he talks of developing 'An Independent Foreign Policy of India', and also his speech at the Asian Relations Conference on 2 April 1947: Gopal (ed.), 1984, Vol. 1, pp. 492–504; Vol. 2, pp. 512–38.

⁵¹ Habib, 1997, pp. 5–6; see also Chandra, 1993, pp. 43–5.

Kerala (1959). Growing tension with the People's Republic of China over Tibet was another indication of the same trend. The process was hastened by the border conflict with China in 1962. It gave rise to a jingoist sentiment which was used by Hindutva forces to make common cause with right-wing political bosses within the Congress to put Nehru and his leftist supporters on the defensive. After Nehru's death in 1964, this situation worsened. The brief war with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965 gave another opportunity to the Hindu right to further their chauvinist anti-Muslim plank under the garb of patriotism. Following the general elections of 1967, the Jan Sangh (People's Congregation) emerged as a coalition partner in governments formed by the opposition parties (including the pro-Soviet CPI) in a number of states; this contributed to the emergence of the Hindutva as one of the mainstream tendencies of Indian politics.⁵²

Another leftward turn in the political and economic policies of the Congress government occurred after Indira Gandhi (1917–84) became prime minister in 1966. Indira Gandhi was able to catch the imagination of the people by appealing simultaneously to the patriotic fervour aroused by conflicts with China and Pakistan during the 1960s and the widespread discontent of the poor and marginalized sections of the people, comprising minorities, dalits,⁵³ backward agrarian castes and tribals (or members of tribes). Her triumph in the 1971 general election, fought on the slogan of *garibi hatao* (remove poverty), was a vindication of this tactical line. The nationalization of banks (1969), the election of V. V. Giri as president against a candidate put up by Congress bosses (1970), India's support for Bangladesh's independence (1971) in defiance of the US threat of military intervention, the abolition of privy purses (1971) and the nationalization of insurance (1971) and coalmines (1972–3) were the landmarks charting the unfolding of this leftward shift.⁵⁴

The impact of Indira Gandhi's radical measures, however, tended to lessen during the second half of the 1970s. The rampant corruption and ineffective implementation of poverty alleviation programmes, combined with the general impression that an authoritarian regime was being created by sidelining constitutional proprieties, gave rise to a powerful protest movement. In this protest movement, under Jai Prakash Narayan's inspiration, the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or National Volunteer Corps) and the Jan Sangh were accommodated as moving spirits. The 'Emergency' imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975 to counter Jai Prakash Narayan's 'total revolution' was a severe blow to parliamentary democ-

⁵² for an attempt to justify the participation of the CPI in the non-Congress governments with the Jan Sangh as a coalition partner, see *Political Resolution adopted by the Eighth Congress of the C.P.I.*, 1968, pp. 7–11.

⁵³ Dalits are the lowest and most oppressed castes in the caste system. They are known as 'Scheduled Castes' in the Indian constitution and were called Harijans by Mahatma Gandhi.

⁵⁴ See Niran, 1985, pp. 110–17, where the focus is on Indira Gandhi's economic policies 'that had no philosophical underpinning'. Cf. Habib, 1997, pp. 6–7.

racy. Two years of the Emergency, marked by the severe repression of opposition groups including a large segment of the left represented by the CPI (M)⁵⁵ and its allies, led to Indira Gandhi's political isolation and she lost badly in the general elections of 1977. The experience of Janata Party rule (1977–80), however, failed to alter the popular sentiment in favour of socialism created by Indira Gandhi's radical measures of the pre-Emergency years. Even the Bharatiya Janata Party, created in 1979 to carry forward the Hindutva agenda of the erstwhile Jan Sangh, paid lip service to 'Gandhian socialism'.⁵⁶

The massacre of a large number of innocent Sikhs in the wake of Indira Gandhi's assassination (1984) by hoodlums posing as Congress supporters, and the failure of Rajiv Gandhi (prime minister, 1984–9) to unequivocally condemn this brutality, brought into disrepute the Congress's role as a party of national consensus. Rajiv Gandhi's subsequent concessions to Muslim conservatism over Shah Bano's case⁵⁷ and to majority sentiment in regard to the Ayodhya dispute⁵⁸ also dented the Congress's image as a defender of secular values enshrined in the Indian constitution. The Congress Party and its government headed by Rajiv Gandhi were seen in the popular perception as totally divorced from the socialist legacy of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Although 'the economy, running with structures already created, showed considerable strength', this did not affect the basic standards of life of the poor. The problem with Rajiv Gandhi's economic measures, according to Bipin Chandra, was that these 'were not part of any long-term framework or policy'. The Congress under Rajiv Gandhi came to be identified with the corruption and opportunism of the neo-rich.⁵⁹ It was with this changed image that Congress faced a loose conglomerate of political forces (including the Bharatiya Janata Party), led by V. P. Singh, in the 1990 general election. V. P. Singh's electoral plank of 'social justice' and an end to official corruption evoked wide support. Even the left parties had entered into an understanding with the non-Bharatiya Janata Party components of this alliance.

⁵⁵ Communist Party of India (Marxist). It was a product of the split in the CPI in 1964. The other segment of the original party retained the name CPI.

⁵⁶ Habib, 1997, p. 7.

⁵⁷ Shah Bano was a Muslim woman who was divorced and claimed maintenance from her exhusband in 1981 under the Indian constitution; her suit was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in 1985, but certain leaders of the Muslim community objected that she was not entitled to it under Muslim personal law. It led to an acrimonious public debate and political mobilizations around Indian secular law versus Muslim personal law. The prime minister conceded the point to conservative Muslim opinion and effectively overturned the Supreme Court judgment through a new law on Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce), which made the natal family responsible for the maintenance of a divorced Muslim woman.

⁵⁸ Ayodhya, a small town in Uttar Pradesh, said to be the birthplace of Rama, the god of the epic *Ramayana*. The town contained a mosque known as the Babri Masjid; certain Hindu groups claimed that the mosque had been built on the site of a temple erected to commemorate the birthplace of Rama; their movement led to the demolition of the mosque; the ownership of the site is still in dispute.

⁵⁹ See Chandra, 1993, pp. 121–3; Habib, 1997, p. 7.

18

PAKISTAN (SINCE 1947)*

*R. Afzal***Contents**

The Ayub Khan era	414
The Yahya Khan regime	416
The Bhutto era	418
The Zia era	420
The democratic era	423

Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947. In pursuance of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the British transferred power in Pakistan to the All-India Muslim League. The league's president, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, became the governor-general and its general secretary, Liaquat 'Ali Khan, the prime minister. At the time of independence, Pakistan was a geographically divided country, located in the Muslim-majority areas in the northwest and north-east of the South Asian subcontinent. A provisional constitution, based on the Government of India Act of 1935, provided an interim constitutional framework until a new constitution could be drawn up.¹

The Pakistan areas were economically the least developed regions of British India. Basically agricultural, even the industries for raw materials produced here were in the Indian areas. Additionally, Pakistan faced unprecedented problems at its birth. Communal violence not only caused a tragic loss of human life but also resulted in mass migrations across the borders. More than 7 million people arrived in Pakistan. The immediate problem was their rehabilitation and resettlement. But more lasting was the problem of their integration in the indigenous population.

* See Map 5.

¹ Callard, 1957, p. 79; Choudhury, 1969, pp. 17–19, 23–34.

The pre-independence communal distrust was passed on to India and Pakistan in the form of embittered relations between the two states. There were differences over the distribution of assets and liabilities. Although a fixed ratio of division was agreed upon, it was followed by conflict over the actual delivery of various items. Evacuee property was another problematic issue. It was only time that diluted the intensity of discord on these issues. More serious were the disputes over the sharing of waters of rivers that flowed into Pakistani Punjab from the Indian territories and the accession of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. When the two countries failed to settle the waters dispute through bilateral negotiations, they accepted the offer of the president of the World Bank for mediation. The Kashmir dispute resulted in armed conflict that only ended when the United Nations arranged a ceasefire. It has so far defied any solution acceptable to the two countries.²

Pakistan faced these and other problems with its limited resources. Since there was no federal capital, Karachi (the capital of the province of Sind) was selected to serve as the federal capital as well. This arrangement proved shortlived and Sind soon had to find a new capital. The takeover of Karachi by the centre caused a centre–Sind rift. Pakistan had inadequate sources even to run the administration at the centre. It met its financial obligations by adopting frugal policies, securing loans and taking over certain provincial taxes. However, soon after independence there was an unexpected increase in the demand for Pakistani raw materials, especially jute and cotton, in the international market as a result of the war in the Korean peninsula. The resultant trade boom brought in handsome revenues, which facilitated Pakistan's economic independence.

The framing of a constitution posed more intractable problems. This task was assigned to a 79-member Constituent Assembly, which also served as the national legislature until a new one was elected after the framing of a new constitution. Two issues particularly hindered the constitution-making process. First, the assembly had to decide the Islamic character of the future constitution, which had been the dominant theme of the Pakistan '*ulamā*' movement. After lengthy debates, they drafted detailed Islamic provisions but failed to determine the status of the Qadianis, whose spiritual head had made messianic claims. The '*ulamā*' demanded that the Qadianis be declared non-Muslims, but the federal government refused to accept their demand. The crisis that followed could not be controlled by the civilian agencies. Martial law was imposed to restore order in the province of Punjab.³ After that, the Islamic issue did not figure seriously in Pakistan's politics until the 1970s.

² Lamb, 1991, pp. 12–13; Afzal, 2002, pp. 14–22.

³ Choudhury, 1969, pp. 20–1, 47–50.

Second, the constitution-makers had to determine the form of federalism. Pakistan presented a unique situation. It consisted of two geographic zones. East Pakistan was one-fifth the size of West Pakistan but a majority of the population lived there. It was linguistically and ethnically more unified than West Pakistan. By 1954 Bengali, along with Urdu, had been accepted as the two national languages. West Pakistan was more diverse; it had four provinces – Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and (British) Baluchistan – ten princely states, and the Tribal Areas. It was economically better-off than East Pakistan. The Punjabis and Muslim migrants dominated the civil service.

West Pakistan was strategically more important than East Pakistan: it was close to the oil-rich Gulf region, it had borders with Iran, Afghanistan and China, and the Central Asian states (then part of the Soviet Union) were a few kilometres away from its borders. The defence policies followed by the British did not end with independence. During the Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with the West and joined the US-sponsored defence alliances, the Baghdad Pact (subsequently known as the Central Treaty Organization – CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The West attached more importance to CENTO than SEATO as far as Pakistan was concerned because of (West) Pakistan's strategic location. These factors required a West Pakistan-dominated political system.

Until 1954, it was perceived that this objective could be achieved by providing parity of representation to East and West Pakistan at the federal level. But the March 1954 elections in East Pakistan, in which the United Front of four East Pakistan-based parties (Awami League, Krishak Sramik Party, Ganatantri Dal and Nizam-i Islam Party) swept the polls, revealed the flaws in this strategy. Then the idea of welding the provinces and states of West Pakistan into one unit was floated to counterbalance East Pakistan. But strong opposition from the political forces to one unit and to a pro-Western foreign policy led to the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly.⁴ The army supported this change and its chief himself joined the cabinet.

A second Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of parity between East and West Pakistan when the Federal (Supreme) Court declared the dismissal of the assembly as unlawful. This assembly framed a constitution that came into force on 23 March 1956, which incorporated the principles of parity, one unit and a mild form of provincial autonomy. The military leadership played a critical role in the acceptance of these principles. The constitution provided a federal parliamentary system with the prime minister as the administrative head. The president was empowered to invite an MNA (Member of the National Assembly) who enjoyed the support of a majority of the MNAs to form the government. He could remove the prime minister if he thought that he had lost that support.

⁴ Wilcox, 1963, pp. 183–4, 186–7.

This power was of little importance under normal circumstances but it could become crucial if no party had a clear majority in the National Assembly.⁵

The constitution transformed the second Constituent Assembly into the first (interim) National Assembly until the holding of elections under its auspices. The constitution had not provided the type of autonomy that the East Pakistan-based parties had demanded. Similarly, there had been a demand for provincial autonomy in West Pakistan. Instead of providing that, the constitution had eliminated the separate identity of the West Pakistani provinces. The pressure from political parties over these issues caused instability. Four governments were formed at the centre within two years. No economic development plan could be implemented in this atmosphere. Even the draft of the first five-year plan (1955–60) was not finalized until spring 1958, i.e. three years after it was supposed to have gone into effect. After several postponements, national elections were scheduled for February 1959. The opposition to one unit, parity and a pro-Western foreign policy in the election campaign alarmed the military leadership. As a result, the president abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law in the country. General Ayub Khan, the army chief, took over as the chief martial law administrator (CMLA)/president.

The Ayub Khan era

Martial law remained in force for about four years (October 1958–June 1962). The change was peaceful except for limited military action in Baluchistan. The army was withdrawn from martial law duties in one month's time and was rarely recalled. However, martial law was strictly enforced. Restrictive laws were used to control the press. All the elective institutions from the National Assembly down to the local bodies and political organizations including political parties, professional associations and student bodies were banned. Ayub Khan tried to prevent the return of the politicians after the lifting of martial law. The Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) barred the participation in politics of more than 6,000 politicians. Ayub Khan used the peaceful atmosphere for reforms and basic changes. The federal capital was shifted from Karachi to a site near Rawalpindi, and was named Islamabad. Boundaries with neighbouring countries were demarcated. The Indus basin treaty was signed with India to settle the waters dispute, and the World Bank arranged funds for its implementation.⁶

Ayub Khan introduced reforms that were recommended by the commissions that he appointed. The most important of the economic reforms concerned the land. Fragmented

⁵ Mahmood (ed.), 1997, pp. 255–6.

⁶ Ayub Khan, 1967, pp. 96–8, 107–13.

landholdings were consolidated and a ceiling was fixed on their size to break up the big landed estates. Although the reforms made available large tracts of land for distribution among landless peasants, the exemptions provided in them diluted their impact. These reforms increased production but failed to eliminate the landlord politicians, which was Ayub's primary objective. The landlords returned to politics with the same vigour once the ban on their activities was lifted. The most radical of the social reforms were the Muslim Family Laws. These laws provided that permission should be sought from the court for second and subsequent marriage(s), divorce would be effective only after it had been approved by the court, the minimum age for marriage was fixed at 16 for males and 14 for females, and the grandson of a pre-deceased son was allowed to inherit the property of his grandfather. Ayub Khan suppressed the opposition to these laws. Although they were not strictly enforced, the laws did improve the status of females.⁷

Ayub Khan's system of Basic Democracies was an institution of local self-government, designed to be independent of bureaucratic controls. But Ayub Khan himself destroyed it when he used it for his own survival in power. After a positive vote from the 80,000 Basic Democrats in a referendum in which he was the only candidate, he appointed a constitution commission. But contrary to the commission's recommendations, he adopted his own constitution, which provided for a centralized presidential system. The focal point was the president, who exercised executive, legislative and financial powers at the centre directly and in the provinces indirectly. Elections to the presidency and the legislatures were held indirectly; the Basic Democrats served as the electoral college.

Initially, Ayub Khan opposed the revival of political parties, which he considered institutions leading to instability. But once political activities revived, he had to allow the parties to function. In fact, he himself led a party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Convention). The political parties did not accept his system, however, and they struggled to replace it by a federal parliamentary system. It was their main plank in the 1964–5 elections, when they formed an alliance, the Combined Opposition Parties (COP). The COP put up Fatima Jinnah, sister of the founder of Pakistan, as a candidate in the presidential elections.⁸ Although Ayub Khan won the elections, he lost credibility amidst allegations of vote-rigging.

Ayub Khan attempted to change his pro-Western foreign policy into one of bilateralism. He wanted balanced relationships with all the major powers. But his cultivation of China angered the US, which was providing more than 50 per cent of Pakistan's foreign aid. At a time when his government's foreign policy and foreign aid were in crisis, Ayub Khan plunged Pakistan into an adventure to capture Kashmir by force. The Pakistan–India war of

⁷ Ziring, 1997, pp. 233–44.

⁸ Sayeed, 1967, pp. 213–33.

1965 ended with grave consequences for Pakistan. The US ended all military and economic aid. After the war, economic aid was restored at a reduced level but the ban on military aid continued.

The post-war Tashkent agreement relegated the Kashmir issue to the background. The ban on military aid, decline in financial allocations, and overtures to India for mutual reductions in the armed forces caused alienation in the military ranks. In addition, the war aggravated socio-economic problems that had already started to appear as a result of Ayub's policies. Unemployment and inflation rose and the funds for social development declined. The inequitable distribution of the economic benefits of development resulted in the concentration of wealth in a few hands, leading to acute social and regional disparities. Twenty-two families allegedly came to control the country's economic resources. The inter-regional and intra-regional economic disparities had a political fallout. The resulting atmosphere was ripe for political exploitation.⁹

The political parties adopted socialism and regional/provincial autonomy in their manifestos. The Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, demanded regional autonomy in its Six Points Programme. The Ayub regime used strong-arm tactics to suppress the pro-Six Points movement and detained Mujib and his close associates. Zulfikar 'Ali Bhutto, Ayub's foreign minister, founded the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which advocated socialist reforms. He launched a movement against Ayub Khan. Although Bhutto was imprisoned, other parties joined the movement and forced Ayub Khan to negotiate. Political prisoners were released and press restrictions were removed. A round table conference managed to reach a consensus only on two issues, a federal parliamentary system and direct elections on an adult franchise basis. The movement restarted with greater intensity. The opposition parties focused on their respective demands relating to autonomy, one unit, the economy and foreign affairs. The deterioration continued unabated. Finally, Ayub Khan handed over power to the army chief rather than the speaker, as required under the constitution. General Yahya Khan took over as CMLA/president, abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law.¹⁰ He promised elections once order had been restored.

The Yahya Khan regime

The second martial law period lasted for less than three years. The military remained on martial law duties throughout this period. Political parties were not banned but they were not allowed to conduct any activity until 1 January 1970. Unlike Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan

⁹ Kochanek, 1983, pp. 77–9.

¹⁰ Afzal, 1998, Vol. 1, pp. 265–98.

had only a limited understanding of Pakistan's political and constitutional problems. Added to this was his impatience with administrative detail. He left important matters to his military colleagues and the 'experts'. In the beginning, he had clear objectives: to hold elections, transfer power to a constitutional government and then return to barracks. These objectives blurred with the passage of time. Yahya Khan was tempted to stay in power and he manipulated the political situation as and when it suited him. He used to meet politicians individually rather than collectively. Gullible as he was, he was easily misled. He made half-hearted attempts to introduce reforms but then abandoned them half-way. The political parties also failed to devise any mechanism for forging common views and strategies on constitutional and political issues.

Yahya Khan took decisions on fundamental issues without any institutional consultation. The Legal Framework Order (LFO), which he issued on 30 March 1970, incorporated these decisions. The LFO also spelt out the basic principles of the future constitution. The Islamic provisions of the earlier constitutions were to be included. The constitution was to provide for a federal parliamentary system ensuring the preservation of Islamic ideology, democratic principles, and the fundamental rights and independence of the judiciary. Representation in the National Assembly was to be on the basis of population. Similarly, one unit was broken up to restore former provinces. The princely states were merged into the contiguous provinces or given a separate status. The LFO provided that the National Assembly would have 313 seats. East Pakistan had 162, plus 7 seats for women, and the remaining seats were distributed among the units of West Pakistan. The number of seats for each provincial assembly was also fixed. Yahya Khan had settled controversial issues to prevent their exploitation in the election campaign. However, he left the issue of provincial/regional autonomy unresolved despite demands for its resolution.¹¹ The elections were first scheduled for October 1970, but then, due to a disastrous cyclone in East Pakistan, they were moved to December.

Political parties campaigned for the elections from January to November 1970. The focus in West Pakistan was primarily on Islam versus socialism, whereas in East Pakistan it was on regional autonomy. In the latter case, the Awami League's Six Points became the consensual charter of the Bengali demands. The Awami League swept the polls in East Pakistan. It won all seats, except two, allocated to East Pakistan in the National Assembly, which constituted an overall majority. The PPP surprised the political analysts by winning 81 of the 138 seats allocated to West Pakistan, but its victory was confined to Punjab and Sind. The military leadership and the PPP had not given any serious attention to the Six

¹¹ Rizvi, 1986, pp. 176–80.

Points. When they had slowly digested their implications, they pressed for a settlement on basic issues outside the National Assembly.

The Awami League felt bound by their election pledges and, with a clear majority in the house, saw no point in making any concessions before the assembly session. The president did call the National Assembly session but then postponed it under pressure from the PPP. The Awami League's violent reaction to the postponement was suppressed by the use of military force. An unsuccessful last-minute attempt to resolve the deadlock through negotiations culminated in a ruthless military action. The loss of human life and property was incalculable.¹² The ensuing Bengali insurgency engulfed the region in another Pakistan–India war. This resulted in the break-up of Pakistan, with the emergence in December 1971 of the independent state of Bangladesh in former East Pakistan.

The Bhutto era

The PPP assumed power in (West) Pakistan with Zulfikar 'Ali Bhutto, the party chairman, sworn in as CMLA/president. Martial law continued until 21 April 1972, when an interim constitution, similar in content to the provisional constitution of 1947, came into force. The National Assembly framed a constitution that was promulgated on 14 August 1973. It provided for a federal parliamentary system with executive authority vested in the prime minister. The president was a figurehead bound by the advice of the prime minister, so much so that his signature was considered valid only if countersigned by the prime minister. The constitution tried to prevent any future military takeover, making such action an act of treason punishable by death. All the political parties represented in the National Assembly voted for the constitution. On the promulgation of the constitution, Bhutto took over as prime minister.¹³

Pakistan signed a peace treaty with India, the Simla agreement, which stipulated the resolution of all disputes by peaceful means and bilaterally. The ceasefire line in Kashmir was recognized as the line of control. India vacated the territories that it had occupied during the war on the western front and returned the (over 90,000) prisoners of war. In return, Pakistan recognized Bangladesh as a separate country, at a historic summit of heads of Muslim states in Lahore. Pakistan fostered ties with Muslim and Third World countries and also developed bilateral relations with all the major powers.

Bhutto attempted to reform every sector of society, as stipulated in his party's manifesto. Land reforms introduced restrictions on landholdings, fixing a ceiling in irrigated areas at

¹² Sisson and Rose, 1990, pp. 154–60.

¹³ Burki, 1980, pp. 91–8.

150 acres (60.7 ha) and in non-irrigated areas at 300 acres. Major industries, banks, insurance companies and ghee, rice, flour and ginning factories were nationalized. The nationalization policy disappointed the left in the PPP and alienated those it affected. Additionally, insufficient managerial party resources damaged the management of the nationalized units. Those affected by this policy swelled the ranks of Bhutto's opponents.¹⁴

The cordiality that the political parties had demonstrated following the break-up of Pakistan did not last long. The National Awami Party (NAP)–Jamiat al-Ulema-i Islam (JUI) coalition ministries in Baluchistan and NWFP, which had been sworn in as a mark of tolerance, disappeared within ten months. The NAP suffered a ban and its leaders were charged with sedition. A tribunal was set up to try them. Bhutto's intolerance of criticism, both inside and outside the party, gradually mounted. He used old techniques and devised new ones to control the opposition. The recalcitrant press was punished. His critics among the politicians were detained. Using his party's parliamentary majority, he amended the constitution to restrict fundamental rights and to curtail the powers of the judiciary.¹⁵ By December 1976, the fragmented opposition seemed to have lost any electoral prospects. But in reality that was not the case.

The opposition parties sprang a surprise when the general elections were scheduled in March 1977. Contrary to Bhutto's calculations, they formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to put up common candidates against the PPP candidates. The election campaign was intense and bitter. Bhutto soon realized the extent of his lost popularity. His extensive use of official agencies for assessment of his party's electoral prospects raised doubts about the fairness of the elections. The PNA's suspicions about the rigging of the elections were strengthened by the unopposed election of 19 PPP candidates to the assemblies.

When the National Assembly results were announced on 7 March, in which the PPP won 155 seats plus the 19 unopposed seats, and the PNA 36 seats, the PNA was convinced of massive vote-rigging. It launched a well-organized movement that forced Bhutto to negotiate with the opposition. The negotiations were unnecessarily prolonged, partly because Bhutto believed that the PNA movement was not genuine and that the US had supported it to punish him for his refusal to retract from the agreement with France for a nuclear-reprocessing plant. Bhutto involved the army first to maintain peace and then to resolve political differences.

The prolongation of the negotiations encouraged the military leadership to evolve its own strategy and options for any impending crisis. The accumulated mistrust in Bhutto frustrated all his moves for a settlement. The 'hawks' in the PNA had concluded that the

¹⁴ Wolpert, 1993, pp. 173–85.

¹⁵ Newberg, 1995, pp. 136–54.

military would hold elections within a specified time after ousting Bhutto from power. They played their role in blocking a PPP–PNA settlement.¹⁶ The climax was reached on 5 July 1977, when General Zia al-Haq, the army chief, removed Bhutto from power and imposed martial law in the country. This time the constitution was not abrogated but a major part of it was held ‘in abeyance’.

The Zia era

The third period under martial law lasted until 31 December 1985. However, General Zia al-Haq remained in power until his death in a C-130 plane crash in August 1988. At first, he was just CMLA, but in August 1978 he assumed the office of president as well. The military was actively involved in the administration of martial law. Political parties were not banned immediately but their influence was gradually diluted. Zia moved slowly to entrench himself in power. First he proceeded against the PPP. Bhutto was tried in a murder case: the Lahore High Court convicted him and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence, and he was hanged on 4 April 1979. After his death, the PPP was decimated in the process of resistance and adjustment to the changed situation. The PNA parties initially sided with Zia; some even accepted ministerial positions. They were under the illusion that now that Bhutto had been eliminated, they would easily come to power in an electoral contest. But Zia had his own plans. He postponed the elections promised for October 1977 to November 1979. Then, instead of holding the elections on schedule, he deferred them indefinitely and banned all political parties. Zia’s policies broke up the PNA and a majority of its component parties arrayed against him, but by then he could face their opposition.

Zia al-Haq cultivated those elements that Bhutto had alienated. He created confidence in the business community by denationalizing some of the nationalized units and by taking other business-friendly measures. He embraced the PNA election slogan for the introduction of the Islamic system (*Nizām-i Mustafa*). His steps to reform the economy along Islamic lines and introduce the *sharī‘a* (Islamic law) produced mixed results. Though these steps won him supporters among advocates of the Islamic system, they estranged their critics and opponents. Some of the Islamic laws aggravated the Shi‘ite–Sunni sectarian conflict that was further fuelled by the Iran–Iraq war (1980–8). Other laws alienated educated women and led to wide-scale organized activism among them.

However, developments in the neighbouring countries helped Zia to withstand the opposing forces. The overthrow of the shah of Iran in the Khomeini-led Islamic revolution of February 1979 shocked the West, which did not want to see renewed instability in Pakistan.

¹⁶ Syed, 1992, pp. 224–31.

Then, in December 1979, the Soviet army marched into Afghanistan and Pakistan was transformed into a frontline state. As a result, more than 3 million Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan. The Zia administration provided them with all possible assistance, and the West, the Arab countries and United Nations agencies also extended economic assistance.¹⁷ The Afghan resistance groups enjoyed a safe sanctuary in Pakistan. Subsequently, they were trained and armed there. Substantial military aid from the US to the Mujahidin groups was channelled through the Pakistani authorities. Zia's Afghan policy won him supporters both in and outside Pakistan. Above all, the economy during his era did not suffer setbacks. Economic aid from the West and Arab countries flowed in without interruption. Then there was an unprecedented increase in the remittances from Pakistanis living abroad that boosted economic prosperity. Additionally, a sharp growth in agricultural production enabled Pakistan to stop imports of food-grains.¹⁸

However, the opposition to martial law did not disappear despite the visible economic prosperity. In February 1981 the 'defunct' political parties formed a multi-party Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), but the protest movement that it was to launch in March fizzled out following the hijacking of a PIA Boeing 727 to Kabul by al-Zulfikar, a militant organization led by Bhutto's son, Murtaza. Thereafter, the MRD's activities were easily controlled until 1983, when it planned a countrywide civil disobedience movement. The regime skilfully blunted the MRD plans in all provinces except Sind, where the movement went out of control and turned violent. The military used force to control the movement. The loss of human life and property in rural Sind left immediate and long-term scars on the polity. The feeling of alienation among Sindhis intensified, which sharpened the ethnic divide in Sind. The simultaneous emergence of the Muhajir/Mutahidda Qaumi Movement (MQM) in urban Sind affected provincial and national politics and the economy.

The Zia regime moved according to its plans to 'civilianize' the system. The opposition movement only pressured it to keep on track. It held elections to the local bodies twice, in 1979 and 1983, which diluted the opposition at the grass roots. In March 1981 it issued a Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) that restricted the powers of the judiciary and empowered the president/CMLA to amend the constitution. The PCO also provided for a nominated Federal Advisory Council (*majlis-i shurā*), which was established by the end of that year. Several politicians from the major political parties agreed to become members. The *majlis* could debate issues but its acceptance or rejection of any issue had little impact on the decision-making process.

¹⁷ Burki and Baxter (eds.), 1991, pp. 8–20.

¹⁸ Talbot, 1991, pp. 245–62.

Two years later, on 12 August 1983, Zia announced his plan for sharing power with the civilian leadership. Before implementing this plan, Zia arranged a presidential referendum in December 1984, calling on the electorate to express confidence in his policy of Islamization. Poor voter turnout did not deter him from proceeding as planned. The referendum was followed by national and provincial elections in February 1985. Political parties were not allowed to participate in these elections. Therefore, the MRD parties boycotted the elections in protest, hoping that voter interest would be as low as in the referendum. But impressive voter turnout in the elections to the assemblies frustrated their plans.

Zia issued the Revival of the Constitution Order (RCO) before the inauguration of the assemblies, which tilted the balance of power in favour of the president. The RCO empowered President Zia to nominate an MNA as prime minister until 1990. The president was also given the authority to appoint armed services chiefs, governors and other key government functionaries. He could dismiss the prime minister and his government, and dissolve parliament at his discretion under Article 58.2(b). The RCO provided for a National Security Council, on which the services chiefs served as members. Zia nominated Muhammad Khan Junejo, a soft-spoken and mild-mannered Sindhi politician, as prime minister, and he obtained a vote of confidence from the National Assembly.

The deliberations in parliament and the negotiations with Zia resulted in the adoption of the Eighth Amendment in the 1973 constitution. This amendment incorporated all the changes made in the constitution since the military takeover in July 1977, except the one relating to the National Security Council and a few others. Political parties were allowed to function and martial law was lifted on 31 December 1985. Junejo assumed the leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and attempted to distance himself from Zia's policies. His five-point economic programme had an appeal among influential political sections. His government withstood the political pressure after the historic reception of Benazir Bhutto (daughter of the former prime minister) in Lahore on her return from self-imposed exile in April 1986, and blunted the PPP-led MRD movement for fresh elections. Instead of using strong-arm tactics, Junejo cultivated the opposition parties and attempted to evolve consensus on national issues. He signed the Geneva Accords for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan after an all-party conference on this issue.

Junejo's independent policies and cultivation of the opposition broadened his support base but soured his relations with President Zia. The rift between the two gradually widened and climaxed in April–May 1988, when there was an explosion in Ojhri camp, where arms for the Afghan Mujahidin were stored before their distribution among the Mujahidin groups. The Ojhri camp blast caused the loss of more than 100 lives and valuable property. The official report held Zia's close associates responsible for the tragedy. Junejo reportedly

planned action against them but before he could do so, Zia dismissed him as prime minister. Zia himself had no time to implement his plans as he was assassinated on 17 August 1988.

The democratic era

Zia's death ushered in another democratic phase in Pakistan's history. However, the political system was the same as incorporated in the Eighth Amendment. The military leadership under General Mirza Aslam Beg decided against a takeover, and elevated Ghulam Is'haq Khan, the Senate chairman, to the office of president; subsequently he was elected to that office. This democratic phase lasted until October 1999. During this phase, caretaker governments arranged four national and provincial elections. Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif, the PML leader, each came to power twice as prime minister.

The PPP emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly in the first elections despite opposition from a multi-party Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Front – IJI), headed by Nawaz Sharif. It formed coalition governments at the centre and in Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan; its partners were the MQM in Sind and the ANP (Awami National Party) and regional parties in the other two provinces. The IJI had a clear majority in Punjab and Nawaz Sharif formed the government there. Inexperience and mutual distrust made it difficult for Benazir and her opponents to work for national reconciliation. Immediately after assuming office, Benazir sponsored a no-confidence move to dislodge Nawaz Sharif from the chief ministership but failed in her attempt. The following year, she herself faced a similar no-confidence move that was supported by Nawaz Sharif in retaliation. She successfully confronted that move but her government lost popularity on other fronts.

Benazir's economic programme, especially the People's Works Programme and the Placement Bureau, was perceived as a clumsy mechanism of political patronage. The Board of Investment chaired by the prime minister, with powers to issue licences for new industrial units, and the cell in her office allegedly controlled by her husband, 'Asif 'Ali Zardari, to oversee bank loans were looked upon as means of corruption. Her attempt to establish her hold on the armed forces raised more serious concerns. She succeeded in replacing the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) chief by a retired pro-PPP general but failed in her attempt to remove Admiral Sirohey as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. By August 1990, she had lost the support of her coalition partners (MQM and ANP) as well as the president who, using Article 58.2(b), dismissed her government and dissolved the assemblies on charges of maladministration and corruption. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a PPP dissident, was installed as the caretaker prime minister to organize elections.

The PPP suffered defeat at all levels in the November 1990 elections. The IJI formed governments at the centre and in Punjab where it had won clear majorities, and in coalition with other parties in the remaining provinces. The development-oriented Punjab chief minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, became prime minister and initiated a number of economic programmes. However, he felt that he could perform better if he had a free hand in governance. He assumed the presidency of the PML but his moves in other areas brought him into conflict with the president. The conflict became public when he announced his intention of repealing the Eighth Amendment. The two men also differed over the appointment of a successor to General Asif Nawaz, the army chief of staff, who had died suddenly of a heart attack.

Using his powers under Article 58.2(b) in April 1993, the president dismissed Nawaz Sharif's government and appointed a Muslim Leaguer, Mir Balakh Sher Mazari, as the caretaker prime minister. Like his predecessors, Junejo and Benazir, Nawaz Sharif appealed to the Supreme Court that the president had acted unconstitutionally. Contrary to the appeals by his predecessors, the Supreme Court ruled in his favour and restored the assemblies. He was reinstalled as prime minister but the conflict persisted. Finally, on the intervention of the army chief, both the president and the prime minister resigned in July 1993.¹⁹ Surprisingly, Moin Qureshi, a retired bureaucrat from the World Bank, was invited to head the caretaker government and arrange fresh elections.

The October 1993 elections again produced mixed results. The PPP and the PML (N) (N = Nawaz) secured 86 and 72 seats, respectively, out of 207 National Assembly seats; minor parties and independents won the remaining seats. Benazir formed a coalition government for a second time. Her party also set up coalition governments in Punjab and Sind while the PML (N) became part of coalitions in NWFP and Baluchistan. A PPP loyalist, Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, was elected president to prevent any repetition of Benazir's first-term of authority in financial matters to her husband, who put his friends in a few key economic positions, again invited allegations of corruption against her government.

This worried President Leghari, but the conflict between him and Benazir came into the open over judicial appointments. Benazir appointed party supporters as High Court and Supreme Court judges without the consent of the respective chief justices. The Supreme Court, on an appeal by a lawyer, ruled against these appointments in the famous 'Judges Case'. On Benazir's refusal to implement this order, the Supreme Court approached the president.²⁰ Meanwhile, Benazir's brother, Murtaza, was gunned down outside his

¹⁹ Amin, 1994, pp. 191–6.

²⁰ 'Ali Shah, 2001, pp. 608–11.

residence in Karachi and the president hinted at her husband's involvement, which complicated the situation. Finally, using Article 58.2(b), the president dismissed the prime minister and dissolved the assemblies to prevent any further deterioration of the situation. Malik Meraj Khalid, a veteran PPP leader, formed the caretaker government to organize new elections.

In the February 1997 elections, the PML (N) won clear majorities at the centre and in Punjab, where it formed party governments. In other provinces, it was part of coalition governments. The PPP was out of power everywhere. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who now had the requisite majority to amend the constitution, took steps to remove the hurdles in his way. The National Assembly first repealed the Eighth Amendment, divesting the president of his powers under Article 58.2(b), and then barred floor crossing by party members, which had been a source of instability. Nawaz Sharif then had a confrontation with the judiciary similar to that of Benazir. A contempt of court case did not deter him from pursuing his objective. Chief Justice Sajjad 'Ali Shah sought President Leghari's support, but in the end, the president and the chief justice both resigned and Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, a friend of the Sharif family, was elected president.

The Nawaz Sharif government's poor performance on the economic front was against popular expectations. Major projects like the motorway consumed huge amounts of money. Inflation and unemployment were on the rise. Severe economic strains followed Pakistan's popularly acclaimed matching response to India's nuclear explosions in May 1998. The freezing of foreign currency accounts and stoppage of international economic aid further damaged the already fractured economy. The government became sensitive to criticism and hostile to all suggestions. Decision-making narrowed down to a very close circle. When the chief of army staff, General Jehangir Karamat, suggested in a speech that a National Security Council was needed to advise on important national issues, he was asked to resign, which he did. Such sensitivity to all suggestions created alarm in the top military ranks. The 1999 Kargil episode, in which an attempt was made to capture strategic posts in Kashmir, and the US intervention for the withdrawal of Pakistani forces behind the line of control, contributed to the loss of trust between Nawaz Sharif and the army chief, General Pervez Musharraf.

Meanwhile, all the political parties united to establish a Grand Democratic Alliance on a one-point agenda, the 'removal of Nawaz Sharif'. Nawaz Sharif moved against General Musharraf and announced his replacement by another general when Musharraf was returning from Sri Lanka. His plane was not allowed to land in Karachi. The military took action against the prime minister and arrested him and several others. On 12 October 1999 General Musharraf took over as chief executive of the country and suspended the constitution.

19

AFGHANISTAN^{*}*C. Noelle-Karimi, W. Maley and A. Saikal***Contents**

AFGHANISTAN FROM 1850 TO 1919	426
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN	435

Part One**AFGHANISTAN FROM 1850 TO 1919***(C. Noelle-Karimi)*

When Amir Dost Muhammad Khan was about to breathe his last on 9 June 1863, he could look back on an eventful reign of close to four decades. Having risen to power in 1826, the first Muhammadzai king had successfully used his narrow power base in Kabul to gradually widen his sphere of influence in such a manner that by 1863 he could lay claim to the regions forming the outline of present-day Afghanistan. Punctuated by the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1839–42, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan's reign marks the beginning of the transition from a tribal polity to a modern territorial state.

^{*} See Map 6

In keeping with the wider political setting, the Sadozai dynasty (1747–1818) had maintained itself by means of a predatory relationship with the revenue-rich North Indian regions, essentially using the surplus yielded by the regions east of the Khyber Pass to ensure the loyalty of the Pashtoon confederacy that formed the backbone of the Sadozai empire.¹ Loosely defined as comprising the regions of ‘Khurasan’ and ‘Hindustan’,² the early modern Afghan state derived its identity not so much from notions of territorial space but was rather conceived of as a web of personal allegiances between the ruling family and the local leadership. In this field of shifting relationships, space was essentially defined by the tension between ‘obedience’ and ‘rebellion’ and the personal ability of the rulers to maintain a balance of power favourable to their interests.

The inherent instability of tribal loyalties posed no problem as long the possibility of territorial expansion provided a sufficient incentive for internal cohesion. Yet with the rise of new regional powers and British colonial interests, this door began to close. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Sadozai rulers lost their rich Indian provinces to the Sikhs. In 1849 the Sikh realm of Punjab was incorporated into British India. Further territorial losses occurred during the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars of 1839–42 and 1878–80. The definition of British and Russian spheres of influence resulted in the creation of the country’s major modern borders, which were delimited in a series of agreements between 1872 and 1896. In this process, the term *Afghanistan*, ‘land of the Afghans’, was coined for the evolving territorial state. In the early nineteenth century, the British still referred to the Afghan ruler as ‘king of Cabool’. Towards the end of the century, by contrast, the word ‘Afghanistan’ had gained currency as the commonly accepted designation for the land on the fringes of, and beyond, British, Russian and Iranian control. Within the country, however, this term had a much narrower connotation, as the word ‘Afghan’ was solely applied to the politically dominant Pashtoons. As the Muhammadzai kings attempted to establish their authority within the confines of modern-day Afghanistan, they faced the double task of subjugating the non-Pashtoon groups while simultaneously weaning the Pashtoon elite from the entrenched privileges accruing to them from their established role as partners and rivals of the Sadozai rulers.

During its period of final decline in the early nineteenth century, the Sadozai empire disintegrated into a number of small regional states. Until 1841 the western province of Herat became the last bastion of Sadozai authority. Kandahar and Kabul, by contrast, passed to the possession of two rival sets of Muhammadzai brothers. Forming a branch of the dominant group of Durrani Pashtoons, the Muhammadzai clan had originally belonged to the

¹ Elphinstone, 1992, Vol. 2, p. 247.

² Boukhary, Persian text, 1970, p. 4.

inner core of families that upheld Sadozai rule. A number of Dost Muhammad Khan's relatives occupied influential positions at the Sadozai court. His grandfather Haji Jamal Khan had served as commander of artillery and his father Payinda Khan and eldest brother Fatih Khan acted as ministers to the Sadozai rulers Shah Zaman (r. 1793–1800) and Shah Mahmud (r. 1800–3, 1809–18). Both men exerted so much influence on the politics of their day that they became known as king-makers and -breakers. Ironically, the futile attempt of their overlords to do away with these all-too-powerful allies hastened the downfall of the Sadozai dynasty.

In the aftermath of Fatih Khan's execution in 1818, his remaining 20 brothers began to advance separate claims to authority, while simultaneously competing against each other from their local bases in Peshawar, Kabul and Kandahar. In this context of rival factions and shifting alliances, Dost Muhammad Khan faced disadvantages both in terms of age and maternal descent. Being one of Fatih Khan's youngest brothers, he had no powerful full brothers to rely on. His other apparent weakness, the Shi'ite background of his Qizilbash³ mother, ultimately proved beneficial, as his blood ties with the Jawansher Qizilbash of Kabul gave him an edge over his brothers in the competition for the possession of the former Sadozai capital.

From his beginnings as a minor warlord, Dost Muhammad Khan embarked on a long, arduous path of territorial consolidation that eventually established him as the founder of the Muhammadzai dynasty, a remarkably stable political entity that was to last for almost 150 years until Zahir Shah was deposed in 1973. The stability of the early Muhammadzai rulers was clearly a function of British interests. This is also exemplified by Dost Muhammad Khan's improved position subsequent to the first Anglo-Afghan war. In the wake of this unsuccessful attempt to re-impose Sadozai authority in Afghanistan, the amir changed in the British perception from an undesirable usurper to a friendly partner. This friendship found its expression in the treaties of 1855 and 1857, whereby Dost Muhammad Khan undertook to be the 'friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company'.

Owing to tacit British approval, Dost Muhammad Khan was able to make substantial territorial gains in the 1850s. While the amir's authority had been limited to the regions of Kabul, Bamiyan, Ghazni and Jalalabad prior to the first Anglo-Afghan war, he was now able to reach for the Uzbek khanates of 'Lesser Turkistan'. Only the principalities of Maimana in the north-west and Badakhshan in the north-east were able to maintain a precarious independence. The British commitment to non-intervention contained in the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1855 encouraged Dost Muhammad Khan to displace his

³ Literally, Red-Heads; descendants of Persian troops, especially the Shi'ite elite troops.

half-brothers from Kandahar. Accompanied by a two-year flow of subsidies, the Anglo-Afghan treaty of friendship of 1857 bought Amir Dost Muhammad Khan's loyalty towards the British during the Indian Mutiny.

The western dominion of Herat remained largely beyond the sphere of Muhammadzai control and was incorporated into Dost Muhammad Khan's realm only two weeks prior to his death. Even so, the question of Herat's position within the larger power constellations triggered two major military crises, both of which coincided with intense Russian and British involvement. With the decline of the Sadozai empire, the Qajar rulers of Tehran had revived historical claims to Herat as part of the old Safavid empire. Until the early 1830s, the Qajar presence in Khurasan was too weak to allow more than occasional exactions of tribute and other expressions of fealty from the rulers of Herat. Finally, in 1837–8 Muhammad Shah Qajar mounted a major expedition against Herat in order to recreate the old and, in his view, proper state of affairs.

The presence of Russian soldiers and advisers in the Qajar army sparked British fears that Russian influence might spread to western Afghanistan and would thus destabilize British India's north-western possessions. While the British occupation of the island of Kharg effectively dissuaded Muhammad Shah Qajar from his plan to occupy Herat, the Indian governor-general's attitude towards Dost Muhammad Khan subsequently hardened in such a manner that he ordered the invasion of Afghanistan which became known as the first Anglo-Afghan war, or 'Auckland's folly', and ended with a disastrous retreat in early 1842. The next Iranian siege of Herat in the summer of 1856, by contrast, caused British sentiment to tilt in favour of Dost Muhammad Khan, who expressed his willingness to provide troops for a campaign against Herat in exchange for British funds.

While Dost Muhammad Khan succeeded in widening his sphere of influence, he was unable to introduce fundamental changes to the administrative system known since Sadozai times. The amir's reliance on his sons for the consolidation of his state fostered a high degree of military and financial decentralization. The Muhammadzai princes used their assignments as provincial governors to carve out separate power bases and to act like 'little kings',⁴ allowing only a trickle of revenue to reach the royal capital. The regions located in the core of the Muhammadzai realm and within easy reach of the amir, by contrast, faced the greatest pressure for revenues and troops. A major portion of the amir's revenues was dedicated to the modernization of the army. By introducing regular infantry regiments and employing British and Iranian military advisers, he sought to create a counterweight to the traditional tribal cavalry that was notoriously difficult to control from the centre. While Dost Muhammad Khan was able to include previously privileged groups like the Tokhi

⁴ Ghubar, 1980, p. 574.

Ghilzais and Durranis of Kandahar within his tax base, he failed to alter the distribution of power between the capital and the rural areas in a lasting manner and was in no position to interfere with the internal affairs of the Pashtoon tribes.

By concentrating the highest military and administrative positions in the hands of his sons, Dost Muhammad Khan was able to establish Muhammadzai claims to overlordship in the country. One of the undesirable side effects of this policy was that the various factions among his sons had sufficient means at their disposal to advance separate claims to power, which plunged Afghanistan into a five-year civil war after the amir's death. When his third son and designated successor Sher 'Ali Khan (r. 1863–4, 1869–78) was finally able to consolidate his rule in 1869, many of his erstwhile rivals had been eliminated by death or exile. Sher 'Ali Khan, on his part, fostered a new state-supporting elite which consisted of tribal outsiders, such as the urban Qizilbash, the Jabbar Khel Ghilzai Pashtoons of the Kabul basin and the Wardak Pashtoons located south-west of Kabul. In order to strengthen the central state, he embarked on a number of reforms that prefigured many of the measures for which his successor, the 'Iron Amir' 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) was to become known. Contrary to general perception, the impetus for Sher 'Ali Khan's reforms derived less from the impact of the famous Muslim reformer Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838/9–97) than from the amir's desire to emulate British institutions.

Like his father, Sher 'Ali Khan sought to bolster his rule by strengthening the army. The number of soldiers at his disposal rose from 25,000 to 56,000 men, and for the first time in Afghanistan's history, regular infantry rather than tribal cavalry formed the backbone of the army. While Dost Muhammad Khan had distributed the army divisions among his most prominent sons, Sher 'Ali Khan organized his army under central command and also centralized the soldiers' pay, abolishing the Sadozai system of local crop assignments to the military leaders. Moreover, the amir sought to break up tribal allegiances within the army by organizing its contingents on the basis of body size or age. Sher 'Ali Khan also aimed at incorporating the provinces more closely into the central administration. Apart from assigning the provincial governorships to members of the new state-supporting elite, he controlled the appointment of officials to the lower echelons of the provincial administration and eventually shifted the control of fiscal matters to the capital. His attempt to collect revenues in cash rather than kind, by contrast, enjoyed little success.

Sher 'Ali Khan continued his father's policy of territorial consolidation by forcing Badakhshan and Maimana to submit to Muhammadzai rule in 1873 and 1875 respectively. Despite his efforts at administrative and military reform, the amir was unable to affect the existing balance of power to the benefit of the centre. As in earlier times, government pressure for soldiers and revenues was most tangible around the towns and along the

trade routes. Sher 'Ali Khan's attempts to create a meritocracy and to streamline government gave new groups access to the sphere of government. While profiting from the amir's attentions, the new state-supporting elite was neither capable of, nor interested in carrying through, Sher 'Ali Khan's reformist ideas. Simultaneously, longstanding tribal loyalties were brushed aside. The fragility of the amir's government became clear in 1878, when he was confronted with an imminent British invasion.

In the light of the prolonged civil war at the beginning of his reign and growing Russian pressure in Central Asia, Sher 'Ali Khan opted for a close alliance with Britain. Yet his repeated requests for the formal recognition of his dynasty and the renewal of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of friendship fell on deaf ears well into the 1870s. Instead, the British Government entered into direct negotiations with the Russians in order to settle the question of their respective spheres of influence. The Clarendon–Gortshakov agreement of 1872 designated the Amu Darya as the border between Afghanistan and Russian interests without soliciting the amir's opinion. A year later British arbiters awarded the most fertile parts of Sistan to Persia. Under the Conservative prime minister Disraeli (1874–80), British policy prerogatives once again shifted to a 'forward policy'. The newly appointed British Indian viceroy Lytton (1875–80) exerted pressure on Sher 'Ali Khan for the establishment of a permanent British mission in Afghanistan. The tensions between the amir and the viceroy mounted in the summer and autumn of 1878, when Lytton reacted to the arrival of a Russian mission under General Stolyetov in Kabul by dispatching a British embassy. Sher 'Ali Khan's initial refusal to allow the British envoy to enter Afghanistan sparked the second Anglo-Afghan war.

Confronted with the threat of a British invasion, Sher 'Ali Khan abdicated in favour of his son Muhammad Ya'qub and fled to Mazar-i Sharif, where he died on 21 February 1879. Muhammad Ya'qub Khan attempted to contain the British occupation by concluding the treaty of Gandamak on 26 May 1879, whereby he ceded the regions of Kurram, Pishin, Sibi and the Khyber Pass to India and accepted the establishment of a British mission in Kabul. The British mission, under the leadership of Sir Louis Cavagnari, was massacred by mutinous Afghan soldiers within six weeks of its establishment in Kabul. The ensuing British occupation by General Roberts faced several challenges. In December 1879 a tribal alliance under the leadership of Mullah Mushk-i 'Alam threatened the British positions in Kabul. In July 1880 Sher 'Ali Khan's son Muhammad Ayub defeated a British army at Maiwand near Kandahar. Given the precarious nature of the occupation and the high expenses it incurred, Lytton decided to restrict the British presence to Kandahar and designated Sher 'Ali Khan's nephew and erstwhile rival 'Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad Afzal as ruler of Kabul. In the west, Herat continued to be controlled by Muhammad Ayub Khan.

While Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) initially only ruled over a fragment of present-day Afghanistan, he was soon able to establish an unprecedented degree of control within the country. Key to his success was a close alliance with the British, who evacuated Kandahar in 1881 and allowed him to displace Muhammad Ayub Khan from Herat. In keeping with the British policy of turning Afghanistan into a buffer state on India’s north-western flank, the amir received an annual subsidy of 1.2 million rupees for the upkeep of his troops and the protection of his north-western borders from 1883. In exchange, the amir left the control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs to the British.

‘Abd al-Rahman Khan’s reign coincided with the delineation of Afghanistan’s major borders. One year after the loss of Panjdeh to Russian troops in 1885, the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission began to demarcate Afghanistan’s north-western border. The final boundary dispute with Russia was settled by the Pamir agreement of 1895: Afghanistan received control over the Wakhan corridor in the Pamir mountains, which formed a political buffer between Russian Turkistan, British India and China. Equally important was the Durand agreement of 1893, which delimited Afghanistan’s southern and eastern borders. None of these boundaries reflected ethnic considerations. While the designated border along the Amu Darya divided the old principality of Badakhshan as well as the territories of the Uzbeks and Turkmens in the north, the Durand Line (see Part Two below) cut through the Pashtoon and Baluch homelands.

Secure from the threat of foreign invasion, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan devoted his energy to territorial consolidation and the forceful integration of those groups that had so far remained beyond the grasp of government control. In the course of his 20-year reign, the amir employed his modernized and centralized army of 79,000 men to contain countless major and minor rebellions. The 1880s and 1890s witnessed major campaigns against the Shinwari (1883), Mangal (1884), Ghilzai (1886) and the Safi Pashtoons of Kunar (1888–96). In 1888 ‘Abd al-Rahman forcefully suppressed a rebellion by the governor of Turkistan, his cousin Is’haq Khan b. Muhammad A‘zam. The process of internal colonization reached its climax with the conquest of the Shi‘ite Hazaras of central Afghanistan in 1891–3. In order to motivate his Pashtoon soldiers to take up arms against the Hazaras, the amir denigrated the latter as unbelievers and declared *jihād* against them. After effectively destroying the local Hazara leadership, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan assigned the most fertile pastures to Pashtoon nomads. His attempts to ‘Pashtoonize’ the northern regions of Afghanistan by means of resettlement likewise created a precedent that was followed well into the twentieth century. ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan’s final conquest in the winter of 1895–6 was the eastern region of Kafiristan, which, as part of the forceful conversion of the local population to Islam, was renamed Nuristan, ‘land of light’.

‘Abd al-Rahman Khan endeavoured to establish a tight grid of military, administrative and judicial control over Afghanistan. He was also more successful than his predecessors in reining in the religious establishment for the purposes of government. Apart from depriving the *‘ulamā*’ of separate sources of income on the basis of religious endowments and incorporating them into a state-controlled system of exams and courts, he attempted to legitimize his rule by religious means, projecting himself as the protector of Sunni Islam and equating proper belief with obedience to his rule.⁵ Despite his dependence on direct and indirect British support, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan managed to shield his country from modern means of communication like rail and telegraph which would have provided links with the outside world. Technical innovations were only welcome in as far as they enhanced the efficiency of his army. The amir also harboured deep suspicions against the Russians, having experienced an eleven-year exile in the Russian protectorate of Samarkand prior to his successful bid for power during the second Anglo-Afghan war. Thanks to British support and his own vigilance, he was one of the few Afghan monarchs to die in power and in his own bed.⁶

On his accession, Amir Habibullah Khan (r. 1901–19) inherited a relatively stable state. He generally emulated the policies of his father, governing in the same authoritarian manner and continuing the close alliance with the British. At the same time, he allowed for certain innovations that had already been foreshadowed during Sher ‘Ali Khan’s time. As early as 1873, Sher ‘Ali Khan had inaugurated a military academy, in which the young elite received instruction in English, mathematics and religion. In 1903 Habibullah Khan set another precedent for modern education by founding Habibiyya College, which was modelled on the reformist Aligarh College in India. Habibullah Khan also followed Sher ‘Ali Khan’s example of establishing a newspaper. The Persian bi-weekly journal *Sirāj al-Akhhbār* [Light of the News] appeared from 1911 to 1918. Furthermore, Habibullah Khan departed from his father’s policies by granting a general amnesty to all those members of the elite that ‘Abd al-Rahman had forced out of the country. This allowed the Musahiban branch of the Muhammadzai family to return from exile in India. Among them, Muhammad Nadir Khan (1883–1933) gained prominence as commander of the Afghan forces during the uprising of Mangal Pashtoons in 1912 and was promoted to the position of commander-in-chief shortly thereafter. His brother Muhammad Hashim (d. 1953) was appointed general in Heart province, while yet another brother, Shah Wali Khan (b. 1885), acted as the commander of Habibullah’s bodyguard. Leaning towards British India, the

⁵ Ghani, 1978.

⁶ Edwards, 1996, p. 83.

Musahiban brothers continued their political ascent during the 1920s and finally took the reins of government in 1930.

Another school of thought was represented by Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933), a member of the Kandahar branch of the Muhammadzai family, who had spent 22 years in Damascus. Closely associated with the ‘Young Turk’ party and Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani, he used his position as editor of *Sirāj al-Akḥbār* to voice his reformist and Pan-Islamist ideas. In keeping with his nationalist vision, he formed the group of modernist ‘Young Afghans’, who were of anti-British and pro-Turkish orientation. Among these reform-oriented Kabulis were Habibullah’s sons Inayatullah and Amanullah, both of whom were married to Tarzi’s daughters.⁷ Like his mentor, Amanullah Khan felt the urge to free Afghanistan from its backwardness, which he attributed to the prevailing lack of education and the evil effects of British imperialism.

The opportunity to oppose the British arose in October 1915, when the German Hentig/Niedermayer mission arrived in Kabul and sought to entice the amir to take an active role in the unfolding world war by siding with the Central Powers. Well aware that an attack on India would entail not only a loss of British subsidies but also war with Russia, Habibullah Khan used the presence of the German expedition as a lever in his relations with Britain. Simultaneously, he summoned a *loya jirga* (general assembly) at which he attempted to convince the 540 prominent religious and tribal leaders present of the need to keep the peace with the British.⁸

If Habibullah Khan had hoped to gain independence in exchange for his loyalty, he was severely disappointed. When the Government of India contented itself with paying monetary compensation of 10 million rupees in July 1918, there was a general feeling within Afghanistan that the amir had been duped by the British. In any event, his decision to remain neutral cost him the last vestiges of support. The Young Afghans were united with the conservative circles around Habibullah Khan’s full brother Nasrullah in their anti-British attitude. Therefore, no particular emotion was aroused in the country when Habibullah Khan was reported to have died during a ‘hunting accident’ on 20 February 1919. Shortly thereafter, his third son Amanullah took an active stand against the British, winning not only independence for his country but also the hearts and minds of his people.

⁷ Adamec, 1974, pp. 13–14.

⁸ Ghubar, 1980, p.739.

Part Two

FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN

(W. Maley and A. Saikal)

The assassination of Amir Habibullah in 1919 triggered a brief crisis of political succession, but within a matter of days, it was clear that Habibullah's son Amanullah would succeed him on the throne. Amanullah (r. 1919–29) was one of the more remarkable historical figures in a remarkable country. While his father was not a notable modernizer, he had been a discreet and careful ruler, who eschewed the brutally repressive tactics that his own father had employed as part of the process of state-building. Amanullah's outlook and policies marked a further shift from the orientation of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. While 'Abd al-Rahman had received a subvention from the British (and had been invested as a 'Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India'), Amanullah was determined to secure for Afghanistan power to act in the areas in which the country's sovereignty remained compromised. Furthermore, under the influence of his father-in-law, the intellectual Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933), he entertained ambitious hopes for the modernization of Afghanistan which were significantly to shape his approach to politics – and ultimately to undermine it fatally. Nonetheless, while Amanullah was to occupy the throne for only a decade, he left a palpable mark on the historical consciousness of the Afghan people. In some respects he was a heroic figure: his misfortune was that his aspirations were not matched by the instruments needed to achieve them.

The securing of full independence from Britain was the first key task that the new ruler set for himself; ultimately he succeeded in his objective, although at some long-term cost. While a range of tactical considerations made it opportune for Amanullah to initiate such a confrontation, it was ultimately the growth of Afghan nationalism which fuelled the

conflict.⁹ Skirmishes broke out on 4 May 1919; Kabul and Jalalabad were bombed by the Royal Air Force, and on 28 May 1919 the Afghan Government sought a ceasefire, which took effect on 3 June 1919. The upshot, however, was congenial to Kabul, for an annex to the treaty of Rawalpindi signed on 8 August 1919 explicitly recognized Afghanistan as a sovereign state. With sovereignty came responsibility. In exercising the responsibilities of monarchical office, Amanullah was able to draw inspiration not simply from Tarzi, but from other rulers of substance in the region. Two rulers notable for their praetorian roots were Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) in Turkey, and Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925–41) in Persia. However, lacking their established military backgrounds, Amanullah sought other bases of political legitimacy.

One of the most important of these was the development of Afghanistan's first constitution, a statute of 73 articles that was officially promulgated in October 1923. Article 2, while referring to Islam as the religion of Afghanistan, offered protection to non-Muslim minorities such as Jews and Hindus. Articles 8–24 set out the rights of the subjects of Afghanistan. Slavery was formally abolished, and the freedom of the domestic press was affirmed, as was the right to free education. Property rights were protected, and all types of torture were prohibited. Administration was the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, chaired by the king (Article 25). Article 36 provided that government officials were to be appointed on the basis of competence. A State Council, consisting of members appointed by the king together with an equal number of elected members, was to exercise legislative functions. All in all, the constitution was a notably progressive document, which at the very least paid lip service to the need to combat autocracy, repression and the vice of nepotism.

Above all, the 1923 constitution reflected the seriousness of Amanullah's vision of change. He was genuinely committed to altering the prevailing power structures at a number of different levels – in the central political system, in relations between the centre and tribal leaderships, in relations with religious notables, and in gender relations. In May 1924 the Mangal tribes in the Khost area revolted against the encroachment of central state power. The issue of gender was a particularly risky area. Amanullah had a strikingly modern attitude to gender questions, and practised what he preached. He married only one wife, in contrast to the four he would have been permitted under Islamic law, and she accompanied him on the major European tour that he undertook in 1928.

Having adopted the title of *pādshāh* (king) in place of amir in 1926, Amanullah was received at the highest levels: by President Paul von Hindenburg in Germany and by King George V in Britain. He even received an honorary doctorate from Oxford University. However, the success of the tour as a device for promoting knowledge of his agenda abroad

⁹ Gregorian, 1969, p. 229.

was not matched by support in his own country. His absence provided opportunities for his enemies to plot, and Afghanistan's rumour mill rapidly twisted his achievements in Europe to his disadvantage. Conservatives derided Queen Soraya's presence at the king's side, and stories were even spread that he had gone mad after eating pork during his travels. He returned to an Afghanistan on the brink of large-scale turmoil.

The events of 1929, one of the most turbulent and dramatic years of modern Afghan history, highlighted the limits of what Amanullah had been able to achieve. His policies had won little support at mass level, but had triggered significant divisions in the Afghan socio-cultural elite, as broadly defined: some in the elite supported his reforms, while others opposed them strongly. This was a recipe for severe political disruption, which spilled over into rural areas, where ordinary Afghans had had little direct experience of the reforms, but saw them painted by conservatives in the most scornful of terms.¹⁰ It is scarcely surprising that the reforms attracted the hostility that they did; they struck at entrenched patterns of patronage and clientelism that Amanullah rightly saw as detrimental to modernization, but which nonetheless benefited significant power-holders who it was only to be expected would seek to protect a system to their advantage. Nonetheless, the reforms might have carried the day had not Amanullah also proved insensitive to tribal sensitivities, provoking what Poullada describes as 'tribal separatism and bellicosity'.¹¹ The rebellion that resulted in Amanullah's overthrow began with Shinwari Pashtoon tribal attacks in November 1928, essentially in defence of local practices of predatory extraction to which the state wished to put an end. The activities of these tribal figures were legitimated by disgruntled mullahs, making the situation far more explosive.¹²

The force that ultimately displaced Amanullah originated not from the east of Kabul, but from the north, in the form of a Tajik, Habibullah, widely known as 'The Son of the Water-Carrier' (*Bacha-i Saqao*), and his followers. They mounted their first attack on Kabul in December 1928, and on 14 January 1929, faced with the threat of a further attack from the same source, Amanullah abdicated and fled to Kandahar. Two days later, Habibullah, by then in control of the Royal Palace, declared himself king. His rule was short-lived; obliged himself to resort to unpopular predatory extraction as a source of revenue, and faced with tribal forces led by Shah Wali Khan, he fled Kabul on 12 October, only to be captured and executed. To this day, debate persists over this transient episode of Tajik rule, which some contemporary observers, such as the Hazara writer Faiz Muhammad, depict in the grimmest of terms, but which others such as the poet Khalilullah Khalili regard more

¹⁰ Poullada, 1973, p. 146.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 159.

¹² On Amanullah's relations with the religious establishment, see Nawid, 1999.

kindly.¹³ What is perhaps more pertinent to note is that Habibullah faced a similar problem to that which was to haunt Afghan regimes 60 years later, namely the difficulty of ‘ruling’ when the revenue flows necessary to sustaining a functioning state had been compromised.

Habibullah’s replacement was the Durrani Pashtoon leader Nadir Shah (r. 1929–33), an older brother of Shah Wali Khan. His occupation of the throne brought a strong leader to the fore, and inaugurated a new ruling dynasty (known as the Musahiban) whose members were to exercise supreme power in Afghanistan until April 1978. Nadir moved swiftly to placate the tribal leaders and religious establishment, first by reimposing the seclusion of women (purdah) as a sanctioned practice. The key elements of socio-cultural modernization to which Amanullah had been committed were rapidly abandoned as state goals, and replaced with a very cautious approach to public policy. Nadir initially bolstered his position by appointing his brother Muhammad Hashem Khan as prime minister, a position he was to hold until 1946, and Shah Wali Khan as minister for war. In 1931 a new constitution was crafted, which provided for a bicameral legislature, the lower house elected, and the upper house appointed by the king (who also appointed the prime minister). Nadir also made serious attempts to reconstitute the national army, which the events of 1929 had severely fractured. This is almost always a difficult exercise to put into practice, but Nadir managed to do so by devolving to the tribes a number of key responsibilities for raising manpower. Officer cadets were also sent to France and to Germany (where Nadir’s brother ‘Aziz Khan was the Afghan ambassador) for training.

It was in Germany that one of the first signs of serious problems for Nadir’s rule surfaced, when ‘Aziz Khan was assassinated on 6 June 1933 by Sayyed Kamal, an Afghan student who had lived on and off in Germany for almost a decade and claimed that his act was in protest at growing British influence in Afghanistan. On 8 November 1933 Nadir Shah himself was assassinated at a school carnival held at the Royal Palace in Kabul. His killer was a 17-year-old named Muhammad Khaliq: he had been a retainer in the family of Nadir’s opponent Ghulam Nabi Charki, who had been executed on the king’s instructions exactly a year earlier. With the benefit of hindsight, this execution was a profound error of judgement, for as Gregorian has written:

the political struggle between the pro-Amanullah elements and the ruling dynasty thus took on an additional dimension, that of a blood feud between the Musahiban family and Ghulam Nabi’s family, the Charkis.¹⁴

When rulers in weakly institutionalized polities are assassinated, there is a serious risk of a succession crisis, but oddly enough the succession to Nadir went remarkably smoothly.

¹³ Cf. Khalili, 1984; McChesney (ed.), 1999.

¹⁴ Gregorian, 1969, p. 338.

His 19-year-old son Zahir, born on 15 October 1914, assumed the throne on the day Nadir was assassinated; Zahir was to occupy it for nearly 40 years before being overthrown in a palace coup in July 1973 (and, remarkably, he survived to return to Afghanistan in 2002 at the age of 87 to receive a newly created position of 'Father of the Nation'). The reason, however, that the succession went smoothly was that Zahir's installation was symbolic of a deeper development, namely a power-sharing consensus among Nadir's remaining brothers. Thus Muhammad Hashem Khan remained prime minister, an austere bachelor who promoted the interests of his nephew Muhammad Daud (1909–78), son of 'Aziz Khan. Shah Mahmud Khan (1886–1959) became minister of war, while Shah Wali Khan (1885–1976) served as Afghan ambassador in Paris. Until his resignation in 1946, Hashem Khan was unquestionably the dominant figure in the regime; Zahir was little more than a cipher, and played no significant political role. Hashem was committed to gradualism in his domestic policies, and for economic advice depended upon the financier 'Abdul Majid Zabuli, who directed taxes away from agriculture and pastoralism (the key activities of the potentially fractious tribes) and towards exports, which could be taxed indirectly.¹⁵

In the sphere of foreign policy, Afghanistan began to branch out. In September 1934 it joined the League of Nations, and it expanded its diplomatic relations in other parts of the world. Relations with Germany were pursued with some vigour, not just because Germany was seen as a counterweight to the neighbouring presence of the British in India, but because some Afghan ultra-nationalists saw themselves as 'Aryans' of the kind that the Nazis' 'racial science' (*Rassenkunde*) depicted as superior beings. However, with the outbreak of the Second World War, Hashem's government responded with admirable caution. It opted for a position of strict neutrality, and agreed that nationals of the Axis powers should be required to quit the country. In this way, Afghanistan avoided the experience of occupation by British and Soviet forces that its neighbour Iran underwent from 1941. The war also witnessed the establishment of formal relations, with resident representation, between the United States and Afghanistan: Cornelius van Engert was appointed resident minister in Kabul, and 'Abdul Hussain Aziz resident minister in Washington D.C.

In May 1946 Hashem resigned the premiership on the grounds of poor health, and was succeeded as prime minister by Shah Mahmud Khan, a popular figure who instituted a somewhat more tolerant political climate than had prevailed under Hashem. While the autocratic Hashem had been prepared to detain as political prisoners a significant number of known supporters of Amanullah, especially from the Charki family, Shah Mahmud was willing to see them released.¹⁶ There was even a brief period of flirtation with political

¹⁵ Rubin, 1995, p. 59.

¹⁶ Fletcher, 1965, p. 242.

pluralism, which saw sympathizers of the *Wish-e Zalmayan* (Enlightened Youth) movement elected to the lower house of the legislature. However, the flirtation was short-lived, and its rather abrupt termination set the scene for more radicalized forces to take shape in the future.

The period of Shah Mahmud's premiership witnessed two other developments of note. The first was the Safi Pashtoon revolt of 1947–9, which was the most worrisome example of tribal mobilization since the overthrow of Amanullah. However, the government responded to the challenge much more effectively than Amanullah had in 1929. Muhammad Daud led forces which struck at the revolt before it could gain wider momentum, and the Safis were forcibly relocated to the north of Afghanistan. The outcome of the conflict also reflected the different approaches to combat of the parties, with the tribes locked into traditional forms of warfare constrained by seasonal economic duties, while the forces of the state enjoyed greater flexibility.

The other important development was a continued widening of Afghanistan's foreign relations. Afghanistan was admitted to the United Nations on 9 November 1946, and in June 1948, the US legation in Kabul was upgraded to the level of an embassy. The upshot was an enhanced US presence in Afghanistan, most notably by US firms involved in the Helmand valley project, in which the Helmand Valley Authority, modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority, built dams and canals with a view to expanding the amount of land usable for agricultural purposes in south-west Afghanistan. However, the project was not a great success, largely because the soil was unsuitable for enhancement in the way that the project envisaged, and in some ways it stands as a model of how scarce resources can be absorbed by large-scale, state-driven activities that are insufficiently sensitive to ground-level complexities. The problems of the Helmand Valley Authority proved to be part of the legacy that Shah Mahmud's government left behind when he resigned on 6 September 1953, opening the way for Muhammad Daud to be appointed prime minister by Zahir Shah.

The Daud period was to differ markedly from the epoch in which Zahir Shah's uncles dominated the political system, and it is useful therefore to sum up the situation that Daud inherited, both in terms of state–society relations, and in terms of Afghanistan's foreign relations. The state which had developed under the Musahiban was ubiquitous, but not especially strong, and the central political leadership was very careful to avoid policy initiatives which might have invaded spheres of activity that tribal leaders regarded as fundamentally theirs to control. The state was quite small, and in 1953, government expenditure represented only 4 per cent of GDP. Of course, the capacity of the state depends not only on the volume of resources it absorbs, but also on the uses to which those resources are put.

In 1953 just over a third of government spending was devoted to defence and security.¹⁷ This did not give the state the capacity to confront a wide range of social forces, but did equip it to move strategically against threats and deal with them before they could spread, as had been the case with the Safi revolt.

In terms of its legitimacy, the state relied not on mass legitimacy, but more on the development of close relations between rulers and key administrative staffs, which is a key route to popular acceptance. This, combined with caution in exercising its powers, meant that most Afghans, who regarded the state as quite a remote actor, saw little purpose in using scarce resources to confront it. Likewise, since the state did little to boost popular expectations, the perils associated with frustrated expectations at the mass level did not arise either. Administratively, of course, the state was hardly a model set of institutions and bureaucracies. On the contrary, it was one of the most corrupt on the face of the earth, with bribery a common practice, and entry and promotion all too often dependent on nepotism and patronage rather than ability. As time went on, this was to have seriously debilitating consequences, as disgruntled military officers, passed over for promotion, drifted into radical political circles. But in 1953, this danger was still well over the horizon.

In terms of foreign relations, Afghanistan's position was dominated by the so-called Pashtoonistan dispute.¹⁸ This could be traced back to the drawing in 1893 of the Durand Line, which in the process of demarcating a boundary between Afghanistan and India, divided Pashtoon tribes between two distinct political units. While the British position was that this had been absolutely affirmed by the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, the position of Afghanistan was that the Durand Line did not constitute an accepted international border. As long as India remained under British control, the issue lay relatively dormant, but the approach of Indian independence, and particularly the prospect of partition in response to the demands of the Muslim League under Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, brought it sharply into focus. In the frontier area, Pashtoonist political forces, associated with 'Abd al-Ghaffar Khan ('The Frontier Gandhi'), had long opposed the Muslim League, whose aspirations they saw as inimical to their own. When the British Government offered Indians the choice of joining either post-partition India or post-partition Pakistan, the Afghan Government lodged a formal protest since Pashtoons of the north-west frontier were not offered the option of either becoming independent or joining Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, this carried little weight in London, and when Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations – the only state to do so – the gesture did little to draw the attention

¹⁷ Rubin, 1995, p. 67.

¹⁸ See Ganguly, 1998. pp. 162–92.

of the wider world to the dispute. Yet the consequences of the dispute were to be prolonged and unfortunate.

Given the circumstances surrounding its creation, Pakistan was afflicted by an almost existential sense of insecurity, and the fact that it found itself embroiled in territorial disputes with its two most important neighbours – over Kashmir with India and over ‘Pashtoonistan’ with Afghanistan – meant that its development was from the outset skewed by an emphasis on the perceived need to cope with external threats. It also had significant leverage that could be used against Afghanistan, not least because of the country’s land-locked status. Afghanistan’s inability to interest the wider world in the cause of ‘Pashtoonistan’ meant that it rapidly became a hopeless cause, but unfortunately it was a cause that was also embedded in Afghan domestic politics, and in the selfworth of key members of the Afghan political elite. The devastating consequences of this were to become clear in the 1950s.

In the early 1950s, Afghanistan entered a new phase in its historical evolution, with the promise of either stability or turbulence, depending on the ability of the mainly traditionalist and fractious monarchy to manage the process of change and development, and to establish an effective nexus between its domestic and foreign policy needs in the context of the Cold War in world politics. On the one hand, a largely conservative, tribal, pre-industrialized Muslim country was put on a course of accelerated modernization through authoritarian state-building, with the Soviet Union as the main source of economic and military aid. On the other hand, this very process carried a serious risk of laying the foundations for Afghanistan’s return in the long run to a politics of violence and bloodshed – a development which had characterized the country’s evolution for much of its history since its coalescence as an identifiable political unit in the mid-eighteenth century.

As modernization unleashed new forces in Afghan politics, and the country was rapidly linked to the Soviet Union despite its official neutrality in world politics, the Afghan ruling elite proved incapable of instituting the kind of political changes that would allow it to avoid a repeat of the pitfalls that had made the previous process of accelerated modernization in the 1920s so hazardous. Factionalism within the royal family, stemming mainly from polygamic rivalries, rapidly mirrored itself in public policy, limiting the capacity of successive central governments to manage the consequences of modernization and the close ties with the Soviet Union. This, more than anything else, contributed not only to the failure of reforms, but also to the opening of the way for the devastating period of warfare and bloodshed which beset Afghanistan from the pro-Soviet communist coup of April 1978 to the US-led intervention in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington.

The change in 1953 of prime ministership from King Zahir Shah's uncle, Shah Mahmud Khan, to his rival cousin and brother-in-law, Muhammad Daud, marked a turning-point in the rule of Nadir Shah's dynasty in particular, and Afghanistan's historical development in general. Daud was an ambitious, autocratic modernizer, dedicated to the goal of achieving what King Amanullah had failed to accomplish more than two decades earlier. To achieve his objectives, Daud believed that he needed to centralize power more than ever before, to invoke a strong sense of Afghan nationalism as central to creating national unity, and to unleash a process of modernization that would rapidly usher Afghanistan into the twentieth century. For this, he required massive foreign aid to build a strong national army, rapid infrastructural and economic development, and an ideological niche upon which he could focus to build a strong ethnic, but nonetheless nationalist, power base for his rule. Since, despite his personal preference for the socialist model of development and change, he had no interest in Marxism-Leninism per se and was conscious of conditions in Afghanistan that militated against communism, he was originally keen to have the United States as the main source of support.

However, when in 1954 Daud's approaches to the US for close ties failed to bear fruit,¹⁹ largely because Washington did not attach as much strategic importance to Afghanistan as it did to the country's two neighbours (namely Pakistan, with which Afghanistan had a simmering border dispute, and Iran, which the Afghan monarchy viewed with a degree of political and cultural rivalry), he was content to turn to the Soviet Union for military and economic aid. Meanwhile, coming from an ethnic Pashtoon background himself and having advocated a renegotiation of the Afghan-Pakistan border (inherited from British India) in support of the Pashtoons of Pakistan, either to join Afghanistan or to secure an Afghanistan-linked entity of their own as 'Pashtoonistan', Daud was disposed vigorously to advance the cause of Pashtoon based Afghan nationalism. Moscow's positive response to Daud's request for aid, and its support for his stand on the border dispute with Pakistan as part of Soviet anti-US efforts in the Cold War, enabled Daud to launch his drive for national modernization and unity, persistently underpinned by the perceived threat from Pakistan as a major foreign policy issue.

The close ties with the Soviet Union rapidly resulted in the Afghan military becoming mostly Soviet-trained and -equipped. The Soviets also played a central role in Afghanistan's economic development and penetrated the country's administration at various levels, with many Soviet advisers and Soviet trained Afghan supporters. But the dispute with Pakistan caused periodic border clashes and the closure of Afghanistan's main transit route, and complicated Afghanistan's relations in the region and with the United States.

¹⁹ See Poullada, 1981, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 178–90.

Washington gradually became aware of the consequences of its refusal to supply military aid to Afghanistan and sought to compensate by providing some economic aid, amounting to about \$500 million until 1979. However, this was no match for the over \$2 billion in military and economic assistance provided by the USSR during the same period.²⁰ The US simply could not counter the potential clout that the Soviets were in a position to marshal in Afghan politics.

Meanwhile, the cost of hostilities with Pakistan interacted strongly with the already existing factionalism within the royal family. Although prior to taking over the prime ministership, Daud had committed himself to a 'gentleman's agreement' with King Zahir Shah not to limit the latter's powers, once Daud assumed power he apparently abandoned that commitment, exacerbating the conditions for rivalry between the two. As relations with Pakistan ruptured (at high economic cost for Afghanistan) by the early 1960s, making Daud very vulnerable, Zahir Shah and his supporters were ready to take over from Daud.

Daud resigned in 1963, but on the proviso that the king should introduce the kind of political reforms which would eventually enable Daud to return to power in his own right through elections. The king had two immediate priorities: first, to improve relations with Pakistan and reopen the transit route; and, second, to initiate an 'experiment with democracy' whereby Daud would not be able to challenge his power again and Afghanistan would to some extent be able to rationalize its foreign policy and diversify its dependence on the Soviet Union without jeopardizing its friendship with it. For the first time, he appointed a commoner, Dr Muhammad Yusuf, as prime minister, and endorsed a cabinet made up largely of Western-educated technocrats. A new constitution was promulgated in 1964, with the overall goal of transforming Afghanistan into a constitutional monarchy with a democratic system of government. This constitution also banned all members of the royal family from holding senior government posts – a clear rebuff to Daud's future power aspirations.

However, the process of democratization soon encountered serious difficulties. Some problems were associated with the normal difficulties of transforming any politically traditionalist, socially conservative and divided, and economically backward society into a modern democratic polity, while others stemmed from the peculiar Afghan setting, of which two facets must be mentioned. The first was that despite his desire for reform, King Zahir Shah proved to be a very indecisive leader, far too concerned about the limitations that democratic reforms could place on his powers. He would neither ratify the bill allowing political parties nor back many of his appointed prime ministers against highly factionalized and self-serving legislatures. The second was related to the Zahir Shah–Daud rivalry.

²⁰ Maley, 2002, p. 21.

Regarding the king's reforms as contrary to his interests, Daud shortly after the enactment of the new constitution set out to frustrate the course of reform in whatever way he could. He used all his influence both within and outside the royal family to achieve his objectives. He was now prepared to use whoever he could, including two rival pro-Soviet factions – the Parcham and the Khalq²¹ – and various Islamist groups which emerged on the political scene in response to a perceived growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, and from which emerged many leaders of the future Afghan Islamic resistance groups (the Mujahidin) to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.²²

The failures of the democratic period finally enabled Daud, with the help of many Parchamis, to topple the monarchy while the king was on a trip to Italy in July 1973 and to declare Afghanistan a republic. Initially, Daud hailed Afghanistan's close relations with its 'great northern neighbour', the Soviet Union, and singled out Pakistan as the only neighbour with which Afghanistan had a serious dispute, but once he had consolidated his hold on power he was ready by 1975 to change course. As an autocrat and national modernizer, he shunned the communist influence in his administration. To purge his government of communists, he embarked on a process of reducing Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union, de-emphasizing its dispute with Pakistan and seeking closer ties with some of the pro-Western oil-rich regimes in the region, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia. He also sought close links with Anwar al-Sadat's regime in Egypt, which was by now recognized as a prominent anti-Soviet actor in the Middle East, and accompanied this with fresh approaches to Washington to assist him in his bid against communist influence in Afghanistan.²³ While the shah could promise Daud a great deal of financial aid (without being able to fulfil such a promise), Washington was still reeling from its Vietnam fiasco and was reluctant to take seriously Daud's warnings about the looming communist threat to his regime.

Daud sought to marginalize the Parchamis and Khalqis, who by 1977 had revived their old alliance within a single, united political entity, called the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and he arrested many of their leaders in mid-April 1978. He could expect no great sympathy from Moscow. In fact, the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, had already taken issue with his policies during a meeting in Moscow in 1977, criticisms to which Daud had responded angrily. PDPA supporters in the armed forces, with the prior knowledge at least of Soviet advisers within the Afghan military establishment, responded to Daud's actions by carrying out the bloody coup of 27 April 1978 during which Daud and

²¹ Arnold, 1985.

²² For details, see Saikal, 2004, Ch. 6.

²³ For a detailed discussion of Daud's foreign policy, see Ghaus, 1988.

most of his family, as well as several members of his cabinet, were killed. The PDPA's leaders under Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal declared Afghanistan a Democratic Republic, with unshakable 'fraternal ties' with the Soviet Union, and set out to transform Afghanistan into a pro-Soviet communist state. In return, Moscow immediately committed itself to the survival and success of the PDPA's rule, pouring in hundreds of advisers and millions of dollars of military and economic aid to enable the PDPA to consolidate its power.²⁴

As could have been expected, however, the PDPA had little chance of achieving its goals. Given the deep-seated rivalries between the PDPA's Parchami and Khalqi factions along political, ethnic and personality lines, given its lack of historical legitimacy and administrative experience, and given the Afghan population's general aversion to its 'god-less' ideological disposition, the party soon tore itself to pieces.²⁵ The Khalqi faction, led by Taraki and his hard-line Stalinist lieutenant, Hafizullah Amin, soon outmanoeuvred the Parchami faction, and sent its leaders into exile – most importantly Karmal, who had all along been Moscow's favourite because of his ideological and cultural sophistication. Yet the Khalqis themselves proved to be disunited, with Amin emerging as the most ambitious and vicious; Taraki was killed in September 1979. The more isolated Amin and his supporters grew, the more Stalinist they became and the more indifference they displayed to the harm their ill-fated and inappropriate policies were inflicting upon the Afghan people. As various Mujahidin groups emerged to fight communist rule, the Islamically reassertive dictatorship of General Zia al-Haq in Pakistan also found an opportunity to back some of these groups as a way of highlighting the communist threat from Afghanistan and diverting the Western pressure to return Pakistan to democracy.

By late 1979, the Soviet Union was faced with two choices: either to let the PDPA regime collapse in favour of a Mujahidin-led Islamic government, and thus be faced with a rising tide of Islamic radicalism south of its border, or to intervene to save the PDPA rule. It opted for the latter.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, which immediately resulted in the killing of Amin and his replacement by Karmal and therefore the end of the Khalqis' political supremacy, shocked both the Afghan people and the international community.²⁶ It was widely condemned around the world, and provided a unique opportunity for the United States to humiliate the Soviets in Afghanistan in the way that the Soviets had sought to expose the limits of US power in Vietnam less than a decade earlier.

²⁴ See Bradsher, 1985.

²⁵ See Saikal and Maley, 1991.

²⁶ Grasselli, 1996.

The US took the lead in organizing support for various Mujahidin groups to empower them to frustrate the Soviet occupation. Washington used Pakistan as a key ally and front-line state to achieve its goal. While the Soviets failed to achieve unity within the PDPA and win international legitimacy for their involvement in Afghanistan, the US efforts, involving the provision of large amounts of arms, money and logistic facilities to the main Mujahidin groups, paid off handsomely. In early 1986 the new reformist Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, described the Soviet occupation as 'a bleeding wound', indicating that the Soviet Union was involved in a very costly and unwinnable war. In November 1986 the Soviet Politburo decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Soviet forces were finally withdrawn by February 1989 within the framework of the UN-supervised Geneva Peace Accords which had been concluded nine months earlier, but with the proviso that if the USSR maintained its support for PDPA rule, the US could maintain its support for the resistance.²⁷ The Soviet losses included over 13,000 soldiers killed and nearly 50,000 injured, and the total cost of the decade-long occupation amounted to 60 billion roubles. This was a development that Gorbachev subsequently listed as one of the four major factors ultimately causing the collapse of Soviet communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union by 25 December 1991.

With the Soviet withdrawal, the US also felt that it had achieved its mission. Without any due consideration for the post-Soviet management of Afghanistan, it wound down its Afghan involvement and, following the collapse of the PDPA government in April 1992, it virtually turned its back on Afghanistan, leaving the country's fate to be decided by warring Mujahidin groups and their regional patrons, most importantly Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. What had kept the Mujahidin somewhat united so far was their opposition to the Soviet Union and its Afghan surrogates, but once this had gone, they turned their guns on one another. Although the celebrated Mujahidin commander, Ahmed Shah Mas'ud, succeeded in taking over Kabul to deliver it to a Mujahidin coalition government, his control over the city was not complete – the rest of the country remained in the hands of local commanders belonging to various Mujahidin groups and supported by different outside actors.

The extremist Mujahidin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar played a particularly destructive role in this respect when he failed to become the undisputed ruler of post-communist Afghanistan. Backed by Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI), which had been put in charge of Pakistan's Afghanistan and Kashmir policies since the early 1980s, Hekmatyar successfully frustrated all efforts, including those of the UN, to produce an internal settlement of the Afghan conflict. Within months of the collapse of the communist government, his

²⁷ Maley, 1989, pp. 12–28.

forces started fierce rocketing of Kabul, and within the next two years half of the capital was destroyed and more than 25,000 of its inhabitants killed. Hekmatyar did so despite repeatedly being offered the post of prime minister. He finally assumed the post in early 1996, but this proved too late to bring stability, for by then Pakistan had found him useless and switched its support to a newly formed Islamic militia called the Taliban ('religious students').²⁸

Orchestrated and heavily supported by Pakistan,²⁹ the Taliban first appeared on the Afghan scene in late 1994. They were composed mainly of ethnic Pashtoons from both sides of the Afghan border under the leadership of a former Mujahidin fighter, Mullah Muhammad Omar. This militia, which was of an extremist ideological disposition and determined to build a puritanical Islamic state, managed rapidly to gain control over southern Afghanistan. Within two years it was able to take over Kabul, forcing the Mujahidin government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani, in which Mas'ud was the military strongman, to flee to the north.

It was from the north that Mas'ud continued to resist the Taliban, their al-Qaida allies and their Pakistani backers until September 2001, when Mas'ud's assassination by al-Qaida agents, and al-Qaida's attacks on targets in the United States, led to Afghanistan's return to the top of the international political agenda and to US military intervention. These events inaugurated a new phase in Afghanistan's turbulent history.

²⁸ See Davis, 1998, pp. 43–71.

²⁹ See Judah, 2002, pp. 68–80.

20

IRAN AND ITS EASTERN REGIONS (1848 – 1989)*

N. Nasiri-Moghaddam

Contents

The last Qajar kings (1848–1925)	449
The Pahlavi dynasty (1925–79)	467
The Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini (1979–89)	476

The last Qajar kings (1848–1925)

NASER AL-DIN SHAH (1848–96)

When the third king of the Qajar dynasty, Mohammad Shah (1834–48), died on 5 September 1848,¹ the queen mother Mahd-e ‘Olia (1805–73), with the collaboration of a few leading figures at court, set up an interim government that ran the country until the arrival in Tehran of Crown Prince Naser al-Din Mirza. The latter, who was 17 years old at the time (born on 17 July 1831) and governor of Azerbaijan, proclaimed himself shah on 13 September 1848. Then, on 20 October, thanks to the efforts of Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Nezam (1808–52), head of the new army of Azerbaijan, and with the backing of the Russian and British consulates in Tabriz, he marched in triumph to the capital. After his

* See Map 6.

¹ In the preceding volume of this collection, the date of Mohammad Shah Qajar’s death is given incorrectly as 20 March 1848. He in fact died on 5 September 1848 (6 Shavval 1264). See Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, p. 351; Khurmuji, 1965, p. 36.

accession to the throne, the young king appointed Mirza Taqi Khan prime minister (*sadr-e a'zam*) with the title of Amir Kabir.²

Naser al-Din Shah was to rule Persia for almost half a century. In domestic policy, at the beginning of this long reign, Amir Kabir consolidated the throne by crushing all revolts, in particular those of Salar and the *Bāb* (Gateway to Truth). Mohammad Hasan Khan Qajar Davallu, known as Salar (?–1850), a maternal cousin of the royal family, had started an uprising in Khurasan towards the end of the reign of Mohammad Shah. After the accession of Naser al-Din Shah, at the request of Amir Kabir, one of the shah's paternal uncles called Sultan Morad Mirza (1818–83) was appointed governor of Khurasan.³ In June 1849 the latter, after several months of fighting, laid siege to Mashhad, whose inhabitants eventually surrendered in March 1850. Shortly afterwards Salar was captured and put to death by strangulation on 28 April 1850.⁴

As for Sayyed 'Ali Mohammad Shirazi (1819–50), known as the *Bāb*, he had begun in 1844 by proclaiming himself to be the representative of the Twelfth Shi'ite Imam, the awaited Mahdi, and later to be the Imam himself.⁵ A disciple of Sayyed Kazem Rashti (1798–1843), leader of the Shaykhis, a religious movement founded by Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i (1753–1826), the *Bāb* had gathered numerous followers among the Shaykhis, who, after the death of their chief, were searching for the Imam Mahdi.⁶ As far back as September 1845, the *Bāb* had been arrested and several times brought before the Shi'ite '*ulamā*'; he was punished and imprisoned, initially at Shiraz (1845–6), then at Isfahan (1846–7), and from July 1847 in the fortress of Maku in the north-western frontier region of Persia. One of the *Bāb*'s adepts, a certain Molla Hoseyn Boshruye'i (1814–49), then went to Khurasan to spread his master's message.⁷ It was in this region, more precisely at Bedasht, a village to the north of Shahrud, that in July 1848 Boshruye'i and his fellow-believers organized a gathering at which an audacious *Bābi* poetess called Qorrat al-'Eyn (1817–52) unveiled herself before her brothers in the faith and declared openly that *Bābism* constituted a formal break with Islamic law (*sharī'a*).⁸

When Naser al-Din Shah came to power, Boshruye'i and a large number of *Bābis* were already barricaded in a citadel in the forests of Mazandaran, where they fought for several months against the troops sent by the government.⁹ In early February 1849

² Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 358–62; Mostowfi, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 65; Amanat, 1993, pp. 1003–4.

³ Eqbal Ashtiyani, 1984, pp. 132–4.

⁴ Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 375–84, 387–99, 403–19.

⁵ MacEoin, 1989, pp. 279–80; see also Chapter 10 on Persia in the preceding volume of this collection.

⁶ MacEoin, 1979; Browne (ed.), 1918; Nicolas, 1905.

⁷ Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 421–2.

⁸ Tag, 1942, pp. 35–6; Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 428–9.

⁹ Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 429–35.

Boshruye'i was killed and his fellow-believers, after holding out for four months, were all massacred.¹⁰ About a year later, the *Bābis* again revolted, but this time at Zanzan in Azerbaijan (May–June 1850) and at Neyriz in Fars (May 1850–January 1851).¹¹ They were again severely repressed. To put an end to this unrest in the country, the shah gave the order, at the suggestion of Amir Kabir, that the *Bāb*, imprisoned since May 1848 in the fortress of Chahriq near Urmia, be transferred to Tabriz and executed publicly in July 1850.¹²

During his short term of office (1848–51), Amir Kabir consolidated the royal authority and its institutions and also introduced a number of administrative, military, health, educational and financial reforms which displeased certain government officials and notables.¹³ They therefore plotted with the queen mother to obtain, first, the dismissal of Amir Kabir in November 1851; and then his execution in January 1852.¹⁴ This tragic episode left a blot on the history of Naser al-Din Shah's reign.

Mirza Aqa Khan Nuri E'temad al-Dowle (1807–65), an influential pro-British notable at the court, a former interior minister and one of the plotters against Amir Kabir, succeeded him in November 1851. A few months later, in August 1852, the *Bāb*'s followers sought to avenge his execution by attempting to assassinate the shah.¹⁵ This unsuccessful attempt provided the government with a pretext to arrest and execute most of the *Bābis*, including their heroine Qorrat al-'Eyn.¹⁶ However, their successors, Mirza Yahya Nuri Sobh-e Azal (1830–1912) and his half-brother Mirza Hoseyn 'Ali Nuri Baha'ullah (1817–92), who were both related to the prime minister, were not put to death and later, outside Persia, propagated two new religions, Azali *Bābism* and Baha'ism.¹⁷ This explains why the shah continued to fear the *Bābis* for the remainder of his reign.¹⁸

Mirza Aqa Khan Nuri was dismissed in August 1858, when the shah abolished the post of prime minister and appointed ministers to head several newly established ministries. From then until 1871, the shah acted as both sovereign and prime minister.¹⁹ This experiment with Western-style reforms gathered pace from November 1871 with the

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 436–47.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 447–59.

¹² Gobineau, 1928, pp. 211–12; Momen, 1981, pp. 78–9.

¹³ Adamiyat, 1969.

¹⁴ Khurmuji, 1965, pp. 103–5; Amanat, 1991, pp. 577–99.

¹⁵ Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 546–51.

¹⁶ Amanat, 1997, pp. 204–18.

¹⁷ MacEoin, 1983, pp. 219–55; Cole, 1989, pp. 422–9.

¹⁸ Amanat, 1993, pp. 1003–4.

¹⁹ The first ministries established were for domestic affairs, foreign affairs, war, finance, justice and *owqāf* (ministry in charge of religious endowments). Later a few other ministries (court, education and trade) were added. See E'temad al-Saltane, 1988, Vol. 3, pp. 1809–10, 1935–6.

appointment of Mirza Hoseyn Khan Moshir al-Dowle (1828–81) as prime minister. This reformer, who had served as a diplomat for over 20 years, including 12 as ambassador in Istanbul (1858–70), introduced a series of administrative, military and judicial reforms based on the Ottoman Tanzimat.²⁰ As an enthusiastic supporter of modernity, he persuaded the shah to grant in July 1872 a vast mining, forestry and industrial concession to a British subject, Baron Julius de Reuter.²¹ About a year after the granting of the concession, which displeased both the Russians and the conservatives in Persia, Moshir al-Dowle arranged his sovereign's first trip to Europe (May–September 1873).²² This first-hand experience of the outsideworld helped the shah to gain a better understanding of the true state of his country. Nevertheless, his favourite Anis al-Dowle (1842–97), who on Moshir al-Dowle's advice had not been allowed to accompany the shah, vented her anger by fomenting a plot at the court during his absence. On his return, the shah, confronted with a palace revolt orchestrated by the '*ulamā*' and, from behind the scenes, by the Russian legation in Tehran, was forced to dismiss his prime minister and cancel Reuter's concession (December 1873).²³

The prime ministers who succeeded Moshir al-Dowle until the end of Naser al-Din Shah's reign were more intent on holding on to their posts than on carrying out reforms. Nevertheless, during those 23 years, a number of changes were made in the legal and taxation systems which aroused increasing opposition from the '*ulamā*'.²⁴ Moshir al-Dowle, who from 1874 served as both minister of foreign affairs and minister of war, continued until his dismissal in 1880 to implement certain reforms. In the military field, on the occasion of the shah's second trip to Europe (May–July 1878), he encouraged his sovereign to sign an agreement with Russia for the creation of a Cossack brigade in Persia.²⁵ And so, in 1879, a few Russian officers led by Colonel Domantovitch arrived in Tehran and founded the Cossack brigade, which later became a division and was to play an important role in Persia at the beginning of the twentieth century.²⁶

From the economic point of view, in his efforts to bring greater prosperity to his country, Naser al-Din Shah embarked on a policy of granting concessions to foreign powers.²⁷ But the cancelling of two such concessions, granted during his third trip to Europe in May–September 1889,²⁸ caused serious political and economic problems for the

²⁰ Adamiyat, 1972.

²¹ Mahmud, 1983, Vol. 3, pp. 1008–18; Curzon, 1892, Vol. 1, pp. 480–1.

²² Naser al-Din Shah, 1874.

²³ Rawlinson, 1875, pp. 135–8; Amanat, 1993, pp. 1003–5.

²⁴ Algar, 1969, p. 179.

²⁵ Naser al-Din Shah, 1879; Kazemzadeh, 1956, Vol. 15, pp. 351–63; Curzon, 1892, Vol. 1, pp. 594–8.

²⁶ Lambton, 1978, pp. 395–6.

²⁷ Teymuri, 2002.

²⁸ Naser al-Din Shah, n.d. [1891].

Persian Government: the first concession, brokered by Mirza Malkam Khan Nazem al-Dowle (1833–1908), the Persian minister in London (1873–89), authorized the creation of a national lottery and the building of casinos in the country. After the shah's return to Tehran, this privilege was abolished for religious reasons and Malkam Khan, who opposed the decision, was dismissed from his diplomatic post in December 1889. The shah's decision owed much to the intrigues of Mirza 'Ali Asqar Khan Amin al-Sultan (1858–1907), prime minister from 1886 to 1896. Partly out of revenge, Malkam Khan, now on the side of reform in opposition to the court, launched a London-based newspaper called *Qānūn* [The Law], which was smuggled into Iran. In this journal, of which a few issues were published in collaboration with Sayyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, known as Afghani (1838–97), a religious intellectual inspired by Pan-Islamist ideas,²⁹ Malkam Khan criticized the absolute power of the shah and the corruption of his entourage.³⁰

The second concession was the Tobacco Régie, granted in March 1890 to Major Gerald Talbot. In exchange for an annual payment of £15,000, this British subject was given a 50-year monopoly over the purchase, sale and export of Persian tobacco. Discontented Persian traders organized demonstrations against the monopoly. They were orchestrated by certain influential '*ulamā*', who even called for a general boycott of everything connected with the production or use of tobacco. This tactic, backed by the Russian legation in Tehran, eventually forced the shah, in April 1892, to cancel the concession against damages of £500,000, which the Persian Government paid over to Talbot in instalments.³¹

The Tobacco movement revealed a lack of balance in the government's domestic policy and signalled a dramatic turning-point in popular dissatisfaction against the country's monarchical system.³² It also highlighted the importance of the role of the '*ulamā*', who were able in these circumstances to take the lead in opposing the court. The scale of this revolt suggests that the assassination of the shah a few years later (1 May 1896), on the eve of his jubilee according to the lunar calendar, was not an isolated and unforeseeable event. The assassin, Mirza Reza Kermani, a 49-year-old cleric and supporter of Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani, had been imprisoned and tortured, partly for his involvement in the demonstrations against the Tobacco Régie.³³

The assassination of Naser al-Din Shah put an end to a long reign that covered a decisive period in the political, economic, social and cultural contemporary history of Iran. Under the shah, the modernization process had gathered momentum: the Polytechnic (*Dār*

²⁹ Keddie, 1972; Pakdaman, 1969.

³⁰ Algar, 1973; Ra'in, 1971. For an example of *Qanun* in facsimile, see Malkam Khan, 1976.

³¹ Feuvrier, 1906, pp. 269–310; Adamiyat, 1981; Keddie, 1966; Lambton, 1965.

³² Amanat, 1993, pp. 1004–5.

³³ Zahir al-Dowle, 1983.

al-Fonūn), the Royal Museum, the postal services, the press, the printing industry, gas lighting, photography and numerous other novelties made a deep impression on traditional Iranian society, which increasingly opened itself to the West during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah.³⁴ Many of these European innovations were introduced by the shah himself, who was passionately interested in art and archaeology. His numerous journals of his travels in Persia and abroad show him to have been a very attentive observer, but his distrust of others and his egotism, his capricious and sometimes cruel treatment of his subjects and his intolerance of dissident opinion seriously tarnished his image. His love of hunting and travelling, which led him to spend much of his life in the plains and mountains surrounding the capital, and his taste for ceremony, together with certain disreputable aspects of his self-indulgent lifestyle, have left a distorted and often grotesque image of him.³⁵

In the foreign policy arena, during the shah's long reign, the country was increasingly encircled by Russia and Britain, exercising both military and diplomatic pressure. In the face of that threat, the shah deployed considerable diplomatic skills – for which he is not always given due credit – and succeeded in keeping the country's sovereignty and to some extent borders intact, though at the cost of somewhat tenuous border arrangements as some parts of Iranian territory (Khiva, Merv, Old Sarakhs, Herat, eastern Sistan, etc.) had to be given up, as we shall see below.

The dispute with Britain over Herat

As soon as Naser al-Din became shah in 1848, Amir Kabir established good relations with Zahir al-Dowle, governor of Herat, who had not backed Salar's uprising in Khurasan. After the death of Zahir al-Dowle in June 1851, he was succeeded by his son Sa'id Mohammad Khan and relations were further strengthened by diplomatic gifts and the bestowal of the title Zahir al-Dowle on the son.³⁶ The friendly relations between the Persian court and the governor of Herat constituted an advantage of which the shah and his entourage were fully conscious. But the British, anxious about their interests in India, did not look kindly on any understanding between Tehran and Herat. Consequently, in January 1853, taking advantage of the position of the pro-British prime minister Mirza Aqa Khan Nuri, Britain concluded a treaty with the shah concerning a possible military presence of the Qajars in Herat. Under this agreement, Naser al-Din Shah undertook to send troops to Herat only in

³⁴ Mahbubi Ardakani, 1978.

³⁵ Amanat, 1993, pp. 1003–4; Mo'ayyer al-Mamalek, 1993; E'temad al-Saltane, 1977.

³⁶ Riyazi Heravi, 1990, pp. 51–2; Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, p. 535.

the event of a military threat, but his troops would not have the right to enter the city during their operations or to stay there once the city had been relieved.³⁷

In September 1855, after an uprising by the inhabitants of Herat, the governor Sa‘id Mohammad Khan was replaced by Mohammad Yusef Khan Sadozai, who, by demonstrating his loyalty to the shah, was recognized as the legitimate ruler and established friendly relations with the Persian court.³⁸ As a result, the Persian Government dispatched reinforcements to help him defend the city when Dost Mohammad Khan, governor of Kabul, after seizing Kandahar in November 1855, was encouraged by the British to attack Herat in 1856.³⁹ The Persian forces, initially given a warm welcome by the inhabitants of Herat, were soon forced to evacuate the city owing to the treachery of Mohammad Yusef Khan, who joined the plot of Dost Mohammad Khan and his British allies.⁴⁰ Irritated by this turn of events, Naser al-Din Shah ordered Sultan Morad Mirza (known as Hosam al-Saltane after his victory over Salar) to attack Herat himself. In this way the shah pursued the old Qajar ambition of re-establishing Persian sovereignty over the long-disputed vassal state of Herat.⁴¹

The city was therefore once again besieged by the Qajar forces who, after several months of fighting and various difficulties, conquered it in October 1856.⁴² But when the British declared war on 1 November 1856, landed Anglo-Indian soldiers on the island of Khark (4 December), took Bushir (Bushehr) (10 December) and advanced into Khuzestan (January–March 1857), the shah was obliged not only to withdraw his troops from Herat but also to relinquish his claim to control the government of that city.⁴³ Negotiations took place in Paris between the representative of the Persian Government Farrokh Khan Ghaffari Amin al-Molk (later nicknamed Amin al-Dowle) and Lord Cowley, the British ambassador in France. Through French mediation, an Anglo-Persian treaty was signed in Paris on 4 March 1857.⁴⁴ This document confirmed the severance of Herat from Persian territory and indirectly recognized the independence of Afghanistan.

The defeat of Merv by the Turkmens

After crushing the uprising of Salar in Khurasan, Hosam al-Saltane, governor of that region, acting on the orders of Amir Kabir, engaged, from July 1851, a series of battles

³⁷ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. 77–8; Mahmud, 1983, Vol. 2, pp. 649–51.

³⁸ Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 607–9, 665–8; Riyazi Heravi, 1990, pp. 54–7.

³⁹ Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 625–7.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 669–70.

⁴¹ Amanat, 1993, p. 1003–4.

⁴² Riyazi Heravi, 1990, pp. 62–3; Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 672–99.

⁴³ Calmard, 1987, pp. 65–8; Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 719–42, 757–63; Hunt, 1858.

⁴⁴ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. 81–5; Mahmud, 1983, Vol. 2, pp. 694–700.

against the Turkmens of Sarakhs, who had assisted Salar.⁴⁵ These skirmishes lasted several months mainly because the khan of Khwarazm, Mohammad Amin Khwarazm-Shah, was discreetly helping the Turkmens. The khan was in fact playing a double game: although he had sent an envoy to Tehran in order to preserve friendly relations with the Persian Government, he was at the same time aiding the Turkmens against the governor of Khurasan.⁴⁶ The mission of Mirza Reza Qoli Khan Hedayat (1800–71), a representative of Amir Kabir sent to Khwarazm in the summer of 1851, did not change matters because he failed to persuade the khan to refrain from supporting the Turkmens and to release several hundred Persian prisoners.⁴⁷ In 1853 the Turkmens of Sarakhs and Merv, fearing the ambitions of the khan of Khwarazm, allied themselves with the governor of Khurasan. This coalition was respected even after the replacement, in April 1854, of Hosam al-Saltane by his elder brother Fereydun Mirza Farmanfarma (?–1854), who was forced to confront the Khwarazm-Shah in March 1855 at Sarakhs. Here the khan was unexpectedly defeated, captured and immediately put to death.⁴⁸ This victory reassured the Turkmens, who soon resumed their attacks on the city of Mashhad.

In the summer of 1858 Sultan Hamze Mirza Heshmat al-Dowle (?–1880), brother of Hosam al-Saltane, was appointed governor of Khurasan. Despite the building of a fortress at Sarakhs, which was eventually completed in November 1859, he failed to subdue the Turkmens. To halt their incursions, which were keeping the region of Khurasan in a state of permanent turmoil, the Persian Government invested heavily in a military campaign. After a few initial successes against the Turkmens,⁴⁹ however, the unexpected defeat of the Persian troops at Merv in November 1860 plunged the court into despair.⁵⁰ Heshmat al-Dowle was immediately replaced by his brother Hosam al-Saltane, who managed to defend Khurasan against the ever more vigorous attacks of the Turkmens. In the summer of 1867, seven years after the defeat at Merv, Naser al-Din Shah travelled to Khurasan for the first time and stayed there three months.⁵¹ The royal presence did not prevent the Turkmens from pursuing their attacks which, together with the bitter memory of the disastrous collapse of the expedition to Merv in 1860, persuaded the shah to accept a diplomatic compromise with Russia for the sake of security in the region.

⁴⁵ Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 480–3.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 469–71.

⁴⁷ Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 471–8; Hedayat, 1977.

⁴⁸ E'temad al-Saltane, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 369–70; Hedayat, 1960, Vol. 10, pp. 583–7.

⁴⁹ A brief report on these initial victories and a plan of the battle were published on 13 Sept. 1860 in No. 473 of *Ruznāme-ye Dowlat-e 'Alliye-ye Iran*.

⁵⁰ A report on this expedition and its defeat was sent to Naser al-Din Shah. This document has been published in two versions. See Shahidi, 1971, pp. 35–64; Lashkarnevis, 1977, pp. 75–144.

⁵¹ Naser al-Din Shah, 1869.

Demarcation of the north-east frontiers

The defeat of the Russians in the Crimean war (1854–6) by an alliance of British, French and Turkish forces changed the direction of Russian expansion, which was pursued henceforth in Central Asia. After taking Tashkent in 1865, the Russians established a protectorate over Bukhara (1868), whose khan handed over the city of Samarkand to the tsar and in addition paid a war indemnity.⁵² In 1869 the main Russian naval base in the south-east of the Caspian Sea was established at Krasnovodsk, where fortifications were constructed. When questioned by the Persian court, the Russian legation in Tehran officially confirmed that Russia recognized Persian sovereignty over the entire length of the Atrek river and had no intention of setting up military bases there.⁵³ This temporary reassurance became, a few years later, the basis of a Russo-Persian agreement that fixed the boundaries between the two countries east of the Caspian Sea.

Pursuing their policy of territorial expansion in Central Asia, the Russians, after seizing Khiva (1873) and Kokand (1876), in 1881 broke through the resistance of the Turkmens, who had been battling with the tsar's forces for several years.⁵⁴ When the fortress of Geok-tepe ('Blue Hill'), last bastion of the Turkmens, fell into the hands of the Russians, the latter imposed the 'Akhal- Khurasan' convention on the Persian Government.

Under the first article of that convention, the Atrek river from its mouth in the Gulf of Hoseyn Qoli in the Caspian Sea up to the village of Chat was to serve as the frontier between the two countries. The same article went on to define with precision, stage by stage and village by village, the new Russo-Persian frontier from Chat as far as the mountains of Zir Kuh. The second article stipulated that a joint boundary commission would shortly be sent to the area to mark out the main features along the new frontier. The other seven articles covered: the commitment of the Persian Government to evacuate all forts on the other side of the new frontier (Article 3); the undertaking by Persia in regard to the headwaters of the Firuze river and the villages and cultivated land along that river (Article 4); the undertaking by both parties to build roads between Khurasan and the Transcaspian with the aim of developing trade between the two regions (Article 5); a bilateral agreement not to arm the Turkmens of Astarabad and Khurasan (Article 6); the right of Russia to appoint Russian agents in the Persian frontier towns to keep watch on the implementation of the clauses of the convention (Article 7); the confirmation of all previous treaties signed

⁵² Mahmud, 1983, Vol. 3, pp. 840–54; Rawlinson, 1875; Vámbéry, 1873.

⁵³ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, p. liv.

⁵⁴ Marvin, 1883, p. 136; Siassi, 1931, pp. 83–5.

between the two countries (Article 8); and a bilateral commitment to ratify the convention in the near future (Article 9).⁵⁵

On 21 December 1881 the convention was signed by Mirza Sa‘id Khan Mo’tamen al-Molk (1816–84), Persian minister for foreign affairs, and Ivan Zinoviev, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Russia in Tehran. On the same day the two men signed another document entitled ‘independent and secret articles’. This document added five separate secret clauses to the convention specifying the Russo-Persian boundaries from the mountains of Zir Kuh to Sarakhs and giving the Russian Government what amounted to a free hand concerning the Turkmens of Merv and the people living henceforth on Russian soil east of the Tejen river (Hari Rud).⁵⁶

The ‘Akhal- Khurasan’ convention and its ‘secret’ additional clauses were officially ratified and exchanged in March 1882. In July 1883 Naser al-Din Shah visited Khurasan for the second and last time.⁵⁷ This trip enabled him to examine the local situation, particularly in regard to the Turkmen attacks after the Russians had taken control. In October 1883 the joint boundary commission, provided for by the convention, visited the area.⁵⁸ In March–April 1884, before the commission had finished its work, the Russians seized Merv and Old Sarakhs (Sarakhs-e Kohne), a city located east of the Tejen river.⁵⁹ From now on, Russia had a boundary with Persia both east and west of the Caspian Sea and became an even greater threat to British interests in India.

Under the 1881 convention, the frontier from Chat to Sarakhs greatly disadvantaged the Persians because all the fertile land, water springs and pasture lay on the other side of the border, which had been imposed on the Qajar government. According to the memoirs of Arfa‘ al-Dowle (1846–1937), translator and one of the Persians on the boundary commission, Naser al-Din Shah had taken an interest in the work of the commission.⁶⁰ Arfa‘ al-Dowle also explained how he had succeeded in convincing the Russian delegation to allow the inhabitants of Lotfabad, a village east of Kalat, to keep their pastureland which, according to the Russian map, should have been annexed to Russian territory. He added that this service to his country had been rewarded by the title of adjutant-general, a privilege accorded by the shah, who had himself examined the new map drawn up by the commission. Certain court notables then accused Arfa‘ al-Dowle of having betrayed his

⁵⁵ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. lxxi–lxxv; Kavusi (ed.), 1993, pp. 183–93.

⁵⁶ Kavusi (ed.), 1993, pp. 194–203.

⁵⁷ Naser al-Din Shah, 1885.

⁵⁸ E‘temad al-Saltane, 1885, Vol. 2, p. 382; Qaziha (ed.), 2001, pp. 222–4.

⁵⁹ Planhol, 1990, p. 405; Curzon, 1892, Vol. 1, pp. 197–8.

⁶⁰ Arfa‘ al-Dowle, 1999, pp. 158–9.

country by ceding to Russia some fertile land around the Gulf of Hoseyn Qoli in order to obtain the pastureland of Lotfabad.⁶¹

Twelve years after the signing of the ‘Akhal-Khurasan’ convention, under a protocol signed in May 1893 between the Russian and Persian governments, the village of Firuze, which the first article of that convention had recognized as Persian territory, was annexed by Russia. In exchange, the tsar offered the shah the village of Hisar, situated to the east of the Caspian Sea, and some pieces of land on the banks of the Arax which had been occupied by Russia since the treaty of Turkaman Chay in 1828.⁶²

Delimitation of the eastern boundaries

In reaction to Russia’s spectacular advance in Central Asia, the British Government, anxious to protect its interests in India, strengthened its presence in Baluchistan and Sistan by imposing the partition of those regions.⁶³ In Baluchistan, a province in the south-east of Iran, there had for some years been ongoing territorial disputes between the Persian Government and the British-protected khanates of Kalat. After the signing of an Anglo-Persian agreement in April 1868 concerning the laying of a telegraph line in the south-east of Persia in order to link India with Europe via Baluchistan and the Persian Gulf, British telegraph agents settled in the region.⁶⁴ A little later the British Government, ostensibly for the security of its agents but in reality to protect its interests in India, obliged the Persian court to accept a joint commission to draw up the boundaries. This commission, chaired by Major-General Sir Frederic John Goldsmid (1818–1908), director-general of the Indo-European Telegraph Company in London, visited the region in 1871 and drew an arbitrary boundary going from Gouator on the Persian Gulf to Kuhak in the heart of Baluchistan.⁶⁵ This arbitration was approved by Naser al-Din Shah in September 1871. The Qajar forces then occupied the strategic area of Kuhak, which the Goldsmid arrangements had not regarded as Persian territory.⁶⁶ This occupation was disputed for over 20 years by the British who, after setting up a sort of protectorate over Afghanistan in 1879, seized Kalat. In March 1896 another arbitration commission, chaired by Colonel Thomas Holdich, at last completed the tracing of the borders in Baluchistan by prolonging the Kuhak line as far as the mountains of Malek Siyah in Sistan. Baluchistan was thus divided

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 104–60; Mokhber al-Saltane, 1965, pp. 380–1.

⁶² Kavusi (ed.), 1993, pp. 319–21.

⁶³ Greaves, 1986.

⁶⁴ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. 183–4.

⁶⁵ Wright, 2003, p. 76; Goldsmid (ed.), 1876.

⁶⁶ According to Aitchison, Kuhak was occupied by Persian forces in May 1874, but certain researchers believe that when the shah approved the Goldsmid arbitration in September 1871 he already knew about the occupation of Kuhak. See Aitchison (ed.), 1933, p. 15; Salar Behzadi, 1993, pp. 135–7.

in two, with a western part for Persia and an eastern one for the British which was henceforth called ‘British Baluchistan’.⁶⁷

As for Sistan, which was claimed by both Persia and Afghanistan, the Goldsmid arbitration divided the region between the two countries in August 1872: Sistan itself, including Neyzar to the north, as far as the mountains of Malek Siyah west of the Helmand river, was attributed to Persia and the other part, made up of territories east of the line, to Afghanistan.⁶⁸ Some time after this arbitration, the occupation of Hashtadan by Persian forces provoked new disputes between Persia and Afghanistan. This fertile plain, about 100 km west of Herat, contained 80 *qanāts* (underground irrigation channels) – hence the name Hashtadan (*hashtād* means 80 in Persian). The occupation of this plain was contested by Britain, which finally, in 1888, succeeded in persuading the Persian Government to accept the arbitration of a new boundary commission. This commission, chaired by Major-General C. S. MacLean, British consul for Khurasan and Sistan, divided Hashtadan between Persia and Afghanistan in November 1888. The demarcation of the new boundary was completed by MacLean in July 1891.⁶⁹

MOZAFFAR AL-DIN SHAH (1896–1907)

About a month after the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah, the crown prince Mozaffar al-Din Mirza (born in Tehran on 25 March 1853), who in keeping with Qajar tradition had been ruler of Azerbaijan since 1855, arrived in Tehran and mounted the throne on 8 June 1896 with no sign of opposition.⁷⁰ Shy, fearful, fickle, a keen hunter and a good marksman but also over-sentimental and superstitious and in fragile health, the fifth Qajar shah inherited at the age of 43 a kingdom beset by serious financial problems. That did not prevent him from travelling, like his father, to Europe three times (1900, 1902 and 1905) in search of medical treatment for his kidney disorder but also to satisfy his own curiosity about newly invented machines in the West. Disastrous loans contracted on two occasions from Russia and once from Britain were used by the court to cover the expenses of these expeditions. Mozaffar al-Din Shah, like his father, also resorted to the sale of trading concessions, the most important of which, a 60-year oil concession granted in May 1901 to a British subject called W. K. D’Arcy, would have major consequences for the political and economic situation in Persia in the following decades.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Holdich, 1897; Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994, p. 132; Siassi, 1931, pp. 88–9.

⁶⁸ Goldsmid (ed.), 1876, Vol. 1, pp. 408–14; Siassi, 1931, p. 90.

⁶⁹ Riyazi Heravi, 1990, pp. 193–4; Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. lxxix–lxxx, clxxvi–clxxxvii; Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994, p. 134; Yate, 1900, pp. 132–3.

⁷⁰ Sadiq al-Mamalek Sheybani, 1987, pp. 305–7, 314–15.

⁷¹ Ferrier, 1982, Vol. 1, pp. 27–47.

Reforms in customs and excise, introduced by Belgian officials in the service of the shah since March 1898, increased the government's revenue.⁷² However, the new measures were unpopular since Persian traders found themselves obliged to pay more taxes than their foreign counterparts trading in the country. This irksome situation was aggravated in November 1901 by the concluding of a trade agreement with Russia that granted Russian merchants substantial customs privileges.⁷³ Complaints about this economic domination were voiced increasingly openly among the various social classes, stirred up by the '*ulamā*'. Certain secret or semi-secret societies (*anjomans*), through their clandestine tracts (*shabnāmes*), also played a decisive role in denouncing the corruption and incompetence of the government in regard to the political and economic interference of foreign powers.⁷⁴ This prompted the development of the constitutional movement that began in April 1905 by calling for the expulsion of Joseph Naus, the Belgian director of customs, the dismissal of certain high-ranking Persian officials and the creation of a 'House of Justice' ('*Edālat-Khāne*'), and ended up in August 1906 by insisting on the promulgation of a constitution and the creation of a national Consultative Assembly (*Majles-e Shurāy-e Melli*).⁷⁵

On 9 September a hastily drawn-up electoral law was ratified by the shah. Elections began at once, and as soon as the elected representatives of Tehran (about 60 deputies out of 156 divided among 6 social categories)⁷⁶ had been designated, the first *Majles* was inaugurated by the shah on 7 October, even before the arrival of the deputies from the provinces. The reason for this hurry was the ill health of the shah: it was necessary to have a coherent – even if unfinished – text of the Fundamental Law (*Qānūn-e Asāsi*) signed by him and countersigned by his successor Mohammad 'Ali Mirza, who was known to have little liking for a constitutional monarchy. The text of the Fundamental Law, which contained 51 articles affirming inter alia the principles of national representation, freedom of opinion and social justice, was ready by the end of October but the shah played for time and only signed it on 30 December, just a week before he died (8 January 1907).⁷⁷

Persia now had a constitution. The decisive role in this achievement was played by the '*ulamā*', intellectuals and tradesmen. (It was of little concern to the masses, who were content with performing their Islamic duties.) As for the neighbouring powers: Russia, whose defeat by Japan in 1904 and aborted revolution in 1905 had an indirect impact on the constitutional revolution in Persia, did not approve of the constitutional monarchy

⁷² Destrée, 1976.

⁷³ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. lxxxii–lxxxv.

⁷⁴ Lambton, 1958, pp. 43–60.

⁷⁵ Browne, 1966, pp. 111–23; Kasravi, 1970, pp. 48–126; Afary, 1996.

⁷⁶ The 6 social categories were: princes and members of the Qajar tribe; '*ulamā*'; nobles and notables; merchants; landowners and peasants; and the guilds of craftsmen.

⁷⁷ Nazem al-Eslam, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 38–45; Malekzade, 1984, II/Vol. 1, pp. 408–11.

in that country; Britain, on the other hand, welcomed a parliamentary regime in Persia that would be able to restrict the absolute power of a Russophile king. This explains why the British legation in Tehran is sometimes suspected of having influenced the Persian constitutionalists behind the scenes at the time of their gathering (*bast*) in the legation's compound, where they camped in July–August 1906 in order to exert pressure on the shah.

Turning to the eastern regions of Persia during the reign of Mozaffar al-Din Shah, the most important event in Sistan was the change in the course of the Helmand river in a way that favoured the Afghans. This provoked renewed conflict between Persia and Afghanistan from 1896. As required by the treaty of Paris (4 March 1857), the two countries asked the British Government to arbitrate. A joint commission, chaired by Colonel Arthur Henry McMahon (1862–1949), was designated in 1902 with the task of redrawing the Afghanistan–Persia boundary in the area where the Helmand had changed its course and arbitrating to ensure an equitable sharing of water from the river. The demarcation of the new boundaries, carried out in two stages, in November 1903 and in February 1905, was approved by both countries.⁷⁸ On the issue of the sharing of the water, the commission decided among other issues in April 1905, after extensive studies on the spot, to attribute two-thirds of the Helmand's discharge to Afghanistan and one third to Persia.⁷⁹ The Persian Government contested this arbitration and opted for the status quo.⁸⁰ The Helmand river, which was essential to the irrigation of Sistan, therefore remained for a few more years a thorn in the flesh of relations between Persia and Afghanistan.

In Baluchistan, as the March 1896 Holdich arbitration had not been followed up by a demarcation of the boundaries, the status of the region of Mirjaveh prompted a number of disputes in Anglo-Persian relations. In March 1905 the British Government, wanting the shah to look favourably on the arbitration of McMahon in regard to the Helmand river, officially recognized that Mirjaveh belonged to Persia.⁸¹

MOHAMMAD 'ALI SHAH (1907–9)

Mohammad 'Ali Shah, the sixth Qajar king, succeeded to the throne on 8 January 1907. He was then 35 years old (born in Tabriz on 21 June 1872) and bitterly opposed to any reduction in the powers of the monarchy. During his short reign, his sole concern was to put an end to the constitution by any means. Some of the '*ulamā*', troubled by the progressive opinions of a few radical deputies, shared the views of the shah or at least

⁷⁸ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. 278–82; Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994, p. 135.

⁷⁹ McMahon, 1906; Tate, 1909; Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. 283–6.

⁸⁰ Mahmud, 1983, Vol. 7, pp. 299–304; Zand, 1976, pp. 39–40.

⁸¹ Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994, p. 133.

preferred a religious constitution (*mashrute-ye mashru'e*).⁸² This caused a fatal split in the ranks of the constitutionalists, who were then subjected to increasingly frequent attacks by the shah and his court. Mohammad 'Ali Shah, despite the fact that he had countersigned the Fundamental Law on 30 December 1906 and promulgated its Fundamental Supplementary Laws on 7 October 1907, and had sworn on several occasions to respect the constitution faithfully, finally gave orders to the Cossack brigade to bombard the *Majles* (23 June 1908).⁸³ On 27 June he dissolved the *Majles* and abolished the constitution as contrary to the *shari'a*. The next 13 months up until the conquest of Tehran by the constitutionalists are generally known as 'the minor tyranny' (*estebdād-e saqir*) to indicate the short duration of the return to absolute rule. Some former deputies were arrested and executed, a few were saved by the intervention of the foreign legations in Tehran, but many others changed sides.⁸⁴

In such a situation, with no hope of restoring the constitution, the constitutionalists of Tabriz again took up the cause. In spite of strong opposition from the Russians, who occupied the city militarily in April 1909, the Azerbaijanis, accompanied by the troops of Bakhtiari from Isfahan and an army from Rasht, took Tehran on 16 July 1909. The shah, who had found refuge at the Russian legation, abdicated in favour of his eldest son Ahmad Mirza and, after obtaining the right to an annual pension, left Tehran for Russia with the rest of his family in September 1909. In July 1911 his vain attempt to recover his throne cost him his pension. He died in exile in San Remo on 5 April 1925.⁸⁵

In matters of foreign policy, the most important event of Mohammad 'Ali Shah's reign was the Anglo-Russian convention of 31 August 1907, which provided inter alia for the division of Persia into two spheres of influence – Russian in the north and British in the south – separated by a neutral buffer zone in the centre.⁸⁶ This convention, vigorously denounced by Persia, was in fact a result of the warmer relations between Russia and Britain brokered by France to counter German militarism.

From the economic point of view, a highly significant event during the short reign of Mohammad 'Ali Shah (and one which completely escaped the attention of the Persian court, at the time absorbed by the question of the constitution) was the striking of oil at Masjed on 26 May 1908 by G. B. Reynolds, a British geologist who had been working in Persia on behalf of W. K. D'Arcy since September 1901.⁸⁷ This discovery opened a

⁸² Adamiyat, 1976, pp. 259–67; Ha'eri, 1981, pp. 277–81.

⁸³ Nazem al-Eslam, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 156–60.

⁸⁴ Digard, Hourcade and Richard, 1996, pp. 40–1; Kasravi, 1970, pp. 647–57.

⁸⁵ Burrell, 1993, p. 432; Amir-Khizi, 1960.

⁸⁶ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. 119–21, 125–6.

⁸⁷ Ferrier, 1982, Vol. 1, pp. 48–102.

new chapter in the political and economic history of Iran, offering fresh prospects for the country and soon exciting the interest of the Western powers in the Middle East.

AHMAD SHAH (1909–25)

On 16 July 1909, following the abdication of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, Crown Prince Ahmad Mirza, then 11 years old (born on 28 January 1898), became shah. Initially, the chief of the Qajar tribe, ‘Azad al-Molk (1823–1910), served as regent; he was followed by the pro-British Naser al-Molk (1856–1927) until Ahmad Shah came of age and was crowned on 21 July 1914. The five years from 1909 to 1914 saw a succession of more than ten short-lived governments. The second *Majles*, inaugurated on 15 November 1909, soon found itself faced with an ultimatum from Russia which demanded the ousting of Morgan Shuster (1877–1960), an American expert employed from May 1911 by the Persian Government to reform the public finances.⁸⁸ Despite Shuster’s dismissal in December 1911, Russian forces gradually took up positions on Persian soil in Azerbaijan as far as Khurasan, where, in March 1912, they bombarded the mausoleum of Imam Reza and killed a number of people opposed to the return of the former shah, Mohammad ‘Ali Mirza.⁸⁹

On 3 August 1914, two weeks after the coronation of the young shah, the First World War broke out. Although neutral, Persia became a battlefield for Turkish, Russian and British forces. Between 1915 and 1917, at a time when one short-lived government followed another in Tehran, certain nationalist, religious and pro-German elites formed a government-in-exile at Kermanshah in the west of the country and fought in vain against the Russians and the British.⁹⁰ Another patriotic movement, organized from 1915 in Gilan in the north by Mirza Kuchak Khan Jangali (1878–1921), called for the freeing of the country from Russian and British interference.⁹¹ In 1915 those two powers signed an agreement dividing Persia into two spheres of influence: the north for Russia and the south for Britain.⁹² In 1916 Britain, seeking to protect its interests from German scheming, created the ‘South Persia Rifles’ (SPR), an Indo-Persian army led by British officers. Another army called the ‘East Persia Cordon’, with its headquarters in Mashhad, controlled all the eastern regions of Persia. After the 1917 October revolution, when the Bolsheviks decided to withdraw from Persian territory, Britain created the ‘Norperforce’ to take the place of the tsar’s army.⁹³

⁸⁸ Shuster, 1912; McDaniel, 1974.

⁸⁹ Uliya’ Bafqi, 1979, pp. 51–63; Sykes, 1958, Vol. 2, pp. 426–7.

⁹⁰ Sykes, 1958, Vol. 2, pp. 442–68.

⁹¹ Fakhra’i, 1964; Ravasani, 1973.

⁹² Moberly, 1987, pp. 53–137.

⁹³ Luft, 2002, pp. 45–79; Sykes, 1958, Vol. 2, pp. 454–5, 476–80; Nasiri-Moghaddam, 1995.

Persia came out of the First World War weaker and beset by administrative and financial chaos. It was even unable to make its voice heard at the Versailles Peace Conference in January 1919 because of the refusal of the French and British governments who, as victors, had agreed between themselves to redraw the boundaries and redefine their spheres of influence throughout the Middle East. They would not allow the Persian delegation to participate in the conference since they considered that Persia, in spite of its neutrality, had always favoured the Germans during the war. The limitations of this Franco-British solidarity emerged on 9 August 1919, when a treaty was signed between Vosuq al-Dowle (1872–1951), the Persian prime minister, and Percy Cox (1864–1937), a British diplomat temporarily in charge of the British legation in Tehran. This document, while recognizing the independence and integrity of Persia with a view to facilitating the reconstruction of the country, placed its army and finances under the control of British advisers and was opposed by France, the United States and Persian nationalists. It was not therefore ratified, either by the *Majles* or by the shah. Indeed the shah, who was due to leave for his first trip to Europe a few days after the signing of the treaty, never alluded to it during his stay in London.⁹⁴

As soon as the shah returned to Tehran (June 1920), where he was given a hero's welcome by the people, he replaced Vosuq al-Dowle with a well-known nationalist, Moshir al-Dowle Pirniya (1871–1935). At the time, Persia was going through a difficult period: in the north, after the landing of the Red Army at Anzali (near Rasht) in May 1920, the Jangal movement led by Mirza Kuchak Khan, which the Bolsheviks had been supporting for some time, had proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Republic (June 1920).⁹⁵ In Azerbaijan the democrats, led by Khiyabani (1879–1920), had taken to calling their region Azadestan ('Land of Freedom') since April 1920 and were demanding independence. In September 1920 this revolt was crushed and its leader killed.⁹⁶ As for the Jangalis, they continued to resist the state forces despite the split in their camp provoked by the far from unanimous declaration of a republic.

In order to persuade the Bolsheviks to stop supporting the Jangal movement, a delegation headed by Moshaver al-Mamalek Ansari (1868–1940) was sent to Moscow in October 1920. The negotiations led to the signing of a treaty of friendship on 26 February 1921. In this document, which was to form the basis of Irano-Soviet relations throughout the twentieth century, the Bolsheviks abandoned the imperialist policy of the former tsarist regime. The treaty, which contained 25 articles, accorded a number of political and

⁹⁴ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. 138–43; Olson, 1984, pp. 214–49.

⁹⁵ Yaqikiyan, 1984, pp. 75–99; Chaqueri, 1995, pp. 188–202.

⁹⁶ Kasravi, 1976, pp. 865–96; Cottam, 1979, pp. 122–4.

economic advantages to Persia and fixed the boundary east of the Caspian Sea on the basis of the ‘Akhal- Khurasan’ convention of 1881 with a few minor adjustments, especially with respect to the village of Firuze, which the Soviet authorities handed back to Persia.⁹⁷

Five days before the treaty was signed, that is, on 21 February 1921, a *coup d’état* took place in Tehran. It was led by a pro-British journalist, Sayyed Zia’ al-Din Tabataba’i (1889–1969), and a Cossack soldier named Reza Khan (1878–1944). Both had been in contact with General Edmund Ironside (1880–1959), commander of the ‘Norperforce’ in Persia.⁹⁸ Recent studies confirm the military and diplomatic involvement of the British but not the backing of the British Government for this coup, which was intended to take over the government without overthrowing the monarchy.⁹⁹ Sayyed Zia’ and Reza Khan were thus appointed prime minister and commander-in-chief (*sardār sepah*) of the army respectively by Ahmad Shah. The new government denounced the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 and promised a series of reforms in agriculture, education, social affairs and health. However, the summary arrest of some 50 leading politicians using methods disapproved of by the court, and the quarrels with Reza Khan regarding the army, provoked a reaction that obliged Sayyed Zia’ to resign and go into exile in Switzerland (24 May 1921).¹⁰⁰

Unlike Sayyed Zia’, whose tenure of office was very short, Reza Khan rose step by step and by May 1921 he had become minister of war. He restored the integrity of Persian territory by severely repressing uprisings in all parts of the country: in Khurasan, the short-lived revolt (July–September 1921) of the local gendarmes, led by Colonel Pesyan (1892–1921); in Gilan, the Jangal movement, whose leader Mirza Kuchak Khan was killed in December 1921 in circumstances suggestive of treachery and plotting; in Azerbaijan, the unsuccessful coup by Major Lahuti (1877–1957), a gendarme officer of Kurdish origin, who fled to Moscow in February 1922; and in Kurdistan, the uprising led by Simko (1882–1930), who was exiled in July 1922.¹⁰¹

As minister of war, Reza Khan’s authority increased, especially after the departure of the Russian and British forces between May and September 1921. In October 1923 Ahmad Shah reluctantly appointed Reza Khan prime minister before himself leaving for Europe for health reasons. The new prime minister, inspired by the republican regime recently proclaimed in Turkey (October 1923), contemplated establishing a republic in Persia. But he bowed to the ‘*ulamā*’, who were worried that, like their counterparts in Turkey, they might be deprived of the *owqāf* (from *waqf*, religious endowment) and forced to accept the

⁹⁷ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. lxxxvi–xcviii.

⁹⁸ Ironside, 1972.

⁹⁹ Zirinsky, 1992, pp. 639–63.

¹⁰⁰ Ghani, 1998, pp. 199–223.

¹⁰¹ Cottam, 1979, pp. 70, 102–10, 123–4; Cronin, 1997, pp. 95–107.

possibly sacrilegious policies of a secular republican ideology.¹⁰² During a visit to Qum by Reza Khan in March 1925, the ayatollahs (title given to the great Shi‘ite religious leaders) therefore let it be known that the way was open for him to change the dynasty and become shah. The overthrow of Khaz‘al (1861–1936), a British protégé, in Khuzistan in April 1925 brought Reza Khan another step closer to the throne.¹⁰³ Finally, on 31 October 1925, the *Majles* deposed Ahmad Shah, who was still in Europe, and put an end to the Qajar dynasty, soon to be replaced by that of the Pahlavis. Ahmad Shah, who never returned to Persia, died in France in 1930.¹⁰⁴

The Pahlavi dynasty (1925–79)

REZA SHAH (1925–41)

Proclaimed king by a Constituent Assembly on 12 December 1925, Reza Shah, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, was sworn in before the *Majles* on 15 December 1925 and ascended the throne in the Golestan Palace the next day. He was crowned on 25 April 1926 at the age of 48, having been born on 16 March 1878 at Alasht in the Savad Kuh of Mazandaran. The name of the dynasty refers to the language of the Sasanians (A.D. 224–651) and was supposed to recall the glory of pre-Islamic Iran; it comes from the family name that Reza Shah had chosen shortly beforehand, when the law of 4 June 1925 instituting the civil register in Persia required each person to choose a family name.¹⁰⁵

Surrounded by reformers such as Davar (1887–1937), Teymurtash (1879–1933), Tadayyon (1881–1951) and others, Reza Shah launched a farreaching programme of modernization and administrative centralization, with the more long-term aim of Westernizing the country. In military matters, a unified standing national army was created and a third of the annual budget devoted to it. The country’s economic policy under Reza Shah was based on state intervention and oil revenues. The shah therefore unilaterally cancelled the concession granted to D’Arcy (26 November 1932) and, after a year of negotiations following the intervention of the League of Nations in April 1933, reached an agreement for a period of 60 years with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which later changed its name to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).¹⁰⁶

The construction of a modern road network and of the Trans-Persian Railway, which from 1938 linked the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, undoubtedly had a profound impact

¹⁰² Wilber, 1975, pp. 73–80; Ghani, 1998, pp. 289–324.

¹⁰³ Ghani, 1998, pp. 325–50.

¹⁰⁴ Sheikh-ol-Islami, 1985, pp. 657–60.

¹⁰⁵ Hambly, 1995, pp. 511–14.

¹⁰⁶ Stobaugh, 1978, pp. 201–6.

on the Iranian economy despite frequent criticism of its purpose and route.¹⁰⁷ State monopolies over certain products such as tea and sugar were introduced with a view to strengthening the economy. New industries such as sugar refining and the manufacture of cement and textiles, established in Tehran and in the provinces, also contributed to the country's economic independence. The state regained control over the customs and secured the revenue that had long been accorded to foreign powers in exchange for loans. Essential to economic expansion was the gradual modernization of the administration. The civil service was organized along Western lines and a modern secular judicial system was progressively introduced. Decisive steps in that direction were the promulgation of the penal code in 1926 and of the civil code in 1928 and the abrogation of the Capitulations on 10 May 1928 after exactly a century of existence.¹⁰⁸

In the field of culture, the education system was modernized: education was made compulsory for both genders in 1936, though exceptions existed especially in rural areas. The founding of the University of Tehran in 1934 also had a long-term impact on the cultural development of the country. Nationalism was strengthened by emphasizing and promoting the pre-Islamic aspects of Iranian culture and by almost systematically eliminating Arabic elements from the Persian language.¹⁰⁹ From March 1935, on the occasion of the Iranian New Year (*Nowruz*), the shah ordered all foreign embassies henceforth to use the term 'Iran' instead of 'Persia'. For Iranians, who had always called their country 'Iran', the change was meaningless but foreigners, brought up on memories of *A Thousand and One Nights*, found it absurd.¹¹⁰

There was an upheaval in the social structure too: army officers, civil servants, businessmen and suppliers gradually rose to the top of the social ladder, becoming richer and more influential than the former ruling classes, such as the landowners, '*ulamā*' and *bāzāris* (merchants) of the past. At the same time, the wearing of Western-style masculine dress, made compulsory from December 1928, and the prohibition of the veil for women from January 1936 affected the daily lives of the people, even though such changes were not to the taste of everyone, especially the '*ulamā*'. The most serious incident in this connection occurred in Mashhad in 1935, when a demonstration against obligatory European-style clothes for men, in particular the headgear known as the *kolāh Pahlavi*, and the impending unveiling of women, ended in a bloodbath in the Imam Reza mausoleum.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Bharier, 1971, p. 203.

¹⁰⁸ Zirinsky, 2003, pp. 81–98.

¹⁰⁹ Hambly, 1995, p. 513.

¹¹⁰ Digard, Hourcade and Richard, 1996, pp. 89–91.

¹¹¹ Vahed, 1982.

Reza Shah is often compared to Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), whom he met in 1934 on his official visit to Turkey, his only trip abroad. Unlike Atatürk, however, Reza Shah did not make lengthy political statements, nor did he write articles; he was a man of action who could not tolerate criticism. During his reign, political parties were practically abolished, criticism in the press was forbidden and the *Majles* lost its authority over the state. Reza Shah clearly failed in two areas – agriculture and relations with the tribes. In 1937 he tried in vain to improve the lot of the peasants by promulgating legislation aimed at forcing landowners to improve their methods of farming. As for the tribes, their forced sedentarization, sometimes in unsuitable regions, proved unsuccessful and aroused much bitterness.¹¹²

In foreign policy, Iran under Reza Shah established good relations with the neighbouring Islamic countries. This enabled him to resolve some boundary problems, particularly in the east. Afghanistan, independent since August 1919, had signed three treaties of friendship with Iran (June 1921, November 1927 and June 1928) and agreed to settle boundary disputes amicably.¹¹³ A joint commission, chaired by the Turkish General F. Altaï, thus delineated in May 1935 the final section of the frontier between Iran and Afghanistan, a distance of some 377 km between Hashtadan in the north and Yazdan in Sistan to the south which had not yet been demarcated.¹¹⁴ The regional Sa‘dabad Pact, signed in 1937, further strengthened relations between Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq. However, the Iranian and Afghan governments did not manage to agree on the question of the Helmand. To ensure the equitable sharing of this river, a treaty and a declaration were signed on 29 December 1938 in Kabul but the documents were neither ratified nor exchanged since, despite the insistence of Iran, the National Consultative Assembly of Afghanistan did not approve the declaration as an official document appended to the treaty.¹¹⁵

Political relations with the Soviet Union were based on the 1921 treaty of friendship, and trade relations between the two countries were clarified by a series of short-term protocols (1927, 1931 and 1935). The Iranian Communist Party, supported by Moscow, constituted one of the stormy issues in the countries’ bilateral relations. The promulgation of an anti-communist law by the *Majles* in June 1931 and the arrest of a group of 53 Iranian communists in 1937 greatly strained their relations.

Iran’s international policy under Reza Shah was to seek a ‘third power’ that would act as a counterweight to British and Soviet pressure. To this end Iran developed closer

¹¹² Savory, 1978, pp. 42–3.

¹¹³ Aitchison (ed.), 1933, pp. xcix–ciii, ccxii–ccxvii.

¹¹⁴ Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994, pp. 135–6.

¹¹⁵ Zand, 1976, pp. 42–5.

relations with Germany, whose share in trade with Iran rose to 41 per cent in 1938–9.¹¹⁶ German companies supplied most of the heavy equipment and machines needed for Iran's industrial development programme and the plans for most new public or government buildings in Tehran were drawn up by German architects working for the Iranian Government.¹¹⁷ During the years prior to the Second World War, Reza Shah thus adopted a pro-German stance, which later gave the Soviet and British armed forces a pretext for transgressing Iran's neutrality and invading the country on 25 August 1941. On 16 September, less than a month later, Reza Shah, whose Trans-Persian Railway was to end up being used by the Allies, was forced to abdicate in favour of his eldest son and to go into exile, first in Mauritius and then in the South African Transvaal, where he died on 26 July 1944.¹¹⁸

MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH (1941–79)

On 17 September 1941, the day after the abdication of Reza Shah, the 22-year-old Crown Prince Mohammad Reza (born on 26 October 1919) was sworn in as the second shah of the Pahlavi dynasty. The young shah's rapid accession to the throne owed much to the prime minister, Mohammad 'Ali Forughī (1877–1942), who played a decisive role. The British and Soviet governments immediately recognized the new shah and in January 1942 signed a tripartite agreement with the Iranian Government in order to make their status as occupying powers official and legitimate. In so doing, while respecting the sovereignty of Iran, they promised among other things to withdraw from Iranian territory after the war.¹¹⁹

In March 1942 Forughī resigned for health reasons and was succeeded by 'Ali Soheyli (1895–1958), who, by declaring war on Germany in September 1943, engaged Iran on the side of the Allies. The evacuation of Iranian territory was also mentioned in the declaration signed on 1 December 1943 by Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt at the Tehran Conference. However, Iran, recognized at the time as the 'bridge to an Allied victory', was faced with serious problems after the war owing to the continued presence of the Red Army, which indirectly supported uprisings led by Ja'far Pishevari (1892–1947) in Azerbaijan and by Qazi Mohammad (1893–1947) and Mostafa Barzani (1903–79) in Kurdistan. The Tudeh Party, founded in September 1941 by the Iranian communists, who had benefited from an amnesty since the accession of the new shah, supported these uprisings, which led to the proclamation of a democratic republic in Tabriz (December 1945) and in Mahabad (January 1946).¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Frye, 1968, p. 80.

¹¹⁷ Wilber, 1975, pp. 173–211.

¹¹⁸ Hambly, 1991, p. 242.

¹¹⁹ Savory, 1993, p. 446.

¹²⁰ Cottam, 1979, pp. 70–3, 124–9.

Faced with the threat to Iran's territorial integrity, Ahmad Qavam (1873–1955), prime minister since January 1946, negotiated in person with Stalin in Moscow (February–March 1946). In April he signed with Sadchikov, the Russian ambassador in Tehran, a draft agreement which kindled hopes among the Russian authorities that the withdrawal of the Red Army would facilitate the award of an oil concession to the Soviet Union by the *Majles*. This diplomatic stratagem enabled the government, after the withdrawal of the Red Army in May 1946, to resolve the crises in Azerbaijan (December 1946) and Kurdistan (March 1947).¹²¹

In October 1947, a few months after these victories, the *Majles* cancelled the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement on the basis of a law passed in December 1944 which forbade the prime minister and other ministers from negotiating any oil concessions with foreigners. The law had been voted on the initiative of Mohammad Mosaddeq (1882–1967). This liberal politician, with a doctorate in law and belonging to the Qajar nobility, had founded in October 1949 the National Front, a coalition of intellectuals, anti-British politicians and *bāzāris* backed by Ayatollah Kashani (1885–1962). It was fighting for the country's political and economic independence following the principle of a 'negative balance', which implied the rejection of all foreign concessions.¹²²

On 4 February 1949 an attempt on the life of the shah during a visit to the University of Tehran almost succeeded. This incident provided the government with an opportunity to outlaw the Tudeh Party. This further increased the displeasure of the Soviet Union, which had failed to obtain an oil concession in the north of Iran in spite of the promises made by Qavam. The five prime ministers who followed Qavam in the next four years (December 1947–March 1951) were all preoccupied by the oil question and some, such as Hazhir (1902–49) and General Razmara (1901–51), lost their lives because of it.¹²³ They were assassinated by the *Fadā'īyan-e Eslām*, a small group of 'dedicated followers of Islam' which, during the 12 years of its existence (1943–55), carried out several political assassinations to obtain the enforcement of the *shari'a* and the suppression of irreligious behaviour.¹²⁴

The shah's political and economic ambitions became increasingly apparent after the failed attempt on his life: in March 1949 he launched his first seven-year economic development plan; two months later, a special Constituent Assembly granted him the power to dissolve parliament and passed a law establishing the senate (for which provision had been made in the 1906 constitution), half of whose 60 members were to be appointed by

¹²¹ Azimi, 1989, pp. 147–64.

¹²² Katouzian, 1990, pp. 51–77.

¹²³ Hazhir was assassinated on 3 November 1949, a year after being appointed minister of the court.

¹²⁴ Keddie and Zarrinkub, 1965, pp. 882–3.

the shah. In November 1950 the shah left for the United States to obtain financial, technical and military assistance under the Truman Plan. However, in the eyes of the Iranian Government, the American assistance was insufficient.

In 1951 the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by Mosaddeq, who had become prime minister on 29 April, plunged the country into political and economic turmoil. Mosaddeq, who took full powers from August 1952, angered the shah on several occasions. Nor did some of his measures meet with the approval of the National Front.¹²⁵ The quarrel between Mosaddeq and the shah ended on 19 August 1953 with a coup led by General Zahedi (1888–1962) with financial support from the CIA.¹²⁶ Mosaddeq was arrested and the shah, who had left the country a few days earlier, returned to Tehran. Zahedi was appointed prime minister and Mosaddeq, arraigned before a military court on a charge of high treason, was found guilty on 21 December and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.¹²⁷

During Zahedi's term of office (1953–5), the oil crisis was resolved by an agreement signed in October 1954 between the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and a consortium of British (40 per cent), American (40 per cent), French and Dutch (20 per cent) oil companies.¹²⁸ The United States thus emerged as winner in the trial of strength between Mosaddeq and Britain. From then on Iran, whose geography made it the neighbour of the Soviet Union and whose geology supplied it with large quantities of oil, became the cherished and grateful ally of the Americans. This circumstance dominated the foreign policy of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi for the last 25 years of his reign, especially since his policy of 'positive nationalism' led him to give priority to the army in order to better secure Iran's independence. However, in view of Iran's military requirements, this policy brought him into an ever-closer alliance with the United States and thus involved the country in the Cold War.

It was in this context that, in October 1955, Iran signed the Baghdad Pact and joined the union made up of Iraq, Turkey, Britain and Pakistan to consolidate the 'green belt' south of the Soviet Union. Following a coup in Iraq on 14 July 1958, which overthrew the Hashemite monarchy and tipped the country into the Soviet camp, the Baghdad Pact was replaced by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).¹²⁹ In March 1959 the shah signed an agreement with the United States under which the latter would come to the assistance of

¹²⁵ Katouzian, 1990, pp. 78–176; Bill and Louis (eds.), 1988.

¹²⁶ Roosevelt, 1979. For an account of this coup from a royalist standpoint, see Pahlavi, 1961, pp. 99–110.

¹²⁷ After serving his sentence, Mosaddeq spent the rest of his life at Ahmadabad, where he died on 5 March 1967.

¹²⁸ Stobaugh, 1978, pp. 213–15.

¹²⁹ Digard, Hourcade and Richard, 1996, pp. 116–17.

Iran if it were attacked. This agreement did not prevent the shah from promising the Soviet Union not to allow foreign missile bases to be established on Iranian soil (September 1962),¹³⁰ a strategy that produced a slight warming of relations with the Soviet Union.

To strengthen relations with his neighbours in the east, the shah intervened in the diplomatic tussle between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which signed a declaration of friendship in Tehran in May 1963. As for the dispute between Iran and Afghanistan over the sharing of the Helmand, a neutral tripartite Helmand River Delta Commission with representatives from Canada, Chile and the United States, set up at the request of the Iranian and Afghan governments, had studied the whole question between 1948 and 1951, but the arbitration made public in February 1951 had not been approved by the Iranian Government, which wanted a greater share of the Helmand's waters.¹³¹ In 1972, disturbed by the recently signed treaty between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the shah decided to resolve the Helmand problem as quickly as possible: after the necessary negotiations, a bipartite commission signed the 'Afghan-Iranian Helmand river water treaty' in Kabul on 13 March 1973. Iran's share was fixed at a level slightly higher than by the previous arbitration (an annual average of 26m³/second as against 22m³/second in 1951).¹³² On 29 May 1973 the treaty was ratified by the *Majles* and on 16 July it was promulgated by the Afghan parliament.

The very next day, there was a *coup d'état* in Afghanistan: the monarchy of Zahir Shah (1933–73) was overthrown by his cousin Mohammad Daud (1909–78), who proclaimed a republic on 17 July 1973 and became the first president of Afghanistan (see Chapter 19). The new regime, which needed Iran's financial assistance, ratified the treaty on the sharing of the Helmand river. The text was officially exchanged in Tehran in June 1977, thus ending more than a century of boundary disputes between the two countries. Trade relations were also to be strengthened, but were held in check in April 1978 by the coup that brought to power the communist Nur Mohammad Taraki (1978–9), a representative of the Khalq faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).¹³³

From an economic point of view, the income from oil and American assistance during the last 25 years of the shah's reign enabled the government to implement five more economic development plans which included numerous major hydroelectric projects. These plans were boosted by a programme of reforms called the 'White Revolution', or 'Revolution of the Shah and the People', which was approved by a national referendum in January 1963. The most important principles of this programme were agrarian reform, the

¹³⁰ Griffith, 1978, p. 376.

¹³¹ Balland, 1990, pp. 413–14.

¹³² Ibid., p. 414.

¹³³ Gille, 1984, pp. 189–95.

emancipation of women, the campaign against illiteracy and the formation of a health corps to provide basic health care in rural areas.¹³⁴ The programme was opposed by two powerful groups: the National Front and the Liberation Movement of Iran (*Nehzat-e Āzādi-ye Irān*), founded in 1961 by religious intellectuals such as Mehdi Bazargan (1907–94) and by progressive ‘*ulamā*’ such as Mahmud Taleqani (1912–79). The demonstrations organized in June 1963 in Tehran and other major cities were severely repressed. The State Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), created in 1957, arrested massive numbers of the regime’s opponents. One of the religious leaders arrested was Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902–89), who was released on 2 August and placed under house arrest. But in October 1964, after parliament had ratified a law granting diplomatic immunity to American servicemen and their families residing in Iran, Khomeini criticized the shah for having capitulated once again to the Americans. The following month the ayatollah was arrested and exiled, first to Turkey and then to Iraq.¹³⁵ In retaliation, the prime minister Hasan ‘Ali Mansur (1923–65) was mortally wounded on 21 January 1965, and on 10 April an attempt was made on the shah’s life by a religious group called the *Hezb-e Melal-e Eslāmi* (Party of the Islamic Nations).¹³⁶

In regard to domestic policy, when Zahedi, prime minister after the *coup d’état*, was replaced by Hoseyn ‘Ala’ (1955–7), the shah made further attempts to open up the political spectrum as the opportunity arose. In 1957 two political parties, *Melliyun* (the ‘Nationalists’) and *Mardom* (‘the People’), were created by the regime with the aim of establishing a Western-style parliamentary system. Prime ministers such as M. Eqbal (1957–60), J. Sharif-Emami (1960–1), ‘A. Amini (1961–2) and A. ‘Alam (1962–4) went along with this artifice of a political opening. As for ‘A. Mansur (1962–5), in December 1963 he created a new party, *Irān-e Novin* (‘New Iran’), which replaced the *Melliyun* and enabled the bipartite political system to continue in a new climate. In March 1975 the shah took a step that he later recognized as having been a mistake: he ordered the dissolution of those two parties, leaving a single party, the *Rastākhiz-e Irān* (Resurgence of Iran), with Amir ‘Abbas Hoveyda (1916–79), prime minister since 1965, as leader.¹³⁷

With the succession to the throne assured by the birth on 31 October 1960 of Crown Prince Reza, the child of his third marriage, with Farah Diba, the shah celebrated his coronation on 26 October 1967, his 48th birthday.¹³⁸ A few weeks before, on 7 September, his health being increasingly affected by a high level of lymphocytes in the blood, he had

¹³⁴ Savory, 1993, p. 447; Denman, 1978, pp. 253–301.

¹³⁵ Digard, Hourcade and Richard, 1996, pp. 128–9.

¹³⁶ Taheri, 1987, p. 60.

¹³⁷ Pahlavi, 1980, p. 124.

¹³⁸ Lapeyre, 1998, p. 105.

had the constitution amended to enable Empress Farah to act as regent in the event of his death before the crown prince attained the age of 20.¹³⁹ In October 1971, to mark the first decade of the White Revolution, the state organized imposing ceremonies at Persepolis for the ‘2,500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire’ to which monarchs and heads of state from all over the world were invited. These festivities, most impressive for foreigners but scandalous in the eyes of the regime’s opponents, ushered in a period in which personal rule by the shah reached its zenith: in September 1965 parliament awarded him the title of ‘King of Kings, Light of the Aryans’ (*Shāhanshāh Āryā-Mehr*).¹⁴⁰

Between 1973 and 1975 Iran, having become the ‘policeman of the Persian Gulf’, benefited from a spectacular boom in the petroleum industry. Major projects in the nuclear, chemical and other industries, but also in urban development, were signed with France, Germany and other Western powers. However, the backlash from the boom, owing to a fall in the demand for oil, severely destabilized the Iranian economy. In August 1977 Hoveyda was replaced as prime minister by a technocrat trained in the United States, Jamshid Amuzegar, who failed to calm a seriously overheated economy.¹⁴¹

After the election of the Democrat Jimmy Carter as president of the United States (1977–81), the stability of the Iranian regime was undermined by an international human rights campaign. The shah had to make concessions by granting an amnesty to political prisoners, easing censorship, clamping down on corruption, and so on. He thus lost the initiative to the opposition, consisting of critical intellectuals, recalcitrant clerics, bazaar merchants, jealous aristocrats, provincial landowners, liberal democrats and rebellious students. Most of the latter were members or sympathizers of armed groups such as the *Fadā’iyān-e Khalq* (Selfless Devotees for the People) or the *Mojāhedīn-e Khalq* (Holy Warriors for the People). Many of them were inspired by the writings of ‘Ali Shari‘ati (1933–77), an intellectual who reinterpreted Islam in the light of Western political theories with the aim of constructing a revolutionary ideology.¹⁴²

First Sharif-Emami and then General Azhari (who followed Amuzegar as prime minister from August to December 1978) failed to control the situation owing to increasingly widespread strikes and repeated demonstrations, some of which, like the one on 8 September, were violently repressed.¹⁴³ The rising discontent crystallized around Ayatollah Khomeini, who in October 1978, after his expulsion from Iraq, moved to the Paris suburb of Neauphle-le-Château from where he conducted an intense propaganda

¹³⁹ Savory, 1993, p. 447.

¹⁴⁰ Lapeyre, 1998, pp. 100, 112–13; Digard, Hourcade and Richard, 1996, pp. 148–9, 152.

¹⁴¹ Graham, 1978, pp. 77–127.

¹⁴² Bill, 1988, pp. 194–5.

¹⁴³ Lapeyre, 1998, p. 129.

campaign with an international impact against the regime.¹⁴⁴ On 31 December 1978 the shah appointed one of his secular opponents, Shapur Bakhtiyar (1915–91), as head of the government in a last attempt to save the monarchy and left the country on 16 January 1979 in the hope of returning later, as he had done in 1953. A few days afterwards, on 1 February, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile, to be welcomed by a jubilant crowd who called him Imam. On 5 February he appointed Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister. General Huyser, an American envoy sent to Iran in January 1979 by President Carter, then succeeded in dissuading the chiefs of the Iranian army from attempting a *coup d'état*. The Bakhtiyar interlude lasted only a few weeks: 11 February 1979 saw the triumph of the revolution and the end of the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was to die in exile in Cairo on 27 July 1980.¹⁴⁵

The Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini (1979–89)

The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, approved by a referendum on 1 April 1979, was followed by the drafting of a new constitution, also approved by referendum in December 1979. Under this regime, political authority and the law are subject to the rules of Islam. In practice, this implies a duality of powers if not of institutions: the state is run by a president of the republic, elected every four years, and by a government headed by a prime minister (in 1989 the post was abolished by an amendment to the constitution when 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989–97)). The president and his government are responsible to an Islamic Consultative Assembly (*Majles-e Shurā-ye Eslāmi*) of 270 deputies elected every four years by universal suffrage. A Council of Guardians of the Constitution (*Shurā-ye Negahbān-e Qānūn-e Asāsi*) rules on the conformity with the precepts of Islam of the laws voted by the *Majles*. In the event of disagreement between the Council of Guardians and the *Majles*, an Expediency Discernment Council (*Majma'-e Tashkis-e Maslahat-e Nezām*) is empowered to decide on the ratification of a law or its repeal. Sovereignty lies in the hands of the Supreme Guide of the Revolution (*Vali-ye Faqih*), who may intervene in political, military, religious or other matters. For the first 10 years following the revolution, while Ayatollah Khomeini was still alive, this power was unquestionably his. As a result, the provisional government of Bazargan (February–November 1979) and the three presidents who followed (Abol-Hasan

¹⁴⁴ The situation of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iraq became more and more difficult after the Iran–Iraq agreement signed in Algiers in 1975. The two countries put an end to their border disputes but also promised to prevent mutually hostile actions.

¹⁴⁵ Lapeyre, 1998, pp. 130–42; Richard, 1993, pp. 35–6.

Banisadr, January 1980–June 1981; Mohammad ‘Ali Raja’i, July–August 1981; and ‘Ali Khamene’i, October 1981–June 1989) ruled the country while respecting and taking into account the views of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the area of domestic policy, the most important events of these first 10 years were: the arrest and execution of the principal representatives of the former regime; the creation of popular armed forces such as the Committees and Guardians of the Revolution to ensure the survival of the republic; the repression of Kurdish and Turkmen uprisings; the temporary closure (1980–3) of the universities as part of a cultural revolution; the assassination of supporters and high-ranking personalities of the Islamic Republic of Iran by terrorist groups; and the systematic repression of all left-wing groups, which marked the victory of the ‘*ulamā*’ within the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On the economic front, the Islamic Republic of Iran established state control over the nation’s industries with the aim of achieving national self-sufficiency (*khod-kafā’i*), the predominant economic slogan of the government. Such forms of state control of the economy, while allowing the private sector to prosper in the black market, created new social tensions, especially as the war against Iraq and conflicts within Iran soon absorbed all energies.¹⁴⁶

In foreign policy, two events with international repercussions marked the first 10 years of the Islamic Republic of Iran: the taking hostage of American diplomats in Tehran by Islamic militants (November 1979–January 1981) and the triggering by Saddam Hussein of a war against Iran (September 1980–July 1988). The trial of strength with the Americans, which ended with the freeing of the hostages after 444 days, led indirectly to the defeat of Carter by Reagan (president from 1981 to 1989) in the US elections.¹⁴⁷ The hostage question also created political and economic problems for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the most serious of which was the embargo decreed by the US Government and followed to some extent by other countries.

The Iran–Iraq war also blocked all prospects of economic development for the country and paralysed for a long time its most important oil-producing province. Having refused to end the war in 1982 when the Islamic Republic of Iran had the upper hand, Ayatollah Khomeini finally accepted a ceasefire only because of the country’s extreme psychological exhaustion.¹⁴⁸ The war produced neither victor nor vanquished, but the country now had to remodel its entire diplomatic strategy towards the Muslim world: the expansion of the revolution, the key element of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy in its first 10 years, was

¹⁴⁶ Digard, Hourcade and Richard, 1996, pp. 174–8.

¹⁴⁷ Salinger, 1981; Sick, 1991.

¹⁴⁸ Gieling, 1999.

subsequently stepped up in the Near and Middle East. In this connection, the government's influence over the Shi'ite groups in Afghanistan during the Russian invasion (1979–89) became increasingly evident and sometimes decisive.¹⁴⁹

In the last few months of his life, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a *fatwā* (edict of anathema) against Salman Rushdie, a British novelist of Indian origin and author of *The Satanic Verses*, virtually condemning him to death for the 'blasphemous' content of his book. This decision had an impact on the Islamic Republic of Iran's relations with Western countries: it took several years and great efforts by the authorities of the Islamic Republic to return them to normal.

Ayatollah Khomeini died on 4 June 1989. As only a few weeks before his death he had rejected his designated successor, Ayatollah Mohammad 'Ali Montazeri, it was thought that internecine strife would split the regime. But the transfer of power took place calmly: the Assembly of Experts (*Majles-e Khebrgān*) elected as Supreme Guide the 50-year-old former president of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Sayyed 'Ali Khamene'i (born on 15 July 1939).

Unlike the last four shahs of Iran, who all died abroad, Ayatollah Khomeini died in the Islamic Republic of Iran and was buried south of Tehran, where the government soon constructed an immense sanctuary that became the venue for official ceremonies and above all the goal of popular pilgrimage. The intransigent personality of Imam Khomeini made a decisive contribution to the success of the revolution and has undoubtedly shaped the new institutions. The authorities of the post-Khomeini Islamic Republic of Iran are trying to preserve them while taking account of recent political developments in the international arena, in particular the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, which has enabled the Islamic Republic of Iran to rediscover former cultural links and economic interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

¹⁴⁹ Emadi, 1995, pp. 1–12; Jalali, 2000, pp. 141–6.

Part III:

**ENVIRONMENT, SOCIETY AND
CULTURE**

21

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT OF
CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA*

E. Shukurov

Contents

Overview 480

South Asian landscapes 492

South-West Asia 494

Overview

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

This region covers an extensive part of the Asian continent from the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter Iran) in the west to Mongolia in the east and from southern Siberia in the north to India in the south. Its geographical coordinates are 55 ° to 08 ° North (on the same latitude as Glasgow in the United Kingdom or Edmonton in Canada in the north, and as Addis Ababa in Ethiopia or Panama City in Central America in the south) and from 44 ° to 120 ° East. Its total surface area is around 10 million km², which is larger than Australia.

CLIMATE

With the exception of India, the region suffers from inadequate moisture supply and extremes of temperature. The northern part, including Kazakhstan and Mongolia, is in the temperate zone and is markedly continental, with sharp seasonal temperature changes and unreliable or inadequate moisture. The average annual precipitation is 250–500 mm in

* See Map 7.

the steppe and forest-steppe areas and 100–250 mm in the semi-desert and desert areas. In winter a lasting snow blanket is formed. Average January temperatures range from -16° to 0°C ; average July temperatures from 16° to 26°C .

Further south, from Iran to Xinjiang, lies the dry subtropical zone where the weather in summer is determined by tropical air-masses and in winter by temperate ones. Total annual precipitation is less than 250 mm and in parts less than 100 mm. Winter precipitation may fall as snow but no lasting snow blanket is formed. Average January temperatures are from -8° to 0°C ; average July temperatures from 24° to 32°C . In southern Iran and in Pakistan easterly winds (trade winds) predominate, and the climate is hot and dry with marked fluctuations in temperature and moisture supply. As much as 1,000–2,000 mm of precipitation may fall annually: average air temperatures are 8° to 16°C in January and over 30°C in July. In both the temperate zone and the subtropics, the lack of rainfall underlies landscape formation processes. Desert-style weathering predominates, with low levels of chemical activity in the surface soils.

India is in the subequatorial zone, where the summer weather is formed by equatorial monsoons and the winter weather by tropical monsoons. Over the greater part the moisture supply is insufficient, with total annual precipitation of 250–500 mm. It exceeds 500 mm only on the west coast, in the Himalayas and in the east, rising in some places to 1,000–2,000 mm. The winter is cooler than the summer but is notably dry. The average January temperature is from 16° to 24°C ; the average July temperature is 24° to 32°C and more. The mountain chains influence the climate considerably and various mountain climates are observed over a large part of the region.

Thanks to the relatively warm climate, two or three harvests per year can be gathered in the subtropical and subequatorial zones. The chief constraint is the acute shortage of water. In several places the dry season lasts for two to ten months and the very high potential of the warm weather can only be utilized fully with artificial irrigation. On the wide plateaux and plains of South-West and Central Asia, the arid climate impedes the development of farming.

In the monsoon zone, rice and industrial crops (jute, sugar cane) are raised, while in the cooler mountain localities tea, coffee and tung trees are grown. In the arid parts of the subtropics millet crops predominate, while on irrigated lands cotton, tobacco and wheat are grown. Large areas are sown to groundnuts. In the temperate zone, spring and winter wheat, maize, soya, rice and cotton are grown.

TOPOGRAPHY AND MINERAL RESERVES

The region is a combination of vast plains and majestic mountain chains. The altitude range is the greatest in the world: from 154 m below sea-level in the Turfan depression in Xinjiang to over 8,000 m in the Himalayas. The plains of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the intermontane plains of Iran, Xinjiang, the Deccan plateau, and the broad river valleys in Pakistan and India stretch for thousands of kilometres.

The greatest influence on the region's ecology is that of the high mountain chains which arch out almost along the east-west parallels. The northern arc starts in the west with the Elburz¹ chain (highest point 5,604 m), which links up with the Kopet Dag (3,117 m) and the Hindu Kush (7,690 m) to meet the Pamirs (7,495 m) and the Tian Shan (7,439 m). Further to the north-east, this arc runs through the Dzungarian Alatau (4,464 m) and the Tarbagatai (2,992 m) to join with the mountains of southern Siberia and Mongolia – the Altai (highest point: 4,506 m), the Sayans (3,491 m) and Hangayn Nuruu (3,906 m). The Karakorams (8,611 m) and the Himalayas (8,848 m) arch eastward from the Hindu Kush.

The high mountain walls shelter Central Asia from the influence of the Indian Ocean, preventing the moist monsoons from reaching its interior. They also store moisture from the upper air currents and are at the origin of all the region's more important rivers. The mountain chains are zoned by altitude, with a natural progression of landscape types determined by altitude. Deserts at the foot of the mountains give way to a belt of mountain-steppe, mountain-meadows and forests, followed by subalpine and alpine belts. Above these lies the belt of lifeless crags, eternal snows and glaciers. In the north of the region, there are no deserts at the lower levels and the eternal snowline descends to 2,500 m. In the south the eternal snows start at 5,000 m. Mountains lower than the snowline do not have the full spectrum of altitude belts and life there is generally sparse. They give rise only to temporary watercourses that run dry in the dry season. Without the high mountain chains, the interior of Central Asia would be sun-scorched deserts.

The region has considerable mineral resources, many of which have been worked since antiquity. They include precious stones, gold, tin, lead, copper and iron ores. Known in modern times are major deposits of copper, nickel, cobalt, gold, platinum, uranium, asbestos, graphite and magnesite, tin and tungsten, sulphur, muscovite, zirconium, phosphates, potash salts, chromites, oil, gas, coal and lignite, and unique deposits of antimony and of lead and zinc, arsenic and mercury ores. The continuing orogenic process is reflected in a high level of seismic activity in the high mountain chains. From time to time there are major earthquakes, resulting in great destruction and loss of life.

¹ The alternative spelling is Alborz. [Trans.]

HYDROGRAPHY

Central Asia consists of a series of closed undrained basins. The largest are the Caspian, Aral and Tarim basins. Only rivers on the region's periphery reach the Arctic or Indian oceans. The continental uplands and South-West Asia have scant water resources. The rains that fall on the plains are mostly short downpours, after which dry river-beds come to brief life and flash flooding may occur. However, the moisture quickly evaporates, the soil dries out and the protracted drought is restored. Only rivers fed by the high mountains that catch moisture from the air-streams do not dry out completely. But as they flow through the desert plains and come closer to their mouths, the rivers gradually run lower, losing water to evaporation and filtration. Here they peter out, lost in the sands, or fall into undrained lakes.

In the Asian interior, where there is little surface water, great importance is attached to ground waters formed by precipitation filtering through the porous deposits of the plains. Near the high mountains the ground waters often reach the surface as abundant springs, creating major oases on the plains below. Since remote antiquity, underground streams have been diverted to the adjacent plains through surface or underground channels (*kārezs*). The latter are particularly widespread on the Iranian highland, where they are used to supply water to settlements and for irrigation. For most Central Asian countries, water resources are the chief form of natural resource and their rational use is essential to economic growth.

Hydroelectric power resources are exceptionally important, especially for countries where other energy sources are scarce: India, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (hereafter Afghanistan), Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, etc. The moist tropics are best supplied with hydroelectric power resources, as well as the mountains and uplands in monsoon regions. However, limited use is made of these regions' hydroelectric power potential, since exploitation of the middle and lower reaches of the rivers would require vast and densely populated areas to be submerged, and exploitation of the upper reaches is hampered by the economic backwardness of the mountain regions. For instance, approximately 10 per cent of the hydroelectric potential of the rivers of India and Pakistan is utilized. In the mountains, the rivers are fast-flowing because of the steep slopes. On the plains, they are diverted for irrigation or filter away and dry out. Only short stretches of a few relatively large rivers are to a limited extent suitable for shipping.

South Asia is reliably protected from the cold influence of the north by the mighty bastion of the Himalayas. Consequently, winter temperatures in the Indian subcontinent are about 5°C higher than at the same latitudes in Indochina. Thanks to the Himalayas, contrasts in rainfall here are even more marked than in Indochina. The southern slopes of the Himalayas in Assam contain the wettest place on Earth, with a total annual precipitation

of 12,000 mm. And at virtually the same latitude on the region's western border, in Sind, there are years when not a single drop of rain falls.

The moisture supply in South Asia declines from the south-east to the north-west, and the volume of the rivers declines in the same direction. The region is generally rich in rivers. As well as a large number of small and medium rivers, some of the largest waterways on Earth flow through it, whether lying wholly within its bounds or with their middle and lower reaches flowing through it. The annual flow of one of the region's largest rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, exceeds 800 km³.

In addition to the Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Indus, other large rivers are the Mahanadi, the Krishna, the Godavari and the Irrawaddy, each of which has an annual flow in excess of 50 km³. The water level of even such mighty rivers fluctuates greatly: up to 80 per cent of the annual flow occurs during the summer monsoon period. Consequently, the summer is accompanied by frequent floods which are especially destructive on rivers where monsoon flooding coincides with the melting of snow and ice in the mountains. The rivers of South Asia characteristically have an abundant hard current, due in part to the intensive ploughing of the soil and the comprehensive deforestation in their basins.

In Central Asia the Syr Darya (together with the Naryn) and the Amu Darya (with the Panj) each have an annual flow of more than 50 km³. The Tarim is also a large river.

The world's largest inland sea, the Caspian (376,000 km²), borders the region in the north-west (Fig. 1). Other major lakes are the Aral Sea (which once occupied 37,000 km² but has now shrunk to half that), Lake Balkhash (17,000 km², also shrinking), Lake Issyk-kul (6,200 km²) and Lake Koko Nor (4,000 km²).

SOILS AND THEIR UTILIZATION

The sheer size of Central Asia, as understood in this volume, and the variety of its topography and climate have brought about a complex surface soil layer, which in many regions has been modified by centuries of farming and in pastoral regions (Fig. 2) has been subjected to erosion caused by destruction of its vegetation. In forested areas in the temperate zone (*podsol*ic), grey and brown forest soils are usual; in the forest-steppe and steppes, *chernozem* and *kastanozem* soils are formed. In the monsoon subtropics, yellow and red soils predominate. On the basalt areas of the Indian subcontinent, distinctive black tropical soils (*regurs*) have formed.

Agriculture is practised on almost all land suitable for arable farming. However, the distribution of arable land is very uneven. The most intensively farmed areas are the plains, which are covered with sedimentary deposits and where every scrap of land is used. Lengthy utilization of the soils has changed their nature and properties, and in a number of places



FIG. 1. Caspian Sea. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

the original soils have been buried beneath a layer of deposits as much as 1.5 m deep left by human activity. Rice growing has had a huge influence on the soils of the monsoon tropics, leading to a kind of ‘rice’ soil. Their chief quality is a stable – but low – fertility which is preserved over centuries.

Unusually widespread erosion inflicts great damage on the soils. Its high level is due to the fragmented relief (over 50 per cent of arable lands are in upland regions), the sharp seasonal variations in precipitations and their torrential nature, the widespread porous rocks which are liable to be washed away and, of course, the destruction of forests and of the natural vegetation which has reached catastrophic proportions in many areas. In arid regions, the soils are subject to weathering and wind erosion.

The other serious threats to soil resources are flooding, which occurs regularly in the summer and autumn on monsoon-area rivers, and also spring and summer flash floods and mudflows in Central Asia. Huge areas on the densely populated plains become covered with sand and clay deposits, causing the soils to lose their productivity and ruining crops over hundreds of thousands of hectares.



FIG. 2. Steppe region. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

Land is used most intensively in South Asia, where with artificial irrigation two, three and even four harvests a year are gathered. South-West and Central Asia have extremely few soils suitable for arable farming. High mountains, sand and stone deserts, widespread saline deposits, and arid and extremely arid climates restrict the opportunities for arable farming. Meadow-steppe and mountain-meadow soils are most used for agriculture. Irrigated farming is prevalent everywhere.

Agricultural production in the region has been increased by switching to more intensive techniques or by the extensive method of replacing natural ecosystems by removing forests and bringing the new lands into use. But in Central and South Asia, where forest resources are scarce and play a huge role in nature protection, the removal of forests inevitably leads to irreparable ecological and economic damage.

VEGETATION

Contrasts prevail in all elements of natural life, as is to be expected in a region with very complex topography and a distinctive zonal structure. Unlike the western and northern Eurasian plains, with their clearly demarcated latitudinal zones which stretch without great exception across almost the entire continent from west to east, the latitudinal zones in

Central Asia are much altered by altitude belts and by the atmospheric moisture-transfer system.

In the distribution of vegetation, the influence of both latitudinal zones and altitude belts is clear to see. For instance, moving from north to south the whole spectrum of zones can be traced: taiga coniferous forests, mixed forests, forest-steppe, broad-leaved forests, meadows, typical and desert steppes, temperate deserts, subtropical evergreen forests and shrubs, subtropical and tropical deserts, tropical dry forests, sparse forests and savannah, alternating moist deciduous and evergreen tropical forests. In the mountains, as the altitude rises, one finds mountain deserts and semi-deserts, coniferous and mixed forests, deciduous forests, mountain-steppes, cold high-altitude deserts, alpine and subalpine meadows and shrubs, all formed under the influence of the high-altitude permafrost.

The region is crossed by a very large belt of arid lands which stretches from the Sahara through the Arabian peninsula to continental China. On its northeastern border lies the Gobi desert, among the world's largest (over 1 million km²), while to the west in Xinjiang lie the Taklamakan (over 270,000 km²) and the Ala Shan (170,000 km²). North of the Tian Shan lie the deserts of Dzungaria (over 500,000 km²) and Muyunkum (40,000 km²), while further to the south-west are the Kyzyl Kum and Kara Kum deserts (300,000 and 350,000 km²) (Fig. 3) and the Ustyurt and Mangystau (ex-Mangishlaq) deserts (200,000 and 40,000 km²). On the crossing to the Arabian deserts lie the deserts of the Iranian highland: the Dasht-i Kavir, the Dasht-i Lut, the Dasht-i Margo and the Registan (in total, 315,000 km²). In the west of the Indian subcontinent there is the Thar desert, which stretches over more than 300,000 km². Thus deserts occupy more than 3 million km², or around a third, of the region's entire area.

In general, the region does not have great forest resources. Taking the area of forest per head of population (0.3 ha per head) as an indicator, it is well behind the average world level of 1.2 ha. The resource is particularly low in India (0.2 ha) and Pakistan (0.002 ha). Commercially important forests are concentrated primarily in the moist tropics and mountains of India, southern Siberia and northern Mongolia. In this context, reserves of industrial-grade conifers account for less than one fifth of total reserves, and are concentrated in the northern regions.

Particular disquiet surrounds the condition of the monsoon forests, the area of which is shrinking with catastrophic speed. Forests are also being badly damaged since in Asia much timber is used as fuel. In a number of countries up to 90 per cent of the total supply is used for that purpose. Uncontrolled felling, the grazing of farm animals in forests and the clearing of forests for arable farming have heavily depleted the forest resources of Central



FIG. 3. Kara Kum desert. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

and South Asia. To restore them, afforestation and conservancy programmes lasting several years will be needed.

Central and South-West Asia are the realm of dry steppes, semi-deserts and deserts with relatively monotonous vegetation. Throughout this extensive region, forests are to be found only on the better-watered mountain slopes and on river-banks. The plains are dominated by sparse grasses and dwarf shrubs. Typical associations in the Central Asian deserts are xerophytes such as various species of saltwort,² *Artemisia* and *Ephedra*. A particular group made up of tamarisk, *juzgun* (*Calligonum* sp.) and saxaul (*Haloxylon*, the characteristic desert tree of Central Asia) grows on sandy substrates.

The steppes of the surrounding hills give way to semi-desert on the plains. The driest foothills of the Iranian highland are covered with thickets of thorny astragal, and some parts are completely deprived of vegetation. The lower parts of the depressions between the mountains are taken up with *takyr*s (clay pans), *solonchaks* (saline soils) or constant salt marshes, at the edges of which various saltworts grow.

ANIMAL LIFE

The fauna of South-West and Central Asia, which belong to the Palaearctic region, is impoverished as a consequence of the Quaternary glaciation and the more recent vertical upheavals. The Indian elephant and rhinoceros and gibbons are all found here. Foxes,

² A range of plants that grow on saline soils. [Trans.]

the jackal, the red wolf, bears, hyenas, the caracal, the jungle cat, the wildcat, the snow leopard, the leopard, the tiger, the civet, deer, goats, wild sheep, antelope, oxen, porcupine, marmot, flying foxes, various bats and lizards are widespread.

Birds include varieties of duck, predators, owls, pheasants, jungle fowl (an ancestral form of the domestic chicken), the peacock, partridge and quail. There are various cuckoos, doves (also indigenous to Africa and Australia), oxpeckers, barbets, woodpeckers, hornbills, pittas, crows, bulbuls, choughs, drongos and starlings.

Reptiles are many and various: crocodiles, turtles (marsh and soft-shelled), lizards (flying lizards, geckoes, skinks, slow-worms, giant lizards and chameleons) and snakes (including pythons, constrictors and cobras). Amphibians are represented by a multitude of frogs. There are plentiful fish of the carp and catfish families.

The animal and plant life of the seas, gulfs and bays of South-West and South Asia is very rich. There are large shoals of fish: sardines, mackerel, bonito and various herrings; plentiful molluscs, echinoderms and shellfish; and various edible seaweeds. The Arabian Sea coast is particularly rich in fish, as it is on the migration routes of many types of fish.

THE HUMAN IMPRINT ON NATURAL LANDSCAPES

The landscapes of South-West, South and Central Asia have been profoundly altered by human activity, which has continued here for millennia. The fertile alluvial plains of North India were settled as early as the Palaeolithic age. Subsequently civilizations grew up here that made quite advanced technical achievements in the rational use of water and land resources. Most cultivated plants originated in Asia. In Central Asia and India, the region holds two of the ten primary cradles of agriculture. Many of the most important field, orchard, garden, melon and gourd and industrial crops, which subsequently spread around the world, were first domesticated and cultivated here. The Indian subcontinent is the birthplace of one kind of wheat, of Indian rice, of several types of haricot bean, of cucumber, sugar cane, jute and hemp. The teaplane and orange spread from Assam in north-east India. The birthplace of most species of wheat, of several types of barley and oats, rye, peas and flax lies in South-West Asia, as does that of many fruit-trees including the quince, the damson, the plum and the cherry. The mountains of Central Asia saw the birth of cultivated walnut trees, apple trees, pomegranates, lucerne, vines and so on. Many species of rice, the bread-fruit tree, several kinds of bananas, coconuts, sugar canes, sago palms, yams and taro originate in South Asia.

Since farming was from time immemorial a key occupation for the population of South-West, South and Central Asia, areas suitable for agriculture were settled first: alluvial depressions, plains and plateaux with a warm and humid climate, and river deltas.

People cleared forests, ploughed up the land and built irrigation systems, and the virgin landscapes gave way to fields, gardens and plantations. The greatest extent of landscape change was observed in South Asia. Least changed by humans were the mountain and high-mountain chains, and the deserts and semi-deserts of Central and South-West Asia. The most important contemporary landscape types are influenced by irrigated and rain-fed agriculture, pastoralism, forestry, mining and construction. However, the last two categories together occupy an insignificant area – less than 5 per cent – of the land, and landscapes shaped by agriculture and forestry are the most important. Their geographical distribution is very unequal. There are areas where artificial landscapes have squeezed out 90 per cent or more of the original natural ones. The Indian subcontinent has the largest concentration of artificial landscapes.

Artificial landscapes typically reorganize the ecology in its entirety, causing changes in the biological cycle and the water and heat balance, changes in the direction of soil processes and the numbers and variety of living organisms, ecological instability and the inability to maintain environmental parameters supportive of life without human intervention. Considerable changes in topography can be observed everywhere – both direct, as surfaces are terraced or levelled for construction and irrigation, and indirect, as ravines and wastelands are formed, soils subside, livestock herding paths form on slopes, etc. The most serious consequence of replacing natural ecosystems with artificial ones is the destruction of the natural control mechanisms that ensure ecological stability in the region and worldwide. A particular danger is an unpredictable deterioration of the climate, the stability of which is ensured by biospheric processes and the living processes of untamed nature.

The Aral catastrophe in Central Asia, among the world's biggest ecological disasters, associated with the destruction of large areas of natural aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, was brought about by very major violations of natural laws and disregard of the region's specific environmental requirements. The death of the internal Aral Sea, the salination and waterlogging of vast tracts of once fertile lands, and the disappearance of the whole world of the *tugais*³ from the lower reaches of the rivers have led to the serious ecological destabilization of this part of the region.

The artificial landscapes of South-West, South and Central Asia are extremely varied and constitute a large body of changes depending on the natural and socio-economic circumstances in which they arose. One of the most typical are the 'rice-farming' landscapes in the monsoon areas, which are among the most profoundly changed by human activity. These landscapes give their areas a very specific appearance whose overall

³ Turkic word for woods growing along the river-banks and flood-plains of Central Asia. [Trans.]

features are identical everywhere. Almost all the level ground is ploughed up, and population density reaches high levels of more than 1,500 per km². India's 'tea-growing' landscapes are another typically Asian example.

In the region's mountains the constantly increasing pressure on nature causes various secondary plant associations to appear, many of them quite persistent and capable in modern conditions of surviving indefinitely. The modern landscapes of Asia's lower and middle mountain slopes are mostly artificial associations: secondary forests, visually poorer and generally less valuable and productive; thickets of trees and shrubs; bamboo clumps which in many parts have squeezed out 50–60 per cent of the original forests; and artificial savannahs. The monsoon forests which once completely covered the plains and hills have been preserved only in isolated patches; in one or two generations they may have completely disappeared before the onslaught of the axe, the fire and the bulldozer.

Humankind's invasion of the moist tropical forests was until recently confined to the sea coasts and river valleys. But now they are being exploited so rapidly that scientists are predicting that the virgin moist tropical forests will have disappeared within the next 50 years. Deforestation and the replacement of primeval forests with secondary and especially non-arboreal associations is an extremely undesirable phenomenon. Forests are hugely important for climatic water content, soil protection, water conservation, health and hygiene and recreation. A reduction in the area of forests damages many branches of the economy which depend directly or indirectly on them, and in South-West, South and Central Asia it also causes a sharp increase in the frequency and duration of flooding on the plains, acceleration of soil erosion, drought, destabilization of the climate and a reduction in the productivity of farm crops. And finally forests, especially tropical forests, represent a unique global genetic pool which preserves representatives of many extinct floras, some dating back to the Tertiary period. Tropical forests are a complex and rich natural system which performs extremely important natural functions – above all, stabilization of the environment's condition and climatic regulation. Consequently, the replacement of virgin forests with secondary associations or artificial plantations of a single species of a single age is an ecologically unequal exchange.

Examples of the extreme degradation of natural landscapes are the artificial deserts and semi-deserts that have arisen as a result of human destruction of landscapes in arid areas: the Thar and Cholistan in Pakistan and the eastern edge of the Thar desert in India, which is encroaching on neighbouring regions at an annual speed of 800 m.

In South-West, South and Central Asia the growing population's increasing pressure on nature and its resources has in a number of places caused such unfavourable phenomena as soil salination and waterlogging, accelerated erosion and wind erosion, reduced

ground-water levels, reduced river levels, silting of reservoirs, pollution of the environment with agricultural and industrial waste products, and a sharp reduction in numbers or even the disappearance of many animal and plant species. Consequently, and in addition to purely biological questions, environmental protection in the region includes overall problems of the rational utilization of natural resources. The possibility of solving them successfully frequently encounters serious obstacles in the economic, political and social contradictions characteristic of many countries in the region.

South Asian landscapes

South Asian landscapes are extremely varied. On the plains and plateaux of the peninsula, various kinds of forest are widespread: moist tropical evergreens on the windy slopes of the western and eastern Ghats which frame the peninsula; monsoon deciduous on the heights and in the interior mountains; sparse dry tropical woodlands on plains with a long dry season and less than 700 mm of precipitation annually. The Indus plain is the driest part of South Asia. Its vegetation is extremely sparse and scattered. Isolated low thickets and patches of dry grasses are interspersed with barren stretches of saline soils. In the west, considerable space is taken up by sandy deserts and semi-deserts, of which the largest is the Rajasthan desert.

The full range of altitude strata – from moist tropical forests to high-altitude and ice deserts – is typical of the Himalayas. On their southern slopes the forests (tropical, subtropical and temperate) rise to 3,000 m, above which lie belts of stunted trees and alpine meadows. South Asia's high mountains contain the world's upper limit for vegetation: 6,218 m. The snowline in the Himalayas is at 5,000–5,500 m. The north slope is very different from the south slope and resembles the landscape of Tibet. There are no forests, which are replaced by stunted woods and a narrow belt of isolated mountain meadows and high-altitude steppes, above which scree desert holds sway.

On the borders of Central and South Asia lies a group of parallel mountain chains 2,500 km long. Of 50 summits that exceed 7,000 m, 10 tower above 8,000 m. Earth's highest mountain, Everest (also known as Chomolungma or Sagarmatha), reaches 8,848 m. To the north of the Indo-Ganges basin, the Siwalik range rises to 3,647 m. The foremost chain of the Lesser Himalayas consists of the Pir Panjal (6,632 m), Dhaola Dhar (5,067 m) and Mahabharat (2,959 m) ranges. Between the Lesser and Greater Himalayas a row of valleys, the beds of glacial lakes, stretches out. The broadest of them are the Kathmandu valley and the Vale of Kashmir. The chief range, the Greater Himalayas, with its steep south-western

faces and gently sloping northern slopes, exceeds 6,000 m and even its lowest ridges are mostly above 4,500 m.

Generally speaking, the Himalayas are made up of gneiss, quartzites, shales and granites, and also dolomites and limestones. The folded blocks are still rising to this day, and together with high seismic activity this touches off landslides, mudslides and erosion. As much as 8 per cent of the surface area is subject to the destructive impact of mudslides. Huge areas of the high mountains are taken up by crags, moraines and scree. Stone seas are also widespread in the western Himalayas. On the southern slopes the snow-line lies at 4,300–4,600 m, while on the dry Tibetan slopes it rises to 5,800–6,000 m. Above 5,000 m, precipitation falls almost all year round as snow. The Himalayan glaciers are currently shrinking.

The summer and autumn Indian Ocean monsoon brings 2,500–4,500 mm and more of precipitation to the southern slopes of the eastern Himalayas. The western ranges are less moist, being cut off from the Indian Ocean by the Thar sand desert. Mediterranean cyclones bring only 500–1,000 mm of precipitation yearly to their slopes. But as much as 3,000–5,000 mm falls on the southern slopes of the Pir Panjal range and at altitudes of 1,800–2,000 m. Snow falls above an altitude of 600 m in the western Himalayas and above 1,800–2,000 m in the eastern Himalayas. On the upper southern slopes it may be more than 5–7 m deep over the season. Snowfalls are accompanied by blizzards, storms and avalanches. The Indian Ocean monsoon cannot overcome the Himalayan barrier, so the northern slopes only receive 100–200 mm of precipitation per year. The moist winds can only pass through the occasional transverse valley to reach the edges of arid Tibet, from where hurricane winds with temperatures as low as -45°C blow from December to May. Snow rarely falls there and rapidly evaporates because of the extreme aridity.

The northern slopes of this very high chain are covered with dry steppes and cold *Artemisia* semi-deserts. In parts these semi-deserts rise to 4,200 m and adjoin the alpine meadows, but frequently juniper and pine woods with some attractive Himalayan cedars or deodars are wedged in between them. The limit of the woodland, at an altitude of 3,800–4,000 m, is formed by thickets of birch, willow and rhododendron.

The southern slopes of the eastern Himalayas are surrounded at their base by the terai, marshy jungles with an unhealthy climate which still shelter tigers, apes and wild elephants. Sal trees, Indian rosewood, khair and Indian silk cotton trees grow in impenetrable groves. At a height of 900–1,200 m, evergreen subtropical forests of oak, chestnut, elm, hornbeam, laurel, magnolia and tree-ferns appear. The monsoon influence can be felt to an altitude of 1,800–2,000 m, where mixed woodland is scattered in the cloud belt. From 2,000 m seasonal frosts set in and rhododendron and mixed woods start to predominate

with low bamboo undergrowth. From 3,000–3,200 m the slopes are covered with spruce and fir woods with dense rhododendron thickets. The black Himalayan bear, the Tibetan wolf, the musk-deer, the langur monkey and the Himalayan hare live at these altitudes. Above 4,000 m the mountains are taken up with alpine meadows.

At the base of the western Himalayas, among shrub thickets growing on yellow soils, the remains of colourful evergreen oak and coniferous forests persist. Higher, on the northern valley slopes, moist coniferous forests appear where the Himalayan and long-needed pine and the Himalayan cedar are the most widespread. At the upper limit of these woods the Himalayan fir is common, its stands being replaced at 3,400–3,800 m by birch woods and then by willow and juniper groves. On the southern slopes of the north-western Himalayas, in Zaskar and Ladakh, there are no forests: *Artemisia* semi-deserts on brown soils predominate here.

The luxuriant alpine grass meadows stretch to around 5,000 m. Mountain sheep, wild goats and Tibetan antelope graze there, hunted by the snow leopard, Tibetan fox, Tibetan wolf and Himalayan bear.

The Himalayan chain passes through India, China, Nepal and Bhutan. The population is chiefly of Mongoloid stock, speaking Tibeto-Burmese languages (Baltis, Ladakhis, Lahuls, Gurungs, Magars, Sherpas and Bhutias), Indo-Aryan languages (Assamese, Punjabis, Kashmiris, Nepalis, Dards and Kohistanis) or Iranian languages (Pashtoons). It is hard to imagine the Himalayan cultural landscape without the ancient pagodas and lamaist monasteries, the broad tea plantations and fruit orchards, the succulent pastures and the settlements hanging above the abyss.

South-West Asia

The influence of the Indian monsoon spreads westward as far as the Persian Gulf. However, it is much weakened by the time it reaches these areas and they receive considerably less moisture. West of the lower Indus, total annual precipitation is less than 250 mm except for a few sea-coasts and exposed slopes.

The Iranian highland is within this broad area with its markedly arid climate. The Thar desert still preserves some conditions typical of the monsoon tropics, with precipitation chiefly in the summer. On the southern Iranian coastline, the influence of the monsoons is felt only in a slight increase in atmospheric humidity in summer, but not in the quantity of precipitation, which is caused only by cyclonic activity in the cold part of the year.

The Iranian highland forms part of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and is surrounded by high mountain chains. In the north the most important are the Elburz range (the Damavand

volcano is 5,604 m high), the Kopet Dag, the Neyshapur mountains, the Paropamisus, the Turkestan range and the Safed Koh. To the south lie the mighty Zagros (the Zard Kuh stands at 4,548 m) and the Makran range. From the Arabian Sea to the Hindu Kush, the Iranian highland is bordered by the central Brahui, Toba and Kakar and Sulaiman ranges and Zadrar. The Iranian interior plateau is crossed by the Kuh Rud and Kuh Benan ranges. The main highland ranges reach to 3,000–4,000 m, the others are not particularly high. Since the snowline lies at 4,200–4,500 m, glaciers and snow-fields are formed only on the highest summits.

The Iranian highland is extremely varied. The predominant relief is very fractured and in parts there is volcanic activity. In the interior there are broad plains with horizontal geological strata. For the most part, the highland has clearly defined subtropical characteristics. The summer is very hot: average July temperatures range from 25 ° to 32 °C, rising on some days to 45 ° and even to 50 °. But unlike Central Asia, here the hot summer does not give way to a cold winter, although in winter the highland is at times in the path of cold air-masses from a spur of the Asian anticyclone. These cold air-streams may bring snowfalls, blizzards, and sometimes quite sharp falls in the air temperature, but on the whole, winter in the Iranian highland is quite mild. Except for the mountains, especially those in the north-east, average January temperatures are usually above 0 °C.

A defining feature of the highland's climate is aridity. Only the peripheral Zagros and Elburz regions receive an annual 500–1,000 mm of precipitation. In the interior the annual precipitation does not exceed 300 mm and in some parts it is 100 mm or less. Since precipitation usually falls in the winter and spring periods, it is fairly ineffective.

On the plains and in the depressions Aeolian landscape forms are common, with sand ridges, dunes and also large stone deserts. The greater part of the Iranian interior plateau is taken up by the clay and salt Dasht-i Kavir desert, and in the south by the Dasht-i Lut scree and clay desert. From the surrounding mountain ridges seasonal salt streams flow down, becoming broad strips of liquid mud in spring.

All the major rivers of the highland are on its external slopes. They flow the year round and are full-watered. The rivers in the interior of the highland are small and only their upper reaches flow all year round. After they join the plain, they have water only during the flood period: for the rest of the time their beds are dry. Only the largest rivers which receive a plentiful supply of mountain waters – such as the Helmand – have water throughout their course, including the lower reaches in the desert.

Due to the shortage of surface water in the countries of the Iranian highland, widespread use has long been made of underground water, reserves of which are particularly large in the southern foothills. As in all of Asia's inland-draining regions, the soils of the highland

are very salinated. The rivers leach salt-bearing rocks and carry huge quantities of salt, which accumulates in the terminal lakes and is deposited in all depressions where large areas are taken up with *solonchaks*.

Surface accumulation of salt is reflected in the vegetation, which includes many halophytes. In general, the vegetation is dominated by desert and semidesert varieties of saltwort and *Artemisias*. Ephemers and ephemeroïds are common on the stone and shingle soils of the *hammadas* (rock-floored deserts), and small saxauls on the desert sands. The mountain slopes are covered with steppe grasses with some mountain xerophytes and *Artemisias*. In places, sparse pistachio trees and subtropical steppe associations are found. Only the moister slopes of the Elburz and Zagros are covered with oak forests.

In the deserts and semi-deserts of the Iranian interior plateau, saltworts, *Artemisias*, ephemers and mountain xerophytes are widespread on the greybrown subtropical soils. The most arid parts are covered with thickets of thorny astragal, and in some cases have no vegetation whatsoever.

On the moist mountain slopes from 2,000 to 3,000 m, coniferous forests of pines, cedars and firs are found, while above them alpine meadows occur. The northern slopes of the Elburz are taken up with thick forests of beech, oak, maple, hornbeam, wild plum and pear. Meadows are frequent above 2,100 m.

The animal life of the highland is similar to that of Central Asia: markhor, mountain sheep, chamois, gazelles, jackals, giant lizards, tortoises and scorpions.

Persians, Afghans (Pashtoons), Uzbeks, Turkmens, Hazaras and Brahuis live on the Iranian highland. A large nomadic population remains. In some areas, irrigated farming and fruit-growing are practised. The depletion of the surface waters (in Iran, for example, 28 km³ out of 41 km³ of river water are used for irrigation) leads to an increasingly intensive use of ground waters. The bulk of it is collected along the mountain and foothill slopes using underground aqueducts (*kārezs* or *qanāts* usually 5–10 km long) linking together a system of wells. The *kārezs* supply 65 per cent of the sown area in Iran and 20 per cent in Afghanistan. Active use is made in Afghanistan of snow-fed and glacier-fed rivers flowing down from the hills. Rain-fed agriculture to grow winter wheat and barley crops can only be practised on the moist mountain slopes. In the valleys of the eastern southern mountain belt, vines, date-palms (up to 900–1,100 m), maize and bananas are grown.

Very large gas fields are concentrated in Iran, and large stocks of iron ore have been discovered in Afghanistan.

Central Asia, being the furthest part of Asia from the oceans, is climatically and hydrologically isolated, with an extreme continental climate and no outflowing waterways. These features have profoundly affected the region's natural life. The small volume of

surface waters and low erosive effect of the flowing waters, combined with sharp fluctuations in temperature and the prevalence of strong winds, means that physical weathering and Aeolian processes prevail over erosion. The detritus produced by the crumbling of rocks, constantly moving down the slopes, has accumulated at the foot of the heights and in depressions, helping to even out the surface. Consequently plateaux, crossed by ridges, are a prevalent feature of the topography of Central Asia.

The nature of the quaternary soil layer in Central Asia is also bound up with the predominance of weathering and Aeolian processes. It consists chiefly of Aeolian sands, loess, disintegrated material of *hammadas* and scree piles in the mountains. The prevailing northerly winds have influenced the distribution and grading of material such that the scree is left in the northern parts of the region while the sand and loess have accumulated to the south.

The mountains of southern Siberia and Mongolia include the Altai, the Sayans, the Hangayn Nuruu and the Hentiyn Nuruu. The highest ranges of the Altai are the Katun range (4,506 m), the North Chu (4,173 m) and South Chu (3,960 m) ranges and the Tavan Bogd Uul (4,082 m).

The climate of the Altai mountains is considerably cooler and moister than that of the neighbouring plains of south-western Siberia, and in the high mountains it becomes cold and moist. However, in the basins the lack of air movement and the temperature inversions cause very low winter temperatures (in the Chu basin, the January average is -31.7° and the absolute minimum is -60°). In summer the air can become very hot and create drought conditions, especially since there is little precipitation here (on the Chu steppe, 100 mm per annum). The western mountains receive from 700 to 2,000 mm yearly, the high mountains of the Katun chain as much as 2,000 mm, and the north-eastern Altai 1,000 mm a year. Most of the precipitation falls in summer and autumn, but the western Altai also receives a lot of precipitation in winter, with the snow blanket in parts reaching 2–3 m. In the eastern parts the winter brings little snow and livestock can be grazed the year round. The snowline is at an altitude of around 2,300–3,300 m. The Altai rivers are chiefly fed by melt-water and summer rains. Characteristically, they run very low in winter and high for a lengthy period in spring and summer.

The biggest of the Altai's many lakes, the Markakol and the Teletskoe, lie in tectonic depressions. The foothills and lower mountains are occupied by mountain meadows and steppes of cereals and mixed grasses, some including shrubs, to an altitude of 400–1,200 m. In the western and north-eastern parts, which are the wettest, the lower and middle slopes are covered with mountain taiga (temperate coniferous forest). In the western Altai, following long exploitation, the dark-needled fir taiga has in places given way to secondary

forests of birch and aspen. Above lies a mountain-meadow zone consisting of the subalpine meadow, meadow and shrub and alpine-meadow zones. In places the mountain-meadows are replaced by mountain-tundra, especially in the east.

The Altai is inhabited by the bear, the lynx, the fox, the sable, the Siberian polecat, the ermine, the squirrel, the musk-deer and the Siberian deer; many species of bird (wood-grouse, hazel grouse, black grouse and nutcracker); and in the high-mountain zone by the Altai pika,⁴ the mountain goat, the snow leopard and so on. Domestic animals include the yak or *sarlyk*.

The Altai contains deposits of gold, mercury, antimony, tungsten, manganese, iron, marble, surfacing stones and lignite. Its hydroelectric and timber resources are large, and its natural pastures and hayfields are rich. Various farm crops such as cereals are raised in the foothills, in the mountain valley terraces and in the basins between the mountains. The population consists chiefly of Altaics, Kazakhs and Russians.

The Sayans consist of the western Sayans (3,121 m) and the eastern Sayans (3,491 m). They generally have smoothed surfaces such as plateaux or *sarams*. Where they rise above the treeline, snow lies for up to 10 or 11 months, while in summer these plateau-like summits are covered in bright lichens. Many large rivers cut through the mountains – one such being the valley of the Yenisei, which squeezes between steep slopes up to 1,000 m and even 1,500 m high.

In the mountains summer lasts only one or two months. As the altitude rises, the average July temperature falls from 16° to 6°. But winter here is warmer than in the foothills and the intermontane basins, although from September to mid-May the mountain slopes are covered in snow and frosts of -40° are quite common with a fierce wind.

The Sayans receive from 300–400 mm and up to 800–1,200 mm of precipitation per year. In the foothills pine and larch forests predominate with an admixture of birch, aspen, bird cherry and glades of tall grass. At a height of 800–900 m mountain taiga of spruce, fir and cedar occurs with plentiful mosses. This is inhabited by musk-deer, squirrel, sable, elk and bear. At 1,600 m this gives way to sparse subalpine forests of cedar and larch and groves of willow, birch and juniper. Above this level stretch alpine meadows and screes. In the eastern Sayan, pine and larch predominate. Above them stretch tundras of shrubs, moss and lichen (bald mountains).

The Sayan foothills are among the most favourable corners of Siberia and have long been settled by humans. In the Minusinsk basin, an isolated and autonomous centre of ancient culture sprang up as long as some two millennia ago. It is evidenced by many barrow tombs, the remains of ancient earthworks and townlets, ore-mines, irrigation ditches,

⁴ A small rabbit-like mammal, also known as whistling hare or rock rabbit. [*Trans.*]

stone carvings and rock faces covered with drawings and inscriptions. These regions are now sown to cereal crops. There are deposits of iron, copper and complex ores, gold, mercury, aluminium and graphite.

The Hangayn Nuruu in central Mongolia rises to 3,905 m, while the Hentiyn Nuruu, north-east of Ulaanbaatar, is lower, at up to 2,800 m. Mongolia's mountains rise amid elevated expanses of plains with a dry and sharply continental climate, marked by large seasonal and diurnal fluctuations in the air temperature and great variations in precipitation from year to year. These climatic features also apply in the hills but the temperatures in both summer and winter are markedly lower, while the quantity of precipitation rises from 100 mm per annum or less in the south and 200–300 mm in the north to as much as 500 mm or more in the mountains. Among the mountain lakes, the freshwater stream-fed Hövsgöl Nuur and the Har Us Nuur stand out by their size.

In the Hangayn Nuruu the following altitude zones can be distinguished: feather-grass steppe, mountain forest-steppe, subalpine and alpine meadows succeeded by alpine meadow-steppe, and the frost and scree zone.

In the intramontane steppe valleys and the foothills, the Mongolian yellow antelope can be encountered, while in the mountain-steppe and forest-steppe the Siberian marmot is abundant. The forests are inhabited by sable, flying squirrels and chipmunk, while roe deer and Siberian deer may be encountered and, in the Chentejn Nuruu, elk and musk-deer. Wolves and foxes are almost ubiquitous. In the high mountains nest the *ular*,⁵ the white partridge, the alpine jackdaw and the chough.

There are large flocks of sheep, cattle, horses and yaks. Mineral wealth mined in the mountains includes coal (in the western and southern spurs of the Hentiyn Nuruu), tungsten, copper and molybdenum ores and fluorite. There are also deposits of phosphorites, graphite, lead and iron ores.

Mongolia is inhabited chiefly by peoples of Mongolian language: Khalkha Mongolians in the centre, Durbets, Bayats and others in the west, and Buriats in the north. There are also Tuvinians living in the north, and Kazakhs in the north-west.

The Kazakh *Melkosopochnik*⁶ is not 1,500 m high, but it has steep craggy sides, stony screes and various kinds of weathering. It receives rather more precipitation than the surrounding plains and consequently forest-steppe and forest landscapes have grown up here – scattered patches of birch and aspen or pine forests and light woodland. There are precious metals, copper, complex and other ores, and quarries for extracting mineral building materials.

⁵ Central Asian snow-cock – a large game-bird. [Trans.]

⁶ This Russian word meaning low hills is used in the *Times Comprehensive Atlas of the World*. [Trans.]

The Kopet Dagh is the outer line of the Turkmen-Khurasan mountains which form the northern limit to the Iranian highland. The Kopet Dagh is relatively low but steep and craggy to the north side, and lies on the southern boundary of the Kara Kum desert. It has no eternal snows or glaciers, so the mountain valleys are not well watered and the mountains themselves are desert-like. The basic ranges of the western Kopet Dagh are divided by valleys running lengthwise several kilometres wide: the Khoja-kala, Sumbar and Chandyr valleys. The northern chain of the western range and the more southerly chains are generally 1,000–2,000 m high.

A little more precipitation falls here than on the neighbouring deserts (on average 300 mm a year, on some parts up to 350 mm), with the greatest amount falling in May. The lower cretaceous limestones hold underground water in their fissures, which feed warm-water springs. These underground waters are brought to the surface for irrigation purposes using a system of *kārezs* with purification wells.

There being no real mountain forests on the slopes (there are only sparse juniper woods), the altitude belts are less obvious in the Kopet Dagh than in many other mountains. The plains below and the low foothills (up to 350 m absolute height) are occupied by southern (subtropical) desert landscapes. The vegetation is predominantly ephemers, especially groups of sedges and meadow grasses, replaced higher up by ephemeral and *Artemisia* communities. In the high foothills and to some extent in the lower slopes (350–500 m), semi-desert and desert-steppe landscapes are widespread, with semi-desert ephemeral *Artemisia* vegetation. In the middle slopes (500–1,150 m) the subtropical mountain-steppes are dominated by couch-grass communities and the scree by beard-grass. Here the Turkmen maple, hackberry and shrubs grow, while the Turkmen juniper occurs even here. In the valleys there are also pistachios to be found, and in the western Kopet Dagh there are walnut groves. At the bottom of the gorges in the south-western Kopet Dagh, shrub thickets grow along the streams together with wild vines and fruit-trees – fig, medlar, apple and pear. Plane-trees and pomegranate can also be found.

The mountain-steppes of the Kopet Dagh are home to the porcupine and the mountain sheep. In the forests and thickets of the gorges there are wild boar, leopards and, on the more open ground, cobras. From 1,150 to 2,500 m is the altitude of the mountain feather-grass and festuca steppe, the mountain xerophytes (*Acantholimon*, *Gypsophila*, *Astragal* and so on) and small junipers. In this altitude zone, the boar and occasionally the leopard, the markhor, the mountain sheep, the black vulture and the Caspian *ular* can be found.

In the western Kopet Dagh there are deposits of barite and witherite, which are used to manufacture barium salts and cinnabar. At the heart of the Kopet Dagh's natural resources

lie the summer (in the upper mountains) and spring (on the lower slopes) pastures. The plains of the foothills and the lateral valleys contain Turkmenistan's main farming oases. The oases of the plains now receive water from the Karakum canal. Protected by the mountains from the northern winds, the south-western valleys are subtropical farming districts.

The Hindu Kush, which rises above 4,000 m, has widespread scree and frequent torrents, avalanches and rock-falls. It is cut through by many canyons and ravines. Some of the valleys form through routes across the Hindu Kush via which peoples – possibly driven by the increased aridity of the steppes – have invaded India from the north.

In the prevailing continental Mediterranean climate, only 300–800 mm of yearly precipitation falls, and precipitation rises to 1,000 mm only in Nuristan and the Hindu Raj range, which are influenced by the Indian Ocean summer monsoon. In the Afghan capital, Kabul, which stands on the Paghman range at a height of 1,800 m, the average July temperature is 25 °C with a daily range of 18–31 °, although at 2,500–4,000 m it is only 10 °. The January average in Kabul is -3 °, but the temperature may fall as low as -30 °. Above 1,300 m the snow blanket lasts for six to eight months, and above 3,000 m the harsh winter lasts for up to nine months. The frequent and abundant snowfalls form a blanket up to 5 or 6 m deep in parts. On the northern slopes the snowline is at 4,650 m, and on the southern slopes it lies at around 5,400 m. Rivers are generally glacier-fed with some snow-melt water.

Up to 1,500–2,000 m the foothills and lower mountains are taken up with semi-deserts and thorn bushes and with dry steppes on grey-brown soils. Higher up junipers grow, joined by groves of damson, barberry, small-leaved maple, wild pomegranate, pistachios and nut-trees. Almond and dog-rose thickets rise to 2,500–2,700 m. In western Badakhshan, Nuristan and the Hindu Raj, the forests are dominated by oak, walnut, maple and, on the northern slopes, spruce and fir: from 2,700 to 3,200 m sparse and stunted junipers prevail. In the mountains of Nuristan and the Hindu Raj, forests of Himalayan cedar, fir and spruce grow and in the valleys there are groves of wild vines, apricots, almonds and apples. On the south-eastern slopes of the Hindu Kush the treeline lies at 3,300–4,000 m and the forest consists of small spruce trees and clumps of juniper. Above 4,000 m there are meadows with thickets of astragal and Acantholimon. The Hindu Kush is inhabited by snow leopards, wild goats and mountain sheep, while deer and brown and black bears are found in the forests.

The scattered *kishlaks* (villages) of the Kafirs, or Dards, Afghans, Tajiks and Pamiris (Wakhis) cling to steep slopes at great altitudes. On soils transported from far away the people raise livestock and crops. Every level space in the villages is invariably ploughed

and sown, the mountainsides are skillfully terraced, and water is led to the crop patches. Wheat, barley and lentils can be found up to 3,400 m. Goats are the chief livestock, but cattle are grazed in valleys with alpine meadows.

Although the Pamirs lie wholly within the subtropical belt, their huge height results in altitude zoning and ensures a harsh climate over most of their territory (except for the western valleys). In the north-west the annual quantity of precipitation exceeds 2,200 mm, while in the eastern Pamirs only around 100 mm a year fall. Cold high-altitude deserts with lifeless landscapes are common here. Unlike the rest of the Pamirs and Alai mountains, where most precipitation falls in the spring and early summer, in the eastern Pamirs most precipitation falls in summer. The climate is very dry and markedly continental and severe (at around 4,000 m the average January temperature is as low as -20° , and in July it is 8°). In the western Pamir valleys the temperatures are higher: at around 2,100 m, the average January temperature is -7.4° and the July average is 22.5° .

On the north-western flank of the Pamirs the snowline lies at 3,600–3,800 m, while in the central and eastern parts it rises to 5,200–5,240 m. Around 7,100 glaciers are known in the Pamirs. The glacial area extends to approximately 7,500 km², or over 10 per cent of the surface area.

Rivers chiefly belong to the Amu Darya basin. In addition to the Amu Darya itself, which is known as the Panj in its upper reaches (Fig. 4), the biggest are the Kyzyl-Su and the Surkhab-Vakhsh. The rivers on the eastern flank of the Pamirs belong to the Yarkand (now known as Shache) and Kashghar (Kashi) basins. Of the Kashghar basin rivers, the upper reaches of the eastern Kyzyl-Su and the Markan-Su flow through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Originating in the high mountains, the major rivers are fed by glaciers and snows, with a larger share of glacier water than the Tian Shan rivers. This is particularly true of those rivers that start in the north-western Pamir glaciers and flow down from the Za-Alaiskiy range. The largest lake in the Pamirs, the Karakul in the eastern Pamirs, lies at an altitude of 3,914 m above sea-level. The largest of the Pamir's stream-fed lakes formed by landslips is Lake Sarez, which was created in 1911 by a mountain-slide.

The landscape varies according to altitude. In the high mountains, snow and ice-fields, stone-fields, meadows and meadow-steppe, cold deserts, semi-deserts, mountain-steppe and steppe valleys are widespread (Fig. 5). On the middle slopes, shrubby steppe, subtropical steppe of tall grass, semi-desert and desert mountain valleys chiefly colonized by *Artemisia* are found. Trees are very rare and of few varieties. On the rocky slopes and ancient moraines there are sparse clumps of juniper which, like the willow, climbs higher




FIG. 4. River Panj (upper reaches of Amu Darya). (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

up the mountain than do other trees. Poplar, birch and willow grow in groves along the banks of rivers and streams (Fig. 6).

The fauna of the Pamirs, particularly in the high mountain deserts of its eastern part, is not abundant but is distinctive and has much in common with the fauna of Tibet and the Tian Shan. The *arkhar* (wild sheep), the long-tailed marmot, the red pika and the Pamir hare live there. Yaks and *kutas* (wild yaks) are reared. Pamir birds include the Tibetan snow cock, the Tibetan sandgrouse, the *ibisbill*, the Tibetan crow and lark, the Himalayan snow vulture and the mountain or Indian goose.

Mineral wealth includes gold, molybdenum and tungsten ores, asbestos, mica, lazurite, rock crystal and coal.

Thanks to the Pamirs' southerly position and continental climate, vines can be cultivated up to around 2,000 m, the apricot up to 2,700 m and barley and peas up to 3,500 m.

Most of the population is concentrated in the mountain valleys. The western part is chiefly inhabited by mountain Tajiks: Wakhis, Ishkashimis, Shughnis, Roshanis, Yazgulis and Vanjis. The eastern Pamirs are more sparsely populated, chiefly by Kyrgyz. The chief livelihood is mountain arable and livestock farming.



FIG. 5. Beginning of the Pamirs. (Photo: Courtesy of B. Galy.)



FIG. 6. Banks of the River Amu Darya. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

The chief northern ranges of the Hisar-Alai are the Turkestan range (5,621 m), the Alai range (5,539 m) and the Zerafshan range (5,489 m). They have many glaciers. The climate is marked by altitude-induced temperature changes and an unequal distribution of precipitation and moisture supply. In the foothills and the lower slopes, the winter is comparatively short and mild and the summer is long, with high air temperatures. The July average at the foot of the mountains is above 24° in Osh and as high as 28° in Dushanbe. With 350–700 mm yearly, more precipitation falls than in the adjacent deserts. At an altitude of 1,500–3,500 m the climate is typically mountainous, being far cooler and considerably moister. On the western, south-western and southern slopes annual precipitation is as much as 1,000–2,000 mm, while in other areas of the middle slopes less than 200 mm falls yearly. At the foot of the hills most precipitation falls in the spring, while higher up it falls in the spring and early summer. Rainfall stops in the mountains far later than on the neighbouring plains; drought starts in the late summer but does not last long: only August and September are very dry. In the snow and ice zone, the annual precipitation in the west reaches 2,500 mm. In the Turkestan range the snowline is at approximately 3,600 m.

Rivers of the Hisar-Alai are fed from various sources, chiefly glaciers and snows. The lower zone (500–900–1,000 m) is subtropical semi-deserts in the foothill plains and *adyrs* (foothills), colonized by a mixture of ephemers and *Artemisias*. *Artemisia* and ephemeral semi-deserts reach to an altitude of 1,000–1,500 m. Above this lie subtropical mountain-steppes. At 1,800–2,000 m these give way to wooded meadows and steppes with almonds, *Exochorda*, dog-rose and broad-leaved trees including walnut and maple. Higher up, juniper reigns. The mountain-meadow zone is replaced at 3,700 m by the zone of snow and ice.

In the foothills deposits of complex ores and mercury are worked, and sulphur, coal, lignite and oil are extracted. There are also tungsten, mercury and antimony ores and coal deposits in the Zerafshan basin. The hydropower resources of the Hisar-Alai are still little tapped. The juniper forests are not exploited because of their important role in preventing soil erosion and conserving water. The pasture resources of the mountain-meadows and mountain-steppes are great and important, as are those of the ephemeral vegetation on the *adyrs* for spring pasture. Many field crops are grown on irrigated and nonirrigated lands in the foothills and lower slopes, and there are many irrigated cotton fields, orchards and vineyards.

The Tian Shan is made up of a number of ranges that run along the parallels (Fig. 7). The biggest are the Kokshaal-Too (7,439 m), Kyrgyz (4,855 m), Kungei (4,771 m), Terskey (5,280 m), Zaili (4,973 m), Talas (4,488 m), Pskem (4,396 m), Chatkal (4,503 m) and Ferghana (4,940 m) ranges. The eastern Tian Shan includes the Borohoro, Bogda Shan,



FIG. 7. Mountains of Terskey and Chatkal surrounding Lake Issyk-kul. (Photo: Courtesy of K. Issak.)

Barkol, Bortoula and Qoltag; to the south lies the Kuruktag. The main ranges are 4,000–5,000 m and up to 5,500 m high.

In the inner and central Tian Shan, the high-mountain valleys are smooth-bottomed; the bottoms are covered with grassland and serve as pastures, called *syrta* (meaning smooth high-mountain areas) by the local Kyrgyz population. On the mountain slopes the intensive erosion forms scree, rock-falls, landslides and, in the gullies, torrents (Fig. 8).

The Tian Shan is situated a long way from the Atlantic Ocean, which generates the cyclones in temperate Eurasia, and lies in relatively low latitudes, among dry expanses of desert plains. This makes its climate in general markedly continental. However, the great range of altitudes and the complexity and fragmentation of the topography produce considerable contrasts in temperature and moisture supply. The adjacent deserts have greater influence on the climate of the foothills and lower slopes.

The westerly air-streams passing at high altitude over the Central Asian deserts bring Atlantic air-masses laden with humidity to the Tian Shan. In some areas, more than 1,600 mm fall annually. However, on the eastern slopes and in the inner and central valleys, drought conditions are established, with annual precipitation of 200–300 mm. Most precipitation falls in summer, but on the western slopes much also falls in winter. On those slopes and on westward-facing valleys the depth of the winter snow blanket reaches 2–3 m,



FIG. 8. Gorge in the mountains surrounding Lake Issyk-kul. (Photo: Courtesy of K. Issak.)

while on the eastern slopes and behind them, especially in the inner and central Tian Shan valleys, there is almost no snow in winter and these valleys are used as winter pastures.

The climate in the mountains changes in accordance with altitude from one of scorching deserts at the foothills to the chill of snow and ice-fields at the summits. The average July temperature is 20–25 ° in the valleys, while at the summits it falls to 0 ° and below. In winter all parts except the high mountains experience cold periods alternating with thaws, although the average January temperatures are sub-zero.

Lake Issyk-kul has a moderating influence on the climate of its basin (Fig. 9). Its huge body of water raises the January air temperature by about 10 °. The snowline lies at 3,600–3,800 m in the north and at 4,200–4,450 m in the south.

The rivers of the Tian Shan end in the undrained desert lakes of Central Asia, or in the lakes of the interior Tian Shan – but often their waters soak through the alluvial plains at the foothills or are diverted for irrigation. The rivers that have their source in the high mountains are fed by glaciers and snow-fields and have their full waters in the summer. The rivers are used for power-generation and for irrigating the arid basins and the nearby deserts.

In the semi-deserts at the foot of the external ranges, *Artemisia*, turf and cereal plant associations predominate. This zone is inhabited by desert and steppe fauna of the clay and loess plains below the mountains. Its upper limit lies at an absolute height of some 900 m.



FIG. 9. Lake Issyk-kul. (Photo: Courtesy of K. Issak.)

Dry steppe dominated by feather-grass and festuca with some *Artemisia* stretches at the base of the next altitude zone, that of mountain-steppe. Above that lie steppes of festuca and feather-grass. In the mountain-steppe zone there are spring and summer pastures in the lower part, and summer and autumn pastures above.

The mountain wooded meadow-steppe zone begins at 1,500 m. It lies on middle slopes with quite steep sides and narrow gullies. The lower, forest-steppe zone has widespread meadow-steppe growing on mountain *chernozems*, shrub thickets and broad-leaved forests of aspen, hawthorn, wild apple, apricot, etc. As recently as the middle of the twentieth century there were tigers here. Badger and wild boar can be seen in the broad-leaved forest. This belt has fine pastures and good hay crops.

In the upper belt of the wooded meadow-steppe zone, above 1,700 m, grow coniferous woods of Tian Shan spruce, mingled in the western Tian Shan with fir (Fig. 10 and Fig. 11). On dry slopes in this zone, there are clumps of juniper which also grow above the spruce. These coniferous forests are inhabited by roe-deer and lynx: bird life includes the nutcracker, which feeds on spruce seeds, the crossbill and the juniper hawfinch. At 2,600–2,800 m the high-mountain meadow and meadow-steppe zone begins, in parts with creeping junipers.

The subalpine meadows make fine summer pastures, the *jailyau* (grassland). Among the meadows there are frequent clumps of creeping junipers, which also occur in the alpine



FIG. 10. Vegetation in the valleys of the mountains around Issyk-kul. (Photo: Courtesy of K. Issak.)



FIG. 11. Vegetation in the valleys of the mountains around Issyk-kul. (Photo: Courtesy of K. Issak.)

belt. The alpine belt, whose meadows also make good summer pastures, has thick low grasses broken by crags and screes.

Common in the high-mountain meadows and meadow-steppes are the *arkhar* mountain sheep, the *teke* mountain goat, the snow leopard, the Tian Shan bear (which is also to be found in the forests), the *pika* and numerous marmots. Birds include the Himalayan snow cock, the alpine jackdaw, the chough, the Alpine horned lark and the brambling.

The snow-fields and glaciers start at 3,600–3,800, with their eternal snows, glaciers, crags and steeply sloping screes.

In the south of the western Tian Shan there are widespread subtropical deserts at the mountain foot, with predominantly ephemers and ephemeroids, *Artemisia* and ephemeral associations and ephemeral, couch-grass and meadow-grass associations together with some tall grasses. In the mountain-steppe altitude zone, there is a widespread subtropical steppe of tall grasses and ephemeroids dominated by hairy couch-grass, bulbous barley and various tall grasses. There are copses of broad-leaved trees amid the meadow-steppe. On slopes sheltered from cold winds by the mountain ridges, there are forests of walnut, sometimes mingled with maple and an undergrowth of damson, honeysuckle, buckthorn and apple.

In dry intermontane valleys that lie at 1,500–2,500 m, there are mountain cold deserts and alongside them semi-deserts and dry steppes are common. Their vegetation is composed of xerophytes and dwarf shrubs, especially *Artemisia*. Where they are better watered, fescue and feather-grass occur. Where the grasses are heavily grazed by livestock, dwarf semi-shrubs become more numerous and the vegetation becomes more desert-like. As the altitude increases, types of *Artemisia*, oat-grass and feather-grass characteristic of the high Tian Shan begin to appear. Plants typical of the high alpine mountains also appear. In moister places the semi-desert and dry steppe give way to mid-mountain and high-mountain steppes where feather-grass, fescue, oat-grass and other grasses predominate. Above the cold high-mountain deserts, in the *syrta* zone below the snows, lie almost bare rock tundras right up against the snow-fields and glaciers of the flat summits.

A varied population lives in the mountain valleys and basins of the Tian Shan: Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Russians, Mongolians, Uighurs, Hui or Dungans, Chinese and others.

Hydropower stations have been built on the Syr Darya and its tributaries, the Naryn and the Kara Darya, the Chirchik, the Ili and many other rivers.

The Tian Shan has forest resources and rich pastures. The most important functions of the forests include water conservation and soil protection, and also preservation of biodiversity and climate control.

The Kunlun Shan stretches east–west for 3,000 km in the very heart of Central Asia. Its main ranges are the Kashghar mountains (7,719 m) and the Arkatag Shan (7,723 m).

Between them stretch high plateaux and intermontane valleys. In the sharply continental climate of the Kunlun, a long, cold winter gives way to a short, hot summer. The average January temperature on the lower slopes is -7° to -9° , and the July average is 25° to 28° . In the high mountains the winter frosts fall as low as -35° and the July temperature does not exceed 7° to 9° . The annual volume of precipitation rises from 50 mm at the foot of the central part of the northern slope to 300 mm in the high mountains and 800 mm in the Kashghar mountains and at the eastern tip of the Kunlun. The precipitation mostly falls in the late spring and summer. Winters are frequently without snow, and the snow blanket may be more than 1 m deep only above 4,000 m. The snowline currently lies at 3,900–4,800–5,900 m. The glaciated area is 11,600 km².

There are no more lifeless mountains in the whole of Central Asia. The deserts and steppes rise almost to the snowline. In the central and most arid part of the Kunlun, the desert reigns. In the major lateral valleys *solonchaks* are widespread. From 3,500 to 3,600 m there is fragmentary steppe of Ephedra, Eurotia and Artemisia. On the western and eastern edges of the Kunlun, it is replaced by bunch grass steppe and meadows. From 5,000 m there is widespread cold desert with cushion forms of Eurotia, Androsace and tansy.

In the past these mountain slopes bore quite extensive forests. Their shade preserved the snows which supplied water to the many city-states along the northern foothills. The destruction of the forests caused the rivers that flow from the Kunlun to dry up and led to the dying of the populous towns in the now waterless Taklamakan and Tsaidam basins. The foot of the mountains that border on the Taklamakan desert were framed with an almost continuous belt of poplar forest that grew there even in the late tenth century thanks to the moisture trickling down from the mountains. Forests of fir, arborescent juniper and Tian Shan spruce can even now be found here and there on the northern slopes of the Kashghar mountains from 2,400 to 3,600 m. On the better-watered slopes of the eastern Kunlun, where once pine and oak forest grew with fir and spruce above them, isolated oaks and elms now stand.

The mountains are home to mountain sheep (in the west the *arkhar*, in the east the *kuku yaman*), mountain goat, *kulan* (wild ass or onager) and the occasional wild yak. Wolves, foxes, bears and snow leopards are common. There are many *pikas* and marmots.

The Kunlun Shan is inhabited by Uighurs and in the west by Tajiks and Kyrgyz. Their main occupation is nomadic stock-farming. In the large river valleys up to 3,000 m, oasis irrigated arable farming is practised. Wheat and barley are grown (up to 3,600 m) and in the foothills there are apricot, pomegranate and peach orchards. Gold, tin, iron and nephrite have long been mined in the Kunlun Shan.



FIG. 12. Karakoram pass. (Photo: Courtesy of B. Galy.)

The Karakoram mountains (average height around 5,500 m) lie between the Pamirs and the Himalayas (Fig. 12). Their eastern extension is formed by the Chang Chenmo (6,320 m) and Pangong (5,820 m) ranges, which merge into the Tibetan highland, while the Ladakh range links the Karakorams with the Himalayas. Eight summits in the Karakorams exceed 7,500 m and four of them exceed 8,000 m. The Karakoram climate is markedly continental, with precipitation ranging from 100 mm at the foot of the mountains to 1,500 mm over 5,000 m. At the foot most falls in summer, while in the high mountains it always falls as snow. Although it is far dryer here than in the Himalayas, the glacial area is large: 16,300 km². On the dry northern slopes the snowline rises to 5,900 m.

The melt-waters from the snow and glaciers feed the basins of the Indus and the Tarim. Glacier falls on the Indus tributaries sometimes cause catastrophic floods and may even temporarily reverse the flow of the Indus upstream of their fall. In winter thick ice-crusts are formed on the rivers. In the intermontane basins there are undrained lakes and *solonchaks* (Fig. 13).

In the lower parts of the northern slopes, deserts with sparse cover of *Reaumuria* and *Ephedra* are widespread. Large tracts have no vegetation at all, and only in the upper reaches of the Raskem Darya are shrubs, poplars, wild apples, pears or apricots to be found. From 3,100 m scattered thickets of *Eurotia* prevail, and still higher festuca and feather-grass steppes. In the most humid and sheltered parts, meadow-steppe occurs with some *Cobresia*. Above 3,500 m the *Eurotia* and *Artemisia* semi-desert combines with



FIG. 13. A well-deserved rest in the Karakoram pass. (Photo: Courtesy of B. Galy.)

solonchak meadows. Some small tufts of grass grow as high as 5,500 m. Camomile, campanula and edelweiss form mats of colour on the grass at the edge of crags. Mosses and lichens rise to 6,500 m. On the southern slopes, chiefly in the valleys, groves of pines, Himalayan cedar, poplar and birch persist to a height of 3,000–3,500 m. Small individual trees may be found standing or creeping on the slopes to almost 4,000 m. Higher stretch the meadow-steppes, among which clumps of rowan, willow and rhododendron may occur almost to 5,000 m.

At 3,000–4,000 m flocks of mountain goats (*markhor*), wild sheep, orongo gazelles and ada antelopes and wild asses graze. Up to 3,800 m the snow leopard is encountered, and up to 4,000 m the *pika* and the bear. Above 5,000 m mountain goats occur, eagles and black hawks fly, while a little lower falcons and kites may be seen.

The Karakoram straddles the border between India and China: it is inhabited by Ladakhis, Baltis, Hunzas and Burishkis – peoples close to the Tibetans. On the lower southern slopes there are vineyards and apricot orchards, and in the valleys up to 3,700 m wheat, peas, and plum and apple orchards are found. Apricots and barley crops ripen almost as high as 4,000 m. On the meadows and along the river-banks and lake shores, yaks, goats, sheep and ponies are grazed.

As a consequence of the trifling volume of surface waters in Central Asia, the dissolved products of mountain erosion have remained in the soil and salinated it, so that the soils here are characteristically very salt-laden and for the most part not suitable in their natural

condition for arable farming. Such soils can only be used after desalination, which requires large quantities of water.

The dryness of the air and soil, the wide temperature ranges and the salination of the soil create limited possibilities for plant growth in arid Asia. The cold winter, with little snow, is replaced by a hot dry summer with a marked lack of water throughout the plant-growing season. The most drought-resistant grasses and a few shrubs and semi-shrubs (which make do with tiny quantities of water and tolerate a large salt content in the soil) are adapted to these conditions. Central Asia's vegetation is extremely sparse and lacking in variety. Here there are dry steppes with grass associations, semi-deserts with *Artemisia*, saltworts and alliums, and also deserts with even sparser vegetation of xerophytes. Considerable areas have no vegetation whatsoever and consist of bare sands and *hammadas*. The predominant species of vertebrates are ungulates, which are adapted to the dry steppes with their snowless winters, and rodents.

Central Asian arable farming is chiefly represented by oasis farms on irrigated lands. Rain-fed agriculture can be practised only in northern Kazakhstan and Mongolia, on mountain-steppes bordering on the forest-steppes, and harvests are guaranteed only in years with abundant moisture.

THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1917–90)

D. A. Alimova, A. Kian-Thiébaut and S. Moosvi

Contents

THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN CENTRAL ASIA	515
WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN	525
Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran	525
Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	531
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN	535
India	535
Pakistan	545

Part One

THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN CENTRAL ASIA

(D. A. Alimova)

The twentieth century was characterized by profound socio-economic, cultural and spiritual changes in the life of women. During that century, women experienced three forms of political and social organization. For example, the status of women in Central Asia, tsarist

Russia's former colonial periphery, was determined to a great extent by the strict traditions and canons of Islam, which governed women's secluded, disenfranchised way of life.

Soviet historiography routinely held that only the October revolution had given women freedom and rights equal to those of men and had accordingly implemented a programme to secure these rights in real life. In fact, in Turkistan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, long before the Bolshevik coup, a progressive movement of the national intelligentsia known as Jadidism had raised the issue of drawing women into social and cultural life as part of its programme to revitalize and reorganize society. *Shurā-i Islami*, a Jadidist organization, was the first to make the issue of women's participation in elections a part of its programme.

Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (1875–1919), 'Abdurrauf Fitrat (1884–1937), 'Abdallah Avlani (1878–1934), A. Chulpan and other well-known participants in this movement believed that society's intellectual level depended in many respects on the status of women. They held that society's transformation must begin with reforms in the spiritual and cultural spheres and in everyday life, which also meant changing the perception of women's place and role in Muslim life. According to their views, the outlook of the younger generation depended greatly on the level of education of their mothers and on the principles underlying family relationships; without proper foundations for the family and a full education for young people, society could not be reformed or led down the path of progress.¹ However, the Jadids, who were well aware that a religious society where the tone was set mainly by the conservative clergy would not be receptive to drastic changes, did not undertake any particularly revolutionary measures.

Such drastic changes were characteristic of the Soviet period, when a political and social experiment was carried out to create a completely new way of life for women in Central Asia. This experiment involved violent methods, which were primarily the work of the Communist Party and entailed an open struggle with Islam. Bearing in mind the more servile status of women in Central Asia, the communists stepped up this struggle, which was conducted on a wider scale than in the European part of the USSR. As a result, definite successes were achieved in securing the legal rights of women and their entry into the productive sphere. During the very first years of Soviet power in Kazakhstan and the Turkistan ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), laws were promulgated abolishing the *kalym* (bride-price), setting the marriageable age (16 for girls, 18 for boys) and prohibiting both polygamy and the marrying off of minors. Special provisions concerning the protection of women's rights were introduced in the constitutions of all five Central Asian republics.

¹ Behbudi, 1914, Nos. 48, 49, 50; Fitrat, 1998; Avlani, 1992.

In the 1920s, when these measures were implemented, national attitudes and the need for a cautious approach were still being taken into account, as were traditions and the special features of women's way of life. The *zhenotdels* (women's sections for work among women, which existed at all levels of the Communist Party structure) organized women activists to go from house to house and to start women's clubs, cooperatives, shops, and special places where women learned to sew, read and write without encountering men.² Persuasion was the primary method in the work of the *zhenotdels*. The salaries of those who worked in the cooperatives made a substantial contribution to the family budget. *Dehqāns* (peasants) were pleased that their wives were earning money without violating accepted moral standards in the process.

However, the rate of women's emancipation did not please the totalitarian regime, which was already gaining strength. To accelerate it, a policy known as the *Khujum* (Advance) was implemented. According to the communists' definition, this was a 'qualitatively new stage' in the resolution of the women's question in the republics of Central Asia. The party shifted from explanatory methods to mandatory implementation of all Soviet laws and all party decrees.³ In fact, the women's question was caught up in the general trend towards the consolidation of totalitarian power. By 1927, all alternative voices had already been eliminated from society. Reforms in agriculture, culture, industry and other areas met the same fate. The desire to accelerate the *Khujum* artificially turned it into something more like a 'shock campaign'.

At the same time, the psychological factor (which was of paramount importance in this matter) was ignored. Even party and Soviet workers, regardless of their rank or position, to say nothing of the common people, found it difficult to accept the idea of women walking around without the *paranja* (a veil covering the woman from head to foot). For example, a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic arrested a worker because his wife had removed her *paranja*. In the *kishlak* (village) of Yallama, in Tashkent *oblast'*, senior workers forbade day labourers from 'uncovering' their women and would not allow them to go out on the street.⁴ This covert and overt resistance greatly alarmed the party organs, so a system of punishments for party members who were not 'pioneers' in this matter was instituted. At the same time, there was no mention of educational-type measures. By then (1927), the communist parties of the republics of Central Asia had 40,000 members and candidate members, of whom 25,000 were representatives of local ethnic groups.⁵

² See Shukurova, 1970; Nabieva, 1973; Aminova, 1975; Palvanova, 1982.

³ Aminova, 1975, p. 136.

⁴ *Kommunistka*, 1927, No. 8, pp. 52–3.

⁵ *Khujum-znachit nastuplenie*, 1989, p. 10.

It was assumed that these communists would be in the vanguard of the *Khujum* and would set an example for people with their progressive thinking. In fact, although they might bring their wives into the squares, where their *paranjas* were burned, the next day they would force their wives to put them back on. Thus, on 8 March 1929, in Osh *oblast'* in the Kyrgyz ASSR, about 9,000 women removed their *paranjas*, but the next day many put them back on.⁶ Administrative measures followed in quick succession. Thus, the Fourteenth Plenum of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (October 1927) approved a decision authorizing the strict punishment of party members for 'social crimes', up to and including expulsion from the party.⁷

No other methods of suppressing resistance to women's emancipation were considered. Verification that the party directive on this issue had been implemented – or, more simply put, the 'purge' – sometimes led to absurd situations. Thus, according to the testimony of one contemporary author, out of 258 senior workers of Kyrgyzstan who were 'checked', 18 had married by paying the *kalym* after the establishment of Soviet power, 3 had inherited wives and 2 were bigamists. Everyone was punished according to the party line, including 7 people who had paid the *kalym* before the October revolution, i.e. before its abolition by the Soviets. In Karakolsk district, the commission decreed that a Communist Party member named Ulmaskulov should be eradicating religious prejudices rather than basic illiteracy. After a similar 'check', one party organization was inundated by statements from the wives of senior workers concerning acceptance into the party.

Intimidation, threats and punishments replaced persuasion and education. Not taken into account was the fact that in the East a woman's fate was wholly dependent on men, her father and husband, who were not mentally prepared for the *Khujum*. The *Khujum* became so much like an organized campaign that a socialist competition was even instituted between the Uzbek and Turkmen republics on issues of woman's emancipation. The competition became known as the Pact of Millions. All this led to tragic consequences. According to archival data, in Uzbekistan alone in the two-year period 1926–8, more than 2,500 women activists, members of village and district councils and leaders of women's clubs and libraries died at the hands of men. A great many of those who were killed or maimed were rank-and-file participants in the women's movement.

Party organs saw the fruits of their haste: a male terror campaign was unleashed against women. It cannot be denied, however, that the aspiration for freedom among the women themselves was very high. Thanks to their support and active involvement, the *Khujum*

⁶ Tabyshalieva, 1995, p. 14.

⁷ *Za partiuyu*, 1927, No. 3, supplement.

was initially a great success. In Uzbekistan, in spring 1927, 100,000 women took off the *paranja*, 5,000 women were studying at the *likbez* ('elimination of illiteracy' school) and 5,202 women were elected People's Court assessors.⁸ These are impressive figures if one bears in mind the place occupied by Muslim women in the social life of the republics before that time.

The party's leading organs, however, intoxicated by the success of women's emancipation, entirely forgot – or, more likely, intentionally ignored – the Islamic factor, adopting a policy leading to the open rejection of Islam and efforts to eradicate it. The exclusion of these two factors – the psychological and the religious – was the reason that resistance to women's emancipation persisted long afterwards.

Moreover, there was a social factor that was not taken into account. A significant portion of the population of the old cities consisted of craft workers, small traders and artisans who had lost everything as a result of the development of industry. The natural process of their economic disintegration reinforced their hostile attitude towards government decisions. Nor did the 'uncovering' of women bring economic benefits for them (unlike the *dehqāns*, who used women's labour in various branches of agriculture, and the poorest segment of the urban population). Thus these artisans and small traders came out openly against women's emancipation.

Both then and later, it was commonly believed that the clergy were inciting crimes against women who had removed the *paranja* and that they were principally to blame for terrorist acts. However, there was also a progressive clergy that strove to restrain the broad sections of the Muslim population under their influence and who realized the consequences of resistance to the liberation of women, a process which had many supporters. Interpreting the Qur'an in a new way, this segment of the clergy expressed the opinion that the Qur'an did not contain a ban on women's participation in social and productive life, nor did it require them to wear the *paranja*. According to archival data, they even attempted to organize their *zhenotdels*. Thus, in *kishlaks* of the Ferghana valley, a proclamation was disseminated, signed by the 'Head of the *Zhenotdel* of the Mursali-bibi Religious Administration': while appealing for women's emancipation not to be impeded, it also stated that their religious education should not be forgotten. These kinds of attempts were repudiated, however, by the official organs.⁹

The open struggle with religion and the clergy was vividly expressed in the activities of the so-called *Kurashchan Khudosizlar* (Militant Atheists) Union organized everywhere. If in the early 1920s the *zhenotdels* favoured caution in their anti-religious propaganda,

⁸ *Pravda Vostoka*, 7 Oct. 1927.

⁹ Lyubimova, 1926, p. 38; Dimanshteyn, 1929, Nos. 5–6, pp. 49–51.

by the early 1930s there was no longer any question of this. K. Makarov, chairman of the union, said openly that there was no longer any point in being cautious. *Kurashchan Khudosizlar* helped to whip up an atmosphere of universal suspicion. All representatives of the clergy without exception were considered class enemies. Their demands to return the mosques to the faithful were presented as a manifestation of their class 'hatred for the Komsomol (Communist Union of Youth) and the clubs'. But the war over women was a war not of classes but of world views. It had nothing to do with the social allegiance of its participants, who found it difficult to relinquish notions of women that had been ingrained in their consciousness for centuries.

This battle was provoked by the crude, irregular methods of work used by the party committees. Thus they used prayer meetings in the mosques to agitate in favour of the *Khujum*, they organized *paranja*-removing 'troikas' that even included the chief of police, and they took notes from husbands stating that they were uncovering their wives. Similar violent methods had an adverse effect on the women's movement itself, which went into decline.

By the late 1930s, with the proclamation of the 'victory of socialism', it was wrongly believed that the social bases of religion had been eradicated. The reason for women's religiosity was seen to be merely 'the harmful complacency of local workers in Central Asia who have permitted the curtailment of anti-religious work among women'. A certain F. Popov connected it with the 'counter-revolutionary' leadership shortly before his article came out on A. Ikramov, the 'repressed' first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan.¹⁰

One of the Soviet regime's problems was how to attract female labour into the national economy. Discussion of women's participation in industrial production focused on those branches where there was the greatest likelihood of using female labour, and it was suggested that women be utilized only in those jobs which did not involve lifting heavy weights or dangerous physical loads. By the late 1920s, however, this position began to change. A tendency developed to equate female and male labour. Equality was interpreted literally and female labour began to be actively incorporated into all types of production. Many party and Soviet workers suggested using women to fill the major gaps in the Central Asian workforce. For example, it was felt that construction work should be done by women and that they should be used in carpentry, in carrying bricks and in laying stone.¹¹

As a result of this forced 'equality', by 1939 women had gained a hold in 50 per cent of male professions. Disregard for woman's natural role and the characteristics of the

¹⁰ Popov, 1938, No. 12, pp. 13–15.

¹¹ Volny, 1931, p. 25.

female organism was also vividly manifested in the use of women in agriculture. Here, too, the thesis about the equality of female and male labour was transformed into dogma that no one tried to refute. In 1930 women in the cotton-growing regions of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan comprised 80 per cent of the workforce. They were used in 15 types of agricultural work, from seed cleaning to ploughing. In 1932 one magazine wrote that female labour should be used exclusively to cultivate labour-intensive, industrial crops.¹² The general and forcible inclusion of women in the *kolkhozs* (collective farms) in the absence of the provision of basic services, especially kindergartens, led to women working in the hot sun with children in their arms and on their backs. Ironically, this was referred to as the high level of consciousness of *kolkhoz* women.

The pursuit of successes in socialist construction also affected the women's question. A decree was handed down from the command regime to consider it resolved. In 1930 the *zhenotdels* were eliminated in quick order, and in 1932 the KUBT (Commission for the Improvement of Women's Labour and Life) and women's magazines were shut down, including the Uzbek *Yangi-yul*. Owing to the ideological and political situation during those years, the women's question suffered the same fate as many other major social issues: it was closed for discussion as a subject not appropriate for rhetoric on 'the grandest achievements'.¹³

During the Second World War, however, the governing bodies of the Soviet state were compelled once again to revive the *zhenotdels*, inasmuch as the full burden of labour in the national economy rested on the shoulders of women, a factor that could not be left outside the realm of ideology. However, women did not enjoy the same popularity and influence they had in the 1920s. Paradoxical though it may seem, the war conditions established women's authority as individuals, workers and leaders. This was of particular significance for the republics of Central Asia. During these years, public attitudes evolved; people became convinced that women could replace the men fighting on the front in all sectors of the national economy, in state government, in social and political life, and in the field of culture. It was during these years that the number of qualified women workers from the indigenous ethnic groups increased significantly.¹⁴ During this period, the number of women workers doubled, and their proportion rose from 29 per cent of the workforce in 1940 to 54.4 per cent in 1945. By the 1950s, the number of women employed in education, science, and health care exceeded the number of men.¹⁵

¹² Rizel', 1932, No. 9, p. 31.

¹³ *Partrabotnik*, 1934, Nos. 3–4, p. 33.

¹⁴ Davletova, 1949; Zhivotovskaya, 1963; Ibragimova, 1987.

¹⁵ Tabyshalieva, 1998, p. 69.

The improvements in the lives of women in Soviet Central Asia, in particular the achievement of universal literacy and the great successes in the areas of technology, health care, education and science, which became free and accessible, transformed their status. For example, in the brief period from 1926 to 1939, the number of literate women in Tajikistan aged 9–49 increased from 0.9 to 77.5 per cent.¹⁶ In the 1960s women made up 60 per cent of the doctors in Uzbekistan, 70 per cent in Kazakhstan, 66 per cent in Kyrgyzstan and 58 per cent each in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.¹⁷ At the same time, however, this was accompanied by ideological indoctrination, and the official communist ideology held the women's movement in strict check, defining the place of women in the overall party system. Since there was a quota system for women, they accounted for only a small percentage of the country's leaders.

Special attention was paid to implementing this arrangement in the republics of Central Asia, where female cadres were not allowed to take the most important decisions. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, women's participation in political life was expressed in slogans rather than action, and became topical only during the celebrations of International Women's Day, 8 March. This period saw a worsening of the socio-economic crisis, which weighed most heavily on women. The indices for women's labour in this period were low, although achievements were touted in party forums. In Turkmenistan, for example, despite the generally slow growth in numbers of women workers, the number of female representatives of local ethnic groups among them rose even more slowly.¹⁸ There was no increase in the proportion of women employed in Uzbekistan's industry for the 15-year period 1950–65.¹⁹ In Tajikistan, for the 27-year period 1950–77, the proportion of women manual and office workers did not change either.²⁰ This was apparently due to the tenacity of conservative thinking among men, who considered women's lot to be the home and family and who were opposed to the employment of women in productive work.

Much more painful and acute was the problem of women's employment in agriculture. However, the role of female labour in cotton production was highly valued, so the difficulties and deficiencies were concealed. In no other period of time was female and child labour exploited on such a scale in the cotton fields. Added to this was the lack of normal social and living conditions and the absence of fixed hours for manual labour during the

¹⁶ Madzhidov, 1977, p. 20.

¹⁷ Velikiy Oktyabr' ..., 1917, p. 15.

¹⁸ Yazykova, 1972, p. 71.

¹⁹ Ubaydullaeva, 1965, p. 46.

²⁰ Chorubkashov, 1980, p. 70.

cotton season. Overall, 90.6 per cent of those employed in physical labour in 1970 were women.²¹

The appearance in the 1950s and 1960s of a large number of female machine operators stemmed from women's own desire to escape from heavy manual labour. However, as early as 1961, their number was dwindling noticeably (in Turkmenistan by a factor of 6, in Tajikistan by a factor of 3),²² and by the late 1960s, the drive by women to acquire qualifications as machine operators had died out altogether.

The party organs attributed this to the scornful attitude among male directors. In fact, most women could not handle working on the crude SKhM-48 and KhVS-12 cotton harvesters and carrying out their technical maintenance, which was fairly unsophisticated. Moreover, this type of employment, which is associated with overwork and the damaging effect of defoliants, had harmful consequences. During those years, there was also a tendency to equate male and female labour and to ignore the fact that there cannot be equality in work and physical loads for men and women. Women worked in the mines, in railway construction and in the heaviest industries. This was not compatible with their physical and biological make-up and had tragic results. As Tabyshalieva correctly notes:

An especially dispiriting situation came about in Uzbekistan. Having transformed this republic into a machine for the production of cotton, Soviet power not only brought about an ecological crisis but also sacrificed the health and dignity of millions of girls and women.²³

The cotton monoculture thoughtlessly cultivated by Soviet power led to the tragedy of the Aral Sea, which was echoed in thousands of family tragedies. The drying up and salinization of the sea, and the excessive use of chemical pesticides to cultivate the cotton plant, led to maternal and infant mortality there being the highest in the USSR. The tendency to extol the achievements of Soviet womanhood, especially the women of Soviet Central Asia, in no way implied parity in household labour. In the USSR, household technology was not developed at all.

Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika in the mid-1990s did not alleviate but rather exacerbated existing problems. The issue of the conflict between housework and work outside the home was barely addressed. All this did not succeed in overcoming patriarchal attitudes but to a certain degree even reinforced them, leaving the woman with her old circle of obligations in the family and imposing on her at the same time the status of a worker in public production. The material resources allocated by the government for a solution to the women's question were woefully inadequate.

²¹ Ubaydullaeva, 1980, No. 10, p. 48.

²² Poladova, 1972, p. 72; Karimova, 1976, No. 3, p. 73.

²³ Tabyshalieva, 1998, p. 71.

Although perestroika did not solve women's problems, especially in Central Asia, it did make it possible to talk about unresolved issues and shortcomings: the poverty among rural women, as expressed in their frequent illnesses, the high infant mortality rate, the lack of a tolerable home life and the shortage of pre-school institutions for children. All this was combined with the absence of fixed working hours, especially during the season of cotton cultivation and harvesting, low wages, poor working conditions, a shortage of drinking water and inferior food. The conditions of work and daily life for women working in industry were also far from perfect. Many enterprises that relied on female labour had been set up without consideration of Central Asia's hot climate. In the 1980s, freeing women from heavy physical labour remained a thorny issue. According to experts' reports, by the early 1980s, the greatest proportion of women employed in physical labour in industry was to be found in 11 republics of the USSR, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.²⁴

The situation entailed serious consequences for women's morale and psychological health. According to press reports, in 1986 and 1987 there were 270 instances of self-immolation by women in Uzbekistan,²⁵ caused by the burden of housework, the impossibility for women to realize their abilities and satisfy their needs, their difficult economic status, and the lack of support and mutual understanding within the family.

Far from disappearing, these shortcomings persisted, and were then compounded by new problems caused by the drastic political changes. The fundamental alterations in the government structures of the republics of Central Asia, the acquisition of independence, the liberation from the dictates of another state, and the realization of the age-old hopes of the peoples of Central Asia also pushed the women's question into the background. During the transitional period, all these new states faced a socio-economic crisis which was felt, first and foremost, by the female part of the population. For this reason, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, measures were taken to organize a structure that would directly address women's issues. Each of the republics attempted to formulate policies in this sphere and to draw up legislation aimed at the social protection of women and the family, as well as a programme of action to improve women's status. All the republics instituted Women's Committees, a network of which has spread everywhere, even to remote provinces. These committees have experience working among the broad mass of the female population and have access to power structures.

The countries of Central Asia, which have taken their own paths to development as nation-states, are trying to secure self-determination in all areas of life. Their all-round

²⁴ *Pravda*, 8 March 1990.

²⁵ *Tashkentskaya Pravda*, 24 Dec. 1988.

development requires the fully fledged participation of women in these processes. Despite the difficulties of the transitional period, the high educational level of both women and men and the development of a mass movement for women's rights can be viewed as encouraging prospects in Central Asia.

Part Two

WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN (1900–90)

(A. Kian-Thiébaut)

In the twentieth century, both Iran and Afghanistan saw the emergence of a women's movement, consisting of urban women from the educated, affluent or middle classes, that has accompanied endeavours in both countries to build nation-states. Women activists have also campaigned for the recognition of women's rights. Modernizing rulers generally included women in the overall programme of modernization and national development, giving them the right to education, political rights and the right to work. However, they did not challenge gender relations within the family, and like their conservative opponents upheld the logic of the patriarchal system and male domination. This is why Afghan and Iranian women fighting the patriarchal order and male domination have attempted to gain access to public life: improvements in their legal status and their position in the private sphere are inextricably linked and are contingent on change in the relations of domination in their societies.

Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Iranian women participated in the three main social movements of modern Iran: the constitutional revolution (1905–11), the movement for the nationalization of oil (1951–3) and the 1979 Islamic revolution. While the first two attracted a minority of educated, upper- or middle-class women, the third saw the massive participation of women of all social classes and cultural backgrounds, confirming the importance of women as a social and political

force. In the post-revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran, gender inequality has been institutionalized through legislation. Despite opposition from a large number of clerics, who wish to send women back to the domestic sphere, women have succeeded in maintaining a presence in the public sphere and have attempted to bring about changes in the laws affecting them and to improve the status and condition of women.

During the constitutional revolution, women constitutionalists, many of them wives, daughters and sisters of revolutionaries, founded the Women's Associations (*anjomanhā-ye nesvān*) in order to debate their social and political rights, and demonstrated in the streets in support of the revolution. The first parliament (1906–8) passed a law making primary education compulsory and free for girls and boys but, owing to lack of funding, this was never enforced. In 1909 the women constitutionalists demanded political rights for women and organized sit-ins in parliament. During the same period, and in order to educate their fellow countrywomen, they published two women's magazines: *Dānesh* [Knowledge] in 1908 and *Shekufeh* [Blossoming] in 1911. However, the majority of members of parliament, the clerics in particular, were vehemently opposed to the granting of political rights to women, deeming it 'un-Islamic'.

This convinced the feminist constitutionalists that securing equal rights would require cultural change, to which education was the key. To this end, they established girls' schools and women's associations and continued to publish women's magazines, including *Zabān-e zanān* [Women's Language] in 1919, *Ālam-e nesvān* [Women's Universe] in 1920, *Jahān-e zanān* [Women's World] and *Nāme-ye bānavān* [Letter for Women] in 1921 and *Peyk-e sa'ādatnesvān* [The Herald of Women's Happiness] in 1928. Accused of anti-religious propaganda, many of these women were imprisoned or forced into exile and their premises were attacked and burned down by obscurantists. Despite these threats, they continued their independent activities and succeeded in recruiting more women to the cause of female emancipation. But the accession of Reza Shah (1925–41), founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, and the emergence of a strong, centralized, omnipresent state brought women's issues under state control and put an end to the independent women's movement. Socialist, communist and even independent women's associations were banned and their founders imprisoned.

Under Reza Shah and largely inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), legislation born of the state's 'secular' but undemocratic approach was introduced and certain reforms designed to facilitate women's access to public life were implemented. The schooling of girls in urban areas gained momentum, and by 1941 girls accounted for 28 per cent of pupils in primary and secondary schools. The founding of the University of Tehran (the first in Iran) in 1936 gave women access to higher education and certain jobs, in education

and the civil service in particular. However, they did not obtain political rights. The Civil Code promulgated in 1928 was largely based on the *shari'a* (Islamic law), and no changes were made to the customary laws which, *inter alia*, accorded men authority both within the family and in public life. The religious tribunals presided over by religious judges who ruled on inheritance, marriage and divorce were not abolished until 1936. Whereas, under the Personal Status Code promulgated in 1933, repudiation, polygamy and temporary marriage remained in force and marriage was forbidden between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man, the wearing of the veil was outlawed in 1936.

For the overwhelming majority of women trapped within the closed world of traditional values, to be seen without the veil was tantamount to going naked. For their husbands, fathers and brothers who, in keeping with tradition, were the custodians of the family's honour (*nāmūs*) and women's 'chastity', this ban was like castration, stripping them of their masculinity – all the more so since the police were under orders to remove women's veils by force.²⁶ As a result, instead of encouraging the presence of women in the public sphere, this measure led the majority of them to shut themselves away. Owing to the limited scope and enforced nature of these reforms, they failed to change traditional culture and perceptions, as on the one hand they were restricted to urban areas and, on the other, they did not affect the fundamentals of patriarchal authority.

The opening up of the political arena in the wake of Reza Shah's abdication in 1941 enabled women's organizations to restructure, resurface and demand political rights, but in vain. It was not until the granting of political rights to women by the Mohammad Reza Shah (1941–79) and the promulgation of the Family Protection Law (1967) that there was an increase in women's rights in both the private and public spheres. As part of his reform programme, the shah granted political rights to women in 1963, a move that fuelled the discontent of high-ranking clerics, including Ayatollah Khomeini, who labelled women's right to vote and their presence in the Chamber of Representatives, the Senate and town councils as un-Islamic.²⁷

Nevertheless, women's right to vote and to stand for election did not result in their large-scale participation in political activities (nor men's, for that matter), as the political arena remained firmly closed. The number of women members of parliament rose from 3 per cent in 1963 to 7.5 per cent in the shah's last parliament. The Senate, half of whose members were appointed by the shah, included three women, all of them appointed.

²⁶ For women's reactions and the consequences of the ban on the wearing of the veil, see *Khoshūnat va farhang* . . . , 1992.

²⁷ Khomeini's telegram of 9 Oct. 1962 to the shah, in *Sahifeh-ye nūr*, 1989, Vol. 22, p. 29, and the telegram of February–March 1963 to Prime Minister Alam from nine senior clerics, including Golpayegani, Shari'atmadari, Tabatabayi, Khomeini and Zanjani. See *Sahifeh-ye nūr*, 1989, Vol. 1, p. 29.

The legislative changes continued with the promulgation in 1967 of the Family Protection Law, consisting of 23 articles. Repudiation was abolished and divorce became legal, polygamy was regulated (a husband's second marriage now required his first wife's consent), women were granted the right to divorce and to have custody of their children following divorce, and their access to several professions, including the judiciary, hitherto a male preserve, became possible. Between 1973 and 1975, during the United Nations Decade for Women, the Family Protection Law was improved, with the minimum age of marriage for girls being raised from 15 to 18.

However, the application of these changes in the laws, which were a long way from establishing gender equality, was limited to the urban, modern, affluent middle classes. Rural women, who made up the majority of the female population (53 per cent of the population was still rural in 1976), remained largely unaffected by these changes, and the traditional and religious middle classes (the *bāzāris*) refused to take part in this imperial modernization. Although no independent women's organizations were allowed, the shah ordered the creation of the Organization of Iranian Women, headed by his twin sister, Princess Ashraf. With the launch of this organization, the aims and activities of women became subject to directives from above.

Like the measures taken to grant women the right to vote and stand in elections, the Family Protection Law enraged Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Iraq. Despite the changes in the laws and the rhetoric of the elite which claimed to have offered equality of opportunity to women, gender inequalities persisted. State-sponsored feminism as an integral component of the patriarchal state's general policies failed to make any real impact on the patriarchal society and culture. Imperial modernization policies gradually began to bring about some demographic and social change, but in 1976 (the year of the last census under the shah), only 35 per cent of women aged 6–65 were literate, the average age of marriage for girls was 19.5, and the average number of children per woman was 7.2. This state of affairs and the absence of an independent women's protest movement combined to impede women's awareness of their rights and the establishment of any female social identity.

During the 1978–9 revolution, large numbers of urban women who shared the general sense of discontent but who had no women-specific demands took part in the revolutionary movement. The transformation of these women into a social and political force led Ayatollah Khomeini, by then in exile in France, to retract his previous position and give a religious stamp of approval to the political rights of women, henceforth to be recognized as lawful and part and parcel of an Islamic model for society. A new interpretation of Islamic laws and traditions, presented by Ayatollah Khomeini and intended to affirm the liberty and

dignity of women and respect for their rights, served to reassure both secular and religious women activists.

But barely one month after the victory of the revolution, the Family Protection Law was abrogated and an Islamic model was applied to women's rights and family law, including: the compulsory wearing of the veil; substantial restrictions on the right to divorce and custody of children for divorced mothers (according to Article 1133 of the Civil Code, men now had the unilateral right to divorce); a return to a minimum age of marriage of 9 for girls and 15 for boys (which had only recently been increased to 13 and 17 respectively); the legalization of polygamy; the submission of women to their husbands' authority (Articles 1105 and 1108); husbands' control over women's activities outside the home (Article 1177); the banning of women from positions involving judgement and decision-making, and so on. According to the inheritance law, which remained unchanged, women inherited only one half of men's share; in the Penal Code, blood money (*diyeh*) for women was half that for men; and a woman's testimony in a criminal case was accepted only if corroborated by that of a man. Women thus lost a substantial proportion of their civil rights, although they were able to maintain their political rights as a result of the active social and political role they had played during the revolution.

The first targets of this new legislation were working women who refused to submit to the demands of the Islamists. With the complicity of Islamist women, secular women whose faith in Islam was seen as equivocal by the authorities, or whose behaviour and lifestyle were deemed too Western, were dismissed or forced into early retirement from the public sector, which employed the majority of working women. Tens of thousands of other women were forced to emigrate.

However, it was not long before some militant Islamist women became disillusioned with the excessive privileges accorded to men and the failure on the part of the political and religious elite – who viewed them exclusively as mothers and wives – to recognize Islamist women's social action, despite their role in the Iran–Iraq war effort (1980–8). Indeed, this portrayal of women, which conflicted with the participatory aspirations of certain militant female Islamists, combined with the retrograde measures imposed on women's rights and family law under the Islamic regime and the new power's manifest desire to remove women from public life, led, paradoxically, to an increased awareness among these women and the emergence of a women's social identity. Yet the war, which mobilized all of society's material and spiritual resources, stifled any expression of discontent among the female population. Despite the social problems faced by women, the government had no specific economic, social or cultural policies designed to address them.

With Khomeini's approval, four women were elected in the 1980 legislative elections for the first parliament. The number of women members of parliament remained unchanged throughout the first three Islamic parliaments, convened in 1980, 1984 and 1988 respectively. All were from religious families and, with the exception of A'zam Taleqani (from the Islamic left), occupied the traditional/conservative end of the spectrum. They came under fierce criticism from their female constituents from traditional and religious backgrounds, unhappy with the deterioration in their status. These women members of parliament, who shared a traditionalist vision and subscribed to the prevailing ideology, defended 'the Islamic needs and rights of women'. It was in this context that they proposed a number of bills to the Assembly, but most of them were rejected by their male colleagues.

The end of the war saw the beginning of what was termed the period of reconstruction (1989–97). The government's work to rebuild damaged infrastructures and restore medical and educational services was hampered by a disastrous lack of specialists, caused by their mass exodus overseas and the obstacles to hiring educated secular women. Thus the trend was reversed in terms of these women's access to work. One consequence of this return to work was a shift in the dominant ideological discourse, which became less intolerant of these women. At the same time, Islamist women stepped up their political and social activities, together with their demands for amendments to the current laws. In response to women's demands, the Women's Social and Cultural Council was formed in 1988 by the High Council for Cultural Revolution, led by President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–97), to promote women's economic and social activities. Likewise, in 1992, the Office of Women's Affairs was established, with the aim of identifying problems and shortcomings and proposing solutions for improving the status of women and their economic, social, cultural and political role. The post of Presidential Adviser on Women's Affairs was also created.

Despite their diminished rights, women benefited from the modernization policies swiftly introduced by the Islamic regime. In 1989 the economic, social and demographic situation forced the state to alter some of its positions. The high annual growth rate of the population (3.9 per cent) and the lack of means to provide for the generation born under the Islamic regime forced the state to attempt to reduce the birth rate – one of the highest in the world at that time – in spite of Islam's pro-birth tradition and opposition from the clergy. Family planning was restored and a major nationwide information campaign was launched to encourage young couples to restrict themselves to two children. This policy was backed up by an increase in the number of free clinics or health centres (*khāneh hā-ye behdāsh*) in rural areas and the training of local nursing auxiliaries to run family planning and child vaccination campaigns and improve the state of health of the rural population.

A great many educated women volunteered for public health work and to help with the education of lower-class women to encourage them to control their fertility by using modern methods of contraception. In 1991, 56 per cent of the population was urban, 67 per cent of women aged 6–65 were literate, the average number of children per woman was 4.2 and the average age of marriage for girls had risen to 21. This socio-demographic trend was to continue through the 1990s.

Under pressure from civil society, the state permitted some measure of press freedom, and this also meant that Muslim women were able to publish women's magazines, which aired the grievances of the female population. The purpose of these magazines (*Zanān*, *Farzāneh*, *Payām-e hājar* and *Zan-e rūz* in particular) was to promote the status of women, underscoring the legal, social, political, cultural and economic gaps, and to propose changes to the Civil and Penal Codes (the latter also based on the *sharī'a*), labour legislation and constitutional law. Different though their beliefs might be, gender solidarity was to emerge between Islamic women and their secular sisters, making collaboration possible. The women's journals were to play a decisive role in raising women's awareness in the 1990s and became a forum for dialogue between them and the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, women intellectuals challenged official Islam by presenting a new interpretation of the Qur'an and Islamic laws that worked to women's advantage. So it was that these women drew strength from Islam and, in reinterpreting it from a female perspective, challenged social gender relations.

Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the first reforms to the status of women were undertaken during the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman (1880–1901), under the influence of his wife Bibi Halimeh, who would appear in public without a veil and with female bodyguards. He authorized girls, once they reached the age of puberty, to refuse to honour betrothals arranged by their fathers during their infancy. Women were also given the right to initiate divorce proceedings if their spouses ill-treated them or refused to pay their allowance (*nafaqeh*), and widows who were obliged to marry a close relative of their deceased husband were released from that customary obligation.²⁸

Amir Habibullah (1901–19) took a particular interest in women's education, encouraged by his reforming adviser Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933). The latter, who had lived for two decades in the Ottoman empire, was greatly influenced by the Ottoman reforms and the thinking of Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, known as Afghani, and subscribed to the idea that

²⁸ Gregorian, 1969.

Islam was compatible with women's education and their social activity. (However, the first schools for girls were not opened until the reign of Amir Habibullah's successor.)

In addition to the change in the status of women, Habibullah's reforms were aimed at strengthening the central government and were therefore likely to reduce the sphere of influence of the tribal chiefs. The conservatives, who saw the Pashtoonwali patriarchal system of traditional tribal laws threatened by those reforms, opposed them, claiming that the amir was anti-religious and manipulated by foreigners. The reaction of Afghan society as a whole was more moderate. The reforms won the support of women from certain urban strata who aspired to the opening-up of their society, while women in agricultural and tribal regions remained faithful to the traditional values.

In the aftermath of the country's independence, Amanullah, Habibullah's son, ascended the throne (1919–29) and attempted, in turn, to introduce reforms in the status of women, in a society that was still predominantly tribal and conservative-minded.²⁹ The first school for girls (*maktab-e masturāt*) was accordingly founded in 1921, the first women's newspaper *Ershād-e nesvān* (in Persian), founded by Queen Soraya, saw the light of day that same year, and child marriages were banned. The amir stopped short of prohibiting or regulating polygamy, but made monogamy compulsory for government officials. In 1924 the first women's hospital (*shafākhāneh-ye masturāt*) was established. The sovereign also sent 13 young women to study in Atatürk's Turkey. Enforcement of the reforms advocated by the amir was limited to Kabul, however, with little effect in the provinces. Hence, they almost exclusively benefited women belonging to the ruling elite. They nevertheless aroused discontent among some Pashtoon tribes, religious leaders and some members of the amir's entourage.

Amanullah's reforming zeal increased following his tour of 1927–8, which took him to Reza Shah's Iran and Atatürk's Turkey, where the authoritarian rulers, intent on modernization, had embarked on widespread reforms. On his return to Afghanistan in 1928, the amir banned the wearing of the veil and made it compulsory for Western clothing to be worn rather than traditional dress: this included the members of the *loya jirga* (traditional assembly) meeting in August 1928, which included 12 women from the royal family. Two of Amanullah's proposals to that assembly were to regulate polygamy and to increase the minimum age of marriage for girls. However, the proposals angered the clerics and tribal chiefs, who did not hesitate to brand the amir anti-Islamic, as had happened to Amir Habibullah. Faced with considerable opposition and lacking popular support, the amir was eventually obliged to relinquish the throne in 1929 in favour of his brother, and his reforms were abandoned for a number of years.

²⁹ Poullada, 1973.

In the 1930s the *masturāt* school, which had been closed, reopened its doors, and the Franco-Afghan Malalay College was established in Kabul, but the status of women remained unchanged. In 1946, with a view to promoting women's access to education and employment, some women activists founded the *Anjoman-e refāh-e zanān* (Association for Women's Welfare). This association, with a non-political agenda, was devoted entirely to social action and the social problems of women and did not attempt to interfere with the culture or the patriarchal system, hence its longevity.

With his appointment as prime minister in 1953, Mohammad Daud—who was supported by the army and dreamed of the 'Pashtoonization' of his country³⁰ – initiated a series of reforms including the creation of university faculties for girls, and expressed his preference for women to abandon the veil. The number of girls' schools and colleges grew apace and the number of educated girls began to increase. During the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933–73), the faculties became co-educational, four women were elected to parliament and two to the Senate, women secured posts in the administration, schools and hospitals, and the 1964 constitution granted women the right to vote. The National Organization against Illiteracy was created in 1969. The number of women graduates gradually increased in the 1960s but scholarships for study abroad were reserved for the royal family and access to the best secondary schools in the capital, including the Franco-Afghan Malalay College for girls and the Esteqlal College (for boys), or the German-Afghan Amany College, remained virtually barred to some strata of society and certain ethnic groups such as the Hazaras.³¹

The 1960s and early 1970s witnessed increased political participation by educated urban women when the formation of political parties was authorized and press freedom was guaranteed. A wide range of political parties sprang up, including the Marxist-Leninist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1965, with its women's counterpart, called the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women, led by six educated middle-class women. This organization's activities were directed principally against the predominant traditional culture, and it was less concerned with women's social problems; however, it did play a role in raising awareness among urban women. Faced with the conservatives' offensive against modern women and their claims for a change in their status, 5,000 women joined forces and demonstrated in Kabul in 1970. Even so, the leftist political parties and their women's organizations only managed to attract a minority of educated urban Afghans.

While on a visit to Rome in 1973, Zahir Shah was overthrown in a *coup d'état* led by his cousin and former prime minister Daud, who proclaimed a republic. A Penal Code

³⁰ Dorronsoro, 2000, p. 54.

³¹ Haidar, 2002, p. 42.

and a Civil Code were drawn up in 1976 and 1977 respectively. The Civil Code granted women, among other things, the right to custody of their children following divorce (up to the age of 7 for boys and 9 for girls, with the possibility of the court extending the custody). Under the new constitution, promulgated in 1977, the age at which all Afghans could vote was 18 and the legal age for a first marriage was 16 for girls and 18 for boys. Article 64 of the constitution granted women the freedom to renounce their betrothals, and Article 27 stipulated the equality of all Afghans, men and women, before the law. The new leaders gave importance to the education of girls, and girls' schools were set up in all provinces. In 1977 the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), of a Maoist persuasion, was founded. Describing itself as an independent women's political organization, its stated purpose was to militate for social justice and human rights; as from 1981 it published a magazine entitled *Payām-e zan* [Women's Message].

Under the communist regime (1978–89), the 1987 constitution stipulated the equality of men's and women's rights in all areas: social, economic, political and cultural. On coming to power, the communists raised the minimum age of marriage for girls to 18 and that for boys to 20, banned forced marriages and abolished the dowry system (*mahr*), even though it represented divorcees' and widows' only capital. The Democratic Organization of Afghan Women, led by Anahita Ratebzad, the minister of social affairs, set up a literacy campaign for rural and urban girls, and the government made literacy classes compulsory for women and men. However, the project was doomed to failure because the urban population, branding the literacy courses pro-communist, boycotted them, whereas in the countryside the compulsory education programme for women angered religious leaders and traditional families, who saw them as corrupting women. Moreover, many families, including moderate ones, were so worried by the presence of Soviet soldiers that they decided to take their daughters out of school.

Under the communist regime, the employment rate among women increased since men aged 16–40 had to do military service and thousands of men left their families to join the Mujahidin. It was in order to fill that vacuum that women, including the barely literate, had to go out to work or were required by the regime to work in factories, hospitals, government offices, printing works and even restaurants. The departure of the male heads of families obliged women, hitherto often closeted at home, to go out in search of a job, an experience that showed women what they were capable of.³²

The 1980s also witnessed the mobilization of many women who risked their lives in challenging the communist regime. In 1980 the refusal of a group of high-school girls to take part in the ceremonies to celebrate the second anniversary of the 'communist

³² Pazira, 2003, p. 71.

revolution' triggered a revolt, which was bloodily put down, with bricks hurled at the soldiers marching in the parade. Students and high-school pupils from the capital joined the revolt, which spread across the country, and several women were imprisoned.

The Mujahidin attempted to draw women into their resistance movement against the communist regime and the Red Army, without inviting them to participate in the *jihād*. However, with the arrival of the Mujahidin in Kabul in 1992 and the creation of an Islamic Government there was a clampdown on the freedom of women, who had already suffered the consequences of 20 years of war. The wearing of the veil was made compulsory and even though women maintained their right to education and work, their presence in public life was greatly diminished. More serious still, women belonging to the Tajik, Pathan or Hazara ethnic groups suffered the consequences of political rivalry among ethnic leaders within the Mujahidin and became its main victims. The atrocities committed by these former allies and the prevailing insecurity alienated a large proportion of the population that had previously supported the Mujahidin, thus paving the way for the Taliban's accession to power.

Part Three

THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

(S. Moosvi)

India

In traditional India women were an important component of the labour force and so among the labouring poor they were held to be an asset rather than a liability. As in most pre-modern societies, certain tasks in India such as spinning, husking rice and grinding corn, were almost exclusively allotted to women, while in other occupations their role was supplementary to that of men. For example, men ploughed the fields and women undertook weeding and transplanting. Or women prepared the clay while men worked on the potter's wheel. Women's traditional work was not, by any means, light. It included such heavy jobs as pounding limestone and carrying bricks in the building industry. Women's restricted participation in certain other spheres was obviously dictated by the responsibilities assigned to

them of child-rearing and domestic chores, which among the poor included fetching water, gathering firewood and fodder, preparing cow-dung cakes and looking after cattle.

While working outside the home, women received wages and often sold or hawked such wares and goods as they produced themselves or in conjunction with their menfolk. This suggested a certain amount of independence for the women of the lower orders in spite of the general male dominance sanctified by faith and culture. It was, perhaps, this economic viability of women of the lower classes that meant that the bride-price was far more universal in old India than the dowry system (payment of large sums by the bride's family to that of the groom) so prevalent in India today. Moreover, in many castes there was the practice of marrying a widow to her husband's brother, or to a groom chosen by the parents-in-law, in contrast to the absolute ban on widow remarriage among the higher castes. (There was, however, no ban on widow remarriage among Muslims.)

Even among the higher classes, women were legal persons under both Hindu and Muslim law. As such, they could hold, and therefore manage property. Women of the Mughal nobility received an education and some of them even found employment in the literary and artistic fields, while others were sometimes assigned semi-bureaucratic or supervisory roles. But the independence of higher-class women was often sharply curtailed, and seclusion and the veil were enforced among both Hindus and Muslims.³³

The colonial subjugation of India during the nineteenth century affected the women of different strata in different ways. The colonial reshaping of the economy, especially 'de-industrialization' during the nineteenth century, brought about considerable changes in the conditions of women of the lower orders. Certain women's professions, notably spinning, were largely eliminated, while other avenues, such as work on plantations, in mines and in the few small factories, were created. The same women could not, of course, shift from the old sectors to the new, and their distress became a part of the nationalist critique of British rule. In certain cases, losing their outside employment meant that they were forced into seclusion.

Conditions in the new jobs created in the mills, mines and plantations were often very harsh and of a drastically different nature from women's traditional pursuits. While the traditional women's occupations were generally parttime and mainly carried out at home, employment at factories, plantations and mines was outside the home, and full-time. Though figures for the early years are not available, by the 1890s approximately 25,000 women were working in the Bombay cotton mills, constituting a quarter of the total

³³ For evidence of these, see Moosvi, 1994. Also for text and illustrations of women at work, see Skinner, 1825.

workforce of the mills;³⁴ and 14,000 were employed in the Bengal jute mills. By the 1920s the number of female jute-mill workers in Calcutta had reached 66,000; 20 per cent of these were migrants from Bihar, Central Provinces, Madras and United Provinces. During the same period approximately 80,000 women, constituting over one third of all mine workers, were employed in the coalmines, working underground as well as on the surface. Most of these women were recruited through labour contractors under 'labour gangs'; they comprised whole families, mostly of tribal origin.³⁵ In 1929 there were around 250,000 women working on tea-plantations, mainly in Bengal and Assam and owned by Europeans.³⁶ A majority of them were migrants recruited as indentured labour under the Acts of 1871 and 1873; they came mainly from the 'tribes' of the Chhotanagpur tract in Bengal and from the Central Provinces, Madras, United Provinces and Bihar.³⁷ Women workers in Indian-owned cotton mills benefited from the 'philanthropic' attentions of Lancashire, which saw a competitor in the Indian textile industry, and so insisted on imposing labour safeguards as a means to raise Indian production costs. On the other hand, women in foreign-owned mines escaped official attention, despite Indian nationalist proddings.

In 1891 an amendment to the first Factory Act of 1881 reduced the working day for women to 11 hours, and in 1911 night-work for women was prohibited. Women mine workers, on the other hand, received no relief. The Mines Act of 1923 gave them no respite on the facile ground that any concessions to women workers would increase the cost of coal by about 50 per cent. Even the regulations of 1929 were a farce – they prohibited women from working underground but exempted Bihar, Bengal, Orissa, Central Provinces and the salt mines of Punjab, the regions in which most of the mines were concentrated. Here the number of women miners was to be reduced gradually and it was stipulated that by 1939 there would be no women working underground. But on the pretext of the outbreak of the Second World War, the government lifted the restrictions on women's underground work,³⁸ making a mockery of the supposed protection for women.

The problem of prostitution intensified with the growth of urban conditions in the twentieth century and any effort to rescue the women was plagued by the lack of any alternative sources of income, or any shelters and rescue homes. The maximum achieved was the Prostitution Act of 1923, which made the maintenance of brothels illegal for men, but not for women. By and large the colonial regime, despite protestations to the contrary, saw a steady worsening of the condition of women.

³⁴ Morris, 1965.

³⁵ Forbes, 1996, pp. 168–70.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 169.

³⁷ Moosvi, 1993.

³⁸ Kydd, n.d.

On the other hand, the modern concepts of gender equality and women's rights, first proclaimed by the French revolution, could not fail to reach India. Initially, those men with a modern education began to espouse the cause of women, in matters such as *sati* (the high-caste practice of widow-burning), the remarriage of widows and female education. Raja Ram Mohan Roy (d. 1832), Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar (1820–91) and Keshav Chandra Sen (d. 1884) particularly distinguished themselves in these efforts. Christian missionaries also played a role, particularly in the field of female education. By the 1850s much progress had been made. *Sati* was prohibited by the Regulation of 1829; female infanticide was declared a criminal offence amounting to murder by a regulation of 1830; and the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act was enacted in 1856. Except for the abolition of *sati*, other laws were of little consequence in ameliorating the social status of women and remained more or less mere declarations of intent.

One area where women were particularly disadvantaged was that of literacy. In 1891 the overall literacy rate for males was 11.4 per cent as against 0.5 per cent for females (with 23 literate men to every 1 literate woman). By 1931 this had only risen slightly to 15.4 per cent for males and 2.4 per cent for females (with 7 literate men to every 1 literate woman). This limited progress was mainly due to private initiatives rather than schemes organized by the colonial regime.³⁹

The initial attempts to provide women's education were made by European missionaries, who were actively supported in many instances by Indian reformers as well as Christian converts.⁴⁰ But in the beginning only a few girls from 'respectable' Hindu families were attracted to missionary schools. By 1854 there were about 626 schools for girls spread all over the country (288 in Bengal, 256 in Madras, 65 in Bombay and 17 in what is now Uttar Pradesh), with 21,755 girls enrolled in them.⁴¹ The second half of the nineteenth century saw considerable progress in women's education. A leading role in this was played by Keshav Chandra Sen in Bengal, who was instrumental in establishing the Victoria Institution in Calcutta, to train women teachers for girls' schools. In 1875 a girl candidate was denied permission by the government-run Bombay University to appear at the matriculation examination on the technical ground that the University Regulations had only used the pronouns 'he, him, his'; but by 1878 the Bethune College for Girls had been affiliated to Calcutta University and the same university (which in 1875 had held that women's

³⁹ Davis, 1951, p. 151.

⁴⁰ Radha Kanta Deb, who opposed the abolition of *sati*, assisted the Baptists in 1819 in forming the Calcutta Female Juvenile Society.

⁴¹ Mathur, 1923, pp. 25–9.

seeking admission to university was a mere hypothetical possibility) was able in 1883 to grant degrees to the country's first two women graduates.⁴²

In subsequent decades, the progress continued: the number of women enrolled in Indian universities rose from 6 in 1881/2 to 264 in 1899/1900, and the number in secondary schools had reached 41,582 by the turn of the century. The efforts of D. K. Karve resulted in the foundation of the Women's University in 1916 at Poona; it was moved to Bombay and renamed SNDT University in 1920.⁴³ It was not, however, recognized by the British Government, and remained an institution largely favoured by nationalists.

At the turn of the century, the question of education for Muslim girls also began to draw attention. The pioneering efforts of Karamat Husain resulted in the opening of a Muslim girls' school at Lucknow in 1900. At Aligarh, which had become under Syed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) the main centre for the spread of modern education among Muslims, a movement for 'female education' was launched by Sheikh 'Abdullah. He established a girls' school at Aligarh in 1906 that grew into a degree college affiliated to the Aligarh Muslim University.

In the first half of the twentieth century, women began to enter such professions as medicine, engineering and commerce, previously the preserve of men. But teaching was the profession most favoured by women: in 1950 over 15 per cent of the primary and secondary teachers in the country were women.⁴⁴

The spread of education among women, though mainly confined to a minuscule minority from among the middle and upper classes, encouraged urban women to organize themselves and so a variety of women's associations were established. Sarladevi Maharani, a critic of the patronizing attitude of men, established the *Bharat Stree Mahamandal* (the Great Organization of Indian Women), which held its first meeting at Allahabad in 1910. Its declared objective was to bring together 'women of every race, creed, class and party ... on the basis of their common interest in the moral and material progress of the women of India'. It opened branches in many towns all over India, opposed purdah and set female education as its main objective. Political aspirations, aroused by the National Movement, also began to play a part. The Women's Indian Association was founded in 1917, and was active especially in Madras Presidency. Within five years it had 2,300 members and 43 branches. The main aim was proclaimed to be the promotion of women's education, with an emphasis on learning English, training in the crafts and the institution of 'Ladies' Recreational Clubs'. A delegation of its members met Lord Montagu, the British secretary

⁴² *The Journal of the University of Bombay*, Sept. 1945, p. 55: quoted from Forbes, 1996.

⁴³ Forbes, 1996, p. 53.

⁴⁴ Jha and Pujari (eds.), 1998, Vol. 3, p. 235.

of state for India, to demand suffrage for Indian women in the impending constitutional 'reforms' of 1919.

The National Council of Women in India, established in 1925, was a branch of the International Council of Women. Its leaders were mainly Indian women, but it was chiefly patronized by women of princely and wealthy families: its membership fees were quite high. It conducted propaganda against 'passive charity' and aimed to make poor women realize the 'necessity of self-respecting, honest work'. It was active until 1944. In political matters it confined itself to submitting petitions to the British Government.⁴⁵

The most important of the women's organizations before independence was undoubtedly the All-India Women's Conference (AIWC), which held its first session in Poona in 1927 with 87 members forming the local reception committee, 58 delegates and 2,000 observers. The initially moderate nature of the organization became apparent from the presidential address of the maharani of Baroda, who advocated 'education compatible with "women's nature" that can help them understand their position as "supplemental" to that of men'. Not only did it fail to advocate a campaign of mass education for women; it tried to idealize the position that women had occupied in an idealized past. All social evils such as child marriage, seclusion, purdah, etc. tended to be attributed to the impact of the Muslim conquest. This interpretation of history not only restricted the appeal and scope of the AIWC but more importantly in its early years prevented it from offering a rational critique of old Indian society, a failure that naturally coloured its efforts to ameliorate the condition of Indian women.⁴⁶

However, the character of the AIWC was soon to change. Holding maledominated social customs to be the real impediment to women's education, the AIWC decided in 1929 to launch a programme to arouse public opinion on the matter. Although in 1930 it decided to abstain from political activity, by the mid-1930s it had subcommittees on labour, rural reconstruction, indigenous industries, textbooks, the Sarda Act (against child marriage), etc. all of which had political implications. The AIWC thus started addressing national issues along with exclusively women's issues. These programmes brought it in line with Gandhi's 'Constructive Programme'. In 1936 its president, Margaret Cousins, declared that while in the beginning the AIWC had been the representative of elite women, it now represented the 'solidarity of sisters', 'ranging from maharanis to harijans [untouchables]'. She asked her fellow members to 'work first for political liberty, for liberation from subjection, both internal and external'. The AIWC's membership fee was reduced to 4 *annas* a year, to encourage the entry of women from the urban and rural poor. One of the principal

⁴⁵ Forbes, 1996, pp. 72–8.

⁴⁶ Basu and Ray, 1990.

nationalist leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru, had held the AIWC's programme to be 'superficial' since it did not examine the 'root causes' of women's misery. These nationalist criticisms were now taken seriously, and efforts were made to learn the realities on the ground by conducting surveys and carrying out research.⁴⁷

Despite its moving closer to the National Movement, the AIWC voted down a proposal from Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (1889–1964) that it should take part in the debates on national issues on behalf of women. It did, however, commit itself to a comprehensive bill of rights of Indian women: this did not find favour with some Muslim leaders, though Muslim women members supported the move. The AIWC started a quarterly journal entitled *Roshni* in 1941 and established a central office in 1946. Its activities remained diverse: while some members took up the task of working among the untouchables and participated in peasant movements, other branches remained passive and at best served as women's clubs.⁴⁸

The struggle for female suffrage from 1917 was mainly fought by women themselves. The nationalist leader and poet Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949) led a women's delegation to meet the Montagu-Chelmsford Commission to demand that Indian women be given the right to vote on the same terms as men. In 1918 the Indian National Congress passed a resolution in support of women's franchise. In supporting the resolution, Saraladevi Chaudhurani declared men and women to be equal. She thus went much beyond the earlier modest claims (even by those such as Sarojini Naidu) that women were the handmaids of men.⁴⁹ Despite these demands, the Southborough Committee did not recommend women's suffrage and the Government of India Act of 1919 left the question to the discretion of provincial legislatures.

The Madras legislature took the initiative, however, and gave the right to vote to women on the same terms as men. By 1926 women had been enfranchised in all the provinces though the suffrage itself was extremely limited. Madras also achieved the distinction of having the first Indian woman legislator, Dr Muthulaxmi Reddi, who also became deputy speaker of the Provincial Assembly. The rules framed under the Government of India Act of 1935 increased the number of enfranchised women to more than 6 million (compared to 28–29 million men), still comprising a mere 2.5 per cent of the total adult female population.⁵⁰ In the 1937 elections to the provincial legislatures, 8 women were elected from 'general' and 42 from 'reserved' constituencies.

⁴⁷ Forbes, 1996, p. 82.

⁴⁸ Basu and Ray, 1990.

⁴⁹ Forbes, 1996, pp. 93–4.

⁵⁰ Keith, 1961, p. 359.

The comparative ease with which Indian women received not only the right to vote but also important political positions was partly an outcome of women's participation in the country's freedom struggle. As early as 1889, 10 women had attended the fifth annual session of the Indian National Congress. In succeeding years their role often remained confined to singing at the Congress session or sitting as observers with their husbands or fathers. But the Swadesh movement (1905–7), which called for a boycott of English cloth, underlined for the first time the importance of women's participation in nationalist agitations. Gandhi's own mobilization of women in his South African campaigns, especially in 1912–13, could not but have an impact on India as well.

Gandhi's own views on the position of women underwent a radical change over time. In his *Hind Swaraj* (1909), he denounced modern civilization for taking women out of the home in search of employment. But experience and circumstances made him change his mind, and ultimately he would not hear of women suffering any disadvantage. He held that women were better suited than men for his non-violent struggle as they were 'pure, firm and self-controlled'.⁵¹ In 1919, when calling for a campaign against the suppression of civil liberties under the Rowlatt Acts, he urged 'ladies of all classes and communities' to join the struggle.⁵²

Women's participation grew in scale during the Non-Cooperation movement (1920–2), during which women played a significant role. In Calcutta, Basanti Devi (the wife of C. R. Das, the president of the Bengal provincial congress), along with two other women, was arrested for selling Indian handspun cloth. This led to a mass protest, including 'coolies, mill-hands and schoolboys', and numerous women joined in the picket of shops that sold foreign goods. Muslim women also openly joined the struggle. A Muslim woman leader known as 'Bi Amma' (the mother of the nationalist leader Muhammad 'Ali) addressed a meeting of 6,000 students at Ahmadabad.⁵³ During 1922–8, after the withdrawal of Non-Cooperation, women joined Gandhi's Constructive Programme in large numbers. The Indian National Congress elected Sarojini Naidu as its president in 1926. She was its second woman president, the first being Mrs Annie Besant (elected in 1916).

The equality of men and women in the political sphere was advocated in the Motilal Nehru Report of 1928, which an All-Parties Conference agreed to present to the British Government as a blueprint for India's future constitution. Women's participation in the subsequent Civil Disobedience movement led to greater influence for women leaders. The Fundamental Rights Resolution proclaimed at the Karachi session of the Congress in 1931

⁵¹ Basu, 1976; *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 1990, Vols. 15, 19 and 20.

⁵² Basu, 1976; *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 1990, Vol. 19.

⁵³ Minault, 1982.

promised ‘universal adult suffrage’, and asserted the equality of men and women before the law in public employment, and the free exercise of women’s trades and professions, while providing for ‘special protection’ of the interests of women workers. When the Congress formed provincial ministries (1937–9) women found representation there, though generally their number was small.

Although the constitution of India (1950) did not entirely fulfil the expectations aroused by the Karachi Resolution of 1931, some substantive gains were nevertheless made. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender and forbids any inequality on this basis in respect of access to public places. Article 16 provides for equality in matters of public employment and Article 29(1) prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender in admission to educational institutions supported by state funds. However, it failed to enforce the equality of women with men in inheritance, marriage, divorce, etc. It only enjoins on the state to legislate a ‘uniform civil code’, without any mention of securing the due rights of women. The Hindu Code (promulgated in the 1950s) did improve the status of Hindu women, but is still wanting in many respects. Only the most senior male can be the *karta* (principal co-owner) of the Hindu undivided family (HUF). Daughters lose their rights in the HUF on marriage since shares in the HUF run only through the male line. Separate laws in many states discriminate against women in respect of inheritance: for example, the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act of 1951, otherwise a major measure of agrarian reform, deprived married women of their inheritance in land.

On the other hand, under Article 15(3) of the constitution, certain laws have been passed in favour of labouring women. For example, the Mines Act of 1951 prohibited underground work for women, while the Factory Act of 1948 restricted the working day for women to nine hours with a six-day week. The Mines Act and other acts provided for maternity leave. But equal wages for equal work were only achieved in government institutions. The Public Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act of 1958 was a bold step against prostitution, even if not properly implemented. In 1951 there were 300,000 women working in factories, accounting for 11.4 per cent of all factory workers.⁵⁴ Women represented 45.9 per cent of the total workforce in manganese mines, 34.9 per cent in iron-ore mining and 24 per cent in rubber plantations.⁵⁵ Tea and coffee plantations and coal mines also had substantial numbers of women workers.

In 1951 India had 1 literate woman to every 2 literate men and the female literacy rate was dismally low, being just 7.9 per cent. However, women’s literacy rose significantly during the first four decades of independence so that by 1991, 401 out of every 1,000

⁵⁴ International Labour Organisation, 1958.

⁵⁵ Jha and Pujari (eds.), 1998, Vol. 3, p. 233.

women were literate (the equivalent figure for men was 656). Women's backwardness in relation to men, though less sharp than under colonial rule, was still noticeable. In two of the largest states, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the ratio remained practically unchanged at 1 literate woman to 2 literate men.⁵⁶ The position was still worse among tribal women and women of the scheduled castes in the reproductive age group of 15–35: their literacy rate was as low as 9 and 6 per cent respectively in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.⁵⁷

Among poorer families, boys were often sent to school, while girls were not; or girls would be taken out of school more easily than boys. According to the 1986/7 National Sample Survey, only 69 girls were enrolled at school to every 100 boys. Similarly, 3 girls were taken out of school for every 2 boys. However, among the urban middle classes the position was different. This was reflected in the numbers of women joining institutions of higher learning. In 1990/1, for example, the average overall enrolment of girls in graduate, postgraduate and professional courses as a percentage of total enrolment was 33.2 per cent.⁵⁸

Although women improved their position in all professions, teaching remained their most favoured occupation. They also became prominent in law, business and the administration. They joined the judiciary and some became High Court chief justices. This was a far cry from the colonial days when Cornelia Sorabji (1866–1954), in spite of holding an Oxford degree, was denied admittance to the bar and could plead only under *sanads* (special dispensations), mainly in connection with women's cases.⁵⁹

In politics, Indian women did even better than their counterparts in the West. In 1991 the ratio of women in the Indian parliament was 7.1 per cent, compared to 6.4 per cent in the United States, 6.3 per cent in the United Kingdom and 5.7 per cent in France. They did not, however, do as well in this field as women in the former socialist countries. Nevertheless Indira Gandhi was one of India's most vigorous and powerful prime ministers; and several women have been chief ministers of states.

However, it would be wrong to say that India is a country where, despite much improvement, real equality with men has been achieved. The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 remains practically a dead letter and 'dowry deaths', where wives are killed either because the dowry demanded is not given or because a remarriage with a larger dowry is anticipated, are regularly reported in the press. In the capital Delhi alone, the number of such deaths reported was 358 in 1979, 466 in 1981, and 573 in 1982. An amendment to the Act of 1961 decreed that the dowry must either be returned to the parents or given to the

⁵⁶ *Census of India Report*, 1991.

⁵⁷ Shariff, 1999.

⁵⁸ *Eighteenth Five-Year Plan 1990–97*, Vol. 2, 1997, p. 317: quoted from Kaur, 2004.

⁵⁹ Forbes, 1996, pp. 246–7.

children if the woman dies an unnatural death. But this too has proved to be practically unenforceable.

Stray cases of *sati*, even though it was abolished in 1829, still occur in India today, most of the cases being reported from the states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. From the city of Jaipur in Rajasthan alone, five cases of *sati* were reported in 1975. The burning of 18-year-old Roop Kanwar, on the funeral pyre of her husband in Rajasthan in April 1987, created a scandal. Shockingly, certain right-wing women's organizations such as *Rani Sarva Sangh* and *Rashtra Sevika Samiti* publicly supported the practice of *sati*.⁶⁰

Orthodox Muslims, including women, successfully agitated against an order of the Supreme Court in 1985 ('the Shah Bano case'), granting maintenance by Muslim husbands to Muslim divorced women. The Indian parliament then undermined the Supreme Court by passing a law denying Muslim women redress under Section 125 of the Indian penal code. However, the Supreme Court's judgment has had the result that the courts, invoking Muslim law itself, have been granting very large sums of compensation to divorced Muslim women. Even the legality of parliamentary legislation is in dispute in the courts. However, Muslim women are still denied equality in inheritance, and polygamy is still legal for Muslim men in India, on the basis of Muslim personal law, which is duly recognized by Indian courts.

Pakistan

The partition of India in 1947 led to the formation of Pakistan, whose self-perception as an Islamic rather than a secular state led in some respects to the creation of a different context from that of India for women's position and status.

The gender ratio in Pakistan during 1951–81 changed somewhat in favour of women, rising to 901 females to every 1,000 males in 1981 as against only 859 females in 1951, but it was still low. Female literacy in Pakistan was low in colonial times, just as in India. In 1951 it was a mere 10.1 per cent as against 25.3 per cent for men. By 1981 it had increased to only 13.7 per cent, while male literacy had risen to 31.8 per cent. There were wide regional variations, however: in North-West Frontier Province the female literacy rate was just 4.9 per cent in 1981 and in Baluchistan a mere 2.9 per cent, as against 22.7 per cent and 12.5 per cent respectively for men in the two provinces. The urban–rural differences were also considerable: in 1981 the literacy rate for urban males aged 10 and above was 51.5 per cent (females: 33.7 per cent), whereas for rural males it was 23.1 per cent (females: 5.5 per cent).

⁶⁰ Jha and Pujari (eds.), 1998, Vol. 2, pp. 209–11.

Despite the backwardness in literacy, urban women, at least, have secured many avenues of employment. In 1981, out of all employed women in Pakistan, 10.91 per cent were teachers, while those in the medical profession serving as doctors, nurses, midwives, etc. accounted for 2.77 per cent. The maximum number, 35.44 per cent, were employed in agriculture and 11.75 per cent in textiles. Women housekeepers and domestic servants accounted for 6.69 per cent. Factories and mines offered little employment (2.03 per cent) while those women working in the building industry constituted 2.59 per cent.

After 1958 certain labour laws were enacted for women factory and mine workers: they provided maternity leave and separate sanitary facilities at work, limited working hours and prohibited specific forms of work, but how far they were actually implemented is not certain.⁶¹

One major feature of women's education in Pakistan is that the ratio of women to men in higher education (apart from engineering and law) is about the same as at school.⁶² Needless to say, women among the higher ranks of the middle classes are better placed than those among the poorer strata in Pakistan.

The educated urban woman of Pakistan have taken steps to form their own organizations, such as the All-Pakistan Women's Organization (APWA) in the 1950s and, later, the Women's Action Forum. It was owing to the efforts of the APWA that a Commission on Family Laws was set up in 1955 and the Family Law Ordinance was passed in 1966 under General Ayub Khan. This law provides for inheritance by women through imposing restrictions on the practice of polygamy, restricting men's right to divorce, and making maintenance for a wife and the payment of the dowry (*mehar*) obligatory. The Family Laws were opposed by the theologians, but women came out on the streets and through their efforts the laws remained on the statute book.⁶³

The constitution of 1973 made further provisions for women's rights and declared them equal to men before the law; it also disallowed discrimination on grounds of gender in employment (Articles 25 and 27). Article 32 required that 'Steps shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life.' Article 37 enjoined the 'securing [of] just and human conditions of work, ensuring that children and women are not employed in vocations unsuited to their age or gender and for maternity benefits for women in employment'. The constitution was short-lived, but women's agitations led to the setting up of the Pakistan Women's Right Committee by Zulfikar 'Ali Bhutto. In 1976 the Dowry

⁶¹ Kelein and Nestvogel, 1986, pp. 28–9, 36–9, 148–9.

⁶² For statistics relating to 1981, see Kelein and Nestvogel, 1986, p. 48.

⁶³ Husain (ed.), 1984; Shahab, 1993, pp. 269, 275, 280.

and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act was passed although, as in the case of India's Dowry Act, its practical consequences have been small.

In 1978 attempts were made by the military regime to curtail the progress made by women since independence. In the guise of a National Educational Policy, attempts were made to deny higher education (particularly technical/vocational education such as engineering, medicine, law, commerce, etc.) to women by abolishing all co-education, supposedly to suit the 'Islamic concept of education'. The APWA and Women's Action Forum opposed the proposal for women's segregation, and ultimately the scheme was abandoned.⁶⁴

In 1979 the 'Hudood Ordinance' was decreed, placing women at a grave disadvantage in relation to men in personal matters. Professedly seeking to impose the Islamic law on adultery, a maximum punishment of death by stoning was prescribed for married persons and 100 lashes for the unmarried, the punishment to be given in public. The required proof of adultery (as well as rape) is the testimony of four Muslim male eyewitnesses of good repute, or a voluntary confession before a competent court of law. Obviously, women are the victims since their evidence as witnesses does not count. The Hudood law in effect sanctions rape, because no woman victim could now prove it. Women victims of rape are open to punishment if they become pregnant, pregnancy itself being deemed a proof, while the male perpetrator, if there are no male witnesses to the act, escapes punishment.⁶⁵ It is interesting that in India the Supreme Court has been led to hold that 'the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim should not be ordinarily doubted'.⁶⁶ This, unfortunately, is still not the law in Pakistan.

Despite such setbacks, it would be wrong to consider that women in Pakistan have been excluded from the framework of governance. During the spells of democracy, for example, Benazir Bhutto occupied the office of prime minister. And in 1985, according to the Government of Pakistan statistics, around 4,000 women were members of various urban and rural councils in the country.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Husain (ed.), 1984, pp. 210–11.

⁶⁵ Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, p. 48.

⁶⁶ Forbes, 1996, p. 245.

⁶⁷ Kelein and Nestvogel, 1986, p. 150.

23

EDUCATION, THE PRESS AND PUBLIC HEALTH

A. K. Patnaik

Contents

Education	549
The press	557
Public health	562
Conclusion	567
Appendix	569

Central Asia's tryst with modernity began in the second half of the nineteenth century with the rise of colonialism. While the states buckled under the military might of tsarist imperialism, societies responded in a variety of ways. On the one hand, the modernization introduced by the colonial rulers was countered by a greater emphasis on traditionalism. On the other hand, a more dynamic reformist trend arose that sought to meet the challenge by adapting modernization to traditional institutions, especially in the sphere of education. Modern institutions like the press were used to promote reformist and nationalist values. Both education and the press had a strong bearing on the health of the population. Along with traditional systems, the region came to acquire a new health system based on Western scientific achievements.

In various contiguous areas, similar developments were also taking shape between the mid-nineteenth and the early twentieth century. The whole region was seething under the impact of colonialism, which also exposed many of the existing shortcomings in these societies. As a result, in some cases even feudal monarchs became modernizers. Nationalists opposed colonialism while accepting the achievements made in the West that could be put to universal use to make the nation stronger. The Jadids of Central Asia through their

new type of schools attempted to modernize society without giving up indigenous culture and tradition, and so did some of the ruling monarchs in Iran and Afghanistan. Modernization, thus, came to this region partly by colonial effort and partly by an internal dynamism unleashed in the process of interaction and confrontation with the colonial powers.

Education

COLONIAL EDUCATION

Reluctantly and slowly, and for their own reasons, the colonial powers introduced modern education in the colonies. Apart from practical administrative needs, modern education could become an important basis for spreading the values and tastes of the colonizers and creating a politically pliable elite. The onset of modern education followed a similar pattern throughout Central Asia. Missionary activities were followed by the colonial state's initiatives in the sphere of education. The early effort to spread religious influence was to some extent countered by the state's effort to expand its political and cultural impact through secular education.

Beginning with Russian, and later through mixed Russian-native schools, the colonial administration tried to induct indigenous Central Asian children into its assimilation project that started in 1875. The mixed schools taught the indigenous children in their native languages through the Cyrillic script. Russian was used to teach basic courses in morals, nature, human and physical geography, history and arithmetic. From the 1880s, the focus was more on the mixed schools and on creating an alphabet utilizing the phonetic system. In 1900 *Ustād-i Awwal* (The First Teacher) came into being as a result of the efforts of a schoolmaster from Tashkent, Sa'id Rasul Sa'id Azizov, who was appointed for the purpose.¹

The mixed schools nevertheless failed to attract local students. According to some sources there were 89 Russian-native schools in 1911. By the end of the tsarist period, Turkistan had 40,000 students in modern elementary schools, of which only 7,000 were indigenous. There was barely any interest shown in spreading modern higher education.²

With its limited and partisan attitude, the colonial education policy failed to make much of an impact in Central Asia. The literacy rate remained very low. Those who were literate came mostly from the urban population and were products of the traditional system. Women's education was another area where only symbolic efforts were made. As a result, the literacy rate was dismal as far as women were concerned. In the whole of present-day

¹ Carrère d'Encausse, 1962, pp. 383–4.

² Medlin, Cave and Carpenter, 1971, p. 50; Kunitz, 1943, p. 315.

Central Asia, only 4.2 per cent of indigenous men and 0.5 of indigenous women were literate. By 1917 only 2 per cent of the Kazakhs were literate. The percentage of literate Kyrgyz and Uzbeks was less than 2 per cent, and the percentage of literate Turkmen men was slightly over 1 per cent. There were only 25 literate Turkmen women.³ The policy of neglect in the field of education meant the continuing dominance of traditional educational institutions, which in fact showed greater vigour in the face of the colonial modernization process.

In other colonized areas, modern education was introduced as the administration's need for lower-level personnel in the bureaucracy and subordinate servants continuously expanded. Though vernacular middle schools teaching a modern curriculum flourished in North India (United Provinces), the establishment of British rule dealt a severe blow to traditional Muslim education in India by abolishing Persian as the court language in 1837 and the subsequent abolition of the posts of Muslim advisers on Muslim law in the courts. As a consequence, by the time of the creation of Pakistan in 1947, while the standard of English-medium schools had improved, the old-type schools had deteriorated and the teaching of non-theological subjects in the vernacular was antiquated.⁴ A bifurcation had developed that turned traditional educational institutions into theological seminaries.⁵

THE TRADITIONALIST RESPONSE TO COLONIAL EDUCATION

In response to colonial initiatives in the field of modern secular education, the traditional elements attempted to reassert the importance of religious education, which remained dominant in Central Asia throughout the tsarist period. According to some estimates, in Russian Turkistan in the 1890s, there were about 10,000 *maktabs* (traditional primary schools) with some 120–140,000 pupils, while in the emirate of Bukhara (not directly ruled by tsarist Russia) in 1911 some 120,000 students attended *maktabs*. *Madrasas* also registered an increase. According to official Russian sources, the number of traditional *madrasas* increased from 11 to 22 in Tashkent (1876–1910) and from 120 to 204 in Ferghana (1892–1911).⁶ Even in the nomadic areas, where formal education had not spread earlier, religious schools proliferated along with secular ones. By the first decade of the

³ Penan, Bakalo and Bereday, 1971, p. 282.

⁴ Qureshi, 1975, pp. 9–12.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 17–20.

⁶ Medlin, Cave and Carpenter, 1971, pp. 33–4. There were 6,445 traditional teaching establishments with 90,993 students in 1894. See Carrère d'Encausse, 1962, p. 374.

twentieth century, officials recorded 121 *madrasas* with 1,800 Kazakh students in Steppe *oblast'*.⁷

In India, the *Ahl-i Hadis* (people following the Prophet's teachings) and the Deoband seminary movement began in 1867 with the opening of the Deoband *madrasa* in the present-day North Indian Province of Uttar Pradesh. This was in response to colonial modernization in the educational field, especially after the failure of the first major Indian revolt against the British in 1857. The six-year course had a curriculum designed to train '*ulamā*' and strengthen their role as the link between Islamic religion and culture and the Muslim population.⁸

THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT

A more dynamic response to colonialism, feudalism and religious orthodoxy emerged around the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The Jadid (Jadid meaning 'new') movement in Central Asia was an attempt to modernize Islamic society to take advantage of Western scientific progress while not giving up religion as the basis of the indigenous culture and society. The Jadids opened new schools, known as *usūl-i jadīd*, where modern secular subjects were also taught.⁹

The first such school opened in Andijan in 1889 and over the next 10–15 years nearly all the towns and large rural settlements had new-method schools. A similar educational reform movement spread to the emirate of Bukhara and the Khiva khanate, though their progress was hamstrung by resistance from the orthodox clergy and the hostility of the ruling emirs. The Jadid schools faced various forms of harassment from the Russian Government – the need to obtain permission before opening an educational institution, restricting the recruitment of Tatar teachers, the compulsory use of the Russian language, and so on. Despite these hurdles, Jadid schools spread throughout the region and by 1917 there were 92 such schools in Turkistan.¹⁰

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Indian reformers attempted to modernize education without giving up their own cultural ethos. The HinduArya *Samaj* movement, which began in the 1880s, changed the face of Punjab and the adjoining territories. The Sikhs of Punjab established the first *Singh Sabha* at Amritsar: it was intended to meet

⁷ For example, the number of *madrasas* increased from 8 (in 1854) to 17 (in 1895) in Semei *oblast'*. Semirechye *oblast'* had 88 *madrasas* with 12,000 students, and Syr Darya had 134 *madrasas* with about 29,000 students, in 1895. See Sabol, 2003, p. 58.

⁸ Jones, 1994, pp. 57–60.

⁹ Ersanli, 1999, pp. 225–7; Abduvakhitov, 1994, p. 67.

¹⁰ Jadidism – A Current Soviet Assessment, 1964. The first Jadid schools in Bukhara opened in 1900–1. See Medlin, Cave and Carpenter, 1971, pp. 31–4; Carrère d'Encausse, 1962, pp. 391–2.

the challenge of modernization by combining religious purity through historical-religious textbooks, magazines and journals using the Punjabi language with modern education. The *Sabha* opened colleges and girls' schools in different parts of Punjab.

Among the Muslims of North India, the movement for a new type of education was heralded by the creation of Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh (in the present North Indian Province of Uttar Pradesh). It provided modern education in a congenial Muslim social atmosphere and became quite popular in the subcontinent among those who favoured a modern scientific education.¹¹

The appearance of modern education in Iran in the 1890s was the result of social protest movements against foreign schools and government inaction in the field of children's education. By 1901, as a result of the new school movement, 17 elementary schools in Tehran and 1 each in the cities of Tabriz, Bushir, Rasht and Mashhad had been set up, teaching religion and modern subjects.¹²

In some other areas the nexus of colonial powers and feudal elements kept social reform at bay. In Xinjiang, for example, there were still no bookshops in 1926, no newspapers, and no schools other than those attached to the mosques and those maintained privately by rich citizens or officials.¹³

EDUCATION UNDER SOCIALISM

Central Asia and its adjoining regions were in a ferment in the early years of the twentieth century. Reformist, nationalist and socialist movements spread and aroused popular sentiment against colonialism and feudalism. With the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia, the Soviet socialist system was established in Central Asia as elsewhere in the former Russian empire. The foundations of a new education policy were laid between 1917 and 1919. The new policy called for socially non-discriminatory, free and compulsory education up to the age of 17. Co-education was to be promoted by the provision of state aid. Religion was to be completely separated from education and schooling was to be related to work experience.

The Soviet policy of industrialization went hand in hand with a policy of creating native skilled cadres through what was known as *korenizatsiya* (indigenization, nativization).¹⁴ Education was diffused throughout society and became a major vehicle for social change. A massive literacy campaign was launched towards the end of the 1920s.

¹¹ Different acculturative movements in India are discussed in Jones, 1994, pp. 96–114.

¹² Arasteh, 1969, pp. 70–2.

¹³ Chen, 1977, p. 172.

¹⁴ Between 1917 and 1938, during the period of *korenizatsiya*, the emphasis was on model national schools, in which all subjects were taught in the national language, with Russian as an optional subject.

A number of means were used to combat illiteracy, besides obligatory legal provisions for certain age groups. These included setting up reading huts and club libraries, special after-work schools, the drafting of schoolchildren to assist adults and organizing community centres for literacy programmes. Workers were given incentives like higher wages for acquiring a higher literacy level. These efforts resulted in a rapid expansion in the level of literacy and primary education.¹⁵ The decision in 1930 to introduce universal primary education further intensified this process and also helped educate girls, especially in the rural areas.¹⁶

There was a wholesale transformation in the sphere of education. By 1970, all the titular nationalities in Central Asia had more than 99 per cent literacy rates and by 1985, apart from universal literacy, over two-thirds of the population aged 10 years and above had a higher or secondary education in these republics.¹⁷ In the 1940s scientific institutes and laboratories were created.¹⁸ Significant changes occurred in secondary education after the 1950s school reform that put greater emphasis on vocational-professional education, with the aim of giving school-leavers a definite skill in some branch of industry or agriculture corresponding to their studies.¹⁹

There had been no modern higher educational institution in Central Asia under the tsarist government. In 1920 Tashkent University was established. Others followed and helped to create qualified specialists and an intellectual substratum among the indigenous Central Asians.

Notable success was achieved in the field of women's education. With the transformation from exclusively male religious schools to a system of universal education, large numbers of women came into the education sector. Age-long seclusion, religious prejudice that sometimes amounted to fanaticism in the initial years, and the traditional attitude in the family that did not favour women's education, made the task all the more difficult. Nevertheless, the anti-illiteracy campaign among women grew and took root.²⁰

A major vehicle of social change is education and training, which not only breaks the hold of archaic customs but also prepares people to take up new and different occupations and makes them upwardly mobile. Central Asia was caught in a vicious cycle in which traditionalism, the high birth rate, low mobility and a lack of skills reinforced each

¹⁵ Medlin, Cave and Carpenter, 1971, p. 134.

¹⁶ For example, the percentage of girls attending primary schools in Uzbekistan rose from only 11.5 per cent in 1911 to 43.1 per cent in 1940–1. See Penan, Bakalo and Bereday, 1971, pp. 279–80.

¹⁷ Glenn, 1999, pp. 82–4; Kaiser, 1992, p. 255.

¹⁸ Medlin, Cave and Carpenter, 1971, p. 134.

¹⁹ Trends in Education in Central Asia, 1959.

²⁰ By 1936 women constituted 45.1 per cent of the total enrolment in Uzbekistan's ABC schools, and in the schools for semi-literates their share was 42.2 per cent. See Aminova, 1985, p. 237.

other. Early marriage frequently resulted in girls having to interrupt their education and becoming teenage mothers, which confined women to domestic roles and deprived them of higher education.²¹ The percentage of women in vocational-technical schools remained low. Indigenous women generally did not enter the field of technical education. This trend was even more conspicuous among rural women, though the gap narrowed significantly from the 1950s onwards.²²

In other areas under the socialist system, considerable progress was achieved in the field of education with full state support. After the rule of the Manchus ended in 1911, the independent monarchy that ruled Mongolia for the next decade established secular schools, the first being in Urga with an enrolment of 47 students. Yet religious education through the Tibetan language predominated and the country had mass illiteracy. After the socialist revolution in 1921, public education was separated from religious institutions and religious instruction in state schools was forbidden. After the opening of a state school in Ulaanbaatar in 1921, the network of schools and the number of students studying in them steadily increased.

The first higher educational institution – Mongolian State University – was founded in 1942. By 1979 there were 7 higher, 24 secondary specialist and 573 general educational institutions. Learning was made easier and more accessible through alphabet reform. A literacy campaign was vigorously pursued and by 1963 about 90 per cent of the population in Mongolia were literate.²³

Under the socialist government, education in Xinjiang made considerable progress. Universal elementary education was provided, illiteracy was reduced and higher-level cadres and technicians were trained. The network of high schools, vocational schools and courses expanded to raise the skill level of the population. Though early marriage of girls and other patriarchal traits hampered the progress of universal literacy, the success in this field was remarkable. By the mid-1970s, 80 per cent of the population of Xinjiang were literate. The 1990 census showed that the proportion of illiterate and semi-literate people (15 years and above) among the Uighurs (26.85 per cent) was only slightly above the Chinese national average (22 per cent).²⁴

²¹ For a detailed discussion of the existence of patriarchal practices, see Patnaik, 1996, pp. 98–118.

²² Patnaik, 1989, pp. 105–8.

²³ *Socialist Mongolia*, 1981, pp. 181–93; *History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, 1973, pp. 261–2, 465.

²⁴ Chen, 1977, pp. 278, 297–9, 331; Yuan Xin, 1996.

NATIONAL AWAKENING AND POST-COLONIAL EDUCATION IN THE NEIGHBOURING REGIONS

The rise of nationalism throughout the region towards the end of the nineteenth century put pressure on the existing regimes to modernize for national survival. In some cases, the monarchies (in Iran and Afghanistan) turned into vehicles of change in the face of popular pressure. The global retreat of colonialism in the aftermath of the Second World War brought to the forefront the agenda of nation-building that visualized education as a key component. Modern education spread at all levels. However, rural education and that for women remained limited.

In the 1930s a large-scale modernization of the education system took place in Iran. Following the establishment of the University of Tehran in 1934, five provincial universities were set up, including one in Mashhad, the capital of Khurasan province. The University of Mashhad became famous for its excellence in theological studies.²⁵ Despite the strides made since then, the education level in the rural areas remained quite low. In Khurasan province in 1956, for example, only 24.5 per cent of rural children attended primary schools as compared to 81 per cent of urban children. The discrepancy in the level of secondary education was even more glaring – 23.7 per cent of urban children and only 0.6 per cent of rural children attended secondary schools.²⁶

Following the adoption of the first constitution in 1923, the programme of educational modernization gathered momentum in Afghanistan. By 1927 the country had 322 elementary schools with 51,000 students. Two universities – Kabul and Jalalabad – were created. The first five-year plan, launched in 1956, paid great attention to education. In 1964 both Dari and Pashto were declared official languages, which helped spread education among different ethnic groups.²⁷

Progress in education in Afghanistan suffered immeasurably in the 1970s due to internal strife and unceasing conflicts. The literacy rate was as low as 11 per cent in 1973–4 (in the 6–65 age group). While, overall, 18.7 per cent of men were literate, the rate among women was a mere 2.8 per cent. There was almost universal illiteracy in rural areas, where only 1 per cent of women and 5 per cent of men were literate in 1979. The spread of higher education was very low – only 2 per cent of men and 1 per cent of women were highschool graduates in 1973/4. Even by 1990, according to a United Nations report, the overall literacy rate was 30 per cent (44 per cent for men and 14 per cent for women).²⁸

²⁵ Eiler, 1978, p. 307.

²⁶ Arasteh, 1969, pp. 72–4, 100.

²⁷ The literacy rate was only slightly better in urban areas, where in 1979 20 per cent of men were literate as compared to 5 per cent of women. See Singh, 1999, p. 22; Singh, 1998.

²⁸ Singh, 1999, p. 22; Singh, 1998.

In the north-west Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had *maktabs* and *pathshalas* (mainly traditional Hindu schools), the Dogra rulers, in response to missionary activities in the field of education, opened a school on modern lines in the early 1860s. Under the monarchy, by the end of 1925, there were 2 colleges, 1 technical institute, 11 high schools, 36 boys' middle schools and 34 girls' primary schools in the state. In addition, there were 63 government-aided *maktabs* and *pathshalas* combining an Eastern education with modern knowledge. By 1947, both the number of institutions and the number of students enrolled had almost doubled. The rulers also responded to missionary activities in educating girls. In 1947 there were as many as 8 high schools, 50 middle schools and 280 primary schools for girls.²⁹

There was a great surge in education in India from the 1950s, the result of social pressures and rising aspirations. Education resulted in social mobility and the erosion of traditional barriers, with a growth in the number of women students. There was considerable progress in education, both in terms of the number of institutions of various types as well as the sophistication and diversification of educational programmes. However, glaring imbalances remained in the growth of literacy between urban and rural populations, and between men and women, especially in some of the North Indian states like Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh.³⁰

Pakistan made significant progress in the field of education through its five-year plans. The literacy level nearly doubled between 1951 and 1988 (for the age group of 10 and above). Beginning with the first literacy campaign in 1950, successive governments tried to raise the level of literacy in the country. However, the literacy level among the rural population, especially rural women, remains a major concern.³¹ Gender segregation in schooling has been the general pattern, with most rural girls receiving little or no education. At the beginning of the 1990s in Pakistan, girls constituted 27 per cent of the enrolment, which declined to about 12 per cent at the secondary level.³²

Overall, Central Asia and the adjoining regions made substantial progress in the field of education following the end of colonialism. Both under socialist and liberal governments (including liberal monarchies in some cases), the modernization of education continued. However, in Central Asia and some of the other areas that came under a socialist system, the eradication of illiteracy and the provision of universal education acquired greater momentum. The relatively faster retreat of patriarchal restraints in these societies made

²⁹ Chathley, 1995, pp. 147–8.

³⁰ Chathley, 1995, pp. 150, 159–60.

³¹ In 1981 the literacy rate among rural women was only 7.3 per cent (urban, 37 per cent), whereas among rural men it was 26.2 per cent (urban, 55.3 per cent). See Singh, 1999, pp. 26–8.

³² Malik and Hussain, 1994, p. 134.

women better educated than their counterparts in neighbouring countries. The role of the state was the most significant factor in transforming the education system into a modern and universal one.

The press

ORIGINS AND GROWTH

Like modern education, the press in Central Asia came into existence as an instrument of colonization and served to propagate the values and views of the colonizers. However, modern education created a modernized elite from whose ranks came the pioneers of national awakening and a reading public that was small but indispensable to the nation-building project. From the end of the nineteenth century, a vibrant and varied press existed outside the ambit of the administration.

The colonial administration had introduced a certain amount of printed material into Central Asia since 1870, when the government bulletin *Turkestan willayatining gazeti* (produced in Tashkent and printed alternately in Kazakh and Chaghatay) was circulated. Another government bulletin produced in both the Persian and Turkmen languages was published in Ashkhabad (modern Ashgabat) region between 1904 and 1917. These publications mainly propagated the views and policies of the colonial administration.³³

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the reformist press became quite active in Central Asia. During the revolutionary years of 1905–7, Central Asian Jadids began to publish their own newspapers and books. Financial difficulties and administrative actions forced many of them to close down within a short time, however. The Jadid press nevertheless succeeded in uniting sections of writers, poets, teachers and the intelligentsia in their project of reform and modernization. Information about Jadid schools came from their press.³⁴

Among the 23 newspapers and journals published by the Central Asian Jadids before 1917, the most influential were *Samarqand*, *Oina* [The Mirror], *Sadoi Turkistān* [Voice of Turkistan], *Bukhārā-i sharif* and *El bayraghi* [The People's Banner]. The contents covered issues vital to the reformist agenda. The Jadid press criticized war, social and moral degradation, disunity and backwardness in Central Asian society. Social issues like the ill effects of drug, alcohol and tobacco use, sexual abuse of children, institutionalization of homosexuality, superstition, excessive spending on funerals, wedding celebrations and entertainment, etc. were all widely discussed. The readers were also informed about the

³³ Glenn, 1999, p. 56.

³⁴ Jadidism – A Current Soviet Assessment, 1964, pp. 34–4.

population and geography of the world, international affairs, the history of humankind and its technological and other accomplishments.

Some reformist papers like *Turk eli* [The Turkic People], *El bayraghi*, *Sadoi Turkistān* and *Ulūgh Turkistān* [Great Turkistan] advocated a wider regional identity, urging the population to go beyond parochial feelings, and propagated the idea of self-determination. *El bayraghi* became the official organ of the soon-to-be-formed independent Turkistan Government and developed into the most important newspaper in Kokand in those days. The Jadid press came under attack from emirs, khans and religious elements.³⁵

On the other hand, newspapers representing the emerging ethno-national consciousness also began publication. At the beginning of the twentieth century, several newspapers and journals appeared in Kazakh areas that gave a voice to the emergence of a Kazakh national identity. *Qazāq* was the most important of these newspapers: it had a circulation of 8,000 at one point and continued to be published until 1918.³⁶

The journal *Ai qap* [Alas!],³⁷ which started in 1911 and continued without interruption until 1915, provided a forum for Kazakh reformists and articulated concerns regarding culture, the economy, language and the national future. Education, especially for young girls, and land issues dominated its pages. Several works by Kazakh women were published. *Qazāq*, which started in 1913, devoted considerable attention to the language question, including illiteracy and written Kazakh. Besides calling upon the administration and the public to raise the level of education and national consciousness, the issue of inadequate health-care and disease prevention, lack of clinics and predominance of traditional medicines were highlighted by the Kazakh press.³⁸

The echoes of national awakening and Turkic identity reverberated in Xinjiang in the 1940s and nationalists started their publications to articulate the cultural and political aspirations of the Turkic peoples of Xinjiang. *Altai*, a monthly journal that made its debut in 1944, played a major part. From the outset it was quite outspoken and critical of government policy in the region. A lively debate followed in its pages after the reprint of an article (originally published in the *Central Daily News* in October 1944) that questioned the Turkic ethnicity of the indigenous Xinjiang population. This was refuted in *Altai* by local leaders.³⁹

In neighbouring areas, modernization and the spread of education led to an increase in the size of the reading public. As a result the number of newspapers grew, as did the

³⁵ Allworth, 1990, pp. 152–3, 169–70.

³⁶ Glenn, 1999, pp. 56–7.

³⁷ Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1964, p. 147; Zimanov and Idrisov, 1989.

³⁸ Sabol, 2003, pp. 60–72, 106–7, 153–4; Rottier, 2003, pp. 75–8.

³⁹ Benson, 1990, pp. 96–7.

diversity of views available to the public through the press. Afghanistan's first newspaper (founded in 1837) was closed down for its anti-colonial views after the British victory in the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878–80). The next venture, *Serāj al-akhbār-i Afghānistān* [The Lamp of News of Afghanistan], first appeared in 1905. Despite being closed for six years after the first issue and coming under censorship from time to time for its call for complete Afghan independence, it nevertheless raised the banner of Afghan national awakening.⁴⁰

In Iran liberal social critics published their ideas in the 1890s through their own newspapers urging educational reform and calling on philanthropists to donate money for new schools.⁴¹ The press became active at the time of the constitutional movement (1905–11). Several newspapers like *Now bahār* [New Spring] in Mashhad advocated reforms such as curtailing the power of religious institutions in secular matters, the distribution of land to peasants, compulsory education, etc. The reformist press in Iran had at times to face considerable pressure from colonial powers like Russia and Britain, which forced the Iranian Government to censor these papers and even exile their editors. On several occasions *Now bahār*'s publication was stopped, though it managed to reappear again and again.⁴²

During the days of revolutionary ferment in the early part of the twentieth century, the Mongolian press was born. The first issue of the journal *Shineh toi* [New Mirror] came out in March 1913, and in 1915 the newspaper *Niysleliyn khureeniy sonin bichig* [News of the Capital City] was founded. These papers were critical of the monarchical regime and the extreme backwardness of the country and also propagated democratic ideas. The first revolutionary newspaper, *Mongolian unen* [Mongolian Truth], appeared on 10 November 1920, which was later celebrated as Mongolian Press Day. It was more concerned with political issues and called on people to take up arms to liberate themselves from colonialism and feudalism.⁴³

Before the middle of the nineteenth century, India had a small press run by Englishmen or missionaries. The strident anti-Indian tone of the Anglo-Indian press prompted many Indians to develop their own press and by 1876 a number of newspapers had appeared (there were about 60 in North-West Provinces, Oudh [Awadh] and Central Provinces). The severe criticism of the colonial government during the famine that took 5 million lives in Punjab and South India led to the repressive Press Act of 1878. At various times, the colonial government muzzled the Indian press, as in the amendment to the Official Secrets Act (1880) calling for civil matters to be placed on the same level as military matters and

⁴⁰ Ahang, 1970, pp. 255–7.

⁴¹ Arasteh, 1969, pp. 69–70.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ *History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, 1973, p. 263; *Socialist Mongolia*, 1981, p. 216.

the Press Act of 1910. Yet the press in British India came to represent a diversity of views that ranged from pro-government to conservative and reformist opinions.⁴⁴

The English-language press made its first appearance in what is now Pakistan in 1857, when the *Lahore Chronicle* appeared as a biweekly and others soon followed. Two major English-language dailies were the *Civil and Military Gazette* and *The Tribune*. While the former was the mouthpiece of the government, the latter was a nationalist paper. The number of Urdu newspapers had increased by the beginning of the twentieth century. Political journalism was heralded by the appearance of *Zamindār* (1903).⁴⁵

From the end of the nineteenth century, the national press in British India demonstrated great political and social dynamism. During the freedom struggle, it worked as a bridge between the masses and social and political activists.

THE CONTEMPORARY PRESS

Modernization and the spread of education intensified intellectual activity in the region. The press was as much a beneficiary of this expanding intellectual universe as a contributor to it. Following independence in Afghanistan, printing and publishing gathered momentum. By the end of the 1960s, besides many government newspapers there were nine private newspapers in Kabul itself.⁴⁶ In Iran, there was a sudden rise in the number of local newspapers in the 1940s and for the next three decades or so the press continued to carry on the tradition of criticism, independent judgement, wit and repartee.⁴⁷

After independence, India and Pakistan developed a much freer press. Being outside the sphere of state ownership and control, the press played a critical role in the post-colonial nation- and state-building process. There was a wide acceptance of the role of the press in the polity. However, it was regarded as elitist and urban-oriented; its circulation was largely in areas where literacy was higher and the space devoted to rural coverage was minimal. From the 1980s, small vernacular newspapers mushroomed in rural areas as well. The largest number was in Hindi, spoken in North India.⁴⁸ In post-independence Pakistan, other cities besides Lahore, such as Karachi and Sind, became important centres where a huge expansion in publishing activities took place. Frontier areas like Baluchistan had newspapers in Urdu and Pashto.⁴⁹ Following independence, the press in both India

⁴⁴ Aggarwal, 1988.

⁴⁵ Khurshid, 1954, pp. 40–3, 48–9, 60.

⁴⁶ Ahang, 1970, pp. 255–7.

⁴⁷ For example, between 1944 and 1954, about 3,000 new licences were issued. See Haas, 1946, p. 188.

⁴⁸ According to one study, 60 per cent of India's newspapers in 1979 were published from major cities and towns controlling about 85 per cent of the total All-India circulation. See Grover, 1990, pp. 43, 229–34.

⁴⁹ Khurshid, 1954, pp. 40–3, 48–9, 60.

and Pakistan articulated diverse and critical opinions on various issues. The major quality national dailies continued to be in English and the press in general had limited readership due to illiteracy among a vast section of the population.

THE SOCIALIST PRESS

The educational transformation brought about by the Soviet state and the standardization of indigenous languages in Central Asia enabled the press to draw on a large pool of educated and skilled personnel. Accessible to a largely literate population, the press truly became a medium of mass communication.

During the Soviet period, the press functioned within the constraints of state ownership and control. Nevertheless, the role of the press remained critical as a source of information regarding various shortcomings and lacunae in the implementation of policies. In fact, the press in Central Asia managed to play a constructive and meaningful role through highlighting issues, especially in the spheres of education, health and the environment.

In the 1950s, for example, when there was a greater emphasis on vocational education, the local press highlighted the poor quality of such education in the region, focusing on issues such as the low standard of vocational training, the lack of equipment and accommodation in the schools, and the shortage of teachers. In criticizing bureaucratic solutions to these problems, the press cited cases of teachers being engaged to teach any subject, including technical courses, regardless of their specialization.⁵⁰ The press also drew attention to the persistence of certain patriarchal customs and practices in attitudes towards women, like bigamy, marriages of adolescent girls, *kalym* (bride-price), arranged and forced marriages and so on.⁵¹

The expansion of cotton cultivation and the rapid industrialization of Central Asia took its toll on the environment and on the health of the population. In 1960 the press exposed industrial and atmospheric pollution, and the lack of healthy working and sanitary conditions in certain mines, in cotton ginning and the engineering industry and in food and catering establishments. The lack of adequate public cleansing, water supplies and sewerage, resulting in intestinal infections, was highlighted by the local press. Whether it was the failure to organize systematic disposal of refuse and sewage, or the unsatisfactory water supply and public cleansing systems in many major towns of Central Asia, the press in the 1960s brought such issues to the notice of the wider public.⁵²

⁵⁰ Trends in Education in Central Asia, 1959, pp. 15–19.

⁵¹ The Peoples of Central Asia: Social Customs, 1959, pp. 214–16.

⁵² Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 1963, pp. 125–7.

During the years of glasnost (1985–90), the press became more critical of the environmental degradation and the state of public health in Central Asia. The Aral Sea crisis and its impact on health – lack of drinking water, increasing salt and bacteria content in water, increase in cases of anaemia, intestinal infections, higher infant mortality, etc. – was taken up by the press.⁵³ Since 1985 hundreds of articles about the Aral Sea crisis and related issues have appeared in local-language newspapers, which criticized the policy of extensive cotton cultivation and irrigation as well as the creation of many industrial enterprises on the banks of rivers as the cause of the crisis. The Central Asian press also discussed the inadequate health and sanitary conditions. Attention was drawn to the excessive use of fertilizers, pesticides and defoliants, particularly Butifors, which has very harmful effects on the body's nervous system and on the childbearing functions of women and was also primarily responsible for the increase in cases of hepatitis in the cotton-growing areas.⁵⁴

Following the socialist revolution in Mongolia, the number of newspapers increased under state patronage. Some of the leading ones like *Uria* [The Call], *Nilslenlin* [New Capital Newspaper] and *Unen* [Truth] were the organs of either the government or the ruling People's Revolutionary Party. By the beginning of the 1980s, Mongolia had a widely circulated press, publishing in five languages. On average, each family took five periodicals. The press highlighted and educated the population about the importance of various policies and ideals necessary to consolidate the socialist state. The main topics discussed in the early years were revolutionary and labour heroism (1920s and 1930s). In the 1940s the press advocated patriotism and aroused people against fascism and militarism. Creative labour (1950s) and moral and ethical problems (1960s) were the subsequent focus.⁵⁵

Though the press under liberal monarchies and democracies in the Central Asian region experienced relative freedom, despite ups and downs, that under socialist governments benefited from expanded universal literacy and education. Within the constraints of state control, the press managed to address various social, economic and environmental issues that vitally affected the populations of these republics.

Public health

ORIGINS OF THE MODERN HEALTH SYSTEM

Central Asia and the neighbouring region had indigenous health systems before the advent of colonialism. In India and Pakistan some of the indigenous systems of medicine retain

⁵³ Glantz, Rubinstein and Zonn, 1994, pp. 172–3.

⁵⁴ Naser, 1989, pp. 49–57; Carley, 1989, pp. 1–15.

⁵⁵ *Socialist Mongolia*, 1981, pp. 216–21; *History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, 1973, pp. 465–7.

their importance even today. Traditional or indigenous treatments included such secular systems as Ayurveda, Unani and Sidha. However, much superstition and many primitive methods of doctoring also prevailed.⁵⁶

The colonial administration created a modern public health system, though on a modest scale and mainly for the use of military and administrative personnel. Public baths were opened in Bukhara in 1897 and a hospital for women was built in the same city in 1910. Tashkent had a military hospital, where civilian patients requiring special treatment, particularly those suffering from malaria, could be sent. Dispensaries appeared in Central Asia and a vaccination programme for children was started by the Russian authorities.⁵⁷

Western allopathic medicine was introduced in India as early as the sixteenth century by British traders and was subsequently promoted by Christian missionaries. However, until 1857 (when colonial power was transferred from the East India Company to the British Crown) there was no systematic health policy as such. Sanitary commissions were appointed in 1863 in the centre and some provinces. The scope of these commissions was widened to meet the problem of epidemics like plague that recurred on an increasing scale.⁵⁸

Some areas of Central Asia had hardly any modern health-care system until well into the twentieth century. A public health system was only set up in the 1930s in Xinjiang, which until 1949 had only 18 modern trained doctors. In Mongolia, Tibetan medicine was the only form of medical assistance available, apart from incantation and prayers. Sanitary conditions were primitive, resulting in various types of diseases and epidemics. Average life expectancy was only 22 years. The mortality rate was high – 25–30 persons per 1,000 died annually and 500 out of every 1,000 infants below the age of 1 died every year.⁵⁹

HEALTH IN THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD

In the post-colonial period, Central Asia and the neighbouring regions made great strides in building modern health systems. The public health infrastructure grew in terms of hospitals, doctors and medical education. However, most of the countries could not provide an adequate health-care system that would benefit the majority of the population, who still lived in villages. Expenditure on health was inadequate and most of it went to urban-based curative health facilities. In Jammu and Kashmir, for example, spending on health

⁵⁶ Superstitions in Central Asia included: swallowing a hawk's eye to cure blindness; and throwing the garment of a sick person onto the road in the hope that someone would pick it up and take away the ailment. See Christie, 1925, pp. 135–6.

⁵⁷ Christie, 1925, pp. 227–9.

⁵⁸ Desai, 1978, pp. 24–5.

⁵⁹ *History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, 1973, pp. 230, 257; *Socialist Mongolia*, 1981, p. 168.

represented only 3.14 per cent of total government expenditure in the first five-year plan (1951–6); this declined to 2.45 per cent in the fourth five-year plan (1969–74).⁶⁰

Due to less emphasis on preventive measures, parasitic and infectious diseases were widespread and accounted for 54 per cent of all deaths in Pakistan in 1986. The limited availability of clean drinking water was another major problem. In Pakistan it was available to only 38 per cent of the population in 1985 and nearly half the urban population had no access to sewage facilities.

Infant mortality was also a major problem. In Pakistan, although the rate dropped from 150 per 1,000 live births in 1983 to 106 at the beginning of the 1990s, it still was very high. Many people continued to use traditional systems of medicine and many sick children were not referred to medical institutions or trained medical practitioners. According to statistics, significant numbers of children who died in some North Indian Provinces in the late 1970s were not attended by doctors (15 per cent of rural infants and 11 per cent of rural children in the 1–5 age group in Punjab; 30 per cent and 26 per cent respectively in Haryana; and 34 and 59 per cent respectively in Uttar Pradesh). Even in urban areas, the figures were sometimes very high (22.5 per cent of infants and 18.5 per cent of children in the 1–5 age group died in Haryana; 66 and 84 per cent respectively in Uttar Pradesh).⁶¹

Surveys have revealed a correlation between education and infant mortality. A nationwide survey of infant and child mortality in India in 1978 concluded that maternal education in the context of a high overall level of education may be necessary to break the cultural and social barriers that hinder a secularization process promoting health education. According to the survey, a general trend of high infant mortality was noticeable in provinces with relatively low female literacy and in rural areas across the board. It also established that the higher the educational level among women, the lower was the infant mortality rate.⁶²

PUBLIC HEALTH UNDER SOCIALISM

In Soviet Central Asia the state was the provider of health care to the population. Compared to the neighbouring areas, there was a greater priority given to public health. The

⁶⁰ In Pakistan in 1986, cities had 1 doctor per 1,801 residents, while the rural areas had only 23 per cent of the country's hospitals and only 1 doctor per 25,829 residents. Eighty per cent of the health budget (less than 1 per cent of GNP) was allocated to curative health facilities. See Zaidi, 1988, pp. 3–8; Chathley, 1995, p. 151.

⁶¹ Malik and Hussain, 1994, pp. 131–2; Shariff, 1990, pp. 800–1.

⁶² In 1978, for example, the South Indian state of Kerala, with a female literacy rate of 70.8 per cent, had a 39 per cent infant mortality rate. By contrast Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, with female literacy rates of 32.4, 21.6 and 13.9 per cent, had very high infant mortality rates – 103, 109 and 167 per cent respectively. See Shariff, 1990, pp. 800–1.

higher literacy level among the population in general, and among women in particular, created favourable conditions for improvements in the health situation in the Central Asian republics.

A World Health Organization (WHO) study group report of 1960 pointed out that despite highly centralized planning and supervision, there was almost complete executive and operational decentralization in the structure of health services in the Soviet Union. Nearly 90 per cent of the problems were dealt with at the local level, without disturbing the general and basic pattern. The country had a unified health system embracing all health disciplines and integrating a number of institutions and functional units. The services reached every locality in all the constituent republics, down to the smallest and most remote villages and farming areas. Though an emphasis was placed on prophylaxis, regarded as the basis of all health services in the country, curative medicine also received due attention. The study concluded that the USSR was probably the first country to accomplish a unification of health care in the sense of integration of treatment and prevention in one single entity, accessible to the whole population free of charge. The basic concept of Soviet medical care was underlined by the so-called 'dispensarization' or screening of the population groups at their place of work or at home; this was followed up by treatment or surveillance of known or suspected cases.⁶³

Central Asia benefited from the new health system that emerged after the establishment of the Soviet state. Some traditional diseases like malaria, leprosy, polio and diphtheria had been virtually eradicated by the 1960s through widespread preventive measures like mass vaccination and immunization. For example, the number of malaria cases in Tajikistan dropped from 28,000 in 1950 to less than 100 in 1962. In Kazakhstan, the number of people dying annually from tuberculosis fell by 75 per cent between 1940 and 1960.⁶⁴

Overall, there was a radical improvement in the public health system. By 1961, Central Asia had 102 times as many doctors as in 1913 and the number of hospital beds had increased to 85,300.⁶⁵ From about 20 doctors per 10,000 of the population in 1970, the number rose to 35 and above in 1987 (except in Tajikistan).⁶⁶ All the Central Asian republics succeeded in reducing the rate of infant mortality. By opening new children's

⁶³ *Health Services in the USSR*, 1960.

⁶⁴ Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 1963, pp. 114–17. Details about public health improvements are available in Part 1 (No. 1) and Part 2 (No. 2).

⁶⁵ Sabol, 2003, p. 249.

⁶⁶ Bond, Belkindas and Treyvish, 1991, pp. 23–4.

hospitals and clinics, and by increasing the number of paediatricians, especially women, infant mortality declined substantially.⁶⁷

However, the expansion of cotton cultivation and rapid industrialization had a ruinous impact on people's health in Central Asia. The Aral Sea basin experienced high infant mortality and morbidity rates, a sharp increase in oesophageal cancers directly attributable to 'poisoned' water sources, gastrointestinal problems, typhoid, high rates of congenital deformation, the outbreak of viral hepatitis, contamination of mothers' milk and lower life expectancy. Water treatment facilities in the region were inadequate, necessitating the use of untreated surface water from the rivers, irrigation canals and drainage ditches for domestic use. Even groundwater supplies were contaminated as a result of the excessive and widespread use of chemicals on the cotton fields.⁶⁸

By 1987, the waters of the Aral Sea had fallen and the sea had shrunk by an estimated 50 per cent, or 30,000 km², creating a desert of salt and sand. Between 1960 and 1989, the salinity level of the sea increased to 23 per cent and in some parts to even 44 per cent.⁶⁹ The drying-up of the Aral Sea resulted in salt from the shores being carried in the air and affecting water sources, and thus affecting drinking water in cities and villages. Pesticides and fertilizers, as well as industrial waste and urban sewage, continuously polluted the Amu Darya river, making it unfit for drinking. According to some estimates, in 1988 nearly half the population in Central Asia used for drinking and household purposes water from rivers, gullies, canals, etc. that were polluted by effluents, toxic chemicals and bacteria, apart from high salinity in some areas. Even in the municipal and institutional water system, the bacteria content was higher than the permissible level.

The use of defoliants in the cotton fields affected the health of women in particular, resulting in infant mortality rates that were two to three times higher in Central Asia than in the USSR on average. There was also an alarming situation due to the common occurrence of other infectious diseases like viral diseases, jaundice, viral hepatitis, and infection of the chest and stomach, the last two accounting for 80 per cent of all fatal illnesses there in 1987. These infections were the primary causes of death among children, including newborn infants. Malnutrition and anaemia were also common in some areas, especially among pregnant mothers and children. The excessive planting of cotton created food shortages that affected the diet.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ For example, between 1940 and 1960, there was a fivefold drop in infant deaths in Kazakhstan. See Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 1963, p. 123.

⁶⁸ Glantz, Rubinstein and Zonn, 1994, p. 172.

⁶⁹ Naser, 1989.

⁷⁰ Carley, 1989, pp. 3–5. The infant mortality rate in all the Central Asian republics increased between 1970 and 1988. See Bond, Belkindas and Treyvish, 1991, p. 25.

In the neighbouring Xinjiang area, public health and sanitation experienced phenomenal improvements after 1949. State medical care was made free for workers and employees, and peasants were covered by a very low-cost cooperative medical service. Many of the old epidemics like cholera, smallpox and plague that used to wreck havoc in the past were wiped out. Diseases caused by dietary deficiencies were also virtually eliminated. In 1949 Xinjiang had only 54 medical units, 696 hospital beds and 388 professional staff. By 1983, there were a total of 63,113 hospital beds and 67,466 professional staff. However, much still needed to be done to improve the quality of life and upgrade the medical services. The infant mortality rate remained very high at 121.92 per 1,000 in 1981.⁷¹

In Mongolia, after the revolution, a medical-sanitary battalion was set up in 1921 and in 1925 a civilian hospital was established. Health became a major focus of the first constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924, which laid down the basic principles – state support, a focus on prevention and free medical treatment for all. The network of medical institutions subsequently spread to all towns and villages and the indices of public health improved. Specialist hospitals started to be set up in various provinces in the 1950s. Since 1960, 10 per cent of the annual state budget has been allocated to public health. Medical services for women and children have improved in every possible way. The provision of local health centres for them, state assistance for pregnant mothers and special allowances for large families with children up to 8 years old are some of the basic features of the health-care system in Mongolia.⁷²

Conclusion

Modern education, the press and public health were introduced to Central Asia and the neighbouring countries under colonial rule. The limited efforts of the colonizers nevertheless set in motion a process that acquired a dynamism of its own. Colonization as well as modernization stimulated a national awakening in the region. The institutions that served as instruments of colonization were turned into vehicles of nation- and state-building. While Central Asia experienced decades of a socialist system following the collapse of tsarism, as did Mongolia and Xinjiang, other areas came to have liberal systems after the end of colonization. In both instances, education and the public health system registered impressive growth. However, the subsequent industrialization and modern development had serious impacts on the environment and on the health of the population. Villages did not see the kind of progress that characterized urban areas. In Central Asia, the extensive planting of

⁷¹ Yuan Qing-li, 1990, pp. 53–6; Chen, 1977, pp. 277–9, 297–8.

⁷² *Socialist Mongolia*, 1981, pp. 168–73.

cotton and expansion of irrigation, together with the use of fertilizers and pesticides, created major health hazards. The public health system was severely stretched and was found to be inadequate. The existence of patriarchy in all these countries was also a serious handicap to achieving universal literacy, reducing mother and child mortality and raising the educational and skill levels of women in general.

The press as an institution that had evolved through the anti-colonial struggle continued to play an important role in society. As the numbers of the educated public increased, so did the impact of the press. It was successful in drawing attention to numerous problems encountered by the population. Although liberal states exercised less control over the press, the readership was confined to a smaller educated public. In Central Asia, on the other hand, the reach of the press was enormous as mass literacy had made it accessible to large sections of the population. Despite the constraints of state control, it remained responsive to social issues.

Modern education and health care were introduced to the region nearly a century and a half ago. By the end of the Soviet period, Central Asia had made huge progress in both these fields, with full state support. Modern secular education in the indigenous languages had succeeded in eradicating illiteracy and raising the general educational level of the population. There were visible improvements in the field of women's education. Although the society retained many vestiges of patriarchy, it nevertheless underwent a transformation during those years.

Appendix

TABLE 1. Number of physicians (all specialties, per 10,000 population) and infant mortality rates, Soviet Central Asia (aged 0–1 years per 1,000 live births, 1970/71–1987/88)

Republic	No. of physicians		Infant mortality (%)	
	1970/1	1987/8	1970/1	1987/8
Kazakhstan	21.8	38.7	21.8	38.7
Kyrgyzstan	20.8	35.1	20.8	35.1
Tajikistan	15.9	27.2	15.9	27.2
Turkmenistan	21.3	34.7	21.3	34.7
Uzbekistan	20.1	34.7	20.1	34.7

Source: *Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v1987g.*, 1988, p. 541; cited in Bond, Belkindas and Treyvish, 1991, pp. 23-5.

TABLE 2. Educational level among titular nations, Central Asia (per 1,000 population aged 10 and above with higher or secondary [complete or incomplete] education, 1959–85)

Republic	1959	1985
Kazakhstan	268	678
Kyrgyzstan	299	666
Tajikistan	299	643
Turkmenistan	363	677
Uzbekistan	311	683

Source: Kaiser, 1992, p. 255.

TABLE 3. Female/male ratio¹ (Central Asians aged 10 and above with higher or secondary [complete or incomplete] education, 1959–70)

Nationality	Urban		Rural	
	1959	1970	1959	1970
Kazakh	61.9	95.6	51.9	85.6
Kyrgyz	67.9	99.4	55.2	86.6
Tajik	54.7	88.0	65.4	88.7
Turkmen	62.0	94.0	75.2	91.6
Uzbek	66.3	93.5	62.0	89.6

1. Ratio = female rate ÷ male rate × 100. A ratio of 100 would indicate equality.

Source: Kaiser, 1992, p. 258.

TABLE 4. Primary and secondary education in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Mongolia and Pakistan: selected indicators (1990/91)

Country	Student/teacher ratio in primary education (no. of students per teacher)	Girls in primary education (%)	Girls in secondary education of all types (%)	In general secondary education (%)	In vocational secondary education (%)
Afghanistan	41	34	51	51	9
Kazakhstan	21	49 ^a	n.a.	52 ^a	n.a.
Kyrgyzstan	16	50	50	50	50
Mongolia	28	50	57 ^b	58 ^b	48 ^b
Pakistan	42	32	31	31	19
Tajikistan	22	49	n.a.	47 ^c	n.a.
Uzbekistan	24	49	n.a.	49	n.a.

a. Data for 1993/94.

b. Data for 1992/93.

c. Data for 1994/95.

Source: *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1997*.

TABLE 5. Health and education, key indices, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Pakistan and Central Asia¹

	Afghanistan	Mongolia	Pakistan	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births, 2001)	279 (2000)	76	109	68	61	72	99	68
Doctors (per 1,000 persons, 1998)	0.11 (1997)	2.7 (2001)	0.57 (1997)	3.46 (2001)	2.92 (2000)	2.01	2.61	3.09
Hospital beds (per 1,000 persons, 1999)	0.25 (1990)	7.4 (2001)	6.5 (1993)	7.44 (2001)	7.9	8.8 (1994)	11.15 (1998)	8.31
Expenditure on education (% of GNP, 1990)	n.a.	8.6	2.0 (1980)	3.2	8.3	9.6	4.4	9.6
Public expenditure on education of total govt. expenditure, 1990)	12.7 (1980)	n.a.	5.0 (1980)	19.1	22.5	24.7	21.0	20.4
Access to water (% of population, 2000)	13	60	88 (1999)	91	77			85
Expenditure on health (% of GDP, 2000)	1.0	6.6	4.1	3.7	6.0	2.5	5.4	3.7
Public expenditure on health (% of total expenditure on health, 2000)	63.5	70.3	22.9	73.2	61.7	80.8	84.9	77.5

1. For some countries, years that are different from others are given in parentheses.

Source: *The Europa World Year Book 2003*; *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1997*.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

W. Floor

Contents

Afghanistan	575
Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran	578
Kazakhstan	580
Kyrgyzstan	583
Mongolia	585
North India	589
Pakistan	593
Tajikistan	597
Turkmenistan	600
Uzbekistan	602
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region	604

The countries dealt with in this chapter had many things in common, but also many differences in the mid-nineteenth century. They were all agricultural subsistence economies. North India, Pakistan and Iran had a mainly sedentary population, while Afghanistan, Xinjiang, Mongolia and the Central Asian khanates had a mainly nomadic population. Only Iran, North India and Pakistan had many large urban centres, although each of the other countries had at least one major primary city (e.g. Bukhara, Tashkent, Khiva, Kabul). All but two of the countries had a majority Muslim population. North India, although also mainly Muslim, still had large Hindu and Sikh minorities, while Mongolia was Buddhist. Most of the countries were sparsely populated, with the exception of North India and Pakistan. All these societies had a population with a low literacy rate of 5 per cent or less.

Education was traditional, mainly urban-based, religious in nature and not focused on the questioning of authority, whether of a scientific or other nature.

From the 1850s the Central Asian khanates were gradually incorporated into imperial Russia, a process that was completed with the occupation of Bukhara in 1920. North India and Pakistan were under British rule, while neighbouring Afghanistan remained formally independent, as did Iran. Both countries were under great political, military and economic pressure from Russia and Britain, however. Xinjiang and Mongolia were under nominal Chinese rule. For most of the countries concerned, a major change took place following the Russian revolution of 1917, when communist ideology became the developmental creed of the Central Asian countries and Mongolia (for Xinjiang, this only occurred as of 1949, with the establishment of communism as the state ideology in China). What are today India and Pakistan remained under British rule until 1947, but thereafter the two independent states chose their own (still strongly centralized) development path. Iran, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, continued an equally centralizing monarchist rule. From 1978 to 1989, Afghanistan was a communist-ruled state; the ensuing civil war was ended by the take-over by the Taliban regime, which had a fundamentalist Muslim ideology that is utterly anti-science and -technology. Iran's Islamic revolution of 1979 led to a regime that was based on a different kind of Muslim ideology, one that actively promotes science and technology.

Following the organizational pattern of the Soviet model for the fields of science and industry, all the Central Asian republics as well as Mongolia and Xinjiang separated education, production and research activities. Research was pursued in specialized research institutes, while little research was done at universities. Under communist rule, centralized science and technology directives were laid down by Moscow – this is still the system in Xinjiang (but from Beijing). Mongolia, although formally independent, also followed the Soviet model and its instructions. During the Soviet era, Russian, rather than the national languages, was the preferred medium of instruction in higher education. The same still holds true for Xinjiang, where Chinese is the main language of science and technology.

By the early 1960s, each Soviet republic had its own academic research centre – the Republican Academy of Sciences and its affiliated branch and section institutes. The aims of the academy are to carry out scientific research in the natural, technical and social sciences, to train scientific staff in all fields of science, to advise the government in matters of scientific policy and to disseminate knowledge. The academy defines priority themes and directions of research in the national academies, coordinates fundamental research financed by the state, participates in international organizations and organizes symposia and conferences to discuss scientific problems and coordinate research.

As a result of the radical socio-economic reforms in the communist countries, all the social indicators (health, education, income) experienced significant improvements. This was not the case in the other countries discussed here. Afghanistan is now only slightly better off than it was in 1900, while North India and Pakistan have made some progress; only Iran has been able to develop consistently. In most countries, the private sector now plays a positive role, although in all countries with a communist past and/or communist present most research and development is still done in state-owned institutions. Whereas in the past this same group of countries had little or no international contacts (other than with like-minded communist states), these are now eagerly sought for the funds and the knowledge that such contacts bring.

Although the ratio of Gross domestic Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the number of personnel involved in the science and technology sector serve as indicators for its importance and progress at the national level, the data require critical evaluation. One important indicator is the number of articles published in internationally respected journals or the number of patents registered in the international patent systems. A second criterion for scientific achievement is the degree to which science enters into a nation's economy. Third, and last, a nation's scientific level is estimated by the quality of science taught in its educational institutions, and the extent to which scientific thinking is part of the general public consciousness. Among the indicators, research and development expenditures, scientific output as publications and frequency of citations seem to be the most clearly defined and least controversial parameters. As to the qualitative aspect, the reader is referred to the Institute for Scientific Information's *Journal Citation Reports*: these present quantifiable statistical data that provide a systematic, objective way of evaluating the world's leading journals and their impact and influence in the global research community.¹

As far as the quantitative aspect is concerned, most of the countries with which we are concerned perform badly. On average, 1.8 per cent of national GDP has been spent on research and development worldwide. The leastdeveloped countries (LDCs) devoted less than 1 per cent (0.9 per cent) of their GDP to research and development in 2000, whereas the more developed countries generally spent 2.4 per cent of GDP. From [Table 1](#) it is clear that the countries discussed have a below-average GERD, particularly those countries for which no data are available. There are on average 10 times more researchers per million inhabitants in the more developed countries than in the LDCs. Three out of every 1,000 inhabitants of the more developed countries are researchers, while only 3 out of every

¹ See <http://www.isinet.com/>.

TABLE 1. Personnel engaged in, and expenditure on, research and development (1997 unless otherwise indicated)

Country	No. of researchers per million inhabitants	No. of technicians per million inhabitants	No. of technicians per researcher	Expenditure on R& D as percentage of GNP
Afghanistan	–	–	–	–
India (1994)	149	108	0.7	0.73
Iran	560	166	0.3	0.48
Kazakhstan	716	293	0.4	0.29
Kyrgyzstan	581	49	0.1	0.19
Mongolia	544	78	0.1	–
Pakistan	72	13	0.2	–
Tajikistan (1993)	666	–	–	–
Turkmenistan –	–	–	–	–
Uzbekistan (1992)	1,763	314	0.2	–
Xinjiang –	–	–	–	–

Source: UNESCO [http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/html/SandTec/Table_III_1_Asia.html].

10,000 inhabitants are researchers in the LDCs according to UNESCO. In this respect, some of the countries discussed here perform better than average.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is traditionally an agricultural and pastoral-based society. In urban areas, handicrafts prevail. Social indicators are still among the worst in the world. The people are divided by tribal affiliations reinforced by the natural geographic divisions of the country. Education continues to be mainly restricted to religious instruction, a system preferred by tradition-bound families, and hence literacy is lower than 5 per cent. Religion is still the binding force between the various groups and there is strong resistance to change. As a result, developments in science and technology during the last 150 years have bypassed most of Afghanistan's population.

Amir 'Abd al-Rahman (1880–1901) tried to forge a nation from the splintered regions comprising Afghanistan and attempted to modernize his kingdom. His son Habibullah (1901–19) brought foreign physicians, engineers (especially for mining), geologists and printers to Afghanistan. He imported European machinery and encouraged the establishment of small factories to manufacture soap, candles and leather goods.² After his assassination, his son Amanullah (1919–29) tried to continue his father's modernizing policies.

² Thornton and Thornton, 1910.

His social and educational reforms included the introduction of secular education (for girls as well as boys), adult education classes and education programmes for nomads. This policy led to his abdication in 1929 and most of his proposals were never carried out – the amir had failed to involve the tribal and religious leaders in his plans, which they resisted. Under Amir Amanullah, some attempts were made to introduce modern education, but the lack of qualified administrators as well as science and technology personnel constrained development. Most notable was the establishment of the College of Medicine in 1932 under Nadir Shah (1929–33). Some small factories were also established in the 1930s (textile, sugar, oil processing). This development was interrupted by the Second World War, but restarted in the 1950s.³ However, manufacturing is still in its infancy in Afghanistan. By 1980 there were only some 200 manufacturing establishments in the country. This was partly due to the lack of infrastructure, in particular the lack of qualified technical personnel to plan, identify, execute and manage industrial projects.

After the establishment of the Afghan revolutionary government in 1978, illiteracy was recognized as the major factor hindering the country's development and preventing the people benefiting from modern science and technology. The first census in 1977 showed that the literacy rate was around 11.4 per cent (18.7 per cent for males; 2.8 for females), with a strong economic, regional and gender bias. The urban population was more literate than the rural, and men more literate than women. People in Kabul province had greater access to education than elsewhere in the country. The new government therefore gave high priority to the expansion of education. In theory education was free from kindergarten through university, but in practice the lack of educators and schools made this policy objective unattainable. In fact, much of the higher training for technical personnel was undertaken in a small number of modern factories, and it was limited to their own staff. Some specialized government agencies (radio and television; civil aviation; Ministry of Mines) did the same. The Ministry of Public Health ran its own nursing school. Those wanting higher education had to go abroad.

Science and technology had been largely ignored in the development plans of successive governments since the Second World War. The first scientific research activities took place in 1956, when the Department of Agricultural Research and Soil Science was created. There was also an institute that dealt with surface water investigations attached to the Ministry of Water and Power. In 1963 the Kabul University Research Centre was established: it was supposed to become the driving force behind the development of science and technology. The centre, however, was unable to fulfil this role. There was a lack of funds, little political support, and the few science and technology activities that took place were

³ Wilber, 1962.

financed by foreign countries and the United Nations. There was also a mismatch between the type of technical education that students received and the needs of domestic industry. Furthermore, much science and technology work had been in the form of technical assistance by foreign experts who did not ensure the build-up of know-how in Afghanistan through the transfer of science and technology. Finally, through the brain drain, many Afghan students studying abroad decided to remain there.

The revolutionary government also wanted to develop the science and technology base of the country in all aspects. To that end in 1979 it created a National Science and Technology Commission chaired by the prime minister. Its task was policy formulation, coordination of research and development, mobilization of funds, and development of incentives to check the brain drain. At the same time, science and technology was better embedded in the national development planning process. To that end, the National State Planning Commission had a Science and Technology Unit that was supposed to liaise with the Science and Technology Commission and science and technology agencies to ensure that research and development matched national needs, both upstream and downstream. In 1978 the government had established an Academy of Sciences attached to the prime minister's office as the highest institution to carry out scientific research in the country. Its major area of responsibility was the encouragement of research and development and its effective use in the natural and social sciences.⁴

Given the structural problem of lack of funds, many of the science and technology activities were made possible due to bilateral and multilateral aid. In particular, the Soviet Union and East European communist countries provided much assistance in training thousands of students and providing laboratory equipment and technical services. Considerable support was also received from India in the form of experts and equipment. However, as had been the case over the previous 100 years, science and technology could not develop properly due to the unresolved socio-political problems in Afghanistan, which repeatedly led to political instability. Governments, whose focus is political consolidation, if not survival, have little time for science and technology.

In 1979 the Russian invasion took place, leading to the war of national resistance and eventually to the fall of the communist government in 1989. Then followed a civil war, and the take-over of much of the country by the Taliban regime to whom science and technology was an anathema. With the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan, once again helped by the international community, has another chance to make science and technology an integral part of its development process.

⁴ Gopal, 1987.

Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran was an agriculture-based society with a low literacy rate and very low social indicators. In reaction to military defeats against Russia, it started around 1810 to import modern military technology and to send some students abroad for training. The printing press was introduced in 1817 and an increasing number of books and (after 1850) newspapers were published. It was only in 1852 that the *Dār al-Fonūn* (Polytechnic), the first modern tertiary institution in Iran, was established. Foreign teachers taught children of the elite the principles of modern science and modern languages, and access to this institution was very selective. At the same time, the government continued to send a number of students abroad for training, while a few went at their own expense. Moreover, the government employed a number of foreign experts for specialist training.

In 1865 the telegraph system was built on Iranian territory. In 1882 the first scientific bi-weekly (*Dānesh*, or Knowledge) was published, of which only 14 issues appeared. A number of publications on medical subjects by Iranian physicians appeared around the beginning of the twentieth century, while the Pasteur Institute was established in 1922 in Tehran. Despite these first steps, Iran had only 905 doctors trained in modern medical science by 1924. Under the modernizing Pahlavi regime, the *Dār al-Fonūn* was transformed into the University of Tehran in 1934. In 1935 the Academy of Iran was established. Its task was to preserve the Persian language and Persian literature. Many students were sent abroad to learn the skills needed to sustain the industrialization and modernization programme. Gradually, provincial and other national universities were established in the following four decades. During this period the student population increased very slowly so that the total enrolment reached 176,000 in 1979.⁵

With the establishment of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 1967, public and private universities and other higher education centres were given a uniform structure. After the Islamic revolution in 1979, major changes took place in the higher education system. To ensure that the new policies and institutions reflected the goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education was set up; it was later renamed the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology (MSRT). It is responsible for the management and planning of higher education organizations in Iran, including universities, colleges and other non-profit and governmental organizations. It also manages most of the larger Iranian research institutes.

To assist the government in policy-making regarding research and to provide support for researchers, the Scientific Research Council was established, with the first vice-president

⁵ Ringer, 2001; Floor, 2004; Menashri, 1992.

acting as its chairperson, and with a number of ministers and outstanding researchers acting as members. The Supreme Planning Council – chaired by the minister of culture and higher education – formulates and adopts all educational programmes and regulations with the assistance of university lecturers, and ensures that the universities maintain a satisfactory level of scientific activity. The Higher Education Expansion Councils at the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Education are responsible for planning and monitoring the establishment and expansion of higher education and research units. The universities and other higher education and research institutions are administered and managed under the supervision and with the financial support of boards of trustees chaired by the minister, and with the chancellor of the university or director of the research centre acting as the secretary. The University Council is responsible for planning the educational and research programmes.

Other specialized institutions in the field of science and technology include the Academy of Iran's Language (1970) and the Academy of Literature and Arts (1974). These academies merged into the newly established Institute of Cultural Studies and Research in 1981. In addition, the Academy of Sciences of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1988), the Academy of Persian Language and Literature (1990) and the Academy of Medical Sciences (1991), with their various scientific departments, have been created. Under MSRT, the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology (IROST) was established in 1980 to promote scientific and research activity in the country.⁶ The Iranian Scientific Documentation Centre (IRANDOC), established in 1968 and restructured in 1991, is a research centre affiliated with the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology; its task is to expand and develop information science and services through research, education and the provision of services.⁷ In 1998 the Iran Industrial Estates Corporation (IIEC), affiliated with the Ministry of Industries and Mines, was instructed to initiate a programme for the development of knowledge-intensive industries (technology parks) within three metropolitan areas. For this purpose, a new vice-presidency for the development of high-technology zones was created within IIEC.

The government realizes that the judicious use of science and technology determines a country's place in the world, politically, economically and socially. Government science and technology policy is therefore aimed at: raising the research share in GNP and improving quantitative and qualitative indicators of research in Iran; directing research activities towards meeting societal needs and further application of research projects of universities and research centres; establishing advanced research centres of excellence at national,

⁶ For details, see <http://www.msrt.gov.ir/English/index.html>.

⁷ For more information, see irandoc-website.

regional and global levels; and, finally, strengthening and developing scientific, educational and research cooperation with international scientific centres and institutions.⁸

Such a policy is vital because, with about 0.1 per cent of its GDP allocated to research and development in 1979, but only 0.2 per cent in 1997 (after a rise to 0.48 per cent in 1994), the Islamic Republic of Iran ranks far behind industrialized societies and even the world average of 1.8 per cent or the 0.9 per cent average of the LDCs. As in the case of higher education, there may have been too much emphasis on quantity. Much science is being produced in Iran but it does not yet necessarily reach the standard necessary for incorporation into world knowledge.

Finally, the brain drain is a major problem for Iran. The latest figures released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicate that Iran ranks first in the brain drain among 61 developing countries and LDCs.⁹ Unofficial figures also indicate that over 4 million Iranians live abroad, many of them having emigrated in search of gainful employment. Each year, between 150,000 and 180,000 Iranians try to leave the country by various means. According to the latest published statistics in Iran, some 420,000 Iranian young adults holding top-level university certificates are currently abroad in search of better job opportunities and more satisfactory living conditions.¹⁰

Kazakhstan

The Kazakh traditional economy was based on herding by transhumant nomads. With the Russian conquest of Kazakhstan by the middle of the nineteenth century, this nomadic lifestyle came to an end as rangelands were converted into croplands due to successive waves of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants. This process had greatly accelerated by the beginning of the Russian revolution (1917). Nevertheless, the establishment of the Research Institute of Veterinary Science (1925), the first of its kind in Kazakhstan, is an indication that animal husbandry was still a major economic activity. As of 1933, several research and development institutes had been established, four of them in the 1930s (Economics and Organization of Agro-Industrial Complexes; Sheep-Breeding; Farming; Agriculture). This was followed by a new wave of 10 institutes in the 1940s (Geological Sciences; Biotechnology and Reproduction of Animals; Potato- and Vegetable-Growing; Human and Animal Physiology; Zoology and Animal Genetics; Chemical Sciences;

⁸ For an outline of the government's policy, see www.msrt.gov.ir/English/Policy/Policies.htm.

⁹ International Monetary Fund, 1999: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/06/carringt.htm>.

¹⁰ <http://www.payvand.com/news/02/may/1077.html>; Torbat, 2002, pp. 272–95; *Indicateurs scientifiques et technologiques 2003*, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/press/2003/pdf/indicators2003/3-brain-drain_fr.pdf.

Mining Art; Metallurgy and Ore Concentration; Soil Science (1945); History and Ethnology). In the 1950s there was a third wave (Water Management; Agrarian Research; Plant Protection; Meat and Dairy Products; Astrophysics; Nuclear Physics; Physiology and Labour Hygiene; Microbiology and Virusology; Chemical Metallurgy; Non-Ferrous Metals).¹¹

In the 1940s many European Soviet citizens and much of Russia's industry were relocated to Kazakhstan due to the Nazi threat. Furthermore, groups of Crimean Tatars, Germans, and Muslims from the north Caucasus region were deported to Kazakhstan. The establishment of new factories and development projects also made demands on the science and technology capacity: this explains why so many new institutes were created. For the same reason, the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan was founded in 1946. Research was carried out in a number of areas, including: earth sciences, mathematics, informatics, physics, remote sensing and space technologies, chemistry, new materials, biologically active substances, biochemistry and physiology of plants, botany, soil sciences, social and humanitarian sciences. More non-Kazakhs arrived in the years 1953–65, during the so-called Virgin Lands Campaign, when much pastureland was transformed into cereal-growing land. More Russians came to Kazakhstan during the 1960s–70s, drawn by the high wages offered to workers who were prepared to move with Russian industrial enterprises that relocated to be closer to the rich energy resources of Central Asia. As a result, the majority of the population became non-Kazakh.

After independence in 1991, the Ministry of Education and Science was made responsible for the formulation and implementation of state policy in the field of education and science, and for general scientific and methodical guidance over all educational and scientific institutions. The ministry, which was created in 1992 to coordinate national science and technology activities, controlled most funding for the Kazakh Academy of Sciences and other scientific institutes in the country. In 1992 the Kazakh Science Foundation was created as an independent non-governmental organization (NGO). In 1993 the foundation's budget was 1.5 billion roubles, which it received from a variety of sources, including transfers from the government budget, subsidies from ministries, contributions from enterprises and grants from foreign organizations. Proposals in the area of basic research received the most funds (80 per cent). During its first year of operation, the foundation received 500 proposals and made 150 grants. In 1993 a Kazakh Academy of Engineering and an Agricultural Academy were also established.

Most fundamental research was and still is carried out by the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, which in 1994 comprised 32 research institutes and a professional scientific staff

¹¹ *Alma-Ata. Nauka Sovetskogo Kazakhstana, 1920–1960, 1960.*

(i.e. holding advanced degrees) of over 4,000. Recently the government has ordered the establishment of 7 national scientific centres in the areas of space exploration, radio-electronics, ecology, computer engineering, biotechnology, and composite processing of materials. The centres will receive priority government funding. The Kazakhstan nuclear centre is already being organized, and will focus on research in radioactive pollution problems and the development of nuclear technologies and atomic power engineering.

The academy has issued a journal since January 1995, *Reports of the National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Kazakhstan*, which publishes original scientific articles by Kazakh scientists in both English and Russian. In addition to fundamental research, the academy has been actively involved in addressing the country's Soviet legacy of serious environmental problems. These include: high levels of nuclear contamination, a result of 30 years of nuclear testing; the reduction of the Aral Sea to one third of its original volume; ecological damage along the Caspian Sea; extensive air pollution, due to opencast coalmines and energy-producing plants; and erosion and desertification of virgin lands due to overgrazing. The Ministry of Education funds the scientific work of government environmental programmes on the Aral and Caspian seas with international assistance.

Most applied research is carried out at universities and other institutes of higher education, for example, the National State University and the Polytechnic Institute. These institutes have their own research laboratories and science councils to evaluate scientific dissertations. Many research topics are determined and funded through economic agreements with industrial enterprises. According to the Ministry of Education, in the past, about 20 per cent of the research institutes and institutes of higher education were funded through agreements with the military-industrial complex. Currently, the Academy of Sciences determines the funding of research and development projects on the basis of the formulation of Target Scientific-Technical Programme (TSTP).¹²

According to the Academy of Sciences, there are about 300 science and technology organizations in the country and some 30,000 technical specialists, including scientists and engineers with advanced degrees. About one third of this technical workforce is employed in Academy of Sciences institutes. Although there does not seem to be a major brain drain to foreign countries, there is however an outflow to commercial enterprises because they offer much higher salaries. In 1990 about 1 million ethnic Germans, mostly farmers, lived in Kazakhstan of whom only 170,000 now remain. The government has conducted a media campaign in Germany to persuade them to return. Also, 1.6 million ethnic Russians, 300,000 Ukrainians and 70,000 Tatars left Kazakhstan in the 1990s.¹³

¹² Erjanov and Morozov, 1996, pp. 97–105.

¹³ *The Economist*, 15 April 2000.

Since 1992 the academy has actively pursued new international ties. As a result, Kazakhstan is receiving substantial amounts of Western technical assistance, in particular from the European Community in the areas of telecommunications, sector restructuring, energy conservation and environmental policies.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan's economy was traditionally based on nomadic herding. Even under Russian tsarist rule there was no major change in this situation. Social indicators, except those for the incidence of disease and mortality, were low. With the Sovietization of Kyrgyz society the level of education rose. The country's economy still remained agricultural in nature, although the establishment of a large number of plants of the defence industry and related research institutes changed the nature of society. As a result social indicators rose, except for mortality and incidence of disease, which declined.

A branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences was established in 1943 in Frunze (now Bishkek). This was the result of the wartime evacuation to the Kyrgyz Republic of many well-known Soviet scientists (including many members of the USSR Academy of Sciences). In 1954 the Kyrgyz branch was elevated to the status of the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz SSR. At that time it consisted of 6 institutes and 500 science and technology staff. Although Kyrgyzstan was mainly an agricultural country, the economy of the Kyrgyz Republic was 80 per cent dependent on the Soviet military-industrial complex. At the time of independence in 1991, some 800,000 Russians and other Russian-speaking minorities were living in Kyrgyzstan, and many of the leading academicians were found among this group. Geophysics and geology were key research areas, given the country's mountainous terrain. In mathematics, Kyrgyzstan traditionally had the best school in Central Asia in topology, and was also strong in physics (nuclear, optical, laser and space) given its links to the defence industry. At independence, Kyrgyzstan therefore boasted a strong science and technology base, including numerous research institutes of the Academy of Sciences and a network of branch institutes, which primarily served the Soviet military-industrial complex.¹⁴

Because of its dependence on the Soviet Union (industry, science and technology funding), the break-up of the USSR had serious economic consequences for Kyrgyzstan. During the Soviet period, the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences had received its primary financial support from the USSR Academy of Sciences budget. This contribution now stopped, which had a negative effect on the scope of research programmes. For despite the national

¹⁴ Akaev (ed.), 1990.

government's officially declared policy of support for science, financial support was symbolic, being barely enough to pay the salaries. Furthermore, having been dominated in the past by the Soviet science structure, Kyrgyzstan lacked a strong centralized body to carry out national science policy in the pure and applied sciences, as well as in higher education. There was no consensus among the Academy of Sciences, the universities (new and old) and the government about the direction that scientific reform should take. Non-scientific factors, such as families and clans, cultural attitudes, regional interests and other private ties have also had a noticeable effect on the development of science policy in the country since independence.

In 1992 the president of the republic, a former president of the Academy of Sciences (1988–90), created the Committee for Science and New Technologies to implement, coordinate and fund national science and technology policy, including the Academy of Sciences. The Kyrgyz Government charged the State Agency on Science and Intellectual Property with the implementation of state technological policy. In 1993 Kyrgyzstan further adopted a new Education Law, which included changes relating to the management of the science and technology sector. One of the main goals of the Ministry of Education is to integrate higher education and scientific research. Therefore, the Committee for Science and New Technologies, formed in 1992, was brought under the auspices of the ministry in April 1995. The ministry only supports research at higher education institutions and branch institutes, as since 1994 the National Academy of Sciences has received its budget separately from the government.

In December 1993 the Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic became the National Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyzstan. Since independence, the paradoxical situation had arisen in which the number of academy institutes had increased, but the overall numbers of science and technology staff had decreased (due to emigration to Russia, low salaries and other factors). Therefore, in 1994 it was decided to reduce the number of science and technology institutions. The scientific science and technology potential of Kyrgyzstan is concentrated in 90 independent technological entities, organizations, firms, higher education institutions, research-and-production centres and temporary creative collectives. The most important science, development and technology priorities are: health and the environment; agriculture and consumer goods; power engineering; mining and water; telecommunications; housing construction; manufacturing know-how; tourism; and basic research.¹⁵

To give expression to the government's desire to prioritize science, parliament adopted its first Law on Science and Principles of Government Science and Technology Policy on 15 April 1995. The law outlines government regulations for science and technology

¹⁵ http://www.bit.ac.at/centralasia/en/china/cont_foerderung.html.

policy, describes the science structure, and sources of financing for science. These financial sources include: the establishment of a National Science Foundation of the Kyrgyz Republic, a Central Foundation for Science and Technology (not funded from the government budget), a Government Innovation Fund, and Regional and Branch Funds although the majority of these foundations have not yet been formally established. According to the law, the science and technology sector is to receive up to 3 per cent of the national budget, which is not a realistic figure. For although science and technology ranks high in the government's policy, science is not considered to be a high priority for funding, considering the demands from other sectors of the economy. GERD has dropped from 0.26 per cent in 1994 to 0.2 per cent in 1997. Most (63.5 per cent) of the funding in 1997 came from government; what was new was that industry and foreign sources (8.5 per cent) had become a structural part of research and development funding, according to UNESCO. International cooperation in science, engineering and innovative know-how is one of the main activities of the state agency on science and intellectual property. During the last 10 years, Kyrgyzstan has concluded agreements in the field of technological cooperation with all CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, the USA and the European Union.

Another unresolved problem is the brain drain. Since 1991 a majority of the Russian and other peoples who were deported during the Second World War have left Kyrgyzstan. Thousands of people are continuing to leave the country, an outflow that is worrying Kyrgyz officials because the exodus is generally among the most educated sectors of the population, initially of Russians and other non-Kyrgyz, but now also of educated Kyrgyz.¹⁶

Mongolia

Mongolia's feudal system was based on a hierarchy of all-embracing subservience of the large majority of the pastoral population to their hereditary overlords. There was very limited formal education and such social mobility as existed only took place within the monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism and Lamaism. Mongolia's first centre of modern sciences came into being in 1921 when the government of the newly independent nation established an Institute of Literature and Scripts. It initially employed 8 persons, among whom were a few Russians, and it also performed tasks as a branch of government. Although its main task was to translate foreign scientific and political books and articles, it was also expected to constitute a library of the same literature in Mongolian, collect old books and make an inventory of old monuments. The institute had a small budget of only 3,000 *lians*, and was initially housed in its president's yurt. In 1922 it bought a wooden house, while its archives

¹⁶ <http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200103/0040.html>.

were kept in a two-storey house as of 1932. In January 1924 the institute was merged with the Department of Education and put in charge of the country's education system.

In November 1924, however, the institute's independence was restored and in 1927 it was upgraded to become the Institute of Sciences. It then also became affiliated with the system of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and was led by USSR academicians. Over time it acquired additional tasks. To the Language and Culture Sector (1921) were added the Sector for Geography and Library (1924), the State Archives (1927), the Museum of the Revolution (1931), the Sector for Animal Husbandry (1943), the Suche-Bator Museum and the Sector for Marxism-Leninism (1945). Each sector had between two and three collaborators. Due to the lack of educated people, members of the pre-revolutionary bureaucracy were initially employed. As of 1927, young students were sent abroad (France, Russia) to be educated. By 1925, the institute had already collected 6,000 books and manuscripts, among which were the Buddhist book of canonical law, *Ganshur* (108 volumes), and a commentary, *Danshsur* (225 volumes). The institute also published a series of booklets to promote the spread of scientific notions in the fields of science, geography and socio-economics, but above all on political matters.

Mongolia could not develop its capacity in all the sciences and thus focused on animal husbandry, the country's economic mainstay. The Committee for Science and High Schools (established on 5 July 1957) prepared the ground for the creation of the Academy of Sciences (24 May 1961). But the Mongolian side insisted on continued cooperation with the USSR Academy of Sciences, which also assisted in the discussions on the preparation of the next five-year plan for the development of science and technology in Mongolia. In 1961 the institute was reorganized as the Mongolian Academy of Sciences (MAS). Slowly, other sciences were added such as the institutes of chemistry and physics (1964), geology (1966), biology (1969), geography and social sciences (1971) and botany (1974). This was the result of the 1964 party congress that had stressed the need to develop capacity in these areas. Soviet Russian scientists laid the foundations in each field of science and technology.

Having transformed a country with a largely illiterate population into one with a functional scientific infrastructure, in 1975 the party created a Committee for Science and Technology charged with the implementation of its science and technology policy. A total of 13 institutes (8 of the natural sciences, 5 of the social sciences) were created as well as 30 research institutes, laboratories and other scientific establishments. As a result of the economic development of Mongolia, science received better material support so that between 1956 and 1996 the scientific staff increased by a factor of 10. Annually some 1,000 students and budding scientists were educated abroad (in Russia or Soviet-controlled East European countries), in addition to the large numbers educated in Mongolia itself.

Despite the early emphasis on animal husbandry, the focus in scientific research has now changed. Social sciences have overtaken all other sciences and agriculture has become the least important of the scientific subjects. The Mongolian Academy of Sciences currently supervises the operation of 16 research institutes and centres and Ulaanbaatar University. Furthermore, it jointly supervises 9 research and production corporations. The State Committee for Science and Technology was created on 17 September 1971 to better manage the increased number of branch institutes and the rapidly growing contacts with foreign countries. It was renamed the State Committee for Science and Technology and High Schools in 1988, while it was transformed into the Ministry of Science and Education in 1992.

Scientific work in Mongolia had traditionally reflected the country's particular geological and climatic conditions, and it involved a good deal of surveying, mapping, and cataloguing of minerals, soils, plants and local microclimates. Projects with clear economic applications were favoured. The Institute of Geography and Permafrost compiled maps of permafrost, which covers more than half the country, and devised methods of construction and mining in permafrost areas. Geological mapping and prospecting for useful minerals had a high priority. The country's climate and location make it a good place for astronomical observatories and for studies of seismicity and tectonic processes. Mongolian physicists concentrated on the development of solar energy and the photovoltaic generation of electricity to serve the dispersed and mobile herders and to help stem the flow of the population to the cities. The expansion of scientific education and of the number of scientists contributed to concern over the environmental consequences of the single-minded focus on short-term economic growth that had characterized the period from the 1960s up to the late 1980s.

The number of scientific staff has grown significantly in Mongolia during recent decades, in particular between 1970 and 1980, when the number doubled. In 1970 only 17 persons per 1,000 inhabitants worked in science and technology, while in 1980 this number had grown to 35. Given the slow buildup of scientific capacity, the composition of scientific staff represents a pyramid form, with the lowest number in the above-50 age group (11.7 per cent), followed by the above-40 age group (19.5 per cent), while both younger age groups show high numbers: the above-30 age group (31.0 per cent) and the below-30 age group (37.8 per cent) in 1985. However, when compared to 1975, there is a clear trend towards a reduction in the wide gap between the age groups, although it will take time.¹⁷

Prior to the passage of the 1991 Education Law, a number of ministries were responsible for the management of the education sector, but they did not formulate policy; they only implemented the decisions taken by the party. In 1992 the Ministry of Science, Technology,

¹⁷ Sedjav, 2000, pp. 68–70.

Education and Culture (MOSTEC) was established, and all science and educational activities were subsequently placed under MOSTEC. Its scope of activities now includes policy formulation, analysis, educational planning and educational development (programme approval, staff development, institutional accreditation, and accountability for the maintenance of academic standards). Since then, the Education Law has been amended five times, the last time in 2000. Despite the changes, implementation suffers from a lack of resources that has led to a deterioration in the quality of facilities and staff (due to the brain drain) as well as cumbersome bureaucratic practices, corruption and overall inequalities. Some institutes are better (or better at selling their services) than others and thus have more funds, while poor students cannot afford the fees and thus access to education and research and development has become increasingly inequitable.

In 1997 the government reorganized about 100 scientific organizations into 20 scientific institutions and centres and 8 corporations for scientific research. The National Council for Science and Technology was established and directives on the ordering and financing of research projects were approved. The Law on Science, the Law on Transferring Technology and the paper on policy towards science and technology were discussed in parliament. The new regulations have changed the basis on which research and development is undertaken. In the past all research and development was done in state institutions (the academy, ministries, affiliated institutes, university laboratories), but now this system has been structurally transformed. It is the first attempt by the government to match needs with capacities as well as to increase research and development by industry.

The number of people in research and development had been on the rise until 1990. Thereafter, due to the political changes, working conditions, salary levels, and changes of functions, the number of people working in research and development institutes dropped by 50 per cent. Nevertheless, the number of people with a university degree continues to increase, but fewer pursue a career path via the academy and its affiliations. The number of scientists in technical sciences is growing, while the number in agriculture and medicine is not, because priority is given to technical sciences and fewer students are trained in the other fields. This is also because the government now demands result-based research and development, while under the old conditions there was a low use of science and technology despite the high cost of creating such knowledge. In the former socialist system, the material basis for scientific research was mostly dependent on grants from other countries. Because the Agricultural and Technical Universities produce most of the concrete and necessary results, they receive increased amounts from the state's budget.

The government attaches great importance to the equipment of research and development institutes to be able to work at world-class level, and to that end it aims to establish

technology parks as exist elsewhere in the world. Since 1997 the objective of research and development policy has changed. Projects now have to compete for funds and are evaluated according to their relevance to the country's socio-economic problems and whether they also address issues of international importance to increase the chance of international cooperation. This demand for more accountability and relevance was spurred by the limited available GERD, which in 1997 had dropped to 0.2 per cent.

Continuing the collaborative ties that already existed between Mongolia and the Soviet Union as well as the socialist countries, similar relations have been established with West European countries as well as with the USA, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The training of Mongolian students in those countries began in 1990, and by 1994 the country had some 1,400 students abroad. Many foreign students are also studying in Mongolia. The government intends to further strengthen international cooperation in the field of science and technology to facilitate the transfer of technology and to strengthen the material basis of research in the country.¹⁸

North India

For the purposes of this chapter, North India is understood to include Jammu and Kashmir State and Punjab State. Both were part of British India and they were mainly agricultural economies. Education was limited, and mostly traditional in nature, whether Muslim, Hindu or Sikh, the major religions of North India. The exception was British education, which was available only to a small number of Indians after 1860. Thus Western education and techniques of scientific inquiry were added to the already established Indian base, making way for later developments. The first university in India was founded in Calcutta in 1857. In 1900 there were 5 universities; by 1920, there were 7; by 1930, 10 more had been added. By 1947, when India gained independence, there were 25 universities. Today the country has well over 300 universities and university-type institutions.

The main result of these developments was the establishment of a large educational infrastructure. Research and development, despite some isolated but remarkable individual achievements (C. V. Raman, Rajendra Nath Mukerjee, Satyendranath Bose, etc.), hardly existed before independence. In 1947 education was therefore chosen to be the principal instrument for the country's transformation from a poor, dependent, economically and technologically backward imperial colony into an advanced nation. Science and

¹⁸ Sedjav, [2000](#).

technology was to bring the means for economic development, independence and equality, both externally and internally.¹⁹

It is therefore not surprising that the Government of India (both federal and state) has dominated the development of science and technology policy and research, mainly based on the pre-existent British pattern. This has meant a top-down approach and a large number of central ministries, institutions and organizations. In fact, the prime minister (as chairperson) controls all science and technology activities in India through the National Council on Science and Technology as well as through the prime minister's science adviser, the minister of state for science and technology (who has control over day-to-day operations of the science and technology infrastructure), and those ministers who have significant science and technology components in their portfolios.

The rest of the infrastructure has seven major components. The national-level component includes government organizations that provide hands-on research and development, such as the ministries of atomic energy and space, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR – a component of the Ministry of Science and Technology) and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research. The second component, organizations that support research and development, includes the departments or ministries of biotechnology, nonconventional energy sources, ocean development, and science and technology. The third-echelon component includes state government research and development agencies, which are usually involved with agriculture, animal husbandry, irrigation, public health and so on, and which are also part of the national infrastructure.

Despite the importance that the Government of India attaches to science and technology, research and development expenditures were only just over 0.7 per cent of GNP in fiscal year 1994, down from 8.6 per cent in 1986. This shows that expenditures for science and technology did not keep pace with GNP growth. Although research and development budget allocations have grown from a low 5 per cent in 1980 to 7.3 per cent in 1987, there was a decline thereafter and the figure continues to hover around 7.5 per cent. More noteworthy is the fact that most government research and development expenditures (80 per cent in fiscal year 1992) went to only five agencies: the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the Ministry of Space, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the CSIR and their constituent organizations.

Because of the allocation of financial inputs, India has been more successful at promoting security-oriented and large-scale scientific endeavours, such as space and nuclear science programmes, than at promoting industrial technology, although the Green Revolution is a noteworthy exception. Part of this lack of achievement has been attributed to the

¹⁹ Macleod and Kumar (eds.), 1995.

limited role of universities in the research and development system. Instead, India has concentrated on government-sponsored specialized institutes and provided minimal funding to university research programmes. The low funding level has encouraged university scientists to find jobs in the more liberally funded public-sector national laboratories. Moreover, private industry in India plays a relatively minor role in the science and technology system (15 per cent of the funding).²⁰

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

After independence and the partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947, Jammu and Kashmir was also partitioned, as the two new states could not agree on another solution, a situation that persists to this day. The science and technology agenda was mainly set in New Delhi until 1989, when a Jammu and Kashmir State Council for Science and Technology was created. Its objectives are: to popularize and disseminate science and technology in the state, with special emphasis on rural and backward areas; to promote and encourage the use of new and appropriate technologies; to sponsor programmes and projects at state research and development institutions for the socio-economic improvement of the state; to identify various problems in diverse fields and to strive for their scientific solutions; to encourage the scientific community within the state by way of awards, scholarships, fellowships and sponsorship to international conferences, seminars, workshops, etc.; and to develop scientific infrastructure and personnel in the academic and scientific institution of the state.

The Jammu and Kashmir Government funds the Science and Technology Council as does the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, which also provides project-based funding. Some 57.6 million rupees (Rs.) were earmarked for 2003 for science and technology and environment by the state government out of a total budget of 22,651.5 million Rs. There were of course other research and development items in the budget such as agricultural research, which was five times higher (271.2 million Rs.). Some of the Science and Technology Council's success stories include: the establishment of a Genetic Counselling Centre where genetic counselling is provided for mentally retarded children and their parents; the regeneration of threatened and endangered plant species and the establishment of conservatories for ex-site conservation of plant germ plasm; and sericulture from leaf to cloth technology where, under the overall heading of training in mulberry cultivation, silkworm rearing, silk reeling, spinning and weaving are taught under one roof. These projects are implemented in collaboration with Jammu and

²⁰ Kuppuram and Kumudamani (eds.), 1990.

Kashmir University and specialized research institutes. Furthermore, science popularization programmes are operational throughout the state, including events such as the demonstration of a portable planetarium, the organization of science quizzes, debates, seminars and science model exhibitions, the celebration of National Science Day/Week, and demonstrations of explaining miracles, etc.

Appropriate technologies have also been popularized.²¹ As an example of the latter, in December 2002 it was announced that the Department of Science and Technology would install 5,000 solar devices in 194 villages throughout the state during 2003. The Government of India further announced in 2003 that it intended to establish 139 Community Information Centres (CICs) connecting all villages across Indian-administered Kashmir, alongside call centres and other schemes to boost Information Technology (IT), even though both power and connectivity remain elusive here. The project aims to connect up the state's 2,681 villages. The latest addition to the scientific infrastructure of Jammu and Kashmir is the construction of the Indian Astronomical Observatory in the village of Hanle; sitting 4,517 m above sea level, it is the world's highest astronomical observatory.

PUNJAB

In 1983 the State Government of Punjab also created a State Council for Science and Technology, which functions under the aegis of the Punjab Department of Science, Technology, Environment and Non-Conventional Energy. Its purpose is to promote socio-economic change and environmental awareness through the application of science and technology and to bring science and technology out of the laboratories and into the life of ordinary people. The council has focused its activities on five key areas: popularization of science; environment; biotechnology; construction and building material technology; and water regime management. Each key area finances a project and monitors its progress at various stages. The State Government of Punjab funds the council as its overseer, the Department of Science and Technology, while the Government of India also provides project-based supports.

As is the case at the national level, the state's chief minister controls science and technology activities in Punjab, for the minister is ex-officio chair of the State Council. Moreover, the secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department of Science, Technology and Environment, is the chair of the Executive Committee and also the member secretary of the State Council. The Executive Committee is responsible for the management and administration of its affairs and the finances of the State Council. The council is funded by the Department of Science and Technology, the Government of Punjab, the Government of

²¹ <http://www.dst-sntcouncils.org/j.k/>.

India and voluntary organizations like the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI). To indicate the importance it attaches to science and technology, the Government of Punjab increased its allocations for scientific research to Rs. 30.583 million for 1999–2000, and to Rs. 11.6 million for ecology and environmental studies. The State Council also generates revenue through consultancies.

The science and technology infrastructure of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab is an integral part of the All-India science and technology system, which has grown from about Rs. 10 million in 1947 to about Rs. 30 billion in 2000, which is still less than 1 per cent of GNP. This has resulted in major achievements in such fields as agriculture, telecommunications, health care and nuclear energy. Nevertheless, large parts of India's population still face malnutrition, depend on bullock carts for transportation, suffer from diseases that have been eradicated in many other nations, and use cow dung and wood for fuel. Although the government has decentralized to some extent, central government control over the planning and operation of research institutions continues, and the weak link between the research and industrial sectors persists. However, because of its large number of domestic- and foreign-trained scientists and engineers and its extensive participation in the scientific programmes of leading industries, India has the capacity to deal with and overcome these problems.

Pakistan

What is now Pakistan had the same history of inadequate science and technology infrastructure prior to independence as India (with which it had constituted British India until 1947). Consequently, the development of scientific education and research in the modern sense is of comparatively recent origin in Pakistan. In 1947, before independence, there was only Punjab University, which had been established in 1882. For a long time it was an affiliating and examining body; most of the teaching work was done in affiliated colleges scattered over the whole province of the British Indian province of Punjab and administered and maintained either by the provincial government or by private philanthropic societies. Academic control over these colleges was vested in the university, which prescribed the courses and syllabuses, conducted the examinations and conferred the degrees. It is clear that this sole institution could not possibly provide the science and technology needs of a nation of some 20 million people.

After independence, the Pakistan Academy of Sciences (PAS) was established in 1953 to promote science and technology, disseminate scientific knowledge and honour eminent scientists, primarily through their election as fellows. In addition to having exchange

programmes with scientific societies, academies and learned bodies in several countries, the academy also publishes a scientific journal (since 1960) and monographs on topics of national interest. It also arranges seminars, symposia, conferences and workshops at national and international levels.²² The Pakistan Council for Science and Technology (PCST) was established in 1961 as the National Science Council of Pakistan (it changed to its present name in 1984) on the recommendation of the first National Science Commission, which met in 1960.

The government has created a separate Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), whose task is to guide, manage, coordinate and promote all science and technology issues. The Pakistan Council of Science and Technology (PCST) supports the ministry in an advisory role on all science and technology policies and programmes, and suggests measures for the promotion, development and application of science and technology in the country. As such, PCST reviews the work of research and development institutions, etc. Another organization is the Pakistan Science Foundation (PSF), created in 1973, which finances research and development agencies and promotes basic or fundamental research that relates to the country's socio-economic needs.

In 1984 MoST formulated Pakistan's National Science and Technology Policy, which argued the need to attach greater importance to science in national development and that government should take the lead in this. The government approved the science and technology policy and its Action Plan, which among other things required the creation of a National Commission for Science and Technology (NCST) as the major decision-making and coordinating agency, to be headed by the prime minister. MoST would act as the Secretariat of NCST, while it retained the task of formulating science and technology policies and programmes. The new structure means that all research and development organizations that function under different federal ministries and provincial departments are engaged in scientific and technological research and development activities.

PCST, in consultation with the federal ministries and provincial departments, major research and development organizations and universities, eminent scientists and technologists, and representatives of the industrial sector, plans for civilian science and technology and research and development activities in the country. These plans are reviewed by the Executive Committee of the National Commission for Science and Technology (ECNCST) before they are presented to NCST for approval. In 1984 the government also established the National Centre for Technology Transfer (NCTT). Its major functions are to act as a clearing-house for technologies (local and foreign), to disseminate information, to support institutions in research and other activities related to technology transfer, to organize

²² Siddiqi, 1979.

seminars, etc., and to carry out activities to develop personnel in technology transfer and other related areas.²³

Science and technology research work is largely carried out in autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations administratively linked with various federal ministries. The research and development organizations operating in the public sector may be classified in terms of areas of specialization, e.g. food and agriculture, industry, water, etc., or on the basis of administrative control by federal ministries. Presently, the number of research and development organizations functioning at the federal level is 58. These organizations function under 12 ministries and 2 divisions, and their activities range from primary research to database formation and information dissemination. Apart from these organizations operating at the federal level, a number of organizations exist at provincial level. However, these organizations work with organizations at the federal level and as such their programmes are mostly common in nature.

There are furthermore science and technology institutes and field stations (non-autonomous) attached to the federal and provincial governments, e.g. Pakistan Industrial Technical Assistance Centre (PITAC), Provincial Agricultural Research Institutes and Rice Research Institutes, etc. The Pakistan Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (PCSIR), established in 1953, is the country's largest research organization. Its objectives include systematic evaluation, development, value addition, and utilization of indigenous raw materials. It also conducts applied research and development work on problems being faced by the industrial sector with a view to adapting, modifying and improving existing technologies appropriate to local conditions. Other major research and development organizations include the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO) and the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), the national space agency.²⁴

Despite the country's impressive science and technology infrastructure, critics find that it still falls short of what is required. In an essay on 'Ideological Problems of Science in Pakistan', the Pakistani physicist Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy presents a graphic picture of the collapse of attempts made in the 1960s and 1970s to build a science base in Pakistan. By the 1980s, the best scientists had left or been dismissed, few young scientists were being trained, and above all, the proponents of so-called 'Islamic science', who claim that the Qur'an contains all possible science, had acquired positions of power in educational and research and development institutions. Hoodbhoy concludes:

²³ Abdur Rahman, Quereshi et al. (eds.), 1990.

²⁴ *Science and Technology Manpower Development in Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal*, 1985.

Indeed, the reaction against science as an instrument of reason, whether applied to social matters or even natural phenomena, appears to intensify with increasing technological dependence on the West . . . The import of technology makes possible the simultaneous coexistence of mediaevalism with the space age.

Because of the allocation of financial inputs, Pakistan has focused on and been successful at promoting security-oriented, space and nuclear programmes rather than developing cutting-edge science or industrial technology. This has been encouraged by the fact that all research is funded by the state. There has been very little university or industry-related focus on research and development. As one Pakistani scientist put it:

Making bombs and missiles has indeed demonstrated a high level of engineering and management skills, but these programmes have little to do with cutting-edge science, original scientific research, high-technology, or the country's general scientific progress.

According to Atta-ur-Rahman, Pakistan's leading chemist and minister of science and technology in 2000, during the period 1990–4 Pakistani physicists, chemists and mathematicians produced only 0.11 per cent, 0.13 per cent and 0.05 per cent respectively of the world's research publications. Pakistan's total share of world research output in 1994 was just 0.08 per cent. The average number of citations per paper was around 0.3. In other words, an overwhelming majority of papers by Pakistani scientists had zero impact on their field. Furthermore, the value-added component of Pakistani manufacturing somewhat exceeds that of Bangladesh and Sudan, but is far below that of India, Turkey and Indonesia. Finally, the country's education system needs a thorough overhaul and with creeping 'Talibanization', the dawn of scientific enlightenment among the masses recedes daily.²⁵

The opinion of these scientists is not shared by the government, however, which at the United Nations Second Committee on Science and Technology for Development (16 October 2002) declared that science and technology formed an important component of Pakistan's development strategy. To that end, the Government of Pakistan had adopted a holistic, progressive and participatory approach to its promotion:

Our IT vibrant policy is aimed at the development of an extensive pool of skilled IT work force; designing of legislative and regulatory frameworks; providing business incentives for investors; and the establishment of an efficient and cost-effective infrastructure that provides affordable and wide-spread connectivity. Significant steps have been taken to ensure that digital gap is rapidly narrowed.

Given the importance that the Government of Pakistan attaches to science and technology research, it has over the last two decades increased development expenditures. These were 0.77 per cent of GNP in fiscal year 1981, but have steadily risen since then to 0.92 per

²⁵ www.alephinc.net/pakistan/html/article2.htm; Rahman, n.d.

cent in 1987. Atta-ur-Rahman, when he was briefly minister of science and technology in 2000, convinced his government that appropriate funding for science and technology could produce valuable long-term dividends for economic development. As a result, the government's proposed budget for science and technology was increased from US\$2.2 million in 2000 to US\$300 million in 2001— an astonishing increase that brings Pakistan's expenditures for science and technology to 0.5 per cent of its GDP.²⁶

Tajikistan

'Science, as we understand it today, appeared in Tajikistan only in Soviet times,' according to Academician Rajabov. Indeed, the country had little scientific capacity in the nineteenth century. In this agricultural economy, the role of women was severely restricted, and in some regions they hardly ever left their homes to work elsewhere, even in the fields. Tajikistan became the object of many scientific studies only after a Soviet state had been established. These studies, carried out by Russian scholars, focused on the country's mineral wealth, flora, fauna, agriculture and public health. It was on the basis of these studies that industrial and hydro-power projects were built and that the programme for the development of Tajik agriculture was drawn up. In the 1920s the Society for Studying Tajikistan and the Iranian Ethnic Groups beyond its Borders, with its various branches, was established in Dushanbe, Khorog, Samarkand and Bukhara. The society arranged scientific expeditions and organized meetings to discuss scientific papers on Tajikistan. The institute also served as a counterbalance to Pan-Turkism, which held that Tajiks were only Iranized Turks. These activities had some impact on the establishment of an autonomous, and then a union Soviet republic.

The Agricultural Experimental Station, established in 1927 near Dushanbe, was one of the first scientific institutions in Tajikistan. In January 1930 the Central Executive Council of the Tajik SSR was established. Its tasks were: first, to plan all scientific work conducted by various organizations on the territory of the Tajik SSR; and, second, to make a comprehensive scientific study of Soviet Tajikistan and the neighbouring countries of the Soviet and Foreign East in respect of their natural wealth and productive forces, economy, social movements, language, law, state development, etc., as well as the development and improvement of the subjects laying the theoretical groundwork for such a study.

Russian interest in the development of Tajikistan led to the establishment of a special committee of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Its aims were: to promote the organization of local scientific and research work; to provide methodological guidance for local

²⁶ http://www.ictp.trieste.it/~sci_info/News_from_ICTP/News_94/features_Pakistan.html.

studies of the productive forces; and to directly tackle problems raised by the government in accordance with the plan. The USSR academy was therefore the first body to organize scientific research in Tajikistan. As a result, by the end of 1932, Tajikistan already had 13 scientific institutions. In 1933 the Kara-Mazar Scientific Research Institute was created, while the National Astronomical Observatory was established in 1932. Hundreds of Tajiks also received an education in Russia. To bring order to the rapidly growing amount of scientific data, the USSR academy opened a base in Dushanbe in January 1933. It had sectors dealing with geology, botany, zoology, parasitology, pedology and the humanities.

Tajikistan's industrial development began in the late 1930s. The early emphasis had been on processing cotton and manufacturing construction materials. The Second World War, however, was a major stimulus to industrial expansion. The output of existing factories was increased to meet wartime demands, and some factories were moved to the republic from the European part of the Soviet Union to safeguard them from the advancing German army. Skilled workers who relocated to Tajikistan from points west received preferential treatment, including substantially higher wages than those paid to Tajiks; this practice continued long after the war. Such migrants provided the bulk of the labour force in many of the republic's industries up to the end of the Soviet era. Cotton textile mills and metallurgy, machine construction, the aluminum smelting plant and the chemical industry all had disproportionately small percentages of Tajik workers, or none at all.

Given these new developments, demand for more research also grew. In 1940, therefore, the Tajik base of the USSR Academy of Sciences was transformed into the Tajik branch. The Astronomical Observatory, the Vakhsh Soil Institute and some smaller establishments were also incorporated into the branch. Other institutions were later created for such research fields as stockbreeding (1944), and chemistry (1945), and a Sector of Geophysics (1946). The branch also trained many local scientists: in 1951 there were 150 scientists working there. On 14 April 1951 the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik SSR was created.²⁷

Before independence, the State Committee of the USSR for Science and Technology implemented programme-targeted planning and defined programmes of union significance. Research institutes were financed by the state budget and by self-financed contracts that constituted more than 98 per cent of total expenditures for science; only 1.2 per cent came from non-centralized sources.²⁸ The focus of research and development was on the country's rich deposits of minerals and ores important to the mining, oil, gas and coal industries; hydroelectric energy resources; geophysical seismological conditions of Tajikistan;

²⁷ Rajabov, 1998

²⁸ <http://www.undp.org/rbec/nhdr/1996/tajikistan/chapter12.htm>.

agricultural conditions; and high birth rates and problems of basic health care. The stable growth of research in terms of personnel, materials, technology and financial support was obvious in the republic before the 1990s. There were more than 100 research or scientific establishments. There were also 400 units with various laboratories, projects and experiments. However, the civil war inflicted great damage and many units were destroyed or plundered.

After independence in 1991 there were no more centralized subsidies and financial support for the Academy of Sciences was drastically reduced. With few exceptions, scientific research has been and continues to be carried out under state sponsorship. The republic's Economic Reform Programme for 1995–2000 asserted that the government would elaborate a programme of support and development of scientific research with the aim of increasing the efficiency of science by regulating and coordinating research priorities. A joint commission comprising the National Academy of Sciences, the Centre for Strategic Research, the Tajik branch of the International Fund of Economic and Social Reforms and the Society of Economists of Tajikistan is charged with the elaboration of a national scientific and technological policy. However, government spending on science dropped from 2.5 per cent in 1994 to 1.5 percent in 1995.

The Republic of Tajikistan currently has 10 research academies (Agriculture, Architecture, Building, Engineering, Higher Learning, Medicine, Music, Natural Sciences, Pedagogical Sciences and Sciences). In addition, there are many branch institutes under the various government ministries. Previously, most were involved in large joint projects in cooperation with the leading institutes of the Soviet Union, but now most of the links have been severed. Each academy and institute currently finds itself responsible for seeking its own funding, apart from very limited government subsidies, to support its planned research and to increase the salary of its fellows. Therefore international cooperation and private-sector support is sought to develop the financial base of research units. Also, there is less emphasis on pure science and more attention is paid to research and development that is likely to have a practical and marketable outcome.²⁹

Inflation, non-payment of salaries and the emigration of personnel have further undermined the functioning of scientific establishments. There has been a brain drain of young specialists due to the lack of current and future prospects. Instead of its 4,100 fellows in 1985, the National Academy of Sciences now has only 2,600. The loss of fellows in the natural sciences has been especially marked, and significant numbers of these specialists have emigrated permanently. The average age of acting academicians is now 62. Since the end of the 1980s, there has been a rapid decline in the numbers of graduate and

²⁹ <http://www.tajik-gateway.org/index.phtml?lang=en&id=1536>.

postgraduate students. Consequently, there is little hope that the numbers of lost specialists can be made up by new graduates. Postgraduate enrolment in 1994 was one quarter of what it was at the beginning of the 1990s and few representatives of science can go to advanced courses abroad or defend their projects for grants. At present almost all fundamental investigations are at a standstill. The Tajikistan Development Programme Report concluded that:

The lack of funding; sharply curtailed research programmes, expeditions and fieldwork; outdated equipment; and severely limited access to scientific literature, conferences and other exchanges of knowledge may also have long-term effects upon the competencies and currency of the remaining fellows as well as on the students who work with them.³⁰

Turkmenistan

The population of the khanate of Khiva was mainly nomadic in nature and was incorporated into Russia in 1881. In 1873 the Khiva khanate was conquered by the tsarist troops. Russia did little to develop its newly won territory apart from introducing cotton as a cash crop. In 1924 the communists established the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) as a full member of the USSR. Gradually the Turkmen tribesmen were transformed from pastoralists into cash croppers, a process completed in the 1930s. Russification through the education system and political process transformed the nature of the country, while industrialization only took place after 1970.

Turkmenistan was an economic and science and technology backwater until recent times. In 1926 the Russian Academy of Sciences established a sector at Ashgabat that dealt with Turkmen culture. Other science and technology activities remained mainly limited to agricultural, linguistic and historical research. In 1941 the Russian Academy of Sciences established a branch at Ashgabat that mainly dealt with subjects such as history, linguistics, literature, biology and geology. In 1951 the National Academy of Sciences of Turkmenistan (NAST) was created with 10 institutes. In 1957 an additional 4 institutes were added (chemistry, botany, zoology and economics). Later other institutes were added so that by 1960 all science and technology sectors were covered by the NAST institutes. A further boost to NAST activities was given by the role of Turkmenistan as the launching pad of the Soviet space programme as well as by the development of the country's energy resources after 1970.³¹ Industrialization, however, remained limited and at independence in 1991 Turkmenistan still did not have a major industrial infrastructure.

³⁰ for details, see <http://www.undp.org/rbec/nhdr/1996/tajikistan/chapter12.htm> (Tajikistan Development Report).

³¹ Azimov (ed.), 1971; Melikov, 1992.

After independence the new government made structural changes in the governing structure of the country, including the science and technology sector. Saparmurat Niyazov, the president of Turkmenistan, became the central figure in the science and technology sector (as in every other sector), and he therefore closed the country's Academy of Sciences. At that time, the basic scientific institutes in Turkmenistan were the Supreme Council on Science and Engineering at the president's office in Turkmenistan (SCCE), the Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Academy of Medical Sciences and the universities. On 16 February 1993 the president decided that the Supreme Council on Science and Technology at the president's office in Turkmenistan (VSNT) had the status of a state control and management institute. Henceforth, 'The decisions of the Supreme Council in the field of state scientific and technical politics are subject to obligatory performance by the ministries, departments and other organizations.' The basic tasks of VSNT are: definition of priority directions and forecasting of development of science, engineering and technology in the country; coordination of the scientific and technical programmes; target financing of fundamental and applied research; and development of international cooperation. Members of VSNT are drawn from leading scientific researchers, experts and managers of sectors of the national economy.

Fifty-three institutions of higher learning, many with productive research programmes, were active in 1993. Higher education and research was hindered, however, by a shortage of laboratories, libraries, computers and data banks, and the publishing facilities to disseminate research findings. The Government of Turkmenistan therefore adopted the Law on State Scientific and Technical Policy (on the development of science and engineering), which states that these areas should be allocated not less than 1 per cent of the national budget. VSNT distributes selected financial assets based on a system of grants that are allocated on a competitive basis. The coordination and control of performance of scientific projects are carried out with the help of six expert commissions, consisting of leading scientists.

To exercise greater control over science and technology, the president signed a decree on 15 December 1997 abolishing the Academy of Sciences and all postgraduate institutions. Researchers and scientists of the academy were henceforth responsible to the government ministries and agencies that deal with their respective specialist areas. The president said he made the decision because of the 'lack of any practical scientific results' from either the academy or the postgraduate institutions. It also resulted in the merger of several institutes as well as staff reductions. For example, the Desert Research Institute was renamed the Institute of Deserts, Flora and Fauna of the Ministry of Nature Use and Conservation of Turkmenistan. It was the result of the merger of three former institutes of the Academy

of Sciences: the Desert Research Institute, Botany Institute and Zoology Institute. Of the 1,000 persons working there, only 80 were kept. According to critics of this new policy, the botanical garden was closed and transformed into the city park. Also all botanical collections have allegedly been lost. These critics believe that the same fate may befall all other scientific collections, and the scientific equipment of the former Academy of Sciences.³²

The official science and technology policy, as determined by the president, is that, first, science in Turkmenistan is still in the making, and, second, it is based on principles of simultaneous development of fundamental and applied sciences. Scientific research in the country is conducted in 28 research institutes. The president did not want to leave to chance the determination of priorities in both basic and applied research. In basic research the authorized priorities are: the chemistry of petroleum and gas; the biological variety of flora and fauna; the Earth sciences; the transformation of renewable sources of energy; the science of ecologies; and the reconstruction of an objective history of the Turkmen people and state.

The authorized priorities in the field of applied research include: biological means of protection of plants and animals; oil and gas technology, in particular drilling at great depths; technology of forecasting, search and investigation of deposits of minerals; development of non-conventional renewable sources of energy; new materials and chemical products from local raw materials; and maintenance of a high standard of health among the population. For the period up to 2010 a new programme of research-engineering development has been elaborated. The policy of the president in this respect suggests the application of advanced technologies, and the creation and development of national technologies. The objectives to be resolved by science up to 2010 lead to the requirements of social policy, the main goal of which is the provision of high living standards.

Uzbekistan

In 1924 the Uzbek SSR, a new administrative unit, was established: it included present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In 1929 the Tajik and Uzbek Soviet socialist republics were separated. During the Second World War, many industrial plants from European Russia were evacuated to Uzbekistan and other parts of Central Asia. With the factories came a new wave of Russian and other European workers.³³ Because native Uzbeks were mostly occupied in the country's agricultural regions, the urban concentration of immigrants led to Tashkent and other large cities becoming increasingly Russified. Uzbekistan played a

³² <http://lists.isb.sdnpc.org/pipermail/eco-list-old/1998-January/000879.html>.

³³ Abdullaev, 1958; Fazylov, 1959.

central role in Soviet bio-warfare research, because both anthrax and bubonic plague are endemic to the country. The biggest anthrax testing ground in the USSR was on a remote island in the Aral Sea, while Central Asia was the centre of a web of disease-research stations known as the Anti-Plague System. The State Committee of Science and Technology of the Republic of Uzbekistan was responsible for science and technology policy.

After independence in 1991, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education became the main coordinating body in higher education; it sets strict rules for the recognition of new developed curricula according to the state educational standards. Research was and is the domain of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences (UzAS). Founded in 1943, the academy currently has a membership of 155 (49 academicians and 106 corresponding members). It is the largest scientific organization in the country and includes more than 50 scientific research institutions and organizations. Its main goals are to advance fundamental scientific research closely connected to economic, industrial and cultural development, study new possibilities of technical progress and promote the practical application of scientific achievement and development.

In October 2003, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the government adopted a resolution that stressed the need to create the technologies of prospecting, extracting and processing of precious metals and stones as well as the need to develop the country's modern education system, which is connected with the activity of the Academy of Sciences and its scientific establishments. It further emphasized the need for applied research and for cooperation with industry. The government further charged the corresponding organizations with establishing a special fund under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences for the development of advanced technologies and products using local materials.³⁴ This policy reflects the message conveyed by the new Science and Technology Research Council, which is headed by the prime minister: 'No research for the sake of research alone.' He noted that, since the restructuring of science and technology was still in progress, opportunities to learn from the experience of others were welcomed.³⁵ State programmes of basic research and scientific and technical development works are financed by funds from the state budget of the Republic of Uzbekistan, annually allocated by the 'Science' branch. The volume of budget financing for 2005 was designed on the basis of priority trends of science and technology, established in accordance with the priorities of the country's social and economic development.

³⁴ http://ino.uzpak.uz/eng/scien_eng/scien_engin_eng_3010.html.

³⁵ <http://www.nato.int/science-old/e/ankara.htm>.

To implement this new policy, Technical-Scientific Programmes (TSPs) have been drawn up within the framework of the country's socio-economic development priorities. Their contents are determined on the basis of proposals by the Academy of Sciences and suggestions from the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and from ministries and departments responsible for science and technology. The annual budgets for the TSPs are fixed on the basis of the annual programme adopted. The latter is the task of the State Committee for Science and Technology. Copyrights of research results are held by the executing state institute on behalf of the state. The state remits part of the funds that it receives in case of the sale of scientific and technical products to the Uzbek State Committee for Science and Technology, which invests the money in innovative research and development. The idea is to provide incentives to scientists to compete with one another, so that they receive a larger share of the budget.

Through contract plans, more accountability is aimed for, while the government also uses the distribution of the research and development budget to address regional problems. This is necessary because many scientists have not yet adapted to the market orientation of the new science and technology government policy. Another constraint is the inadequate economic-legal framework in which research and development takes place as well as the inadequate use of non-budgetary resources to fund science and technology activities. The current science and technology priorities are: formulation of social and economic policy itself; agro-industrial complex; fuel and power engineering complex; mineral and feed stock complex; health care and environment; and information technologies and management. For the current decade 300 programmes have been authorized, in which more than 60 organizations and 27 TSPs participate.³⁶

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

Science and technology in this region was limited to what was necessary for herding and crafts. Medical and other sciences were very rudimentary and of a folk nature rather than of a scientific bent. Given that most people were rural, the literacy rate was low (less than 1 per cent), and the capacity for and access to higher education and research was limited, tradition-bound and focused on religion and its ancillaries. As a consequence, not only was the literacy rate low, but so were all social indicators, except for the incidence of a large number of diseases and mortality, which were high. In this situation hardly any change occurred during the first part of the twentieth century.³⁷

³⁶ Riskiev, 1996, pp. 27–33.

³⁷ Forbes, 1986.

It was only after the establishment of the communist state of the People's Republic of China in 1949 that institutions, policies and work methods were radically changed so that people could be educated, science and technology applied, new problems researched and new solutions developed. The fact that in the 1950s and 1960s the central government sent massive numbers of Chinese to Xinjiang to help develop water-conservancy and mineral-exploitation schemes also contributed to this change. They worked in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), established in 1954. Many of them were demobilized members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) who had previously been engaged in the building of farms, schools and hospitals, but also of factories and mines as well as having performed defence functions. Each year, the XPCC sent groups of technicians to adjacent counties, townships and villages to give training courses in growing crops and operating and repairing farm machinery, and to spread advanced technologies. The XPCC was dissolved in 1975, but recreated in 1981 and since then it has been engaged in constructing irrigation works, sand breaks and forest belts. Because of the large influx of Han Chinese, these are now almost on a numerical par with the Uighurs, who had been 74 per cent of the population in 1953.

Because of the region's relative backwardness, the central government arranged that as of 1989 some 80 institutions of higher learning in the hinterland should enrol 10,000 university and junior college students, 640 postgraduate students for specific posts or work units, 860 teachers and education administration personnel, and 1,400 business administration personnel from among Xinjiang's ethnic minorities. In addition a number of ethnic-minority visiting scholars were sent abroad for further studies. A similar policy has been pursued with regard to Xinjiang's backward industrial enterprises. The central government decided to move some enterprises and factories from more developed areas along the south-east coast of China to Xinjiang. It further transferred engineers and technicians from the inland areas to newly established key enterprises in Xinjiang, and sent large numbers of handpicked ethnic-minority workers from Xinjiang to study and practise in advanced enterprises in the inland areas, resulting in the growth of a big contingent of leading engineers and technicians for Xinjiang in a very short period of time.

Despite the important changes that have taken place over the last half-century, Xinjiang is a region where many non-Han people are still traditionally nomadic and primarily engaged in agriculture or pastoral pursuits. Because of this nomadic lifestyle, many of the herders in Xinjiang still live in felt yurts, but their children receive free compulsory education. Consequently, whereas the economic base of Xinjiang is still agriculture, the development of modern science, farming, transportation and industry means that it does not lag far behind other Chinese provinces as it did in the past.

Since 1985 the organs of self-government in regional autonomous areas have extensive self-government rights beyond those held by other state organs at the same level. These include, among many other things, independently planning and managing science and technology matters. In addition to its own funds, the region's institutes can apply for funding to the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), which supports basic research and some applied research and assists talented researchers. The university in Urumqi is also connected to CERN, China's 'information highway' linking every part of China and every corner of the world, to improve education quality and research abilities in the country, and to provide Chinese universities and colleges with easy access to the world's science and technology.

Given the fact that science and technology is an integral part of socio-economic development in Xinjiang, its science and technology infrastructure has grown over time and currently boasts research and development institutions as well as those involved in outreach and the popularization of science and technology findings. Care has been taken that all these responded to the socio-economic needs of the region as well as to its ethnic composition. The rapid industrialization and commercialization of science and technology have changed Xinjiang's traditional ways of agricultural production and operation. In particular, progress has been made in the fields of protective plant cultivation, irrigation technology and strain improvement. The industrial base that has been created in Xinjiang has also benefited from the government's emphasis on science and technology in the development of the regional economy. As a result, it is modern, economically efficient and cost-competitive.

Currently, Urumqi has about 110 scientific research institutions under either the government of the autonomous region, the government of the city or various national government ministries. There are also 45 specialized societies, associations and other academic organizations. The total number employed by all these institutions is 5,000. By the end of 2001, the number of professional and technical personnel in the enterprises and institutions of the whole region had reached 385,100. Many of these institutes, such as the Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, are affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Other major institutions include the Xinjiang Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Xinjiang Science and Technology Committee and Xinjiang University. These and other organizations publish science and technology journals, either in Chinese or Uighur. According to government data, during the 50-odd years since the founding of communist China, Xinjiang has achieved 7,102 significant science and technology findings, of which 201 have won national awards. What is of particular interest to the region is that the technical popularization of Xinjiang's merino sheep has attained an advanced level in China, while

the region's technology of desert highway construction is at the cutting edge in its field. The highway running through the Taklamakan desert, for example, is the only one in the world built on shifting sand.³⁸

³⁸ www.chinaembassy.org.np/white_paper/xinjiang/6.htm.www.mail-archive.com/uyghur-1@taklamakan.org/msg03747.html.

25

THE ART OF THE NORTHERN REGIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA*

A. Khakimov

Contents

The overall cultural situation	608
Pottery	610
Copper embossing	614
Jewellery	616
Felt products	624
Carpet-making	628
Artistic fabrics	637
Printed cloth	641
Embroidery	642
Leather goods	650
Bone carving	651
Wood painting	655
Miniatures and other arts	655
Modern fine arts: painting in the twentieth century	658
Conclusion	674

The overall cultural situation

Starting in the early twentieth century, the appearance of new, European art forms, including easel and monumental painting, sculpture, drawing, theatre, ballet, symphonic music,

* See Maps 1 and 2

cinema and television, radically changed the art, culture and mindset of the peoples living in the region. At the same time, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries traditional art forms continued to flourish, among them artistic handicrafts, oral poetry, traditional popular musical genres and the performing arts. The history of traditional artistic handicrafts and European fine-art forms in the region during this period can be divided theoretically into three historical phases, as described below.

LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

With the tsarist conquest of Turkistan, the area became the focus of strategic assimilation and was subject to ethnographic study. In Turkistan, artistic handicrafts underwent natural and intensive development and local artisans were able to satisfy fully the demands of the local population for household goods and religious paraphernalia. As with colonial architecture, new fine-art forms in the area begin to infiltrate the region's major cities, creating in the process small local centres where European aesthetic forms were reinterpreted.

FROM THE 1920S TO THE 1980S

This period saw the creation of national republics and their absorption into the unitary state of the USSR, whose policies radically altered the development of popular arts and crafts. Small-scale and cottage production, which hitherto had formed a unique area in the manufacture of traditional artistic crafts, now gradually began to die out. The dynamics by which the style of fine art developed were determined by socio-political and ideological factors.

FROM THE 1990S ONWARDS

During the 1990s the former Soviet republics of the region obtained national independence and pursued an independent policy in all areas of public life, including that of artistic culture. A new, highly reverential attitude to national history and to the cultural heritage encouraged the development of a new approach to national culture and art. Traditional festivities, customs and rituals, as well as a number of forgotten trades and crafts, began to enjoy a renaissance.

Fine art now entered a period of freedom. Artists were free to express themselves creatively and were liberated from state censorship and the need to keep within the restrictive boundaries of socialist realism. There was an atmosphere of stylistic pluralism, which also gave rise to a new avant garde, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Pottery

In the nineteenth century in what is today Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and part of Turkmenistan (Charju) there emerged the main schools and centres of what was to become Central Asia's ceramics industry, a sector with traditions that reach back centuries. These were: the central or Bukhara–Samarkand school with centres in Tashkent, Samarkand, Urgut, Bukhara, Gijduvan, Shahr-i Sabz, Kitab, Kattakurgan and Denau; the north-eastern or Ferghana school with centres in Rishtan, Gurumsaray, Khujand, Chorku and Isfar; and the south-western or Khwarazm school centred in Urgench, Khiva and the towns of Madyr and Kattabag. While developing in accordance with more general trends in the region, the pottery produced in each centre retained strong localized features.

Pottery of the Ferghana and Khwarazm schools is characterized by a colour scheme that employs cold dark blue, white and light blue. This similarity of colour scheme is due to common techniques used in application: the use of alkaline, or *ishkor*, glazes that lend a special dark- and light-blue tinge to the painting they cover. In all other respects, however – the shape of the wares, and the content and treatment of ornamentation – the pottery of these two schools is essentially different. Khwarazm is the only area where one can find distinctive large dishes with vertically raised sides known as *badiyas*.

Pottery in the north-eastern and eastern regions of Central Asia is more diverse in terms of the form and content of the decorative motifs it employs. The range of wares includes large and medium-sized chalices, large dishes, small jugs, vessels of various shapes for dairy products, mugs, wash-bowls and so on.

Pottery of the Bukhara–Samarkand school differs radically in its colour scheme from the dark-blue–white–light-blue pottery of Ferghana and Khwarazm. It features a warm yellow–brown colour scheme that combines brush painting (Gijduvan, Shahr-i Sabz, Urgut) with an engraved design (Denau, Kitab and Karatag).

The craft workers of Central Asia made mostly glazed tableware and non-glazed ware (generally for everyday use, such as large vessels for water and food products) that was classified by form as bowls (*kosas*) or jugs (*kuzas*), with each artisan specializing in the manufacture of one or the other. A *kosa* potter would produce bowls of various types such as *kosas*, *shokosas* and *piyalas*, as well as flat dishes called *lagans* (Fig. 1), *tavoks*, *togoras*, *badiyas*, etc. A *kuza* potter, on the other hand, would manufacture jugs and earthenware pots varying in shape, size and function. Ware was normally made on a potter's wheel, less often pressed or moulded by hand. The shapes were extremely simple, yet highly practical. Brush painting (*qalami*) and a method of incision through the slip (*chizma*) were the most common techniques used to decorate glazed wares.



FIG. 1. Gijduvan. *Lagan*-dish. Ceramic. End of the nineteenth century. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Rishtan ceramics had a reputation for being the finest in the region on account of the high quality of their artistry and the technology involved in their manufacture (Fig. 2). Rishtan's craft workers developed a particularly lyrical style of painting. At the same time, the depiction of specific objects now became part of the ornamentation, from *choi*-dishes (tea-dishes), jugs and musical instruments to guns and knives. Rishtan is currently reviving the technology of manufacturing the *ishkor* glaze and all craft workers there now use it as a mandatory part of the design process (Fig. 3).

Another recognized centre of Ferghana ceramics is Gurumsaray, which in the 1970s and 1980s was home to three master craftsmen: M. Rakhimov, M. Turapov and S. Khakimov. By the early 1990s the traditions of this school had begun to wane and today not a single master craftsman remains. Gurumsaray ceramics are noted for their strong conservatism and for their greater adherence and loyalty to old traditions: one craft worker alone, for example, performed the entire process of manufacturing an artefact from start to finish. Modern-day pottery manufacture in Rishtan and Gurumsaray has retained the nineteenth-century tradition of decorating everyday objects such as vases and knives.

On account of its style and the techniques employed in its manufacture, specialists correctly classify the pottery of northern Tajikistan with the northeastern school of Central Asian ceramics. The northern regions of Tajikistan have a number of major ceramic centres: Khujand, Kanibadam, Isfara, Uratepe and Chorku. In the south-eastern regions of



FIG. 2. Rishtan. *Shokosa* (large bowl). Ceramic. 1970s. Master I. Kamilov. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)



FIG. 3. Rishtan. *Lagan-dish*. Clay glaze (*ishkor*). 1980s. Master Sh. Yusupov. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 1999.)

Tajikistan, pottery was also produced by hand. In Darwaz, Karategin, Kulab, Faizabad and Pripamir, hand-made ceramics are noted for their diversity of form and type and include, among others, bowls, water vessels, jugs and churns.

The glazed pottery of the Bukhara–Samarkand school has its own particular style. One potter of this school who was to enjoy a period of fame in the 1920s was Usto Ishbabaev from Kattakurgan. A characteristic feature of Gijduvan ceramic ornamentation

in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the abundance of animal motifs. The products made by the craft workers of Shahr-i Sabz featured a rich, warm colour scheme combined with free-style painted illustrations (Fig. 4).

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, potters in Khwarazm manufactured ceramic ware and sought to create elements of architectural decor. This tradition is still alive today. The ornamentation used in Khwarazm pottery has a restrained and noble quality about it, reflective of the relative isolation of the region's cultural development. Khwarazm pottery has preserved its classical geometric ornamentation and the richness of its vegetal patterns. In the late twentieth century, potters in Khwarazm were producing ware glazed with only *ishkor* enamel. Today the main centres of Khwarazm pottery are the village of Madyr, near the district centre of Khanka, and the settlement of Kattabag, near the district centre of Yangiaryk.

The downturn in the fortunes of traditional pottery production can be dated to the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when the countries of the then USSR were hit by a general economic crisis. Tajikistan suffered particularly heavily on account of its civil war. In Uzbekistan things started to settle down in 1993, with the greater stability in the socio-economic situation. A major source of help in reviving the traditional ceramics industry has come in the form of grants from international organizations to master craftsmen to



FIG. 4. Shahr-i Sabz. *Shokosa* (large bowl). Ceramic. 1979. Master A. Muzafarov. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

set up schools where the appropriate skills can be learned. Examples of the positive input made by these organizations can be seen in the regeneration of the Gurumsaray and Gijduvan schools of traditional ceramics.

Copper embossing

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Central Asia's leading centres manufacturing embossed goods (mostly dishware) were Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand, Samarkand, Karshi, Shahr-i Sabz, Tashkent, Ura-tepe and Khujand, all of which, while sharing a common artistic style, had their own distinct features. Aspects of this common style included a marked tendency for vegetal and geometric ornamentation, as well as a woven design that covered the surface of wares differing in form and function (Fig. 5).

Domestic utensils included trays, bowls for fruit, drinks and juices, vessels for tea, pails, containers for transporting food, water scoops, braziers, containers for cups, vases, jugs, water vessels, washing bowls, various household articles – vessels in which to keep change, caskets, smoking paraphernalia, snuffboxes and writing sets – pencil boxes and ink



FIG. 5. Khiva. Jug. Copper. Nineteenth century. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

pots, lamp pots, as well as ritualistic artefacts such as bowls for alms and incense-burners, hunting drums, etc.

Embossed copper products were made by craft workers trained in one of three types of expertise: coppersmiths responsible for shaping and tinning, founders who cast the vessels and parts of the total shape (handles, lid tops, spouts) and embossers who decorated the products with embossing and engraving. The techniques used in the various Central Asian centres were more or less identical: embossing, engraving and openwork. To enhance the effect of the patterns, craft workers began finishing wares by applying a punch and gauze to the background. The nineteenth century saw the establishment of local schools of artistic embossing in Uzbekistan.

In the nineteenth century the most well-known products were those made by embossers in Bukhara and Khiva. These were noted for their high levels of artistry and expressiveness of form, their classical sense of balance and proportion and the durability of their ornamental motifs, which were fashioned using deep-embossing techniques. Similar in style to those of the Bukhara school were the embossed copper goods of Samarkand. The design of Karshi and Shahr-i Sabz work included painted backgrounds and inlays using turquoise, coral and brightly coloured glass. Products of this type were characterized by a smooth engraving style that was achieved using a fine and delicate pattern. The vessels are complicated in outline and cumbersome in appearance. Shallow engraving and inlay were also used by craft workers in Kokand. The shape of the products, as well as the ornamentation and decorative techniques applied, were richer here than in Karshi and Shahr-i Sabz. The Kokand method involved openwork ornamentation. Embossing in Tashkent was, in terms of its artistic qualities, less prominent. The city mainly manufactured large dishware for everyday use and only rarely was it decorated with intricate designs.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, embossers in Ferghana and later in Bukhara and Samarkand began to illustrate their wares with architectural monuments, while in Kokand they started to use fantastical creatures. It became common for wealthy townspeople to have the interiors of their houses adorned with ornamented metal utensils. In the 1950s and 1960s the everyday, functional aspect of traditional metal products all but disappeared. By the second half of the twentieth century, artistic embossing in Uzbekistan was in danger of vanishing completely.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the revival of the art of embossing in Bukhara, now home to scores of new craft workers (Fig. 6), and in Marghilan, Khiva and Tashkent. The products manufactured by these modern-day specialists are mainly purchased as souvenirs or for display in exhibitions. These days the craft workers tend to focus their attention on



FIG. 6. Uzbekistan. Metal craft worker. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

the artistic properties of the artefacts they produce, such as the beauty of their form or the type of ornamentation employed in the final product (Fig. 7).

While the development of metal processing among the Kazakhs, Turkmens and Kyrgyz meant the manufacture of essential artefacts and the adornment of horse harnesses, it also brought even greater artistry in the shape of jewellery, more specifically in the production of women's ornaments, but also in the design of weaponry and armour.

Jewellery

Much of the work done by Central Asian jewellers involved applying filigree finishes to sabre scabbards and dagger hilts, and the production of parts for harnesses and men's belts with silver-gilt plates and platelets studded with precious stones. Their main job, however, was to manufacture different types of women's jewellery. From early youth to old age, every important event or rite of passage in the life of a Central Asian woman was reflected in the type and choice of gold, silver and other ornaments. By and large they were divided into wedding or festive and everyday categories, although they were also determined by considerations of age, social class, etc. Girls between 3 and 7 years old were usually given silver earrings and bracelets or inexpensive coral ornaments by their parents. The set of adornments worn by brides-to-be were particularly beautiful.

Larger pieces of jewellery were mainly made from silver (sometimes gilded), while gold was used to make earrings, rings and bracelets. The Central Asian jewellers used



FIG. 7. Uzbekistan. Tea service. Brass. 1990s. Master M. Madaliyev. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 1999.)

virtually all the traditional techniques of metal processing at their disposal: forging, casting, punching, threading, engraving, embossing, impressing, as well as applied and openwork filigree.

Classifications of Uzbek, Tajik and Karakalpak jewellery are commonly based on whether a given ornament adorns the head, the forehead or the temples. Generally speaking, classification of this type, albeit with a small degree of regional specificity, can be applied to ornaments worn by Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen women.

UZBEKISTAN AND TAJIKISTAN

In the nineteenth century the main jewellery-producing centres of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were Bukhara, Khiva, Tashkent, Samarkand, Kokand, Qarshi, Shahr-i Sabz, Kitab, Chimbai and Turtkul. Other centres were Urgench, Gijduvan, Andizhan, Namangan, Marghilan, Chust, Urgut, Baisun, Denau, Khodjeily, Kasansai, Nurata, Shirabad, Ura-tepe and Asht.

An elegant diadem, known either as *mokhi-tilla* or *kosh-tilla*, crafted from gilded silver and studded with turquoise, semi-transparent and transparent stones, adorned the head of Uzbek and Tajik brides. It was normally worn together with an ornament on the temples, called a *gajak*, which was lavishly studded with colourful stones. A popular adornment worn on the forehead by women in the southern regions of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was a loose system of fine threads with embossed silver platelets called a *sil-sila* or *shokila*. In Bukhara metal pins were produced called *zhigas* or *sarsuzans*. Their blunt ends were fashioned into lamellate medallions or platelets and were sometimes made to look like a bird. Khwarazm had its own distinct type of gilded silver cupola-shaped crown that was either multifaceted or rounded in form, studded with stones and glass, and sewn onto a girl's hat. This was called a *takya duzi* (referred to in Turkmenistan as a *gupba*). A bright, multi-coloured and inlaid style is characteristic of the various types of necklaces worn by Uzbek and Tajik brides. Each had a particularly poetic-sounding name, e.g. *nozi-gardan*, *zebi-gardan*, *zebi-sina* (literally meaning 'tenderness and beauty of the neck and breast'). In the mountain regions of Tajikistan and in the south of Uzbekistan necklaces made of coral beads combined with silver platelets or coins (called *rokhti mugras*) were very popular. The top fastening on a woman's dress was also the responsibility of the local jeweller. Particularly distinct items of jewellery characteristic of southern Tajikistan were brooches in the shape of round, openwork silver medallions. The pendants attached to such medallions created the impression of a sun-like orb with rays shooting out in all directions (*gulibands* or *guli-yakas*). Brooches of this kind were also popular with women in Turkmenistan, where they were known as *guli-yakas* (neck flowers).

By the beginning of the twentieth century, jewellers sought increasingly to cover their wares with as many coloured stones as possible, and revealed a marked tendency to more intricate designs and to a certain eclecticism where style was concerned. This was partly due to the impact made in Turkistan by Russian and Tatar ornamentation, which local craft workers consciously imitated in a bid to satisfy the tastes of the more prosperous members of the community.

The 1920s witnessed a new stage in the development of Uzbek and Tajik jewellery. During this decade the general appearance of jewellery products changed, acquiring more simple and modest forms and colour schemes. As for the more intricate traditional forms, this period saw the revival of a type of earring known as *kashgar-boldok*, which is made from gold.

From the 1950s to the 1970s Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, Kokand and Khiva remained the principal centres of Central Asia's jewellery industry. While products continued to be manufactured with the same diversity of form characteristic of the past, new

forms began to appear, including golden earrings shaped like five-pointed stars with a turquoise or a pearl set in the centre. It was during these years that changes were made in the way jewellery production was organized. With the founding in 1963 of a jewellery factory in Tashkent, production ceased to be organized along the lines of a cottage industry. During this period traditional-style craft workers continued to manufacture items of jewellery in Bukhara, Tashkent, Samarkand, Marghilan and Urgut.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s most of the region's craft workers and professional jewellers sought to combine in their products the old traditions of jewellery-making with a sense of their own individual creativity (Fig. 8).

KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakh traditions of metalworking and jewellery manufacturing date back to the time of the nomadic tribes who inhabited the main regions of what is today Kazakhstan. The most famous centres were the towns of the Syr Darya and the settlements of central Kazakhstan and Semirechye. Throughout the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries travelling smiths and jewellers would set up workshops in winter and summer encampments.



FIG. 8. Uzbekistan. Earrings. Silver and coral. 1990s. Master F. Dadamukhamedov. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

Kazakh craft workers smelted iron, zinc, lead, gold and silver, and made alloys from zinc and copper, silver and gold. They employed a number of different techniques of metalworking, such as casting, forging, embossing, engraving, impressing, gilding, blacking, aluminium-magnesium processing, silver-line metal hatching and filigree. To cast their products craft workers would use *kalyps* (moulds) made out of stone, metal, clay and wax. In a number of regions, impressing was used (Mangystau). Engraving and embossing were highly popular with Kazakh jewellers.

The products that brought the Kazakh jewellers true fame, however, were ornaments for harnesses and weapons, the range of which was vast indeed. The Kazakh craft workers made magnificent curved sabres called *kylyshs*, a double-edged sword (*selebe*) and a weapon similar to a sword (*sapy*), daggers (*khanjars*), a long spear with a steel point and a tassel made out of horsehair, and so on. The Kazakhs called their most valuable possessions *asyl buiym* (treasure or valuable item). They included decorations for horses, e.g. saddles (Fig. 9), reins, saddle-cloths, saddle-girths, belts with stirrups suspended from them, as well as breast ornamentation.

Kazakh jewellers used gold, silver, precious and semi-precious stones, coral and pearls to make ornaments for women and in doing so utilized the entire range of methods and



FIG. 9. Kazakhstan. Saddle. Metal, leather and wood. Mid-nineteenth century. (Photo: From Margulan, 1986, p. 177.)



FIG. 10. Kazakhstan. Woman's pendent. Silver and agate. Mid-nineteenth century. (Photo: From Margulan, 1986, p. 183.)

techniques at their disposal. Women's jewellery is noted for its wide variety of shapes and sizes and for its use of traditional vegetal and animal designs (Fig. 10).

KYRGYZSTAN

Kyrgyz jewellery was made from silver. The jewellers did not have any special premises of their own, but would find a space for themselves and their basic equipment in a tent or go about their business in the open air. Jewellers would normally work sitting down. Beside them would be a small furnace, bellows made from animal hide, as well as an anvil and their tools. The most prevalent technique was that of applying silver to metal using silver wire. In addition, the jewellers used forging, casting, filigree, impressing, granulation, studding using coloured stones, embossing and engraving. Gilding was also practised.

Kyrgyz jewellery was not noted for its range or wide variety of forms. Many items, such as forehead adornments and coil and flat bracelets, are the product of a long history of interaction between the Kyrgyz people and their neighbours, the Tajiks and Uzbeks of the



FIG. 11. Kyrgyzstan. *Söikö* earrings and pectoral. Silver and coral. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 2002.)

Ferghana valley. Other examples include *söikö* earrings, which are covered with granulated beads and have pendants made from coral and silver chains (Fig. 11).

The Kyrgyz style derived from the distinct traditions of the Kyrgyz jewellers: these were particularly visible in *Jelbirööch* ear adornments and in the ancient, understated yet expressive, ornamentation employed in round brooches used to hold together parts of a woman's dress and similar to the Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen *gulyakka*. Necklaces made from small coloured beads and coral beads were also popular.

An important aspect of Kyrgyz jewellers' work involved producing decorative artefacts for harnesses. These included different types of silver platelets, blacked plates with engraved designs, and small bells with openwork.

There were Kyrgyz ornaments (Fig. 12) for plaits, the breast, the neck, the ears, the hands and the arms. One particularly popular type of women's ornament was the *shökülö* (cf. the Karakalpak *saukele*), a conical headdress decorated with pearls, mother-of-pearl and brocade, as well as silver and gilded figurines. Sometimes a large silver plate called a *kalkan* (shield) would be attached to the hat. Headgear was covered with a net made out of



FIG. 12. Kyrgyzstan. Amulet. Silver, coral and semi-precious stones. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 2002.)

tiny coral beads (*marjans*). As of the middle of the nineteenth century, *shökülös* were worn only at weddings by the bride when she left for the home of the bridegroom. The hat would be worn for a period of five days, after which it was kept as a souvenir until the occasion of another wedding.

The rich and distinct artistic traditions of the Kyrgyz people were embodied in their jewellery. Nowadays Kyrgyzstan's professional jewellers are using their talents to develop these traditions on a new creative basis.

TURKMENISTAN

Turkmen jewellery is distinguished by the unity of its artistic style, reflected in the monumental and majestic, one-dimensional and yet sophisticated forms of its products, which are characterized by low-key colour schemes combined with rich and flowing designs. The adornments of Turkmen women were made chiefly from silver, which featured a flowing gilded floral design.

A much-loved (and virtually the only) semi-precious stone was the orange-purple cornelian. A traditional diadem worn on the forehead, the *egme*, was made in the shape of a rectangular, uniform and slightly curved plate decorated with cornelians, gilded ornament and openwork carving, features that carried the signature of the Saryk and Teke craft workers.

Heart-shaped pendants, called *asyks*, which embodied the poetic idea of faithfulness and pure love, were a favourite ornament worn in the hair by Turkmen girls. These were often worn in twos or threes with a cylindrical amulet added on top. Such pendants were adorned with cornelian studs, gold plate, fine filigree and an open-cut design (Fig. 13). The compactness and abundance of the cornelian studs and gilded ornamentation distinguish silver Turkmen breast and shoulder amulets from their Uzbek and Tajik counterparts. A very typical Turkmen ornament was a compact, irregularly shaped plate that was decorated with cornelian studs, patterned with gilding and openwork engraving and finished with light, ringing pendants that softened the impression of bulkiness. The collar on the dress typically worn by Turkmen girls was adorned with a *gulyaka*, an elegant clasp consisting of a round silver-gilt disc with cornelian studs and sometimes with coloured glass and a heavy tassel of ringing pendants. A wide and sturdy pair of bracelets called *bileziks* covered the lower arms from hand to elbow (Fig. 14).

By the middle of the twentieth century traditional jewellery products had lost their former social function and the traditions hitherto maintained by the Turkmen master jewellers began to disappear. Professional craft workers in the field are now trying to revive the art of jewellery-making. Their attempts to date have frequently proved unsuccessful and have suffered from an excess of eclecticism.

Felt products

KAZAKHSTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN

From time immemorial, *koshma* (felt) was an indispensable part of everyday life in Central Asia. Unlike other materials that demanded intricate technologies, the production of *koshma* required almost no additional tools and retained the features of the ancient past (Fig. 15). In the nineteenth century, felting was a common practice mainly among the Kyrgyz, the Kazakhs and the Turkmens. *Koshma* with rolled-on designs was also used in the daily lives of certain parts of the Uzbek population (Kashka Darya, Surkhan Darya, et al.). On the other hand, felt products made by sewing together cut-out patterns and appliqués, as well as by means of embroidery, were exclusive to the Kazakh and Kyrgyz industries.



FIG. 13. Turkmenistan. Pendants. Silver filigree and coral beads. (Photo: From the Turkmen journal *Turkmen Medenieti*, 1993.)

Kazakh and Kyrgyz *koshma* also incorporated shades of orange and crimson, and the graphic design was normally made to contrast sharply with the background. Three techniques were employed to decorate the *koshma*. The first of them involved rolling a coloured wool design onto the felt base. The Kazakhs called this type of carpet *tekemet*, the Kyrgyz – *ala kiyiz*. The second technique was that of appliqué, which involved sewing a pattern using dyed felt or fabric on the felt base. The third and last technique consisted of sewing together the elements of a pattern that had been cut simultaneously from two different coloured pieces of felt (Fig. 16). Carpets that were produced in this way were known to the Kazakhs as *syrdamaks*, and to the Kyrgyz as *shyrdamals* or *shyrdaks* (sometimes referred to as mosaics) and were a marked example of the artistic features of this technique (Fig. 17). Felt used in mosaic-style *koshma* was generally more compact, which is why it had to be processed longer. The designs incorporated three or four colours – red, dark blue, yellow or orange. They were cut and sewn together using felt of different, mainly contrasting, colours and were then usually sewn onto plain felt and quilted using woollen thread. It was of paramount importance that a mosaic carpet be of high quality as it formed part of a



FIG. 14. Turkmenistan. Twin bracelets. Silver and cornelian. Late nineteenth century. (Photo: From *Museum Guide of the National Museum of History and Ethnography of Turkmenistan*.)

bride's dowry and was never offered for sale. Mosaic *koshmas*, bordered and embroidered at the edges with braid, were mostly used for keeping the yurt warm (Fig. 18). To decorate felt products, Kyrgyz crafts-women made skilful use of appliqué, using not only felt, but also leather, velvet, cloth and other kinds of fabric.

In the general character of their ornamentation, the felt carpets of the Kyrgyz are similar to those of the Kazakhs. The most common motif in ornamental art and in religious contexts was that of a ram's horn (*kochkorak*) (Fig. 19).

A variation on the Kazakh *syrmak* was the *bitpes* felt carpet. The very name *bitpes* (meaning unfinished, unachievable) suggests the type of intense labour involved in creating this kind of ornamental design, which was made by applying a cord composed of motley-coloured woollen threads to a felt surface. Along with the spread carpets of the *tekemet*, *syrmak* or *bitpes* kind, the Kazakhs were particularly fond of felt wall carpets called *tus-kiizs*, onto whose white background were sewn multicoloured patterned figures from felt, cloth or, more rarely, silk or cotton fabric. This appliqué technique was widely practised in the northern regions of Kazakhstan, where the most beautiful *tus-kiizs* were produced.



FIG. 15. Kyrgyzstan. Woman preparing the *koshma* (felt). (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

Although nowadays the small quantities of felt products manufactured tend to be for souvenir purposes, felt carpet products continue to find a market among the members of the local population, and not only in rural districts; on account of their colourfulness and the ornamental appeal, town-dwellers also like to use them to adorn their flats.

TURKMENISTAN

Turkmen ornamental felts (called *keches*) possess a distinctive quality all of their own and are fascinating on account of the type of designs used. The main design that frames the central area is common to all Turkmen tribes and is known as *sary ichyan* (yellow scorpion), *sailan* (the elect) or *gochak* (ram's horns). The process of making felt is essentially the same as that in other parts of Central Asia. Among the Turkmen, felt manufacturing is the exclusive domain of women (Fig. 20). Turkmen products are dominated by fiery red and warm light-yellow tones, although sometimes dark blue and green are used. Moreover, owing to the gradual change of colours with similar tones, the design blends smoothly into the background.



FIG. 16. Kyrgyzstan. Sewing together of elements of felt carpets. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

Carpet-making

Carpet-making is one of the most labour-intensive of the artistic industries, with traditions in Central Asia reaching back to ancient times. Nevertheless, it is carpet products from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that are most fully represented today in museums and private collections. During this period all the nations of the region engaged in the manufacture of flat-woven rugs, while it was the Turkmens and, to some extent, the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and nomadic Uzbek tribes who chiefly engaged in knotted carpet-making.

The carpet products of Central Asia – both knotted and flat-woven – were produced for a whole range of different functions. The most common varieties included flat-woven spread rugs and short-pile runners and prayer-mats (*joy-i namazs*), as well as curtains for inside the yurt. Objects for everyday use made from carpet fabric were notable for their artistry and the care with which they were manufactured. These included oblong sacks suspended on cords from the walls of the yurt called *chuvals* that were used for storing clothes, utensils and food products. Various types of carpet articles were designed for the



FIG. 17. Kyrgyzstan. *Shyrdak* carpet. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 2002.)

saddle: girths, horse-cloths (Fig. 21) and saddlebags (*khurjins*) that were often made using striped flat-woven fabric.

The Turkmens placed great stress on the decorative finishes applied to the carpet used to adorn the camel that walked at the head of a wedding caravan. For it was on this camel that a young newly married wife would be taken to the house of her husband; its sides would be hidden from view by five-cornered rugs (*asmaldyks*), its head would also be covered with patterned rugs and its knees had carpet bands wound around them.

In the manufacture of carpet products much importance was attached to the type of wool used, and to the dye, dying methods and weaving technique. Central Asian carpet-makers preferred long, light-coloured, soft wool taken from sheep that had been sheared in the spring and which was not very coiled, was strong and had a specific shine to it.

Until the 1870s it was the custom in Central Asia to use durable colour-intensive dyes of vegetable origin. From the late nineteenth century onwards the use of cheaper and brighter aniline dyes had a detrimental effect on the quality of carpet products: the magnificent range of cherry-red and red-ochre tints found in the carpets of times past was now replaced




FIG. 18. Decoration of the interior of a yurt.



FIG. 19. Kazakhstan. Felt carpet. (Photo: From Margulan, [1986](#), p. 159.)



FIG. 20. Turkmenistan. Felt carpet. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

by dazzling and garish colours that quickly lost their initial appearance because of the inferior dyes.

In Central Asia carpet products were woven on primitive horizontal looms of two types: narrow or wide. The archaic character of the looms and related appliances contrasts strongly with the great beauty and high quality of the carpet fabrics produced on them. The narrow, easily assembled and disassembled looms were used to make carpet strips for yurts and other narrow strips from which rugs and carpets would then be sewn. The wide looms were permanent fixtures which did not stand outside in the yard but were kept either in a room in the house or in the yurt for purposes of manufacturing large, usually knotted, spread carpets.

Over many centuries of carpet-making in Central Asia, generations of craftswomen perfected the principles of formulating and arranging designs and the choice of colour schemes common to all schools in the region. The central layout was usually framed with a patterned border. Inside the main area were design motifs that were repeated and arranged with biaxial symmetry in vertical or horizontal rows. It was only in smaller products that the design was central. Two techniques were applied when colouring designs: right-angled

and diagonal. A balanced, static design was produced using the first technique, which was more characteristic of Kyrgyz carpets. With diagonal colouring, which was often used by Turkmen carpet-makers, the surface of the design acquired a certain dynamism and the ornamental rhythm was particularly expressive.

TURKMENISTAN

Central Asia's reputation for fine carpet-making owes much to the Turkmen craftswomen, whose products are rightly considered classic examples of the art of carpet manufacture. For the Turkmen, carpets held both a practical and a ritualistic significance. Newborn babies were laid in carpet cradles, while rugs, baskets and bags were all part of a bride's dowry; the deceased were mourned on special funeral carpets that were later left on the grave in accordance with custom.

The key features in Turkmen carpet design were *gols* (tribal designs on carpets). In the past these had been tribal emblems, but later they were used as decorative elements in carpet ornamentation. Various in form, often rhomboid or polygonal medallions, they occupied the central field of carpets arranged either like chess pieces or in orderly rows, and framed at the edges by patterned strips (Fig. 22a-b). The number of local schools in Turkmen carpet-making reflects the multiplicity of the Turkmen tribes, including, among others, the Salors, Tekes, Saryks, Yomuts, Chaudurs, etc.



FIG. 21. Uzbekistan. Horse-cloth. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)



FIG. 22(a-b). Turkmenistan. Carpet-making. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

Salor products were particularly prized. They have come down to us in the form of museum pieces. Each reflects what were the characteristic techniques of Turkmen carpet-making: a dark-red background, medallions coloured diagonally and blending with the colours of the background, the central field framed by a patterned border, and geometric

floral ornamentation. The assortment of Teke carpets was basically the same, although the red background tended to be less nuanced. Bright yellow dominated the colouring of the medallions studded around the design. Teke carpets were generally decorated with geometric shapes, although vegetal motifs were also to be found. Saryk carpet products had a dark, red-brown background on which an ornamental design was emphasized using fine lines drawn in light-coloured tones. Yomut carpets, like those of the Teke tribe, tended to feature primary colours, as well as a design involving rhomboid *gols*, the sides of which took the form of hooked figures. Ersarin carpet products, whose designs reflect the influence of Uzbek and Tajik *abr* (meaning ‘cloud’) fabrics and a wider and freer interpretation of colour motifs, represent an intermediate group.

Around the beginning of the twentieth century, market demand for Turkmen carpet products rose, which led to a slight deterioration in their overall quality. In 1929 a carpet factory was set up in Turkmenistan. The factory incorporated an artistic and experimental workshop that later was to develop into a company called ‘Turkmenkover’. In a bid to come up with new solutions, during the 1930s and 1940s efforts were focused on theme-based carpets, heralding the appearance of portrait and narrative illustrations that often included inscriptions with the designs. As in other cases where essentially alien illustrative forms were introduced into local folk art in the region, the result was frequently eclectic.

UZBEKISTAN

Carpet-making among the Uzbeks featured long-pile, short-pile and non-pile products. Compact short-nap carpets were particularly popular with the people of Samarkand, Bukhara, Shahr-i Sabz, Khiva and other towns. During the 1920s and 1930s carpet production in Uzbekistan was developed in industrial *artels* (cooperative associations of workers or peasants), while in 1960 carpet-weaving factories were set up in Khiva, Shahr-i Sabz and other towns. At the same time, the domestic production of carpets by hand was generally encouraged throughout the republic.

In the 1990s home-based carpet-weaving was continued in the towns and villages of the Ferghana valley, Nurata in Mejdugorye, the Syr Darya region and Karakalpak. Uzbekistan’s principal carpet-weaving areas are, however, the Kashka Darya and Surkhan Darya (Fig. 23) regions and Khwarazm.

Today, carpet manufacture in Uzbekistan is developing in three main fields: traditional, small-scale home weaving, the manufacture of carpets by hand in state enterprises, and the production of carpets by private companies. The many years of using aniline dyes has had a detrimental effect on the aesthetic properties of homemade carpets by turning them from objects of high art into a run-of-the-mill everyday product. Today work is under



FIG. 23. Uzbekistan. Surkhan Darya *oblast'*. Women weaving a carpet. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

way to revive the technology of colouring woollen threads using natural dyes. Samarkand, Bukhara and Marghilan are seeing the revival of techniques for the production of silk carpets.

KYRGYZSTAN

In the past, carpet products were a very common aspect of everyday Kyrgyz life. Pamiro-Alai and Ferghana Kyrgyz tribes, as well as Kyrgyz living in the south-western parts of the Xinjiang–Uighur Autonomous Region of China, have been engaged in the manufacture of nap carpet products for a long time.

In addition to *kelims* (floor carpets), bags of various types can still be found with an outside carpet covering (*chabadans*, *kosh jabyks*), carpet strips for decorating yurts (*terigichs*), saddlebags (*kurjuns*) and saddle rugs (*eger kepchuks*). In olden days, Kyrgyz carpets, including a particularly famous variety made by the Khydyrsha tribe, were average in size (1.5×3 m), but from the late nineteenth century, when they began to be sold at local markets, carpetmakers started to make enormous spread carpets of up to 100 m^2 in size that had previously been unknown in Central Asia.

Kyrgyz carpets are made on the same type of horizontal loom (*dukon*) as Turkmen and Uzbek carpets. The pile is between 5 and 7 cm in height, the knot 1.5 cm and tied by hand. A Kyrgyz carpet has on average a weave of 900–1,000 knots per dm² (square decimetre). Larger carpets are usually a combination of two or more. The carpets are woven with sheep's wool, but the warp is made of camel and goat's wool.

Red and blue were the major colours featured in knotted carpets, although they were complemented by shades of brown, black and yellow. Yellow, brown, green and white were more rarely encountered. In terms of their ornamentation and the particularities of their colouring, Kyrgyz carpets are much closer to the carpets of Xinjiang and to Uzbek (Andijan) carpets.

For a variety of reasons, Kyrgyz carpet production in the early twentieth century fell into decline. Today, the ancient carpet-making regions are attempting to organize a cottage carpet-weaving industry. In addition, there are trends that indicate a revival of the methods of the past and the use of old dyes and design techniques.

KAZAKHSTAN

In the nineteenth century all carpet products were manufactured by the Kazakhs on vertical and horizontal looms (*ormeks*). The most famous traditional Kazakh flat-woven carpets were called *alashas*. Strips of 30–40 cm in width were woven on narrow-beam looms and decorated with a design. Afterwards they were sewn together as a carpet 4 × 2 m in size.

Another type of larger flat-woven carpet was the *takyr kilem*. Designs in blue, white, yellow or brown were blended on a crimson-red background. Flat-woven carpets made by the Naiman tribe were produced in the form of smooth fabric with a raised illustration of their tribal emblem. In flat-woven carpets the most common motif was that of a ram's horns, which were restylized as geometric ornamentation.

The Kazakhs attached great value to carpets (Fig. 24). They considered them to be the most expensive and most valuable part of a bride's dowry. Like other peoples in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Kazakhs refer to a pile carpet as *kilem*. A large, more closely woven, more luxuriant carpet is known as *orda kilem*.

Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek carpets have a number of similarities in ornamentation, layout and colouring. The Turkmen school of carpet-making developed with a certain degree of independence and consequently has little in common with the principles of carpet production found in other schools of Central Asia.



FIG. 24. Kazakhstan. Carpet. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

TAJIKISTAN

Carpet-weaving (*qolibofi*) was never a common decorative applied art in Tajikistan. It was practised only by Jirgital Kyrgyz living in Tajikistan, who mainly manufactured various types of short-pile products such as wall bags (*khurjins*) and saddle-girths, as well as (in smaller quantities) spread carpets. The ornamentation of all these products was similar to that of the Alai Kyrgyz. Women from a number of semi-nomadic Uzbek tribes inhabiting the south of Tajikistan wove small carpet products (mostly *napramachis* and *khurjinis*). In the early years of the twentieth century, Tajikistan began to manufacture carpets in *artels*, the drafts for which were made by artists based on the motifs of Tajik embroidery, as well as of Caucasian and other carpets. Thus it is mainly the designs and motifs of folk embroidery and textiles that are used in the carpet-making of the Tajiks.

Artistic fabrics

Nineteenth-century Central Asia produced a wide variety of plain and patterned fabrics from cotton, wool, silk and silk mixtures. (See [Fig. 25 a-b-c-d.](#))



FIG. 25(a-b-c-d). Uzbekistan. Preparation of silk fabric. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

UZBEKISTAN

In the second half of the nineteenth century, weaving in Uzbekistan was the most developed area of the crafts. Famed for their fabrics were Bukhara, Namangan, Marghilan, Samarkand, Shahr-i Sabz, Kitab, Karshi, Khujand, Urgut and Khiva. The most popular fabrics were those made from cotton (*kalami*, *alocha*, *susi*, *chit*), part-silk (*bekasab*, *banoras*, *pasma*, *adras* [Fig. 26], *duruya*, *yakruya*, *atlas*, *bakhmal*) and silk (*shoi*, *atlas*, *khan-atlas*). With the exception of silk (*atlas*) and velvet (*bakhmal*), very simple weaves were used: linen and rep. Woollen fabrics for outer clothing were also produced. Among the various fabrics, the part-silk velvets from Bukhara and Kokand, covers from Samarkand and Ferghana, as well as very fine transparent silk shawls (*kalgais*), were particularly popular. Most of these fabrics were decorated with strips or an *abr* design. The design of *abr* silk, part-silk and – much more rarely – cotton fabrics was a fascinating process.




FIG. 26. Uzbekistan. Loom for weaving *adras*. End of nineteenth century. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

The production of cotton fabrics was a truly popular and widespread activity (Fig. 27). Specialists who have studied cottage industries in the late nineteenth century describe many kinds of local cotton fabrics: *mata*, *khosa*, *buz*, *kalami*, *janda*, *astarchei*, *susi*, *alacha* and variations of them: *damkhaba*, *misri*, *chapanakhi* and others. However, even in the first half of the nineteenth century, in the heart of what appeared from the outside to be a thriving industry, there were already signs of decline. The reason was the inability of the cottage industries to compete with machines. Central Asia was overtaken by the more technically sophisticated fabricated cotton, silk and brocade fabrics on which the designs common to oriental fabrics were reproduced with reasonable success. These products proceeded to edge out from the market Uzbek cotton fabrics, and the production of *kimkhob* and *bakhmal* suffered irretrievably as a consequence. Only local silk and part-silk fabrics adorned with strips and *abr* patterns survived the competition.

The early years of the twentieth century saw the return of many types of traditional Uzbek fabrics in workshops of the cottage industry, then in *artels* and in factories. In the 1920s a shortage of prefabricated fabrics in the country led to an increase in the cottage manufacture of cotton fabrics. During this period fabric production in Uzbekistan underwent no significant changes. The same plain linen fabrics (*kalami*, *sarpinka*, *astarchit* and *alacha*) continued to be manufactured and traditional knots and colour schemes were retained, as were local styles and characteristics (Fig. 28). The main cotton-producing



FIG. 27. Uzbekistan. Preparation of cotton thread. End of nineteenth century. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

centres were Samarkand, Urgut and Nurata, and settlements in the Bukhara region (such as Gijduvan, Vardanzi and Zandana), in the Ferghana valley (Namangan) and the district of Besh-Aryk.

More low-key than those found in Bukhara, dress fabrics from Ferghana proved to be more in keeping with the aesthetic requirements of the day. The older centres witnessed a revival in the production of *bekasab*, *banoras* and other striped part-silk fabrics, which retained their local distinctiveness in terms of colouring and rhythm.

In the 1930s industrial enterprises began to operate in Samarkand, Tashkent and Marghilan and the network of small producers started gradually to diminish. Manual production of cotton and plain part-silk and silk fabrics was scaled down, and the *artels* of Tekstil-promsoyuz now limited their output to *bekasab*, *shoi* and silks. Popular fabrics came to lose their unique appearance. In addition, numerous traditional methods of manufacturing and decorating fabrics were lost.

In the 1990s, thanks to the revival of traditional customs and festivals and a heightened interest in national dress, the demand for handmade artistic silk fabrics increased. Throughout Uzbekistan, and especially in the towns of the Ferghana valley such as Marghilan and Kokand, handmade silk fabrics began once more to be produced.



FIG. 28. Baysun. Loom for the preparation of *alacha*. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

Printed cloth

In the mid-nineteenth century, a common Central Asian tradition was the manufacture of printed cloths. They were used to make dresses, shawls, tablecloths, curtains and covers. While Bukhara was recognized as the centre of printed-cloth production, other locations such as Samarkand, Ferghana, Khujand and Tashkent were also key players. Printed cloth made in Khwarazm was noted for its extremely refined patterns. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cloth was still printed in a rich variety of colours: in addition to the usual design of black and red on a pink background, for example, dark-blue indigo prints on a light cream background were also popular. In the early twentieth century, blue-black was to disappear, and in the 1920s and 1930s the production of red-black printed cloth was sharply scaled down. It was only by the middle of the 1970s that Uzbekistan saw a return to this traditional art form.

Master printers produced metre-length printed cloths from which they sewed clothes, as well as tablecloths, curtains and bedspreads. Only cotton was used to make printed cloth. This was soaked in a special solution, then a design was applied to the cotton using wooden stamps known as *kalybs*. Designs were mostly vegetal: luxuriant bushes, elegant buds intertwined with stems and leafy shoots that rhythmically alternated with pomegranates and almonds.

Between the 1920s and 1960s, almost in spite of the slump in printed cloth production, new printed patterns were created in the small workshops, *artels* and factories alongside the manufacture of fabrics. In the 1980s and 1990s the ancient traditions of cloth printing were revived. By making creative use of traditional motifs and techniques, modern craft workers were able to create new red-black and yellow-black printed cloths in Tashkent and red-black ones in Marghilan.

Embroidery

Almost all peoples living in the region used embroidery to decorate clothes and everyday items. The embroidery of the Tajik and Uzbek populations inhabiting the plains of Central Asia had much in common. In fact, so popular is this traditional form of artistry that to this day houses that are veritable museums of embroidery are to be found throughout the rural areas of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The walls of rooms (normally those of newly weds) are adorned with embroidered friezes (*zardevorys*) (Fig. 29) and decorative wall hangings (*suzanis*). Embroidery was used to ornament everyday items such as bedspreads (*bolinpushs*, *takyapushs*), sacks for keeping tea (*choikhaltas*), mirrors (*oinakhaltas*), as well as women's and children's robes (*tunchas*), dresses, men's sashes (*belbogs*), headgear (*tyubeteikas*) (Fig. 30), small finishing braid (*jiyak*), etc.

The main designs used in embroidery were shoots, buds, pomegranates and almonds, as well as other vegetal designs. Large rosettes were a popular feature of decorative panelling (Fig. 31); these were sometimes of an astral nature (for instance, the Pskent *oi-palyak suzanis*).

Before the end of the nineteenth century, silk and woollen threads were used to embroider handmade cotton fabrics in white or cream-yellow (Fig. 32). Later factory-made fabrics of different colours and threads coloured with artificial dyes were to appear that had a detrimental effect on Central Asian embroidery as a whole. The designs became motley and faded quickly.

In different regions and centres embroidery styles and designs took different forms. Characteristic of Samarkand and Ura-tepe ornamental embroidery, for example, is a contrasting combination of flowers and large images. Designs for Bukhara (Fig. 33), Ferghana and Pskent panelling, on the other hand, are lyrical and subtle with a large variety of crimson, light-green and purple shades.

In the 1970s and 1980s traditional embroidery began to disappear and it is only now in Uzbekistan (Fig. 34) and, to some extent, in Tajikistan that attempts are being made to revive the former centres of traditional embroidery (Fig. 35).



FIG. 29. Bukhara. Gold embroidery for wall hanging. 1980. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 1999.)

THE MOUNTAIN REGIONS OF TAJIKISTAN

Darwaz, Kulab and Karategin have a distinct type of embroidery. The artistry and imagination of the inhabitants are most clearly visible in the adornment of women's and children's clothing. Festive and elegant, invariably in rich red or yellow-cream colours, young women's dresses were simple and loose fitting. Their entire front section and wide sleeves were embroidered with green, yellow, red and white threads usually in the form of large, round multi-row rosettes with coiled shoots.

Craftswomen made richly embroidered pieces of clothing and everyday articles using red, yellow and white silk thread on red or black cloth. The embroidery on a woman's blue dress was unique in that it featured a design made up of a combination of geometric patterns and stylized religious images.

KYRGYZSTAN

Until the 1870s and 1880s Kyrgyz craftswomen mostly embroidered with leather, suede and felt, as well as homemade woollen fabrics, using the raw materials of their own



FIG. 30. Tajikistan. Women selling headgear (*tyubeteikas*). (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)



FIG. 31. Tashkent. Decorative embroidered panel. 1960. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

economy. By the late nineteenth century new materials for embroidery appeared, such as cotton, red woollen cloth, red, dark-blue and yellow satin, coarse calico and black velvet. During this period women's and children's clothing was lavishly embroidered, as were



FIG. 32. Nurata. Decorative embroidered panel. 1880s. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)



FIG. 33. Bukhara. *Suzani* embroidery. Nineteenth century. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

various felt parts of yurts, wall carpets (*tush kiyizs*), carpet strips, leather, felt, velvet and woollen cloth bags for clothes and utensils, felt saddle and horse-cloths.

Kyrgyz embroiderers used a large number of different stitches (Fig. 36). The technique they most commonly employed was chain stitch, but they also satin-stitched. Designs were dominated by motifs depicting stylized leaves, bushes and flowers, while zoomorphic and geometric ornamentation featured only rarely.



FIG. 34. Baysun. Women embroiderers at work. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)



FIG. 35. Tajikistan. *Suzani* embroidery. 1970s. (Photo: Courtesy of G. Ratushenko.)

KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakh embroidery (*keste*) is very similar to that of the Kyrgyz in terms of its application, as well as its technical and artistic characteristics. For many centuries Kazakh women



FIG. 36. Kyrgyzstan. Chamois embroidery. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 2002.)

used embroidery to adorn their clothing and household articles. They embroidered using wool and were familiar with gold and bead sewing. The basic techniques were chain stitch and satin stitch. They embroidered towels, bedspreads, bags of various kinds, women's headgear, wall carpets and covers for boxes and chests, and used silk, woollen and cotton thread on felt, cotton and woollen fabrics (Fig. 37). In modern conditions, where in many ways the need for the artefacts of a nomadic way of life has vanished, embroiderers in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan work only on decorative wall carpets, pillowcases, items of headgear and, as souvenirs, women's skirts, kaftans and purses, in whose production traditional techniques and artistic styles have been retained.

TURKMENISTAN

Traditional Turkmen embroidery was connected mainly with decorating national costume. Hand-woven wool and silk and, from the late nineteenth century, various types of industrially produced fabrics were the basic materials used in embroidery. A favourite colour for clothing was red, which since time immemorial had symbolized life, youth and the



FIG. 37. Kazakhstan. Embroidered wall carpet. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

fecund powers of nature; however, it was meant to be worn mostly by young girls (Fig. 38). Clothes for women and girls of other ages were embroidered with blue, green and yellow. Like Kyrgyz embroiderers, Turkmen craftswomen often used loop stitch and satin stitch. For each piece of clothing they used a special stitch and embroidered a suitable design.

THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION

A unique and, to some extent, independent area of Central Asian embroidery is gold-thread sewing, which came into its own in the mid-nineteenth century in Bukhara. This had always been an exclusively male trade, the skills of which were passed down from father to son. Numerous everyday domestic items were embroidered with gold and silver thread: *chimillik* (a curtain dividing a room into two parts), *joy-i namaz* (prayer-mat), *takhmonpush* (bedspread), small items such as bags for money, tea, seals, scabbards for knives, and various horse paraphernalia: *zinpush* (saddle-cloth), *dauri* (horse-cloth) and *yolpush* (saddle cover). Designs incorporating gold-thread sewing were used to adorn numerous individual pieces of a woman's festive costume: *peshonaband* (hair fillet), *sarandoz*, *rumol* (headscarf or mantle), *kal'tapushak* (headgear worn by a married woman), *kurtu* (dress), *zokhi-kurtu* (gold-thread braid for edging the front cut of a dress), *kaltachu* (woman's outer smock), *duppis* (*tyubeteikas*), *poicha zarduzis* (women's wide trousers), *makhsis* (velvet or woollen



FIG. 38. Turkmenistan. Young girl in national costume. (Photo: From: *Tourism & Development*, 1997. Ashgabat.)

cloth boots with soft soles), *kaushis* (shoes with low counters), *popushs* (shoes with narrow turned-up ends) and *paranja* (outer clothing similar to a smock, worn over the head).

Gold-thread embroidery was used on velvet of dark, rich tones such as violet, dark blue and green. The process of embroidering with gold thread was carried out in the following manner: first, a basic design was sewn using spun or drawn gold thread; then the detailed work was done with twisted or drawn gold, and finally with silk. There were five kinds of gold-thread embroidery: *zarduzi-zaminduzi* – uniform embroidery of a background using gold thread; *zarduzi-gulduzi* – sewing of a design that had been cut out of paper; *zarduzi-gulduzi-zaminduzi* – a sewing technique that combined the two previous kinds; *zarduzi-berishimduzi* – combination sewing; and *zarduzi-pulyakchaduzi* – a combination of gold-thread embroidery with sewn sequins.

In the twentieth century a gold-embroidery factory was set up in Bukhara, the employees of which were nearly all women. The function of gold-thread products changed: they came to be seen mostly as souvenirs, as well as large decorative panels and curtains for theatres and folklore ensembles. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s the local populations of

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan surprisingly developed a new interest in everyday gold-thread goods, and in many towns that had previously been unaware of such an industry, traditions connected with the art of gold-thread embroidery began to enjoy a renaissance. Today it is one of the most popular forms of national enterprise in these countries.

Leather goods

The artistic processing of leather was widespread not only among the nomads, but also in the larger towns of Central Asia. In the noisy bazaars of Samarkand and Bukhara skilful *charmduzis* (leather dressers) would embroider suede hunting trousers, fur-lined leather boots, cushions, purses and men's belts while customers looked on. Horse paraphernalia was colourful and smart: saddlecloths and leather harnesses were ornamented with blackened silver platelets and small bells, and studded with cornelian and turquoise. An elegant and refined tooled ornament was applied to bindings and cases for papers (*juzgirs*), which were used by theologians and scholars of the day. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, leather products had become overburdened with ornamentation and design features.

Leather goods produced by the one-time nomadic peoples, the Kyrgyz, the Kazakhs and the Karakalpaks, were notable for a constancy of style and adherence to traditional forms.

Like clothing and horse harnesses, leather dishware was an essential feature of everyday life. These utensils were made mostly from camel skin and used chiefly for drinking fermented mare's milk (*kumys*). Leather drinking vessels came in a variety of forms such as enormous water-skins (*sabas*), medium-sized *chanochs*, small cases for porcelain and faience cups (*piyala-kaps* or *chyny-kaps*), kettle-shaped milk pails and bowls for soured cream (*konochoks*, *konoks*) and jugs (*bulkaks*). Vessels used when at work, such as *sabas* and *chanochs*, were simple in form and without any type of ornamentation. The most originally shaped and richly decorated vessels were flasks known as *kookors*, whose form resembled the bent horns of a mountain goat (Fig. 39). *Kookors* were used to transport *kumys* when travelling to new pastures, while *kumuras* were used to serve *kumys* to guests. *Kumys* dishware was richly decorated with the greatest of care. The production of leather milk pails with spouts (*konoks*) involved a particularly intricate process. They were sewn from camel skin that was noted for being robust and for maintaining its shape when being treated.

Multi-layer leather was used in the manufacture of cylindrical cases in which several cups could be kept, one on top of the other. Also common were *chyny-kap* cases shaped like a hemisphere bearing the outline of an upside-down cup (Fig. 40). *Chyny-kaps* were made



FIG. 39. Kyrgyzstan. *Kookor* and *chyny-kap* for drinking *kumys*. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 2002.)

from a variety of materials: cheegrass, thin switches of meadow sweet, juniper, walnut, leather or felt. Wooden *chyny-kaps* were sometimes covered with leather or decorated with carvings.

Given the constant travelling involved in a nomadic way of life, leather goods were convenient and practical, and thanks to the efforts of their producers they also became magnificent examples of artistic creativity. Today such everyday leather articles are going out of use and are mainly produced to be sold as decorative souvenirs. All the same, certain parts of the leather-processing sector (mostly those involved in the production of clothes) are finding a market for their products.

Bone carving

The origins of bone carving in the region go back to early history. There are many examples of bone being used in the manufacture of artefacts in ancient and medieval times. In the nineteenth century, this tradition was particularly visible in products such as sabre and dagger hilts and scabbards, as well as rifle butts. While the visually elegant national musical instruments of the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Karakalpaks, Uighurs and other peoples in the region are made from expensive types of wood, to this day the craft workers who make them inlay them with pieces of bone.



FIG. 40. Bukhara. *Chyny-kap* and leather goods for travelling. End nineteenth–early twentieth centuries. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

In towns wood carving was used both in the manufacture of everyday articles such as wooden chests for keeping clothes in, children's cots (*beshiks*), small boxes, book stands (*lauhs*), and for decorating fixtures around the home such as doors, columns, built-in wooden alcoves, etc. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the second half of the nineteenth century, there was a fashion for many-sided decorative tables and stools catering to the tastes of the European population in Central Asian towns. By the early twentieth century, Khiva, Bukhara, Samarkand, Kokand, Tashkent and Khujand became centres for the leading schools of wood carving (Fig. 41 and 42). To this day they are famed for their craft workers, who used two main methods of carving: a simple technique of ornamentation using a notched or incised design, and an intricate non-background technique in which the background was removed (Fig. 43). In the mountain regions of Tajikistan, in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the carvers' art was utilized in the decoration of wooden shoes, chests for domestic utensils and other household items.

The technique involved in non-background carving could be achieved only by professional carvers and was considered to be a highly skilled urban craft. The basis of carved



FIG. 41. Tashkent. Small table. Carved wood. 1927. Master S. Khojaev. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)



FIG. 42. Karakalpak. Small pedestal for vessel. Carved wood. Beginning of twentieth century. Master B. Daliev. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

ornamentation, as manifested in this particular technique, are *islimi* – a pliant, elastic and dynamic intertwining of shoots covered with buds, flowers and leaves; and *pargori* – a meticulous and static geometric design achieved using a pair of compasses and a ruler. The



FIG. 43. Tashkent. Decorative table. Carved wood. 1991. Master O. Fayzullayev. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 1999.)



FIG. 44. Bukhara. Wood carving decorating the Bala Hauz. (Photo: © V. Terebenin.)

chiaroscuro effect of *islimi* and *pargori* was used brilliantly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by master wood carvers in Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva (Fig. 44).

Wood painting

Like carving, wood painting was for many years used in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in interior decoration and was likewise connected with the decoration of a variety of everyday objects. An intricate arabesque design would be applied to the primed surface of six- or eight-sided tables, boxes and other objects with a pre-traced pattern and then painted with a fine brush in vegetable or mineral dyes using bronze and silver. Usually red, green and, less commonly, blue were the colours chosen. From the 1920s to the 1980s this art form was given new impetus in the artistry displayed by the leading craft workers of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, whose products, for all their traditional style, also reflect a strong individualism. Uzbek decorative painting does not blend one colour with another but tends instead to use contrasting colour combinations.

From the 1920s to the 1980s, as a result of new building developments and the reconstruction of old towns and district centres, Uzbekistan was to see a significant increase in the use of architectural painting. As in the past, the main centres of ornamental painting include Khiva, Bukhara, Samarkand, Kokand, Marghilan, Ferghana, Andijan, Namangan, Chust, Kuva, Altyaryk, Rishtan and Tashkent.

In discussing ornamental painting, some mention must be made of a special area of activity of the *naqqāsh* (painter): the painting of everyday objects. There are two main techniques, which differ in terms of their artistic properties. The first technique involves the painting of tables, shelves, cases and boxes (Fig. 45 and 46). The second is the simple painting of widely used objects such as cradles, small household utensils and children's toys.

Articles made from specially grown figured pumpkins comprised an original sector of Central Asian folk art (Samarkand was considered a major centre) (Fig. 47 and 48). Particularly popular were snuffboxes (*noskadus*), which came variously decorated in a number of different shapes and sizes.

Miniatures and other arts

In Uzbekistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s miniature painting and the technique of making and ornamenting papier mâché products (trinket boxes, make-up paraphernalia, etc.) enjoyed a new lease of life. One new ornamental feature was that of motifs and images taken from oriental miniature painting of the Middle Ages. Over the past 10 to 15 years the craft workers of Uzbekistan have achieved outstanding results in this area of decorative art. By creatively interpreting medieval motifs and themes, modern-day artists are breathing new life into the art of traditional miniature painting. Modern miniaturists use a wide range



FIG. 45. Kazakhstan. Chest. Carved and painted wood. End of nineteenth century. (Photo: From Margulan, 1986, p. 199.)



FIG. 46. Tashkent. Casket. Painted wood. 1990. Master M. Boltabayev. (Photo: From *Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, 1999.)

of materials in their work, including leather, papier mâché (Fig. 49), pumpkins, canvas and paper. The style of miniature painting is also used in work on large monumental paintings in the interiors of modern buildings in Uzbekistan (the *Oliy Majlis* building, the State Museum of Timurid History, etc.).



FIG. 47. Samarkand. Painted pumpkins. 1920s–1930s. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)



FIG. 48. Tashkent. Painted pumpkin. 1990s. Master Sh. Rikhsiev. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)



FIG. 49. Tashkent. Box in papier mâché. 1990s. Master M. Baltabaev. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

Modern fine arts: painting in the twentieth century

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, tsarist Russia's military and political conquest of the region also brought with it active cultural expansion. The fact that the first Russian artists to come to the region had begun their work in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan played an important role. This process was particularly vibrant in Samarkand, Bukhara, Kokand and Tashkent, cities whose architectural monuments and ethnographic exotica appealed strongly to Russian painters such as Vereshchagin, Yudin, Bure and Kazakov. Through their work there emerged the special genre of ethnographic realism, which often featured elements of social critique (e.g. Vereshchagin). Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century figurative art forms began to infiltrate the region. However, this process was not universal, nor was it encouraged by local power structures.

State backing for the introduction of figurative art to the masses began in the 1920s. The emergence of painting at the beginning of the twentieth century was underpinned by the new communist ideology, an atheist philosophy and also by a negation of the values inherent in Muslim culture. The first generation of professional painters in the 1920s consisted of visiting artists who contributed much to the emergence and development in the region of new forms of figurative art. In Uzbekistan, this larger group included A. N. Volkov, M. I. Kurzin, O. K. Tatevosyan, A. Nikolaev, V. Ufimtsev, P. Benkov and N. Kashina; in Turkmenistan – R. Mazel, A. Vladychuk and, a little later, O. Mizgireva; in Kyrgyzstan –



FIG. 50. Uzbekistan. N. Kashina: *Children*. 1920s–1930s. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

S. Chuikov and the artist and teacher V. Obraztsov; in Kazakhstan – N. Khludov; in Tajikistan – P. Falbov.

UZBEKISTAN

Working in Uzbekistan during the 1920s and 1930s was a large group of Russian artists educated in Moscow, St Petersburg and Kiev. The group spent time in Turkistan and their lives were for ever connected with this part of the world. They included: L. Bure, G. Nikitin, O. Tatevosyan, V. Eremyan, A. Nikolaev, A. Volkov, V. Ufimtsev, P. Benkov, N. Kashina (Fig. 50), A. Ermolenko and Z. Kovalevskaya. Each of them was very much an individual, and their work was to become an inalienable part of Uzbekistan's new art and culture. While they were all attracted to the Orient on account of its 'exoticism', they nevertheless expressed their love for the region in a highly individual manner. Some of them subscribed to realist theories of art and sought to give their recreation of characteristic ethnic types, ethnographic sketches and architectural landscapes an overriding sense of academic authenticity. The second school is reflected most vividly in the work of A. Volkov and A. Nikolaev. This school shared much with the search for avant-garde means of artistic expression found in European art at the beginning of the century.



FIG. 51. Uzbekistan. A. Nikolaev, known as Usto Mu'min: *Bridegroom*. 1924. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

Volkov was drawn more by the picturesque texture of the canvas, the play of form and colour. His stylistic innovations continued the traditions of cubism. In his search for a new form of artistic expression through which to convey his understanding of the Orient, the artist turned to works of Vrubel, Picasso and Matisse. Volkov's greatest gift was his sense of colour, as evident in one of his most famous works, *The Red Teahouse* (1924), which was awarded the Grand Prix at a Paris exhibition. During the late 1920s and early 1930s his work underwent a sudden change: his avant-garde treatment of traditional Eastern themes was replaced by works of a social orientation that testify to a violent rupture in the artist's creative credo. Dependence on social prescriptions had a detrimental effect on the quality of his work.

Another outstanding artist was to meet with a similar fate. Nikolaev was obsessed by his search for a synthesis of the traditions of painting found in Russian icons and Eastern miniatures. He expressed his philosophical and artistic concept of the Orient as a poetic and simultaneously exotic world of dreams; for instance, *Spring, Boy and Bridegroom* (Fig. 51). By the early 1930s the artist was likewise compelled to switch to employing the theories of socialist realism and created a series of canvasses that were considerably inferior to the works of his previous period ('School of the Old Method').




FIG. 52. Uzbekistan. U. Tansykbaev: *Portrait of an Uzbek*. 1934. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

The works of Volkov and Nikolaev reflect the general trends in the painting of Uzbekistan in the late 1920s and 1930s, when socialist realism emphatically supplanted the creative searching of the previous decade. Another avant-garde tendency in the art of Uzbekistan in the 1920s was represented by M. Kurzin, an artist who was influenced by cubism and futurism, as well as by V. Ufimtsev and E. Karavai.

In the 1930s all creative aspirations were harshly criticized as manifestations of formalism and Western bourgeois machinations in art. It was during this time that any attempt by the above-mentioned painters to produce a symbiosis of traditional local aesthetics with Western avant-garde practice was finally silenced. Thanks to the efforts of the first group of painters in Uzbekistan, these years saw the creation of a number of different schools and artists' studios which were to prove instrumental in the emergence of national artists. Thus began the careers of artists such as L. Abdullaev, B. Khamdami, U. Tansykbaev (Fig. 52), A. Abdullaev, S. Khasanova, M. Nabiev, A. Siddiki and C. Akhmarov. Their works were, however, to become dominated by realist theories of painting. By the second half of the 1930s the pressure of Stalinist ideology and the imposition of the socialist realist diktat inevitably led to the levelling of individual creative styles throughout the entire USSR, including Central Asia. The war of 1941–5 also affected the development of Uzbek art. During the war and the years that immediately followed it painters' works were closely linked with the theme of war, often lending their art the attributes of a documentary study.

Until the 1980s the ideological formula informing all Soviet art was that ‘art should be socialist in content and national in form’. However, in the years preceding 1990 artists were increasingly disinclined to adhere to this dictum. In the 1950s, the decade of socialist realism’s total victory, new forms of figurative art were taking shape in Uzbekistan. These included monumental painting and landscape sculpture, as well as various drawing techniques. Yet, as before, painting reigned supreme, although important changes were under way. A new generation of artists was surfacing. They included R. Akhmedov, N. Kuzybaev, V. Zelikov, M. Saidov, T. Oganegov and Y. Elizarov, all of whom had studied at the Repin Art Institute in Leningrad and it is with this group of artists that a new and important stage in the development of a national school of painting is linked.

The founder of the epic landscape, U. Tansykbaev, did not so much depict a landscape as convey the emotions and feelings that nature evoked. His painting *Morning at Kairakkum Hydroelectric Station* is rightly considered a classic of Uzbek landscape painting. The portrait and thematic picture also developed further. Among portrait painters an important name is that of A. Abdullaev, who created a series of remarkable images of prominent representatives of the Uzbek intelligentsia: the actor A. Khidoyatov, the academician K. Niyazov, the film director K. Yarmatov and the writer U. Igun. The pictures created by R. Akhmedov in the 1960s (e.g. *Mother Giving the Breast*) (Fig. 53), *Portrait of an Old Collective-Farm Worker* and *Shepherdess*) laid the groundwork for a new stage in the development of Uzbek portrait painting. Meanwhile artists were beginning to turn increasingly to the heritage of Uzbek art, particularly to the miniature. G. Akhmarov made his own distinct contribution in his paintings in the foyer of the A. Navoi Opera and Ballet Theatre (1947).

A characteristic feature of art between the 1960s and 1980s was the desire to update traditional figurative principles, the search for new forms of expression and the use of an expressive-symbolist style. The beginning of this process dates to the second half of the 1960s, when a new generation of artists burst onto the scene. They included R. Charyev (Fig. 54), B. Babaev, V. Burmakin, Y. Taldykin and N. Shin. In the 1970s the basic tone of Uzbek painting was set by the work of D. Umarbekov, and others,¹ all of whom worked in different styles. It was, however, thanks to their pictures that for the first time Uzbek painting became imbued with a spiritual subtlety, expressed in various colour and stylistic formations.

The growth of national self-consciousness during the late 1980s and the interest it prompted in domestic artistic traditions, such as ancient and medieval art, and folk crafts, revived the use of metaphor and allegory. Paintings became filled with mythological

¹ B. Dzhalalov, M. Tokhtaev, A. Mirzaev, S. Abdurashidov and R. Shadyev.



FIG. 53. Uzbekistan. R. Akhmedov: *Mother Giving the Breast*. 1962. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

personae and subjects, now in the style of mural paintings of Buddhist monasteries,² now in the spirit of miniature painting.³

Art in Uzbekistan since the 1990s has been characterized by a vast range of styles that in many ways is linked with the country's newly found independence, engendering an atmosphere of creative freedom. Happily coexisting are a wide variety of schools and trends, such as academic realism, decorativism and national romanticism (often seen in the form of the stylized miniature), together with avant-gardism in the shape of non-figurative painting or installations. To a large extent this can be explained by the intensification and expansion of the creative world-view, and the aspiration of artists to transcend the boundaries of everyday experience.

The social-grotesque and generally social-critical trend in painting in the late twentieth century has come to lose its significance and effectively disappeared. In Uzbekistan in the 1990s a group of artists came together, each with his or her highly individual style, and to

² By artists such as L. Ibragimov, M. Kagarov and D. Umarbekov.

³ By A. Nasretidinov, A. Ikramdzhonov, G. Kadyrov, et al.



FIG. 54. Uzbekistan. R. Charyev: *Portrait of the Producer Sh. Abdusalyamov*. 1967. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

this day interest from audiences and critics alike is as strong as ever.⁴ The works of these artists have undergone a metamorphosis. Phantasmagoria, the blending of mythological and folklore images, subjects, symbols and signs – all are incorporated in a new canvas and are characteristic of their painting today. Innovative features in 1990s art were linked with the appearance of original installation projects produced by the talented painters V. Akhunov, Z. Usmanov and A. Nikolaev. Art in the 1990s was enriched by a new group of talented artists.⁵ Their works have enriched contemporary figurative art and in many ways define its main traits for the first years of the twenty-first century.

TURKMENISTAN

Turkmen painting in the 1920s was represented above all by the work of Ruvim Mazel, who had studied at the Academy of Arts in Germany. The creative experiments carried out

⁴ The artists include G. Baimatov, L. Ibragimov, A. Nur, G. Kadyrov, Z. Usmanov, I. Mansurov, F. Akhmadaliev, S. Alibskov, B. Dzhalalov, D. Umarbekov, A. Mirzaev, R. Shadyev, A. Ikramdzhanov, V. Akhunov, S. Khakimov and A. Turdyev.

⁵ B. Ismailov, T. Karimov, B. Mukhamedov, N. Shoabdurakhimov, T. Akhmedov, M. Dzhalalyan, D. Sadykova, Z. Sharipov and many others.

by Mazel and his followers⁶ derived from their interpretation of the decorative features and colours of Turkmen carpets. Like the first wave of painters in Uzbekistan, Mazel attempted to create a new style of Turkmen painting by organically combining Eastern and Western aesthetics. It was to be based upon a conception of the Turkmen carpet with its age-old decorative system and its bright, expressive positive colouring. These artistic quests were reflected in his watercolours *Carpet Tales* (1920–1) and *Around the Carpet* (1925–6). The group's active attempts to seek a new style did not meet with official approval and in the mid-1920s the Shock-Work School of Oriental Arts was closed down.

Primitivism coupled with a folkloric-popular style inform the work of Nurali Byashim, the first Turkmen artist. Although he lacked a professional education, he has nevertheless gone down in history as a dazzling and unforgettable phenomenon, a talented, natural and at the same time self-taught painter. One of his first paintings, *Kurban Bairam* (1921), was devoted to the theme of religious ritual. However, the generally optimistic nature of the work, its colourfulness and the ornamental rhythms of this large-scale painting suggested the ascent of the folk spirit that very much accorded with the social ideas of the time. In the 1920s the artist was also to create portraits in which a socio-psychological emphasis cannot be felt, yet which clearly reflect Byashim's desire to search for a certain feminine ideal in keeping with the epic and folkloric ideas of the Turkmen people.

In the 1930s Turkmen painting, like art throughout the entire region, was dominated by the requirements of socialist realism. The principles of a social philosophy of art had now been established, and their importance was reinforced by the war of 1941–5.

In the post-war painting of Turkmenistan a particularly important role was played by the thematic picture, which glorified peaceful labour and those who performed it – the workers, the rural community and the intelligentsia. The enormous and universal demand for themes involving the post-war regeneration of civilian life often led to certain compositional and stylistic clichés, as well as the neutralizing of national and individual characteristics. During these years, however, several artists such as I. Klychev, Y. Annaurov, A. Kuliev, A. Amangeldyev and D. Bairamov created vivid and interesting works that incorporated unusual styles and themes, attempting, while remaining inside the framework of accepted aesthetic practice, to discover original artistic solutions. This was made manifest with the utmost degree of artistic expression in the works of the greatest Turkmen painter, I. Klychev (Fig. 55). His paintings *In the Encampment*, *Shearers*, *Legend* and *Beludzhi*, created in the 1960s, became classics of Turkmen painting. Popular genres in Turkmen painting such as the portrait, the thematic picture and the landscape were developed further during this period.

⁶ O. Mezgireva, S. Beglyarov, V. Volmiev and M. Kuliev.



FIG. 55. Turkmenistan. I. Klychev: *Lyalya. Girl with Cherries*. 1975. (Photo: From the Turkmen journal *Turkmen Medenieti*, 1993.)

Turkmen painting of the mid-1970s revealed two main trends: one was lyrical and given to a more spiritual interpretation of a given theme, and the other was social, with a tendency to scrutinize problems of daily life.

Turkmen painting turned a new page in the 1990s, when academic traditions combined with avant-garde experiments in non-figurative abstract art. As in the past, the acknowledged master Klychev continues to work productively. In recent years, he has produced a brightly coloured and metaphoric painting entitled *Magic Patterns* (2002), which recalls the creative experiments conducted by artists in the 1920s such as Mazel and Mizgireva. This same concept of reinterpreting traditional aesthetics can also be seen in *Still Life* (2000) by the talented artist S. Akmukhamedov. Undemanding in style, yet intensely sincere, A. Almamedov's pictures, *Firyuzin Hills* (1997) and *Konekesir* (2000), both of which were awarded the Nurali Byashim prize, are imbued with a profound lyricism. A reworking of the stylistics of primitive folk art is perceivable in K. Nurmyradov's multi-figure painting, *Day of Remembrance* (2001).

Recent years have seen the appearance of a new genre in Turkmen painting – that of abstract art, which is becoming increasingly popular and is already moving in a variety of

different directions. The work of the new generation of experimental painters⁷ is characterized by a profound philosophical reinterpreting of the process of reality, vivid psychological images and daring artistic experimentation. The sharply delineated individual manner of their painting is a consequence of specific historical circumstances that have allowed artists to experiment and search for the widest possible range of creative solutions.

KAZAKHSTAN

In the 1920s Kazakhstan did not enjoy the type of environment conducive to artistic endeavour that was found in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. This explains why new forms of figurative art did not emerge as dynamically or as variously in Kazakhstan as they did elsewhere.

It was during the 1930s that one of the first national artists, A. Kasteev, achieved recognition. His appearance on the art scene coincided with a period when society was laying the foundations of the socialist state and this is reflected in the tone of his works: *The Bartered Bride*, *Dairy Farm*, *Milking Mares*, etc. By and large, fine art in Kazakhstan in the 1930s was dominated by the official requirements of socialist realism. At the end of that decade an art and theatrical college opened in Alma-Ata at which several national artists were to receive their training.⁸ Some of them later graduated from art institutes in Moscow and Leningrad and went on to form the nucleus of Kazakhstan's national school of painting.

In the 1940s Kazakh painting expanded its range of genres and themes. This was particularly true of the post-war period. Even so, the Stalinist ideology of the day did not allow artists to go beyond the acceptable themes and norms of the socialist-realist aesthetic.

In the 1960s the growth of national self-consciousness in Kazakh society began to appear also in art in the form of an intense and committed attitude displayed by painters towards their own nomadic cultural heritage.⁹

Kazakh painting in the 1970s and 1980s exhibits a wide range of innovations. On the one hand, the tradition of reinterpreting the Kazakh cultural heritage begun in the preceding decade was developed further, while on the other hand the universal Soviet 'severe style' was evident. The 1980s were also a time when ideas concerning stylistics that would come to fruition in the 1990s were already beginning to be developed. This is certainly true as regards a number of works by A. Sydykhanov, such as *Stopping Place in the Mountains* and *Chauken Bazaar* (1983–4), where the style, resembling that of Filonov, creates the basis for further abstracted forms and silhouettes. Subsequently, Sydykhanov rejected all figurative

⁷ They are represented by P. Garryev, A. Dzhumaniyazov, O. Lalykov and A. Kulyev.

⁸ Among them were S. Mambeev, M. Kenbaev, K. Telzhanov, U. Azhiev, A. Galimbaev and S. Romanov.

⁹ This line found expression in the works of painters such as S. Aitbaev, S. Sarieva, A. Sydykhanov and T. Toguzbaev.



FIG. 56. Kazakhstan. Ch. Gulliev: *Mammetir*. 1994. (Photo: Courtesy of A. Khakimov.)

art and took as his models generic graphic signs such as seals (*tamghas*), interpreting them as the ancient coded messages of remote ancestors.

Developing this idea further in the 1990s, Sydykhanov created something akin to a universal semiotic conception of national painting, projecting this onto all phenomena and objects that were the object of his attention. This concept was to influence the work of a number of young artists and during the 1990s helped to create a greater diversity in Kazakh painting. Among those to have been influenced by this new tendency are original painters such as G. Madanov (*Gold on Silver*, 2002) and the well-known artist A. Akanaev (*Wheel-Khorlo*, 2002).

Modern Kazakh painting is, however, not confined to sign-and-symbol art and variations thereof. Artists working in a variety of forms of figurative art have also been quite productive. Admittedly, their work tends to be rather stylized, but it nevertheless reflects current ideas concerning the search for a national style¹⁰ (Fig. 56).

Unlike the neighbouring republics, Kazakhstan during this period managed to organize a network of galleries, something that was in many ways made easier by the active

¹⁰ In this regard, paintings by well-known artists such as A. Galimbaeva (*Mother and Daughter Marzhan*, 2000), K. Duisenbaev (*Composition*, 2002) and Z. Kairambaev (*Allegory*, 2001) are of particular interest.

development of a market economy. In the 1990s Kazakhstan saw a veritable explosion of art dealing with current themes. This frequently took the form of various types of installation projects and performance art whose creators were often painters by training. In their search for innovative approaches, in the pace and dynamics with which they were implemented, Kazakh artists have in many ways shown themselves to be more progressive than their nearest neighbours in the region. However, this is no real indication of how art is developing in terms of quality; it merely shows where the emphasis is being placed.

KYRGYZSTAN

The work of a large number of politically enlightened institutions played a major role in the development of the artistic life of Kyrgyzstan between the years 1918 and 1924: red yurts and tea houses, red vehicles and caravans, and clubs. They directly promoted public interest in those forms of professional art previously unknown to the Kyrgyz people.

From the 1930s right up until the 1970s Kyrgyz painting was characterized by a firm adherence to the realist tradition, with detailed paintings from life and at the same time a poetic interpretation of the theme of humankind's relationship with nature. During this time painting developed dynamically and by the late 1930s its creative potential had become a force to be reckoned with.

One of Kyrgyzstan's first professional artists was S. A. Chuikov. His picturesque studies of 1917–20 are an important part of his work. He was instrumental in establishing the Union of Artists of Kyrgyzstan (1934) and a picture gallery (1935) that was later to become the republic's State Museum of Fine Art. His studies *Horse beside a Yurt* and *Village* showed the nature of Kyrgyzstan in a variety of aspects and are fresh, sincere and painted with emotion. As such, they lead to a greater understanding of the characteristic features of the new phenomenon of easel painting in Kyrgyzstan.

One of the most prominent representatives of the first generation of artists was G. Aitiev, who made his reputation with memorable portraits and landscapes from the mid-1930s onwards. Other figures who played a conspicuous role in the development of Kyrgyz painting in the 1930s included S. Akylbekov, A. Ignatev and E. Maleina. It was during this period that national painting established its genre and thematic priorities. Although the landscape and scenes of everyday life emerged as the most popular forms, portrait painting also produced some interesting images. The best paintings of this time show artists attempting to avoid the negative impact of dominating ideological directives that were neutralizing individual creativity.

Painting in the 1940s was very much connected with the theme of war and continued to develop the traditions of realism characteristic of the previous period even though painting was now far more dramatic in terms of content.

The 1960s and 1970s were to see the flowering of all genres: narrative and thematic, landscape, still life and portrait. By the late 1970s Kyrgyzstan had a new generation of painters who challenged the established traditions by their use of unusual concepts and by their artistic objectives. The work of S. Bakashev, S. Ishenov, M. Akynbekov, S. Aitiev and M. Bekdzhanov demonstrates an unequivocal rejection of painting from nature. Instead, they set themselves the task of interpreting historical and modern material by association. Much of their attention was devoted to the problem of the national and cultural heritage, as well as to the ethno-cultural distinctiveness of the Kyrgyz people. Painting now began to speak in the language of allegory and acquired a generalized decorative style.

In the 1980s this new orientation intensified on account of the political events in Soviet society, that is to say, perestroika and the concomitant relaxation of socialist-realist principles. Nevertheless, realist painting continued to retain its position in Kyrgyz painting. The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was a time of great importance for painting in Kyrgyzstan (Fig. 57). The enthusiasm for new artistic concepts and solutions literally spilled out onto painters' canvasses, bringing a new and highly distinctive look to national painting. It was during this period that scholars noted the emergence of a new artistic phenomenon, Kyrgyz modernism, examples of which were displayed at the exhibitions 'New Wave' (1989, 1990) and 'Wall' (1991).

Having given artists creative freedom of expression, the acquisition of independence has stimulated this process in a new, unprecedented way. Meanwhile the work of new-wave painters¹¹ combines daring formal experiments with a desire to preserve the fabric of traditional aesthetics, including its monumental, epic connotations and symbolic significance. For all the general innovative orientation of their experiments, they differ from each other in their specific style. The epic breadth of the Kyrgyz epic and the expressive strength of European expressionist painting is a key feature of works by Z. Zhakypov (*Birth of an Epic*, 1994), N. Nurgaziev (*When the Day Came*, 1995) and T. Kurmanov (*Dedication to Sayakbai*, 2001). Western philosophical thought on the discreteness of the historical process in the paintings of Y. Shigaev (*Alai Tsaritsa*, 2001) and K. Davletov (*Composition*, 2001) is expressed using the traditional Kyrgyz symbolic and ornamental system.

As with Kazakhstan, in the 1990s a brisk art market opened for business in Kyrgyzstan, leading to the creation of a whole range of galleries and free groups of artists who came

¹¹ Such as S. Aitiev, Z. Zhumabaev, A. Asrankulov, Z. Zhakypov, N. Kongurbaev, S. Torobekov, Y. Shigaev, D. Nurgaziev, E. Saliev, T. Kurmanov and K. Davletov.



FIG. 57. Kyrgyzstan. N. Imanalieva: *The Dialogue*. 1990.

together to work on one project or another, whether avant-garde or outwardly traditional. The greatest achievement in Kyrgyz painting in recent years is the appearance of a new and highly original national and ethno-cultural tradition, of new directions in art and a wide variety of original and individual creativities. It is this in particular that comprises the base on which the unique aspects of Kyrgyzstan's national school of painting will be built in the new millennium.

TAJIKISTAN

In 1929, in connection with the formation of the Tajik SSR, a group of professional painters came together in the city of Dushanbe. Thereafter, the republic's Union of Artists was set up in the early 1930s. The story of fine art in Tajikistan is bound up with similar processes in Uzbekistan. One of the first Tajik artists, A. Ashurov, studied in Tashkent. Similarly, the well-known masters E. Burtsev and P. Falbov also began their artistic careers in Uzbekistan. The first exhibitions, held in the 1930s, showed just how much art in Tajikistan was dominated by the realist school of painting and by painters' desire to reflect not individual feelings but the social dimension in society. Thus the socialization of art was a typical characteristic of painting in Tajikistan in the 1930s.¹²

¹² During this time exhibitions in Tajikistan very often featured works by painters such as A. Ashurov, M. Khoshmukhamedov, E. Burtsev, M. Novikov, P. Falbov and G. Timkov.

In the 1940s, during the war years, painting's forward progression was somewhat suspended and gave way to more mobile pictorial representations in the form of political and propaganda posters. It was only in the 1950s that Tajik painting revived. This is particularly noticeable in a series of portraits of workers, teachers and foremen (in the first half of the 1950s).

The 1960s saw a number of innovations in Tajik painting: it was during this period that it acquired its unique features, i.e. the desire to take painting beyond the boundaries of illustrative realism and to focus upon a person's inner world rather than on events as phenomena in process, attempts to create a style that is at once expressive in terms of colour and monumental and generalized in terms of artistry. In these years new talents were to make names for themselves in the artistic life of Tajikistan.¹³

In the 1970s and 1980s the content, style and colour range of Tajik painting was to expand significantly. The combination of contrasting techniques, styles and artistic creeds became a noticeable feature of painting in the 1980s. This is particularly evident if we compare the work of S. Kurbanov with that of S. Sharipov. Kurbanov's works are characterized by a faceted, linear manner of painting using planar compositional solutions (*Family Portrait in Interior*, 1976–8, and *I Have Divined all the Mysteries of the World*, 1980). Sharipov's works, on the other hand, use a pasty texture that is full of picturesque nuances and a deep light and airy perspective (*Workday Doctors*, 1979, and *A Letter*, 1983). As well as a return to previous themes and stylistic techniques, this period saw a new aspiration towards reinterpreting folk traditions (although this trend was not so widespread as in other republics in the region). Another painter of this period who should also be mentioned is N. Nikitin, who painted several studies of *Perviy Parad* [First Parade] before the final one that was painted for the state in 1983–4 (Fig. 58).

The situation in Tajikistan started to change during the 1990s. Art began to show the influence of new trends, while – as throughout all the countries and regions of the former USSR – socialist realism was rejected as a universal method. However, the logical development of a national art in Tajikistan was interrupted by the outbreak of civil war. It was only towards the end of the 1990s, after stability had been restored to political and public life, that a renaissance occurred in the world of art. As in the past, the painters Kurbanov, Sharipov and Y. Sangov remain a prominent force, while new art trends were created by younger artists such as N. Khamidova, F. Khodzhev, R. Akhmedov, L. Irismetova and A. Mirshakar.

¹³ Among them were V. Boborykin, E. Nosik and I. Lisikov, all of whom had graduated from institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, as well as the young artists A. Abdurashitov, Z. Khabibullaev, A. Amindzhanov, K. Khushvakhtov, A. Rakhimov and V. Sapronov.



FIG. 58. Tajikistan. N. Nikitin: *Perviy Parad* [First Parade]. 1967. (Photo: Courtesy of J. Williams.)

Throughout the recent period there has been a growing interest in Tajik history and in the cultural traditions of the Tajik people, as well as in Tajikistan's customs and way of life. A focus on the everyday life of the people is evident in the painting of Y. Sangov (*Gathering Mulberries*, 1992, and *Autumn in Tajikistan*, 2002). Even so, the manner of his painting can change. If in these works he uses traditional figurative painting techniques, in the diptych *Dissonance I, II* the artist switches to abstract painting and in this way succeeds in conveying a mood of dramatic intensity. Thus in the painting of these artists it is possible to see the different directions they have taken in their attempt at experimentation, as well as the breadth of their stylistic approach.

One of Tajikistan's most talented and original young painters when it comes to style is A. Mirshakar, who uses ironic and highly subtle psychological nuances in his construction of human personae (Fig. 59). In his works a very clear and elegant style of painting conveys a slightly ironic yet impressive picture of characters, who, although defenceless, are, as simple people, resolute and pure where their inner world is concerned. An example is the artist's very light and subtle composition *Friends* (2002), which shows a woman in profile talking with a parrot that sits on top of the cage rather than inside it. Mirshakar's work is undoubtedly one of the most fruitful lines in modern Tajik painting.



FIG. 59. Tajikistan. A. Mirshakar: *Spletni* [Gossips]. 1997. (Photo: © Gallery 'Abris', Dushanbe.)

Conclusion

From the 1930s to the early 1980s, art in Central Asia was dominated by the figurative school of painting and was particularly influenced by the theories of socialist realism. It was only with the coming of independence in 1991 that the art scene underwent a radical change. Independence meant that artists were now able to use art as a vehicle of self-expression: they were free to choose their themes and styles. Art from the 1990s reveals the desire of artists to define their place in history, to show the unbreakable bond that links the past, present and future and to underline the impossibility of expunging history from consciousness. In addition, their work shows the increasing emphasis given to individual ways of looking at the world, something that in the past had no opportunity of expression.

THE ARTS IN EASTERN CENTRAL ASIA*

Li Sheng, Xu Jianying, R. G. Rozi and and C. Atwood

Contents

THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF XINJIANG	676
The late Qing period (1850–1912)	676
The Republican period (1912–49)	689
The modern period (1949–90)	692
UIGHUR VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE	700
The Uighur house	702
THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF MONGOLIA	711
Introduction	711
Fine arts from the ‘second conversion’ to 1900	712
Buddhist architecture to 1900	716
Architecture and the fine arts in the early twentieth century	719
Fine arts, 1921–90	724
Architecture, 1921–90	731
The contemporary art scene	732

* See Map 3.

Part One

THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF XINJIANG

(Li Sheng and and Xu Jianying)

The Xinjiang region in the north-west of the People's Republic of China is, broadly speaking, an integral part of Central Asia, but the art of Xinjiang has developed its own specific characteristics as a direct result of its isolated geographic environment. The western sector and its mainly Islamic culture is contiguous with that of Central Asia; the southern districts neighbour the Indian subcontinent, the birthplace of Buddhist culture; the south-western corner bordering on Afghanistan and the north of modern-day Pakistan was the birthplace of Buddhist art; the south-eastern quarter and Tibet, whose traditional Tibetan Lamaism has had an immensely strong influence on the Mongol peoples of Xinjiang, has had a close relationship with the art of Lamaism; and, finally, the eastern region has long been understood to be part of the hinterland of China proper, and Chinese traditional art and modern art have had a profound impact on the modern art of Xinjiang. From 1850 to 1990 the Government of China underwent radical changes, which also influenced the development of the art of Xinjiang. The period can be divided into three stages: the late Qing dynasty (1850–1912); the Republic of China (1912–49); and the modern period (1949–90).

The late Qing period (1850–1912)

The period from 1850 to 1912 was an exceptional time in the historical development of the art of Xinjiang. One reason was the long period of civil disturbance provoked by the invasion of Xinjiang¹ by the khan of Kokand, Agbor, which hindered any artistic development. Nevertheless, the popular folk art of Xinjiang managed to survive because of its inherent vitality; art from China proper also underwent a significant transformation with in Xinjiang. Another contributing factor was the great number of Western archaeologists and

¹ This refers to various Muslim–Han conflicts and revolts that took place largely between 1862 and 1873. In the 1830s the Qing had given the khanate of Kokand special privileges within the Xinjiang region following aggressive incursions into the territory. [*Trans.*]

explorers who excavated, purchased or stole Buddhist artefacts, claiming that they wished to promote a greater understanding of the ancient art of Xinjiang through its research and dissemination, when in fact they were causing irreparable harm to priceless art objects from over one thousand years of history.

From 1861 to 1878, influenced by peasant revolts and the invasion by one of Agbor's officials, Xinjiang was beset by internecine warfare, and this had a considerable impact on the lives of all its nationalities. Art was particularly affected because it expressed the major concerns of the lives and livelihoods of ordinary people. After the pacification of Xinjiang, society gradually stabilized, manufacturing developed and people's standard of living improved. This period of Xinjiang's artistic development was characterized not only by a resurgence but also a strengthening and development of its art.

The most important manifestations of Xinjiang's popular ethnic arts are the handicrafts and folk music and dances of its national minorities. After Islam became the dominant religion, sculpture representing the human form declined, and this tendency filtered through into each of the region's folk arts. The settlement of Xinjiang by a number of ethnic minorities meant that cultural influences from east and west were deeply felt, and it was thus natural that the folk art of Xinjiang should absorb many aspects of literary and artistic accomplishments to form its own unique style and rich and varied content.

ARTS AND CRAFTS

The arts and crafts of Xinjiang are mainly reflected in its jade carvings, carpets and silks. Jade carvings are a traditional handicraft of the Uighur people. From classical times, Xinjiang has produced high-quality jade of which the Kunlun Shan² and Khotan (Hotan)³ (Fig. 1) jades are the most highly valued. After the Qing dynasty had subdued Xinjiang, the scope of mining and carving in the region increased considerably, especially during the reigns of the Emperors Qianlong and Jiaqing; in Qianlong's reign, for example, a block of green jade weighing more than 5 imperial tons was extracted from Khotan and carved into the world's largest jade piece once it had arrived in Beijing. After this time, since official imperial Qing residences now all wished to acquire jade works, jade carvings from Xinjiang flooded into China proper. From the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, although jade carving in Xinjiang can still be regarded as an important business, being a superior-quality material it nevertheless required much time and effort to carve and polish and was expensive to produce, thus losing its competitive edge in the internal and

² The Kunlun mountains are contiguous with the Karakoram in the south-west and form the physical border between Xinjiang and the states to the south as well as with Tibet. [*Trans.*]

³ Khotan is in the south of Xinjiang and on the southern edge of the Taklamakan desert. [*Trans.*]



FIG. 1. Khotan jade. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)

international market-place. Apart from exceptional circumstances, the Xinjiang jade carvers used basic techniques to process jade from the Kunlun mountains; their skill can be seen in the carving, polishing and adornment of rings, writing materials, cups, bowls (Fig. 2) and all manner of small, carved jade artefacts.

The most important carpet manufacture in Xinjiang was that of the Uighurs, with their woven *zai rong* style of rugs, and in particular the rugs of Khotan. The principal designs for the patterned rugs of Xinjiang were those based upon the ‘well’, ‘field’ and ‘rice’ frameworks, each of which provides a foundation for any added permutations. From the centres of these differing designs, lines, angles and different decorative patterns, both large and small, radiate outwards to form varied and richly layered frames. However, the central lines are the principal ones, the spaces in between being filled with various plants and flowers, using two or four segments to create a wealth of consecutive, wellknit patterns. Moreover, every area of Xinjiang has its own variation on each pattern, with decorated rugs from Khotan showing the widest variety, using fairly deep colours; rugs from Kashghar (Kashi) are well-knit with exquisitely fine and smooth decorative designs, the colours refined and elegant; rugs from Yarkand (Shache) are full of meticulously worked variations and are brightly coloured with shades of fiery red. These rugs usually employ about 15 colours but may include several dozen hues, mainly red, blue, blackish or dark green and yellow.



FIG. 2. Peach-shaped bowl. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)

Each brand of Xinjiang carpet can be classified according to its intended use, decorative content and place of manufacture. Uses include being spread on beds and *kangs*,⁴ and as prayer mats, *itandays* (small rugs used on saddles, chairs, beds and *kangs*) and runners. Original styles include the Persian, *Xiamu*, *Bogu* and *Kuqa* brands. The pattern content of the rugs can be categorized as either that of the pomegranate flower, five-petal, scattered flower, fine art or sculpted *kun* variety (*kun* is a style of carpet from the Kunlun mountains).

Apart from rugs, Uighur patterned felt is very distinctive; its chief characteristics are lock-stitch embroidery, appliqué, rolling-design felt and printed felt. Patterned felt is mostly produced in Khotan, Kashghar, Kuqa (Kucha) and Yengi Hisar (Yengisar). Although the patterned felt from each location varies in style and colour, they all employ similar principal figures such as various flowers and planes, branches, leaves, buds and fruit. Virtually all are decorated with images of nature and the heads, horns, eyes, paws, hoofs and crests of birds and beasts as well as other everyday objects.

Edlays silk is the most famous woven silk of the Uighurs and is produced mainly in Khotan and Kashghar. Traditionally, its raw materials are all natural silk, and the colours are mineral- and plant-based. *Edlays* silk can be broadly divided into four main categories: black, red, yellow and synthetic. Black *edlays* silk is, as the name suggests, usually

⁴ Heatable brick beds that can be used by the whole family. [Trans.]

black, and its decorative features include tassels, chains, ‘human head’ and ‘human heart’ designs, lattice-work, ram’s-horn designs, sickles, flowers and plants depicted in traditional Chinese style as well as multitudinous white patterns on a black background. Red *edlays* has either a yellow or a white background with red patterns superimposed; it usually features pears, orchids, apples, oranges, the Chinese *toon* (Tree of Heaven), plant leaves and vegetation, small flowers, pottery, musical instruments and apricot trees. Yellow *edlays* silk uses a red background with golden patterns superimposed, mostly representing apples, orchids and apricots. Synthetic *edlays* uses these same three patterns, but other traditional designs are simplified and laid out into six different composite sections; they are divided into upper, middle and lower motifs, forming many different shades within the coloured material. Original and traditional raw materials and techniques provide a basis upon which patterns such as these can be used in *edlays* silk, as well as in rugs and patterned felt.

Other national minorities in Xinjiang also have famous handicrafts, each rich in content and with its own particular characteristics, such as the saddles and padded jackets of the Kazakhs, the padded cotton jackets of the Kyrgyz, the embroidery, wood carvings, embroidered paintings and paper-cuts of the Hui Muslims and the folk paintings and embroidery of the Xibes.⁵

ARCHITECTURE

Every nationality in Xinjiang has its own characteristic style of architecture. Among the traditional residential housing of the Muslim peoples there is a strong Islamic influence. The Uighurs constructed their buildings using the ancient and traditional skills they had inherited, which also had a strong Islamic flavour (Fig. 3). The architectural influences on town dwellings built by the Uzbeks and Tatars are analogous with those of the Uighurs. The Hui Muslims drew lessons from the techniques employed by the Han Chinese, Uighur, Kazakh and other Muslim nationalities when it came to building, extending and improving upon the living requirements and enhancing the aesthetic precepts of the indigenous peoples of the region. Architecture can be largely divided into two categories: religious sites and mausoleums, and ethnic dwellings. The following is by way of an introduction to the state of architecture in the latter stages of the Qing dynasty.

The principal Islamic buildings in late Qing Xinjiang were mosques, mausoleums (Fig. 4), domes and minarets. These buildings make use of glazed bricks to adorn their external walls, this being part of the special style of their external framework. Entering the rooms, one usually finds a large shrine or niche. The walls have stone bas-relief carvings

⁵ Also known as the Sibos, distributed over Xinjiang and Liaoning. [Trans.]




FIG. 3. Ili. Traditional Uighur building. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)

of flowers, with geometric designs engraved on the pillars, beams, doorways and windows. The caisson⁶ ceilings usually employ coloured patterns. New buildings and extensions dating from this period include many prayer halls and mausoleums, such as the extension in 1872 of the Idgah (Etnir) mosque in Kashghar (Figs. 5 and 6).

These are two basic styles of mosque architecture in Xinjiang. The first is the traditional Chinese wooden structure built in the Islamic style (termed simply the Chinese style) and the second resembles a more Central Asian or Persian construction (referred to simply as the Central Asian Xinjiang style). Both these styles, needless to say, developed and evolved during this period and became peculiar to Xinjiang.

Mosques built in the Chinese style were usually erected in areas where there were substantial Muslim populations of Huis and Hans. In its architecture and construction, this type of mosque reflected long-term developments in Islam within China proper; from its plane-level construction to its architectural design, every aspect was completely Chinese as if custom-made in the country. Examples of this style are the Great Sha'anxi mosque in

⁶ A caisson is a sunken panel in a ceiling, vault or cupola. [Trans.]



FIG. 4. Kashgar. Apa Khoja mausoleum. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)

Urumqi,⁷ the Great Sha'anxi mosque in Yining and the Earth Block mosque in Fukang. Special characteristics include a robust central axis, with no minaret rising from the centre, and usually a pavilion-style construction approximately three eaved storeys in height. In design, religious halls were typically modelled on a plane level with a raised platform, with the rolled canopy-style roof or peaked roof in the *xie* style (also called the *xieshan* style) and hexagonal or octagonal pavilion-style towers forming a diamond-shaped pinnacle; these three constituent parts together made up an interconnected pagoda-like structure. The courtyards on either side of the religious complex had porched reception rooms with rolled and canopied or *geng*-type roofs; these rooms house many commentaries and religious paraphernalia for handling official religious business such as weddings, funerals and other ceremonies.

Another aspect of this architecture was that the mosque entrance sported a high and imposing minaret, with the roofs of all the religious halls in the courtyard rising and falling behind it; the religious site's kiln, or 'back burner', came in the form of a lofty tower that

⁷ The modern-day capital of Xinjiang Autonomous Province. [Trans.]



FIG. 5. Kashghar. Idgah mosque. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)

was modelled on the rest of the mosque complex's special architectural characteristics. The architectural space and overhead boundary lines within the complex give the appearance of an integral architectural unit that is aesthetically pleasing to the eye from every angle. Such architecture strikingly reflects the dissimilar artistic characteristics of mosques, temples and other religious sites.

Next we address the composition and style of Central Asian–Persian Islamic architecture. As a part of Central Asia, Xinjiang has its own distinct regional Islamic building styles. Their principal characteristics are briefly discussed below. First, the religious site is either open-plan or semi-open, with one perimeter wall. Second, the site is adapted to local conditions without any specified axis. Third, there is only one decorated religious prayer hall within the site, with the position of this decorated shrine pointing in the obligatory direction towards the Qa'ba at Mecca. Fourth, the crosswise layout of religious services was continued and developed from its original form in Western and Central Asia, becoming a semi-open layout using a series of wooden colonnades to make an external forum for religious worship; centrally, at the rear of the whole complex, an inner prayer hall open and crosswise in layout was built; in the style of a hall, it was well adapted to the peculiarities of the Xinjiang climate. Fifth, the temple gatehouse was also suited to local conditions, often lacking a dome; because the space within the gatehouse was large, it would have



FIG. 6. Kashghar. Hall in the Idgah mosque. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)

needed a vaulted ceiling to solve the problem. Although no drum towers with exposed and vaulted domes were built, there were, in place of such vaulted domes, sunken corridors or porches in the middle of each gatehouse building which were of extensive and rectangular parallelepiped design along the lines of arches found elsewhere in Islamic shrines; these sunken porches had columns at each end supporting small roofed pavilions. The latter sported vaulted ceilings, and thus avoided using the characteristically half-hidden and half-revealed domed ceilings of Central Asia. Sixth, large and medium-sized mosques, apart from being used for religious services, all followed Islamic teachings when it came to multiple and functional uses.

Seventh, within the gatehouse and on the large rectangular walls, great concave Islamic niches were centrally placed; furthermore, ‘hanging’ arches were suspended without need for support, and on the great niches and to the right and left were added between five and seven framed, rectangular minor niches. At both exposed corners of the rectangular walls, minor minarets stood atop columns, although the main minaret itself did not sport any decoration or bas-relief, nor did the mosque exteriors exhibit beautiful decorations. Eighth, the interiors of religious halls were the only focal point for decoration. Ninth, within the

halls of large and medium-sized religious sites, ponds and pools enclosed by trees were forbidden.

Mausoleums were another important component of Islamic architecture in Xinjiang. What are now called mausoleums were originally termed ‘holy sites’ or ‘bases for believers’. The most memorable aspects of their architecture are found in their tombs and basement rooms. Most of Xinjiang’s mausoleums are concentrated in southern Xinjiang on a line from the south of the Tarim basin to Tashkurgan in the eastern Pamirs; because of this geographic spread, the exteriors differ widely, with no one mausoleum representative of the others (though most of them are found in the Khotan district). Xinjiang’s mausoleums have had their own particular form since their inception in the fifteenth century, and the architectural layout of sixteenth-century complexes shows very little maturation.

By the mid-nineteenth century, however, Xinjiang’s architecture reveals major developments in style and form. By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, Xinjiang’s mausoleums had assimilated every aspect of traditional Chinese architectural culture, just as previously every architectural influence from Central Asia and other areas had gradually been absorbed and transformed into a unique Xinjiang style. Mausoleums from this time used traditional Chinese and indigenous wooden structures (the ‘mixed’ style), while at the same time they continued to develop the techniques and art used for particular niches and domes in accordance with the required Islamic vaults and curves, thus creating the mature architectural style found in Xinjiang’s mausoleums.

As the economy developed and each of the nationalities increasingly travelled and intermingled, a relatively large number of religious buildings of different types were erected (Fig. 7). For example, 1889 saw the construction of the important lamasery (Fig. 8) at the Temple of Sacred Blessings in Zhaosu county near Ili.⁸

Overall, however, it was Islamic architecture that developed the fastest and yielded the richest variety of distinguishing features, such as in the Tatar mosque in Urumqi and the mosques in Yining, Tacheng⁹ and other places. The plane level layout and architectural execution of these sites each have their own special characteristics. In northern Xinjiang, several settlements have numbers of extant buildings that were constructed by members of other religious faiths and movements such as the Buddhists, Daoists, Nestorians and Catholics, among others; in southern Xinjiang, on the other hand, Islamic buildings still account for the majority of religious sites (Fig. 9).

⁸ This was the base for the Qing’s attempts to regain control over rebellious Xinjiang in the latter half of the nineteenth century and also served as its capital. [Trans.]

⁹ Also known as Qoqek. [Trans.]



FIG. 7. Urumqi. Confucian temple. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)



FIG. 8. Zhaosu county. Main temple of lamasery. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)

Quite apart from this, the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Mongols and (to some extent) Tajiks constructed settlements in accordance with the demands of their natural geographic habitat, many living in nomadic felt tents, or yurts, whose design corresponds to the unhindered nomadic existence of these ethnic minorities on the great steppes. Other nationalities are Buddhist, Daoist or Eastern Orthodox or believers in shamanism (e.g. the Yibos, the Da'urs [Tahurs], the Mans, the Hans, the Eluosis [Russians]): their principal buildings are constructed mostly from brick or earth, all grouped around a courtyard with flat-roofed square or rectangular rooms.



FIG. 9. Modern mosque. (Photo: Courtesy of Xu Jianying.)

FOLK SONGS AND DANCES

From classical times, Xinjiang has been extremely rich in folk music, so much so that in ancient times it was called the ‘Yanqi kingdom, entranced by music and besotted by dance’. In Khotan,¹⁰ it was said, ‘The people perfect song and dance.’ Kuqa¹¹ was the main region of origin for these songs and dances, but the latter had also absorbed the music of the central Chinese plains, western Asia, India and other places to form the famous Kuqa musical tradition.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the ‘Twelve *Mukamas*’ came to represent the musical art of Xinjiang. These systematized and gathered together Xinjiang’s music, dance and poetry, and it was upon this basis of classical *Kuchah*, *Khoten*, *Su* (vernacular folk songs) and other ancient music from Xinjiang that Arab and other Islamic nations’ musical instruments and compositions were absorbed into, and fused with, the indigenous culture. Gradually this became a broad, popular canon of folk music. It commonly included

¹⁰ The classical name for the ancient region of Xinjiang, roughly corresponding to what was known as Turkistan. [Trans.]

¹¹ This state in Chinese Turkistan was the cradle of music; being on the Silk Route, it assimilated many Turkish, Persian, Indian and Chinese influences. [Trans.]

12 suites of main melodies, each suite formed from the *Qionglakman*, the *Dosten* and the *Meshilaif*.¹² The words of the songs are taken largely from famous poems, ballads and folk-tales. In the course of their evolution, they had been rearranged many times. In 1879 a system was devised by the Kashghar artist ‘Ali Salim and the Yarkand artist Satwirdi, who added local folk interpretations of the *Dosten* and *Meshilaif*, thus greatly extending the scope of the Twelve *Mukamas*. This arrangement of the Twelve *Mukamas* constituted an important milestone in their historical development. (See more under ‘Music and dance’ below.)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADITIONAL HAN-STYLE PAINTING AND TEMPLES

Towards the end of the Qing dynasty, Han-style painting was chiefly embodied in the New Year paintings of the Yangliuqing tradition. At this time a large group of impoverished people moved from Yangliuqing to Urumqi and, having imported their New Year paintings into this environment, they established a ‘little Yangliuqing’ school of painting at Xiheba (the western river-bank). From here, these New Year paintings spread to every area of Xinjiang. Examples show that, while preserving the traditional content of Yangliuqing painting, they also reflect the lives of the local ethnic populations of Xinjiang as in depictions of pavilions, platforms, towers and palaces, contemporary ethnic customs as in the Ili school of painting, or whatever was dearest to each Muslim population.

At this time the classical art of Xinjiang suffered a serious setback at the hands of the imperialist forces, which obtained many pieces either by force or by deception. Many Western scientists, artists and officials used tourism, exploration, archaeology, missionary work and other ploys as a pretext for infiltrating Xinjiang, where they proceeded to plunder its culture and steal huge quantities of priceless historical artefacts of every historical period and style. According to statistics compiled by the Japanese author Shi Tiangan¹³ in *The Experience of Exploration in Central Asia and its Results*, between 1856 and 1910 more than 70 expeditions of archaeologists and explorers from Germany, Russia, France, Japan, Switzerland, the United States and Hungary, among others, visited Xinjiang; through archaeological digs, purchases from the populace and other methods they succeeded in removing more than 10,000 ancient relics. These included wall-paintings and statues from Buddhist grottoes, classical Chinese paintings on silk from basement rooms and tombs, wooden carvings and figurines of Buddhist nuns, every variety of ancient woollen and silken artefact and popular folk art and craft items. The result was not only

¹² Suites of music, singing and dance. [Trans.]

¹³ The Chinese transliteration of a Japanese name. [Trans.]

that huge quantities of ancient relics from Chinese Xinjiang were lost abroad, but also that numerous artistic skills were lost for ever.

From this brief overview it can be seen that, although there was no outstanding progress in the visual arts of Xinjiang during this era, nor were any prominent artists produced, yet folk art, and in particular music, did register some relatively strong development. There were also advances in architecture, especially in the field of religious buildings, and Chinese and Xinjiang architectural styles became increasingly fused with Islamic architecture. The characteristics of Xinjiang art may be summarized as follows: the emergence of a new-found originality in its artefacts; the standardization of the form and figure of art works and their execution, thus establishing firm guidelines while allowing for some flexibility of interpretation; and the mingling of various schools and trends in the fine arts of the Middle East and China proper to form a wide-ranging connection between the two.

The Republican period (1912–49)

At the time of the Republic of China, the ‘New Territories’ of Xinjiang were either sealed off by the separatist regime, which ruled by force of arms, or were subject to the ravages of internecine warfare between rogue and army units. Art in Xinjiang could find no way of achieving significant development. This situation was particularly detrimental to the fine arts: neither modern art nor traditional Chinese silk painting had any scope for development within Xinjiang. However, resolute steps were taken to encourage music, dance and folk arts and crafts. Some aspects of this situation are discussed below.

At the time of Yang Zengxin, no new styles of literature or art were able to enter Xinjiang because of the vigorous separatist policies he implemented. In the early days of Sheng Shicai’s domination of Xinjiang, he allied himself with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and drew close to the Soviet Union (USSR) and for a time literati and artists from every region of China were able to visit Xinjiang. Mao Zhi, Zhao Dan and Wang Weiyi were instances of this trend. Some new styles of modern art therefore managed to spread through Xinjiang. In the period 1934–9, nine societies or associations for the promotion of culture were successfully established for the Khalkha, Hui, Uighur, Mongolian, Han, Tatar, Uzbek, Eluosi and Xibe nationalities. Many of these cultural associations subsequently established theatre companies; the Hans chiefly performed stage plays and Beijing (Peking) opera, while minority nationalities put on festivals of song and dance. In October 1939 Zhao Dan and others formed Xinjiang’s first professional theatre company and the Xinjiang Experimental Theatre Company.

At the onset of the War of Resistance against Japan, several cultural organizations simultaneously highlighted resistance to the Japanese and national salvation, thus encouraging the development of modern political art in Xinjiang – at this time, fine art, drama, opera, music and dance all underwent vigorous development. Cartoons were widely used to promote the so-called ‘Xinjiang Enlightenment’, and Xinjiang’s first cartoon publication called *The Times* appeared. Popular genres of drama originally included Sha’anxi opera, Beijing opera, Xinjiang melodies,¹⁴ folk songs and dances; to these foundations were added new, spirited and versatile contemporary repertoires such as *Zhengzhou Successfully Resists the Japanese*, *The Taiwanese Youth Press On*, *Catching the Han Traitors* and so on. Moreover, new types of drama were driven forward by experimental theatre groups which gave successful performances of *Qu Yuan*, *Wu Zetian*, *The Germ of Fascism*, *Thunder and Rain*, *Raising a Tempest South of the Yangtze* and others. Soviet dramatic styles brought back by people returning from the Soviet Union were mixed with long romantic sagas of the Uighurs. Epic plays such as *Alif and Sana’im*, *Rabaya Saiding*, *Onegin* and *The Pedlar and the Young Lady* were performed throughout Xinjiang.

In 1946 the Nationalists¹⁵ took control of Xinjiang. The following year, the Association for Furthering Culture in the North-West was moved to Xinjiang from its original base in Lanzhou. At the same time, experimental theatre groups were established, books and magazines were published and writers’ associations and three research groups for drama, fine art and music were set up. The Chinese artists Zhao Wangyun¹⁶ and Mao Zhiyi, the musicians Ma Sihong, Yu Yixuan and Huang Yuanyin and others were invited to Xinjiang to hold exhibitions and give performances. In October 1947 the Xinjiang Youth Folk Music Touring Theatre performed a set of characteristic Xinjiang songs and dances in urban centres throughout the country. This promoted the fusion of Xinjiang’s traditional folk music and dance with modern styles.

At the same time as Chinese artists were settling in Xinjiang to work, the region produced its own indigenous artists who specialized in painting traditional Chinese landscapes and flora and fauna such as Wang Buduan and Li Zizhao; Zheng Lianpeng specialized in line drawings of landscapes using the traditional ink-and-brush style, while Wang Luzhen painted flowers and plants; the Hui Muslim artists Chen Shou and Yan Xin’an were both skilled at depicting flowers and birds in the traditional Chinese style. After the War of Resistance against Japan broke out, great numbers of artists arrived in Xinjiang, thus encouraging the development of fine art in the region. Some celebrated artists made

¹⁴ A sung-verse form created in the Southern Song and Jin dynasties. [Trans.]

¹⁵ The Guomindang (Kuomintang), established by Sun Yatsen and others, was China’s official government between its two revolutions (1912–49). [Trans.]

¹⁶ For the paintings of Zhao Wangyun, see the website: www.ieshu.com/dic_result_deaital.asp?id=666.

important contributions to the development of Xinjiang's fine arts; these included Wang Wei, the cartoonists Dai Pengyin and Lu Shaofei, the traditional Chinese artists Hu Baihua, Shi Kun, Yu Helu, Lu Feng and Ding Xinong and the famous painters Si Tuqiao, Han Leran, Zhao Wangyun and Mao Zhiyi. These and other artists, who all visited northern and southern Xinjiang, produced a great range of excellent works reflecting the landscapes of the frontier regions which were exhibited in Urumqi, Ili and other places.

Although during the times when Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren held sway over Xinjiang the region's culture was isolated from the mainstream and modern art was unable to enter Xinjiang, fine arts and music in the folk tradition nevertheless remained active and dynamic.

There were no great advances in architecture during this period and they were largely confined to the construction of the Great Southern mosque in Urumqi. This was built in 1929 and was situated on Liberation Street South. The buildings faced west and east and consisted of a great gatehouse with side rooms and a prayer hall, a bathhouse and other rooms. The prayer hall was built of brick and wood on the model of the Goulian pagoda, with an open-plan, raised platform typical of the Hui Muslims. A front porch was built before a ditch, and there were single-eaved roofs, a *xieshan* dome and sheet-iron roofing. The building used a system of brackets inserted between the top of a column and a cross-beam called a *dougong*¹⁷ for holding in place the carved peach-wood cavity rather than using the modern *dougong* method, with a *xie* system of brackets placed between the columns in a wooden construction typical of the north-western region. The gables on either side of the front porch and its interior used carved green glazed bricks as an integral part of their design. The roof beams, supports and walls used brightly coloured blue, green, red, yellow, black and white multicoloured designs to create patterns of flowers and plants, clouds and curlicues, epigraphs, mountains and streams, forming a Chinese-style Hui Muslim brand of architecture.

From the beginning of the 1920s, the Xinjiang carpet industry underwent considerable development and a rug factory was built at Khotan; in the 1930s carpet factories at Khotan and Lop employed some 2,000 people. Although the scale of rug production increased dramatically during this period, changes in carpet style, design and decoration were not great.

¹⁷ Each bracket was formed from a double bow-shaped arm called a *gong* which supported a block of wood called a *dou* on each side. [Trans.]

The modern period (1949–90)

After October 1949, many changes occurred in the region which entered a new phase of development. The arts and crafts of every nationality in Xinjiang received substantial government support, and a new era of development began. Moreover, traditional folk art, fine art and musical modes were systematized, the valuable treasury of ethnic architecture was conserved and restored, and many different artistic forms from China as well as modern art were promulgated and developed rapidly within Xinjiang so that every national minority was soon able to produce a raft of famous artists. Art education was encouraged by the establishment of art colleges, painting schools and art departments, all of which contributed to Xinjiang's artistic progress.

ARTS AND CRAFTS

During this period, Xinjiang's arts and crafts, especially jade carving and carpets, underwent vigorous development in both scale and technology. Jade carving was a traditional art and craft form and as such received considerable government support in improving its standards and range of styles: a corps of jade carvers was trained and their accomplishments were displayed, leading to the production of a large number of objects of relatively high artistic value.

In the 1950s the government rationalized the fragmented body of folk artisans, employed traditional arts and crafts, and refined every type of jade utensil and ornament. In 1964 it set up the Xinjiang Jade-carving Factory and started a second jade-engraving factory at Khotan. In 1978 the Xinjiang Bureau of Light Industry invested in a new factory building for jade carving. Apart from carving and polishing figures, birds and beasts, fish and insects, flowers and plants, bottles, stoves, scent bottles, cups and writing materials, the factory also carved and polished superior-quality jade goods suited to modern tastes such as in its objects entitled *Wandering Sheep*, *Dance* and *Picking Grapes*.

At the same time, Chinese jade-carving masters were engaged to improve the technological level of jade carving in Xinjiang, thus promoting a link between the jade carving of China proper and that of the autonomous region; this led to a clear Chinese influence on the jade carving of Xinjiang. The jade carver Wang Yunzhu is representative of this group. Wang Yunzhu usually makes use of his designs, carving and polishing to show off his skill in producing classical household utensils. His products are perfectly executed, use the raw material to its full potential and are outstanding in form; they appear bold and unconstrained, are pithy in content, and epitomize the magnificence of the northern style with a meticulous standard of chiselling. Chief among his works are *Green Jade*

*Bottle Continuously Engraved with a Phoenix, Jasper Ding*¹⁸ *in the Lei Style, Turquoise Lian*¹⁹ *Bottle with Bird Decorations, White Jade-backed Flask Dipped in Quicksilver and Crystal Dragon and Phoenix Xian*²⁰ (along with the famous *Crystal Scent Bottle*). This last-mentioned work is scarcely more than 10 cm high; its design is novel and its craftsmanship audacious. The insides are carved with coiled dragons which are exquisitely and delicately picked out and are glittering and translucent, bright and clean, the engraved detail full and accurate. *Autumn Proclaims Beautiful Colours* is another representative piece of Wang Yunzhu's work. This is a jade carved ornament like a calabash with chrysanthemums chiselled on the inside and two *katydids*²¹ carved on the outside. The engraver ingeniously makes use of the stone's sugary qualities to carve the chrysanthemums, with one *katydid* on the mouth of the calabash and the other crawling across the vessel's exterior. The golden-yellow chrysanthemums are full of life; the grasshoppers rub their wings and it is as if one can hear their chirping, full of sound and colour, just as in real life.

FOLK ARTS AND CRAFTS

The folk arts and crafts of Xinjiang have today reached their apogee. The production, technology, decorative designs and many other aspects of carpets, for example, have made hitherto unimaginable progress. In the 1950s the Xinjiang government brought together destitute, itinerant carpet weavers and employed them in the Number One Carpet Factory in Khotan. Over the next 30 years, more than 30 carpet factories were built in Khotan, Lop, Yarkand, Yecheng, Kashghar, Aksu, Bayingolung and other places. Innovative production techniques were introduced in the selection and processing of the fleeces. The threads and decorative designs used for the rugs were not only based on keeping alive Xinjiang's traditional concepts, but steps were also taken to assimilate national and international decorative patterns and lines. The resultant style was rich in ethnic overtones as well as modern decorative characteristics.

Xinjiang's handcrafted rugs have repeatedly won the national fine art and craft 'Hundred Flowers' prize. Beautiful examples can be found hanging in the Great Hall of the People and the Hall of Bestowing Kindness, both in Beijing, as well as in national and autonomous regional assembly halls; they are fully representative of the outstanding technique and rich artistic imagery of the felt rugs of Xinjiang.

¹⁸ An ancient cooking vessel with two looped handles and three or four legs. [Trans.]

¹⁹ A vessel used to hold grain at the imperial sacrifice. [Trans.]

²⁰ A vessel used to bathe the feet and clarify the spirits. [Trans.]

²¹ Also known as long-horned grasshoppers. [Trans.]

ARCHITECTURE

There are two aspects to architecture in today's Xinjiang: the ongoing conservation and restoration of historically important Buddhist temples and grottoes and Muslim shrines; and the development of modern architecture. Xinjiang has a large number of Buddhist 'storehouses', wall-paintings and sculptures. Some famous Buddhist grottoes have been catalogued by national cultural preservation units so that they can be conserved and restored. Examples are the Thousand Buddha grottoes at Kizil and Kumtul. The Kizil grottoes, commonly referred to as an 'art treasure house', include 263 caverns within the complex, with Buddhist wall-paintings dating from around the third century to the end of the eighth. Nowadays 5,000 m² of wall-paintings are preserved here. The subject-matter of the wall-paintings is chiefly the Buddhist traditions, predestinations and stories based upon original lives; some concerns the sayings of Mile and deep meditative²² exercises for believers. Other scenes show the cultivation of fields, hunting, business transactions, music and dance and other views of ethnic minority life. The layout of these richly decorated wall-paintings is novel. The portraits display a dizzy intermingling of many techniques with their bold outlines and use of disparate colours. Some use a stiff brush to portray the principal distinguishing features of the human physiognomy and form, afterwards emboldening the lines in colour, making the figures extremely realistic and vivid and giving them a three-dimensional feel.

These paintings have a distinctive local flavour and all show a very high standard of artistry. Because China's territory and borders were consolidated comparatively early and the Kizil grottoes are large, the subject-matter and artistic style of the statuary and murals provide an excellent reflection of the level of culture and art of the people of the ancient state of Kuqa (Chinese Turkistan). Furthermore the rich content of these wall-paintings reflects the real lives led by the people of that time. The Kizil grottoes occupy an important place in the classical art history of Xinjiang. They are also of great significance for research into the relationship between local social history in ancient times, Buddhist art and the art of Central Asia.

Equally famous are the caves at Kumtul, in Kuqa county: row upon row of Buddhist caves, 112 in all, with their backs to the mountains and facing the river. The Kumtul grottoes, which were excavated and created at the end of the fourth century, absorbed the Buddhist art of the musicians attendant upon the Buddha which had, by that time, already taken shape and spread throughout Xinjiang, but this art also took account of the art of

²² This refers to the fact that in ancient China some musical instruments used silk in their manufacture, as with the stringed *qin*, or zither. [*Trans.*]

the central Chinese plains, thus forming a composite and contemporaneous artistic style with the ethnic forms of the time. Its technique of line drawings is referred to as ‘using a brush with force and concentration just as a melody is laid upon silk’.²³ It makes use of the pattern of hills to display the stories of original lives; the paintings are lively in style, rich in colour and interspersed with activity, sometimes featuring people and at other times displaying plant and animal life.

The Kizil and Kumtul grottoes were both designated as important cultural sites worthy of preservation by the central Chinese Government in 1961, and at the end of the 1980s the Xinjiang Regional Government set up a dedicated research programme. The ensuing research and conservation work has yielded some important results.

Xinjiang has a number of other important buildings of historical and architectural value that have been conserved and restored by the government. For example, the Temple of Sacred Blessings at Zhaosu in Ili was designated as an important cultural site of the autonomous region and has undergone restoration, after which it looks even more dazzling and resplendent. The Great Hui mosque at Yining, whose classical architecture is of historical as well as artistic value, has also been renovated.

During this time, Urumqi and other urban centres quickly developed as examples of modern suburban architecture. Modern city architecture has largely been inspired by Han architectural forms as well as fusing with contemporary Western styles; at the same time, it is informed by many ethnic styles from within Xinjiang, especially those of the Uighurs, forming a unique brand of modern architecture. For example, 1985 saw the construction of the Xinjiang Great Hall of the People: this mainly employed modern building styles, but the internal decoration of each room was designed to reflect the characteristics of each region and nationality within Xinjiang. The separate halls were all restored and decorated. This building is representative of architectural developments in Xinjiang during the 1980s.

MODERN FINE ARTS

After the establishment of the New China, the fine arts in Xinjiang developed rapidly and a flourishing fine-art scene emerged, with publishing and education also making visible progress. Xinjiang has taken important steps towards the creation of a modern art scene. Traditional Chinese painting, oil painting, print-making, thumbnail sketches, cartoons, New Year paintings, watercolours, gouache and sculpture have all undergone a transformation, with major artists working in each field and the establishment of art education programmes.

²³ Dhyana. [*Trans.*]

The most well-known Xinjiang painter is Xu Shuzhi, a traditional Chinese artist who depicts landscapes, figures and animals (Fig. 10). Representative works include *Protecting the Livestock*, *Bumper Harvest Time*, *Yellow Sand and Red Willow Go Whistling* and *Early Morning*. Another traditional Chinese artist is Xie Jiadao, who depicts the picturesque mountain and river landscape of Xinjiang in his paintings. Wu Qifeng,²⁴ another traditional Chinese artist, paints figures and is expert at using fine brushwork with close attention to detail and realism;²⁵ representative of his work are the paintings *The Oasis Blossoms into a New Song*, *Welcoming the Spring Scenery*, *Village Teacher* and *Bright Snow*. The traditional artist Gong Jianxin depicts figures by expertly using ink in his portraits, of which *Yao Chihui* is an example. Li Lian paints figures, landscapes, flowers and birds in a Chinese style; examples of his work include *Guest Stops at Yurt*, *Refreshing Breeze* and *Travelling Sunbeams*.

Several dozen ethnic-minority artists also emerged at this time, especially fine artists from the Muslim tradition such as Ghazi Emet²⁶ (Fig. 11) and Abdukirim Nesirdin²⁷ (Fig. 12). They shook off the traditional fetters of Islam and unswervingly trod a new path of artistic creativity using differing styles. Their work depicts real-life situations and illustrates the progress towards modernity made by each nationality.²⁸ Their works portray Xinjiang's magnificent natural scenery; the rich human landscape and ethnic feelings of



FIG. 10. Xu Shuzhi: *On the Move*.

²⁴ For Wu Qifeng, see the website: www.xj.cninfo.net/culture/drawer/wqf/zuopin.htm.

²⁵ Known in Chinese as *gongbi* painting. [Trans.]

²⁶ See the website: www.tilimat.biz/ghazi_emet.htm.

²⁷ See the website: www.tilimat.biz/abdukirim-nesirdin.htm.

²⁸ They achieved spectacular results. For example, the Uighur oil painter Ghazi Emet painted *Evil Brought to Trial*, *Mahmoud Kaxgal* and *Mukma*. The Kazakh oil painter Ahman is represented by *The Artful Sheep*, *A New Road in Paradise* and *Gong Naise Goes on His Travels*. The Uighur oil painter Eni Ufur painted *Uighur Girl*, *Guest* and *Morning*, while another Uighur oil painter called Khalim Nasruddin is famous for his *Meshilaif*, *Hami Meshilaif* and *Berceuse*. *Fresh Milk Presented to the Newlyweds* and *Lake Saylim* are by the Mongolian oil painter Ba Gun. The Eluosi (Russian) oil painter Alexei is known for *Easter*, *Song of Reclaiming the Wasteland* and *Three-part Song of the Peasant-soldier Reclamation Household*. The Uighur traditional Chinese painter Jilail Abulliz painted *The Army and the People Unite* and *Expressing Sympathy and Solicitude*.



FIG. 11. Ghazi Emet: *Dance in Turfan*. (Photo: Courtesy of the artist.)

love towards their surroundings; many aspects of everyday life, work and construction; and great numbers of distinctive contemporary situations. All these portrayals act as a backdrop to modern times. Many of the artists working at a national or even international level have experienced life in Xinjiang at first hand for many years, as shown by their individual and richly evocative subject-matter. An example is the renowned painting of a donkey by the famous artist Huang Zhou.²⁹

In 1952 Xinjiang College set up an art department and in 1958, on the foundations of the original art department, the Xinjiang School of Art was established; later, this became the Xinjiang College of Art. In the 1980s Xinjiang Normal University established a department of fine art. These art schools nurtured many artistic talents. At the same time, Chinese schools of fine art supported large numbers of ethnic-minority artists in Xinjiang, several dozen of whom gradually became established, forming the backbone of Xinjiang's fine-art scene. Specialist schools of drawing and painting were also founded, such as the Xinjiang School of Painting, which had a major influence on the development of fine art within the region. Amateur fine art associations continually expanded. New life was also breathed into popular art; Magaty county and other places, with their peasant paintings, attracted the attention of the art world.

Xinjiang published a major series of collections of ethnic-minority folk designs, some painstakingly gathered over several decades and some that had come to light as a result of recent research.³⁰ An extensive set of illustrated volumes covering numismatic art,

²⁹ For Huang Zhou paintings, see the website: <http://www.caozh.com.cn/mjzt/efgh/huang-zhou.htm>.

³⁰ Examples are *A Collection of Kazakh Folk Designs* and *A Compendium of Popular Uighur Patterns and Designs*, both published in 1980 by the Xinjiang People's Press. The National Minority Cooperative



FIG. 12. Abdukirim Nesirdin: *Dolam Mukam*. (Photo: Courtesy of the artist.)

Buddhist art and the art of wall-paintings was compiled, translated and published. Recent research was included in these.³¹

It could be argued that modern times have seen the first steps in new art forms, with perhaps photography making the greatest advances. Xinjiang's wide expanse of territory and its unique characteristics, not to mention the rich diversity of its human scene, have all provided ideal conditions for the development of the art of photography. The photographers of Xinjiang have produced a catalogue of influential works and have published many different collections of their art.

Publishing House brought out *A Collection of Uighur Architectural Designs*, and the Xinjiang Fine Art Photography Publishing Group produced *A Collection of Uighur Folk Designs* as well as a series of books reflecting popular ethnic art.

³¹ Examples include the Cultural Society's *Ancient Ethnic Relics in Xinjiang*, the Xinjiang People's Publishing House's *Precious Items from the Classical Art of Gaochang-Turpan* and *Mural Art from the Grottoes of Bosklik at Turpan* and the Xinjiang Fine Art Photography Publishing Group's *A Complete Classified Collection of China's Fine Arts: The Wall-paintings of Xinjiang's Grottoes* (eight volumes), *Classical Art of Xinjiang, China* and *The Coinage of Xinjiang*.

MUSIC AND DANCE

The large-scale suites of sung, instrumental and dance music known as the Twelve *Mukamas* initiated by the Uighurs, who thus take the title of ‘Progenitor of Music’, were on the brink of being lost for ever before the founding of the New China, largely because they were an oral tradition. In the 1950s the Xinjiang Regional Government laid particular emphasis on rescuing assorted art forms and organizing their collection and classification. Formal publication of the material took place in 1960. The foundations were laid for the standardization and widespread dissemination of the Twelve *Mukamas*. Scarcely half a century earlier there had been only two or three musicians who could perform the complete Twelve *Mukamas*; now *mukama* troupes and *mukama* research centres were established and widespread *mukama* performances were given.³²

The origins of Xinjiang’s folk songs go back a long way. With the help of practising musicians, Wang Lebing was able to collect, edit and transcribe a great number of these folk songs, turning them into something even more exquisite and making their lyrics more refined so that they quickly spread throughout China and even abroad.

During the period between 1850 and 1990, there was a very close relationship between art and government changes in Xinjiang, together with societal developments. On the one hand, the arts have assimilated many different artistic traditions and techniques while continually recreating traditional art with a local ethnic flavour. On the other hand, the art scene has shown itself to be both innovative and receptive, as countless new art forms from within China and abroad manage to form, take root and develop in Xinjiang.

³² See more on Uighur music (<http://www.amc.org.uk/education/articles/uyghurs.htm>).

Part Two

UIGHUR VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE

(*R. G. Rozi*)

The Islamic ban on idolatry has had a great impact on the art of the Uighurs and other Turkic peoples in Xinjiang, with artistic works and architectural ornament tending to rely on geometric patterns or abstract plants or flowers.³³ However, the preference for bright colours and symmetrical arrangement of objects found in ancient Uighur art works is also noticeable in contemporary works of art and decoration.

Inherited from the Central Asian architectural stereotype in the protohistoric period, the layout of contemporary Uighur architecture can be characterized as compact and centripetal. Its typical features are the central *aywan*, with its arched cloisters, and the other parts of the building grouped centripetally around the *aywan* (Fig. 13). Through different historic periods, this type of layout has persisted in sacred and secular architecture.

Aslanapa points out that ‘Uighur architecture resembles Buddhist and Manichaeian religious art in combining Indian and Persian forms.’³⁴ Many features of the architectural heritage of the proto-historical and medieval periods have persisted until the present day. For example, the characteristic centripetal layout of Uighur secular and sacred buildings is still popular, and murals are widely used in religious and domestic architecture. However, the motifs employed in decoration and mural paintings have become non-figurative because of the above-mentioned Islamic prohibition on idolatry. In government and commercial buildings constructed under the Chinese regime, murals with figurative themes are still displayed.

Apart from its historical influence, Xinjiang’s geographic location, its oases and its bordering regions have also been key players in architectural style. Among the Uighurs, for example, diverse architectural forms are found in different parts of Xinjiang: the oases of Kashghar, Khotan, Turfan and Kuldja, in particular, all have their own distinct styles of

³³ Rozi, 1998.

³⁴ Aslanapa, 1971, p. 42.



FIG. 13. Kashghar. Plans and drawing of a Uighur house. (Adapted from Rozi, 1995, p. 166.)

vernacular architecture. As a historic city on the ancient Silk Route, Kashghar was the centre of the Karakhanid dynasty in the eleventh century. In Kashghar, houses have a central *aywan* (lit. ‘bright place’ in the Uighur language; the courtyard of a traditional Uighur house). Uighur vernacular houses in Kashghar are protected from the harsh dry climate by heavy earthen walls, perforated by small windows. In comparison to the colourfully decorated *aywan* and interior of the house, the external appearance is plain.

Located on the southern edge of the Taklamakan desert, Khotan was a Buddhist centre in the Kushan period (first–fourth century A.D.). Vernacular houses in Khotan are more secluded from the outside than in Kashghar. The *aywan* has a raised ceiling (*aksena*) about 60–120 cm above the roof for ventilation and lighting. The houses are built from earthen walls, woven wooden branches and a timber framework (Fig. 14). Located in the middle of Xinjiang with a rich cultural heritage, Turfan was the capital of the Uighur empire (744–840). Responding to the extreme hot weather in summer, the traditional Uighur houses in Turfan are built half underground and half above ground with a mud and timber framework. Compared to other Uighur houses in Xinjiang, the houses in Turfan are less




FIG. 14. Khotan. Plan and drawing of a vernacular house. (Adapted from Yan (ed.), 1995.)

colourful in decoration. Kuldja, near Xinjiang's northern border, is adjacent to Kazakhstan. Clearly influenced by Russian architecture, the traditional Uighur houses in Kuldja have an open layout with external yards (Fig. 15).

The Uighur house

SPATIAL ORGANIZATION

In the spatial organization of domestic architecture, the differentiated role of men and women in Uighur families is reflected in the spatial partitioning of Uighur houses. The women play the dominant role in family affairs while the men take charge of affairs outside the house. The reception room forms a men's area to entertain guests, especially male guests, while women prepare food for guests in the kitchen. The kitchen and courtyard are the women's domain in which women do the housework and nurture the children in traditional Uighur families.

In the proto-historical period, the most important feature of the house was the reception room, with benches running along the fully painted walls.³⁵ Similarly, in contemporary

³⁵ Rozi, 1998.




FIG. 15. Kuldja. Plan of a house. (Adapted from Yan (ed.), 1995.)

Uighur vernacular houses, the reception rooms are decorated with wall-hangings, wall-paintings and niches. The benches of proto-historical time become *heykandazs* (the long cushions placed on rugs laid over the adobe platform, or *supa*, for guests to sit on) (Fig. 16). Even in modern Uighur apartments, the reception room is furnished in a similar way, though the benches have become modern sofas (Fig. 17).



FIG. 16. Kashghar. *Heykandaz* in the interior of a Uighur house. (Photo: Courtesy of R. G. Rozi.)



FIG. 17. Kashghar. Reception room of a Uighur house. (Photo: Courtesy of R. G. Rozi.)

BUILDING MATERIALS

The main walls of Xinjiang domestic buildings are composed of mud, mudbrick, and fired brick with a timber framework. Possessing good insulation properties, these materials protect against the scorching heat in the summer, the freezing wind during the winter, and dusty sandstorms throughout the year. Since earth is readily available and easy to use for construction, almost all traditional Uighur houses are built of pounded earth and mudbrick as the primary building material, often supplemented by a timber framing of post and beam construction. The absence of rain and the dry air make it possible to construct two- to three-storey houses in Xinjiang with structurally sound adobe walls. Soil is also used in the construction of a flat roof, a dominant feature throughout the region, which employs layers of straw-reinforced earth, reed, yellow soil and timber.

With advances in construction technology, walls are now being built in different ways. Half-brick, half-earth walls are used, combining the strength of brick with the insulation properties of earth. Brick-based earthen walls are also used in Xinjiang domestic architecture, in which the basement is made of brick, while the upper part is of earthen material.³⁶ Fired brick is gradually becoming the main wall-building material. However, due to the

³⁶ Rozi, 1998.



FIG. 18. Kashghar. Exterior view of Uighur houses. (Photo: Courtesy of R. G. Rozi.)

excellent insulation properties and affordability of earth, mud-brick is still widely used for walls, especially in rural areas.

The foundations of domestic buildings are usually constructed of pebble, gravel and sand-rammed material and brick. The floor is constructed of earth paved with brick. The roofs of vernacular houses in Xinjiang are of rammed earth (mixed and reinforced with wheat-straw) of about 200 mm thick, spread on densely covered timber ribs on a timber frame. The roof is usually flat with a slope of 2–3° down to the outer edges.

With local building materials used for heavy walls, solid foundations, thick roofs and high fences, the traditional Uighur house gives the impression of being a solid castle. The use of local materials on the plain, unadorned exterior is in perfect harmony with the loess oasis landscape of the natural environment (Fig. 18). By contrast, the interior (including the courtyard) is richly decorated and reveals a sophisticated spatial organization.

ORNAMENT AND DECORATION

The Uighurs use plaster relief, coloured murals, timber carving, brick carving, brick laying, engraved windows, as well as glazed coloured tiles, to decorate their buildings. Plaster relief is mostly used for the interior walls. Lines of white plaster are carved on the light blue, yellow and green base (Fig. 19). Coloured decorative patterns, scenery or flowers are painted on the timber, mainly on the ceilings and on the bottom drawers of the *mihrap*



FIG. 19. Kashghar. Decoration of an interior wall. (Photo: Courtesy of R. G. Rozi.)

(a large niche to store bedding). Brick carving and brick-bond patterns are used to ornament the exterior walls of the courtyard, including staircases (Fig. 20).

The motifs of wall-paintings and wall decorations have changed over time, according to the dominant religion. In contemporary Xinjiang, with the Islamic ban on idolatry, the painting of human and animal figures of the Kushan and post-Kushan periods has changed to motifs such as plants, geometric patterns and calligraphy. Abstracted from the familiar objects of the Uighur surroundings in Xinjiang, the following elements are commonly found: motifs from popular traditional domestic plants, such as fig leaves, grapes and grapevines, almonds, pomegranates, etc; geometric patterns, such as the pentagon, hexagon, circle, triangle, rectangle and a mixture of these; domestic utensils, such as teapots, samovars, vases, flowerpots, musical instruments, traditional hats and knives, etc; and calligraphy, Qur'anic scriptures or Uighur poems and proverbs.

Delicate designs of abstract plant and floral motifs are used on windows, doors and the plaster relief on wall surfaces. Green, blue and white are the favourite colours of the Uighurs, though other colours are used in mosaics and glazed brick. These same patterns and colours are also found on Uighur clothing, carpets, tapestries, hats and other artefacts. Fireplaces and niches not only serve a practical function but are the artistic expression of



FIG. 20. Kashghar. Exterior wall and staircase in a courtyard. (Photo: Courtesy of R. G. Rozi.)

the owner. Fireplaces and the variety of niches in Uighur houses use similar decorative patterns to those found in religious building such as mosques and tombs.

WALL SCULPTURE, WALL-PAINTINGS AND 'SOFT' WALL DECORATIONS

Wall sculpture consists of a variety of niches on the interior walls for storing and displaying artistic tableware, vases, samovars, teapots, books, etc. Although the idea of these niches was once thought to be derived from a shrine in a mosque or a church, it is now believed that they come from the proto-historic period when Buddhism was widespread.³⁷ Wall-paintings, or frescoes, on the interior walls (with their plaster relief carvings) are also used as decoration in the Uighur secular and sacred architecture of Xinjiang. 'Soft' wall decorations include hangings such as rugs, tapestries, cloth dados and curtains. These hangings not only provide a warm, inviting ambience, but also keep the interior warm and display the richness of the regional cultural traditions.³⁸ The carpets, tapestries and dados also protect people from the dust of the mud and brick walls and the plaster reliefs. The wall hangings

³⁷ Rozi, 1998.

³⁸ Wang, Yang and Rozi, 1997.

and other 'soft decorations' found in contemporary Uighur vernacular houses are derived from the wall-paintings that originated in the Kushan period.³⁹

DECORATION OF CEILINGS, EAVES AND FLOORS

The traditional decoration of the ceilings of the rooms and the veranda includes small, densely laid structural timber beams laid in a pattern that is designed to show off their natural colours and the carved cross-beams. Although the decoration of the veranda ceilings is similar to that found on the ceilings of the rooms, the colours are not as bright.⁴⁰ The eaves of the houses and their verandas are decorated with layers of carved or sculptured brick and carved timber in an upside-down trapezoid pattern. The windows and doors are made of timber painted with different coloured patterns (Fig. 21). The floors are paved with different materials of varying thickness. Carpeting and brick paving are commonly used for the floor in Uighur houses. The wooden columns and posts of the veranda are decorated with coloured painting. The balustrades and balusters are made of timber carved in a variety of shapes and painted to match the colours of the columns and posts (Fig. 22). Steps and stairs are usually constructed of brick laid in a variety of patterns.

COLOUR AND TEXTURE IN UIGHUR EXTERIORS AND INTERIORS

In general, plain colours that reflect those of the natural landscape are used for the exterior of domestic architecture, while bright colours are used for the courtyard and for interior decoration. As one moves from the exterior to the interior of the building, the plain colours and textured surfaces are gradually replaced by brighter colours and smoother surfaces. Thus the exterior walls and fences use the colours of the earth and bricks, while the gates of the houses are mostly in the original colour of the timber, or are painted a light tan or orange colour. (Exceptionally, Uighur houses in Kuldja frequently use a light sky-blue for both interior and exterior decorations.) The most popular colours used for interior decoration are blue, red, white, green, orange and black, while for the exterior decoration white, sky-blue and blackish green are the most popular colours used. Basically, the darker the room or space, the brighter the combination of colours used outside.

On the veranda, the eaves of the corridors, the timber columns, balusters, balustrades and ceilings are usually carved and painted in light green and blue and decorated with a variety of patterns. These colours not only harmonize with the soft light of the veranda, but also match the colours of the plants and flowers in the courtyard. The outdoor stairs, steps

³⁹ Rozi, 1998.

⁴⁰ Yan Da-Chun (ed.), 1995, p. 36.



FIG. 21. Kashghar. Door of a Uighur house. (Photo: Courtesy of R. G. Rozi.)

and exterior walls of the houses use plain colours such as those of the reddish brick and the timber, matching the colours of the natural loess oasis environment.

Among the Uighurs of Xinjiang, the popularly used colours blue, green and white have symbolic meanings. According to Yang,⁴¹ blue has a sacred meaning in Turkish culture. The Turks called themselves ‘Kok Turk’; *kok* means blue, but it also means sky and heaven. Blue symbolizes water, heaven and sky in Uighur culture; these are mentioned frequently in Uighur songs, poetry and other literary works. Because of the aridity of the climate and the oasis environment of Xinjiang, water is vital in the life of the Uighurs. Settlements are often situated along canals and rivers or wherever water is available; alternatively, ponds and lakes are at the centre of Uighur settlements. Blue (symbolizing water) is of special significance in Uighur culture. The frequent use of green may be due to the Uighurs’ love of plants,⁴² it may be derived from Shi‘ite Islam, which sees green as the colour of peace,⁴³

⁴¹ Yang, 1994, p. 369.

⁴² Yang, 1994, p. 370.

⁴³ Ibid.



FIG. 22. Kashghar. Decorated balustrade. (Photo: Courtesy of R. G. Rozi.)

or it may mean ‘life’ in the Xinjiang oasis environment.⁴⁴ White symbolizes tranquillity and purity, black represents darkness, death and solemnity, while red symbolizes youth, vigour and property.

The active and passionate character of the Uighurs, who enjoy regular dancing and social gatherings, has been suggested as explaining their use of bright colours, both in architecture and clothing.⁴⁵ In the cognition of the Uighur people, *shoh* means ‘bright, active, easygoing’ and is a desirable attribute. According to Li, ‘When Uighurs evaluate works of art, the most important point is whether they are *shoh*.’⁴⁶ As Li asserts, the gloomy

⁴⁴ Rozi, 1998.

⁴⁵ Rozi, 1998.

⁴⁶ Li, 1985, p. 339.

indoor space of Uighur houses in arid areas inevitably results in the desire of the inhabitants for bright colours in the interior decoration for a visually pleasant sensation.⁴⁷

Part Three

THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF MONGOLIA

(*C. Atwood*)

Introduction

Despite the Mongols' traditionally nomadic, pastoralist lifestyle, they have nourished a surprisingly rich tradition of fine arts and architecture. Particularly in Mongolia proper ('Outer Mongolia', or the present-day independent state of Mongolia), the one-time monastery town and present-day national capital Ulaanbaatar has been a centre of art and architecture from the eighteenth century continuously to the present. Other monastic centres in Mongolia proper have also been centres of art. In Inner Mongolia, now an autonomous region in China, artistic and architectural traditions flourished in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but did not make the transition to the modern era as successfully. The same can be said of the Buriats and Kalmuks, Mongol peoples living in Russia, where Buddhist temples were built in a peculiar mixture of Tibetan and European neo-classical styles. In all Mongol lands, Buddhist influenced monuments and art works were subject to violent communist inspired iconoclasm, under Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s and under Mao Zedong in the 1960s, from which only the most famous examples have survived.

Mongolia's history of fine arts and architecture can be divided into two basic periods. The first, spanning from roughly the late sixteenth up to the early twentieth century, was the period of the dominance of Buddhism and of Tibet and China as the main outside influences. For most of the twentieth century, Russian influences became dominant while communism and other secular European schools of thought prevailed. Today, this second period may be said to be continuing although with a more international cast and a pluralist ideology.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 327.

The successive predominance of first Buddhist and then communist aesthetics and practice of representation within Mongolian fine arts, and the influence of Tibetan, Chinese and Russian canons on Mongolian monumental architecture, raises the question of whether Mongolia can indeed be said to have a single artistic tradition. In reality, however, there was significant continuity in style, media, social base and artists between Mongolia's early European-style art and the Buddhist iconographic tradition. Although more purely European-style art later gained predominance, neo-traditional revivals have maintained strong continuity with Mongolia's Buddhist and folk-art traditions, a continuity reinforced by strong nationalist and essentialist currents in the current pluralistic cultural atmosphere. Continuity is less visible in monumental architecture, although one finds the use of yurt-shaped forms as an icon of 'Mongolianness' in both Buddhist and communist artistic traditions.

Fine arts from the 'second conversion' to 1900

The 'second conversion' of Mongolia to Buddhism began in 1576 in southwestern Inner Mongolia, spreading from there north to Khalkha Mongolia, east to central and eastern Inner Mongolia, and north-west to the Oirat Mongols. The spread of Buddhism involved the building of monasteries and assembly halls as well as the importation and domestic fashioning of Buddhas, both painted and sculpted. By the late seventeenth century, domestic schools of manufacture were well established, but in the nineteenth century commercial manufacture by Chinese and even Europeans took over virtually all the lowend market in cheap religious goods, as well as the construction of temples.

The earliest examples of Buddhist fine arts in Mongolia are the wall paintings at the Maidari Juu temple in south-western Inner Mongolia and in Erdeni Zuu in central Mongolia. Both appear to date from the late sixteenth or seventeenth century and show a number of similarities in composition, symbolism, and dress of the figures. Those of Erdeni Zuu have survived, however, only in copies.⁴⁸ The surviving wall-paintings of the Xiongbaodian hall in Maidari Juu picture the paintings against the Chinese-influenced naturalistic grassy, hilly background that had replaced the shrine-setting in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist art during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Pictures commissioned by Chinese officials of Mongolian princes such as Altan Khan (1508–82) presenting tribute⁴⁹ had undoubtedly already familiarized Mongol artists with the portrayal of the human figure and landscape. (See Volume V, Chapter 18, Part Three.)

⁴⁸ Tsultem, 1986b, Pls. 150–1; Charleux, 1999.

⁴⁹ Tsultem, 1986b, Preface.

Mongol assimilation of Tibetan Buddhist art traditions was assisted by the importation of Tibetan Buddhist art and the translation of iconographic manuals. A number of famous Tibetan Buddhas were presented to the Mongols during the process of conversion such as a Juu (from Tibetan *Jo-bo*) Shakyamuni Buddha held to have been made by the gods during the Buddha's own life and housed in Höhhot's Yekhe Juu temple.⁵⁰ Mongolian sources also mention Nepalese artisans sculpting Buddhas, ornaments and reliquaries for Mongol patrons.⁵¹ Nepalese artists had been patronized by the Mongol khans as early as the thirteenth century. The movement of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist art into Mongolia was hastened both by the education of well-born Mongolian lamas in Tibet and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the identification of Mongolian incarnate lamas among children in Tibet. Both returning Mongolian lamas and Tibetan boys being escorted to take up their position as incarnate lamas carried with them vast amounts of religious articles, art works and sometimes entourages of artisans.

In Tibetan Buddhist iconography, the proportions and attributes of Buddha figures are determined by a system of relative proportions called 'fingers' (the width of a finger) and 'spans' (the distance from the tip of the thumb to the tip of the middle finger fully extended). Each span contains 12 fingers. The various figures are divided into classes, such as Buddha, peaceful Bodhisattva, female deity, tall wrathful deity, short wrathful deity and humans.⁵² The details were found in Indian treatises augmented by the visions of Tibetan yogins. Eventually descriptions of iconographic prescriptions for large numbers of Buddhas were collected by scholars such as Ishi-Baljur (1704–88), the ethnic Mongol abbot of Sumpa temple in Kökenuur (Qinghai), and the '500 Buddhas' blockprint printed in Khüriye (Urga in Russian, today Ulaanbaatar) in 1811.⁵³ While those iconographic treatises contained in the *bsTan-'gyur*, or collection of canonical Indian treatises, were translated in the eighteenth century into Mongolian, Tibetan remained the universal language of Buddhist artists regardless of ethnicity. Indeed, books remained far less important in the transmission of these techniques than the ties between master and pupil.

Mongolian fine arts achieved an early peak of brilliance in the sculptures of the First Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu (*Qutughtu*) Lubsang-Dambi-Jaltsan-Balsangbu (1635–1723), commonly known by his name as a novice, Zanabazar. The chief religious figure of the Khalkha Mongols from age 14 to 16, he received instruction and initiations in Tibet from the Fifth Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. On his return, he began casting reliquaries

⁵⁰ Elverskog, 2003, pp.187–8; Altan'orgil, 1981, pp. 89–97.

⁵¹ Elverskog, 2003, pp. 174, 187, 193.

⁵² Jackson and Jackson, 1984, pp. 45–67.

⁵³ Tsultem, 1986b, Preface.

and designing temples, and in 1655 he cast his first mature Buddha, no longer extant. A number of Buddhas from his hand survive today, with others being attributed to his school.

His greatest masterpieces include the Vajradhara cast in 1683, the set of five Dhyani Buddhas cast around the same time, the Sitasamvara and consort also of that time, and his White and Green Taras (the latter was traditionally completed in 1706). Zanabazar's religious images share with previous Mongolian Buddhist art a strong Nepalese influence visible in the delicate detail of the ornamentation, while Chinese influence can be seen in the soft modelling of the robes. Zanabazar's sculptures are all of cast bronze with gold gilding in which the matt finish of the skin contrasts with the burnished finish of the robes and jewellery. While Zanabazar used colouring for the hair and a few other details, he rarely if ever used the inlaid jewels common in other Tibetanstyle Buddhist sculpture. Adhering closely to the iconometric conventions, Zanabazar's masterpieces show a strikingly lifelike gracefulness and beauty of face. Legends connect his White and Green Tara images to the maturing beauty of his consort, the 'Girl Prince' (Kheükhén Khutukhtu). The artist's anvil has been preserved as a relic, although the only pieces in the hammered repoussé technique that could possibly be from his hand are the flame aureoles traditionally placed behind some of his sculptures. After Zanabazar's death, his school in Khüriye continued to produce masterworks of Buddhist sculpture during the eighteenth century, but this school was replaced by artists trained in differing schools in the nineteenth century.⁵⁴

In Inner Mongolia, the town of Dolonnuur (modern Duolun) was the main centre for producing religious artefacts. A distinctive school of highquality Dolonnuur sculpture flourished from 1700 to the early twentieth century, alongside a vast number of crude, mass-produced items. Masterpieces of this school, such as the series of three Buddhist deities, Manjushri, Avalokiteshvara and Vajrapani, share much of the harmonious proportions and lifelike dynamism of Zanabazar's works, but otherwise are quite different in method and overall effect. Major Dolonnuur statues were made in parts of beaten brass plates soldered together and gilt with burnished gold. Opulent inlays of lapis lazuli, turquoise and coral along with lacquer and enamel pigments appealed to patrons. Billowing scarves, flat earrings and five-leaf crowns are also characteristic of the Dolonnuur style. By the nineteenth century, the Dolonnuur school dominated the production of high-quality Buddhist sculpture and members of this school may have also relocated to Khüriye to work.⁵⁵

The other major media of Tibetan-style Buddhist fine art are the *thangka* or iconographic painting and the temple banner or iconographic appliqué. *Thangkas* were painted

⁵⁴ Berger, 1995; Tsultem, 1982; Choinkhor, 1995.

⁵⁵ Bartholomew, 1995, pp. 81–2; Stoddard, 1995, pp. 219–20, 243–5; Rhie and Thurman, 1991, pp. 68–9, 144–5.

on silk or cotton stretched on a wooden frame. The cloth was primed with a mixture of liquor, glue and chalk and smoothed with stones. The pigments were made of ground minerals or lac in a size of animal fat. Basic colours were called 'father colours' while white was the 'mother colour'; their mixing produced 'son colours'. Demons and evil figures were depicted in ash-grey 'servant colours'. Half-tones were rarely used. Designs were first produced on paper and then transferred to the cloth by piercing the drawn figures with a needle and applying dye along the pricked outline. Temple banners were produced by sewing appliqués of silk and brocade along patterns drawn by master artists. Pearls and other jewels were frequently also sewn into these temple banners.⁵⁶

Although some *thangkas*, including a self-portrait and a portrait of his mother Khandu-Jamtsu, are attributed to Zanabazar, these traditional attributions are not certain. Few Mongolian *thangkas* can be reliably dated before the mid-nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Khüriye was the great centre of *thangka* and temple-banner production in Mongolia, and one of the major centres of this medium in the whole Tibetan Buddhist world. Masterpieces by nineteenth-century artists include Agwangsharab's mid-nineteenth century portraits of the First and Fifth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtus, Gendündamba's images of the deity Jamsrang (or Beg-tshe), Chojantsan's painting of the deity Mahakala (late nineteenth century) and Jügder's painting of Ushnishvijaya (turn of the twentieth century). It should be noted, however, that the Khüriye artists worked within a highly traditional school. Attributions of *thangkas* commonly differ from source to source and must be regarded as subject to further study and revision. Similarly temple banners, produced by seamstresses in the service of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu's great establishment under the guidance of master artists, are hard to attribute to particular individuals (Fig. 23).⁵⁷

An interesting feature of Mongolian Buddhist fine art was the importance of individual portraiture. In particular, the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtus were portrayed as distinct, recognizable individuals despite the overall iconographic conventionality of their art. Whether in *thangka* paintings, sculpture, temple banners or popular prints, Zanabazar's round balding head, characteristically inclined with a kindly expression, is very distinctive (Fig. 24). Portraits of the Seventh Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu (1850–68) are easily recognizable by his swarthy skin and strong, square-set jaw, typical of his Tibetan ancestry. Recognizable portraits of other high Mongolian lamas such as the Jangjiya Khutukhtus in Beijing are also known.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Tsultem, 1986b, Preface; Jackson and Jackson, 1984.

⁵⁷ Tsultem, 1986b, Preface, Pls. 3–86; Dariimaa, 2003, pp. 10–123.

⁵⁸ Tsultem, 1986b, Pls. 88–92, 105–16; Rhie and Thurman, 1991, p. 276.



FIG. 23. Temple banner of the fierce Buddhist protectress deity Baldan Lhamo. (Sanskrit, Shri Devi; Mongolian Okhin Tenggeri). Appliqué with inlaid semi-precious stones (necklaces), mother of pearl (skull diadem), and peacock feathers (floating crown). Artist and date unclear. (Source: Tsultem, 1986b, Pl. 79.)

Buddhist architecture to 1900

As nomads, the Mongol tradition of domestic architecture was limited to the yurt (Mongolian, *ger*). Contrary to popular impressions of the unchanging yurt, yurts in fact underwent fairly significant changes, with today's collapsible lattice-work yurt first appearing in the sixth century and replacing non-collapsible forms on carts only in the fifteenth century.⁵⁹ During times of imperial expansion, the Mongols successively adopted a number of monumental architectural styles. At the time of the second conversion, the Tümed Mongols of southwestern Inner Mongolia were already employing Chinese architects and builders in creating palaces and pavilions. As a result, it is not surprising that Chinese architectural forms initially dominated Mongolian religious architecture. Later, however, Tibetan forms challenged the dominance of Chinese architecture. Hybrid forms, particularly with Tibetan walls surmounted by a Chinese roof, were also common. Among the

⁵⁹ Andrews, 1999.



FIG. 24. Zhanabazar (the First Jebtsundamba Khutuktu), by Agwangsharab. Mineral paints on cotton. Mid-nineteenth century. (Source: Tsultem, 1986b, Pl. 105.)

Kalmuks and Buriat Mongols of the Russian empire, Buddhist temples were almost all influenced to varying degrees by European architectural forms, ranging from the neo-classical colonnade to the onion dome of Russian Orthodox churches, while still maintaining Chinese and/or Tibetan motifs.⁶⁰

Fine examples of Chinese-style architecture among the Mongols of Inner Mongolia include the Maidari Juu temple (built in 1606) near Baotou in south western Inner Mongolia, and the Yekhe Juu (Chinese, Dazhao) temple in Höhhot, first built in 1579 and rebuilt in 1640. The vast Badgar Sume (Chinese, Wudangzhao) monastery (begun in 1749) north of Baotou is a Tibetan style temple complex in Inner Mongolia. Shireetü Juu in Höhhot (first built in 1585, rebuilt in 1697) combines Chinese and Tibetan architectural elements in an appealing mix. A very distinctive monument is the Five Pagoda temple (Chinese, Wutasi) of Höhhot, dating from 1727. Built with the load-bearing, slightly inward-slanting walls of Tibetan architecture, the roof is surmounted by a Chinese-style pavilion and five unusually shaped stupas (reliquaries). The temple's walls are faced with stone on which are carved Buddhas and mantras, and a unique astronomical chart with Mongolian captions. This 'five pagoda temple' style originated in China's Ming dynasty (1368–1644), as an imitation of

⁶⁰ Borisenko, 1994; Minert, 1983.

the Mahabodhi temple in Bodhgaya, India.⁶¹ Unfortunately, few Inner Mongolian temples outside the Höhhot-Baotou area survived the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s.

In Mongolia proper, only Erdeni Zuu and Gandan-Tegchinling, the second of the two great temple complexes of Khüriye, survived the destruction of Buddhism in the 1930s. Vast Tibetan-style complexes such as Manzushiri-yin Kheid (outside Khüriye), Zaya-yin Kheid (Tsetserlig) and Baraibung Kheid (Khentii) were razed virtually to the ground. In general, in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Khalkha the northern, more mountainous areas preferred Tibetan-style architecture, albeit often with Chinese roofs, while in the Gobi desert areas Chinese-style temples were more common.

Yurt-style log cabins among the Buriat Mongols of Siberia are known from their early contact with the Russians in the seventeenth century. A striking part of temple architecture in Mongolia proper, especially Khüriye, was the use of cylindrical buildings with conical roofs, inspired by the yurt form, and square marquee-type forms, inspired by tents (*maikhans*) used by Mongols at countryside entertainments. Both were constructed in wood and appear to have been designed for relatively easily mobility like the yurt and *maikhan* tents themselves. Indeed, the great temples of Khüriye remained mobile for over a century and a half, being moved to a new location every few years. The earliest known monumental yurt-style wooden temple was the shrine of Abtai Khan (1554–88), placed in Khüriye. Since the city of Khüriye did not settle at its present site until 1779, this wooden yurt must have been regularly dismantled and set up before that time. Yurt- and marquee-style tents were also used to surmount Tibetan-style temples as at the Gombo-Gurgi temple at Erdeni Zuu. These and all other yurt-style temples were destroyed in the 1930s and 1940s.

The most famous marquee-style building was the *tsogchin dugang*, or great assembly hall, of Khüriye's central temple, the Nom-un Yekhe Khüriye (officially titled Rebu-Gejai-Gandan-Shaddubling). This hall was square in shape, measured 42 × 42 m and could accommodate up to 2,000 lamas. The three-tiered wooden roof was erected on 108 poles (108 was a sacred number in Buddhism). The design of this temple was attributed to Zanabazar, although like Abtai Khan's yurt-temple it must have been regularly dismantled and set up until Khüriye was fixed at its present location in 1779. Mongolian hagiographies assigned great symbolic meaning to each of the features of this *tsogchin dugang*. Other smaller assembly halls in Khüriye imitated the form of the great *tsogchin dugang*.⁶²

⁶¹ Altan'orgil, 1981; Nei Menggu Bowuguan, 1987; Sélhéjab and Oyunbilig, 1991; Gaubatz, 1996, pp. 201–2.

⁶² Shchepetil'nikov, 1960; Tsultem, 1988; Ölzii, 1992; Dashnyam et al., 1999, pp. 295–79.

Architecture and the fine arts in the early twentieth century

In 1911 the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu (1870–1924) led Outer Mongolia to independence with the assistance of the Russian empire. Although Mongolia was forced eventually to accept only autonomy from China, not genuine independence, and make numerous economic concessions to Russia, this declaration began Mongolia's opening to the world and the country's halting efforts to develop modern institutions. Although Mongolia was reoccupied by Chinese troops in 1919 and by White (anti-communist) Russians in 1921, officials of the old autonomous government and young intellectuals formed a political party that appealed to Soviet Russia. In July 1921, with Soviet assistance, they established a revolutionary nationalist government, with the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu as the nominal head of state.

ARCHITECTURE

From 1911 to 1921 Mongolia was a theocracy in which the clergy established under the incarnate lama emperor, the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, expanded rapidly in wealth and prestige. Expanded patronage funded some of the great monuments of Mongolian architecture, while modern artistic trends and the paradoxically worldly atmosphere led to new experimentation.

The most outstanding monument of the theocratic period was the great temple of Migjid Janraisig (Eye-Opening Avalokiteshvara), which housed a 14-m high gilt copper image of the deity. The temple, which still occupies a prominent place on the Ulaanbaatar skyline, consists of a three-storey Tibetan-style hall surmounted by a further two-storey Chinese hall (Fig. 25). In contrast to many of these hybrid Tibeto-Chinese-style buildings, the proportions are strikingly harmonious. Built between 1911 and 1913 and funded by alms collected from the populace, the temple was erected to cure the Khutukhtu's blindness.⁶³

Other architectural monuments of the turn of the twentieth century include the palaces of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu along the Tuul river, just south of the capital Khüriye, and the Choijung Lama temple. The latter was built between 1899 and 1901 to house the younger brother of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu as the official state oracle. The only extant palace today is the Sharabpeljailing, popularly known as the Green (or Winter) Palace, built from 1893 to 1906 (Figs. 26 and 27). A striking feature of this palace complex is a two-storey Russian-style building added in 1905. Between 1912 and 1919 a magnificent

⁶³ Ölzii, 1992, pp. 123–33.



FIG. 25. Temple of Migjid Janraisig (on the left) and the *tsogchin dugang* (great assembly hall) of Gandan-Tegchinling monastery (on the right). This *tsogchin dugang* is built in the marquee style pioneered by the no longer extant *tsogchin dugang* of Zanabazar. (Photo: Courtesy of Katherine Petrie.)

ceremonial gate in the Chinese style was built in front of the temple – the 280,000 *taels* of silver for its construction were again collected as alms from all over the country. The massive multiple roofs, supported by 108 brackets (no nails were used in the construction), appear to float over the slender supporting poles. All of these buildings were constructed by Chinese contractors, using both Mongolian and Chinese craftsmen. The Buddhist images inside were the work solely of Mongolian monastic craftsmen.⁶⁴

Another, albeit minor, element in Mongolian architecture was the introduction of Russian vernacular architecture. From 1860 onwards, occasional Siberian log cabins, with their distinctive decorative shutters and trimmings on the windows, dotted the city. An elaborate two-storey version of Russian vernacular architecture was introduced in the famous ‘Red House’ built by the Russian mining executive Victor von Grot (b. 1863) near the Jebtsundamba’s Brown Palace (Fig. 28).

FINE ARTS

In the fine arts, the theocratic era saw the birth of secular genre paintings, experiments with ink drawings and the growing influence of photography. These developments are associated especially with the famous painter Busybody (*marzan*) Sharab (1869–1939), although other artists were also pursuing them. Trained in iconography in the countryside, Sharab moved to Khüriye in 1891 and eventually became the official portrait painter for the court of the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Ölzii, 1992, pp. 5–46, 107–19.

⁶⁵ Lomakina, 1974; Sonomtseren and Batchuluun, 1989, pp. 46–56.



FIG. 26. Ulaanbaatar. The ceremonial gate complex Andingmen, outside the Green (or Winter) Palace of the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, completed in 1919. (Source: Tsultem, 1988, Pl. 70.)

The development of genre paintings, exemplified by Sharab's famous works, *Airag* [fermented mare's milk] *Feast* (also called *A Day in the Life of Mongolia*) and *Autumn* (Fig. 29), appears to have been inspired by the Buddhist genre of the wheel of samsara painting. In wheel of samsara paintings, the painter portrays the six possible births for living beings (as a Hindu god, demi-god, human, animal, hungry ghost or hell being) as the result of



FIG. 27. Ulaanbaatar. Andingmen (detail): front of the main gate in the ceremonial gate complex, completed in 1919. (Source: Tsultem, 1988, Pl. 71.)



FIG. 28. 'The Summer Residence' or Khaistai Labrang Palace of the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu. Painted by an anonymous painter of the Khüriye/Urga school. The large 'Red House' was built by the Russian mining executive Viktor von Grot. Mineral paints on cotton. Early twentieth century. (Source: Tsultem, 1986b, Pl. 170.)

ignorance, anger and lust (allegorically represented by a pig, a snake and a rooster). As can be seen in Buriat examples from the turn of the twentieth century, the section on the human birth began to be used for portraits of the details of human life, whether evil (hunting, slaughtering animals, farming), good (lamas holding religious ceremonies) or neutral (wrestling, shearing sheep, setting up yurts). Evidently, Sharab and others in Khüriye were inspired by depictions of the human birth to begin to paint these genre scenes separately.⁶⁶

Sacred-place portraits was another Buddhist genre that eventually fed secularizing artistic trends at this time. Notable portraits of sacred places included the nineteenth-century portraits of Khüriye and Bereewen monasteries, and especially the portrait of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa sometimes attributed to Sharab and the painting of the Maitreya procession attributed to Dorji (1870–1937). After independence in 1911, this genre took a secular direction in Jügder's 1912 portrait of Khüriye (Fig. 30), which was conceived not primarily as showing a religious site but as displaying accurately the new and rapidly changing capital of an independent country. Other painters in the Khüriye school during the theocratic period mixed pictures of the new palaces and European-style buildings of Khüriye with the animal and human figures of the genre painting style.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Pupyshchev, 1995, Pls. 74–7; Tsultem, 1986b, Preface, Pls. 161–9.

⁶⁷ Berger, 1995, pp. 172–9; Tsultem, 1986b, Preface, Pls. 153–7, 170–3.



FIG. 29. *Autumn* by B. Sharab. The painting depicts the typical activities in autumn. Mineral paints on cotton. Early twentieth century. (Source: Tsultem, 1986b, Pl. 166.)



FIG. 30. Ulaanbaatar. Mongolia's capital Khüriye (Urga, modern Ulaanbaatar) in 1913. Painted by Jügder. Mineral paints on cotton. Now kept in the Bogd-khaan Palace-Museum. (Source: Tsultem, 1986b, p. 156.)

In this period, the use of Chinese ink paintings and photography influenced iconographic art. The famous Inner Mongolian poet and novelist Injannashi (1837–92) painted sketches of the courtyard where he was born and birds and flowers in a thoroughly Chinese

style.⁶⁸ In turn-of-the-century Khüriye, Damba was inspired by Chinese landscape drawings in his portrait of Zaya-yin Gegeen's monastery painted in mineral paints with mostly monochromatic hues. Tsagan Jamba ('White Jamba') used coloured drawings to picture livestock and game animals, as well as portraits of the female deity Gūnjin Lhamo and the epic hero Dugar Zaisang. Sharab mastered pencil and *tush* (thick Russian ink) as well as the traditional mineral paints. In his most famous portraits, he inked in the flesh tones of his patrons (such as the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, his consort Dondugdulma and other high clerical figures) but painted the clothing and background in mineral paints. His settings were mixes of traditional Buddhist iconographic conventions and more realistic depictions of the figures, throne and room. He frequently drew faces from photographs.⁶⁹

Fine arts, 1921–90

The 1921 revolution brought to power a revolutionary junta supported by the Soviet Union. The new government was initially very cautious about making radical cultural changes, a reluctance accentuated by the embryonic state of the country's modern intellectual class. For many years, the new government had neither the will nor the finances to sponsor large-scale experiments in secular arts.

Even so, the revolution made a striking difference to the work of painters like Busybody Sharab. Sharab gave up painting both his genre scenes and his iconographic portraits and instead took up printing political cartoons and portraits (drawn from photographs) of world revolutionary figures such as Lenin and Karl Liebknecht and Mongolia's leader General Sükhbaatar. Little if anything of the occasional and journalistic art of the next two decades has great artistic significance. Famous Buddhist artists such as Gendündamba and Nawangdendüb continued to work and train pupils into the 1930s, although their work has not survived. The massive purges of 1937–40 and the concurrent destruction of the Buddhist monasteries and laicization of the lamas killed off the older generation of artists.

In 1942 Mongolia's now thoroughly communist-style government organized the Union of Mongolian Artists with the mission of funding and nurturing artistic talent in all branches, while simultaneously enforcing socialist-realist canons of art on the Soviet model. The artists recruited had varying backgrounds, although most had spent time working as illustrators or commercial artists for publishing houses or newspapers. Work on cinema and theatre sets was also important for this early European-style art in Mongolia. ürjingiin Yadamsüren (1905–87), for example, went from carving block-prints of Buddhist

⁶⁸ See the plates in Erdenitoütaqu, [1958/1981](#); Liu Wenyan and Lai Bingwen, [1988](#).

⁶⁹ Tsultem, [1986b](#), Pls. 158–60, 174–8 (note: Pls. 176–8 are actually copies, not originals).



FIG. 31. *Breaking in a Horse* (1963) painted by O. Tsewegjaw. Oil on canvas. 200 × 150 cm. (Source: Sonomtseren, 1971, Pl. 3.)

scriptures in 1918 to Moscow's Communist University of the Toilers of the East in 1930 and the Surikov Fine Art Institute in 1939. Luwsangiin Gawaa (b. 1920) trained from 1933 with a Soviet artist K. I. Pomerantsev (and later with Sharab) as an apprentice illustrator at the State Publishing House.

Soviet influence, while dominant, was not the only conduit for modern artistic influences, however. Ochiryn Tsewegjaw (1915–75) was born in Buriatia in Siberia, fled the Russian revolution with his family, and entered high school in Ulaanbaatar (Fig. 31). There an Inner Mongolian artist Soyoltai, who had trained at the Beijing Art Institute before migrating to Mongolia, introduced him to the French Impressionists (Soyoltai himself perished in the Great Purges).⁷⁰ Dulamjawyn Damdinsüren (1909–84), who became a lama in 1920, had experience as an iconographic artist before being laicized in 1937. He studied with Sharab in that same year and worked at the printing house until 1947, when he began working full time as an artist.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Sonomtseren and Batchuluun, 1989, pp. 80–104.

⁷¹ Dariimaa, 2003, p. 10.

At first the new Union of Mongolian Artists treated European-style oil and canvas as the sole superior medium for painting. Until the mid-1950s, scenes from revolutionary and military history and portraits of political leaders were virtually the only permissible topics for Mongolian artists. The ideological thaw created by the de-Stalinization movement in the Soviet bloc after 1956 had a direct influence on Mongolian art. Portraits of living leaders and the idolization of the deceased Marshal Choibalsan (Mongolia's 'Stalin' from 1936 to 1952) disappeared and the range of acceptable themes expanded vastly. Although Mongolian urbanization accelerated in the 1950s and 1960s, the country's artists preferred to focus on the countryside and traditional themes, a trend that has continued to the present. Depictions of horses, camels and the herding life were particularly popular. Yet scenes of rural life often stressed modernization, portraying a train in the distance or a motorcycle parked by a yurt.

Political pressures did not disappear, however, and the artists' clear preference for traditional and rural themes was frustrating for the national leadership. In March 1959 the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) charged that Mongolian artists had 'hardly studied Marxism-Leninism at all or the works of the world's classic authors, and not worked intensively to master socialist realism'. Despite this criticism, de-Stalinization continued in the Soviet Union until 1963, and the Mongolian Government had to follow the liberalizing trend. In the mid-1960s, however, the political and cultural space opened by de-Stalinization began to close. In January 1969 the MPRP again issued a decree criticizing abstract art and calling for the Committee of the Union of Mongolian Artists to stick to socialist realism.⁷² This time, the cultural climate in the Soviet Union was likewise becoming increasingly dogmatic and the decree greatly inhibited Mongolian artistic development. Trends towards abstract art and 'unedifying' subjects were driven underground, ending the period of unusual artistic creativity that had begun in the mid-1950s.

Although painting remained the dominant branch of the fine arts, other media that flourished in the 1950s and 1960s included drawing, printing and sculpture. Drawing in pencil had been a phase of production in Mongolian *thangka* painting, and it was through pencil drawings that Mongolian artists assimilated European canons of composition and draughtsmanship. Likewise printing, including lithographs and linocuts, had been the main medium for the illustrations and propaganda art that formed the bulk of artists' work before the 1940s. Two of the most familiar and widely reproduced works of Mongolian art are the linocuts *Good Morning, Mommy!* (1963) by D. Amgalan (b. 1933) (Fig. 32) and *A Herd of Horses* (1962) by S. Natsagdorj (b. 1928). Modern sculpture in Mongolia began with Sonomyn Choimbol's monumental sculpture of the revolutionary leader General Sükhbaatar

⁷² Sonomtseren and Batchuluun, 1989, pp. 149, 151.



FIG. 32. *Good Morning, Mommy!* (1963) painted by D. Amgalan. From the collection 'Morning in Our Motherland'. Linocut. 45 × 75 cm. (Source: Sonomtseren, 1971, Pl. 33.)

on horseback, erected in the capital city Ulaanbaatar's main square (unveiled in 1946). More so than any other medium, however, sculpture remained limited to either sentimental portrayals of folk life or monumental depictions of historical and political leaders.

The neo-traditional movement in Mongolian art was clearly expressed in the creation of the *Mongol zurag* (Mongolian painting) style. In this style, the traditional medium of *thangka* painting (mineral paints on cotton) is used for non-religious topics. D. Manibadar was an early pioneer in this style with his painting *Old Warrior* (1942), portraying a bearded warrior in armour on a throne. This 'feudal' style and theme was only tolerated during the years of patriotic fervour during the Second World War. No further examples of the *Mongol zurag* style won public acclaim until 1958, when Ü. Yadamsüren unveiled *Old Fiddler*, portraying a bearded fiddler playing the Mongolian 'horse-head fiddle', the traditional instrument *par excellence* in Mongolian folk music. In the following decades, *Mongol zurag* artists created a number of classic paintings that became iconic images of Mongolian tradition such as *Naadam* [Games] (1966) by D. Damdinsüren, *Migration* (1967) by Ts. Minjuur (b. 1910), *Chess Players* (1968) by B. Awarzad (b. 1907), *Black Camel* (1968) and *Camels* (1971) by A. Sengetsokhio (b. 1917) (Fig. 33), *Mongolian Woman* (1968) by Ts. Jamsran (b. 1924) and *The Call* (1975) by N. Tsültem (b. 1923) (Fig. 34). Although oil painting continued as a widely used medium, the officially approved impressionism-influenced socialist-realist style was overshadowed in the 1960s and 1970s by the new *Mongol zurag* school.

In the *Mongol zurag* school, paintings of historical topics from the 1921 revolution were also popular; the use of this neo-traditional style to represent revolutionary topics graphically expressed the assimilation of the events of 1921 into Mongolian tradition as part of the



FIG. 33. *Camels* (1971) painted by A. Sengetsokhio. Mineral paints on cotton. (Source: Tsultem, 1986b, Pl. 186.)

legacy of the elders. The *Mongol zurag* painters also paid homage to the pre-purge generation of Mongolian artists in, for example, Sengetsokhio's *Portrait of the Painter Busybody Sharab* (1963). Tsultem's *The Call* was a much more elaborate 'remake' of Sharab's own lithograph of a soldier calling revolutionaries to war by blowing on a conch shell used as the masthead to the party periodical *The Call* in November 1921. (The conch shell was used in Buddhist services to summon lamas to the services.)

The *Mongol zurag* school was by no means monolithic. Some artists, like D. Damdinsüren, remained rooted in the old Buddhist painting traditions, while others adopted European methods of perspective, shading and realistic portraiture. Kh. Tserendorj (b. 1910), for example, in his *Wedding Ceremony* (1967), made extensive use of shading (although without a single consistent source of light) to render the landscape and abandoned the traditional conventions of *thangka* painting in rendering the waves on water, clouds and grassy slopes. His *Migration for the Servants* (1968), however, shows a topic unusual in the *Mongol zurag* repertoire (criticism of class inequalities in the old society), with geometric perspective (unknown in traditional Buddhist painting) and an abundant use of half-tones,



FIG. 34. *The Call* (1975) painted by N. Tsültem. Mineral paints on cotton. (Source: Tsültem, 1986b, Pl. 189.)

yet with an elaborate cloudscape taken directly from *thangka* conventions. In general, however, while *Mongol zurag* painters made more use of half-tones than did traditional *thangka* painters, they generally emulated the *thangka* painting practice of using outlines filled with swaths of colour.

Paintings of rural scenes like Ts. Dawaakhüü's *Festivities at a Cooperative* (1979) (Fig. 35) and Minjuur's *Migration* were typically composed without geometric perspective in an episodic panel-style composition very similar to Sharab's *A Day in the Life of Mongolia*. On the other hand, indoor scenes, such as *The New Masters Have Come* (1963) by B. Gombosüren (b. 1930) (Fig. 36), showing the arrival of the 1921 revolutionaries at the palace of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, and *An Audience with Lenin* (1967) by Sengetsokhio, depicting Sükhbaatar's meeting with Lenin in Moscow, use perspective to centre the heroic figure of Sükhbaatar with his followers faced with either the darkened authority of the Khutukhtu or the welcoming figure of Lenin. In line with his aim to document traditional rituals in their architectural setting in pre-revolutionary Khüriye,



FIG. 35. *Festivities at a Cooperative* (1979) painted by Ts. Dawaakhüü. Mineral paints on cotton. (Source: Tsultem, 1986b, Pl. 191.)



FIG. 36. *The New Masters Have Come* (1963) painted by B. Gombosüren. Mineral paints on cotton. The painting depicts Sükhbaatar (centre) and his revolutionaries (on the left) receiving the seal of government from the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu (enthroned on right) and his entourage. (Source: Tsultem, 1986b, Pl. 190.)

Damdinsüren's portrayals of the *Naadam* games and the *Tsam* dances were drawn from an aerial perspective, as if from a photograph taken from an aeroplane (Fig. 37).⁷³

⁷³ Tsultem, 1986b, Preface, Pls. 181–92; Sonomtseren, 1971.



FIG.37. *Tsam in Khüriye* (1966) painted by D. Damdinsüren. Mineral paints on cotton. The Tsam was an exorcistic dance performed in honour of the fierce Buddhist deity Yamataka. The painting is looking north towards the centre of Mongolia's capital Khüriye (modern Ulaanbaatar) and represents the city's look around 1920. In the middle of the immediate foreground is the city's ceremonial gate. The walled compound behind the dancers is the 'Yellow Palace' of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu. The low white building to the north-west of the Yellow Palace is the marquee-style *tsogchin dugang*, or Great Assembly Hall designed by Zanabazar. (Source: Sonomtseren, 1971.)

Despite the roots of *Mongol zurag* in Buddhist painting, religion itself had only an ambivalent presence in *Mongol zurag* painting, due to the continuing ideological pressure of the communist government, and perhaps to a reluctance on the part of traditionally trained artists to mix secular and religious styles. Compositions that explicitly adopted iconographic methods of portraiture, even for secular topics such as D. Urtnasan's *Wise Queen Mandukhai* (1982) or D. Damdinsüren's *Mother's Glory*, were rare. In private, however, painters such as Damdinsüren, who had never given up his Buddhist faith despite forced laicization, continued to paint Buddhist icons.

Architecture, 1921–90

Mongolian architecture, like the fine arts, did not emerge from the period of revolutionary destruction until the 1940s. As in the Buddhist period, monumental architecture in Mongolia continued to be more strongly influenced than the fine arts not just by foreign models but by the presence of foreign architects and construction workers. Until the mid-1960s, foreign labour played a major role in Mongolia's building industry.

Despite the 1921 revolution, little visible change occurred at first in the cityscape of Khūriye, renamed Ulaanbaatar ('Red Hero') in 1924. The first distinctive new building was the Green Dome theatre (built in 1927), designed by a Hungarian architect, Joseph Gelet, with a round green roof in a form inspired by the yurt. The few buildings built before 1945, such as the State Printing Press of 1929, followed a purely European style. The architects were generally Soviet, but their designs in Mongolia in this period were surprisingly ornate, perhaps influenced by the Siberian vernacular architectural style.

After 1945, Soviet architects such as N. M. Shchepetil'nikov and Gerhard Kozel designed the buildings around the central square of Ulaanbaatar in a full-blown neo-classical style with columns, entablatures and pilasters (Fig. 38). Meanwhile Japanese prisoners of war built the first large apartment blocks in Mongolia, four storeys high and again with a number of neo-classical touches. This style was continued in the 1950s in apartment blocks built by Chinese guest workers under the direction of a city plan drawn up by Soviet and Mongolian architects. The pioneering Mongolian architect in the post-war era was B. Chimed, who closely imitated Soviet styles, modelling his tombs of General Sükhbaatar and Marshal Choibalsan, for example, on the tomb of Lenin in Moscow. In designing the Ulaanbaatar Hotel (1961), Chimed moved in a more modernist direction while also adding touches of Mongolian 'national characteristics'. Despite the imitative character of the architecture, the centre of the new Ulaanbaatar kept a certain charm and architectural unity marked by, for example, the widespread green roofs. This charm has, however, been marred by the generally poor upkeep of the buildings and the subsequent addition after 1990 of several multi-storey steel and glass constructions.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, Mongolia witnessed a construction boom both on the outskirts of Ulaanbaatar and in the surrounding cities. Construction had to be rapid to keep up with the rapid pace of population growth, urbanization, and industrialization and most of the buildings fit the stereotype of Soviet concrete public housing projects with shoddy construction and an alienating gigantism. Few if any presented any distinctive Mongolian characteristics, nor did they mix harmoniously with the previous neo-classical style in the Ulaanbaatar centre.⁷⁴

The contemporary art scene

The increased openness of the late 1980s and the peaceful 1990 democratic revolution removed the ideological controls on art in Mongolia. The Green Horse Modern Art Society was formed to promote abstract and avant-garde trends in art, and its members eventually

⁷⁴ Shchepetil'nikov, 1960; Tsultem, 1988.



FIG. 38. Ulaanbaatar. The Opera and Ballet Theatre on Sükhbaatar Square. Designed by Gerhard Kozel. The Opera and Ballet Theatre was unveiled in 1949. (Source: Tsend et al. (eds.), 1974, p. 56.)

created their own Art Institute. The Union of Mongolian Artists remains, however, the major professional organization.⁷⁵ At the same time, the economic crisis eliminated state funding for the arts and put virtually all large construction plans on hold until the late 1990s.

Mongolian painting has a relatively high profile both in Mongolia and abroad – it has established a significant reputation in Japan, Europe and North America, where many Mongolian artists have exhibited. Artistic trends are very diverse. Religious and erotic themes that were previously prohibited are now given free expression. Despite the new importance of purely abstract art, Mongolian painting remains predominantly representational and traditional themes based on the national past, the countryside and pastoralism are still important. The definition of the traditional past has, however, been expanded to include shamanism, religious rituals, the great conqueror Chinggis Khan and other previously taboo subjects. The religious revival has meant that Buddhist iconographic art is again in great demand for temples, private devotions and connoisseurs. Ironically, however, the secular *Mongol zurag* style has been somewhat overshadowed both by the new vitality

⁷⁵ Union of Mongolian Artists, 2002–4.

in European-style oil and canvas painting and the return to purely religious art. In 2002, 14 *Mongol zurag* artists established an organization called Mongol Zurag to promote their style. New or revived media include leather art, felt art, and calligraphy in the traditional vertical and cursive Uighur-Mongolian script, which had been replaced by a new Cyrillic alphabet between 1945 and 1950. Overall, the Mongolian artistic scene is remarkably lively for a nation of only 2.5 million people set in the heart of Asia.

27

THE ARTS IN WESTERN AND SOUTHERN CENTRAL ASIA

W. Floor, C. Adle and S. P. Verma

Contents

IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN	736
INDIA AND PAKISTAN	771

Part One

IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN*

(W. Floor)

Iran

Painting

THE QAJAR ERA (1796–1925)

During the first half of the Qajar period, the artistic scene was mainly dominated by the painters attached to the royal court under the chief royal painter (*naqqāsh-bāshi*). The other painters, i.e. those who did not work for a patron, whether royal or not, but who worked for the market, followed their own artistic leanings. Persian painters mainly illustrated and illuminated manuscripts, in small-scale works, where detail and colour were more important than texture and shading; they also produced lacquer work, oils and frescoes. Qajar paintings were still traditional in that they focused on: narrative literary works – the depicted scenes included subjects such as romance, and epic themes (battles, royalty); sensual themes (flora and fauna), including the erotic; and religious subjects (imams, ‘*ulamā*’). However, the rendering of the subject matter showed an evolution not only in style, but also in the way that royalty and other traditional subjects were depicted. Finally, Qajar painters used a large variety of media such as walls, canvas, wood, glass, enamel, books, newspapers, pen-boxes (*qalamdāns*), water pipes, screens, tiles and so on.

After about 1850 Qajar painters split into two stylistic groups, one continuing to work in traditional ways, the other adopting a European style. This development was gradual and was inspired by the European trips made by several painters. The first such trip was by Kazem, the son of ‘Abbas Mirza’s chief painter. He left in 1811 for Britain, where he died two years later. Mohammad Shah (1834–48) sent two painters to Europe: Mirza Reza was

* See Map 6.

sent to Paris and Abu'l-Hasan Ghaffari Sani' al-Molk to Rome around 1847. Under Naser al-Din Shah (1848–96), the most important painters sent to Paris were Mirza 'Ali Akbar Khan Mozayyen al-Dowle Natanzi (on his return he became a teacher of painting at the *Dār al-Fonūn*, or Polytechnic) and Mirza 'Abd al-Motallab. The purpose of the state-financed European education of talented painters was for them to acquire the basic principles of the European painting style, with its naturalistic representation of objects and individuals. Furthermore, the aim was to create an indigenous group of Iranian painters who had mastered European art and techniques and could teach them to students who could not afford to go abroad to study.

On the orders of Naser al-Din Shah, Sani' al-Molk, on his return from Europe, founded a school called the *Maktab-e Naqqāshi-ye Majjāni* (School of Free Painting) in 1861: here, pupils were taught in formal classes rather than according to the traditional apprenticeship system of on-the-job training. Sani' al-Molk also started an atelier and a public art exhibition. The school was later absorbed by the *Dār al-Fonūn*, where painting and drawing were formal subjects for the students. As a result, Iranian artists began depicting the real world and day-to-day life rather than traditional subjects such as hunting and battle scenes, dancing girls, birds and flowers. The result was a series of naturalistic landscapes, urban scenes, portraits of princes and courtiers, and everyday people. Thus a style of painting emerged that combined Eastern and Western influences.

It is true that in early Qajar times even before 1850, several painters (especially on *qalamdāns*) had followed European models, but the style was still traditionally Persian. The subsequent formal training of painters in European techniques in Persia itself, the growing popularity of photograph-like illustrations in the printed media and the spread of photography all led to a new style of painting. E'temad al-Saltaneh, for example, observed:

As of the time of the invention of photography, portrait painting, likeness painting (*shabīh-keshi*), landscape painting (*dūrnamā-sazi*) as well as paying attention to light and shade and the application of perspective (*qānūn-e tanassob*) was being applied.¹

Sani' al-Molk's work nevertheless reveals the influence of miniature painting and Iran's artistic heritage, although he was well versed in European painting techniques. His contemporary, Mahmud Khan Saba, poet laureate and court painter, on the other hand, was one of the artists who struck an artistic balance between contemporary European trends and the heritage of Persian painting. His water-colours are a photographic-like series of depictions of royal palaces, gardens and rooftop views of Tehran and its people in the Qajar era. Portrait painting, which became quite popular, relied on photographs mainly to reduce the sitting time for the patron:

¹ E'temad al-Saltaneh, [1306/1884](#), pp. 125–6.

Naser al-Din Shah paints himself and keeps a *naqqāsh-bāshi* in his service who often paints his portrait. He does not spend too much time sitting for his portrait; when the moustache has been finished he is done, and leaves it to the artist to complete the face. The bust which he likes is copied from Nicholas I.²

The shah's face was probably completed using a recent photograph. The photograph-like stance of the painted figures in the second half of the nineteenth century is striking when one compares portrait paintings with portrait photographs.³ Photography, which had been described in 1844 as a kind of painting combined with techniques learned in and borrowed from Europe (perspective, shades of light, especially chiaroscuro, colouring), led to a style that has been dubbed the photographic style. Some of the painters of that style were also photographers. (See more on photography below.)

The introduction and popularity of book printing, which became widespread at the same time as the introduction of photography in Iran, dealt a further blow to painters and related craftsmen who worked in the traditional style: it was much cheaper to print a book (even lithographs) than to have it copied, illuminated and decorated with miniatures. This victorious march of the printing press is clear from the decreasing number of manuscripts produced; it completed the process (started in the eighteenth century) of the gradual disappearance of manuscripts with good miniatures, of which very few were made in Qajar Persia, even before the growing popularity of lithography. Although miniature painting continued it was at a lower level, sometimes restricted to *qalamdāns* and reproductions of seventeenth-century-style manuscripts. Traditional folk painting such as found on the walls of coffee-houses or religious sanctuaries and other buildings also continued. Traveling dervishes might also have paintings showing the epic glories of the martyrdom of the Shi'ite imams and heroic scenes from Iran's epic past. Technically speaking, these pictures are simple. The colour schemes and compositions derive from the domain of miniature painting and follow the figural conventions of Qajar art. New fields of artistic expression were lithography, printed books and (from the beginning of the twentieth century) caricatures (see below).

The artist who would come to dominate Iranian painting and sculpture was Mohammad Ghaffari *Naqqāsh-bāshi* (Kamal al-Molk), a nephew of Sani' al-Molk. He had received his training at home and the *Dār al-Fonūn*, and from 1898 to 1901 he studied in Europe, where he copied old masters and was exposed to the European artistic community. Although Iranian realist painting had begun before the time of Kamal al-Molk, it was he who came to epitomize this style and who set the tone for the next 40 years. Because the *Dār al-Fonūn*

² Polak, 1865, Vol. 1, p. 291.

³ For the latter see Afshar, 1371/1992; Adle and Zoka, 1983, pp. 249–80, provide evidence that photographs were used for portrait paintings.

was not a real art academy, for students also had to take non-art related subjects, in 1912, at the suggestion of Kamal al-Molk, a *Madreseh-ye Sanāye‘-e Mostazrefeh va Madreseh-ye Naqqāshi* (School of Fine Arts and Painting) was founded, with Kamal al-Molk as director. Pupils at the Kamal al-Molk school – and other painters who held similar ideas – made a large number of landscapes, portraits, still lives and copies of European works.

The school’s goal was to find new talented students and educate them in the best possible way. Kamal al-Molk did not confine the curriculum to painting. He introduced other arts and crafts such as sculpture, carpet weaving, mosaic design and woodwork to his school in order to revive the dying fine arts. In a relatively short time, Kamal al-Molk trained a number of competent students who would later become famous artists. Their achievements attracted much attention, both in Iran and Europe.⁴ Esma‘il Ashtiyani (1893–1971) was a pupil and friend of Kamal al-Molk and painted in his style. After Kamal al-Molk, he was the most important representative of the Iranian photographic-style school.

THE FIRST PHASE OF MODERN ART (EARLY 1920S TO 1940S/1950S)

Despite the improved communications with Europe, there was little communication between the two art worlds. When the photographic style came into vogue in Iran, impressionism was already starting to be replaced by other forms of modern art. When Kamal al-Molk’s school started to train its students and they in turn passed on their know-how to the next generation, cubism and other related trends were already passé in Europe. Kamal al-Molk’s school dominated the Iranian art scene until the end of the Second World War, although its influence is still felt today. Although Kamal al-Molk painted his last work in 1928, his principal students continued in the realistic style and were among the leaders of the traditional school until the end of the 1960s. The realist school of painting may be characterized by its craftsmanship, as is clear from the draughtsmanship, use of perspective, clear contours and natural proportions. The school also influenced the coffee-house school of painting, which produced scenes illustrating Iran’s mythical past and its religious heritage, in particular the martyrdom of the Imams.

THE SECOND PHASE OF MODERN ART (1940S/1950S TO 1970S)

The birth of the second phase of modern art in Iran goes back to the start of the 1940s, when the foundation of the first Institute of Art in Tehran marked the beginning of a serious and systematic approach to the new discoveries of Western art. The institute was part of Tehran

⁴ Among them were Hoseyn ‘Ali Khan Vaziri, Esma‘il Ashtiyani, ‘Ali Mohammad Heydariyan, Mahmud Oliya’, Ne‘matollah Moshiri, ‘Ali Akbar Yasami and Mohsen Soheyli.



FIG. 1. Hoseyn Kazemi: *Composition*, 1976 (mixed media on canvas, 116 × 80 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

University, founded in 1934 to serve, among other things, as a centre for the propagation of modern arts and sciences and as a link to world civilization. In 1940 Esma'il Mer'at, the Iranian minister of education, who had spent some years in Paris, ordered the French architect André Godard – then the director of the Iranian Archaeology Services – to set up an art school modelled after the *Ecole Supérieure des Beaux-Arts* in Paris, which became the cradle of modern art and painting in Iran. The next 20 years was a period during which young artists 'tested out' the various modern and changing expressions of Western art in search of new methods and their own style and character. Consequently, much of their output reflects that exploration and bears the imprint of the different Western artistic styles. In fact, Hoseyn Kazemi, one of the pioneers of modern art in Iran, was exposed to impressionism as a modern art form at the Faculty of Modern Arts (Fig. 1). The modernists had to fight on two fronts: against the influence of the miniaturists and followers of Kamal al-Molk, and against the prejudices of the general public, which had yet to be won over.

By that time the change in Iran had already started and the clash with the photographic school was a fact. Young artists such as Hushang Pezeshkniya (1917–72), Sohrab Sepehri (1928–80), Hoseyn Kazemi (1924–93) and Mahmud Javadipur (b. 1920), to mention some of the most important names, introduced new ways of communicating in painting (Fig. 2).



FIG. 2. Hushang Pezeshkniya: *Flute Player*, 1968 (watercolour on paper, 70 × 50 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

At that time, modern artists formed a small group of avant-garde thinkers and doers that included not only painters, but also poets and prose writers. The ‘dehumanization’ of their subjects gave rise to strong opposition. The modernists argued that their paintings reflected reality as it is. The lack of venues to exhibit and publicly discuss their new art was sorely felt. The first exhibitions of modern painting in Iran took place in 1945 and 1946 and were staged in cultural institutions attached to foreign embassies, since modern artists were not yet recognized as such by the Iranian Government. The first exhibition ever held was at the Soviet embassy’s Voks House, with paintings by Mashayekhi, Ameri, Javadipur and some better-known Persian painters. Mashayekhi and Javadipur later opened a gallery, which lasted for a mere six months and ended with unpaid bills for the rent.⁵

In 1948 a number of university-educated painters – among them Mahmud Javadipur (Fig. 3), Jalil Ziyapur (Fig. 4) and Javad Hamidi – launched a modernart movement called the Fighting Cock Society (*Khorūs-e Jangi*), which published the art and literature magazine *Rooster’s Claw* (*Panjeh-ye Khorūs*), edited by Bahman Mohasses. This opened up better opportunities for artists to show and discuss their work. Some of the painters were also modernist poets in their own right. Hoseyn Kazemi, for example, who painted the

⁵ Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac* 1974, p. 483.



FIG. 3. Mahmud Javadipur: *A Woman*, 1948 (oil on canvas, 56 × 73.5 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

well-known portrait of Sadeq Hedayat (Iran's most famous twentieth-century author) and also worked as an illustrator, published several collections of poems during his lifetime. He also worked as a potter and founded the art and literature magazine *Sarv* (Cypress) in Tabriz in 1961. Together with Mahmud Javadipur and Hushang Ajudani, Hoseyn Kazemi founded the Apadana Art Gallery in October 1949, which became an artists' centre. The first exhibition at the Apadana in 1949 aroused strong emotions and upset the traditionalists; there was even an attack on the paintings.

The early 1950s were characterized by quasi-cubist and prismatic depictions, while the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a move towards avant-garde experimentation such as free-form abstracts and a dynamic interpretation of impressionism, cubism, expressionism, surrealism, abstractionism, pop art and conceptual art, while at the same time not entirely abandoning the traditional heritage. Hushang Pezeshkniya and Ziyapur are believed to have introduced cubism into Iran. The former was a very good portraitist and an excellent draughtsman. The painter and poet Sohrab Sepehri had a 'tree-trunk' period and experimented with several styles including abstract (Fig. 5). In the main, however, Iranian modern art remained more figurative, more occupied with pattern, more interested in brilliant colouring than contemporary Western painting.



FIG. 4. Jalil Ziyapur: *Hope*, 1989 (oil on canvas, 100 × 135 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)



FIG. 5. Sohrab Sepehri: *Stones*, 1977 (oil on canvas, 200 × 200 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

Marcos Grigorian, who had studied art in Rome, had on his return to Tehran in 1954, where he also taught at the School of Fine Arts (*Honarestān-e Honarhā-ye Zibā*), opened a commercial art gallery, the Gallerie Esthétique (1954–9). He organized the first Tehran



FIG. 6. Marcos Grigorian: untitled (pisé on canvas, 165 × 200 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

Biennale (1958) in collaboration with the Department of Fine Arts (Fig. 6). Until that time, the government had not shown much interest in modern art. In 1950 a Fine Arts Department had been created to encourage artists in various fields (painting, theatre, film). The department was part of the Ministry of Education until 1961, when it was transferred to the prime minister's office. In 1964 the Ministry of Art and Culture was created and it took over all the functions of the Fine Arts Department. From that time, the government continued to support modern art and played a crucial role in the organization of subsequent Biennales. The Tehran Biennale awarded cash prizes and medals. The jury consisted mainly of foreign art specialists. At that time, the government also held exhibitions of the work of students from the art schools (*honarestāns*). The one for girls was founded in 1954.

The fight between modernists and traditionalists that had begun in the 1940s continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Fig. 7).⁶ It was perhaps partly also a financial problem

⁶ Among the traditionalists were Abu'l-Hasan Sadeqi, Hasan-Ali Vaziri, Esma'il Ashtiyani, Rassam Arjangi, Mehdi Vishka'i, Mostafa Najmi, Samimi, Ms Shaghaghi, etc. The most outspoken modernists were Mohsen Vaziri Moqaddam, Hoseyn Zendebrudi, Hoseyn Kazemi, Jalil Khayyampur, Marcos Grigorian, Ms Shokuh Riyazi, Sohrab Sepehri, Abu'l-Qasem Sa'idi, Bijan Saffari, Sirak Melconian, Jazeh Tabataba'i, Naser Oveysi and Parviz Tanavoli.



FIG. 7. Mohsen Vaziri-Moghaddam: untitled, 1966 (oil on canvas, 82 × 131 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

because the traditionalists complained that the Fine Arts Administration favoured the modernists. The traditionalists considered modernism a deviation from ‘real art’. The famous miniaturist Hoseyn Behzad stated:

The modern and cubist painters of Iran have, due to lack of skill, taken to the painting of abstract objects and the drawing of meaningless lines on paper. Another reason may be that they are not capable of producing worthwhile works. Fortunately, the people of Iran are not deceived by the unusual and strange nature of their work, as is clear from the fact that these painters have not been able to sell any paintings so far in Iran. Art speaks for itself. Art which does not convey the feelings of the artists and the meaning implied in it, is not art. The painting called the *Gate of Auschwitz* is nothing but a fruitless effort by the painter, who does not even bring to memory the macabre, infamous and abominable murders which took place in that concentration camp ...⁷

Another weekly journal, *Sepid va Siyāh*, wrote about the Third Biennale (1962) that it was a step backwards compared with the first two:

Some painters, by drawing crooked lines and producing bad imitations of Iranian miniatures, tried to give a national colour to their work. Likewise, in order to give an Iranian touch, one of the sculptors has joined together a ewer, a bowl and a basin and has named it *Shirin, the Beautiful Woman of Iran*.⁸ It is surprising that interesting works by artists like Mansur Qandriz, Cyrus Malek, Morteza Momayez and Behruz Golzari were not selected for the Venice Biennale.⁹

⁷ *Rowshanfekr*, 23 Aug. 1962.

⁸ Referring to the 36-m-high painting by Marcos Grigorian exhibited in 1962.

⁹ *Echo of Iran*, *Iran Almanac 1963*, p. 490.

At the Fourth Biennale (1964), 225 painters and sculptors submitted 500 works, of which 125 were selected for exhibition. Most were modern and abstract. Of the six judges, four were foreign. The Fine Arts Department noted a trend towards abstraction and commented on this biennale that 'Our art is generally losing touch with reality, divorcing itself from any resemblance with the physical world surrounding us.' The large increase in young artists and beginners was also noted.¹⁰

Although the number of modernists increased rapidly, so also did the criticism which held that few artists had any really new ideas. Others maintained that 'Iranian painters, by adopting the Western style, have deprived our country of our national art.'¹¹ Despite the growing unease about the nature of modern painting in the mid-1960s, many exhibitions of modern art were held. The most talked-about was a 'Street Exhibit' (*Nemāyeshgāh-e Khyābāni*), when 56 artists put 180 works on show in the street south of Farah Park (now Laleh Park). Ms Seyhun with Saba Gallery sponsored the exhibition, which was seen by thousands of people. Many other exhibitions were held, especially in the autumn, at foreign cultural societies, hotels and government buildings. One (in October 1968) was of works by 37 painters of the Kamal al-Molk Arts School, all in the classical style. What was also new was that a number of commercial art galleries had opened such as the Borghese, Modern Art, Saba and Iran galleries. In 1969 the Seyhun Gallery (opened in February 1967) and the Negar Gallery held several exhibitions of contemporary Iranian art.¹²

National TV held an exhibition of work by male art students in November 1969; there was also an exhibition of work by female students. By 1970 there were two art schools in Tehran, one for boys, the other for girls; both Tabriz and Isfahan also had an art school. There was a five-year course in art and handicrafts and a three-year course in painting, calligraphy and music. Since 1961, there had also been a School of Decorative Arts (*Madrāseh-ye Honarhā-ye Taz'ini*) where those graduates of art schools who had not been admitted to university could continue their studies and obtain a degree. All universities had a Faculty of Fine Arts, and there were also private art schools.¹³

To give an outlet to some 50 professional modernist painters and several hundred art students, the Ministry of Arts and Culture supported the modern art world in various ways. Most notable had been its initiative in starting the Tehran Biennale, the last of which was

¹⁰ Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1964*, pp. 621–2.

¹¹ Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1969*, p. 601.

¹² They showed works by Mohasses, Zendebrudi, Tanavoli, Seyhun, Arabshahi, Gholam-Hoseyn Nami, Changiz and Rabin Shahvaq, M. Katuziyan and L. Matin-Daftari.

¹³ In March 1970 Iran had 50 institutes teaching painting. These had 2,809 students, of whom 310 graduated in 1970. According to the 1966 census, there were 5,804 painters in Iran (5,075 men and 729 women): see Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1971*, pp. 619–20.

held in 1966. For by 1970, gone were the days that artists had to go to great lengths to get their works exhibited. By then there were several art galleries catering for a relatively small group of interested people (the majority of the country had no interest in these new art fads). The ministry also provided scholarships for aspiring artists to study abroad as well as financing the participation of Iranian artists in international exhibitions.

During the late 1960s and 1970s there was a strong artistic output in a range of non-representational art forms. However, there was also a backlash against modern forms of art, resulting in a renewed interest in coffee-house paintings,¹⁴ which suddenly became very popular. Grigorian had exhibited them at his gallery and had encouraged his students to take an interest in them. The most prominent artists working in this style, which flourished in the early twentieth century, were Hoseyn Agha Qollar Aghasi, 'Abbas Bolukifar and Mohammad Agha Modabber (the most famous of whom was Qollar Aqasi). When Empress Farah bought many of their paintings, everyone else followed. But it was not just a fad, for many modern artists took their inspiration from coffee-house paintings.

The other development was the beginning of a kind of neo-naturalist school that eschewed modernism and sought to find its inspiration in the Iranian past and its roots. The work of Hoseyn Zendebrudi (b. 1937) exhibited at the Tehran Biennale drew much praise and led to this art trend being called the '*saqqā-khāneh* school' by the art critic Karim Emami. He gave it this name because the water fountain, or *saqqā-khāneh*, is traditionally 'a piece of religious folk art with a decorative façade and an almost metaphysical presence'. Zendebrudi combined modern Western and Iranian techniques and materials with traditional Shi'ite ritualistic and folkloric themes and thus appealed to a large segment of society (Fig. 8). Many other artists¹⁵ followed the same path, because it offered the road to modernity without having to copy or ape the West or become like the West. It seemed as if a typical Iranian formula had been found. These artists attempted to use traditional calligraphic, illustrative and visual elements in their work. Other artists were inspired, with greater intensity and independence, by the elements of Persian visual arts of the remote and recent past, and produced works that were clearly distinguishable from other forms of Western modern art. These neo-traditionalists (or the *saqqā-khāneh* school) were to dominate the next Tehran Biennale.

This was all part of a growing anxiety, among both intellectuals and the general population, about the growing Westernization in all aspects of life. It was at that time that Jalal Al-e Ahmad wrote his *Gharbzadegi* (Westernmania). Fifteen years earlier he had already participated in the discussions held by the Apadana and Fighting Cock groups about the

¹⁴ See *Religious Inspiration in Iranian Art*, 1978; *Les peintures populaires de la légende persane*, 1979.

¹⁵ Artists such as Mansur Qandriz, Faramarz Pilaram, Sadeq Tabrizi, Naser Oveysi and Mas'ud 'Arabshahi.



FIG. 8. Hoseyn Zendeherudi: untitled, 1976 (acrylic, 130 × 162 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

meaning of modern art. By the mid-1960s Ahmad's position was clear with regard to modern art. In one of his novels (*The American Husband*), the Iranian wife says of her American husband:

First he invited me to an exhibition of paintings at the new 'Abbasabad Club – one of those exhibits where they draw figures without a head, or put heaps and heaps of paint in the middle of two yards of fabric.¹⁶

Many were pleased at this development as they felt that contemporary Iranian art continued to be influenced by Western artists: it was either inspired by them or was an imitation of their work. With the advent of the so-called *saqqā-khāneh* school, there was finally a domestic artistic innovation which paid attention to Iranian traditions. The modern art critics felt that rather than art for art's sake, art for the people should be pursued. Many people had been greatly upset by the exhibition of contemporary paintings in April 1971. They also discussed it with Empress Farah, whose paintings had been exhibited, despite the fact that traditional paintings had also been shown at the exhibition. As a result, observers noted that

¹⁶ Javadi, 1988, p. 244.

there was a waning interest in modern art; many galleries closed, although Tehran still had around 13 galleries in 1973 and a new one was being opened. The newspaper *Āyandegān* commented in February 1973: 'Our painting has become alien to the general public.'¹⁷ Karim Emami wrote in *Keyhan International* on 9 June 1973 that Iranian painters were still in search of their own identity:

The artists have merely lost much of their own cultural heritage in the process, without finding any viable alternative. A healthy assessment of Western traditions and a deep intellectual reaction to foreign products are lacking. It is all the more difficult since Western civilization itself is undergoing serious turbulence, redefinition of terms and throwing out ever newer conceptions of art. The entire unholy mess is too often copied and uncritically accepted by those who have lost their own traditions.¹⁸

In 1974 Tehran's First International Arts Exhibition was organized, with France displaying 160 paintings by French and Iranian painters. It was decided that it would be held every two years.¹⁹ This and other events show that, despite criticism, modern art was here to stay, but so was the neo-traditionalist school of painting. During the remainder of the decade there were no new developments apart from the establishment of the Museum of Contemporary Art (*Muzeh-ye Honarhā-ye Mo'āser*) in 1977.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD

After the Islamic revolution in 1979, art inspired by popular traditions and religion, that is Shi'ism, gained even more in popularity. This found its expression in all forms of visual arts. Whereas religion had always been present in the works of the *saqqā-khāneh* artists, Shi'ite themes now became the message in the works of many artists. However, this new trend did not displace the older schools. Modern abstract, cubist painting as well as naturalist, realist and neo-traditional painting was still thriving in the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter Iran). During the 1980s, with the ongoing eight-year war against Iraq, Shi'ite-patriotic themes overwhelmingly dominated Iranian art. Supported by the state and dominated by popular religious pro-government organizations, they targeted the whole Iranian people to mobilize it in the 'imposed war' (as it was called in Iran) against the Iraqi army which had invaded in 1980. Posters and wall paintings, printed in millions or painted on

¹⁷ Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac* 1973, p. 457.

¹⁸ Ibid., *Iran Almanac* 1974, p. 483.

¹⁹ Ibid., *Iran Almanac* 1975, p. 469.

walls all over Iran, played a crucial role in the mass mobilization of Iranians, especially in the first years of the war, which ended in 1988.²⁰

Current government policy continues to support Iranian artists, including their participation in international venues. Iran sent the work of three modern painters to the 2003 Biennale in Venice: the sculpture by Behruz Darash (painter, sculptor and musician) was composed of hundreds of minimalist aluminium elements suspended in an allegorical conflict between fantasy and reality; Hoseyn Khosrowjerdi (painter, designer and cartoonist) showed a combination of digital art and performance art; and the work by Ahmad Nadaliyan consisted of sculpted fish like ancient fossils in a river-bed. All of the above shows that Iranian artists have found their own multifaceted voice.

SCULPTURE

Kamal al-Molk was also an accomplished sculptor, as his statues of the great poets Amir Kabir and Ferdowsi show. Kamal al-Molk also influenced modern sculpture through his pupil Abol-Hasan Sediqi, who introduced the Western classical style into Iran, just as his master had done for painting. Modern Iranian sculpture was much influenced by Europe. By 1960 the most notable contemporary sculptors were Sediqi, Haji Nuri and Arjangi (d. 1963). Also influential was Sayyed 'Ali Akbar San'ati (b. 1918), another pupil of the Kamal al-Molk school. He created more than 1,000 paintings and 400 statues. After the exhibition of contemporary paintings in April 1971, several statues were ordered, mainly traditional in style. On the other hand, modern sculpture was better received, both modern pieces and copies of pre-Islamic models.

The work of Parviz Tanavoli (b. 1937) (Fig. 9) and Jazeh Tabataba'i (b. 1930) also took its inspiration from Iranian folk art and the pre-Islamic past. Tabataba'i was the founder of the Modern Art Gallery (Fig. 10). Tanavoli and Zendebrudi had worked together and were artistic fellow-travellers; the former considered his atelier Kabud to be the cradle of the *saqqā-khāneh* movement. Both sculptors (who are also painters) welded scrap materials into sometimes robot-like and sometimes abstract agglomerated figures. One of Tanavoli's best-known sculptures is a 3-D calligraphic representation of the word '*Hitch*', which means 'Nothing', i.e. emptiness, non-existence and beyond 'illusion'. There are clear references to the ideas of Omar Khayyam, as well as to some modern Western writers, in this sculpture. It also pays tribute to the great Persian calligraphic tradition.

²⁰ *A Decade with Graphists of the Islamic Revolution, 1979–1989*, 1989; *A Decade with Painters of the Islamic Revolution, 1979–1989*, 1989; *A Selection of Works Exhibited at the First Biennale of Iranian Painters*, 1991.



FIG. 9. Parviz Tanavoli: *Farhad Has Fallen*, 1968 (ceramic, 40 × 101 × 42 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

MINIATURE PAINTING

Even though Iranian painting was influenced by the Kamal al-Molk school, the contemporary art of miniature moved in another direction. Promoted by the *Madrasedh-ye 'Āli Honarhā-ye Irāni* (Academy of Iranian Arts), miniaturists first found a route back to the Timurid Herat and later to the Safavid style. They also took their inspiration from the painters who signed their works '*Sāheb-e Zamān*' ('Master of the Time') and their followers in the Indo-Persian style. Although the modern miniaturists use innovative techniques and add new elements such as light and shadow, the pictures are somewhat similar to those of Reza 'Abbasi's period (beginning of the seventeenth century: see Volume V of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Chapter 19). The themes are once again the nobles, palaces, polo and banquet scenes, etc.

Among the great masters of the neo-Herat/neo-Safavid school were Hoseyn Taherzadeh Behzad (1894–1968), Hadi Tajvidi (1891–1938), 'Ali Moti' and Mohammad Mossaver al-Molk. The younger generation is represented by the works of 'Ali Karimi and Mahmud Farshchiyan. All these painters use new methods of composition and perspective. Hoseyn Behzad, after his return from France where he went in 1935, invented a new style by combining modern European art with traditional Iranian painting and using sketch and colour as the primary elements of his painting. Contrary to the traditional miniatures, Behzad



FIG. 10. Jazeh Tabataba'i: untitled, 1973 (oil and collage, 73 × 113 cm). (Photo: © Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art.)

used colour sparingly. A number of works with only a single figure and in one colour are representative of his unique style.

Like Behzad and other miniaturists, 'Ali Karimi (1913–97) experimented first with the traditional miniatures of the Herat, Safavid as well as the Qajar eras. Karimi was one of the most famous contemporary masters of miniature painting in Iran. He started his art education at the age of 12, graduated at 22 and went on to become professor at and later director of the Academy of Iranian Arts. Karimi turned to a new direction in his mature artistic period: the daily lives of ordinary people, as well as his own fantasies, now constituted the main themes of his painting. Without departing from the classical style of the miniature, the artist developed a new genre of contemporary painting. Karimi produced more than 500 works, both traditional and modern miniatures.²¹ While, even after his death, Behzad remains the leading figure of this school, it is presently Mahmud Farshchiyan who is better known among the general public.

²¹ <http://home.t-online.de/home/f.a.karimi/history.htm>.

Caricatures, cartoons and posters

Caricatures and cartoons had become an integral part of the Iranian media since about 1906. Initially, they were rather roughly drawn and inspired by Western models. A new Iranian style came into being in the 1960s and is now well developed due to the ground-breaking work of artists such as Ardashir Mohasses, Deram-Dakhsh and Davalu. As stated in the previous paragraphs, with the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in 1979 both cartoons and posters, which had been mostly comic or commercial in nature, acquired a political, religious and satirical dimension, while at the same time wanting to be considered as works of art in the case of posters.

THEATRE

Traditional Persian drama was expressed in various forms of comic satire (*tamāshā*) and mime (*taqlid*), as well as by narrative drama (*naqqāli*). In addition, there was religious drama (*ta'ziyeh-khāni*). The first Western-style forms of drama were only performed as of 1886, when Naser al-Din Shah ordered the construction of the *Takiyeh-ye Dowlat* (Royal Theatre) for the performance of religious drama. The first performance there was a Western play, however. For a time, modern plays became a fad among the elite. None of these performances were really public ones, however. Apart from the high cost of the tickets, which excluded most people, the performances were aimed at a limited target group: this included officials at the royal court and other members of the Persian elite, as well as leading members of the European and Armenian communities.

Because this European form of theatre was new to Iran, there were as yet no plays written by Persian authors. Stage directors, therefore, had to use foreign plays as a vehicle for the introduction and dissemination of this type of dramatic art. Plays by Molière were the first to be translated, or rather to be adapted to a Persian audience. At least three plays by Molière were translated, including *Le Misanthrope* (*Gozāresh-e Mardomgoriz*), which was published in Istanbul in 1286/1869–70. Other early translations were *Le Médecin malgré lui* (*Tabib-e Ejbāri*) and *L'Etourdi* (*Gij*).

Of greater importance for the development of Persian drama were the works of Mirza Fath 'Ali Akhundzadeh, who between 1850 and 1856 wrote six comedies in Azeri Turkish (the language of Azerbaijan). The plays of Akhundzadeh were translated into Persian by Mirza Ja'far Qarajehdaghi, who in his preface stressed their educational intent. The translations appeared first in Tehran in 1864, but the lithographed edition was almost as rare as the original manuscript, while it was also badly printed and thus difficult to read and full of mistakes. Given the fact that the play contained strong criticism of the system of

government prevailing in Iran, it is understandable that it was not staged. Moreover, the shah had now lost interest in Western theatre, so no more plays were performed in Tehran after 1890 or thereabouts.

TOWARDS A MODERN THEATRE

A new boost to modern theatre was given by the advent of the constitutional revolution in 1905–11. In its wake, many plays were published and performed by newly created theatrical troupes. The first play performed in Tehran after the constitutional revolution was in Zahir al-Dowle's hall (*tālār-khāneh*), behind the *Anjoman-e Okhuvat* building in November 1907. The revolution not only led to a wave of publications, but also to the performance of plays in the large towns, in particular in Tehran.²² The relatively lively theatrical scene in Tehran and elsewhere prompted a number of writers to translate Europeans plays to be staged by the various troupes, but they also wrote their own original Persian plays. Ahmad Mahmudi Kamal al-Vezareh (1875–1930) wrote a number of plays, including *Master Nowruz, the Cobbler* (*Ostād Nowrūz-e Pinehdūz*). Written in 1919, this play was clearly modelled after *baqqāl-bāzi*. It was also the first drama to use the argot of south Tehran. In his *Haj Riya'i Khan*, al-Vezareh created a Persian Tartuffe. Under the pseudonym 'Ali Nowruz, Hasan Moqaddam (1898–1925) published *Ja'far Khan Has Returned from Europe* (*Ja'far Khān az Farang Āmadeh*). This successful comedy pokes fun at those Europeanized Iranians who put on European airs and speak Persian with French words to project an image of modernity. Performances also took place in other Iranian towns such as Tabriz, Rasht, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Mashhad and Qazvin.

The relative freedom that people had enjoyed after the constitutional revolution came to an end with the establishment of the Pahlavi regime in 1925. The new ruler, Reza Shah (1925–41), did not tolerate dissent; he only wanted support for his drive towards the modernization of the country. This meant that he wanted to portray Iran as a modernizing state to the outside world. Satire was only tolerated if it was aimed at the backward Qajar dynasty. Because all plays had to be cleared by the censors, drama found an outlet in the writing and performance of patriotic and historical dramas eulogizing the glories of the past. Authors had to submit their scripts to the government, i.e. the Ministry of Education, Foundations and Crafts. One of the reasons for plays being censored was that there was a high turnover of censors (*momayyezs*), each with their own agenda. The published government documents of this period provide no evidence of clear detailed policy guidelines on what was permissible and what was not. The personal opinion of the censor therefore

²² Morteza Qoli Khan Fekri, Ahmad Mahmudi, 'Abdol-Rahim Khalkhali, Afrasiyab Azad, 'Ali Mohammad Khan Oveysi, Taqi Raf'at and 'Abu'l-Hasan Forughī all had plays performed during this period.

played a major role in the decision whether to allow a performance or not. Three criteria were usually applied: artistic value (*fanni*), moral value (*akhlāqi*) and appropriateness (*moqtaziyāt*).

Hasan Javadi distinguishes three types of plays during this period: historical plays, romantic musical comedies and didactic social comedies. Sadeq Hedayat and many others wrote plays based on episodes from Iranian history. For example, Hedayat wrote two plays, *Parvin, Dokhtar-e Sāsān* (Parvin, the Daughter of Sasan, 1928) and *Māzyār* (1933), both of which were nationalistic in tone and took as their theme the Arab invasion of Iran in 640. There were romantic musical comedies such as *‘Abbaseh, Amir’s Sister* (*‘Abbaseh, Khāhar-e Amir*) by Reza Kamal ‘Shahrezad’, who wrote many more of that type. And, finally, there were didactic social comedies that basically supported the new modernizing efforts (women’s emancipation, hygiene, education), while contrasting them with the backwardness of the past. Sayyed ‘Ali Nasr (d. 1961), one of the founding fathers of modern Iranian theatre, wrote many such plays, including *‘Arūsi-ye Hoseyn Āqā* (The Marriage of Hoseyn Aqa, 1939). Another playwright was Zabih Behruz (1891–1971) whose satirical comedy *Jijak ‘Ali Shāh* criticized social conditions in the country.

Despite censorship under the Pahlavi regime, Reza Shah did much for Iranian theatre. According to Sayyed ‘Ali Nasr, the founder of *Komedi-ye Irān*, the shah enjoyed the theatre. He also allowed, and even encouraged, women to visit the theatre and to perform in plays. In 1939 modern theatre received for the first time official recognition as an important section of modern Iranian culture. With the encouragement of Reza Shah, the *Honarestān-e Honarpishegi* was created to train actors and directors so that theatres and plays could be introduced with a view to educating and entertaining the public. For theatre was considered the best means to educate people about social problems, child rearing and hygiene. The creation of the *Honarestān* had long been a cherished goal of a small group of actors, directors and playwrights who felt that, in order to excel, they had to take a more professional approach to their art. Until then, the only organization to provide a formal training for aspiring actors, directors and set designers was the *Estudiyo-ye Derām-e Kermānshāhi*, established in about 1931.

From the foregoing it is clear that modern theatre was a labour of love because everybody involved, whether actor, playwright, director or stage-hand, was an amateur. Each theatrical group consisted of like-minded people, often friends, with a common interest that frequently went beyond that of theatre. Politics and theatre often went together in the early days as well as later. Each group usually had one or more ‘strong man’ who was the driving force behind the theatrical activities and who kept the group together. If he left, the group usually dissolved. These theatrical ‘forces of nature’ were often playwright,

translator, actor, director, manager, bookkeeper and stage-hand all rolled into one. The members of the group worked during the day and put on their performances at night. Sometimes their enthusiasm and cohesion were such that they stayed together for an extended period of time, which allowed them to perform in cities other than Tehran. There were not many theatres, and they were often used for other functions such as cinema. Performances often took place at schools and in private houses. The plays were mostly translated Western ones, mainly French, in particular Molière. Both translators and actors took liberties with the text. The translators would adapt the play to the contemporary Persian context, while the actors were allowed to improvise, which was in line with the tradition of Iranian comic drama.

During the Second World War, theatre in Iran thrived as never before. Reza Shah had abdicated, and his son Mohammad Reza Shah (1941–79) sat on a shaky throne. Many playwrights wrote plays and others made translations, for translated plays continued to hold an important place in the repertoire of Iranian companies. Among the new plays, a work published in 1949 stood out: *Tūp-e Lāstik* (The Rubber Ball) by Sadeq Chubak, which was a satire on Reza Shah's police state. Given the new freedoms and possibilities, Western-style dramatic art was for the first time performed by professionals instead of amateurs. 'Ali Naseriyan and 'Abbas Javanmard started producing plays with a small company called the National Art Group (*Gorūh-e Honar-e Melli*), created by Shahin Sarkissian (1912–66). Some other troupes were also established and plays were staged, before a generally appreciative public. However, there was hardly any support from the state or the municipalities and thus these efforts died a natural death. Nor were any new artistically or otherwise significant plays written during this period.

In the 1950s theatre came up against competition from the radio, which started to broadcast plays, first in Tehran and later in an ever-growing number of cities. As a result, Iranian theatre was moribund by the mid-1950s. Acting, directing and writing were still in their infancy despite decades of sometimes vibrant theatre activities. Despite the size of its population, Tehran did not have one respectable theatre. The government, which had 'run' modern theatre activities from the very beginning, nevertheless took steps to keep it alive in the mid-1950s. To ensure that drama became known among the people, as well as to improve the theatre scene for actors and theatre-goers, the government took a series of steps among which were the already mentioned broadcasting of dramatic serials on the radio. With the introduction of television in 1960, plays were also televised, which meant more work for actors and playwrights and technically broadened the scope for the dramatic arts. As of 1955–6, Tehran University started to give introductory drama classes for students with the help of some American professors, who were living in Tehran. To ensure

that actors could perform under better conditions, the ministry also built a number of theatres in Tehran and in the provincial capitals over the next 15 years.

The number of theatre playwrights grew significantly during the 1960s as the result of government incentives. There were three main trends: one based its plays on modern Persian literature, another took its inspiration from Iranian popular dramatic tradition, and the third was influenced by European avant-garde theatre.²³

Experimentation was encouraged by the government so as to enable Iranian theatre to compete with Western theatre in output and quality. However, playwrights who went too far were censored and even jailed. During the late 1960s, and continuing into the 1970s, censorship increased and playwrights became increasingly introvert. Theatre therefore focused on foreign plays, ranging from classical Greek authors like Sophocles and Euripides to Shakespeare, Goethe and Schiller. Even more important was the role of plays by modern American and European authors. Iranian playwrights either joined the worldwide avant-garde movement, or they became representatives of the realist movement, and/ or they took their inspiration from the *rū-howzi* (popular traditional comedy) tradition. Other writers, just as painters did, resisted the appeal of foreign models and sought their inspiration in Iranian dramatic tradition and Iranian popular stories. The mix of modern and traditional, symbolism and realism, foreign influence and social ills remained the main menu offered to theatre-goers until the end of the Pahlavi regime. In addition there was the less literary form of theatre, which was more popular in nature and closer to *rū-howzi*, and which continued to enjoy great popularity. Without the support of the Ministry of Arts and Culture, Radio and Television, modern theatre might have died a quiet death. However, the Shiraz Festival, the Iran Art Festival and some television programmes kept it alive.

Just when theatre in Iran seemed to be on the road to revival, the Islamic revolution took place in 1979. Initially scores of theatrical groups were formed and plays, both new and old, were staged in all major towns. However, this 'Tehran spring' did not last longer than a year and theatre (like other expressions of opinion) was suppressed. The newly established Islamic Republic of Iran did not approve of theatre, especially the kind that was imbued with Western tradition. Theatre was socially, religiously and above all politically suspect and hence was relegated to the sidelines. Many leading artists and playwrights such as Gholam Hoseyn Sa'edi and Bizhan Mofid fled the country, fearing arrest and worse because of their political convictions. With the start of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980, the

²³ The leading playwrights of the 1960s and 1970s were Gholam Hoseyn Sa'edi, 'Abbas Na'ibandiyan and Bahram Beyza'i, while the leading stage directors were Mohammad 'Ali Ja'fari of *Te'atr-e Emruz*, 'Ezzatollah Entezami, 'Ali Nasiriyani, Arbi Ovanessian, Ja'far Vali, Davud Rashidi, and 'Abbas Javanmard of *Gorūh-e Honar-e Melli*. Bahram Beyza'i and Gholam Hoseyn Sa'edi (under the pen name of Gowhar Morad) also wrote for film, while the latter also wrote sociological studies.

government imposed strict censorship. However, contrary to expectations, the regime did not ban theatre altogether. In fact, it came to understand the importance of theatre as a political propaganda tool. Apart from the performance of *ta'ziyeh* (religious drama), no plays were staged for some time.

After this initially difficult period, however, theatre returned to the stage with a vengeance. The change started after the end of the Iran–Iraq war in 1988, when the country could focus once again on living rather than on dying. In terms of content and genre, nothing much had changed, except for one thing, viz. the enormous demand and enthusiasm for theatre in the country and that there was more of it than before. The drama schools at all major universities were reopened and private drama training institutions began operating, all with large numbers of students. Most importantly, the government and its various institutions have adopted theatre as a means of politically correct expression. As in the Reza Shah period, those plays which support the objectives of the regime are supported through the organizations affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance.

As a result, the First International Congress of Islamic Dramatic Art took place in 1991, and in 1993 the First Congress on *Ta'ziyeh* was organized. This was followed by the First Congress on Children's Theatre in 1994 and the Tehran International Puppet Festival Congress in 1996. All these conferences continue to be held at regular intervals. In addition, an increasing number of theatre-related festivals are being organized. For example, the *Fajr* (Dawn) Theatre Festival is part of the larger *Fajr* Festival, which has been organized every year since 1981 to commemorate the victory of the Islamic revolution. Playwrights continue to write about the same themes as under the Pahlavi regime. Although experimentation remains an important characteristic of playwriting, there is now more recourse to traditional models such as *naqqāli* (story-telling) and *rū-howzi*. The long suppression of theatre may explain the enormous popularity it now enjoys in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

CINEMA

Iran's first cinema was established in Tehran in 1903 by Ebrahim Khan Sahhaf-Bashi: first in the back of his shop, where he sold and exhibited curiosities such as electrical or X-ray apparatus, and then in 1905 – or shortly after – in a large hall in Cheraq-Gaz (now Amir Kabir) Avenue; tea and snacks were served. Due to financial problems, Sahhaf-Bashi had to close his cinema in 1906 and he went abroad at the end of 1908 or in early 1909. In 1907 Mehdi Rusi Khan, Mohammad 'Ali Shah's (1907–9) photographer, started to show films in his workshop. He was soon followed by Aqayof, Ardashir Khan and Esma'ilof, who all started their own cinemas.²⁴ The next cinema (Jadid or Tajaddod) was opened in 1917 by

²⁴ Adle, 2001, pp. 183–7.

Ardashir Khan (Batmagriyan), who, like others, also arranged magic lantern shows. It had a seating capacity of 200, and musical accompaniments and snacks were provided. This cinema was closed in 1919. Films were then shown in hotels that charged low prices to attract customers. In 1925 another cinema was opened, with a separate hall for women. The first dedicated cinema was built by Morteza Qoli Khan Bakhtiari in 1928; it was followed by another one in 1931. Cinemas also doubled as theatres because they had been equipped with theatrical technical facilities.²⁵ In 1932 an American visitor noted, 'There are practically no places of amusement in Tehran except two moving-picture palaces. The walls of the halls are almost covered with antique wall-carpets.'²⁶ This was an indication that cinema was becoming popular and as of 1935 the number of cinemas, including those in the provinces, increased. In 1931 a British author named Reitlinger attended a silent film show, which he described as follows:

At Shiraz they were giving a film: the action took place in a Scottish baronial castle, with much old-world ribaldry about profiteers and faithless husbands on the Lido, popping of corks and chasing in and out of rooms. A *compère* described these events in Persian with the solemn sing-song of one reading the Koran. In the first row, rocking with merriment, was the lean ascetic form of the dervish who looked like Sa'adi, and with him several members of the green-turbaned fraternity, the venerable descendants of the Prophet.²⁷

In the mid-1930s, cinema audiences ranged between 2,000 and 3,000 persons a day, which sometimes led to a price war between competing cinemas. A British female visitor opined in 1934:

The cinema has made an enormous difference to the women of the towns. In some districts they sit on one side, the men on the other, but in Tehran they may sit together. The cinema gives them a new source of laughter, that fundamental need. [...] The cinema, more than anything else, is making the women discontented and from that alone will come change.²⁸

In 1935 the cinema in Mashhad was attacked as part of clerical-led anti-government demonstrations.²⁹ In 1936 there were 12 or 13 cinemas in Tehran and 3 in Isfahan (one Armenian, one Indian, one Iranian), which were also much frequented by women. Some of these cinemas were open-air affairs. In that same year, a group of European students saw 'Sunshine Susie and an excellent Charlie Chaplin, performed in the open air' in Tehran.³⁰ An import permit was required from the Ministry of Commerce for each film projector.

²⁵ For a very well-documented history of Iranian cinema, see Omid, [1377/1998](#).

²⁶ Miller, [1934](#), p. 228. According to another visitor, at that time 'The Rue Lalèzar boasts of several cinemas': Alexander, [1932](#), p. 54.

²⁷ Reitlinger, [1932](#), p. 131.

²⁸ Merrit-Hawkes, [1935](#), p. 292.

²⁹ *Ettela'at dar yek-rob'-e qarn*, 1329/1950, p. 139.

³⁰ Emanuel, [1939](#), pp. 271–2.

Occasionally foreign embassies would show cultural and/or propaganda films from their own countries, in which case they would rent the projector from one of the local cinemas, or hire the cinema itself.³¹ During the 1940s the Russian and British governments both organized film shows in urban cinemas, but Britain also organized ‘travelling cinemas all round Persia, giving 16-mm shows at every town and large village on the main roads.’³² In the 1940s the social and political climate became freer and more relaxed, and mixed seating gradually became the norm.

By the start of the 1960s, cinemas had become meeting-places for truants from school and teenage lovers, and in 1961 the government planted detectives among the audience to catch young offenders. In the 1950s and early 1960s film-going became so popular that cinemas could no longer meet the demand. As a result, long queues formed outside. In 1962 the journal *Rowshanfekr* wrote that Tehran’s population of 2 million was spending as much as 230 million rials per month on visits to the cinema, not counting film shows at embassies and cinema clubs.³³ In 1963 Tehran had 74 public cinemas, each earning between 1 and 5 million rials a month. Whereas at the end of the 1950s only some 80,000 people a day went to the cinema, by 1963 this number had risen to 400,000.³⁴ However, there were frequent arguments between cinema owners and the authorities about their profits, their fiscal breaks, and the higher share demanded by the municipalities. When the cinema owners threatened to strike, the municipalities reacted by threatening to close them down. As a result, there was no strike and the cinema owners paid more taxes.

In 1965 the annual number of cinema tickets sold in Tehran was 23 million; by 1968 it had risen to almost 36.5 million. Almost 45 per cent of the population in Tehran had been to the cinema, although those from high-income and educated groups (more than 75 per cent) were among the most regular film-goers. The number of cinemas also continued to grow, despite the increased competition from television. Nevertheless, films did well.³⁵ Most films were imported. The first talking film shown in Iran was in 1931. In 1956 a total of 298 films were imported, of which 167 were American. By 1961 this number had risen

³¹ Blücher, 1949, p. 209; Byron, 1937, p. 144 (German propaganda film in 1934).

³² For ‘cinema culture’ in Mashhad in 1943–5, see Skrine, 1962, p. 130 (Russian and British film programmes), p. 184 (British mobile film programme), p. 190 (British Council films), p. 195 (open-air cinema with British war films), p. 219 (Disney’s *Fantasia*; and a famous Indian film, *Raj Nartiki*).

³³ *Rowshanfekr*, 22 Aug. 1962.

³⁴ During that same period 94 new cinemas were built, encouraged by easy credit and tax breaks, which equalled the investment costs. Between 1954 and 1976 the number of cinemas in Tehran rose from 40 to 123, and in the provinces from 70 to 333. See: Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1968*, p. 637; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1971*, p. 635; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1973*, p. 131; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1974*, p. 131; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1976*, p. 112.

³⁵ Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1970*, p. 590; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1974*, p. 131.

to 1,020 imported foreign films, of which 506 were American, while 21 Iranian films were also shown.

IRANIAN FILM-MAKING

In 1899 Mozaffar al-Din Shah (1896–1907) bought a cinematographic camera. Mirza Ebrahim ‘Akkasbashi, the court photographer, was in charge. He shot the first extant Iranian film, which showed the Flower Festival at Ostende in August 1900. In Iran, cameras were used to film subjects such as the arrival of a train at Tehran station, the lions in the royal zoo, a group of mourners during Moharram (the Shi‘ite month of mourning) or comic pieces acted in the palace gardens.³⁶ After 1921 there were a few unimportant films; most of them were newsreels by Khan Baba Khan Mo‘tazadi, probably the first professional Iranian film-maker. The first Iranian silent feature film (*Abi va Rabi*), shown on 1 January 1931, was made by Avanas Ohaniyan (1900–61), who had trained at Moscow’s film school. Ohaniyan also ran a small film school in Tehran. The first Iranian sound movie was directed and produced by ‘Abdol-Hoseyn Sepenta (1907–69) and shot in Bombay. Its title was *The Lur Girl* and it was reportedly successful when first screened in Tehran in 1935. The first dubbed foreign film was shown in 1946; entirely shot by Esma‘il Kushan (1914–81) in Turkey, it was entitled *The Fugitive Girl*. Dubbing in Iran started in 1948.

The first Iranian film studio (Mitra Film) was established by Kushan in 1947. Its first film was *The Storm of Life* (1948), which was not a critical success.³⁷ The second studio (Pars Studio) was set up in 1952 and produced *The Prisoner* (1958), which was not unsuccessful. This was followed by Moradi Studio, and then by other studios such as Badi‘, Alborz and Mada‘en. Between 1953 and 1956 some 90 studios were started, most of which made only one film before going bankrupt. By 1973 only 27 Iranian film studios and 13 film dubbing studios remained. By 1963 some 200 Iranian feature films had been produced, among which was the first Iranian colour film, *The Whirlpool* by Pars Film, which later made the first Iranian cinemascope techno-colour movie, *The Fugitive Bride* (1958). (See [Table 1](#) for the number of Iranian films produced between 1948 and 1975.) However, many Iranian films were weak from the point of view of plot, acting or photography. Some took their cue from Egyptian and later Indian films by including a number of songs sung by leading artists. *Midnight Scream* (1961) by Samuel Khachikiyan (b. 1924) was considered the best Iranian film produced up to 1961 and it was shown in two

³⁶ See Adle, 2001, pp. 187–98.

³⁷ Omid, 1377/1998, pp. 195–9.

TABLE 1. Annual Iranian film production (1948–75)

Year	No. of films	Year	No. of films	Year	No. of films	Year	No. of films
1948	2	1955	7	1962	23	1969	60 (ca.)
1949	1	1956	13	1963	–	1970	63
1950	1	1957	12	1964	65	1971	70
1951	6	1958	13	1965	41	1972	100
1952	11	1959	21	1966	20	1973	140
1953	20	1960	25	1967	90	1974	80
1954	25	1961	33	1968	50	1975	65

Source: Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1968*, p. 638; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1970*, p. 614; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1973*, p. 132; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1974*, p. 131; Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1975*, p. 125.

first-class cinemas in Tehran.³⁸ Drama, melodrama, comedy, crime and adventure films are the principal genres of Iranian cinema.³⁹

In 1975 several production companies such as Misaqiyeh, Asr-e Tala'i and Aryana were forced to close down, due to rising production costs and competition from cheap Hong Kong (karate) and US–European movies (spaghetti westerns). The government tried to convince the remaining producers to merge, to reduce their costs and to stop making 'cheap' movies. The Iranian film industry, which employed some 5,000 actors, artists, directors, technicians, etc., had an annual turnover of only \$12 million in 1975 and had not been able to carve out a market for itself even in the Middle East.⁴⁰

In 1963 the country had about 170 actors and actresses, many of whom produced their own films. Leading film directors included Golestan, Shirazi, Khani and Saber. Film producers formed a syndicate with a view to raising the quality of Iranian feature films. This was necessary not only because many were mediocre, but also because of increased competition from dubbed foreign films. Better results were obtained from producing documentaries (Golestan), or via joint-ventures with foreign producers, as well as the rise of intellectual film-makers such as the collaboration between Farrokh Gaffary and Jalal Moqaddam, who made *The South of the Town* in 1958. The screening of the film was halted by the authorities, however. In 1966 the Iranian 'blockbuster' was *The Treasure of Qarun* (*Ganjeh-e Qārūn*). However, during this period Iranian films were generally poor imitations of US and Indian movies. They were mostly shown in the provinces and in third-rate cinemas in Tehran. By 1970 the most expensive Iranian film had cost 10 million rials and the cheapest about 4 million; both were a success and made a profit.⁴¹

³⁸ Omid, 1377/1998, pp. 195–9.

³⁹ Naficy, 1981, p. 345.

⁴⁰ Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1976*, pp. 113–14.

⁴¹ Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1970*, p. 615.

About this time, however, there was a marked change in the quality of films. In 1969 *The Cow* (*Gāv*) by Daryush Mehrju'i, *Mrs Ahu's Husband* (*Shohar-e Ahū Khānom*) by Davud Mollapur and the controversial films *The Idiot* (*Hālū*) by 'Ali Nasiriyān and *Qeysar* by Mas'ud Kimiya'i were considered a turning-point in neo-realist Iranian cinema. In 1971 the first annual film festival (*Sepās*) was held in Tehran. Iranian films started to win prizes at international film festivals.

Iranian film-making suffered not only from technical deficiencies but also from a lack of funding. Because cinema owners imported cheap copies of popular foreign films, it was suggested that they should be taxed heavily and the funds could then be used to subsidize the making of Iranian films. The Iranian film-going public preferred spectacular coloured films with little dialogue and lots of action, and that is what they got. Cartoons were very popular, but seldom shown because they interfered with the time allocated for each screening.

The first Iranian cartoon film was made in 1963 by Ja'far Tejaratchi. Others followed, helped by the fact that the Fine Arts Administration, which made many documentary films, had a special cartoon film studio and supported their production. It also employed Nosratollah Karimi, who had been trained in the art of animation in Czechoslovakia. The government also supported the participation of Iranian films in international festivals, where initially they did not have much success with the exception of documentaries such as those by Golestan. Iran itself also organized an International Festival of Educational Films in 1963 and in 1964 hosted the Asian Documentary Film Festival.

After the 1979 Islamic revolution, film production dropped significantly, with only some 60 films made over the 1979–85 period.⁴² This was partly due to the flight of film-makers and to censorship. Under the Pahlavi regime, film censorship did not permit opposition to Islam or the shah. After the Islamic revolution, not only was no opposition tolerated, but no woman without Islamic dress could be shown on screen. Despite these constraints, the Iranian film industry has produced many excellent films that have won prestigious prizes and public acclaim abroad. 'Abbas Kiarostami is the best known among these film-makers. His films, such as *Close-Up*, *Through the Olive Trees*, *Taste of Cherry*, etc. have been shown all around the world.

PHOTOGRAPHY (C. ADLE)

The daguerreotype, invented in 1839, was introduced in Iran in 1842 thanks to Mohammad Shah Qajar. The first daguerreotypist was the Russian diplomat Nikolai Alexandrovich

⁴² Maghsoudlou, 1987, p. 38.

Pavlov (1816–c. 75?). Its limited use compared to Western Europe continued during the following years. At the court, it was practised by Jules Florentin Richard (1816–91), a Frenchman working for the Persian Government who converted to Islam, and in Azerbaijan by Prince Malekqasem Mirza (1807–c. 1862), the shah's uncle and a very inventive man.⁴³

Conventional photography reached its peak under Naser al-Din Shah as the king was a photographer himself, an art lover and a generous patron. The Photothèque in the Golestan Palace in Tehran preserves thousands of priceless photographs dating from his period. The principal artist and His Majesty's Photographer was Aqa Reza 'Akashashi (1843–1890), but there were others such as 'Ali Khan Vali, who was governor of Azerbaijan and mainly practiced his art there. Some of his reports to the shah were in the form of photographic albums. Mozaffar al-Din Shah, who introduced cinema to Iran, actually preferred photography and was a photographer himself. He lacked his father's discipline and the annotations in the albums and pictures dating from his time are less orderly and detailed. The main court photographer was Mirza Ebrahim Khan Sani' al-Saltaneh (c. 1865–1906), but the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were dominated by Mirza 'Abdollah Khan Qajar (c. 1850–1908), who even undertook expeditions to north-eastern Iran to take pictures of sites and people.⁴⁴ Another prolific and well-known artist active in the early twentieth century was Antoine Khan Sevruguine (late 1830s–1933).⁴⁵ The compositions of his photographs were influenced by the art of painting; he made numerous portraits.

The introduction of instantaneous photography at the end of the nineteenth century dramatically changed the situation. Photography ceased to be the privilege of Persian aristocrats, the rich and their protégés, and became a generally affordable technique. During and after the constitutional revolution, photography played a social role and was much used. Although most photographers followed the constitutionalists, one of the leading exponents, Rusi Khan, sided with Mohammad 'Ali Shah and accompanied the deposed shah into exile (1909). Ahmad Shah, his successor and the last Qajar king (deposed in 1926), was not interested in photography as an art form; nor were the later Pahlavi kings or the revolutionary rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

When still a simple Cossack, Reza Shah Pahlavi (deposed in 1941) had a photographer friend, 'Ali Khadem. It was he who later took many of the royal portraits. He was, however, a professional photographer running a public studio (*'Akāskhāneh Hasanābād*, opened in 1912). He remained a central figure among the photographers in Tehran for decades. That was still the case in 1950, when the Tehran Syndicate of Photographers was

⁴³ For the introduction of photography in Iran and the daguerreotypists, see Adle and Zoka, 1983, pp. 249–80; Adle, in press [2005]; Afshar, 1983, pp. 214–82.

⁴⁴ Zoka, 1977.

⁴⁵ Bohrer, 1999; *Sevruguine's Iran*, 1999.

established. Mashallah Khan 'Fotografi' was another prominent photographer in those days. Some of the photographers of the next generation, such as Reza Tabataba'ian (Studio Chehrenoma), Ebrahim Partow, Mirza Mohammad Khan Dibadin and Mahmud Nasta'liq trained at his studio. Vahan Terpantiyan, with his studio and shop on Naderi Avenue (Foto Vaheh), was another leading figure, but mainly in the commercial field.⁴⁶

Among the major photographers of the mid-twentieth century and the 1960s were Ahmad 'Ali,⁴⁷ whose work was shown in galleries, and Hadi Shafa'iyeh, a university professor. Shafa'iyeh is remembered less as an art photographer than as a theoretician of the art of photography.⁴⁸ He had limited knowledge of the past of that art in Iran and, like many Iranian architects, painters, sculptors and other artists, followed Western moulds fairly uncritically. The interest in the past of Iranian photography as well as the limited search for an independent means of expression is new; the former dates back to the 1970s–80s, and the latter probably only to the beginning of the twenty-first century.

When the Islamic revolution broke out in 1979, followed by the war with Iraq (1980–8), there were dozens of professional photographers in the country. Some such as Yahya Dehqanpur⁴⁹ and Kamran Adle⁵⁰ stayed out of the new mainstream. Others, such as Kaveh Golestan (later killed in the war in Iraq in 2003), Kazem Akhavan, Alfred Ya'qubzadeh, Reza Deqqati, Mohammad Farnud, Bahman Jalali and many others were passionately involved in both events, especially the war. Among the war photographers, Sa'id Sad-eqi was particularly active among many volunteer fighters and soldiers who often took the best and most dramatic pictures.⁵¹ When the situation started to calm down in the late 1980s, Nasrollah Kasra'ian followed a path traced among others by Nicole Faridani⁵² and became the country's best-known photographer, thanks to his romantic photographs of the Iranian landscape.⁵³

⁴⁶ See Zoka, in press [2006].

⁴⁷ *Nashriyeh-ye herfeh va honarmand*, 1381/2002, No. 3, pp. 59–79.

⁴⁸ See Shafa'iyeh, 1981; Shafa'iyeh, 1993.

⁴⁹ On that photographer and four others, see *Panj negāh be khāk*, 1981.

⁵⁰ K. Adle, 1977.

⁵¹ For a good selection of war photographs taken by photographers mentioned in the text and many others, see *Imposed War, Defence vs Aggression*, 1983–7.

⁵² Faridani, 1994.

⁵³ Kasra'ian, 1990; in the same genre, see also Bakhtyar, 2001.

Afghanistan

PAINTING

Painting in Afghanistan was limited to manuscript production and murals. The techniques were the same traditional ones as used in Iran, although the output was more limited. Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880–1901) appreciated the visual arts, in particular frescoes. To that end he employed a number of court painters such as Mir Zaman al-Din and Mir Yar Beg. They decorated his palaces such as Koti Baghcheh and Bostan-Serai with floral patterns, but no living beings. The most important of the court painters was Mir Hesam al-Din, who specialized in murals and albums.

Contemporary Afghan art began in the 1920s. One of Mir Hesam al-Din’s pupils was Gholam Mohammad Maimanagi (1873–1935), who admired the European style of painting and wanted to be sent to Europe for training. In 1921 King Amanullah (1919–29) sent him for two years to Germany, where he was supposed to study lithography. However, Gholam Mohammad spent much of his time studying and copying European old masters. On his return to Kabul, the king asked him to establish an art school where students from all over Afghanistan could come and learn painting, book illustration, carpentry and carpet weaving. A number of professors from Iran (carpet weaving), India (S. M. Deane) and Turkey (M. Farrokh) as well as ‘Ali Mohammad, another pupil of Mir Hesam al-Din, taught at this school. Gholam Mohammad himself taught the basics of painting and lithography. He also illustrated several books by Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933).

In 1921 King Amanullah also sent students to Germany to study engineering. Among them was the 14-year-old ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Breshna (1907–74). Rather than study mechanical engineering, however, he studied book illumination, printing and lithography at Wuppertal. Later he was able to convince Amanullah (who was visiting Germany) that it was better to have a good painter than a bad engineer. On his return to Kabul in 1931, Breshna replaced Mir Gholam Mohammad as head of the School of Art (1931–9). In 1934 he added courses on lithography, textiles, architecture, sculpture, ceramics, glazing and stone cutting to those already taught at the school. Over time, the student body grew to 1,700. Breshna taught the best students, among whom the most noteworthy were ‘Abdollah, Ghows al-Din, Gholam ‘Ali, Kheyr Mohammad and ‘Abd al-Rahman.

From 1939 to 1943, Breshna headed the government printing press and national publishing house, where he introduced new printing techniques. He was also the editor of several newspapers and yearbooks in those years. From 1940 to 1953, as the director of Afghan Radio and then, in 1943, as its president, he promoted traditional Afghan music and composed many pieces of music, including the 1973 national anthem of Afghanistan.

He was also active as a caricaturist and dealt with social conditions in Afghanistan. As a vehicle for his satirical views, he created the figure of Rajab Khan, an apparently simple-minded man, who, through his comic deeds, highlights social or moral problems.⁵⁴ The art school was closed down in 1965, when Amanullah Hayderzad, an Afghan sculptor, established the Fine Arts Department at Kabul University. Yusef Kohzad (a painter, playwright and poet) founded the Afghan National Gallery of Art.

Breshna also painted many genre subjects from everyday life in Afghanistan. Eighty of his paintings (water-colours) were taken to Germany by his son in the 1990s. A collection of 16 oil paintings that he made for King Zahir Shah (1933–73) have disappeared, probably destroyed by the Taliban along with many other paintings. (See more on Breshna below.)

Another artist, Kheyr Mohammad, or Mohammad ‘Aziz (1915–90), studied at the School of Art in Kabul. After graduation, he taught at Ghazi High School and later became the principal of the Technical High School. In 1950 he went to the United States for further studies in art and photography. On his return to Kabul, he was appointed deputy director of Kabul Museum. As a painter, he mostly followed the impressionistic style in his water-colours, which depicted rural scenes and portraits of country people:

In many of his portraits of rural people, it is the eyes which are most distinguishable: uncertain, melancholic and full of uneasiness and anguish. They perhaps represent a genuine depiction of the characteristics of these persons, their lives and the society in which they live.

Kheyr Mohammad also painted the mural of Ahmad Shah Baba after the conquest of Delhi.⁵⁵ This is a reference to Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747–72), the founder of Afghanistan in the eighteenth century.

The traditional art of miniature painting on manuscripts – also known as ‘Persian painting’ – was still practised in the western city of Herat in the late nineteenth century. It experienced a revival, mainly thanks to Mohammad Sa‘id Mash‘al (1917–98), one of the greatest contemporary artists of Afghanistan, who lived most of his life in Herat. Mash‘al’s inspiration was the sixteenth-century painter Behzad, also from Herat. Mash‘al had many pupils and apprentices. He was not only an accomplished painter but also an acclaimed writer. He wrote poetry, prose, panegyrics, quatrains and more. His four statues of horses placed in Herat’s main bazaar were beheaded by the Taliban because they were considered ‘idols’, while his wall paintings in that same city were covered with whitewash. Mash‘al and his pupils also decorated the Great Hall of Heart (*Zarnegār*), but these paintings were also destroyed along with his other works by the Taliban.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ http://admin.qantara.de/uploads/540/WWF_78_Fine_Arts_in_Afghanistan.pdf; <http://www.afghan-german.de/lauf/text/Breshna/Breshna.htm>.

⁵⁵ <http://www.afghanmagazine.com/oct99/visualarts/ustadaziz.1>.

⁵⁶ www.afghanmagazine.com/july98/articles/mashal.html.

Violence and looting during the civil war (1992–6) laid waste to the Afghan museum collections, which were further decimated when the Taliban systematically and intentionally destroyed most of Afghanistan's art that showed human or animal figures. Artists could no longer practise their art.

THEATRE

The first modern play to be performed in Afghanistan was in 1920 in the *Bāgh-e 'Omūmi-ye Paghman* (The Public Garden of Paghman). It was a piece entitled *Fath-e Andalus* (The Conquest of Andalusia), about the conquest of Spain by Tareq b. Ziyad. There were also theatre performances in Herat as of 1921, under Salah al-Din Seljuqi. Other performances followed, both comedy and tragedy, such as *Soqūt-e Andalus* (The Fall of Andalusia). The first time that a female role was included in a play (though acted by a man) was in 1924. Some of the plays were the result of the presence of Turkish military officers. Plays by local as well as foreign playwrights, such as *Ezdevāj-e Ejbāri* (The Forced Wedding) by Molière, were performed. The theatre was in the Paghman Gardens or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fall of King Amanullah in 1929 put a stop to theatre performances for a while. But under his successor, *Fath-e Andalus* was performed at court. After Nadir Shah's assassination in 1933, theatre became dormant.

In 1940 theatrical activities began again in Kabul in the *Puhna Nandari*, which also doubled as a cinema. Usually, one play a week was performed for a number of years. Most of the actors and directors were teachers and students, and plays were therefore also performed at schools. Between 1940 and 1953, when he was also head of Afghan Radio, 'Abd al-Ghaffar Breshna (painter, composer, musician, editor and poet) wrote some 20 plays for radio and theatre. He directed them himself, as well as designing and painting the sets. His most popular piece was *Uncle Malang* (*Laleh Malang*), staged in 1947.⁵⁷ He also produced several plays with Salah al-Din Seljuqi, such as the very successful *Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves*. Other playwrights included (among many others) 'Abd al-Rahman Pazhvak, Mohammad 'Othman Siddiqi and 'Abd al-Rashid Latifi.

Gradually several theatres were opened in Kabul in the late 1950s (Makateb, Javanan, Zeynab, etc.). Theatre as known in the West flourished only from that time, in particular due to the support of Mahmud Habibi, head of the renamed Directorate-General of Culture and Art, and his successors. In 1966 Pashto theatre also started. Acting became more professional as training was available at the Institute of Theatrical Art founded by Kheyrzadeh.

⁵⁷ <http://www.afghanland.com/entertainment/music/breshna.html>.

The growing influence of the Soviet Union and its satellite states also had its impact on Afghan theatre and cinema culture. Adaptations of European classics were introduced at first; in 1979 there was even a production of Ionesco's *Le Roi se meurt* in Kabul. But in the 1980s playwrights favoured the didactic treatment of themes from everyday Afghan life, which also coincided with the return of large numbers of Afghan students who had studied in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Whereas women's roles had initially been played by men, after 1960 actresses also appeared on stage. In addition to the city theatres such as those in Kabul, Herat and Kandahar, there were traveling companies which staged plays in provincial centres or at country fairs. Children's theatre started in the 1980s. Many young people studied theatre at Kabul University's School of Fine Arts.

The one and only cinema-theatre, the Kabul Theatre, was destroyed in the mid-1990s. The first theatre performance after the fall of the Taliban regime took place on 6 January 2002, heralding a new phase in its short history. The programme included a piece about the rise and fall of the Taliban:

with the main actor setting fire to the buckled infrastructure that was once a stage, and another actor arriving to find that the Taliban had set fire to his home, his theatre, 'and the whole of Afghanistan'. A woman then appeared in a wedding dress, symbolizing the return of peace. It had the audience roaring for more. The piece was followed by a musical recital by a quartet playing traditional Afghan instruments and national songs performed by popular Afghan star Aziz Ghaznaway.⁵⁸

CINEMA

Although films were already shown in Afghanistan in the 1930s, Afghan film history and culture started in 1951 with the release of *Love and Friendship* (*Eshq va Dosti*). This first Afghan film had been processed in Lahore. Despite its popular success, it took 19 years for the next Afghan feature film to be shot. During the period from 1951 to 1972, the nascent Afghan film industry produced only short, black and white films and documentaries. In 1965 the Afghan Film Organization was established in Kabul and started producing films despite technical and economic challenges.

With the release of the feature film *Like an Eagle* in 1972, the Afghan film industry took off for the second time. This time it stayed afloat until the fall of the communist regime in 1992, the start of the civil war, and the arrival of the Taliban in 1996. In 1972 the well-equipped building of the Afghan Film Organization was completed, giving the necessary boost to film culture in the country. Soon afterwards, *Friday Night*, *The Suitor* and *The Smugglers* were shot as well as newsreels and documentaries. Private film studios

⁵⁸ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1749533.stm.

like Nazir, Shafaq, Qays and Aryana Films later emerged and started producing feature films, *Rozgarān* and *Rabi'a-ye Balkhi* being the most popular. Despite the surge in film production between 1972 and 1992, Afghanistan produced not more than 40 films, far fewer than any other country in the region.

According to film-makers and film critics, the Afghan film industry was rehabilitated after 1978, when it also emerged on the international scene. In the following years, a dozen full-length colour feature films, tens of television films and hundreds of documentaries and short films were produced by Afghan film-makers and shown throughout the country. Films such as *Akhtar-e-Maskhara* (Ridiculous Akhtar), *Mojasema ha Mekhandand* (Statues are Laughing), *Jenāyatkārān* (Criminals) and *Gonāh* (Sin) generated great interest among the Afghan people. There was (and still is) censorship aimed at ensuring that films support the government's political views and programmes; the country also produces and shows propaganda films. This was particularly the case under the communist regime (1978–89).⁵⁹ Afghan feature films made during that period, such as *Sabor-e Sarbāz* (Sabor the Soldier), *Farār* (Escape) and *The Moments* won both national and international acclaim in Eastern Europe (e.g. at the Varna Film Festival). The Afghan Film Organization suffered from financial problems, however, and Afghan cinema lacked up-to-date and well-equipped studios, there was a scarcity of laboratories for colour pictures as well as a lack of professional actors and directors and many other shortcomings. Well-known Afghan directors at that time included Mohandes Latif, Sa'id Workzai and Faqir Nabi, who produced feature films focusing on the country's problems and people's everyday life.

In the mid-1990s Afghanistan had 26 cinemas, 17 of them in Kabul. In 1996, when the Taliban came to power, films – deemed 'un-Islamic' – were systematically destroyed and cinemas were closed and wrecked. Facing prosecution, many film-makers fled the country while others abandoned their vocation. Under the Taliban, the screening of any image was seen as idolatrous. This also held true for the collection of film reels, numbering many thousands, stored at the Afghan Film Institute. A visit by a high-ranking Taliban official in 2001 led to the order to burn the institute's entire stock of more than 3,000 films, although more than 1,000 were saved from the fire.

Many of the country's cinemas were destroyed in the civil war. Kabul now has a mere handful of cinemas. The programmes consist mainly of Indian films, but also some American and Iranian movies. Kabul's first cinema reopened on 19 November 2001, giving excited residents their first chance to go to the cinema since 1996. Thousands of people waited patiently for the doors of the Bakhtar Cinema to open, then stormed the building in the rush for seats, undeterred by the signs of long neglect and dilapidation, and even the

⁵⁹ <http://www.afghancinema.com/history.html>.

poor quality of the films. Two films were shown, a classic Afghan movie *Uruj* (Ascension), about Mujahidin guerrillas fighting the Soviet occupation, and an Indian film *Elan* (Declaration). Women were not allowed inside. In the old Kabul, young courting couples went to the cinema; in the new Kabul of 2004, women who do so are considered prostitutes.

The cinema had fallen into disuse during the Taliban's rule. Its rows of wooden seats were dilapidated, the ceiling was full of holes and the projection screen had had to be patched up. Cinemas have reopened across Kabul, attracting thousands of viewers every day. Old Russian projectors have been returned to use, churning out decades-old Indian and Iranian films. The quality is low, the lighting bad and the frames damaged by scratches, dents and dust. But under the blanket of darkness in the auditorium of the Park Cinema, hundreds sit on the edges of their seats during an Indian action film. The films may be 30 years old and many people do not understand the language but that does not seem to matter.⁶⁰

As under previous regimes, censorship still exists. Anything that is against the interests of Islam or the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, pornographic material, and anything which is overtly political or dangerous for the government is banned. New Afghan films have already been made since the fall of the Taliban in 2002. The two best-known feature films are Siddiq Barmak's *Osama* (about a little girl during the Taliban period, who decides to cut her hair and dress like a boy in order to get a job and feed her family) and *Kabul Cinema* by Mir Wais Rekab.

Part Two

INDIA AND PAKISTAN*

(S. P. Verma)

INDIA

By the end of the eighteenth century, India had witnessed a complete fusion of the celebrated Mughal art with other Indian schools. Mughal painting, known for its surface brilliance, ornate style and complicated motifs, now appeared with simpler forms and compositions – a change which pointed to the completion of the life cycle of a glorious court art.

⁶⁰ BBC News (29 Jan. 2002).

* See Maps 4 and 5.

With the decline of the Mughal empire, its art traditions flourished with various regional variations accommodating Rajasthani and Pahari styles; but it could never attain the skill and realism of Mughal times. Now there began to emerge another synthesis, through the direct interaction of Indian artists with Western art.

From about 1770 onwards a distinct style known as the 'Company style', a mixture of medieval Indian miniature and British academic techniques, developed. It first emerged at the major centres of British settlement, Calcutta and Murshidabad; this was followed by a secondary phase at Patna, Benaras, Lucknow, Delhi and Tanjore (in South India). The work produced at these centres towards the close of the eighteenth century and until the middle of the nineteenth century exhibited the increasing influence of British academic art. The Company style faded away with the introduction of photography in the 1870s, and the artists became draughtsmen, designers and illustrators.⁶¹ Even here, their existence tended to be short-lived. Pushpa Sundar observes:

The Government of Bombay was directed to employ photographers in place of draughtsmen for archaeological work, making it more precise; but this also meant a loss of employment opportunities to Indian artists.⁶²

There was little left of the Company style after 1890.⁶³

Sculptures and paintings executed by the British artists Chantry, J. H. Foley, Tilley Kettle, Zoffany, Thomas Daniell, William Hodges and Sir Joshua Reynolds (all of whom travelled in India between 1760 and 1790) greatly influenced the large format of the later miniatures of the Awadh school, which flourished at Faizabad and Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh during 1722–1856. The artists of these centres derived their themes and techniques largely from the Mughal miniatures executed during 1659–1748. With English influence, a mixed style emerged, a fusion of the late Mughal school and an adaptation of Western themes, the techniques of chiaroscuro and perspective. Mihr Chand, the most prominent painter of this school, is known to have executed several almost identical copies of the works of Kettle and Zoffany.⁶⁴ Yet essentially Awadh painting exhibits a continuity with the imperial Mughal school even if it cannot be described as a form of 'high' art. It rather confirmed the degradation of a great art tradition. Awadh artists accepted the principles of academic art but had a poor understanding of them, and the result was a poor imitation. Nevertheless, the portraits were sometimes executed successfully.

Delhi artists mostly produced likenesses of members of the Mughal dynasty and the customary miniature portraits in rigid profile. The conventional tiny portraits executed on

⁶¹ M. Archer and W. G. Archer, 1955, pp. 47–9.

⁶² Sundar, 1955, p. 77.

⁶³ M. Archer and W. G. Archer, 1955, pp. 39–50, 116.

⁶⁴ Goetz, 1959, p. 237.

ivory were also stereotyped and repetitive. Nevertheless, these portraits are commendable as pieces of decorative art and the products of skilled draughtsmanship.

Patna, another active centre of painting, flourished during 1750–1945, and like Delhi is known for its miniature portraits. The artists worked for their patrons, largely European merchants and Anglo-Indians; and always accommodated Western techniques of modelling, and light and shadow to suit their patrons' taste. The work of the representative painters of this school, such as Sewant Ram, Hulas Lal, Bansi Lal, Madhav Lal, Bhanwar Lal, Jamuna Prasad, Shiva Lal and Jairam Das, is regarded as a category of 'Company' art.⁶⁵ Basically, the Patna school adhered to the tradition of miniature painting and to some extent retained the qualities of the Mughal school, i.e. delicate realism, sensitivity and flowing lines. Patna artists produced realistic portraits of artisans, professional people, etc., pictures of flora and fauna, and miniatures of European men and women executed on ivory and mica. Francis Buchanan, in his 1811–12 report on Patna miniatures, thought, not unsurprisingly, that 'the painters [Mosuwwar], though talented in executing miniatures with minute attention of details, were far behind the Europeans in technique.'⁶⁶

In Punjab (at Lahore, Amritsar and Kapurthala), the Sikh school of painting developed under the patronage of the Sikh rulers, Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799–1839), Maharaja Sher Singh (1839–43) and Maharaja Dalip Singh (1843–9). It also embraced the traditions of Western academic art, and with the amalgam of Pahari traditions attempted a new mode of realism. Present in the Sikh kingdom were European painters such as Leopold von Orlich, Theodor Schoefft and Emily Eden and their work naturally influenced Punjab painting.⁶⁷ Maharaja Ranjit Singh expressed delight at the portraits executed by Vigne.⁶⁸ A Hungarian artist named Theodor Schoefft stayed at Lahore throughout 1841 and executed the portraits of almost all the principal personalities at the Sikh court during the reign of Maharaja Sher Singh.⁶⁹ The Sikh school had painters of the Pahari tradition, especially of Kangra and Guler. On grounds of style, Sikh painting owes much to the Mughal school (especially of the late seventeenth century) and also draws on Pahari schools of painting, though it seems to lack the warm and sensitive rendering of human and animal figures of the former, and the scenic charm of the latter.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ M. Archer, 1947, pp. 3–33.

⁶⁶ M. Archer and W. G. Archer, 1955, p. 32.

⁶⁷ Srivastava, 1983.

⁶⁸ Hugel, 1972, p. 337.

⁶⁹ W. G. Archer, 1966, pp. 47–8.

⁷⁰ Verma, 2002, p. 160.

In brief, the nineteenth century witnessed a decline in the pictorial art of India. The high art of the Rajasthani, Mughal and Pahari schools diminished, and whatsoever survived lingered on in a subdued manner. According to Havell:

The productions of the Rajasthani schools during the 18th century, though extremely great in quantity, seldom achieved the rich harmonies of the painting of the 17th century ... the Rajasthani style enters into its phase of decline. The works turned out by the last representatives of a dying tradition lack vitality and harmony of colour. The expression is insipid and the increasing competition from cheap prints which were coming into vogue finally put an end to the last great phase of the traditional Indian art.⁷¹

In British India, local artists followed the dictates of their European patrons. Indian artists tended to be overwhelmed by Western culture and art and frequently became mere imitators. Aijazuddin writes:

For the nineteenth-century painters, there was nothing left to do but to eke out an existence by making facile, salable likenesses. Newer artists merely stammered where their predecessors had sung, copied what their forebears had created, but failed to infuse into their work that additional dimension of passionate originality which had distinguished Pahari paintings.⁷²

Indian artists' work now lacked all originality and this state of affairs naturally thwarted the progress of indigenous art.⁷³ Further, Indian artists lacked confidence in their work since Indian princes and the aristocracy eagerly collected European works of art and commissioned highly paid British artists to paint their portraits.⁷⁴ Portraits in the European style enjoyed such vogue that the possession of European paintings became a symbol of social status. In rare instances, commissions were also given to Indian artists since their fees were much lower than those of the British. The wife of the governor, Lord Clive, patronized Indian artists who did botanical drawings. Twenty-seven folios of this work are preserved in the India Office Library, London.⁷⁵ In another instance, the raja of Benaras engaged the artists Dallu Lal Gopal Chand and Lal Chand to produce portraits in the British style.⁷⁶ However, it is notable that in the quality of the art produced, a certain standard was

⁷¹ Havell, 1964, pp. 117–18. See also Goetz, 1959, p. 233; Swarup, 1968, p. 164 ('Patronised by the Sikhs the Kangra style in yet another expression lingered on even after 1850, but the spirit was obviously spent up and the rhythm and lyricism had altogether disappeared').

⁷² Swarup, 1968, p. 164 ('The painters, yielding to material considerations, quickly modified their styles to suit the tastes of their European patrons and produced a number of miniatures and portraits. But the artists were mere copyists whose works were generally crude and lifeless').

⁷³ Aijazuddin, 1977, p. xxvii.

⁷⁴ Mitter, 1992, p. 279.

⁷⁵ M. Archer, 1972, p. 115; M. Archer, 1979.

⁷⁶ M. Archer and W. G. Archer, 1955, pp. 47–9.

maintained. The graceful forms, delicate patterns and general finish that had created interest in Indian art in the West were still to be found.⁷⁷

The art schools established in British India at Madras (1850), Calcutta (1854), Bombay (1857) and Lahore (1857) introduced the Western academic art of Victorian England. Indian artists were taught the principles of Victorian art, without any interest being shown in their country's own art traditions. The art schools were designed to produce illustrators, block-engravers, portraitists and painters of very limited vision. Certainly, the schools were not institutions that could be expected to effect any great artistic regeneration or change.⁷⁸ It should be remembered that the direct realism of European art had no place in indigenous art, where an artist sought to suggest the essence of reality rather than its outward form. Physical reality is not the basis of all art; these Indian art schools forgot that not all art needs to be naturalistic.

A reaction to the British policy of art education emerged during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when it began to be stressed that to understand the style and forms of a particular art, it should be seen from the viewpoint of the people among whom it was produced. This led to a renewed appreciation of Indian art and its revival. This approach was first applied by Havell (1864–1937) and Coomaraswamy (1877–1947). Havell traced the original source of Indian art in what he called 'idealism'; and he felt that Indian art needed to be appreciated from its own standpoint.⁷⁹ He considered that Indian art could only be preserved by the survival or revival of the spiritual power that created it.⁸⁰ Vincent Smith, too, realized that nothing of high worth could be created by artists who merely seek to imitate foreign models. If modern India was to evolve a new art of its own, it must have its roots in the Indian past and appeal to Indian sentiment.⁸¹ Even an imperialist of the stamp of Lord Curzon (viceroy of India from 1898 to 1905) had already announced in 1902 that: 'No national art is capable of continued existence unless it satisfies the ideals, and expresses the wants of the nation that has produced it.'⁸²

Havell became the father figure of the new movement in Indian art. His approach influenced the work of Abanindra Nath Tagore (1871–1931) and others such as Nandalal Bose (1882–1966), Binode Bihari Mukherjee, Mukul Dey and Bireswar Sen. The new movement sought to revive the oriental art of Ajanta, Sigiriya, the art of the painted religious banners of Tibet (China), and the traditions of Mughal, Rajasthani and Pahari art. The

⁷⁷ Raghuvanshi, 1969, pp. 469–70.

⁷⁸ Kaul, 1961, p. 106; Subramanyam, 1978, pp. 17–18.

⁷⁹ Bhuvanendram, 1991, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Havell, 1911, p. 121.

⁸¹ Smith, 1911, p. 201.

⁸² Sundar, 1955, p. 147, note 17.

small format of the paintings, like the folios of the Mughal album pictures now adopted, suggested links with medieval Indian art traditions. Further, instead of oil pigment, tempera and water-colour won favour. The mode of naturalistic representation of an object with chiaroscuro was abandoned and linear expressions akin to Rajasthani and Pahari traditions became dominant.

A growing fascination with themes based on the *Ramayana*, the *Mahabharata*, the *Bhagavad Gita*, the *Puranas* and the work of Kalidasa (e.g. *Shakuntlam* and *Meghdut*) further affirmed an affiliation with Indian culture. The publication of the Ajanta murals by Griffiths in 1896 made Indian artists enthusiastic to learn and practise a forgotten art. An emphasis on the imitation and adaptation of the themes, styles and techniques of great Indian traditions led to the rise of the Bengal school. An attempt was also made to incorporate the traditions of Chinese and Japanese painting. The work of Abanindra Nath Tagore exhibits the influence of Chinese painting, and the water-colour technique of Japanese art. Percy Brown recognizes that this new school did not attempt a slavish imitation of any of the historical styles, and the works of this movement manifest a genuine desire on the part of the artists to interpret in colour their imaginative conceptions, and to reproduce these in the indigenous style and by means of traditional methods.⁸³ This new approach to art spread fast and influenced other art schools at Bombay (now Mumbai) and Ahmadabad. Indeed, the rise of the Bengal school at Calcutta and Shantiniketan seemed to complement the need to find one's own non-Western roots with the rise of Indian nationalism.

Raja Ravi Varma (1848–1946) of Travancore was the major representative of the Western academic school. He was severely criticized for his 'lack of poetic faculty of illustrating' and 'superficial study of India life' by Havell and Coomaraswamy, protagonists of the Bengal school.⁸⁴ Ravi Varma was a traditionalist and yet he adopted the photographic and academic techniques of Western art with great success and enjoyed considerable vogue. No other artist after Ravi Varma has ever enjoyed such popularity.⁸⁵

Nevertheless, artists of the new school soon realized that their exclusive focus on the adaptation of old art traditions left little scope for something new and original. In the quest for newer modes of artistic expression, some artists turned to the reinterpretation of conventional themes and adopted innovative art forms and techniques which led to the emergence of modernism in Indian art. Gaganendra Nath Tagore, Rabindra Nath Tagore (1861–1941), Nandalal Bose and Jamini Roy (b. 1887) are the great masters of this version of the Bengal school. Gaganendra Nath Tagore, who was greatly influenced by the impressionists,

⁸³ Brown, 1965, p. 66.

⁸⁴ For their remarks, see Smith, 1911, p. 199. See also Swarup, 1968, p. 68 ('devoid of all aesthetic merit').

⁸⁵ Purohit, 1988a, p. 694.

experimented with cubism in art. His masterpieces display a cubistic arrangement of light and shadow. Rabindra Nath Tagore emphasized the 'expressionism' of the West. However, the effective lines and rhythm in his paintings are invariably in the Indian mode. Nandalal Bose, though known for his linear rhythmic forms, experimented with various mediums and techniques. Among others who contributed to the work of this school are Asit Kumar Haldar (1890–1964), Ambani Sen (b. 1895), Lalit Mohan Sen (b. 1898), Gunen Ganguli, K. K. Hebbar (b. 1911), Rathin Mitra (b. 1913) and Gopal Ghose.

Jamini Roy started his career in the Western academic tradition but then shifted to post-impressionism, and a little later to the style of the revisionist Bengal school, and finally to expressive forms of the folk-art tradition with the simplest compositional schemes. Jamini Roy explored the folk tradition of Bengal and enriched his art with a classical purity of line. Other adherents of this style were K. Sreenivasulu (b. 1923), Ambani Sen, Sunil Paul, Sitiesh Das Gupta, P. L. Narasimha Murthy (b. 1918), A. A. Ahmelkar (b. 1918) and Rathin Mitra. But they never achieved the simplicity that characterizes the work of Jamini Roy. Kanwal Krishna, K. S. Kulkarni, Lakshman Pai, K. C. S. Panikkar, Kalyan Das and D. J. Joshi are other painters who evolved a modern style through their study of folk art. The work of Zain al Abidin and Quamrul Hasan of East Pakistan (Bangladesh, since 1972) also reveals affinities with Jamini Roy. Other artists whose work was influenced by Abanindra Nath Tagore were Abdur Rahman Chughtai, Sarda Ukil, D. P. Roy Chowdhury, Suren Gangoly, Hakim Khan, Mukul Dey and Samarendra Nath Gupta.

Amrita Sher Gil (1913–41) attempted a profound synthesis of the more enduring elements in Western and Indian painting. She was influenced by the neo-impressionists, first, Cézanne (1839–1906) and then Gauguin (1848–1903), and by the Japanese masters such as Ogata Korin (1658–1716) and Hon'ami Koetsu (1558–1637) (Fig. 11).⁸⁶ Manohar Kaul writes: 'Her unique power of assimilation and her persuasive personal idiom proclaim the originality with which her works are stamped and make them a significant contribution to art.'⁸⁷ Her simple but intense idiom influenced a host of Indian painters. Her meaningful use of pure blacks and pure whites for rich aesthetic expression has been picked up by Maqbool Fida Husain.

From the mid-twentieth century onwards there emerged greater possibilities of internationalism in Indian art, and the artists assimilated various influences and produced modernistic art. Sailoz Mookerjee (1935–85), one of the few eminent contemporary painters, was possibly the first artist to break away from the old Bengal tradition (Fig. 12). He drew inspiration from the Kangra school and folk art. Mainly influenced by Matisse (1869–1954),

⁸⁶ Goetz, 1959, p. 241.

⁸⁷ Kaul, 1961, p. 164.



FIG. 11. Amrita Sher Gil: *Bride's Toilet* (oil on canvas). National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. (Photo: Courtesy of S. P. Verma.)

he nevertheless remained faithful to Indian traditions. The lyrical quality of the Kangra style and the simplicity of folk art are the basis of Sailoz's art, whose vibrant and colourful pigments are reminiscent of Matisse. Rasik D. Raval is another artist who owes much to Matisse.

Lalit Mohan Sen (b. 1898) distinguished himself in almost all media – woodcuts and linocuts, sculptures in wood and soft soapstone. His studies combine subtle rhythms with plastic suggestion. Bhabesh Sanyal (b. 1904) successfully integrated the Indian tradition with the features of academic and modern art. His visual experience is compounded with a naturalistic approach. Bireswar Sen (b. 1897), heavily influenced by Nicholas Roerich, the Russian painter, attained fame for his landscapes of the Himalayas. The work of Sudhirranjan Khastgir (b. 1907), which incorporates some features of modern art, is characteristically Indian in its forceful rhythmic lines and forms. A distinct style with leanings towards the Bengal school flourished under the influence of K. K. Hebbar (b. 1911), Jaya Appaswamy (b. 1918) and N. S. Bendre (b. 1910); Bendre was one of the most versatile of India's twentieth-century artists.

India has thus learnt much from the West though it has assimilated this in its own way. There are no rigid patterns or trends in Indian modern art. However, the contemporary trends in vogue until the end of the twentieth century can be broadly divided into four groups: neo-traditionalists, representationalists, folk artists, and modernists or experimentalists. Surrealism or super-realism has had only a limited place in Indian modernism. Satish Gujral (b. 1925), a powerful painter, is influenced by the Mexican school and



FIG. 12. Sailoz Mookerjee: *Washing Day* (oil on canvas). P. C. Chaudhuri Collection. (Photo: Courtesy of S. P. Verma.)

surrealism. Hemat Misra and Jaswant Singh (b. 1918) are other surrealistic artists. The representationalists enjoyed a considerable hold over Indian art during the first half of the twentieth century. Among these artists, the most prominent were V. P. Karmaker (b. 1891), Atul Bose (b. 1898), Y. K. Shukla (b. 1907), R. P. Kamat (b. 1907) and S. G. Thakur Singh (b. 1895). The group of experimentalists is represented by Syed Haider Raza (b. 1922), H. A. Gade (b. 1917) and Maqbool Fida Husain (b. 1915). Husain, the most distinguished painter, is a self-taught artist. His work is unmistakably Indian in inspiration. He combines symbols with stylized scenes derived from Indian tradition. Amina Ahmad is another painter whose work (like that of Maqbool Fida Husain) is symbolic, incorporating decorative abstraction.

The real excitement of contemporary art in India lies in its diversity and vitality. It is true that every age has its own special needs and its own ideals, but the self-consciousness of being an 'Indian' artist is becoming less relevant for the more mature painters.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Carven, Jr., 1963, p. 33.

Pakistan

During both the British colonial and the modern periods, European influences and the traditions of Indo-Islamic art dominated the centres of painting at Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Chittagong and Dacca. The earlier generation of the modern movement was represented by M. A. Chughtai (d. 1975), who had been associated with Abanindra Nath Tagore, Fayzee Rahmin and Haji Sharif – all heavily indebted to the Mughal and Pahari schools. Chughtai's watercolours have a lyrical quality of line and colour akin to the Pahari paintings, and the effect is overwhelmingly romantic (Fig. 13). Allah Bux, a contemporary of Chughtai, is equally admirable for his delicate forms and rhythmic patterns. Both Haji Sharif and Fayzee Rahmin worked in the traditional miniature style of the Mughal period. However, the aesthetic merit of traditional art is now rather less recognized. The tradition of the art of calligraphy and design-work, revived at the Mayo School of Arts in Lahore, is still in considerable vogue. The works of Sadequain represent another facet of the fusion of East and West. As a calligraphist, he is an orientalist; but as an artist, his line drawings are fully expressive of modernism.

The contemporary women artists, Sughra Rababi, Razia Sirajuddin and Razia Firozuddin – all from Punjab (West Pakistan) – are heavily indebted to the West and their work shows a close affinity with Western experimentalist idioms. In independent Pakistan, the artists' focus shifted from an earlier interest in realistic expression to Western modernist developments in art. Several artists with experience of studies abroad have tended to promote modernism. The National College of Art in Lahore flourished under Shakir Ali, an outstanding artist; and the Art Institute in Dacca (East Pakistan; Bangladesh since 1972) prospered under the direction of Zainal Abidin.

With the exposure to the Western world and its art, art in Pakistan also underwent a vital change; and the traditionalists themselves were eager to adopt Western trends in modern art. Modern art in Pakistan should therefore be viewed within the framework of this overwhelming change in artists' attitudes. Many Pakistani artists who had studied abroad introduced new art trends on their return to their country. Various trends emerged simultaneously. S. M. Sultan and Jehangir, famous for his water-colour landscapes, were impressionists; Qamrul Hasan (b. 1921) followed Mexican realism; and Zubeida Aga (b. 1941) pursued abstract painting. Portrait painters like S. H. Askari and Sheikh Ahmad belong to the school of representationalists. Saifuddin, initially a realist, later came to be inspired by the folk-art tradition. At present, there are hundreds of artists, the majority of whom are experimentalists, following different artistic trends. Thus, just as in India, art in



FIG. 13. Muhammad Abdur Rahman Chughtai: *Sharfun-Nisa*. Lahore Museum, Lahore. (Photo: Courtesy of S. P. Verma.)

Pakistan is progressing while simultaneously experimenting with various styles and modes of expression.

CINEMA

Photographic know-how and a knowledge of the techniques of sound transmission gave rise to the film industry. Photography had been known in India since the 1870s.⁸⁹ Dadasaheb Phalke (1870–94) had mastered the technique of photography and was in charge of the photographic studio of the Kalabhavan, Baroda.⁹⁰ By 1863–5 the camera had become a familiar object.⁹¹

The first films made in India were newsreels and documentaries. The Indian director Phalke was impressed by imported French films such as a depiction of the life of Christ by the early French film-maker Georges Méliès (1861–1938)⁹² shown in Bombay (now

⁸⁹ M. Archer and W. G. Archer, 1955, p. 106.

⁹⁰ Rangoonwala, 1970, p. 60.

⁹¹ Bourne, 1975.

⁹² Crowther, 1979, p. 472.

Mumbai) in 1910. Phalke's first mythological film, *Raja Harishchandra* (comprising 4 reels of about 37,009 ft/ 11,280 m), was shown in Bombay in 1913. His other mythological films are the *Gangavataran*, *Mohini Bhaskarasur* and *Satyavati Savitri*. Phalke was greatly impressed by the artist Raja Ravi Varma (1848–1946), famous for his mythological paintings in the Western academic manner, and he too concentrated exclusively on this genre. To Phalke goes the credit of first using a screenplay and shooting it with rehearsed actors. Today, he is known as the father of Indian cinema. His last film, *Setubandhan* (his only talkie), was made in 1935.

International developments further influenced Indian cinema, and up to the First World War (1917) a wide range of films from all over the world were absorbed in the Indian market. During this period, the American film industry progressed and Hollywood became the film capital of the world.⁹³ It dominated the Indian film industry, with US films accounting for 50 per cent of the foreign films imported during 1927–8. Consequently, Indian cinema missed the innovations occurring in the film industries in Germany, France and Russia.

The rise of Dhiren Ganguly saw a change in the subject matter of Indian films. Ganguly is known for the introduction of comedy to the Indian screen. His most famous film, *Bilat Pherat* (1917), is a satire on Indians who return from England with a veneer of Anglo-Indian culture. It shows a shift from mythological subjects to another genre. However, Ganguly was less interested in light comedies and he produced several mythological films (*Yashoda Nandan*, 1921; *Indrajit* and *Har-Gouri*, 1922) followed by devotional ones (*Chintamani* and *Yayati*, 1923) and costume dramas (*Stepmother*, 1923, and *Amar Jyoti*).

The popularity of mythological films could be sustained as they were relatively immune from foreign competition. Thus, besides Phalke, Ganguly and Baburao, even J. F. Madan's Elphinstone Bioscope Company produced mythological movies. The latter produced *Prahlad Charit* and *Satyavadi Raja Harishchandra* in 1954. J. F. Madan, who was an actor on the Parsi-Urdu-Gujarati stage, emerged as a great entrepreneur in the Indian film industry, and by 1931 he controlled 126 cinemas.⁹⁴ It was at his Elphinstone Picture Palace that the first talkie, Universal's *Melody of Love*, was shown in 1929. Although his sons carried on the business after Madan's death, it shrank drastically and in 1933 Madan Theatres Ltd was left with only two cinemas.⁹⁵

Indian producers now started to equip their studios with sound equipment, and as early as 1931 the first Indian talkie, *Alam Ara*, directed by Ardeshir Irani, was shown at the

⁹³ Ryder, 1956, p. 201; Purohit, 1988, p. 943.

⁹⁴ Purohit, 1988, p. 954.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 955.

Majestic Cinema in Bombay. The transition from silent features to talkies was fast and by 1935 the silent era had come to an end.⁹⁶

The costume drama was another subject that fascinated Indian producers, although it posed the problem of how to dress the actors. One example is *Dr Kotniss ki Amar Kahani* (1946) by Shantaram. With the introduction of films based on costume dramas, Western dress and fashions entered the Indian screen. This genre is well represented by *Dhoop Chhaon* (1935) by Pahdi Sanyal and *President* (1937) by Chhabi Biswas. Historical-biographical films also became popular. These were more realistic than the mythological and devotional films. Here also the producer turned to costume dramas, but with elements of myth and fantasy.

Indian cinema from 1934 to 1956 is best represented by the 'social films' of P. C. Barua, Frenz Osten, Shantaram and Satyajit Ray. Osten, a German, came to India and made films for Bombay Talkies. The major productions of this period include *Devdas* (1936) and *Mukti* (1937) by Barua; *Achhut Kanya* (1936) by Osten; and *Duniya na Mane* (1937), *Admi* (1939) and *Padosi* (1941) by Shantaram. Satyajit Ray (1921–92), deeply impressed by Rabindra Nath Tagore and Western music, found it difficult to work with professional Indian musicians and for all his later films was his own music director with creative musical ideas. His highly acclaimed films *Pather Panchali* (1955), *Aparajito* (1956), *Jalsaghar* (1958), *Devi* (1960), *Sampati* (1961), *Charulata* (1964), *Shatranj ke Khilari* (1977), *Ghare Bahire* (1984) etc. generated a cult of Satyajit Ray.

Stunt pictures became popular around the middle of the twentieth century. Examples are *Diamond Queen*, *Hind ka Lal*, *Bombaywali* (1941), *Jungle Princess*, *Muqabla* and *Return to Toofan Mail*. War propaganda films produced during the Second World War include *Dushman* (1939) by Nitin Bose; *Roti* (1942) by Mahboob; *Nurse* (1943) by Chaturbhuj Doshi; and *Panna* (1944) by S. Naqvi. With the rise of the demand for an independent state of Pakistan from the late 1930s, that theme was treated in films like *Josh e Alam* (1939) and *Muslim ka Lal* (1941). The 'gangster film' also had a place in Indian cinema and is well represented by *Jagte Raho* (1956) by A. Mitra, and *Awara* (1951) and *Sri 420* (1955) by Raj Kapoor. Cartoon films, first attempted by R. C. Boral in the 1930s, added a certain charm to the Indian cinema. *On a Moonlit Night* was Boral's first cartoon.

Colour film production began with *Ajit* (1948) by Bhavani; *Jhanak Jhanak Payal Baje* (1955) by Shantaram; and *Jhansi ki Rani* (1953) by Sohrab Modi. Colour film production was quite limited until the 1970s. By the 1980s, however, it had come to dominate the

⁹⁶ From 172 silent films and 0 talkies in 1930, and 206 silent films and 28 talkies in 1931, the situation had reversed to 7 silent films and 164 talkies by 1934, and 0 silent films and 233 talkies by 1935: see Purohit, 1988, p. 979.

Indian cinema. Now colour has become so widespread that even regional art films have discarded black-and-white.

From 1925 to 1950 heroines tended to dominate the Indian screen, to be replaced by heroes in the years 1950–75 with the rise of Dilip Kumar, Raj Kapoor and Dev Anand, who captivated audiences.⁹⁷ This trend continued with the great popularity of Rajesh Khanna, Dharmendra, Sanjeev Kumar and Amitab Bachchan. As regards the pattern of visits to the cinema, the lower the income, the higher the frequency of visits.⁹⁸

The growth of films in regional languages (i.e. Bengali, Telugu, Gujarati, Marathi, Kannada and Malyalam) was limited until the mid-twentieth century. Whereas previously 75 per cent of the total output had been represented by Hindi movies, by the 1950s regional films outnumbered Hindi movies. This was related to the shift of the capital of the Indian film industry from Bombay to Madras (now Chennai), which became the first originating centre of films during the 1970s, followed by Bombay and then Calcutta (now Kolkata).

Indian cinema has suffered somewhat with the expansion of television and video films. With the increasing popularity of television from the late 1970s, cinema attendance is decreasing. Under the impact of television, there is no doubt that the motion-picture industry will undergo many changes and will have to find new markets for its products.

⁹⁷ Purohit, 1988, p. 1050.

⁹⁸ Ryder, 1956, p. 201.

CINEMA AND THEATRE

L. L.Adams

Contents

The tsarist colonial period	785
The Soviet period	786
The post-Soviet era	792

The tsarist colonial period

Prior to colonization, there were four main kinds of theatrical performance to be found in Central Asia: courtly performances of oral poetry, music and dance by performers employed by the rulers; popular performances of oral poetry and epics, music and dance supported by merchant or noble patronage at home or in tea houses; dervish performances of religious song, oral poetry and stories of saints’ lives during rituals and holidays for a middle- and lower-class audience; and itinerant circus, minstrel and puppet troupe performances for the masses in the bazaars. With the exception of courtiers, performers generally had a low social status. Theatre was akin to a trade and performers were organized in guilds or came from professional theatrical families. In the southern parts of Central Asia, public entertainment was unacceptable for ‘virtuous’ women, who entertained each other with music and dance in the segregated courtyards of their own homes.

These different types of performers and venues roughly corresponded to differences in the content of what was performed: courtly ballads extolled the deeds of the ruler and his predecessors; oral poetry and song performed for the masses told of the adventures of ancient heroes; the tea-house culture revolved around romantic themes; Sufis propagated a mystical Islamic tradition; and entertainment for the masses was humorous, playing on

the dilemmas of domestic life and engaging in political satire and obscenity. There were considerable differences in both the form and the content of theatrical performances between rural and urban, sedentary and nomadic, and Persian and Turkic/Mongol cultural regions.

From the 1850s, Russian colonizers began to introduce into the colonial districts of major urban centres the European forms and methods of cultural production that are familiar to us today as ‘theatre’. These were also willingly adopted by the indigenous rulers, who had a long tradition of increasing their social status by successfully emulating (and occasionally improving on) another culture’s high art. Also during this period, European cultural forms were making their way into Uzbekistan through the enlightenment plans of educated Turkistanis, known as Jadids, or reformers (see above, Chapter 7). The Jadids wanted to reform their societies by introducing modern schools, new habits such as reading newspapers, and new pastimes such as going to the theatre. The Jadids bridged the distance between nineteenth-century Turkistani culture and twentieth-century Soviet culture by maintaining a continuity with the Islamic values of their society while also using theatre for the purpose of social progress.

Expatriate Tatars (from the European part of Russia) first began to perform Russian and Caucasian dramas in Turkistan in 1905, and by 1913 had their own standing theatre group in Tashkent. The Jadids appropriated the medium for their own goals and in 1911 the first Jadid play, *Padarkush* [The Patricide] by Behbudi, was performed. Starting in 1916, amateur reformist theatres on a European model were established in the larger cities under the auspices of Jadid cultural organizations. There was no film production in Central Asia until the Soviet period, though films could be viewed in the colonial centres of Central Asia in the 1910s.

The Soviet period

Shortly after the Russian revolution, the creation of republic-level institutions that would foster the ‘cultural evolution’ of Central Asians, such as the state drama theatres, was one of the main cultural priorities of the Bolsheviks. In the 1920s and 1930s, culture administration became increasingly bureaucratic and institutionalized as Central Asian cultures were given new direction, shaped by new cultural forms as well as socialist cultural content. New theatres were established to foster development in drama, dance and opera, and the politicization of art included rewards for those artists who embraced the proletarian spirit and conformed to the state ideology. Entirely new theatrical genres were introduced, such as opera and ballet, and new kinds of theatrical organizations and schools were

opened. Folk culture was institutionalized in professional dance and musical troupes. This flowering of cultural activity should not be naively seen as a Central Asian cultural renaissance, however, since culture was being transformed as it was 'developed'. In areas such as Mongolia, which were under Soviet influence, communist culture also influenced the development of European-style theatre in the 1920s. Mongolia's State Drama Theatre was established in 1931 and during the 1930s performed the same sorts of revolutionary dramas as could be found in the theatres of Russia.

During the 1930s, these cultural changes took a much more repressive direction than they had during the experimental 1920s. The state began not just to reward those who cooperated with Soviet ideology, but to punish those who dissented. During the Terror, not only dissenters but also too-successful communists were jailed or killed. Many Central Asian artists and intellectuals were killed or sent into exile during the purges of the 1930s. Other less ominous developments took place as the state began to implement in Central Asia socialist policies that had previously been mere rhetoric or had been implemented only in the European part of the Soviet Union. Professional theatre workers' associations and schools for the arts were established to ensure that culture was properly channelled through the organs of the state.

From the mid-1930s to the early 1940s, European theatrical genres began to incorporate local literary and folkloric traditions and theatre-goers could visit both Russian-language and local-language performances. During this period, each of the Central Asian republics had its first 'national' operas and ballets performed. The earliest national opera was the Kazakh *Kyz-Jibek* (1934) and the earliest national ballet was the Uzbek *Pakhta* (1933). Also during this period a number of local-language musical theatres were opened in Central Asia, enjoying more success during the subsequent decades than theatres employing European musical genres.

In 1924 the first Central Asian film studio opened in Bukhara (Uzbekistan) and in the years that followed, all the Central Asian republics set up their own studios: Turkmenistan (1926); Kazakhstan (a documentary unit in 1929 and a film studio in 1934); Tajikistan (a documentary unit in 1930); and Kyrgyzstan (a documentary unit in 1942). Mongolian cinema began in the mid-1930s but the production of feature films was intermittent until the 1960s. Most of the films made in Central Asia before 1940 were silent, and documentary films preceded feature films by several years. Due to the fact that even feature films were subject to the Soviet goals of education and enlightenment, there was frequently little difference in the content of documentary and feature films. One of the artistically most outstanding of these documentaries was *Turksib* (1929), which tells the tale of the motivation behind and the challenges involved in building the Turkistan–Siberian railroad.

Since cinema was entirely a foreign import to Central Asia, most of the early feature films from these studios were made by ideologically sound but less talented directors and film crews from Russia. This resulted in films that displayed Central Asian exotica for European audiences while clumsily projecting a pro-revolutionary message to local audiences. Titles such as the Tajik film *From Cotton to Cloth* indicate the deadly earnestness and agitprop orientation of these early Central Asian films. Cinema (as well as theatre) in Uzbekistan first focused on the liberation of the 'Eastern woman' (*Musul'manka*, 1925; *Vtoraia zhena* and *Chadra*, 1927) and then on the civil war and anti-Soviet resistance (*Shakaly ravata*, 1927; *Krytyi furgon*, 1928; *Posledniy bek*, 1930). In 1931 the first Turkmen feature film, *Zabyt' nel'zia*, was produced. Kyrgyz film did not really take off until the 1940s and Kyrgyzstan's film industry languished until the mid-1960s. Cinema in Kazakhstan was somewhat more developed than in the other republics and began using Kazakh actors in the late 1930s. The film *Amangeldy* (1939), about the role of the Kazakh worker in establishing Soviet power in Kazakhstan, is considered the foundation film of Kazakh national cinema.

The content of Central Asian theatrical productions closely paralleled the content of film. Productions of the mid-1930s to the early 1940s reflected the artistic doctrine of the time, socialist realism. For example, the first multi-act Tajik drama was *Bor'ba* (1933), about the struggle against the anti-Soviet Basmachi movement. In Kazakhstan, the plays of the contemporary author Auezov, such as the historical drama *Abai* (1940), were very popular. The main exceptions to the iron grip of socialist realism were plays by ideologically correct Russian authors such as Gogol, Western authors whose work was acceptable to the Communist Party (such as Schiller, Molière, Gozzi and Goldoni) and classics, such as Shakespeare's *Othello* (which was first performed in Tajik in 1939, in Uzbek in 1941 and in Turkmen in 1954). Plays by Shakespeare and other foreign authors such as Brecht remain popular to this day.

The Second World War era was, compared to the Terror, a time of cultural liberalization in the Soviet Union. In Central Asia, the arts were influenced by two phenomena related to the war. First, both male and female performers joined the army and entertained the troops, coming into contact with performers and soldiers from other parts of the Union, sharing their national cultures and becoming decorated war heroes and veterans – this conferred special status and privileges in the Soviet Union after the war. Second, evacuees from European Russia who lived in Central Asia had a huge impact on local cultural institutions. Many of the Soviet Union's leading artists lived in Tashkent or Alma-Ata (now Almaty) during the war, and some of them stayed even longer or made Central Asia their 'second home' after their return to Russia. These refugees established theatrical institutes

and choreography schools so that they could continue to work during the war, and these institutions lived on even if their founders departed after the war. While this was not an intentional policy of Russification, the activities of these European refugees led to increased Russian influence over local cultural development.

Central Asia became the centre of Soviet film production during the Second World War, when many artists were evacuated to the region from the European parts of the Soviet Union. *Ivan the Terrible*, one of the most famous films by the great Soviet director Sergei Eisenstein, was shot in Alma-Ata. Dushanbe (Tajikistan) became a centre for the production of Soviet children's films. As would be expected, most of the Central Asian films of the 1940s focused on patriotic and heroic themes and these films (mostly by directors from Ukraine and Russia) focused on the struggles taking place in the European parts of the Soviet Union more than on so-called national themes, which had been the focus of film in the 1920s and 1930s. The exception to this was Uzbek cinema, which continued to produce feature films such as Ganiev's *Takhir i Zukhra* (1945), based on pre-revolutionary literary themes, a trend which spread to Tajikistan in the 1950s and to the other Central Asian republics in the 1960s.

By the 1950s the Central Asian republics and Mongolia boasted most of the main theatrical institutions found in every Soviet republic: opera and ballet theatres, conservatories, drama theatres, dance schools and ensembles, a writers' union and a ministry of cultural affairs. Regional cultural diversity had been thoroughly institutionalized through schools and professional troupes that performed and propagated distinct styles of national dance and song. The repertoires of professional theatres throughout northern Central Asia focused on works by European playwrights such as Shakespeare, Brecht and Gorky, though local playwrights were also encouraged to produce works on revolutionary themes.

The 1950s were also an era of intensified development of Central Asian rural and folk culture. The state accumulated the resources to act on its promise to raise the cultural level of the rural population, establishing *kolkhoz* (collective farm) music schools and theatre troupes through local 'houses of culture'. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, cinema also became more institutionalized with the formation of a Union of Cinematographers in each of the republics. Between 1955 and 1960, the relatively tiny film industries of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan averaged one feature film a year. The larger studios in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were able to diversify their production. While Kazakh and Uzbek films still focused on historical themes, the genre of films about everyday life began to develop during this period.

The power of the Soviet state over culture increased in the 1960s, even as the Khrushchev thaw gave opportunities for freer creative expression. The policies of Kul'tprosvet, the

state's cultural enlightenment organization, became even more standardized and dogmatic than they had been during Stalin's time: the ideology had always been there but the state had not been able to fully implement it until the Brezhnev era. The material resources of the state allowed the system of houses of culture to greatly expand during the 1960s and the 1970s, institutionalizing amateur arts activities. The state was able to turn its energies from basic cultural tasks such as literacy and elementary education to more subtle forms of cultural engineering such as imposing new socialist ceremonies and expanding the activities of the Komsomol (the communist youth organization) to include youth theatres and other edifying artistic pastimes. By the mid-1980s, youth theatre in Soviet Central Asia was actually one of the most dynamic realms of culture production, often daring to perform works that would be considered too radical by professional theatres.

In this era of prosperity and Soviet expansionism, Tashkent became the Soviet Union's model city of third-world development, serving as a shining example of Soviet cultural policies for Marxist regimes and parties around the world. Tashkent hosted the Soviet Union's main film festivals, art exhibitions and writers' conferences attended by artists from all over Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. From 1968 through the 1980s, Tashkent hosted the International Film Festival of the Countries of Asia and Africa. Soviet international cultural influence was also felt in other parts of Central Asia under communist influence. By the 1970s, Mongolia was producing about three feature films a year.

The film industries of the Soviet republics also began to develop more rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, as local directors returned from their training in Moscow and Leningrad full of inspiration. During the Khrushchev thaw of the 1960s, directors took advantage of the relative freedom they found working far from Moscow, and many interesting films were made both by Central Asian directors and by Europeans working in Central Asia with Central Asian themes. The most famous example of the latter is Vladimir Motyl's *Beloe solntse pustyny* [The White Sun of the Desert] (1970), a Central Asian action film that takes place during the Russian civil war. Representing the former, the films of Ali Khamraev such as his 'Soviet Easterns', and his film about early Soviet Uzbekistan, *Bez strakha* [Without Fear] (1972), continue to stand today for the best of Soviet Central Asian cinema. While Khamraev's work set the story-telling style of subsequent Uzbek cinema, Tolomush Okeev's lyrical cinematic style set the standard for Kyrgyz cinema (e.g. *Lutiy* [The Fierce One], 1973). Films from the Kyrgyz SSR, such as *Pereval* [The Mountain Pass] (1961), *Znoi* [Heat] (1963), *Pervyi uchitel'* [The First Teacher] (1965) and *Djamilia* (1969), interwove Soviet socialist values, the profundities of everyday life, and Central Asian concerns with family and the environment. One of the highlights of Kyrgyz

cinema was the production of films based on the work of the well-loved contemporary writer, Tchinguiz Aytmatov (b. 1928).

Kazakh cinema took off in the late 1980s in what is known as the Kazakh new wave. In 1984 Russian film-maker Sergei Soloviev organized a workshop at the Moscow State Film Institute (VGIK), specifically for the training of young Kazakh film directors. The effort was a deliberate attempt by Moscow to boost the quantity and quality of production in Kazakhstan and by all accounts it was a spectacular success. New-wave directors included Ardak Amirkulov, Serik Aprimov, Abay Karpykov, Rashid Nugmanov, Ermek Shinarbaev and Talgat Temenov. Highlights of the new wave that continue to be shown at international film festivals include *The Needle* (1988), *The Last Stop* (1989), *The Fall of Otrar* (1990) and *Kairat* (1991). The simple, bleak films of the Kazakh new wave tended to be refreshingly free of the didactic tone of most previous Soviet cinema, and focused mainly on the alienation of youth and the social problems of Soviet society.

Unlike the capitalist countries, where market-driven organizations such as film studios, the recording industry and audience research companies are the means through which innovation and quality are fostered or held back, a very different configuration of entities shaped the development of Soviet culture in Central Asia during the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras. Nearly all culture production was channelled through the ministry of culture and various professional unions. For example, amateur performers were affiliated with a local house of culture, which provided them with scripts, costumes and venues. Professional actors received salaries from theatres, television and radio companies, or film studios.

At the top of the theatrical hierarchy were the professional associations closely linked with the ideological apparatus of the Communist Party. Theatre and cinema policy was decided or at least funnelled through the Union of Theatrical Workers and Goskino, which controlled all film production in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, actors, script writers and directors lived well and were taken care of by their trade union. They received fairly high salaries, and awards and bonuses from the state, were provided with housing by the union, and were well respected in society. The Soviet state also provided Central Asian artists with opportunities for extensive travel and touring productions, mainly throughout the Soviet Union, but most performers also travelled abroad on state-funded tours at least once in their life. Central Asian theatres often participated in so-called 'decades of culture' (festivals featuring the culture of a particular nationality), which were held in communist bloc countries on a regular basis. Touring became one of the sources of pride for Central Asian theatres and the exposure to theatrical traditions in other parts of the world was

an important source of inspiration for artists. Much of this changed very rapidly with the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union.

The post-Soviet era

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, theatre and cinema in Central Asia have struggled to survive. In the years following independence, the Central Asian states have taken rather different paths in their cultural policies, but in all cases the personnel in the theatre and cinema business have suffered economic hardship and crises of artistic and professional identity. Throughout Central Asia, the abandoning of the doctrines of socialist ideology has also meant both localization and globalization: a new stress on national heritage as well as a growing orientation towards international tastes. In the major cities of Central Asia, tourists and expatriates make up much of the population who can now afford a ticket to the theatre, but in many cases, indigenous audiences also support plays which explore local historical or cultural themes and experimental productions that comment on contemporary life. In most of the capital cities, theatre continues to be performed in the local language as well as in Russian and in the language of minority nationalities such as German or Uighur. Puppet theatre, seen as an indigenous theatrical tradition, is now even more popular than it was during the Soviet era and numerous new puppet theatres have been created, especially in Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have both withdrawn most of the state subsidies that supported theatre in the past, with the result that many theatres have closed. Those that survived the first decade of independence, however, have revitalized their repertoire and are more interesting than they were before. One example of the revitalization of theatrical life in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) is the Art-Ordo Theatre Festival, which showcases plays by theatres from several Turkic-speaking countries and regions of the Russian Federation. The Kazakh new wave set the stage for an international appreciation of post-Soviet Kazakh and Kyrgyz cinema, with international 'Silk Road' film festivals composed mainly of Kazakh and Kyrgyz films. The films that attracted the most attention are *Jylama* [Don't Cry] (Kazakhstan, 2003), *Killer* (Kazakhstan, 1998), *Altyn kyrghol* [My Brother Silk Road] (Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan, 2001), *Beshkempir* [The Adopted Son] (Kyrgyzstan, 1998), *Ovuz* [The Orator] (Uzbekistan, 2000) and *Mal'chiki v nebe* [Boys in the Sky] (Uzbekistan, 2002).

Central Asian cinema from the 1960s onwards was generally characterized by a low-key sensibility: simple stories about simple lives. The trend in post-Soviet Uzbek cinema has been in a different direction, with film-making taking inspiration from Bollywood,

not in terms of musical content, but in terms of a more bombastic aesthetic. This is largely due to the fact that with 25 million people, Uzbekistan has a large consumer base for Uzbek-language films, whereas film-making in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is still more oriented to the art-house market. The state also continues to subsidize cinema in Uzbekistan, leading to a duller, more pedagogical content that is sometimes reminiscent of the Soviet era. The same is true of much of Uzbekistan's theatre, since all but two of the country's theatres are still state-run. While the main Russian and Uzbek academic drama theatres (Fig. 1) in Tashkent continue to produce high-quality plays, the Ilkhom Theatre in Tashkent and the Eski Masjid from Karshi are the only theatres free of direct state control.

Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, each with a population of just a few million, all face a similar problem: a very small market for theatre and cinema in the local language. However, since they had very different political regimes during the early post-Soviet period, the arts are thriving to a greater degree in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan's president has not only removed many state subsidies, but has closed most of the country's cultural institutions. Turkmen directors can often be found working in exile (even neighbouring Uzbekistan's authoritarian climate attracts some Turkmen directors), though many Turkmen artists have simply fled into exile in Moscow or Almaty.

After Tajikistan's civil war (1992–7), Tajik cinema was brightened by the films of Jamshed Usmanov and Bakhtior Khudoinazarov, who have overcome some of the



FIG. 1. Tashkent. Uzbek National Academic Drama Theatre. (Photo: Courtesy of L. L. Adams.)

limitations of the Tajik film industry by engaging in joint-venture productions with studios in Europe and Asia. Cinema in post-Soviet Tajikistan has also been heavily influenced by the flourishing film industry in the Islamic Republic of Iran, since the Tajik language is closely related to Persian.

Theatre in Tajikistan has struggled for survival. The repertoire of Dushanbe's Lakhuti Tajik Academic Drama Theatre includes classics such as *Oedipus Rex*, historical dramas written in response to state-sponsored nation-building campaigns (e.g. *Ismoili Somoni*, a play about the national hero of Tajikistan), as well as contemporary dramas and plays based on Sufi and Greek parables. In short, theatre in post-Soviet Tajikistan is being sustained but cannot be said to be thriving.

ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN PLANNING
IN NORTHERN CENTRAL ASIA FROM
THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST TO THE
SOVIET PERIOD (1865–1990)*

M. Azzout

Contents

Introduction	795
Architecture and urban planning during the tsarist period (nineteenth and early twentieth centuries)	797
Architecture and urban planning during the Soviet period (1920s–90s)	807
Conclusion	832

Introduction

The history of the cities and architecture of Central Asia in the latter part of the nineteenth century and nearly the whole of the twentieth century is unique in many respects, due to the fact that the region experienced not only a colonial period – like the rest of the Islamic world – but also the Soviet period. As far as urban planning was concerned, each of these periods was marked by a severe disruption of the existing situation, leading ultimately to a radical break with tradition. During the colonial period, cities came to be characterized by a morphological parallelism, while the Soviet period brought innovations of unprecedented scope.

* See Maps 1 and 2.

The driving force behind these innovations was a deliberate attempt, for the first time in history, to recast long-established social, economic and political structures into an egalitarian society of a kind that had never been known before. Inevitably, cities and urban architecture were affected by the resultant upheavals. The old legal systems were abolished and social institutions were replaced by new ones; in a word, Central Asia found itself caught up in a whirlwind of far-reaching change.

One of the most significant breaks with the past was the abolition, in 1929, of the status of the *waqf*¹ land and property. This paved the way for the alteration, even the destruction, of part of the traditional urban fabric. Urbanization proceeded at an accelerating rate in response to the advance of industrialization and the large-scale population transfers that took place in the post-war period (1940–5). In contrast to cities in the Islamic world, which had no operational urban planning until a fairly late date (1960s–70s), the cities of Central Asia were given urban development master plans for the reconstruction and development of the cities (*General'niy plan rekonstruktsii gorod* [Genplan]) as long ago as the 1930s and 1940s. Those Genplans were put into effect in the 1950s, and a remodelling of the urban spatial environment resulted. One of the features of that remodelling was the construction – on a vast scale – of buildings designed in unfamiliar styles to serve unfamiliar functions.

The uniqueness of the cities of Central Asia thus consists in ‘objective’ properties that have endowed them with particular interest as urban entities. In this chapter, we will analyse the successive stages in their growth and the general characteristics of the architecture of Central Asia as it evolved during the colonial (tsarist) and Soviet periods. The first part analyses the features of Central Asian and Russian colonial cities and examines the different ways in which architects adopted, interpreted and combined Central Asian architectural languages with Russian architectural languages.

The second part considers the successive steps leading to the creation of the ‘aesthetic paradigm’ of a Soviet architectural and urban policy that sought to affirm the new political order. Such a paradigm should not be seen as the materialization of a frozen ideological corpus, but rather as an expression of its own temporality characterized by phases of construction, consolidation and crisis. Architectural and urban policy in Soviet Central Asia was indeed clearly correlated with the historical development of cultural, social and industrial policies. Following the slump of the 1920s, Central Asian architecture flowered, with ‘icon-building’ giving the various expressions of a ‘national style’. This process matured until 1955, when all efforts were concentrated on modernizing the ‘craft-industries’ through mechanization and standardization processes. Those considerations led to a plain style of

¹ A *waqf* is an Islamic charitable foundation consisting of property in mortmain. Income from the property was used essentially for the construction and maintenance of bridges, caravanserais, mosques, *madrasas*, etc.

architecture and urbanization which, with the ambitious social policy of the 1970s–90s, was influenced by an international style, while nevertheless taking account of the region's social and climatic characteristics.

Architecture² and urban planning during the tsarist period (nineteenth and early twentieth centuries)

URBAN TRANSFORMATION DURING THE TSARIST PERIOD

Before the Russians conquered Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century, many of the cities retained the main characteristics of the Central Asian Islamic urban structure.³ It is true that in terms of appearance they reflected different historical periods: the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries dominate in Samarkand whereas the sixteenth and seventeenth are the focus of Bukhara, and the nineteenth and twentieth are dominant in Khiva. Consequently their urban landscapes differed in some respects. However, various features of their structure and organization, and one characteristic institution, in particular, are similar enough to be noteworthy.

Every Central Asian city was surrounded by a wall, or even, in exceptional cases, two walls,⁴ pierced by ten to twelve *darwāzas* (gates) and six or seven *tachiks* (passages). The structure of the four main avenues leading into the *shahristān* (centre of the city) might be radial (as in the case of Kokand, Tashkent and Samarkand) or octagonal (as in the case of Khiva and Bukhara). The buildings representing religion (the great mosque) and the civil authorities (the citadel and the palace) were concentrated in the *shahristān*, around a main square lined with merchants' establishments; the square led to the main avenue containing the bazaar.⁵ In every city, the main streets served to demarcate four *dakhas* (administrative areas), each of which had its own *qāzī* (Islamic judge). The secondary streets were a warren of narrow lanes and blind alleys that made up the city's *rabads* (residential areas). These *rabads* consisted of *mahallas* (independent units),⁶ each of which contained a number of houses and managed its own affairs. Each *mahalla* boasted a public centre directed by an *aqsaqal* (lit. 'whitebeard', elder),⁷ a mosque, a *chāy khāneh* (tea shop) and various commercial establishments.

² On the architecture of traditional housing, see Voronina, 1951.

³ On this, see Shishkin, 1943; Lavrov, 1950; Sukhareva, 1976b, pp. 132–48; Sukhareva, 1958.

⁴ The city of Khiva comprised two parts: the outer city (*duchan-kala*) and the inner city (*ichan-kala*). Each part was enclosed by a wall.

⁵ See McChesney, 1987, pp. 217–42.

⁶ On the *mahallahs* of Tashkent, see Mallitskogo, 1927.

⁷ *Aqsaqals* were chosen by consensus from among the group's oldest, most experienced and influential men. Russians called them *starshinas* (responsible for collecting taxes and other administrative duties).

The second major characteristic of Central Asian cities, and, indeed, cities elsewhere in the Islamic world, was the institution known as the *waqf*, or charitable foundation. As mentioned above, a *waqf* was the result of an inalienable donation of a piece of land or other real estate the management of which was entrusted to a pious institution and the income from which went to support either some charitable purpose or particular individuals. The point to note here is the ‘inertia’ of such an arrangement: the institution was extremely widespread, and *waqfs* were very numerous; furthermore, as noted, the property involved was inalienable. The combined effect of these attributes was to make the *waqf* system a very powerful force that tended to freeze landownership in cities and even whole districts, and, thereby, to prevent change in their structures and landscapes.⁸ As such, they were a factor in keeping the cities of Central Asia generally ‘static’.

Following the Russian conquest, the cities became the main arena in which Central Asian societies were confronted, submerged and destabilized by the full technological, legal and cultural panoply of the tsarist empire. The development of capitalism, the rise of cotton-processing industries and the building of the Transcaspian Railway were all crucial factors in bringing change to the cities of Central Asia. Housing estates for workers employed in the new industries or on the railway sprang up on their outskirts. In addition, the cities experienced substantial population inflows, especially in the late 1880s following the construction of the Transcaspian Railway: between 1865 and 1897 the population of Tashkent⁹ rose from 100,000 to 156,000, and by 1912 it had grown to 253,000;¹⁰ the population of Samarkand rose from 25,000 to 55,128 between 1865 and 1897 and by 1914 it had grown to 97,550.¹¹

Between 1865 and the end of the following decade, six colonial cities were established in ‘Uzbekistan’:¹² Tashkent (1865), Samarkand¹³ (1868–72), Kokand (1875), Novy Marghilan (1876), Namangan (1877) and Novy Bukhara (1887). The function of these cities was to accommodate military garrisons, bureaucrats, civil servants and businessmen. In most cases, the colonial settlement was located near the old city, which was frequently referred to as the ‘indigenous city’. Nevertheless certain settlements, especially in southern

⁸ Chaline, 1996, p. 75.

⁹ By the end of the nineteenth/early twentieth century, Tashkent equalled Zurich in size, while Kazan and Samara had as many people as Athens or Venice, Damascus or Algiers. See *European Historical Statistics*, 1975, pp. 76–8, *The World Almanac & Book of Facts*, 1984, p. 202, and *International Historical Statistics*, 1982, pp. 66–71, for comparative data. Figures for several Russian cities differ widely from source to source and also according to the time of year when the census was taken. See Hamm (ed.), 1986.

¹⁰ Dobromyslov, 1912, p. 70.

¹¹ In 1893 the population of the Russian part of the city of Samarkand was 10,128 inhabitants; among them were 4,823 military families.

¹² Chabrov, 1960, p. 222.

¹³ On the city of Samarkand, see Sadkulov, 1973.

Semirechye and the north-west of Syr Darya *oblast'*,¹⁴ were a pure colonial creation and the influence of the 'old city' was insignificant. The function of these cities was mainly to accommodate Russian bureaucrats and farmers. They were the creations of topographers and military engineers and were designed from a single model.

However, these cities¹⁵ came to display different patterns of development, depending on how much room there was for them to grow at the sites where they were established. Three modes of expansion may be distinguished: in some cases the Russian colonial settlement sprawled around the traditional city; in others it developed as a parallel entity; and in still others the city was built on 'new land', well away from the existing urban area or small villages.

- Where communication routes (such as railway lines in the case of Bukhara) were remote from the traditional city, urban development proceeded through the creation of satellite communities in such parts of the site as were suitable for urbanization.
- Another mode of expansion resulted from a deliberate decision to build the new town in close proximity to the traditional city, giving rise to a parallel urban entity, as occurred with Samarkand, Chimkent, Tashkent, Namangan, Andijan and others.
- Lastly, the establishment of new towns at 'new land' as Verny (Alma-Ata), Pishpek, Novy Marghilan (Skobelev) or at the locations that were insignificant in urban terms, as in the case of Ashkhabad, Termez, and many others, produced cities that were exclusively colonial creations.

For the first and third case the octagonal system was commonly adopted. The linear configuration of buildings along two main avenues (transversal and longitudinal) leading into the centre of the city was a distinctive feature of the city's pattern of development. In fact, the octagonal wide streets as well as irrigation-ditches and tree-lined avenues were planned following the ideal of the 'garden city'. This master plan was adopted in Novy Bukhara and in almost all the colonial cities of southern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The master plan of Pishpek¹⁶ in 1872 defined the future development of the city: two main crossing streets divide the city in four symmetrical parts. The commercial and administrative buildings and the cathedral were concentrated in the centre around a square. These features of layout were adopted for the city pattern of development of Verny (Alma-Ata). It is important to underline that the urban development of the colonial cities of Semirechye and the north-west of Syr Darya *oblast'* were very different from the colonial cities of

¹⁴ On the colonial cities of Semirechye and the north-west of Syr Darya *oblast'*, see Mendikulov, [1959](#).

¹⁵ On the urban history of late imperial Russia, see Hamm (ed.), [1986](#).

¹⁶ On the master plan of Pishpek, see Lazarenko, [1951](#), p. 125.



FIG. 1. Tashkent. Schematic master plan. Beginning of the twentieth century. (Source: Archive, Ministry of Culture of Uzbekistan.)

Turkistan governor-generalship: they were not surrounded by walls as in the old cities of Central Asia.

Thus in the presence of the surrounding wall, the radioconcentric system was commonly adopted for Russian colonial cities. It consisted of a series of major streets radiating outwards from a central square, connected by semicircular secondary streets. The central square was used for military parades; the garrison, the barracks and sometimes even some houses for senior civilian administrators were located nearby. This system was used for the first time at Tashkent in 1865 (Fig. 1), and that city served as a model for virtually all the subsequent Russian settlements in Turkistan governor-generalship.

Kokand was an exception in that it was designed in accordance with a linear planning system (not radioconcentric or octagonal) (Fig. 2). With 82,000 inhabitants in 1897, Kokand was the second largest city in the region after Tashkent. It was the capital of the khanate, and by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it had become a prestigious centre of capitalist industry and trade, thanks to cotton-growing and cotton-processing. New types of buildings, notably commercial buildings and banks, were erected in substantial numbers, mainly along one of the main streets, which gradually became the new heart of the city. In Kokand, the linear configuration of buildings along one main avenue was a distinctive feature of the city's pattern of development. Linear development




FIG. 2. Kokand. Schematic plan of the Russian part. (Source: Archive, Ministry of Culture of Uzbekistan.)

on an octagonal pattern occurred to a lesser extent in Namangan, 'New Bukhara' and in part of the city of Samarkand.

Concurrently, other Central Asian cities, especially the larger ones such as Tashkent and Samarkand, were being transformed as the tsarist authorities carried out extensive renovations. Their streets were widened, paved and renamed, new buildings of the Russian colonial type were erected, and new commercial firms invaded the major thoroughfares. New urban systems thus arose, characterized by greater or lesser degrees of fragmentation, depending on the pattern of development of the settlements, with their space organized in novel ways, and featuring a mixture of new and old elements in varying proportions.

ARCHITECTURE OF THE TSARIST PERIOD

Rebirth of traditional civil and religious architecture: restoration and construction

The rise of a local bourgeoisie, born of the cotton industry and the trade in cotton, contributed to an architectural revival in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. *Waqfs* proliferated, providing funds for the restoration of substantial numbers of ancient monuments, while large-scale investment focused on new architectural projects and urban development. It is important to bear in mind that the tsarist authorities took very little

interest in the ancient monuments of the conquered civilizations, and as a result their ranks included no real experts in Central Asia. It was only after the death of General von Kaufman (governor-general of Turkistan) in 1882 and the accession of Tsar Alexander III (1881–96) that various movements were founded in an effort to ‘break’ with the policy of ‘ignorance’ that had prevailed ever since the conquest. The Amateur Archaeology Circle,¹⁷ founded in 1895 and financed partly by the local bourgeoisie, and the Turkistan branch of the Russian Geographic Society, founded in 1897 in Samarkand, undertook the tasks of studying and restoring the region’s imposing monuments. At the same time, palaces, mosques and *madrasas* were flourishing in Khiva, Kokand, Bukhara and many other cities.

The School of Architecture and Local Builders in Samarkand, to take only one example, single-handedly developed and executed at least 34 projects after 1865, including 16 in the early years of the twentieth century, just before the October 1917 revolution. Dozens of skilled *ganchakars* (plasterers) or *gilkārs* (carvers) and *naqqāshs* (decorators) lavished their skills on the beautification of newly erected buildings. The Yangi Masjid (mosque), for example, was built in Dahbed in Samarkand *oblast’* in 1902, and there were many other buildings that could be mentioned.¹⁸

Khiva’s architecture was essentially monumental, with almost nothing to differentiate it from that of the first half of the nineteenth century, as may be seen from the Dust-Alama *madrasa* of 1882, the Kazy Kaljna Salim-Akhuna of 1905, and the ‘Abdurasul Baja and the Yusup Jasaul-Bashi of 1906; it was not until the early years of the twentieth century, when Islam Khoja (the khan’s vizier and a member of his family) introduced his political reforms, that new building techniques began to attract some interest.¹⁹ Russian architect-engineers were invited in from Tashkent and Moscow, and in collaboration with local master builders they helped erect new buildings for the German farmers who had been settled on lands around Khiva.²⁰ In this way, new building techniques were combined with local traditions. New buildings within the *ichan-kala* (inner city) illustrate these changes, notably the minaret built in 1910 by the master builder Khudaibergen Khoja (which at a height of 44.6 m and measuring 9.5 m in diameter is one of the largest in Central Asia), the Islam Khoja *madrasa* built in 1913, and various others.

In Tashkent, the policy of ‘openness’ adopted by the new tsar resulted in the construction of a great mosque in Tashkent in 1886. The new building, erected on the ruins of

¹⁷ On this matter, see Lunin, 1958.

¹⁸ Bulatova and Notkin, 1963, pp. 30–1; Zahidov, 1965, pp. 143–50; Sprague, 1994, p. 490.

¹⁹ Nil’sen, 1988, p. 156.

²⁰ Pugachenkova, 1976, p. 181; Nil’sen, 1988, p. 156.

what had been a fifteenth-century mosque (Khoja Ahrar), was ‘remarkable for its form and technique, thanks to Russian engineers, who introduced Gothic and Byzantine elements’.²¹

Tsarist architecture in Central Asia: an experimental laboratory

While Central Asian architecture underwent a ‘renaissance’, the Russian colonial towns were becoming a laboratory for Russian architects who had no outlet for their skills in their native land. All the styles currently in vogue in Russia appeared in Central Asia, albeit reinterpreted on occasion to suit local tastes.

Pseudo-Russian and classical architecture of Central Asia

In the course of time, the pseudo-Russian style came to be widespread in Central Asia. It was adopted essentially for Christian religious buildings, including Tashkent cathedral designed by A. N. Rezanov,²² the cathedral in Novy Marghilan designed by I. S. Kitner, and the ‘*treugol’nik*’ church in Kokand, which was the work of A. L. Benois,²³ but also for commercial or administrative buildings, such as the government bank in Samarkand. In Central Asia, this Russian variant of a medieval revival carried with it the idea of tsarist supremacy and domination over the conquered lands. ‘It was based upon the complexities of sixteenth-century brickwork such as that used in the mighty Vasiliy Blazhenniy cathedral on Red Square.’²⁴ Alongside the pseudo-Russian style, classicism remained in vogue. The twin houses built by V. S. Ge’ntsel’man²⁵ in 1904 for the Mandalaka brothers (a firm of wealthy merchants) represent one of the period’s most significant examples of classicism (Fig. 3). Other buildings in that style include the Duma in Tashkent, which was designed by A. L. Benois and E. P. Dubrovich²⁶ (Fig. 4).

²¹ Pugachenkova and Rempel’, 1958, pp. 150–1.

²² Academician Rezanov attended the St Petersburg Academy of Arts. He worked in Tashkent as an architect.

²³ Benois attended in 1865 the St Petersburg Academy of Arts, he received the title of independent artist (*svobodniy khudozhnik*). From 1874 to 1890 he worked in Tashkent as architect for Syr Darya region. He died in 1903.

²⁴ Sprague, 1994, p. 502.

²⁵ Ge’ntsel’man, the senior architect for the project, was a civil engineer who attended the St Petersburg Institute of Engineering. He had worked in Central Asia since 1875.

²⁶ Dubrovich was a civil engineer. In 1890 with Benois, they built the exhibition pavilion in Tashkent. Dubrovich was head architect of the city of Tashkent from 1897 to 1898. From 1902 to 1910 he worked as engineer of Samarkand *oblast’*.




FIG. 3. Kokand. Twin houses built for Mandalaka brothers. Architect: V. S. Ge'ntsel'man. 1904. (Source: Archive, Ministry of Culture of Uzbekistan.)




FIG. 4. Tashkent. Sketch for the Duma. Architects: A. L. Benois and E. P. Dubrovich. 1898. (Source: Archive, Ministry of Culture of Uzbekistan.)

Local interpretations of eclecticism: borrowing from the Central Asian style in tsarist architecture

Eclecticism was also a feature of Central Asian colonial architecture. It was an outgrowth of the appearance of new technology and the economic prosperity that characterized the region at that time. Appropriately enough, it found expression in administrative, cultural and social buildings, such as hospitals, libraries, theatres and cinemas. It was drawn from various sources, in some instances during the construction of a single building. The

Russo-Chinese Bank built in Samarkand in 1910 by I. A. Markevich²⁷ is a good example. By combining two heterogeneous elements, a façade in neoclassical style and a modern 'art nouveau' style of decoration, the architect created a new and original composition. Some architects combined the Russian architectural language with that of Central Asia. In designing the residence of the governor of Ferghana *oblast'*, for example, A. I. Lekhanov²⁸ applied the principles of classical Russian architecture in association with Gothic arches.

In some instances, collaboration between Russian engineers and architects and local master builders resulted in buildings in which Russian architecture was associated with a Central Asian style of interior decoration: in the governor-general's house in Tashkent, for example, which was built in 1870, some rooms were decorated entirely by local artisans. Similarly, all the brickwork of the Sergei Circus in Tashkent was the work of Uzbek artisans under the direction of A. A. Burmestera.²⁹ This effort to combine Russian architecture and Central Asian decoration was also reflected in the new palaces that were built for the khans and emirs of the region.

Reciprocal borrowings of style and building techniques

Many Russian architects, then, worked with local master builders in creating new palaces. Emirs and khans appear to have adopted a broader range of stylistic references, introducing Russian elements into their new palaces. Both the style and the interior layout of the rooms in the Sitori Mahi Khoja palace in Bukhara and the Khudayar Khan palace in Kokand were a blend of 'European' and local tastes. Both palaces were overloaded with interior decoration, and the bedrooms, which would ordinarily have been left undecorated, resembled those found in the homes of wealthy Russians.³⁰ Russian engineers and architects like I. P. Sakovich³¹ and I. A. Margulis unquestionably made a major contribution to the new palaces of the khan of Khiva and the emir of Bukhara. The style of the emir's palace in

²⁷ Markevich was a civil engineer who attended the St Petersburg Institute of Engineering. From 1908 he worked as an architect in Syr Darya *oblast'*. From 1915 to 1916 he was the head architect of the city of Tashkent.

²⁸ In 1871 a builders' commission was established and from 1871 to 1877 the military engineer of the governor of Turkistan, I. A. Lekhanov, was the head of this commission and controlled the construction of all Turkistan governor-generalship. After 1877 different sections were set up in Turkistan and the engineer of the *oblast'* was in charge of one of these sections. In 1885 a builders' committee was established.

²⁹ Dobromyslov, 1912, p. 315.

³⁰ Nil'sen, 1988, p. 148.

³¹ Sakovich was a civil engineer. From 1881 to 1887 he worked as engineer of Ferghana *oblast'*. By the end of 1899, he worked in the cities of the emirate of Bukhara and built different buildings such as the building of the political agent in 1885 and in 1893 the main church of New Bukhara (modern Kagan).




FIG. 5. Kagan. Palace of the emir of Bukhara. Architects: I. P. Sakovich and I. A. Margulis. (Source: Archive, Ministry of Culture of Uzbekistan.)

Novy Bukhara (Kagan), in particular, was such a mixture of hybrid form and volume with a Central Asian type of interior decoration as to defy definition (Fig. 5).

Similarly, the homes built by wealthy local merchants are noteworthy for their innovative styles and construction techniques. This phenomenon can be explained partly by the new frame of reference adopted by some of the native bourgeoisie, and partly by the frequent earthquakes that occurred in Central Asia during that period (Tashkent in 1866 and 1886, Verny [Alma-Ata] in 1887 and the Andijan region in 1902). Following these earthquakes, a commission of inquiry was established, which in due course issued comments and recommendations on the subject of building construction that were published in the local press. The earthquakes had been so severe that the importance of new building techniques was immediately recognized.³² In civil architecture, fired clay brick was adopted for basement walls, iron and other metals were used in place of wood, and the traditional flat cob roofs were replaced by gable roofs made of sheet iron.

³² Nil'sen, 1988, p. 172.

Architecture and urban planning during the Soviet period (1920s–90s)

FROM THE FIRST MULTI-STOREY DWELLINGS TO LARGE COMPLEXES: THE SEARCH FOR A SOCIALIST MODEL OF CONSTRUCTION

The first multi-storey dwellings in Soviet Central Asia (1920s–30s): a period of crisis

The 1920s was a period of architectural recession in war-torn Central Asia. Throughout that period, construction mainly consisted of housing in the vicinity of industrial establishments for workers and their families. The debates over rationalism and socialist realism that were exciting architects and urban planners in Russia at this time were almost inaudible in Central Asia. Building continued in the spirit of the pre-revolutionary period. Indeed, G. Bauer and G. M. Svarichevsky's 1924 design for a workers' housing development displayed many of the features of tsarist architecture. This attitude, which persisted until the end of the 1920s, is to be explained by the fact that until the early 1930s, most experts in these fields were products of the tsarist period.³³

The architectural panorama at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s was a mosaic of highly contrasting elements. Throughout this period, even as the old dream of the 'garden city' with its cottages surrounded by greenery continued to be pursued, the most radical ideas were being put forward, calling for the destruction of old lifestyles and their replacement by collectivism.³⁴ And between these two extremes, buildings developed within the framework of the limitations imposed by the harsh reality of the times. Everything was subordinated to the achievement of one vital goal: to solve the housing shortage as quickly as possible. It was not until after the first five-year development plan (1928–32) and the beginnings of the mass collectivization of land that the 'garden city' idea lost currency and a search for new socialist forms of housing and other structures got under way in Soviet Central Asia.

The architects sent from Russia and Ukraine at the end of the 1920s³⁵ imported new ideas that they somehow adapted to the Central Asian context. They were the first to

³³ Many engineer-architects were products of the tsarist period including G. Svarichevsky, A. Til'tin, L. Voronin, F. Smirnov and A. Siltchenkov; some of them – Svarichevsky, Voronin and S. Kolotov – were teachers at the Central Asian Builders Institute established in 1930 to train young architects such as A. Babakhanov, V. Jahangirov, and others.

³⁴ Ikonnikov, 1990, p. 123.

³⁵ A young architectural class (S. Polupanov, F. Dolgov, A. Pavlov, A. Sidorov, A. Petelin, K. Babievsky, etc.) trained in Moscow and Leningrad was sent to Central Asia to carry out the architectural project. Some of them – Petelin and Babievsky – were also teachers at the Central Asian Builders Institute.

introduce constructivism into Soviet Central Asian buildings. In 1932 two architects sent from Moscow, K. Babievsky and A. Petelin, designed one of the region's earliest three-storey residential buildings, illustrating the constructivist ideas of that period.

It is important to note that during the first five-year plan (1928–32) alone, more than 10 million peasants moved to towns and became wage-earners. The massive migration produced a housing crisis of mammoth proportions.³⁶ Moreover, economic resources were in short supply at the time, so architects and urban planners opted for local housing types (which cost less than the new multi-storey residential blocks), a trend that illustrated constructivist ideas. Thus, although the abolition of *waqf* lands in 1929³⁷ paved the way for new construction projects within traditional cities, 'at that time, traditional housing accounted for 84 per cent of all housing'.³⁸ It was not until the end of the 1940s, when the first urban master plans for the reconstruction and development of the cities (Genplans) were developed, that multi-storey apartment blocks began to be erected in Central Asia.

The war years and reconstruction (1940–55)

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet Union's total housing stock was reduced by some 10 per cent, but in some cities more than half of the buildings had been destroyed. Some cities that had escaped war damage had to face the massive influx of refugees between 1944 and 1948;³⁹ this was the case of Tashkent, whose population doubled in this period, reaching 1 million. Moreover, much of the USSR's industrial potential shifted to the hinterland, and this stimulated rapid urban growth. Despite the acute housing shortage between 1946 and 1950, the official discourse paid some attention to the aesthetic of the new buildings. The housing crisis had a low impact on the priorities established by the institutes of architecture, which were dominated by men whose social and political legitimacy rested on their capacity to produce buildings in a 'national style' – a concept that was invented during those years.

³⁶ Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 6.

³⁷ In 1922 a law was adopted establishing a system, known as the GVU (*Glavnoe vakufnoe upravlenie*), for the administration of *waqf* lands and property by the government. The system enabled the Soviet authorities to control the income from *waqfs* and channel it to serve educational objectives. After the borders of the Central Asian republics had been demarcated, all such income was devoted to education and other cultural purposes. In March 1927 all *waqf* lands were placed under the direction of local *komkhozs* (*kommunal'noe khoziastvo*), the agencies that managed real estate and provided other municipal services, and were finally nationalized by a decree issued in January 1929.

³⁸ *General'niy plan rekonstruktsii gorod Bukhary*, 1940, p. 111; cited in Azzout, 1999.

³⁹ The 5.2 million refugees in the Soviet Union in April 1947 represented around 30 per cent of all the inhabitants.

The success of young architects sent from Russia and Ukraine – K. Babievsky, M. Bulatov and V. Dimitriev – and those educated locally in the Central Asian Builders Institutes – V. Jakhangarov and C. Actsaturov – was clearly linked to their ability to produce a ‘national style’. This young generation worked closely with some of the most famous Russian architects sent from Moscow such as A. Shchusev, A. Kuznetsov, V. Lavrov and S. Polupanov. They produced the archetypal style of official building that blended classicism with the interior layout inspired by Central Asian palaces.

The rapid promotion of young architect-urbanists who graduated in the 1920s (for those sent from Russia and Ukraine) or at the beginning of the 1930s (for those educated in Central Asia) is largely due to the troubled Stalin era. This new generation was not associated with the tsarist period and could more easily claim to be the legitimate agents of the promotion of a national architecture.

The shortage of building materials restricted the implementation of new aesthetic principles, however, and ‘icon-buildings’ in the ‘national style’ remained scarce (Fig. 6 a-b). Two-floor residential buildings were mainly erected along the major avenues of some ancient cities, in line with official speeches about ‘local tradition’ and the ‘new socialist order’. In Tashkent, for instance, the façades of buildings on Navoi Avenue (Fig. 7) and on the banks of the Ankhor canal (Fig. 8 a-b) are decorated with niches, arcades and cornices and are good examples of the interpretation of the ‘national style’ by architect-urbanists of the time. Those projects are the work of the Republican Union of Architects (founded in 1934) and other institutions.

At the same time, model housing projects were undertaken by the local organizations in charge of project development (Uzgosproekt, Kazakhgosproekt and their counterparts in the other republics). They aimed to develop projects of a reproducible type for the entire territory or, at least, for a large area. Indeed, the model housing, 264-b series, designed by the architect B. Trofimov and the engineer V. Ozerov in Turkmenistan, was used to rebuild Ashgabat after it had been devastated by an earthquake in 1948. The 210 series (Fig. 9), a three-storey building-type designed by Ozerov and the architect I. Rachinskaya in Uzbekistan, served as a model for a great many apartment blocks in Central Asia, particularly in industrial cities. In 1953 four-storey brick buildings (TG-1) were conceived by Uzgosproekt. Based on this design, plans were drawn up for standardized prefabricated concrete slabs that were suitable for the area’s climatic and seismic conditions. The elaboration of those standards was not ordered by the government, but was the pragmatic response by architects to the specific needs of the time. These apartment blocks were built as economically as possible by whatever means were available. Local materials (i.e. brick) were used for the most part, while almost no metal went into them. Thanks to this system



FIG. 6(a-b). Tashkent. Buildings in the ‘national style’. 1949–50. Architects: M. Bulatov and L. Karash. (Photos: Courtesy of M. Azzout and G. Akramova.)

of construction, 1.7 million m² of rental accommodation were built in Uzbekistan between 1946 and 1950, and 2.8 million m² during the years of the five-year plan (1951–5).⁴⁰ The

⁴⁰ Kadyrova, 1974, p. 50.



FIG. 7. Tashkent. Apartments on Navoi Avenue. 1949–50. Architects: M. Bulatov and L. Karash. (Photo: Courtesy of M. Azzout and G. Akramova.)

creation of a large-scale reproducible architectural model, which was the first step in the serial production of housing, dates from the very beginning of the 1950s.

The great turning-point: industrial politics and large-scale housing complexes (mid-1950s–1970s)

On 4 November 1955 a decree was issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Council of Ministers about the ‘removal of excessive expenditures of building projects’. This decree followed Nikita Khrushchev’s famous speech of the previous year in which he condemned ‘Stalinist architecture’ and called for the rationalization and industrialization of the building sector. The new standardization of building processes was supposed to achieve greater savings and increased productivity.

In the period of political instability following the death of Stalin, the Central Asian interpretation of the Moscow directive had been to orient its housing policy ‘towards an industrialization of the project types already initiated in the previous years’. The success of slogans such as ‘standardize’, ‘industrialize’ and ‘transform the work-site into an assembly line’ can be explained by the fact that they were all part of a continuous effort, started in the 1940s, of serial production in the building as well as in the metallurgy and cement industries.



FIG. 8(a-b). Tashkent. Residential building on the banks of the Ankhor canal. Architects: M. Bulatov and L. Karash. (Photos: Courtesy of M. Azzout and G. Akramova.)

By the late 1950s, industrialization had come to be a decisive factor in the evolution of architecture. Traditional procedures were abandoned in favour of the technique of assembling prefabricated buildings (composed of large panels and concrete blocks). Huge complexes of identical four- and six-storey buildings proliferated all over Central Asia. Prefabricated panel manufacturing became a thriving industry in the cities of Turkmenistan




FIG. 9. Standard plan of an apartment (210 series). Architect: I. Rachinskaya. (Source: UzNIIPgradostroitel'stvo.)




FIG. 10. Standard plan of an apartment in prefabricated panels (I-464 series model). (Source: UzNIIPgradostroitel'stvo.)

and Tajikistan.⁴¹ Here we see a sort of new rationalism, in which form was enslaved to the building industry. Economic criteria determined the selection of serial building types. The I-464 series (Fig. 10) was a highly successful type that was built all over the Soviet Union, and nowhere was it more widely adopted than in Central Asia.⁴²

⁴¹ Boeva, Vladimirov and Tukchaidova, 1976, p. 16.

⁴² Ibid.

To rebuild its capital city destroyed by the 1966 earthquake, Uzbekistan developed an ambitious ten-year building programme on a scale unknown in other republics. A decree was issued by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on 14 June 1966 ‘to help the Uzbek SSR recover from the damage caused by the earthquake’. Thanks to its new building industry, Uzbekistan was able to erect 2.7 million m² of housing in three years, more than the total that had been destroyed in the 1966 earthquake.⁴³

The ‘icon-buildings’ built at high cost in the centre of towns in the 1940s represented the synthesis of national tradition and the new socialist order – ‘national in form and socialist in content’. Those wartime brick, plaster and timber buildings were followed, from the mid-1950s onwards, by simple standardized constructions made with industrial processes. They were built mainly in places where the industry wanted to attract skilled workers.

By the end of the 1960s, it had become clear that more aesthetic and more comfortable housing was needed. The old functionalist idea that the functional attributes of a building should determine its appearance reasserted itself. The architects of the following decade once again had to take into account both internal and external factors. This raised problems of cultural continuity and the interaction between old and new in an urban setting.⁴⁴

If the early 1950s had been dominated by the experimentation of various forms of a national architecture, by the early 1970s only a few types of housing were being built across the entire Central Asian territory.

‘The crowning achievement of economic and social politics’ (1970s to the end of the 1980s)

Climatic conditions and cultural context

The 1970s housing policy was influenced by the official slogan to ‘give each family a modern flat’.⁴⁵ This policy was presented as an essential part of a social project, designed to tie in with economic and social policies. Indeed, sociological as well as economic considerations were taken into account to determine the type of housing to be built. This approach led to various statistical studies on family structure.⁴⁶ In 1969 a government decree on

⁴³ Kadyrova, 1974, p. 50.

⁴⁴ Ikonnikov, 1990, p. 43.

⁴⁵ On this, see *General’niy plan rekonstruktsii gorod Bukhary*, 1970. According to this Genplan, the following was envisaged for each inhabitant: 12 m²/inhabitant in 1980, 15 m²/inhabitant in 1990 and 18 m²/inhabitant in 2000.

⁴⁶ Thus, according to these studies, the family structure of the city of Bukhara was composed as follows: 15 per cent of the population consisted of 1-person families; 60 per cent of 2–4-person families; 15 per cent of 6-person families; and 10 per cent of 8-person families. These statistics were useful as bases to determine the layout of the future apartments. Other sociological studies took into account the ethnic composition of the population. Thus, according to these studies, in the historical area the population was 93 per cent local,

‘measures to improve housing construction’ was promulgated by the relevant ministry of the USSR.⁴⁷ In the 1970s housing complexes became more compact, with larger, taller houses. The transition from serial buildings to standardized units allowed for greater variation, and that in turn led to a broader range of possible combinations within a single standard.

Climatic and cultural considerations became the determining factors in the layout of new housing. The exposure and internal layout of apartments had to be suitable for the Central Asian climate and meet the needs of the societies concerned. Central Asian interior spaces – *hauli* (open space), *aywān* (semi-open space) and *khāna* (enclosed space) – were reinterpreted through the introduction of loggias into apartments. The loggia was ventilated at both front and back, and the kitchen and the loggia were separated by a common room opening on to both of them. This interest in creating traditional spaces could be observed at various levels. In new housing units, for example, groups of buildings were set closely together around semi-enclosed courtyards, full of greenery, that were reminiscent of traditional *haulis*.

The tall 10- or 17-storey buildings that were typical of that decade, with shops supplying essential items on the ground floor, were also designed in accordance with these principles. A 17-storey building with bevelled corners in Tashkent (Fig. 11) is a good illustration of the trends prevailing at that time.

From the sixth floor upwards, the building is encircled with balconies at intervals of three floors; these were intended as substitutes for the traditional courtyards. Decoration also became a key element in the interpretation of what was termed ‘Central Asian culture’. Prefabricated decorative elements were stuck on to the panels of the façades, creating a curious pastiche effect (Fig. 12).

PUBLIC BUILDINGS: SEARCHING FOR A SOCIALIST MODEL OF CONSTRUCTION; CONSTRUCTIVISM, SOCIALIST REALISM, MULTI-STYLISTIC

How to identify a ‘socialist architecture’: public buildings from the 1920s to the 1940s

From constructivism to socialist realism revisited

During the 1920s many old buildings were deliberately destroyed; others were renovated and new buildings were erected to meet the needs of the new socialist society that the

in the north of this area the number dropped to 78 per cent, whereas in the new Soviet-type districts (the southern districts), the number dropped to 38 per cent. These factors determined the allocation of cultural services. On this, see *General’niy plan rekonstruktsii gorod Bukhary*, 1990.

⁴⁷ USSR Communist Party (KPSS) in the Resolution and the Congress, 1972, pp. 47–51.



FIG. 11. Tashkent. A 17-storey residential building. 1985. Architect: O. Aidinova. (Photo: Courtesy of M. Azzout and G. Akramova.)

USSR was trying to build. The innovative trends of this period, namely rationalism and constructivism, found their fullest expression in the great public buildings that were erected during that decade. Constructivists and rationalists, influenced as they were by experiments in so-called ‘left-wing’ art, emphasized the function and rational layout of buildings. The task of architecture was henceforth ‘to formalize and crystallize the socialist way of life.’⁴⁸

The Palace of Labour project in Moscow, designed by the Vesnin brothers in 1923, was one of the earliest examples of this trend. It is a gigantic concrete structure, bare of decoration, with geometrically organized volumes and windows aligned in straight rows down the sides – a design that was highly characteristic of what was to become the constructivist style. This school made very little impression in Soviet Central Asia, however, partly because it was suppressed at an early date (1930) but also because building materials were in short supply.

Designed by architects sent from Moscow, the few buildings erected in Central Asia that did represent the constructivist school were interpreted in accordance with ‘local taste’.

⁴⁸ Ginzburg, 1935, p. 7.



FIG. 12. Tashkent. Prefabricated decorative elements of a residential building. Architects: A. Kosinsky, V. Azimov and others. (Source: TashGiprogor.)

One of the small number of large-scale projects in the constructivist style was the government complex in Alma-Ata, which was designed by Moise Ginzburg, one of the founders of constructivism and a specialist in the history of the architecture of Central Asia. This massive monument, to use Ginzburg's own words, was constructed:

with simple, basic means corresponding to the specific topography of Alma-Ata as well as the peculiarities [climate, etc.] of the Kazakh ASSR. This was one of my first experiments in the building of a new image for Soviet architecture.⁴⁹

And, indeed, the volumes were organized in such a way as to form an inner courtyard (planted with trees) that was reminiscent of the houses and palaces of Central Asia. Furthermore, the colours (browns, greens and light blues) used for the interior decoration of the complex were taken from Kazakh ornamental art. This complex illustrates the nascent phenomenon of buildings in which constructivist principles were combined with 'national forms'.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 8; Sprague, 1994, p. 308.

⁵⁰ Yarlov, 1985, p. 115.



FIG. 13. Andijan. State Bank. 1928. Architect: S. Polupanov. (Source: UzNIIPgradostroitel'stvo.)

Other, more modest buildings (Fig. 13) were designed by S. Polupanov⁵¹ in accordance with constructivist ideas, but since reinforced concrete was in short supply, some architects resorted to brick instead. In constructivist architecture proper, the concrete skeleton is the determining element, commanding the rhythmic design of the whole.

Beginning in the 1930s, however, constructivism began to be accused of not conveying 'a true picture of Soviet architecture',⁵² and thereafter it lost ground to socialist realism. The architects and urban planners accused the new architecture of the 1920s of embodying cosmopolitanism, formalism and oversimplification. Therefore, it became the denial of the 'national style'.

The new paradigm of the towns of the future in its most condensed definition, 'national in form and socialist in content', became the guiding principle of the architecture of the 1930s. The expression 'national in form' authorized the resumption of the 'national tradition' of Central Asian architecture, whereas 'socialist in content' meant the nationalization

⁵¹ S. Polupanov came from Moscow in the 1920s with a group of architects from various cities of Russia – Moscow, Leningrad-St Petersburg – and Ukraine. Along with Svarichevsky, he brought the ideas of constructivism and rationalism to Central Asia.

⁵² Ginzburg, 1935, p. 6.

of land and the end of property speculation. The very hazy definitions of the concepts ‘national form’ and ‘socialist content’ facilitated the reappropriation and recontextualization in the Central Asian context.

Rejecting or preserving tradition

The conflict between Moscow’s architects and urban planners relates primarily to politics. It is always difficult to decide what to preserve and what to reject of a country’s material and intellectual heritage. For those led by Alexei Shchusev, the inspiration for the ‘national tradition’ of ‘progressivism’ lay in the precapitalist era whereas for those led by Moise Ginzburg, their inspiration could come from all past culture.

The Palace of the Soviets project in Moscow, designed in 1931, may be regarded as a landmark for Soviet architecture as a whole during this period. The ‘palace’ concept had become the symbol of the new culture, and the traditional formal characteristics of palaces appeared in architecture.⁵³ The official attitude to the country’s architectural heritage changed, and the advocates of variants of neoclassicism, who were perhaps the majority of Russian architects, became predominant. The trend favoured Shchusev, and the most politically ‘acceptable’ style seemed to be the neoclassical. Thus the monumental majesty of the several versions of that style became the expression of socialist realism.

In Soviet Central Asia, the political definition of an urban and architectural style inherited from the past was based on a different terminology from that of Soviet Russia. According to theorists of this period, Central Asia (unlike imperial Russia) had not reached the stage of capitalism. Thus the architects and urban planners envisioned their designs as anti-feudal rather than as anti-capitalist. They sought to ‘legitimize’ their objective by becoming recognized as the holders of indispensable urban knowledge and – in the political context of the time –necessarily anti-feudal, anti-capitalist and ‘progressivist’.

Therefore the inspiration for the national (‘progressivist’) tradition was ‘pre-feudal’. As defined by the theorists, the period of ‘decline’ (the seventeenth–nineteenth centuries) could not provide inspiration for the ‘national style’, and the national ‘golden age’ was seen as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. However, certain practices from the tsarist period were continued: for example, there was frequent borrowing from the interior decoration of palaces dating from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century.

It should be remembered that during this period, the political and administrative elite was entirely composed of an older generation – a considerable number of architects had started their professional life in the tsarist era. Indeed, Svarichevsky, A. Til’tin, L. Voronin

⁵³ Ikonnikov, 1990, p. 180.

and F. Smirnov, to mention only the most famous architects during this period, had worked during the tsarist period and remained very active after the October revolution. Some of them –Svarichevsky and Voronin – helped to reorganize the architectural profession by training the first local architectural class of 1934 at the Central Asian Builders Institute. Thus Russian architects revived pre-existing themes, and the bulk of the architectural repertoire was inspired from their experience during the tsarist period. Russian architects continued to collaborate with local builders just as they had done in the tsarist period.

During this period, the ‘cultural heritage’ became a geopolitical issue. Indeed, after a delimitation of the Central Asian republics in 1924, architectural cultural heritage became an important identifier of the new territorial boundaries, a process that could be described as the ‘territorialization of the architectural cultural heritage’.⁵⁴ The new ‘national style’ architecture helped to reinforce the demands for recognition by the young Central Asian republics by allocating a specific architectural language to each republic.

This ‘revisiting’ of the past allowed architecture that had formerly been widely defined as ‘Muslim of Central Asia’ (with its various local versions) to be categorized as exclusively ‘Uzbek’, ‘Kazakh’, ‘Kyrgyz’, ‘Turkmen’ or ‘Tajik’. Thus architects and urban planners created a panoply of new architectural terms – inspired primarily by the decoration or interior layout of traditional palaces. They specified what was supposed to be typically Kazakh (felt, yurts) or Uzbek (*pichtak*, arabesques, turquoise), etc. From the standpoint of the aesthetic theory of that period, the national characteristics of form came to constitute one of the fundamental principles of socialist realism in art.

The All-Union Agricultural Exhibition that was inaugurated in 1939 proved to be an excellent testing-ground for the application of the theory of ‘national architecture’.⁵⁵ The architecture of the pavilions was to be an experimental ground for the materialization ‘in concrete’ of what may be labelled ‘the national style, reflecting the cultural diversity of the Soviet peoples’.⁵⁶ The Uzbek pavilion stood out by its distinctive architecture (Fig. 14). The architect, S. Polupanov, who had designed many buildings in Uzbekistan, used various features of Central Asian architecture: the *hauz* (pool of water), *hauili* (inner courtyard), openwork sculpture on alabaster (*ganch*), stalactites and so on. The plan was based on a reinterpretation of the form of a *pokoi* (reception room in an Uzbek house). The traditional *pokoi* was enclosed, but here the architect created a space extended by an open-plan area, giving the pavilion a welcoming aspect.⁵⁷ In line with the main entrance stood a *hauz*,

⁵⁴ Azzout, 2002.

⁵⁵ Ikonnikov, 1990, p. 227.

⁵⁶ Yarlov, 1985, p. 128.

⁵⁷ Yarlov, 1985, p. 131.



FIG. 14. Tashkent. Uzbek pavilion at the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition. 1939. (Photo: Courtesy of M. Azzout.)

surmounted by a high kiosk with dramatic decoration (a slender column in the Central Asian style), which, however, had no structural function.

On the other hand, certain projects designed by Ukrainian and Russian organizations in charge of project development were often copies of former projects already realized in Russia or Ukraine. The Palace of the Soviets is a particular example that became a symbol of ‘socialist realist’ architecture. Dushanbe’s Opera and Ballet Theatre, built in 1939, is another good example. It is a replica of the Soviet Army Theatre in Moscow, classical in its perfect symmetry, while the building’s volume and spatial structure are determined by the emblem. The profusion of extraordinarily slender columns, forming strangely lofty porticos, on its frescoes appear to be the equivalent of the decorative and symbolic architecture that made its appearance during the 1930s. The influence of the Palace of the Soviets on the stylistic characteristics of the period was evident in numerous public buildings.

In the 1940s and 1950s, in particular, the forms of classical architecture were associated with Central Asian decorations. The desire to incorporate specific ‘references’ to Central Asian tradition, or to reproduce some unmistakably identifiable prototype (stalactites, Gothic arches and so on), became standard features. Buildings erected during the war years (1940–5) are characterized, for the most part, by Russian classicism or ‘suprematism’. These stylistic forms were deemed to symbolize Soviet supremacy.

In Central Asia, and especially in Kazakhstan, where many war evacuees were sent, the Russian classical style and suprematism developed to an increasing extent. The theatre in

Alma-Ata clearly illustrates this trend. This theatre, which was built in 1941, is simply a replica of the Moskva Cinema designed by Lazar Hidekel (an architect from St Petersburg), but with its walls covered with Kazakh-style decorations intended to suggest ‘felt blankets of the kind used by Kazakh nomads to cover their yurts’.⁵⁸ The Alishir Navoi Theatre in Tashkent (Fig. 15 a-b), designed in 1947 by Shchusev, is another example of a Central Asian interpretation of socialist realism, based on variants of the neoclassical order and characteristics of the ‘national culture’. All these buildings were erected in collaboration with local master builders.

The role of local builders in the creation of a socialist architecture

The reorganization of the profession of architect which was generated by the above-mentioned 1934 training course at the Central Asian Builders Institute involved the marginalization of ‘traditional’ local builders, leaving major constructions in the hands of their colleagues trained in Moscow or more recently in Tashkent. At the end of the 1930s, ‘traditional’ local builders were charged with erecting new *kolkhozs* (collective farms), housing, clubs for communist propaganda, public baths and other facilities. In short, they built all that made it possible for these *kolkhozs* to function. However, some ‘traditional’ local builders, still considered as second-rate, were utilized as decorators of the interior of the prestigious architectural works, as they had been during the tsarist period.⁵⁹

Impact of the new planning on public buildings (1950s–60s)

From socialist realism to standardization

The socialist realist attitude in art and architecture persisted down to Stalin’s death in 1953.⁶⁰ Large-scale buildings based on prefabrication and technical progress had now become one of the established bases of architecture within the Soviet Union. Borrowings from tradition became mere imitations of the panoply of architectural forms derived from previous periods. The new urban planning influenced the types of public buildings that were erected, and thus gave rise to the idea of cooperatives, which were highly successful in Central Asia. The large shopping centre built in the *rayon* (residential district) of Chilanazar in Tashkent in 1962 was the first of its kind in the Soviet Union. V. Spivak,

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 134.

⁵⁹ In 1940 the committee for museum affairs and the preservation of ancient monuments and nature (UzKomstaris) organized special classes for a local master (*usta*). The old masters (*ustas*) such as Shirin Muradov (1880–1957), Suleiman Khojaev (1866–1947) and Abdu Ghafurov (1884–1956) were teachers at UzKomstaris to train new students. The main role of new trained masters was to decorate the interior of prestigious architectural works.

⁶⁰ Sprague, 1994, p. 511.



FIG. 15(a-b). Tashkent. Alishir Navoi Theatre. 1936–47. Architect: A. Shchusev. (Photos: Courtesy of M. Azzout and G. Akramova.)

V. Roschupkin, I. Koptelov and A. Yasnogorodsky were the architects who designed this project.⁶¹

⁶¹ Kadyrova, 1987, p. 100.

‘Multi-stylism’ (1970s–90s)

The 1970s were characterized by a highly varied architecture. Multi-stylism became a feature of the period, with rationalism revisited, neoclassicism and hybrid Central Asian forms. Formal rationalism is clearly expressed in the Namangan administrative building, which was designed in 1974 by D. Chuvaev. The composition of this building, with its facing of light-coloured stone, expresses a single theme: the widely spaced bearing points support a massive crown topped with a large, bare acroterion. It is reminiscent of the Palace of Culture in Moscow, which was built during the same period.

The 1980s were noteworthy for the construction of underground rail-transit systems as part of the urban development of the major Central Asian capital cities. The initial lines of the Tashkent subway, which were completed in 1980, were unquestionably one of the most popular architectural achievements of the period. It was the first time that such a substantial project had been designed essentially by Uzbek architects. Every station is a work of art, reflecting powerful visual images and a concentration of vast spatial systems. The basic guiding principle was that every station should be associated with the surface facilities through the judicious use of visual or thematic associations.

URBANIZATION OF THE CITIES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA (1930s–1990s)

As industry developed rapidly after 1928, the construction of new cities or the remodelling of old ones became the order of the day. There was a vigorous debate over the ideal population distribution model for the region. There were two parties with diametrically opposed views on the matter: on the one hand, the advocates of the concept of ‘urbanization’, led by the economist Leonid Sapovich, and on the other hand those who favoured ‘disurbanization’, whose champion was another economist, Mikhail Okhotovich. Sapovich imagined the ideal city as ‘a compact, organized entity for production, living and culture’, with its entire population housed in from 1 to 20 ‘communal houses’ structured around modern means of transport and communications. Only adults would have bedrooms.⁶² Okhotovich rejected the unit of land as a basis for concentrating the population. His ideal city would be everywhere and nowhere, with its inhabitants linked by car and telephone.

These two concepts were given material form in the competition for the design of the new town of Magnitogorsk, a metallurgical complex in the southeastern Urals.⁶³ The ‘disurbanist’ model featured the establishment of eight residential ‘lines’ located along roads radiating out from the industrial complex, while the ‘urbanist’ model, known as

⁶² Ikonnikov, 1990, p. 113.

⁶³ On the construction of the city of Magnitogorsk, directed by Ernst May, see Kotkin, 1995.

Sozogorod, featured a compact, organized plan with green spaces and apartment blocks for 2,000–4,000 inhabitants located close to the complex.

Urban development master plans for the reconstruction and development of the cities of Moscow and Leningrad (present-day St Petersburg) were developed in 1935, subsequently becoming ‘a guiding standard for urban planning throughout the country’.⁶⁴ However, the linear ‘disurbanist’ model was virtually abandoned.

The urban planning principles in these projects were used for the urban development master plans for the reconstruction and development of the cities of Tashkent, Samarkand, Alma-Ata and other Central Asian cities (Fig. 16).⁶⁵ Soviet Central Asian cities can be divided into four basic categories: historic cities that were remodelled and expanded (Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, to mention only the best-known); cities that arose in response to industrial development, such as Chirchik, Navoi and Bekabad); the former tsarist administrative centres of Verny (Alma-Ata), Ashkhabad (Ashgabat),⁶⁶ Frunze (Pishpek) and, lastly, former villages that were restructured into cities, such as Stalinabad (Dushanbe).⁶⁷

Restructuring of the historic cities of Soviet Central Asia: the first urban development master plans for the reconstruction and development of the cities (1940s)

Between 1920 and the early 1930s, the state confiscated and nationalized the most important Islamic architectural monuments of Central Asia and abolished their former functions. This attitude was particularly marked in 1929, with the abolition of *waqf* lands and properties and the launch of the first five-year plan (1928–32), accompanied by large-scale collectivization of land, intensive cotton-growing and the grain-supply campaign. Throughout this period, many architectural monuments were used as warehouses, and many of the houses in the old cities were deliberately destroyed (70 per cent of the residential dwellings in the city of Bukhara were destroyed between 1917 and 1947).⁶⁸ In the *Official Gazette* of the Central Executive Committee of 31 October 1930, we read:

⁶⁴ Kadyrova, 1974, p.12.

⁶⁵ Kadyrova, 1974, p.12.

⁶⁶ Known briefly in the 1920s as Poltoratsk, the centre of the former Transcaspian *oblast'* of tsarist Turkistan which became the capital of the Republic of Turkmenistan in 1924.

⁶⁷ The two last groups will not be discussed separately, since their Genplans were not so different from those of the first two groups mentioned.

⁶⁸ According to the master plan for the city of Bukhara, there had been 12,000 dwellings before 1936, while in 1940 only 3,500 remained. It thus appears that 70 per cent of those dwellings had been destroyed.



FIG. 16. Tashkent. Schematic master plan (Genplan). 1937. (Source: UzNIIPgradostroitel'stvo.)

Madrasa of the village of Daghit, Ak Darya rayon, Samarkand okrug: has decided to demolish the *madrasa* and to use the bricks to erect a building for the purpose of establishing a foundation for cultural instruction.⁶⁹

Until the 1930s, building proceeded in the absence of urban planning of any kind. The few buildings that were erected belonged to industrial establishments (such as silk or cotton factories) and were located near them. The cities of Central Asia had to wait until the 1930s and 1940s for their first urban development master plans for the reconstruction and the development of the cities (Genplan), and it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that those plans were implemented. Even then, the prospects opened up by the Genplan did not always lead to concrete results. The Genplan was designed by a collective of architects, engineers and economists, and it was intended to cover a period of between 20 and 25 years. It might be supplemented by additional development detailed plans (PDP), and it might be amended on occasion, notably in the event of a natural catastrophe such as an earthquake.

After various tentative beginnings, Genplans were prepared for the historic cities of Central Asia. A Genplan for Tashkent was drawn up in Moscow in 1938–9 under the direction of the well-known architect Kuznetsov. A Genplan for Samarkand was prepared in Tashkent in 1938 under another well-known architect, Bulatov. Bukhara received its Genplan in 1940, Khiva its Genplan in 1941, and others followed. While these Genplans

⁶⁹ National Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan, TsGA Uzrep F. 86, inv. 2, No. 115, p. 26.

for the reconstruction and development of the historic Central Asian cities were designed by a variety of collectives of architects in different republics, or in Moscow, they shared a number of characteristics:

- identification, for the first time, of the city's functional zones (industrial zone, residential zone, administrative centre);
- reconstruction and development of the street layout, to improve the traffic flow, and establishment of public transport systems featuring such vehicles as trolley buses; the street layout was based on a radioconcentric system designed so that commuting distances should not exceed 45 minutes;
- provision of green spaces such as parks, squares and playgrounds and, later, water features such as pools and *ariqs* (canals) (amenities of this kind came to account for 3.5 per cent of the total urban area, with 6.4 m² per resident);
- development of a new city centre containing most of the main buildings, clustered around a large square which in some cases included the city park.

Unlike theories of 'city building' that focused on the economic and commercial functions of the 'down-town' district, the urban planning of Soviet Central Asia, in the first Genplan dated 1940, proposed the transformation of the 'market centre' into a place for socialization and the political expression of the 'new dominant class' in society. Thus the down-town area must be located in the centre, with the public buildings embodying the working class and its party. Down-town necessarily became the social and political centre where meetings and demonstrations could take place.⁷⁰

The identification of functional zones entailed the grouping together of a number of industrial facilities. New establishments, for example, were built out by the old city wall, and buffer zones of parks and gardens – a protective green belt between industrial and residential areas – were created. The green belt would extend into the old city, which as a rule contained very little greenery. The reconstruction of existing streets was frequently injurious to the historic cities, entailing: first, the demolition of many old houses and the urban fabric, more generally in cases where an existing street was widened or a new street opened through an old district (Fig. 17); and, second, the demolition of the old city wall (Bukhara) in cases where the city was developed or simply grew to the point where it spilled over its former limits. In some instances, the radioconcentric system of streets engulfed and stifled the city's historic centre (as in the case of Khiva) (Fig. 18) or encroached upon old outlying districts (as in the case of Bukhara).

⁷⁰ *General'niy plan rekonstruktsii gorod Bukhary*, 1940, p. 128.




FIG. 17. Tashkent. Reconstruction of Navoi Street. Architects: M. Bulatov and V. Smirnov. (*Source*: TashGiprogor.)



FIG. 18. Khiva. Schematic Genplan (Uzgosproekt). 1950. (*Source*: UzNIIPgradostroitel'stvo.)

Industrial cities

Throughout the Soviet period, urban planning was closely linked to economic requirements.⁷¹ The state's objectives were to conform to the 'Gosplan'⁷² theory; other initiatives were

⁷¹ On this matter, see Merlin, 1975; Beaujeu-Garnier et al., 1995.

⁷² The State Economic Planning Agency.

individual programmes established by industries. Industrialization was dependent on urbanization. The size of a city was decided by its main industrial activities. The success of the ‘industrialized city’ was determined by its economy and the competence of its leaders. Thus a city based on the chemical industry should accommodate from 60,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, and a city dependent on heavy industry from 120,000 to 200,000 inhabitants. The first industrial sites in Central Asia spawned towns around the new factories. Chirchik and Navoi, for example, were centres of the chemical industry and Almalyk, Zerafshan and Bekabad grew up around steel plants and non-ferrous metal industries, while Angren was a coal-mining town.⁷³

During the Second World War, many industries were moved deep into the hinterland, thereby contributing to the growth of new cities. Those cities became, in effect, experimental laboratories for Soviet urban planning. Theories discussed in Moscow or in the capitals of the Central Asian republics were put into practice in these new cities, which became ‘showcases for Soviet greatness’. The city of Navoi, for example, which was a product of chemical plants and the energy sector, was remodelled in the 1960s on the new theoretical bases of the day. Water, greenery and *ariqs* became the new imperatives in the remodelling of Central Asia’s cities. In addition, the ‘urban-planning’ model began to lose ground to a new graduated model (Gradow). The simultaneous construction of industrial districts and housing was the principle behind urban growth. Each city was designed within a system of interrelated cities. Planning aimed to rationalize their function by specializing and treating the level of the services they offered on a hierarchical basis.

Navoi, 400 km south-west of Tashkent, occupies 8 km² of land. The city is divided into three functional zones: industrial, residential and recreational. The residential areas are located in the central district. The city’s infrastructure is organized on a graduated plan: essential services are located as close as possible to the residential areas (within a radius of 300–350 m). The first service group includes schools, shops and so on, while the second group includes less heavily frequented institutions such as cinemas, sports clubs, libraries and restaurants. A broad belt of greenery separates the residential from the industrial areas. Navoi has been dubbed ‘the green city’, and its three structural elements are water, vegetation and the buildings. The city boasts 26 *hauzs*, all of them connected by *ariqs* along its tree-lined main thoroughfares. The water enhances the local microclimate and allows the greenery to flourish. Navoi is an excellent example of the trends of the 1960s and 1970s.

⁷³ Kadyrova, 1974, p. 32.

Urban planning between the mid-1950s and the 1970s: industrialization, rationalization and the advent of the *micro-rayon*

In the first half of the 1950s, new Genplans were developed for the great capitals, including Tashkent, Alma-Ata and other large Central Asian cities. The war had brought an influx of populations from every part of the Soviet Union, while industrial development had caused the great Central Asian capitals to grow vigorously but not uncontrollably. During this period, district-by-district planning became the basis of these cities' Genplans. Cities were organized into districts: the *rayons* (40,000–80,000 inhabitants) and *micro-rayons* (10,000–15,000 inhabitants) each of which corresponded to standardized norms.

The *rayon* was an outgrowth of industrialization that served as the model for the typology of the cities of Soviet Central Asia. A *rayon* was made up of approximately 8 housing units, each of which was known as a *micro-rayon*. Every *micro-rayon* housed some 10,000 people in an area of 20–25 ha, was structured around a cluster of basic services, including shops, cultural facilities, a community centre, parks and sports complexes, located at a distance of less than 100 m, and was connected via one or more activity centres to public transport facilities.

One of the earliest examples of a Central Asian *rayon* was the Chilanazar quarter, which, like many others, was built by a large industrial company, a textile complex in this particular instance. Chilanazar, located in the south-western part of Tashkent, was designed in 1956 by a collective of architects, including I. Gordeeva and O. Gazenkopf. Chilanazar comprised 9 *rayons* with a shared administrative centre and a community centre.⁷⁴ The Chilanazar *rayon* served as a model for many Central Asian cities; it was duplicated virtually unaltered at several new sites.

During this period, the new construction technique required a wide open space. Thus most new buildings were concentrated outside the city, abandoning the historic centre as well as the workers' district. Except in down-town and peripheral districts, the morphology and the physical aspect of Central Asia's historic cities was almost unchanged until the end of the 1970s.

⁷⁴ Kadyrova, 1974, p. 53; Kadyrova, 1987, p. 88.

The reconstruction of ancient cities and the redevelopment of new ones (1970s–80s)

*Reconstruction of the ancient cities*⁷⁵

By the late 1960s, urban planners had begun to be concerned about the historic cities, and about their historic monuments in particular. In 1967 Khiva's central *ichan-kala* was declared a protected architectural site; controlled building zones were established around the monuments of Bukhara; 'in order to isolate the historic centre of Samarkand from traffic, the Registan was surrounded with green spaces',⁷⁶ and there are many further examples of measures to protect and isolate ancient monuments that might be cited.

It was not until the 1970s, however, that the ideas of integration of the urban environment and cultural continuity were given material form by an integrated restructuring of the architectural heritage of many cities.⁷⁷ In addition, this phenomenon was fostered by the Soviet policy of encouraging tourism between the various republics. Many ancient buildings were renovated to meet the requirements of tourism.

From that time onwards, the rehabilitation of historic monuments went hand in hand with tourism. Thus in the detailed plan for Bukhara PDP (1977, under the supervision of A. Alexandrovich), entire chapters were dedicated to tourism. Various itineraries were planned, to the extent of even calculating the time needed for a tourist to go from place to place on the various itineraries. Each building was given new functions and could be classified according to one of three categories: a monument to be viewed; a monument designed to keep its original function; or a monument that had been transformed for new and modern requirements with the option of exhibiting its architectural value.⁷⁸ The question of reconstructing the urban fabric of the ancient city centres was now identified with the restoration and use of ancient monuments and the demolition of housing deemed unfit for human occupancy. During that period, many old dwellings were renovated and turned into hotels for tourists; this process continues today. It was not until the late 1980s that the historic city centre ceased to be regarded as a separate entity and came to be accepted as an integral part of the city as a whole.

⁷⁵ One might think that the 1966 earthquake (which destroyed the city of Tashkent) explains the interest in the rebuilding and restoration of the traditional cities of Central Asia. It is important to note, however, that during the same period, i.e. the end of the 1960s, the overall urban policy of the Soviet Union and of certain East European countries such as the German Democratic Republic was directed towards the rebuilding of the historic centres.

⁷⁶ Alexandrovich and Kalinovskaya, 1968, p. 31.

⁷⁷ Ikonnikov, 1990, p. 412.

⁷⁸ Azzout, 1999, p. 165.

Urban planning linked to economic and social development

For the Soviet cities of Central Asia, the late 1960s and early 1970s marked the beginning of a new development phase. The objectives of the Genplans of the 1940s and 1950s had been attained, and it was now necessary to prepare new Genplans for the future development of those cities. Accordingly, the architects of the various republics joined forces with economists and engineers to prepare regional development plans. It was on the basis of these regional plans that Genplans were now prepared. In fact, the Genplans were closely linked with economic and social development; cities were no longer regarded as self-contained systems, but rather as components of a population network characterized by the complete integration of all their parts. This new approach was reflected in the redistribution of functional zones (heavy industries were relocated outside the cities), the development of major road traffic and public transport roads (with the establishment of new roads linking the city with its surrounding region), and lastly, the construction of new city centres.⁷⁹

Conclusion

Within the limits of this chapter, it has not been possible to cover the entire complex urban and architectural history of a period lasting more than 150 years. However, it is immediately apparent that a number of issues from the tsarist era were not adequately resolved during the Soviet period. How can new technology become the ally of local traditions? How can the old urban fabric best be reintegrated into the future development of these cities? Many attempts at answers have been forthcoming from various local, Russian and foreign architects and urban planners, but definitive solutions have not yet been found.

⁷⁹ Within the limits of this chapter, it has not been possible to discuss the new city centres.

LITERATURE IN PERSIAN AND OTHER INDO - IRANIAN LANGUAGES

H. Javadi, A. Alimardonov and I. Hasnain

Contents

LITERATURE IN PERSIAN	834
Neoclassicism (the Bazgasht school)	835
The dawn of enlightenment: the pre-constitutional period	837
The constitutional period: the outburst of social and political literature	838
The reign of Reza Shah and the beginnings of modern poetry	841
Breaking traditions: new poetry (she'r-e now)	843
Fiction in modern Persian literature	846
LITERATURE IN DARI	851
Classical literature	851
Modern prose and journalism	852
Literature of resistance	854
Literary studies and novels	854
The post-communist period	856
LITERATURE IN TAJIK	859
LITERATURE IN OTHER INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES	863
Kashmiri	863
Punjabi	867
Sindhi	874
Urdu	879

Part One

LITERATURE IN PERSIAN

(H. Javadi)

In the nineteenth century Iran suddenly found itself the focus of ever-growing attention and rivalry on the part of Britain, France and Russia. This was a prelude to further relations with Europe, which included sending the first group of students to England in 1806 and establishing the first printing house in Tabriz in 1816–17. It was at the initiative of the reform-minded crown prince ‘Abbas Mirza that Mirza Saleh Kazeruni was sent to England to learn the art of printing. ‘Abbas Mirza also sent his men to St Petersburg to be trained in the art of lithography. The first printing business was started in Tabriz in 1824–5, to be followed by another one in Tehran in 1837–8. Apart from the advent of printing, two other events speeded up the process of enlightenment. One was the publication of the first newspaper and the other was the foundation of the *Dār al-Fonūn* (Polytechnic) in 1852 by Amir Kabir, the reformist prime minister of Naser al-Din Shah (1848–96).

Although a two-page account of current events appeared for a short time in 1839 through the efforts of the same Mirza Saleh, it was not until 1851 that a more regular government paper (*Rūznāmeḥ-ye vaqāye‘ ettefāqiyeh*) was established by order of Naser al-Din Shah in order ‘to raise the awareness of the people of Iran, and inform them of domestic and foreign news’. However, in the early stages the newspapers were exclusively government papers. Furthermore, a censor’s office was established in 1864 in order to control the papers that were published abroad. The importance of newspapers published in Persian outside Iran and smuggled illegally into the country cannot be overemphasized.¹

The foundation of the *Dār al-Fonūn* in 1852 encouraged the spread of European influence and spawned a number of translations from European languages. Initially the European teachers at this educational institution, with the help of their Iranian students, published handbooks in Persian, which laid the foundations of a modern Persian prose in

¹ *Akhtar* (published in Istanbul, 1875–97), *Qānūn* (London, 1892–3), *Habl al-matin* (Calcutta, 1891–2), *Sorayā* (Cairo) and *Ershād* (Baku) all had a far-reaching impact on their Iranian readers.

science and technology. Literary works were mostly translated from the French: one of the first was *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Isfahan* by James Morier in the beautiful prose of Mirza Habib of Isfahan (put to death in 1897). Morier imitated the Persian prose style and pretended that the book was the memoirs of an Isfahani friend who had fallen ill in Tucat, Turkey, and died there. Mirza Habib was so successful in rendering it in Persian that for many years Iranians thought the book was the work of one of their compatriots. *The Adventures of Hajji Baba*, along with translations of novels by Dumas père, Fénelon, Daniel Defoe, Jules Verne, Lesage and Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, laid the foundations of the Persian novel and short story, which appeared in the early twentieth century.

Under the influence of Ahmed Vafiq, who had translated and published Molière's *Le Misanthrope* in Istanbul in 1869, Mirza Habib produced his own Persian adaptation under the title, *Gozāresh-e mardom goriz* [Adventures of a Misanthrope]. In spite of being an excellent translation, it went unnoticed and it was not until 1874, when Mirza Ja'far Qarajehdaghi translated the Azerbaijani comedies of Fath 'Ali Akhundzadeh (originally written between 1850 and 1856), that drama in its modern form was effectively introduced to the Persian literary scene.

Neoclassicism (the *Bazgasht* school)

In the field of poetry, this period saw the continuation of the *Bazgasht* (neoclassical) school, which advocated a return to the classical masters of Persian poetry. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a group of poets including Neshat of Isfahan and Saba of Kashan came to the conclusion that the only way to revive Persian poetry from the decadence of the late Safavid and Afsharid periods was to return to the style of great masters such as Ferdowsi, Farrokhi, Manuchehri, Sa'di and Hafez. As Nima Yushij, the founder of modern Persian poetry (see below), puts it, 'This was a return to the old style out of desperation.'² This group tried to imitate the old masters in every respect. Saba of Kashan wrote a *Shāhanshāh-nāme* in praise of Fath 'Ali Shah (1796–1834), imitating Ferdowsi's *Shāh-nāme*; and Qa'ani, Soroush and Mijmar tried to excel in following Manuchehri and Farrokhi in *qasideh* (*qasida*, ode) writing and Hafez or Sa'di in *ghazals* (lyric poems). In short, it was a court poetry that often failed to take account of the realities of ordinary life. Even satirical poets such as Yaghma of Jandaq, who to some extent portrayed everyday life in his poetry, tended to be more of a panegyrist than a satirist.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the same trend continued. The *Bazgasht* movement had many followers and the courtly poetry that had blossomed anew in the

² Yushij, 1972, pp. 50–1.

reign of Fath 'Ali Shah continued to dominate the scene. Forughī of Bastam (1798–1857), Shahab of Isfahan, Qa'ani of Shiraz (1808–53/4), Soroush of Isfahan (1813–68/9) and Mahmud Khan of Kashan (d. 1893), the poet laureate, were among the most well-known poets during the reigns of Fath 'Ali Shah and Naser al-Din Shah. Forughī and Shahab excelled in writing panegyrics and the former was particularly known for his beautiful *ghazals* in the style of Hafez and Sa'di. Soroush translated and versified the Arabic poetry of the text of the *One Thousand and One Nights* for a Persian version, which was prepared by 'Abdol-Latif Tasuji. Whenever there was a suitable version by one of the great masters, Soroush chose this instead of the Arabic original, but very often he did the versification himself. The result was an incredible literary work in both prose and poetry.

A contemporary of Soroush was Habibollah Qa'ani, who in spite of his short life became one of the most outstanding poets of nineteenth-century Iran. He was the first Persian poet to be acquainted with European languages, especially French, from which he translated a book on botany. However, acquaintance with the West did not have a profound influence on his work, and he remained a master of traditional poetry. Though he excelled in lyrical poetry, his greatest talent lay in writing strophes (*mosammat*) in the tradition of Manuchehri. In his prose more than his poetry he tried to depict the realities of everyday life, especially in *Ketāb-e parishān* [*Pêle-Mêle*], which was in imitation of the *Golestān* of Sa'di.

Another outstanding poet of the early nineteenth century was Abol-Hasan Yaghma (1782–1857), who came from humble origins in the desert town of Biyabanak and had a turbulent life including nearly six years spent in prison. He was well known for his extraordinarily beautiful *ghazals*, as well as for his biting satires in which his language became obscene and even coarse. Although sometimes his satire borders on invective, it is social malaise and especially religious hypocrisy that he is criticizing in his best-known satirical works.

One of the younger generation of the neoclassical poets, who distinguished himself from the others by being bold enough to translate his experiences into poetry and a criticism of Iranian society, was Abu Nasr Fathollah Khan Sheybani (1830–91). After trying in vain to recover his inherited properties, he came to the conclusion that 'justice in Iran is dormant' and turned to Sufism for consolation. He is considered as one of the early poets, who brings social problems into his work and heralds the coming of a new era in poetry. Throughout his works there is a pessimistic tone, exposing the abuse of the law by a corrupt officialdom in an absolutist society. However, he does not criticize the shah but rather looks to him to bring about reforms.

Very different to Sheybani was Mohammad Taqi Shurideh of Shiraz (1863/4–1926), who in spite of becoming blind at the age of 7 as a result of smallpox, was full of energy and optimism. He was a traditional poet in *ghazal* and *qasideh* and wrote many works of textual criticism on Nizami, Sa‘di and Farrokhi. His *Nāme-ye roshandelān* [Book of the Clear-Minded] was characteristically written as a consolation for the blind.

Mirza Javad Adib Neyshapuri (b. 1864) and Mirza Sadeq Adib al- Mamalek Farahani (1860–1917) were among the last representatives of the neoclassical school of poetry to bring modern ideas into Persian poetry. Farahani had a more marked interest in politics and became one of the foremost advocates of the constitution and enlightenment.

The dawn of enlightenment: the pre-constitutional period

Before turning to the poetry of the constitutional period, mention should be made of a number of critical pamphlets or books written by the enlightened group of Persian intellectuals, functionaries and courtiers. The ever-deteriorating socioeconomic conditions of the population in the mid-nineteenth century, the rivalry between Russia and Britain over control of Iran, and the religious *Bābi* movement that stirred up riots, particularly among the poor, alarmed the ruling class and prompted them to think of some kind of reform to prevent the fall of the dynasty. Many intellectuals advocated the study of Western science and technology, while they saw the main source of evil as the absolute power of the shah. However, their fear of the regime led them to make excuses for the shah and to lay the blame for all his inadequacies on his advisers. On account of their criticism, their works were frequently published posthumously outside Iran.

Majd al-Molk (d. 1881), whose tours of duty had taken him to the Russian and Ottoman empires, in his *Resāle-ye Majdieh* (published in Tehran in 1946), argued that the shah himself was interested in education and reforms, but was surrounded by a crowd of sycophants who had nothing but their own interests in mind. The clergy, especially those who preached to the people, were afraid of a change in the *status quo* and losing their grip over the populace. One of the pupils of the *Dār al-Fonūn*, E‘temad al-Saltane (1843–95), who was the author of many books including two on the ancient history of Iran and served as a minister of printing (*entebā‘āt*), produced a literary work entitled the *Khalseh* or *Khāb-nāme* [Book of Dreams], which was posthumously published as *A Description of the Decline of Iran*. In a dream he brings to justice the past prime ministers of the Qajar kings and reveals the miserable and corrupt condition of the court, a criticism that could well be applied to the court of Naser al-Din Shah.

Malkom Khan Nazem al-Dowle (1827–1907), originally an Armenian from the district of Julfa in Isfahan, who became an adviser to Naser al-Din Shah, managed to secure some business concessions in Iran but was not on good terms with the monarch. He wrote a series of political pamphlets, which were intended for circulation among the elites, but were soon secretly circulated throughout Iran. In works such as *Rafiq va vazir* [Friend and Vizier], *Osūl-e mazhab-e divānyān* [Principles of Officialdom], *Osūl-e taraqqi* [Principles of Progress] and many others he described how Iran could be saved and reforms implemented. According to Yahya Arianpour, who has written one of the best accounts of Persian literature over the past 150 years, Malkom was:

an ambitious, brave, learned and intelligent man, who despite his love of money was deeply patriotic. Despite criticisms directed against him, it cannot be denied that he played an important role in the awakening of the Persians.³

Another reformer and brilliant writer was Mirza Agha Khan of Kirman, who was beheaded in Tabriz in 1896 for having links with the assassin of Naser al-Din Shah. In his works such as *Sālār-nāme*, *Sad mas'aleh* [One Hundred Problems] and *Rezvān* [Paradise], he (like Malkom), humorously and sometimes with biting satire, criticizes the corruption and gives a vivid picture of a society suffering under a despotic ruler.

A younger contemporary of Mirza Agha Khan was Haji Zeyn al-'Abedin of Maragheh (1839–1912), whose imaginary travelogue (*Siyāhat-nāme-ye Ebrāhim Beik*) became one of the most influential works of the constitutional period. He was a prosperous merchant who spent some time as Iranian vice-consul in Kutasi in Georgia, but later because of his ill-treatment at the hands of an Iranian official, he took Russian citizenship. Being a patriot, he then decided to regain his Persian citizenship and after achieving this in Istanbul in 1902, Haji Zeyn al-'Abedin returned to Iran. He found a 'land wrapped in ignorance and superstition and devastated by despotism and corruption'. His *Siyāhat-nāme* [Book of Travels] is a bitter satire on the Government of Iran and the social conditions of the country; depicted with sobering realism, its object was to awaken Iranians to the deplorable conditions and to bring about reform.

The constitutional period: the outburst of social and political literature

The constitutional revolution of 1905–11 and the turbulent years following it changed the course of Persian literature. While classical poetry in the form of panegyrics had been written at the Qajar court, it was poetry with political content and social and political satire that

³ Arianpour, 1971, Vol. 1, pp. 391.

dominated the scene. Although the old poetic forms such as the *masnawi* (poem in couplets), *ghazal*, *qasideh*, etc. were still used, the content was didactic, topical and political. The press played an important role in popularizing poetry. Many writers and poets who had depended for their living upon various patrons were no longer compelled to write panegyrics for the king and emirs. Ordinary people had now become their patrons. Poetry, with its deep roots in Persian culture, along with journalism had become an effective medium for satire and political discussion.

Two types of new poets had emerged: publicists who expressed their ideologies in the form of poetry, and another type who composed patriotic *ghazals* in the form of *tasnifs* (songs). The poet had become someone deeply committed to the political and social welfare of the people. E. G. Browne, who for the first time collected the poetry and writings of the constitutional period in his *Press and Poetry of Modern Persia*, stresses this point when he says: 'If one collects the poems written since the beginning of the Persian revolution, it will be a poetic history of the movement.'⁴

'Abol-Qasim 'Aref Qazvini (1882–1934) was one of the first poets of the revolution. He came from a traditional clerical family, and his father on account of his good voice wanted to make him a *rowzeh-khān* (reciter of the sufferings of Imam Hoseyn and his family). Though at first he associated with court circles, Qazvini soon left them and went over to the supporters of the revolution in which he found a meaning and a purpose for his poetry. He sang his political *ghazals* at gatherings that were attended by thousands of people. During the First World War, along with other liberals, he emigrated to Istanbul, where he remained until 1919. After returning to Iran, he joined the movement of Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan Pesiyan, and in his poems incited people to march on Tehran. After the tragic death of Mohammad Taqi Khan, 'Aref Qazvini continued his public concerts with even greater success than before.

Mohammad Taqi Bahar, better known as Malek al-Sho'ara Bahar (1880–1951), started as a classical poet in Mashhad but soon joined the cause of the revolution to become one of its most eloquent advocates. After serving several times as a member of parliament and spending some time in prison, Bahar chose an academic career and became one of the most distinguished scholars of his time. Although traditional in style, the content of his poetry was closely associated with contemporary events. He depicted Mohammad 'Ali Shah (1907–9) and his court in humorous and satirical verses. During the rule of Reza Shah (1925–41), when censorship forbade all criticism of the king, Bahar managed to write satires in the most ingenious and covert manner.⁵ According to Jan Rypka, Bahar covered

⁴ Browne, 1914, p. 3 (Persian introduction). See also Javadi, 1985, pp. 136 et seq.

⁵ See Javadi, 1985, pp. 180–1, for the translation of one of his ingeniously written pieces of satire.

a wide variety of subjects in his poetry and ‘achieved a homogeneous personal poetic style, intended for a wide public. His poetry was explicitly didactic in aim but without being dry and pedantic.’⁶

Mention should be made of three revolutionary poets, Abo’l-Qasim Lahuti (1887–1957), Mirzadeh-ye ‘Eshqi (1894–1924) and Mohammad Farrokhi of Yazd (1889–1939), who all had different fates. A fervent socialist and revolutionary, Lahuti was forced in 1918 to flee to Istanbul, where he published the literary journal *Pārs* in 1921. One year after his return to Iran and after an unsuccessful uprising in Tabriz, he fled to the Soviet Union. There he lived for the rest of his life, later becoming the leading poet of Soviet Tajikistan. His large two-volume *Divān* (Moscow, 1946) comprises many lyrical and epic poems in both classical and modern forms. More than form, Lahuti was concerned with the political message of his poetry and the ‘awakening of the masses’.

‘Eshqi, a sincere and devoted patriot, became disillusioned when the republican cause was lost when Reza Khan became the monarch. He had published vehement attacks against the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 and the corruption of the Qajar court in his famous journal *Qarn-e bistom* [Twentieth Century]. After publishing a caricature and a satire against Reza Khan, he was assassinated by government agents.

Farrokhi did not fare much better. At the age of 15 his mouth was literally sewn up for writing a poem in praise of democracy. After escaping from prison in 1910, he reached Tehran and joined the revolutionaries and wrote many *ghazals* on social and political topics, even paying tribute to the October revolution in Russia. He became a member of the *Majles* (parliament) in 1930–1, but being an open supporter of socialist views, was obliged to emigrate to Berlin. The government of Reza Shah enticed him to return, whereupon he was imprisoned. He died in prison two years before the abdication of Reza Shah and the release of all political prisoners.

Iraj Mirza Jalal al-Mamalek (1874–1926) was a Qajar prince, who unlike most of his contemporaries was not much affected by the revolutionary spirit of the tumultuous times in which he lived. However, he should be mentioned as an advocate of greater social justice for women in Iran. In humorous and sometimes erotic terms, he describes the situation in which women are brainwashed to keep their veil. In his *Hejāb-nāme* [Book of the Veil], which enjoyed wide popularity, he encourages women to discard the veil. His satire extends to other social and political questions in his *‘Āref-nāme* [Book of ‘Aref], a bitter satire on the poet ‘Aref Qazvini and some other contemporary poets, whom Iraj Mirza pictures as political opportunists. Iraj Mirza also tried his hand very successfully at the translation of

⁶ Rypka, 1968, p. 373.

some fables by La Fontaine and an adaptation of Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis* that he called *Zohreh va Manuchehr*.

Poetry and journalism went hand in hand in this period, and two poets deserve a brief mention as they represent a new style in satirical Persian poetry. Seyyed Ashraf al-Din Gilani (1871–1934), better known as Nasim-i Shomal because of the journal that he published for many years under this name, was popular on account of his ready wit, beautifully written *tasnifs* and satirical verse in which he used colloquial expressions. It was under the influence of the famous Azerbaijani journal *Mollā Nasroddin*, which had a tremendous impact not only on the Iranian press but on the constitutional movement as a whole, that he began writing political satire. In fact, most of the time he freely translated the biting and exceedingly humorous works of the great Azerbaijani poet Taherzadeh Sabir (1862–1911).

‘Ali Akbar Dehkhoda (1879–1956), who later became the author of the first encyclopaedic dictionary in Persian (*Lughat-nāme*), began his famous satirical essays (*Charand parand*) in the journal *Sur esrāfil* (1907). In his crisp and sharp satirical style, he laid the foundations of modern Persian prose. In some of his poems such as *Morgh-e sahar* [The Morning Bird], written in memoriam of his friend and the editor of *Sur esrāfil*, Mirza Jahangir Khan, he reaches new heights, both stylistically and in expressing his heartfelt sentiments. In his satirical verse he makes great use of colloquial language, which was new in Persian literature.

The reign of Reza Shah and the beginnings of modern poetry

The nearly 20 years of Reza Shah's rule, from his rise to power in 1925 to his forced abdication in 1941, was a fairly uneventful period in Persian literature, except for the appearance of early examples of free verse. Following the example of Atatürk in Turkey, Reza Shah embarked on a general modernization of his country. He himself became a driving force in launching the country into the modern age of reforms. On the other hand, Reza Shah's dictatorial and ruthless rule stifled all vestiges of the dearly won freedom of expression and democracy. The politically motivated poetry, satire and journalism that were found in the works of ‘Eshqi, Gilani, Farrokhi, Qazvini, Lahuti and Iraj Mirza disappeared and freedom of expression declined sharply. Poets either devoted themselves to meditative and philosophical subjects, or they referred to social grievances in vague and allegorical ways. Political verse satire, which had been such an outstanding feature of an earlier age, became something of the past, and only criticism of a very general nature was tolerated. Before the end of Reza Shah's reign, of the six above-mentioned poets, ‘Eshqi was assassinated,

Farrokhi perished in prison, Lahuti fled to Russia, Gilani died in a lunatic asylum, where he was forcibly confined, and the other two died of natural causes.

Bahar and Parvin E'tesami (1910–41) are the most outstanding classical poets of this period. Parvin E'tesami, the daughter of the well-known journalist and poet Yosuf E'tesami, had a modern education at the American Girls' College in Tehran and was well trained in classical poetry. Although almost untouched by the turbulent years of the early twentieth century in Iran and their politics, she was one of the country's most talented and influential poetesses. Imitating the art and the languages of the great masters, she wrote *ghazals*, *qasidehs* and poetical dialogues (*munāzīras*) in the classical style but with the philosophical and moral themes of modern times. Parvin E'tesami had a great sympathy for the misery and suffering of the poor and also for the plight of women. According to Rypka, though her themes and subject-matter were extremely novel:

She hardly grazed the surface of the really urgent problems, even in the poems of social themes. She did not attempt to find a solution or to penetrate deeply into the social context, but lapsed into sentimental and affected melancholy.⁷

Had she lived longer, she would surely have reached greater heights in Persian poetry.

Mohammad Hoseyn Shahryar (1905–87) and Rahi Mo'ayyeri (1910–69) were the most famous traditional poets of recent times. While the latter was mostly known for his *ghazals* (*Sāyeh-e 'omr* [Shadow of Life], 1954), the former wrote in a variety of traditional forms and even tried his hand at free verse. He practised the same eclecticism in his political life, easily abandoning the Pahlavis to sing the praises of the Islamic revolution. His *Vāy Mādaram* [O My Mother] and *Payām be Einstein* [A Message to Einstein] are two excellent examples of his blank verse. In lyrical poetry, Shahryar's *ghazals* are in the style of Sa'di and Hafez.

Shahryar broke new ground by writing poetry in his native Azerbaijani Turkish, which was frowned upon under the Pahlavi regime. His famous *Hayder Babaye salam* (1954; part II, 1963) was responsible for breaking the literary isolation of Azerbaijani Turkish in Iran. Through graphic imagery and in a beautifully simple language, the poet recalls his carefree childhood, growing up in a village near Tabriz overshadowed by the Hayder Baba mountain. All the manners, customs and local traditions of the villagers are described in the stanzaic and syllabic pattern of the traditional bards (*'āshiqs*).

⁷ Rypka, 1968, p. 387.

Breaking traditions: new poetry (*she'r-e now*)

While the formal and traditional type of poetry continued in Persian, from the second decade of the twentieth century there were poets who experimented with modern poetry and blank verse. Shams Kasmai, Taqi Ra'fat and Ja'far Khamene'i, some under French and others under Turkish literary influence, tried their hand at new forms and styles. It was Mohammad Esfandiyari (1897–1959), better known as Nima Yushij, who changed the course of Persian poetry. He lived a modest and simple life between his native village in the mountains of Mazandaran and Tehran and never travelled abroad. He knew French and the influence of the French Impressionists was instrumental for him. He decided to put Persian poetry on a new route. In the manifesto of his 'poetic ideology', which he postulated for the first time at the first Congress of Persian Writers in 1946, he announced his departure from the old classical prosody (*'aruz*) and his adoption of a new style (*she'r-e āzād*, 'free verse') that had not been used before.

Nima believed that the imaginative essence of the poem should dictate its form. He says that he has not completely rejected the old prosody, but rather he has enlarged it by adding to it 'the natural declamation of human speech with the rules of prosody'. He adds:

In my verse the rhythm and rhyme are valued differently. The length and brevity of my verse [*mesra'-hā*] are not chosen capriciously. In irregularity itself I recognize regularity. Each one of my words succeeds the other in a well-thought-out and strict fashion. For me, writing free verse is more labour-intensive.⁸

In short, for Nima the essence of poetry did not consist only in the symmetry of the structure of the verse, in the rhythm and rhyme, but in the harmony and acoustic influence of the word. He stressed that Persian poetry, both in content and in form, should undergo a radical change. The narrative and descriptive method in poetry should be pertinent to the life and understanding of people in the modern world.

Nima's early poetry was in the classical style and his famous *Āy shab* [O Night] is a beautiful *tarji'-band* in the style of Sa'di. In his long lyrical poem *Afsāneh* (1922), which is very much under the influence of the French Romantics, he deviates slightly from the usual classical pattern. In spite of bitter criticism from the traditionalists, Nima continued his work. The really radical departure came with his poem *Qognus* [Phoenix] in 1937, to be followed by many other poems such as *Khāb-e zemestāni* [The Winter Sleep], *Āy ādam-hā* [O People], and *Morgh-e amin* [Faithful Bird].

Nima's path was followed by a group of younger-generation poets, the most important of whom are mentioned below. Mehdi Akhavan Sales (1928–90), whose pen-name

⁸ Quoted by Makhaleski, 1961, p. 162.

was 'Omid', began his career as a classical poet and only later turned to free verse. Nima pioneered the way and Akhavan offered excellent examples of the new style. His early collections⁹ are mostly in the classical style with some beautiful examples of blank verse. The title-poem of the collection *Winter* is a case in point. Depicting the dictatorial atmosphere of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, where people are so scared and wrapped up in themselves that they do not want to answer your greetings, it became one of the most outstanding poetical protests of the period. In Akhavan's poetry, the symbolism of words gains a new dimension and they are also chosen for their relation with the contents of the poem. (Indeed, they are so well chosen that almost no other words could be substituted for them.)

Another major poet who defied the conventional restrictions of classical poetry in favour of free-flowing verse and displayed his love of democracy and political freedom, both under the shah and under the Islamic regime, was Ahmad Shamlu (1925–2000). On account of his works and translations, Shamlu was arrested and spent 14 months in jail; he was released in 1955. His first collection of poetry was published in 1947, but his first great masterpiece came in 1957: it was *Havā-ye tāzeh* [Fresh Air], which would have a profound impact on modern Persian poetry.¹⁰ Ayda, the poet's second wife, was the source of inspiration for his superb lyrical poems, which sometimes remind one of the *Song of Songs* that he himself rendered beautifully into Persian. In the words of Shamlu:

I, an Iranian poet, first learned about poetry from the Spanish Lorca, the French Eluard, the German Rilke, the Russian Pasternak and the American Langston Hughes; and only later, with this education, I turned to the poets of my mother-tongue to see and know, say, the grandeur of Hafez from a fresh perspective.¹¹

The poet and painter, Sohrab Sepehri (1928–80), was an exception among Nima's many followers. While for many he remained the model of a real artist, many others criticized him for being isolated in his ivory tower and unaware of the social and political struggles of his time. Far from the hue and cry of intellectuals, he pursued his sublime and somewhat mystical goals in a surrealistic and very sincere poetry replete with lively imagery. Being profoundly influenced by oriental schools of philosophy and religions in his travels to Japan and India, Sepehri was a poet of nature who combined his art of painting with his lively

⁹ *Arghnun* [Judas Tree] (1951), *Zemestān* [Winter] (1954), *Ākhar-e Shāhnāme* [End of the *Shahname*] (1959) and *Az in Avestā* [From this *Avesta*] (1965).

¹⁰ His other collections include *Bāgh-e āyeneh* [Garden of Mirror] (1960), *Ayda dar āyeneh* [Ayda in the Mirror] (1964), *Lahzeh-hā va hamisheh* [Moments and Ever] (1964), *Ayda, derakht va khanjar* [Ayda, Tree and Dagger] (1965), etc.

¹¹ Hakkak, 1984a, pp. 221–2.

and melodious poetry.¹² His one-volume collected poetic works, published as *Hasht ketāb* [Eight Books] in 1967, became exceedingly popular after his death.

A close friend of Sapehri was Forugh Farrokhzad (1935–67), who in her short life had an incredible impact on modern Persian literature. After briefly being married to her cousin at the age of 16 and having a son, Farrokhzad relinquished her son to her ex-husband to pursue her calling as a poet and an independent lifestyle. She published three collections of poetry, *Asir* [Captive], *Esiyān* [Revolt] and *Divār* [The Wall], in the classical style from 1955 to 1958. She produced a prize-winning film, *Khāneh siyāh ast* [The House is Black], about a lepers' colony in Tabriz in 1962. With the publication in 1964 of her fourth collection, *Tavallod-e digar* [Another Birth], Forugh Farrokhzad became a major figure in modern Persian poetry. A unique and talented poetess in her own right, she is particularly distinguished as a woman who despite social restraints and taboos dared to express her innermost feelings about love, sex, society and the self with an openness and frankness unprecedented in the history of Persian literature. In the four collections of poetry that Farrokhzad published before her tragic and untimely death at the age of 32, one can trace the development of her style and thought from the personal and often introspective scope of her earlier poems. In her later collections she attains a broader social vision and an often transcendental view *vis-à-vis* universal questions of life and death, decay and birth. Her fifth collection of poetry came out posthumously in 1965 as *Imān biyāvarim beh āghāz-e fasl-e sard* [Let Us Believe in the Coming of a Cold Season].

Another remarkable poetess of our times is Simin Behbahani (b. 1927), who has established herself as one of the most outstanding figures in the contemporary Iranian poetic scene. Behbahani and Farrokhzad reached poetic fame at almost the same time, but their style is different. Behbahani mostly concentrates on the *ghazal*, and avoiding the daring departure of Nima-style poetry, looks for a middle ground. In her second collection of poetry, *Chelcherāgh* [Chandelier] (1957), she is already moving from the quatrain (*chāharpāreh*) to a new style of *ghazal*, which is akin to the traditional style but with a social and political content.¹³ While not a militant feminist like Farrokhzad, Behbahani cannot reconcile herself with the values dictated by a society ruled by men. Though her poetry abounds in themes of politics and struggle, she cannot be called a revolutionary poet.

¹² His first collections of poems included *Marg-e rang* [Death of Colour] (1951), *Zendegi-ye khāb-hā* [Life of Dreams] (1953), *Āvār-e āftāb* [Collapse of the Sun] (1961) and *Sharq-e andūh* [East of Sorrow] (1961). Other collections of his gentle and meditative poetry were published as *Hajm-e sabz* [Green Dimension], *Mosāfer* [Passenger] and *Sedā-ye pāy-e āb* [Sound of the Footsteps of the Water] in 1957.

¹³ Her other collections include *Marmar* [Marble] (1963), *Rastākhiz* [Resurrection] (1971), *Yek daricheh āzādi* [A Window for Freedom] (1995), etc.

Of the second generation of Nima's followers, Nader Naderpur (1929–81) and Fereydu Moshiri (1927–2000) distinguished themselves by their poetic genius and by perfecting the style of free verse. In collections like *Sh'er-e angūr* [Poem of Grape] (1954) or *Dokhtar-e jān* [Daughter of Wine] (1954), Naderpur's poetry is rich in imagery and deeply embedded in the texture of the Persian language. After the Islamic revolution, Naderpur in Los Angeles and Esma'il Kho'i (b. 1938) in London became the most outspoken poets of protest against the new regime. Reflections about life and death, love and destiny as well as human suffering have been some of the themes of Moshiri's poems in collections such as *Bahār rā bāvar kon* [Believe the Spring] (1968) and *Āh bārān* [Oh, Rain] (1982). Still from the younger generation of poets, Mohammad Reza Shafi'-e Kadkani (b. 1939), a well-known scholar of Persian literature, with a deep knowledge of Persian and Arabic poetry, displays an extraordinarily sensitive lyricism and great musicality in his poetry.

While following the ideas of Nima on rhyme and rhythm, the younger generation of poets laid more emphasis on the social function of poetry (such as M.A. Sepanlou in *Khānom-e zamān*, Tehran, 1987). As the political establishment often stood directly in opposition to the humanistic and social concerns of the poets, they tried to express their message in a vague and symbolic fashion. A school known as the 'Poetry of Resistance' included many poets of the younger generations,¹⁴ some of whom expressed their ideas openly while others did so more covertly. Another group known as the 'New Wave Poets' refused to turn poetry into a means of revolutionary or social action. After the Islamic revolution, for a short while there was a tendency to write in more traditional style and forms. More avant-garde types of modern poetry were associated with too much Westernization and were not favoured. Nationalistic, mystical and devotional themes were used by those poets who remained in the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter Iran). Those who had left the country after the revolution mostly continued their poetry of protest and social concern.

Fiction in modern Persian literature

Translations of European novels and works such as Maraghe'i's *Sayāhat-nāme* with their realistic prose had paved the way for the rise of some early historical novels. One of the first novelists who mostly wrote on historical subjects with an eye on didactic themes was Sana'atzadeh Kermani. His first novel, *Dām-gostarān yā enteqām-khāhān-e Mazdak* [The Plotters or the Avengers of Mazdak], depicts the intrigue-ridden court of the last Sasanian king, which was on the verge of collapse under pressure from the invading Arabs. Among

¹⁴ Such as Maftun Amini (b. 1925), Siyavosh Kasrai (1925–2003), Ahmad Reza Ahmadi (b. 1940), Esma'il Kho'i, Khosrow Golsorkhi (1941–74) and Shafi'-e Kadkani (b. 1939).

his other novels are *Dastān-e Māni-ye naqqāsh* [The Story of Mani the Painter] and *Siyāh-pushān* [Men in Black Robes]. The former deals with the romantic life of Mani, the famous prophet and painter, and the latter with the life of Abu Muslim, the Persian general who led the struggle of the Persian element within the Arab empire.

Another novelist was Mirza Mohammad Baqer Khosravi, who, like many other intellectuals of his time, joined the constitutional movement. During the struggle with the forces of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, Khosravi retired to his native Kermanshah. The most outstanding among his novels is a trilogy entitled *Shams va toghrā* [Sun and Sign], *Māri-ye Venizi* [Mary of Venice] and *Toghrol va Homā*, which takes place in the time of the Ilkhans Abaqa Khan and Ahmad Takudar. In essence, they are three romantic novels in which historical details are not treated convincingly.

Mohammad ‘Ali Jamalzadeh’s (1881–1997) *Yeki būd yeki nabūd* [Once Upon a Time] (1921), published by the journal *Kāveh* in Berlin, was a landmark not only in the Persian short story but in Persian fiction as well. Apart from employing the techniques of the modern short story in this collection, in his interesting introduction to the volume, Jamalzadeh vehemently criticizes the traditionalists in Persian literature who write for the learned few and ignore the general public by using unrealistic and florid language. Earlier Dehkhoda, in his satirical essays *Charand parand*, had made very effective use of colloquial and expressive language, but Jamalzadeh in his short stories goes one step further. Though contemporary with other writers such as Jahangir Jalili (1909–38), Mohammad Mas‘ud (assassinated in 1947), ‘Ali Dashti (1896–1981) and Mohammad Hejazi (1899–1973), Jamalzadeh is considered as the father of Persian fiction. He advocated a simplification of the literary language and invited writers to use a style that was closer to colloquial speech. He used idioms and expressions of everyday life and opened a new chapter in Persian prose. It was in the works of Sadeq Hedayat that the new style reached perfection and became a model for the younger generations of Persian writers.

Sadeq Hedayat (1903–51) is perhaps the most well-known Iranian novelist. After being educated in Europe, he returned to Tehran in 1930 and published a series of brilliant short stories: *Zنده beh gūr* [Buried Alive] (1930), *Seh qatreh khūn* [Three Drops of Blood] (1932), *Vagh Vagh sāhāb* [Mr Bow-Wow] (1933), *Sag-e velgard* [The Stray Dog] (1933), and a longer story called *Allaviyeh khānom* (1979). In all these works, Hedayat describes, with remarkable sensitivity, insight and understanding, the lives, aspirations, anxieties and sorrows of his characters. His most famous and controversial novel is *Būf-e kūr* [The Blind Owl] (1937), which has been translated into English; its bleak and Kafkaesque world is very different from the atmosphere of his other works of fiction. Among Hedayat’s satirical works of fiction are *Tup-e morvārid* (1947) and *Hāji āghā* (1945). The former is a bitter

satire on the dictatorial rule of Reza Shah and the beliefs and practices of Islam. The latter is a satire on the life of a hypocritical miser who, chameleon-like, changes his political ideologies in order to suit the occasion. *Hāji āghā* was apparently inspired by *Marg-e sūdkhor* [Death of the Usurer] (1937) by the great Tajik writer Sadriddin Aini, whom Hedayat met in Tashkent in 1953.¹⁵

A close friend of Jamalzadeh and Hedayat was Bozorg 'Alavi (1907–96). After being educated in Germany he returned to Iran, where he joined an illegal Marxist group. This eventually led to his incarceration, along with 52 other intellectuals, in the prison of Reza Shah in 1937. After being freed in 1941 he continued his literary career and published two accounts of his years of incarceration as *Panjāh-o seh nafar* [Fifty-three Persons] and *Varaq-pāreh-hā-ye zendān* [Prison Papers]. His most famous novel is *Cheshmhāyesh* [Her Eyes] (1952), which describes the love affair of a young aristocratic woman with a revolutionary artist. After the Islamic revolution he briefly visited Iran in 1979 and 1980 and published his last novels entitled *Muriyānayeh-hā* [Termites] (1989) and *Ravāyat* [Narration] (1998).

Another friend of Hedayat and 'Alavi was Sadeq Chubak (1916–98), who, in his five collections of short stories and two novels, proved to be one of the most accomplished masters of Persian fiction. He created his short stories with a remarkable awareness of structure and language. He displays an incredible familiarity with the lives and thoughts of his characters, who are mostly chosen from the lowest and most deprived classes.¹⁶ One of his best-known novels is *Sang-e sabūr* [The Patient Stone] (1966).

Jalal al-Ahmad (1923–69) and his wife Simin Daneshvar (b. 1921) belong to a later generation of writers. Jalal al-Ahmad's fame mostly came with his nonfiction work *Gharbzadegi* [Westomania], which was directed against the onrush of excessive modernization and Westernization that he saw as undermining the national traditions and old canons of behaviour prevalent in Iran.

Though not as prolific as her husband, Simin Daneshvar is one of the most prominent women writers of Iran. Her fame rests primarily on her novel *Savushan* (1969), which soon after publication became a best-seller. It is the story of an honest and patriotic landlord who does not want to sacrifice his tenant farmers for the benefit of the British forces in the Second World War, when his native province of Fars is occupied by them. The story is seen through the eyes of Zari, a young wife and mother, who copes with her idealistic and strong-willed husband while struggling with her desire for traditional family life and her

¹⁵ See Javadi, 1995.

¹⁶ See Kamshad, 1996, p. 128.

need for an individual identity.¹⁷ Daneshvar's two later collections of short stories, *Shahri chon behesht* [A City Like Heaven] (1961) and *Be ki salām konam?* [To Whom Shall I Say Hello?] (1980), are written with sensitivity and masterful insight into the lives of the characters.¹⁸ Daneshvar's novel *Jazireh-ye sargardāni* [Island of Bewilderment] (1993) is partly based on her own life. Her works stand as precious contributions to the world of Iranian fiction. She can be considered the first in the line of female novelists¹⁹ who have taken it upon themselves to create a link between literature and social change, and especially to depict the lives of Iranian women in their struggle to gain their rights.

Some of the most prominent writers of a later generation are discussed below. Though their writings cover a wide variety of topics and styles, a concern with social justice, an examination of the problems and sufferings of the deprived and the poor, psychological novels, and experiments in regional novels are the most pronounced among them. After the fall of the prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953 and the establishment of censorship, there was a prevailing sense of disillusionment. More novelists turned to introspection and metaphysical questions of human life, and probing the minds of their characters appears more in their novels. In depicting the morale of a 'vanquished generation', Bahram Sadeqi (1936–86) creates memorable characters. He is very familiar with the social conscience of his age and creates terrifying caricatures that remind one of the realities of his time.

Gholam-Hoseyn Sa'edi (1935–95), better known under his dramatic pen-name Gowhar Morad, who was a doctor and psychiatrist, became involved in political activities right from the end of his school days – this later led to him being imprisoned and tortured. He was a prolific writer and produced more than 30 works, including novels, novellas and collections of short stories, plays and monographs. His experiences as a doctor in a poor district of Tehran, as well as his extensive travels all over Iran, enabled him to produce a vast gallery of characters from a wide cross-section of Iranian society, especially the lower and middle classes. The depiction of their lives, aspirations, hopes – their whole world – was the focal point of Sa'edi's works.²⁰ When his dreams of a freer and more open society were not realized after the revolution, he fled to France where he wrote bitter satirical works such as his play *Othello dar sarzamin-e 'ajāyeb* [Othello in Wonderland] (1984). He also published the second series of his well-known literary magazine *Alefbā* in Paris. Some of

¹⁷ See Daneshvar, 1990.

¹⁸ Most of these stories are collected in two volumes and published by Mage: *Sutra and Other Stories*, tr. Hasan Javadi and Amin Neshat, 1989; Mafi, 1989.

¹⁹ Such as Goli Taraqi (b. 1939), Mahshid Amir-Shahi (b. 1940), Shahrnush Parsipur (b. 1946), Monir Ravanipur (b. 1954) and Fattaneh Hajj Seyyed-Javadi (b. 1948).

²⁰ See Javadi's introduction to a selection of Sa'edi's work, 1980, p. x.

his outstanding novels and collections of short stories are *Dandil* (1966), *Tars-o-larz* [Fear and Trembling] (1968) and *Vāhemeh-hā-ye binām-o-nishān* [Unknown Worries] (1967). Some of his stories have been made into successful films.²¹

The last two decades of the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah (1941–79), in spite of the harsh conditions, were very fruitful for Persian fiction. It seems as if all the experiments of earlier generations had come to fruition; new trends appeared in fiction that made this a very diverse and rich period. Iranian intellectuals' over-dependence on foreign ideals, with disastrous results, created a sense of national awaking. The reactions to it can be seen in al-Ahmad's *Westomania* and *The American Husband* and Sa'edi's *Dandil*. The search in the modern and censored history, that was never properly told, can be witnessed in novels such as *Savushun* by Daneshvar, *Hamsāyeh-hā* [The Neighbours] (1974) by Ahmad Mahmud (b. 1930) and *Shahzadeh Ehtijab* (1968) by Hushang Golshiri (1937–2000). Depicting regional ways of life and taking their stories to the furthest and most remote corners of Iran is another example of the search for roots and a national identity. Sa'edi in his *'Azādārān-i Bayal* [The Mourners of Bayal] (1954), Mahmud Dowlatatabadi (b. 1940) in his monumental and epic-like *Kelidar* (1981)²² or his *Jāy-e khāliye Lāluch* [The Empty Place of Laluch] (1979) and Amin Faqiri (b. 1944) in his *Dehkadeh-ye purmalāl* [The Miserable Village] (1958) all explore various aspects of the regional novel.

The failures of the intellectuals and their dilemmas in a society in transition are shown in the works of Sa'edi, Jamal Mir Sadeqi (1933–2003) and Nader Ebrahimi (b. 1936). Iraj Pezeshkzad (b. 1928), in his comic novel *Da'i-jān Nāpoleon* [My Uncle Napoleon] (1973), explores yet another aspect of Iranian society. It is a social satire on the widespread Iranian belief that foreigners (particularly the British) are behind every political event in Iran. It is a brilliantly written and funny novel with a gallery of varied and memorable characters.²³

The Persian novel has come a long way since its early beginnings over a century ago and new genres and new trends have appeared, especially in the last two decades. In the works of Esma'il Fasih (b. 1935) we see 'war novels' such as *Zemestān 62* [Winter of 83] and in the 'modernist novels' of Parsipur, Mahshid Amirshahi, Ghazaleh 'Alizadeh and Goli Tarraqi a whole range of varied themes can be seen – from love of freedom to social traditions and customs, from a Kafkesque isolation to a nostalgic outlook on the world of childhood. As Hasan 'Abedini says in his *One Hundred Years of Persian Prose*: 'The early

²¹ For a list of Sa'edi's works in English, see Sa'edi, 1980, p. 237.

²² *Kelidar* is a ten-volume 3,000-page saga of Kurdish tribesmen's life and adventures described in a poverty-stricken village in Khurasan. A second similar work by the author, *Ruzgār-e seperi shodeh-ye mardom-e sālkhordeh* [The Bygone Days of Old Folks], was published in 1986.

²³ Pezeshkzad, 1996.

stream of the Persian novel has now become a vast river, let us hope that it will gain more depth while pouring into the sea of people's life.'²⁴

Part Two

LITERATURE IN DARI

(H. Javadi)

Classical literature

The second period of the rule of Sher 'Ali Khan (1863–4; 1869–78) saw the cultural revival of Afghanistan. In 1873 the first printing press was established in Kabul and the periodical *Shams al-nahār* began publication. Though its language was Dari, its style and set-up were modelled on the press in India. The first English translation called *Wa'z-nāma* was from *The Times* of London by a certain 'Abdol-Qadir. The great reformist and thinker Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (Afghani) was in Kabul and Sher 'Ali Khan consulted him on many of his plans for reform. In spite of all this, the reforms did not have a great impact on literature, especially poetry. Most of the poets continued to follow Bedil, Hafiz and Sa'eb.

Mirza Qodsi Herawi (d. 1883), Mirza Mohammad Nabi, known as Wasil (1828–92), Mir Mojtaba Olfat Kabuli and Gholam Mohammad Tarzi (1830–1900) are among the most outstanding poets of this time who imitated the classical masters, especially Bedil and Hafiz. Most of these poets had court affiliations, but there were some who preferred to be independent: Ahmad Naqshbandi (d. 1898) wrote his *Golshan-i hayrat* [Garden of Wonder] on the life of the Prophet Mohammad in imitation of Nizami, and Mohammad Ibrahim Gowhari (d. 1905) wrote many *qasidehs* eulogizing the imams.

Although 'Abdol-Qadir Bedil (1644–1721) had a huge impact on Dari poetry, he was not the only influence. The classical masters of Persian poetry, and more particularly those of the Iraqi and Khurasani schools, also had a major influence on the poetry of the era. The poets of Herat and western Afghanistan, being near Persia, were influenced by the *Bazgasht*, or neoclassical, school of Persian poetry. Fatollah Khan Shaybani, one of the poets of the *Bazgasht* school who was in the Persian army in Herat around the year 1857,

²⁴ 'Abedini, 1990, Vol. 2, p. 367.

influenced a number of poets of western Afghanistan. This influence even extended to later generations of poets such as Esma'il Siyah, 'Abdol-Hoseyn Towfiq (b. 1908) and Latif Nazimi (b. 1946). Even in our own times, a poet like Khalilollah Khalili was distinctly influenced by Persian poets because of spending some time in Herat.

The early writings in prose were mostly on the country's history: *Pādishāhān-e Mote'ākhter-i Afghānistān* by Ya'qub 'Ali Khan (Kabul, 1889–90); *Tatemmat al-bayān fi tārikh al-Afghan* by Sayyed Jamal (Kabul, 1899); and *Sirāj al-tawārikh* by Fayz Mohammad Hazara (Kabul, 1913–16). The last-mentioned work, which mostly deals with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was written in honour of Amir Habibollah Khan (1901–19), one of whose titles was *Sirāj al-mella*.

Modern prose and journalism

Modern prose and journalism in Afghanistan begins with Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933), who spent 23 years of his early life abroad, mostly in Damascus and Istanbul, and translated many books from Ottoman Turkish. *Around the World in Eighty Days* and three other works by Jules Verne, as well as a number of Tarzi's original works of poetry and prose, were among these publications. After returning to Afghanistan, he managed to obtain permission to continue the publication of *Serāj al-akhbār Afghāni*, which had been banned after only one issue on account of its democratic positions. From 1911 to 1918 Tarzi edited this journal, which exerted a profound political and cultural influence not only in Afghanistan but also in North India and Central Asia. It became the region's most liberal, progressive and anti-colonialist publication. Because of his personal relations with Habibollah Khan and his sons, Tarzi managed to continue publishing this periodical; in its eighth year, he added a newspaper for children, which was the first of its kind in Afghanistan.

After a fruitful diplomatic and civil-service career, Tarzi (who was the father-in-law of Amir Amanullah, 1919–29) had to flee the country to Istanbul in 1928 because of the uprising against the king's reforms. He died there five years later. In later years, four important newspapers – *Amān-e Afghān* (1919), *Islāh* (1929), *Anis* (1929) and *Tolu' Afghān* (1921) – followed the path that Tarzi had opened up in journalism. The last publication appeared in both Dari and Pashto, and it was at this period that Pashto's becoming the official language of the country was discussed; it was later to become a heated political issue.

Tarzi tried very hard to extend his reformist ideas to the domain of poetry and to persuade contemporary poets to write on social and political themes. Though some complied, and even a Sufi poet like 'Abdol-Haqq Bitab (1892–1971) wrote a few poems on modern advancements, the old 'Indian style' of poetry (*sabk-i hindi*) with its high-flown

imagery and hyperbole continued. Among the poets who followed the call of Tarzi, albeit in a limited fashion, was ‘Abdol-Ghani Mostaghni (1875–1933), who was also influenced by the poetry of Malek al-Sho‘ara Bahar and was praised by him. ‘Abdol-Hadi Dawi (1895–1982), under his pen-name Parishan, was another poet who wrote *ghazals* in the style of Iraqi and translated the poems of Iqbal Lahuri into Dari verse. Mir Mohammad ‘Ali Azad Kaboli (1884–1944), ‘Abdol-Ghafur Nadim (1880–1917) and ‘Abdollah Qari (1870–1945) were among the outstanding poets of this period. Mohammad Esma’il Siyah, known as Guzak (1855–1945), was a satirist who successfully imitated ‘Obeyd Zakani and humorously wrote about modern advancements in the age of Amanullah Khan.

The leading poet of recent years was Khalilollah Khalili (1909–90), who mostly followed the Khurasani style, and his poems are distinguished by their romantic and epic character. His *Ariana Songs* describe historical events in Afghanistan and in his other poems the impressions of his travels in Europe and the Middle East can be seen. Though he experimented in modern poetry in the *chāhārpāreh* (quatrain) form, it was in classical poetry that Khalili reached new heights. ‘Abdol-Rahman Pazhwak (1921–85), ‘Abdol-Hakim Ziya’i and Mohammad ‘Osman Sidqi (1914–37) all followed the traditional styles. Other contemporary poets such as Ziya Qarizadah (b. 1922), Mohammed Yusof Ayinah, Rahim Elham (1930–2003), Soleyman Laiq (1930), Mohammad ‘Asef Fekrat Herawi (b. 1946), Wujudi Panjshiri and Wasef Bakhtari (b. 1942) have all tried their hand at both traditional and modern styles. Bakhtari (who now lives in Los Angeles) in the classical style reminds one of Malek al-Sho‘ara Bahar, and in the Nima’i style (i.e. the style of Nima Yushij) is like Akhavan-e Sales. Like him he has mourned the tragedies of his nation, and he has been always with them, from the prison of Pol-i Charhki to the self-imposed exile in Los Angeles.

Though some Afghan poets were familiar with English and French modern poetry and blank verse, it was through the influence of Nima Yushij from Iran that they turned to a different type of poetry. However, their initial experimentation was far from successful, and some like Khalili even went back to the traditional classical style. Others continued to write in both classical and modern styles, but (unlike Iran) in Afghanistan poets of great stature did not appear in the realm of blank or free verse. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s traditional poetry managed to flourish. Bariq Shafi’i (b. 1931) in his *Setak* [Tree Branch] (Kabul, 1963) and *Shahr-i hamasah* [City of Epics] (Kabul, 1979), Mahmud Farani (b. 1938) in his *Ākharin setāreh* [The Last Star] (Kabul, 1963) and *Ruyā-ye shā’er* [Poet’s Dream] (Kabul, 1967), Gholam Mujadid Laiq (b. 1930) in his *Bādbān* [The Kite] (Kabul, 1981) and Vasef Bakhtari in his *Dar kuche-hā-yi sorkh-e shafāq*

[In the Crimson Lanes of the Sunset] (Kabul, 1981) all display great talent and ingenuity.

In recent years, under the influence of modern Persian poets such as Shamlu, Akhavan, Forugh, Nader Naderpur and Tavallali, Afghan poets of the younger generation have experimented more in the Nima'i style, sometimes with brilliant success: 'Abdol-Qahhar 'Asi (1957–84; he died when his house in Kabul was struck by a rocket), in his numerous collections of poems, gives a vivid description of the war and the capture of Kabul by the Mujahidin. Mohammad 'Aref Pazhman (b. 1946), Latif Pedram (b. 1963) and Mohammad 'Aqel Birang Kuhdamani (b. 1951) all belong to this group of modernist poets. All three went for higher education to Iran and the tragedy of war weighs heavily in their poetic and prose works. Meanwhile classical poetry, especially the *ghazal*, continues to be a favourite poetic form among contemporary Afghan poets. Layla Taymuri (b. 1964), Soraya Vahidi (b. 1942), Razeq Fani (b. 1943) and many others have published poetical collections in the classical style.

Literature of resistance

The occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces in 1979, which lasted for almost a decade, and the subsequent years of war and the domination of the Taliban had a cataclysmic effect on the country. On the one hand, it forced many millions of Afghans to emigrate to Iran, Pakistan, Europe and the USA while, on the other, it engulfed Afghanistan in a disastrous civil war of unprecedented dimensions. On the literary scene, it also had far-reaching consequences. A 'literature of resistance' (*adabiyyāt-e moqāvemat*) was gradually created, mostly by those poets and writers who had remained in the country but also by those who had left. This type of literature had existed before the Russian occupation and there were many examples of it during the war with the British and later on. Layla Sarahat (1958–2004), Partov Naderi (b. 1952), Gholamshah Sarshar Shomali (1930–81; died in prison in Kabul) as well as 'Abdol-Qahhar 'Asi and Latif Pedram were among the poets who wrote against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Among the Afghans who had emigrated to Iran, 'Ali Fadaei was one of the first to publish an anthology of resistance poems in 1984 (*Majmū'a-yi sorūd-i khūn*) to be followed by many more of its kind in the years to come.

Literary studies and novels

Before considering the novel and the short story in modern Dari literature, a brief mention should be made of literary studies. Between 1951 and 1955 'Abdol-Hayy Habibi founded

the *Āzād Afghānistān* (Free Afghanistan) Party in Peshawar; it brought out a publication with this name. The party advocated democratic ideas and criticized the government for corruption and its abuses of human rights. After returning to Afghanistan in 1961, Habibi headed the Afghan Historical Society (founded in 1942) and was one of the first scholars to print critical editions of a number of classical Persian texts. Under the auspices of this society, the periodical *Āriānā* was published over nearly three decades, making a significant contribution to history, literature and art in Afghanistan. The publication of the *Encyclopaedia Āriānā* (Kabul, 1949–69) was also an important step in the advancement of literary and historical research. In 1965 a period of relative freedom opened up for the press and numerous periodicals and newspapers began publication. Politically the most important among them were the Communist Party newspapers *Parcham* [Flag] and *Khaleq*.

One of the first novels that Tarzi translated from among the works of the nineteenth-century French novelist Xavier de Montépin was the *Tragedies of Paris*, which along with his other translations became the source of inspiration for the first Afghan novels. The first Afghan work of fiction was *Jahād-e akbar* [The Great Jihad] (1919) by Mohammad Hoseyn Jalandari (1882–1960), which depicts the struggle of the Afghans against the British invaders. A graduate of Aligarh University and a prolific writer, Jalandari was probably familiar with many Western-style novels, but as a result of the translations of Tarzi and others, the language had become flexible and dynamic enough for fiction. In vivid and rather conversational language, the author relates the story of Dost Mohammad Khan's son, Vazir Mohammad Akbar Khan, who is traditionally regarded as the hero of the Anglo-Afghan wars.

In the following years, while the development of fiction continued, historical and romantic novels and long stories were especially favoured. In the 1950s and 1960s short stories became more prominent than long novels. 'Abdol-Rahman Pazhvak could be taken as an example: in his stories such as *The Gypsy Girl* and *Sudabeh and Zal* and *People's Legends*, he turns to romance, classical literature and folklore. Rahnavard Zariab (b. 1924) is a novelist and short-story writer of a later period who has published more than 100 short stories. Some of these writers display great sophistication and depth such as Zarif Sadeqi (b. 1942) in his novel *Escape from Darkness* (Kabul, 1967). 'Alem Eftekhar (b. 1951) is an interesting example of a writer of regional novels and short stories and vividly describes the lives of the villagers around his native Jozjan.

Between 1953 and 1968, under the influence of the Communist Party of Afghanistan as well as the translations of many foreign authors, such as Balzac, Maupassant, Dickens, Jack London, Hemingway, Dostoevsky, Chekhov, Sholokhov, Gorky and others, who had been translated mostly into Persian in Iran, the writing of realistic stories in a local

setting became very popular. Iranian leftist writers such as Bozorg 'Alavi had a considerable influence on the Afghan writers of this period. Romance and poetic themes were not much in favour. The writers turned to social and realistic themes with a regional setting. One of the most well-known figures of this period was 'Abdol-Ghafur Bershna (1912–82), who based his stories on folk tales (*Qesse-hā va afsāneh-hā* [Stories and Tales], Kabul, 1973). Babrak Arghand (b. 1946), Jalal Nurani (b. 1958) and 'Aziz al-Rahman Fathi are among the realistic and regional novelists and short-story writers.

With the premiership of Mohammad Daud Khan (1953–63), the hope of democracy and an open society faded once again. Instead of political themes, social criticism and stories with historical, social or romantic themes became popular.²⁵ There was an improvement in the condition of women and a very successful female writer was Roqqiya Abu Bakr (1919–2004), who wrote short stories with social themes and translated a number of world classics into Dari. Of a younger generation of writers who started after the resignation of Daud Khan and the appearance of a semblance of democracy, 'Azam Rahnavard Zariab (b. 1945) and his wife Spozhmai Zariab (b. 1950), Mohammad Akram Osman (b. 1937) and Mohammad Saber Rosta Bakhtari (1938–2004) are the most significant novelists.

In this period, short-story writing developed considerably. Among the writers of shorter fiction were Razzaq Ma'mun, Zolmai Babakuhi, Gol Agha Nazari (b. 1960), Jalal Nurani (b. 1951), Mohammad 'Aref Pazhman (b. 1949) and Maryam Mahbub (1954–2004), who was the second most important woman writer of this period. The most well-known novels are *Bachah-ye yatim* [Orphan Child] (1973) and *Bāzi-ye sarnevesht* [Play of Fortune] by Mohammad Aman Varestah, and *Azhdahā-ye khodi* [Dragon Inside] (Kabul, 1973) by Baha al-Din Majruh (b. 1928). The latter is a large-scale philosophical novel in which the writer makes use of Afghan folklore and Sufi literature. It is considered one of the best Afghan novels of its genre.

The post-communist period

After the communist coup of April 1978 which overthrew Daud, Afghan fiction turned mostly to propaganda and to idealistic and socialistic themes. The novels and short stories of this period had the stereotyped characters peculiar to such literature. Three outstanding novelists of the period were Asadollah Habib (b. 1941) in *Dās-hā va dast-hā* [Sickles and Hands] (Kabul, 1983), Babrak Arghand in his three-volume novel *Rāh-e sorkh* [The Red Road] (1983) and 'Alim Eftekhar in his *Golule-hā gap mizanand* [Bullets Talk] (Kabul,

²⁵ Of the notable novels of this period, mention should be made of Fathi's *Dar pāy-e Nastaran* [At the Foot of Nasturtium] (Kabul, 1951), Ghulam Ghuth Khaybari's *Tofang-dārān-i Khaybar* (1955) [Musketeers of Khayber] and Shafi's (b. 1921) *Hākem* [Governor] (1956).

1983). There was another group of writers who chose a very different path and rather opposed the former group. They were more individualistic and dealt with the despair and dilemmas of people in the modern world. They followed Camus and Sartre or (among Persian writers) Sadeq Chubak and Sadeq Hedayat. The most outstanding among them were the couple Spozhmai Zariab and 'Azam Rahnavard Zariab.

Rahnavard Zariab is a prolific writer who began writing short stories in the early 1980s. With his collections of stories such as *Kutāh āvāzi az miyān-i qarn-hā* [A Short Song from the Midst of Centuries] (Kabul, 1983), *Mard-i kuhestān* [The Man of the Mountain] (Kabul, 1984) and *Dusti az shahr-i dur* [A Friend from a Far City] (Kabul, 1986), he became one of Afghanistan's best-known and most respected fiction writers. Zariab uses historical, mythological and romantic themes for his stories, but in his realistic short stories or novellas he tends towards naturalism, with vivid descriptions of the sufferings of his characters. In his stylistically complex novel, *Naqsh-hā wa pindār-hā* [Images and Perceptions] (Kabul, 1987), the identity of the narrator is continuously changing from a 'self' to 'others'. Zariab in this novel seems to be very much under the influence of Hedayat's *The Blind Owl*, with its Kafkaesque atmosphere.

Spozhmai Zariab, in her many collections of stories, such as *Rostam-hā wa Sohrāb-hā* [Rostams and Sohrabs] (Kabul, 1983), *Dasht-e Qābil* [Cain's Waste] (Kabul, 1987)²⁶ and *Divar-ha gush dashtand* [The Walls Had Ears], displays the influence of Camus and Kafka. Her novel *Romān dar keshwari digar* [The Novel in Another Land] (Kabul, 1986) describes her own life as a student in Paris.

In comparison with the so-called 'official' literature, the latter group is sometimes referred to as 'literature of resistance'. There were other writers who followed neither of the two trends. Akram Osman, a talented satirist who began his career as a radio journalist at Radio Kabul in 1965, is an outstanding example of the last group. Among his numerous collections of short stories, *Dracula wa shagerdash* [Dracula and his Pupil] (Kabul, 1979) and *Waqti ke nay-hā gol mikonand* [When the Reeds Blossom] (Kabul, 1983) are the best known.

In this period, the writing of fiction and particularly short stories developed in an unprecedented manner. The appearance of many essays of criticism on the works of Akram Osman, Rahnavard Zariab, Spozhmai Zariab and many others in journals such as *Anis*, *Gharjistān* and *Zhunden* was another indication that works of fiction were being taken seriously. Towards the end of the communist regime, as the civil war began to rage, fiction

²⁶ This collection was reprinted in Mashhad in 1994 and its French translation appeared in Paris as *La plaine de Cain*, 2001. Her other work, *Divār-hā gush dāshtand*, is published as *Ces murs qui nous écoutent*, Paris, 2000.

writing declined and a mood of pessimism and despair set in. *Sadā'i az khākestar* [A Voice from the Ashes] and *'Atr-i gol-i sinjid* [Fragrance of Oleaster Blossom], both by Qader Muradi, *Khākestar wa khāk* by Qatīq Rahimi (b. 1962) and *Āvār-i shab* [Collapse of the Night] by Sarvar Azarakhsh (b. 1948) give depressing and gruesome pictures of what was happening. After the fall of the leftist regime at the hands of the Taliban and the emigration of tens of thousands of Afghans, Afghan fiction in particular and literature in general became an 'émigré literature'. Literary activities remained only in Herat, which was not under the control of the Taliban. The *Anjoman-i Adabi-yi Herat* (Literary Association of Herat) continued its work and the mass exodus of writers and artists did not apply to its members.

The largest groups of Afghans went to Iran and Pakistan, and because of the commonality of the language in Iran, Dari literature thrived there. In Tehran, Mashhad and Qom literary circles were formed. Even in Tehran there were workshops for young Afghan writers. Two literary journals in Tehran, *Khatt-e sevvum* [The Third Line] and *Dorr-e Dari* [Dari Pearl], published important short stories and essays. Among the early group of émigré writers, some actively joined the resistance and wrote ideologically highly charged fiction. However, there were exceptions: Maryam Mahbub (1954–2004), Spozhmai Zariab, 'Atiq Rahimi²⁷ and Zalmai Babakuhi (b. 1951) in the West, and writers such as Sarvar Azarakhsh, Khalid Nawisa and Seyyed Ishaq Shoja'i in Iran and Pakistan, have tried to explore their new environments under the condition of exile and homelessness while reminiscing about the past. The second generation of writers, who mostly grew up outside Afghanistan, did not experience the war and have been influenced by the literary trends of the countries where they live. Sometimes their language is not as pure as the earlier group, and in the case of some younger writers in Iran, the mixing of Dari and Persian is noticeable.

The works of Afghan writers in exile, as well as the retelling of what happened in their country, are far from over. Yet it is ironic that in spite of war and the rule of the Taliban, the amount of literary works, both prose and poetry, has been considerable and their impact wide and far-reaching.

²⁷ Rahimi, 1999.

Part Three

LITERATURE IN TAJIK

(*A. Alimardonov*)

Russia's conquest of Central Asia at the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century had certain objective consequences which were historically progressive. It put an end to the feudal internecine wars, to slavery, and to the isolation and stagnation of the Central Asian peoples, who now had an opportunity to learn about the achievements of cutting-edge science and technology in Europe and Russia; the path to knowledge and enlightenment was opened to them. Literature drew closer to everyday life and gave an increasingly realistic reflection thereof. Despite opposition from the forces of reaction and religious fanaticism to everything new and progressive, the ideas of the popular Jadid movement found ever wider reflection in the works of such famous Tajik poets and writers of the period as Qari Rahmatullah Wazih (1818–93), Ahmad Donish (1827–97) and Shams al-Din Shahin (1859–94) and their followers and those who shared their beliefs.

The splendid works of these literary figures also reflected such important issues of the Jadid movement as criticism of feudalism and propaganda for the new progressive social structure of Russia and Europe, the need to study the secular sciences, the defence of working people's rights and interests and so on.

At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, the Jadid movement, and especially the pioneering ideas of its founder in Tajik literature, Ahmad Donish, drew the majority of its followers from among scholars and poets. These included such well-known contemporary poets and writers as 'Abd al-Qadir Khoja Sauda, Tash Khoja Asiri, Mirza Siraj Hakim, Mirza Azimi Sami, 'Aji (pseudonym of Sa'id Ahmad Siddiqi, 1865–1927), Khairat, Zu-Funun and others, who had acquired both an open-minded outlook and literary skills from Donish's works (see Chapter 7 for details on some of these authors). Increasing attention was devoted in their work to the topical and vital issues of Tajik society as it endeavoured to follow the European countries and Russia on the path to progress and prosperity. In this way, by setting and developing a realistic tendency in the

poetry and prose of the time, the leading poets and writers strove to move Tajik literature closer to social realities and contemporary demands.

At the same time, Tajik literature of the period continued to be greatly influenced by the 'Indian style' (*sabk-i hindi*), especially the works of the Persian-language poet from India, Mirza 'Abdol-Qadir Bedil (1644–1721). The attitude of the progressive poets of that time to the works of Bedil and their imitation of his style were quite a different matter. For example, Donish had penetrated Bedil's refined and symbolic poetry so deeply that he was able to comment for his friends on many difficult ideas in Bedil's philosophical and literary works, explaining them in simple and understandable language. Under the influence of Donish, many progressive poets of those times, such as Sauda, Wazih, Shahin and Muztarib, who at the beginning of their creative life had simply copied everything of Bedil's, later abandoned his style and turned to the more easily understood and accessible style of the Persian-language poets of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.²⁸

There were no important literary circles at the court of the last Manghit rulers of Bukhara. However, in keeping with tradition, there were certain poets and scholars who amused the emir and his courtiers with eulogies and anecdotes. At that time, besides the presence of a certain literary milieu in large towns such as Bukhara, Samarkand and Khujand, in various provinces of the emirate and in the provincial towns²⁹ there were local literary circles which bred a whole series of talented poets.³⁰ An examination of their poems points to the common tradition of Persian-language literature in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and India, and the creative ties between these countries' writers.

It should be noted that the creative heritage of Donish played an important part in awakening the people and producing new generations of Tajik Jadids including, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Sadridin Aini (1878–1954). Following Donish in his creative literary work, Aini attached himself to the only opposition movement in the emirate of Bukhara at that time, the Jadid movement, which after 1916 called itself the Young Bukharans and was directed against the emir of Bukhara.

Tajik literature at the beginning of the twentieth century developed in close step with the socio-political and economic situation, and to a certain degree reflected contemporary changes in Tajik society. A large part in this was played by Persian and Turkic newspapers, including the first newspaper in Persian, *Bukhārā-i sharif* [Bukhara the Noble] (1912), published in Kagan. The bestknown poetry and prose works of the period were Fitrat's

²⁸ Aini, 1954, p. 108.

²⁹ Kash (Shahr-i Sabz), Ura-tyube, Hisar, Kulab, Qara-Tegin, Darwaz, Badakhshan and so on.

³⁰ Hasrat, Mauzun, Irsi, Farigh, Bismil, Nasikh Kulabi, Rahimi, Khoja Husain, Khazani, Nasimi, Garmi, 'Abd al-Hayy Mirja' Harfi, Bahrin, Darwazi, Yari, Fitrat, Ghafili, Mirza Liqa and others, altogether 63 of them. See Habibov, 1984a; Habibov, 1984b.

stories, *The Dispute* and *Stories by an Indian Traveller* and his collection of verse *Saiha* as well as Aini's story, *The Happy Family* and Mirza Siraj's *Gift to the Inhabitants of Bukhara*.

The Soviet period witnessed the conception and birth of the new Tajik literature. It was created by poetry – Aini's famous poem, *March of Freedom* (1918). In the period 1920–40, special importance was attached to the artistic word in the struggle against the enemies of the Tajik people, and Aini was in the front rank of literary figures who, by the power of their artistic works, scholarly articles and socio-political journalism, debunked the enemies and critics of the Tajiks, and angrily denounced them. An important part in their publication and distribution was played by the journal *Shu'la-i inqilāb* [The Torch of the Revolution] (1919–21), which besides Aini also published such writers of the new times as A. Munzim and S. 'Ali-zoda. The poetry of the 1920s (A. Munzim, A. Hamdi and A. Fitrat) was essentially propagandistic.

Tajik literature, as part of Soviet literature, carried out the ideological instructions of the times, raising and artistically interpreting the same issues and themes as Soviet literature as a whole. Tajik literature from 1924 to 1950 mainly glorified the October revolution and its achievements, extolled freedom, championed science, knowledge and equal rights for women, criticized religious fanaticism and the relics of feudalism in daily life, and highlighted the problems of collectivization and industrialization, the fight against fascism, and the situation in the rear and on the battle-fronts during the Great Patriotic War (Second World War), and so on. The poetry of those years, having undergone some change, was to a considerable degree coloured by a romantic perception of life and filled with a lofty civic passion engendered by revolutionary reality (the poems of Lahuti, S. Aini, P. Sulaiman and others). Tajik poetry was raised to still greater heights by the emergence of talented young poets such as A. Dihati, M. Tursun-zoda, M. Mirshakar, Kh. Yusufi and B. Rahim-zoda, and the 'People's Poets', S. Wali-zoda, Y. Wafa and B. Khudaydad-zoda, who wrote a number of splendid poems.

In the Soviet period, Tajik prose, too, developed both quantitatively and qualitatively (B. 'Azaza, R. Jalil, J. Ikrami, H. Karim, S. Ulugh-zoda, 'Ali-Khush, etc). Then and in subsequent years, a large number of stories, tales and novels were published: *Ādina*, *Dāhunda*, *Death of a Money-Lender* and *Slaves* by Aini; *Shādi* and *I Plead Guilty* by J. Ikrami; *Nawābād* and *Noble Friends* by S. Ulugh-zoda; *The Immortals* by R. Jalil; and *Loyalty* by F. Niyazi. The growth of the literary skills of Tajik prose writers ensured that in their works, the traditions of Persian-Tajik prose were fused with the experiences and achievements of European and Russian literary figures of the past and present. Since then, Tajik fiction has developed so rapidly in terms of both quantity and quality that it has even grown ahead of poetry.

Satire was a genre which enjoyed considerable success at this time. This was demonstrated on the one hand by satirical stories, short poems and anecdotes (Aini, B. 'Azizi, H. Karim, etc.) and on the other hand by Aini's well-known story, *Death of a Money-Lender*.

The birth of drama, quite a new prose genre for Tajik literature, dates from the middle of the 1920s, although it developed more fully only in the 1930s and 1940s. This was when the plays of A. Amin-zoda, J. Ikrami, S. Ghani, A. 'Usmanova, S. Ulugh-zoda and M. Tursun-zoda were published, bearing witness to the beginning of the successful development of this new genre of Tajik literature.

A feature of Tajik Soviet literature is its handling of internal problems and conflicts – the collapse of the emirate and the feudal system, the struggles against the Basmachis, the fascists and so on. Basically these themes were dealt with in such genres as poetry, short stories and socio-political articles and essays. The theme of the Great Patriotic War was addressed in poetry: *Mardistān* and *Tanya's Victory* by Lahuti, *Son of the Motherland* by M. Tursun-zoda and *People from the Roof of the World* by M. Mirshakar. It should be noted that the language of Tajik Soviet literature was noted for its simplicity and closeness to everyday speech.

The themes of the heroism of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War and the victory over fascism remained important in the following years. It was continued in Tajik literature at a qualitatively new level. Outstanding among the large numbers of works devoted to this theme are the novels of F. Niyazi (*Don't Say the Forest is Deserted*), Talis' story *Summer* and the deeply moving poems of M. Qana'at (*Waves of the Dniepr* and *Voices of Stalingrad*). Qana'at's poems focus for the first time in Tajik literature on the internal human world, the thinking and lofty moral qualities which speak of the grandeur of human beings in general, and the meaning of existence on earth in particular.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, Tajik literature saw the arrival of talented young writers brought up in the creative style of Aini and Lahuti.³¹ The period from the end of the 1950s to the 1980s was a time of intense development of Tajik literature. As a consequence of the changes in policy by the Soviet state at that time, writers gained great creative freedom and thus considerably expanded the ideological themes and artistic boundaries of Tajik literature. As a result, Tajik poetry and prose, including drama, gained new highly artistic works which became part of the golden treasury of literature of the Soviet period. The internal, spiritual world of the human being, human experiences and thoughts increasingly attracted the attention of Tajik writers.³² Tajik poetry of the 1960s–80s is greatly indebted

³¹ These included A. Shukoha, M. Farhat, A. Bahari, G. Mirza, P. Talis, F. Muhammadiev, A. Sidqi, U. Rajab, G. Sulaimanova, M. Qana'at and M. Hakimova.

³² M. Qana'at, L. Sher-'Ali, B. Sabir, Gulrukhsar, G. Safar-zoda, H. Faizullah, Gulnazar, Ziya 'Abdullah, N. Qasim and others.

to the creative work of M. Qana‘at for notable advances in form, content, ideological theme and stylistic and artistic content. At this time, the long poem underwent substantial development.

With regard to Tajik fiction, one should note its ongoing qualitative evolution and the broadening of the scope of its ideological themes and genres. One of its characteristic features is its appeal to the national traditions and the history of the Tajik people, and a large number of historical novels and stories have been published.³³

In the leading prose works of the 1960s–80s, the story, essay, tale and novel give realistic depictions of various aspects of life in Tajik society. At the same time, increasing attention was being paid to the internal world of the human being. Tajik literature of this period witnessed the development and growing maturity of psychological prose.³⁴ Drama too underwent further development during this period with such writers as S. Ulugh-zoda, G. ‘Abdullah and F. Ansari. It was at this time that Tajik literature became widely known and recognized, both within the Soviet Union and beyond its borders. Proof of this is the translation of Tajik works into the languages of the peoples of the USSR and other countries of the world.

Part Four

LITERATURE IN OTHER INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES

(I. Hasnain)

Kashmiri

The adoption of Urdu as a court language in 1907 was a major setback for the Kashmiri language. So greatly did it affect the status of Kashmiri that to speak it even at home was considered beneath one’s dignity. On the literary front, the deaths of Parmanand and Prakash Ram brought a lull in literary creativity. The mellifluous voice of Mir had faded.

³³ The best examples include the novels *Shurāb* by R. Jalil; *The Twelve Gates of Bukhara* and *Safar-Makhsun in Bukhara* by J. Ikrami; *The Adventures of Safar-Makhsun* by J. Ikrami jointly with H. Nazarov; the novel *Wāsi‘* and the short story *The Sogdian Legend* by S. Ulugh-zoda; and the novel *Star in the Night* by R. Hadi-zoda.

³⁴ *Tā’rikh-i adabiyāt-i soveti-i Tājik*, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1984.

Kashmiri took a long time to salvage its linguistic and literary identity. Mahjur, Zinda Kaul, Azad and Nadim (see below) had to pull Kashmiri out of the stupor into which it had relapsed.

Like several other Indian literatures, the renaissance of Kashmiri literature is also closely linked with post-independence literary activities. The political events in Kashmir, especially the 1947 attack, resulted in the mobilization of Kashmiri writers and other artists in defence of their valley. The Cultural Front was organized and for the first time artists were assigned a role in a period of turmoil and aggression. The establishment of Radio Kashmir on 31 July 1948 provided a great opportunity for the use and development of the Kashmiri language and its adoption in a variety of new contexts. Creative writers made serious attempts to develop those literary forms that had been neglected earlier, for example, drama, the short story and prose. Until this time the main literary form had been poetry and the dominant themes were nationalism (defined rather narrowly), the Kashmiri identity and religious harmony. In 1958 the Jammu and Kashmir Academy for Art, Culture and Languages was founded, which provided further encouragement for the Kashmiri language.

The early modern period saw the assimilation of Persian poetic forms like the *masnavi* (poem in couplets) and the *ghazal* (love poem), the development of the *lila* lyric (see below) and the continuation of the Sufi tradition. Mahmud Gami (1765–1855) introduced the *ghazal* form to Kashmiri poetry. He also wrote traditional *vatsuns* (a type of song), original compositions in *roph* (a folksong form), *naats* (eulogies in praise of the Prophet) and *masnavis*, which were mostly abridged or adapted translations of Persian originals. He wrote numerous *ghazals* and poems based on the legendary love stories of *Laila-Majnu*, *Shirin-Khusro* and *Yousuf-Zulaikha*, which is a translation of a Persian *masnavi*. His diction is largely Persianized, accompanied by the use of Persian constructions.

Maqbool Shah Kraiwari (1802–75) wrote several *masnavis* besides his immortal *Gulrez* (1849), a metrical romance depicting passionate human love in the story of Ajab Malik and Nosh Lab. Though the term is borrowed from Persian, the setting is typically Kashmiri. Kraiwari also wrote *Haroon Rashiid* (1852) and *Gris' nama* (1853), a frank satire on a Kashmiri farmer. He also made a name in the field of lyrical poetry. The *masnavis* written during this period were mostly *razmia* (combat), *bazmia* (love) and occasionally *hazlia* (burlesque).³⁵

³⁵ Some other famous *masnavi* poets of this period were Prakash Ram (*Ramavtarcharit*), Lachhman Raina 'Bulbul' (*Saamnaami*, *Nal-o-daman*), Waliullah Matoo (*Heemal*), 'Abdul Ahad Nazim (*Zain-ur-Arab*), Amiruddin Kreeri (*Saamnaami*, *Khaavar naami*) and Mohiuddin Miskeen (*Zeba nigaar*).

Rasool Mir (d. 1870), the founder of the romantic trend, is the most famous lyricist in Kashmiri; his poetry is both sensuous and romantic and his style is simple, direct and easily intelligible. He was in fact considered a pioneer in maintaining the purity of the Kashmiri language and, hence, is rightly regarded as ‘the father of the Kashmiri *ghazal*’.³⁶ He also wrote several mystical poems.

Parmanand (1791–1874) and his school represent the *Lila* group of poets. *Lila* lyrics are hymns in praise of a personified god, usually Krishna. Parmanand wrote three very long poems, *Radha suyamwara* [The Choice of Radha’s Spouse], *Sudama Charitra* [The Story of Sudama] and *Siva-lagan* [The Marriage of Siva]. He also wrote other poems like the *Lotuses*, *Chakras*, *Mandalas*, *Sahaza*, *Vyatsar*, etc., which are remarkable for their melody and their spiritual and devotional conviction.³⁷ Prakash Ram, who wrote *Ramavataarliilaa*, is said to be the founder of the *lila* lyric.

The years 1930–47 were the period of Ghulam Ahmed Mahjur (1885–1952) whereas from 1947 onwards was the era of Dinanath Kaul Nadim (1916–88), also referred to as the ‘Nadim era’. Mahjur switched to Kashmiri after 1918. Apart from continuing the *lol* tradition, he, along with ‘Abdul Ahad Azad (1903–48), gave Kashmiri poetry an individual identity through the concept of ‘*Kashmiriyat*’ – the Kashmiri identity. Ghulam Nabi ‘Dil-roz’ (1916–41), Zinda Kaul (1884–1965) and ‘Abdul Satter Asi (d. 1951) are some other better-known poets of this period. Zinda Kaul, popularly known as ‘Masterji’, wrote poetry in the *bhakti* (devotional religious) tradition and enriched *bhakti* poetry after Krishna Razdan (1851–1926). Ahad Zargar and Samad Mir represent the Sufi tradition, which is also discernible in the poetry of Amin Kamil (b. 1924) and Ghulam Rasool Santosh (b. 1929). The *naats* of ‘Abdul Ahad Nadim (1840–1911) are a highly prized contribution to devotional poetry.

Dinanath Nadim revolutionized Kashmiri poetry and may be considered an epoch-maker and a trend-setter. There is no published collection of his work, save *Shihil’ kul’* for which he was honoured with the Sahitya Akademi Award. Most of his poems were either presented in poetic symposia (*mush’ira* or *kavi sammelan*) or published in local journals. Like his predecessors and some contemporaries, his decision to write in Kashmiri was a late one. His first Kashmiri poem in 1942, *Maj Kashmir* [Mother Kashmir], coincided with the time when Kashmir was passing through a critical phase, with the mass-movement ‘Quit Kashmir’ slogan challenging the established Dogra dynasty. Nadim’s *Aravali prarakhna* and *Grav* [A Complaint] are poems of patriotism, revolution and freedom. Here he is

³⁶ Bamzai, 1973, p. 836.

³⁷ Besides Parmanand, the other members of the *Lila* group were Pandit Krishan Razdan, Pandit Lakshmanji, etc.

asking the kinds of questions that members of the Progressive Writers Movement were already asking in other parts of India. Consider, for example:

Why should the share of a labourer be stolen by a capitalist?

Why should a honey-bee circle the flowers and take away their honey?

Perhaps this theme was not new for Indian poetry, but it was new for Kashmiri. Nadim introduced a number of stylistic innovations like blank verse, free verse, dramatic monologue, the sonnet, haiku, etc. by departing radically from classicism. His *Bi g'avi ni az* [I Will Not Sing Today] in blank verse caught the imagination of Kashmiris – literate and illiterate – and was adopted by other poets. These innovations excited Nadim's contemporaries as well as poets of later generations.³⁸ 'Abdul Rahman Rahi's *G'avun chum* [I Have to Sing] clearly shows Nadim's influence. Rahi has been a recipient of the Sahitya Akademi Award.

The short story in Kashmiri came into vogue as a result of the popular uprising and the installation of the first popular government in 1947. Prose had been non-existent until then. The sense of nationalism associated with the New Kashmir movement attracted Kashmiri intellectuals and writers with a progressive and leftist orientation and inspired them to switch over to Kashmiri. A realistic view of the human condition largely dominated their writings. Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din's (b. 1928) *Sath sangar* [The Seven Hilltops] (1955) was the first-ever collection of Kashmiri short stories; it portrayed the contradictions of the middle class and also the pulsating life among the backward classes. Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din received the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1958. Autar Krishen Rahbar, a contemporary of Akhtar, and a host of others such as Sufi Ghulam Mohammad (b. 1929), Umesh Kaul, etc. published stories depicting the social malaise, oppression and communal tensions in post-independence Kashmir.

After 1955 the short story took a new turn. Short-story writers like Bansi Nirdosh (b. 1929), H. K. Bharati (b. 1937), Taj Begam (b. 1931) and G. R. Santosh (b. 1929) wove local customs, creeds and colour into the fabric of their stories. Literary activities in the 1970s increased further and created a literary atmosphere conducive to the growth of prose in general and the short story in particular. Two trends could be seen in the contemporary short story. One trend was towards modernism in which the writers experimented with new forms. Iqbal Fahim's *Kunyzath* [The Lonely Self], Bharati's *Anigatichi topaz khanji* [Topaz Piece of Darkness], etc. are stories where the narrative art loses its strength on account of excessive symbolism and the use of vague metaphors. The other trend

³⁸ Such as Mir Ghulam Rasul Nazki (b. 1909), Arif Mirza (b. 1910), Ghulam Nabi Firaq (b. 1922), Santosh (b. 1929), Chamanlal Chaman (b. 1937), Ghulam Mohd Aajir (b. 1945), Rafiq Raaz (b. 1952), etc.

emphasized narrative art. *Myon aaftaab* [My Sun] by Akhtar, *Shithyomut siriyi* [Frozen Sun] by Rahbar, *Halas chu rotul* [It is Dark Now] by H. K. Kaul, etc. represent this trend.

Kashmiri has a long tradition of folk dance-drama, which includes dialogue, music and dance. Literary drama started very late. Most of these plays were based on either Sanskrit sources, such as *Satich kahvat* [The Touchstone of Truth] (1929) by Nandlal Kaul (1870–1940) and *Bilvamangala* by Nilkanth Sharma (1888–1970), or Perso-Arabic sources such as *Shirin-Khusro* and *Laila-Majnu* by Ghulam Nabi ‘Dilsoz’, etc. The former had a Sanskritized style while the latter had a Persianized style. *Grisi sund gari* [The Household of a Peasant] by Mohi-ud-Din Hajini (b. 1917) is the first play in Kashmiri written on an original and realistic theme. A number of playwrights have contributed to the development of Kashmiri drama and a host of voluntary organizations and drama clubs have actively engaged in staging Kashmiri plays.

The novel in Kashmiri appeared very late. Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din’s *Dood ti dag* [Sickness and Pain] (1957) is the first novel in Kashmiri. Although successful, it lacked the necessary scope and depth of a true novel. *Gati manzi gaash* [Light amidst Darkness] by Muhammad Amin Kamil appeared a couple of years later and with this the novel in Kashmiri had truly arrived. ‘Ali Muhammad Lone’s novelette *Aas’ ti chhi insaan* [We, Too, are Human], *Mujrim* [The Accused] by Ghulam Nabi ‘Gauhar’ and *Mokajaar* and *Akh dore* by Bansi ‘Nirdosh’ are other contributions to this genre in Kashmiri literature.

Punjabi

In a highly charged atmosphere with a certain wounded sensibility born out of a linguistic dislocation, Punjabi had to struggle hard to assert its Sikh identity and emerge as a literary medium. The renaissance in Punjabi literature came at the end of the nineteenth century under the inspiration of the Singh Sabha movement among the Sikhs. The main objective of the movement was to establish a Sikh identity. Hence for Bhai Vir Singh (1872–1957), Punjabi became the natural medium of expression for achieving both a national and a linguistic identity. Bhai Vir Singh was chiefly responsible for elevating the Punjabi language to a literary level that it had never previously attained. His early life was devoted mainly to journalism and pamphleteering. He founded the weekly paper *Khalsa samacar* [News of the Khalsa] in Amritsar (1899). At the age of 26 he published his first novel, *Sundrii* (1898).

Although *Jyotirudae* (1882) is considered the first original Punjabi novel, *Sundrii* is the first novel in Punjabi written with a purpose.³⁹ Driven by the desire to pull the Sikh people

³⁹ Das, 1991, p. 289.

out of their stupor and stagnancy, Bhai Vir Singh extolled the courage and sacrifice of the Sikhs, their resistance against the tyranny of the Mughals and their role as protectors of the weak and the poor. Though the historical background of the novel is thin, the author succeeds in creating the illusion of a vanished era. Bhai Vir Singh wrote two more novels, *Bijay Singh* (1899) and *Satvant Singh* (1900). Together these three may be treated as a trilogy. He also wrote an epic poem, *Rana Surat Singh* (1905), and a play entitled *Raja Lakhdata Singh* (1910). Among his novels are *Kalgidllur camathar* (1935), depicting the life of the seventeenth-century guru Gobind Singh, and *Guru Nanak camathar* [Stories of Guru Nanak] (1936), a two-volume biography of the founder of Sikhism. *Baba Naudh Singh* (1921) brought a shift in his stance: from presenting the glorious history of the Sikhs to portraying the harsh realities of the rural society of his time.

Apart from religious themes, even the vogue of the short poem starts with Bhai Vir Singh's body of poems published in three volumes entitled *Matak hulare* [Elegant Swings], *Lahran de haar* [Garlands of Waves] and *Bijlian de haar* [Garlands of Lightning]. He is known as the father of modern Punjabi poetry. His major poetic work is the epic popularly known as *Rana Surat Singh*. It was written over two years with a view to propagating the cardinal features of the Sikh religion. Steeped in the spiritual mysteries of the Sikh faith, this epic, an allegorical fantasy, handles realms beyond the physical. It was also the first time that free verse, called *sirkhandi chhand*, had been attempted in Punjabi poetry. The epic is the odyssey of a soul in the quest for self-knowledge, and it is claimed to have brought about a radical change in Punjabi poetry, lending it new dimensions, a new idiom and new possibilities of expression. The true modernity of *Rana Surat Singh* lies in its prosody, its metre and its imagery.

Both the struggle for freedom and the Sikh Gurdwara reform had an impact on Punjabi literature and consequently brought many poets with a modern consciousness to the forefront of poetic creativity. Prominent among them were Hira Singh Dard (1889–1964), Gurumukh Singh Musafir (1899–1976), etc. However, it was Mohan Singh 'Mahir' (1905–78) who broke away from traditional poetry in the mid-1930s.

Mohan Singh is considered to be the greatest Punjabi poet of recent times. He earned this distinction after writing his great epic, *Nankayan* [Life of Nanak] (1971). He introduced modernism to Punjabi poetry and experimented boldly with form, with Freudian and Marxian overtones, as is evident in his *Kasumbhara* [Red Oleanders] (1937) and *Adhvale* [Half-Way House] (1937). In *Kach sach* [Falsehood and Truth] (1945) he made the transition from the romantic to the socialist-progressive mode, which he continued to maintain in his Sahitya Akademi Award-winning book *Wadda vela* [Late Morning] (1958), and in *Avazan* [Voices] (1950) and *Jaya mir* [Victory of Peace] (1953). 'Mahir' died with a

deep commitment to ‘*Punjabiya*’ – the Punjabi identity. *Nankayan* is a commissioned work penned at the request of Punjab University to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Guru Nanak.

Another famous poet whose name is associated with that of Mohan Singh is Amrita Pritam (b. 1919) (see more on her below). Amrita Pritam and Mohan Singh are the most celebrated poets of Punjabi literature. The period immediately after independence, marred by the bloody partition, is rightfully known as the ‘Amrita Pritam–Mohan Singh era’ of Punjabi poetry. Pritam’s poetry is a wonderful blend of earthiness and the unfathomable depths of the psyche of a woman shackled by the small-town orthodox ideas in which she grew up – and who later becomes an emancipated woman who breaks free in cosmopolitan Lahore and then Delhi. Pritam’s immortal poem on the tragedy of partition, *Ajj akhan Waris Shah noo* [Waris Shah Today], has virtually become a legend and is sung with great pathos all over the Punjabi-speaking areas on both sides of the border. She received the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1956 for her romantic, melancholy *Sunehura* [Messages] (1952). One of her collections, *Kaghaz te kanvas* [Paper and Canvas] (1973), won her the prestigious Jnanpith Award in 1981.

Harbhajan Singh (b. 1920) embarked on his journey as a progressive aesthete in his *Lasan* [Weals] (1954) and *Adharaini* [Midnight] (1962) and went further in probing existentialist questions. This was evident in his Sahitya Akademi Award collections *Na dhupe ne chhaven* [Neither Sunshine nor Shade] (1967), *Sarak di safe te* [On the Page of the Road] and *Main jo bit gaya* [I, Who Am the Past].

Sohan Singh Misha (b. 1934) broke new ground by introducing sophisticated realism in his collections of poems such as *Chaurasta* [Crossroads] (1961), *Dastak* [Knock on the Door] (1966), etc.

Perhaps the most convincing achievement in Punjabi poetry after Mohan Singh has been the work of Shiv Kumar Batalvi (1936–73), known as the Keats of Punjabi poetry. Batalvi’s urban upbringing in a brahminical environment proved to be his greatest asset, which he exploited to the best of his poetic genius. It is a culture exclusive to Shiv Batalvi, among his peers. *Loona* (1965), Batalvi’s great play in verse, won him the Sahitya Akademi Award. In this play he gives a new interpretation to the legend of Pooran Bhagat. Batalvi’s conception and treatment of the story are unique and brilliant, wherein he identifies himself with the female character Loona and portrays the plight of the downtrodden Indian woman.

Jaswant Singh Neki (b. 1925), Pritam Singh Safeer, etc. are some poets of the middle generation who have poetic achievements to their credit. While Neki’s *Karuna di chhan ton magron* received the Sahitya Akademi Award for the year 1979, Safeer’s *Anik Bisthar*

received the award in 1983. Avtar Singh Pash and Surjit Pattar are some of the younger generation of poets who have already come to prominence as trend-setters.

Events following Operation Bluestar⁴⁰ generated some of the most grim and heart-rending poetry that could not even be matched by the tragedy of partition. Ajeet Cour (b. 1934), Prem Prakash, Waryam Singh Sandhu and Harbhajan Singh are some of the Punjabi writers and poets who have written highly perceptive short stories such as Ajeet Cour's *Na maaro* [Kill Not] and Harbhajan Singh's *Ki faujan da maan* [Forces Need not be Vain]. As is clear from the work of poets of the younger generation like Surjit Pattar, both partition and the aftermath of Operation Bluestar have taken a heavy toll on the literary landscape of Punjab. With the former, readers lost Waris Shah, the Muslim bard who created the immortal romance of *Heer Ranjha*; with the latter, readers would lose Shiv Kumar Batalvi, the Hindu lyricist who has captured the hearts of young and old with his enchanting Punjabi love songs.

An interesting feature of contemporary Punjabi poetry is the overwhelming participation of women writers like Manjit Tiwana, Pal Kaur, Ka Na Singh, Amar Jyoti, Kamal Ikarsi, Pritam Sandhu, etc. The female poets of this generation have departed significantly from the earlier generation in their more liberal treatment of man–woman relationships.

The novelists Mohan Singh Vaid (1881–1939) and Charan Singh Shaheed (1881–1935) came close on the heels of Bhai Vir Singh, followed by Amar Singh and Master Tara Singh (1885–1968). However, it was with Nanak Singh (1897–1973) that the Punjabi novel matured fully. A prolific writer, Nanak Singh has been called the father of the Punjabi novel. He made significant contributions to various literary genres. His greatest contribution to Punjabi fiction is its secularization. He depicted episodes from contemporary life, cloaked with a veil of romantic idealism. He made his mark in the literary world with his novel *Chitta lahu* (1932). *Pavitar papi* (1942) is considered to be his masterpiece. He deviates from the narrative pattern and uses flashbacks and the boomerang technique. Thus his novels have no beginning, middle or end. His great historical novel, *Ik mian do talwaran* [One Sheath and Two Swords] (1959), won him the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1962.

Nanak Singh has influenced almost all Punjabi novelists in one way or the other, the most prominent being Jaswant Singh Kanwal,⁴¹ the realist Gurdial Singh (b. 1933)⁴² and Sohan Singh Sital, a traditionalist in form but modern in outlook.⁴³ Materialism predominates in the writings of Nanak Singh, Jaswant Singh Kanwal, Gurdial Singh and Sohan

⁴⁰ A political event that culminated in the state-sponsored army attack on the Golden Temple at Amritsar in 1984.

⁴¹ *Puranmashi* (1950), *Rup dhara* (1959), *Hani* (1961), *Lahu di lo* (1975) and *Manukhta* (1980).

⁴² *Marhi da diva* [A Lamp in the Cremation Ground] (1964), *Anhoe* (1967) and *Adh chanani raat* (1970).

⁴³ *Jug badal gaya* (1971).

Singh Sital, who saw fiction as a criticism of life. However, there were other types of novelists such as Surinder Singh Narula, Narendarpal Singh, Kartar Singh Duggal, Surjit Singh Sethi and Narinjan Tasnim, who regarded fiction not as a criticism of life but as a source of recreating the complexities of life. Narula is the harbinger of realism in the Punjabi novel; his first novel, *Peo puttar* (1946), proved to be a trend-setter.

The realistic and the psychological novel developed side by side in the work of Narendarpal Singh, who delighted in experimenting with new forms and new techniques. His *Punnya ke masaya* (1964) is a stream-of-consciousness novel depicting India's cultural background through the life story of a school-teacher. His *Sutardhar* (1979) is a prophecy about the future of humankind.

Kartar Singh Duggal (b. 1917) is a brilliant and a prolific Punjabi writer who has authored several novels, short stories, plays and poems. He remains unparalleled in Punjabi literature for having fictionalized landmark events in the contemporary history of India. Among his works is a celebrated trilogy covering a tumultuous and volatile period in Punjab.⁴⁴

Surjit Singh Sethi (generally known as an experimentalist) has also been a prolific writer. His fifth novel, *Ik khali payala* (1960), created a stir in literary circles as it was written in the form of an interior monologue. Here an attempt has been made to trace the inner void of a Roma, a symbol of the modern woman in search of her identity.

Hanera hon takk (1971) is a psychological novel by Narinjan Tasnim in which the stream-of-consciousness technique is used to catch the flux of time past and present at moments of heightened sensibility.

In Sant Singh Sekhon's novel *Lahu mitti* (1950), realism takes on a deeper hue. The novel tells the story of a peasant family whose members are uprooted as they go in search of new pastures during the digging of a canal. *Baba Aasman* (1971) also depicts the struggle of a peasant family. Sekhon believes that sociopolitico-economic factors are the real causes of the sufferings of the masses.

Amrita Pritam (mentioned above as a poet) is a prolific writer in several genres. *Doctor Dev*, her first novel, appeared in the late 1960s. With its publication, Pritam switched from writing poetry to prose. *Pinjar* [The Skeleton] (1970), her second novel, is one of her most powerful works, in which she provides an intensely poignant account of partition.⁴⁵ Pritam's prose has a distinct poetic and lyrical quality about it, which has endeared her not only to her Punjabi readers but also to her Hindi audience.

⁴⁴ *Hal muredan da* [The Plight of the Devotees], *Ab na bason eh gaon* [No More Will I Live in This Village] and *Jal ki pyaas na jaaye* [The Thirst for Water Never Dies].

⁴⁵ *Ik si Anita*, *Jeb katre*, *Unanja din*, etc. are some of her other novels.

Dalip Kaur Tiwana (b. 1935) is a prominent contemporary Punjabi novelist. Her works focus on the mindscape of the oppressed woman and the lowly position that society accords her. Another major theme running through her writings concerns naive rural folk and their suppressed ambitions and desires. Tragedy and irony are the hallmarks of her fiction. The complex inner duality of the female psyche is Tiwana's principal concern. By far her finest work is the novel *Langh gaye darya* [The Waters Flow down the Rivers] (1990).

The contemporary Punjabi novel is now a maelstrom of various trends. Baldev Singh (*Ann data*), Om Parkash Gaso (*Mitti da mull*, 1972), Ram Sarup Ankhi (*Sulagdi raat*, 1978; *Kotha Khara Singh*), Harnam Das Sehrai, Jagjit Brar, etc. are the pioneers in this field.

The rise of short-story writing coincided with the advent of the Punjabi press. However, in the absence of any model, these short-story writers adopted a Western framework for their subject matter. Nanak Singh, Gurbakhsh Singh, S. S. Charan Singh 'Shahid' and Sujana Singh belong to the early age of the Punjabi short story. The technique of story writing improved with Kartar Singh Duggal, Mohinder Singh Sarna, etc. and certain dramatic elements and greater subtlety were introduced. A dramatization of events replaced the old story's narrative pattern. Control over the narration slipped out of the author's hands – 'Exit Author' became the watchword of this age.⁴⁶

The Punjabi short story is indebted to female writers like Amrita Pritam and Dalip Kaur Tiwana, who made enormous contributions in this field as well as in the other genres in which they wrote. Primarily a fiction writer, Ajeet Cour has nine collections of short stories and two novels to her credit. She received the Sahitya Akademi Award for her fine autobiographical work entitled *Khanabadosh* [The Gypsy] (1982). Her *Savian chidian* [Sea-Green Sparrows] is an anthology of short stories, in which some key episodes pertaining to her own life are discussed. Ajeet Cour enjoys a distinct position among the autobiographical writers in Punjabi.

It was with Ishwar Chand Nanda that modern Punjabi drama came into existence. *Dulhan* [The Bride] (1913) was Nanda's first one-act play, followed by *Baba Ram bhajani* (1914), *Jinn* (1932), etc. His better-known plays are *Subhadra* (1920), *Shami Shah*, etc.

Side by side with Nanda's realistic form ran the tradition which drew inspiration from classical Sanskrit drama, using the conventions of *mangalacharana*, *sutradhara*, etc. *Mundri-chhal* [Trick of the Ring] (1927) and *Damini* (1930) by Bawa Budh Singh, and *Puran Bhagat*, *Kunal* and *Savitri* by Brij Lal Shastri represent the traditional voice.

⁴⁶ Surinder Singh Narula, Surjit Singh Sethi, Balwant Gargi, Jaswant Singh Kanwal, Mohan Singh Diwana, Mohan Singh, Man Mohan Bawa (*Yodh naadd*) etc. are the stalwarts of other fields who have also contributed immensely to this genre.

Joshua Fazal Din from Lahore wrote *Munde damul* (1928), *Parbha* (1945), *Pati varta Kamla*, etc. for the edification of rural people. In *Pind de vairi* he gives a dramatic picture of how the peace of rural life is torn apart by petty enmities and grudges.

With the Progressive Writers Movement in 1936, a new social awareness among Punjabi playwrights emerged. Sant Singh Sekhon's plays *Chhe ghar* [Six Houses] (1941), *Bhavi kalakar* [The Artist] (1945), etc. portray the themes of social commitment and class struggle.

Balwant Gargi's plays are marked by his diverse style. His *Loha kut* [The Blacksmith] (1944) deals with the suppressed emotions of Shanti, wife of the blacksmith Kaku. His *Kesro* (1952) is a realistic comedy dealing with women's education. His *Sautan* [The Rival Wife] (1980) deals with the incestuous relationship of a mother, a son and a daughter. He also wrote several one-act plays, such as *Pattan di beri* [The Boat Woman] (1950), *Bebe* [The Matriarch] (1944) and *Chaku* [The Knife].

Ik siphar siphar [One Zero Twice] (1941), *Tin natak* [Three Plays] and *Sat natak* [Seven Plays] are one-act collections by Kartar Singh Duggal, while *Mitha pani* [Sweet Water], *Kob kan* [The Mountain Cutter] and *Diva bujh gaya* [The Lamp has Blown Out] are his full-length plays.

Although plays with a social theme and moral purpose have also been written by Gurdial Singh Phul, he has largely devoted himself to writing Sikh historical and religious plays such as *Jin sat palley hoe* [Those Who Possess the Truth] and *Apna mool pehchan* [Recognize Your Real Self].

Social comedies such as *Buhay baithi dhi* [Daughter at the Threshold], *Jutiyan da jora* [A Pair of Shoes] and *Murde da ration* [The Ration for the Corpse] have been written by Gurdial Singh Khosla.

Surjit Singh Sethi and Kapur Singh Ghuman have experimented with modern techniques in *Mard mard nahin, tivin tivin nahi* [Man is not Man, nor is Woman Woman] and *Putlighar* [The House of Puppets], respectively.

Sheila Bhattia is credited with having introduced opera in her plays such as *Heer-Ranjha* (1957), *Rukhe khet* [Dry Fields] and *Prithvi Raj Chauhan*. Gursaran Singh, Hardit Singh Sutantar Giani, Alam Jit and Gurcharan Singh Jasuja are some prominent playwrights who have experimented with the techniques and form of plays.

DALIT LITERATURE IN PUNJABI

In spite of the social-reformist movements, radical political movements and even the impact of Sufism through poets like Shaikh Farid and Bulle Shah, Punjabi society could never remain non-communal, classless and non-casteist. The existence of Dalits in Punjab as a

downtrodden section of society is a natural ground for the emergence of a Dalit trend in Punjabi literature as well.

In modern Punjabi literature, Principal Sujana Singh is considered the harbinger of the Dalit voice. Santokh Singh Dhir and Gurdial Singh further consolidated the tradition set by Sujana Singh. The impact of the Naxalite movement on Punjabi literature gave a further impetus to this trend. Writers like Prem Gorkhi (*Arjun Safedi Wala*), Kirpal Kazak, Attajeet (*Bathloo Chamar*), Nachatar (*Baki da sach*), Bhura Singh Kaler (*Tutte pattee*), Lal Singh, etc. made their Dalit identity vibrant through their short stories.

Though Nanak Singh, Jaswant Singh Kanwal, Kartar Singh Duggal, Surinder Singh Narula, etc. gave space in their novels to depict the sufferings of Dalit life, the first real Dalit hero (Jagseer) emerged in Gurdial Singh's novel, *Marhi da diwa*. Sohan Singh Sital's novels *Tutan wala khuh* and *Jug badal gaya* also portray Dalit life in a very sympathetic manner. Gurcharan Singh Rao's *Mashalchi* is a powerful novel focusing on Dalit life.

Prem Gorkhi's *Gair hazir aadmi* [The Absent Person] (1994) is the first Dalit autobiography in Punjabi in which the painful and anguished life of a Dalit is presented in an artful and dramatic form.

Harcharan Singh has depicted many Dalit characters in his plays like *Ratta Salu*. Balwant Gargi has also captured the anguished reality of Dalit characters in his plays such as *Loha kutt*, *Kesro* and *Kanak di balli*.

Punjabi poetry presents the Dalit voice more vigorously. Quite a number of contemporary poets⁴⁷ representing Dalit sensibilities have made the Dalit trend in Punjabi poetry an established reality.

Sindhi

Although Sindhi belongs to an Indo-Aryan language family, it differs considerably from other Indo-Aryan languages of the subcontinent both in terms of sounds and grammar. For example, the presence of four unique implosive sounds as well as a set of pronominal suffixes for verbs, certain nouns and postpositions not only make Sindhi distinct from other cognate languages but also bring it close to Dardic (Kashmiri) and Iranian (Baluchi and Persian). Another unique feature of Sindhi is that, unlike most other North Indian languages, the short vowel in the word-final position is not only pronounced but also inflected for case.

⁴⁷ Among them are Lal Singh Dil, Gurdas Ram Aalam, Manjit Qadar, Sant Ram Udasi, Balbir Madhavpuri, Madan Vira and Dharam Kameana.

The mid-nineteenth century was important both for the growth and development of Sindhi language and literature and for the emergence of a Sindhi ethno-nationalist consciousness. Colonial rule in Sind was established in the mid-nineteenth century; Sindhi as an official vernacular was recognized by the British Government in 1851 and ‘its use in administration and record-keeping ... led to the subsequent standardization of the language ... orthography ... compilation of dictionaries, grammar ... literary histories and the introduction of printing and print media’.⁴⁸

Since Sindhi was not the language of administration, it lacked a uniform script. Hence multiple scripts were used which contributed to the consolidation of identities based on religion, caste and region.⁴⁹ For example, the Khojah community used the Khuwajiko (or Khojki) script, the Memans preferred to use the Memaniko script, the Hindus wrote in Devanagari, the Sikhs in Gurmukhi, etc. The recognition of Sindhi as an official vernacular brought order to a ‘chaotic’ scriptural plurality. Perso-Arabic and Devanagari were the two strong contenders. Political exigencies, however, favoured the Arabic script with modifications in 1852. Ultimately, half a century later, the modified Arabic script with 52 characters was adopted for use in the official domain in Sind.

The partition of the subcontinent sharpened the divide along religious lines in India and led to the emergence of three contending factions – one supporting the Devanagari script, the other lobbying for the Arabic script and the third one trying to re-establish a:

modified form of the old *Landa* (*Hatavanika*) commercial alphabet, claiming that it is related to the writing system of the ancient civilization of *Mohenjo Daro* and thus ... is the unique and authentic heritage of Sindh ... preserving ‘Sindhism’ and Sindhi identity.⁵⁰

Nineteenth-century Sindhi literature shows a discernible departure from the synthesizing tradition, which was the distinguishing feature of the preceding century’s *littérateurs*. For example, verse forms like *duha* (*doha*), *soratha*, *baro duho*, *tunveri duho*, etc. gave way to Persian poetic forms such as *qasida*, *masnavi*, *musaddas*, *rubai*, *ghazal*, etc. Political factors not only heightened the process of Persianization but also compelled the Sindhi literati to believe that it was only through the process of Persianization that the Turco-Persian *ashraf* (elite) would accept Sindhi, and that Sindhi would gain and flourish in the process.

Akhund Gul Mohammad ‘Gul’ (1809–56) was not only the first Sindhi poet to complete his *Diwan* in Sindhi but also the trend-setter of the Persianized poetic forms. Mir Hassan ‘Ali Khan ‘Hassan’ (1824–1909), Ghulam Mohammad Shah ‘Gada’ (1824–1900), Akhund

⁴⁸ Asani, 2004, p. 614.

⁴⁹ Asani, 2004.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 626.

Kasim ‘Sangi’ (1851–1924), Shamsuddin ‘Bulbul’ (1857–1919) and many others were composing Persianized forms in Sindhi. Among them, Sangi enjoys a significant position in Sindhi literature. He particularly excels in the *ghazal*. He was the leader of the ‘Sangi school of poetry’ and the entire period from 1881 to 1915 is popularly referred to as the ‘Sangi age’.⁵¹

Mirza Qaleech Beg (1853–1929) is a prominent name in Sindhi literature; he was a votary of the Sangi doctrine. His poetic collection, *Amulha manik* [Priceless Gem], and a host of other translations of Omar Khayyam are perfect examples of where the Persian poetic forms are used. Born in Hyderabad to a Turco-Caucasian family, Qaleech Beg devoted his life to enriching the Sindhi language and literature. He was a prolific translator, reputed for not having left a single book ‘that was not immediately converted into Sindhi’.⁵² He was also known as a perfect craftsman, ‘capable to apply every rhetorical device to his verses . . . to enrich his beloved Sindhi with as many forms as possible’.⁵³

The following quote aptly captures the essence of this versatile genius, known as the ‘doyen’ of modern Sindhi literature:

To fill the deep gap of Sindhi poetry and prose, he has deeply investigated the different books of both Eastern and Western poets and scholars, literati and excellent men, philosophers and mystics, gnostics and rationalists, has translated their prosaic and poetical jewels into fluent Sindhi, and has put them before us – and there is no subject or title upon which he has not turned his pen.⁵⁴

The close proximity with Persian, however, suffered on account of the changing political milieu. The early decades of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of nationalist and patriotic poets and ultimately the return of ‘the traditional Sindhi forms and themes of the early virtuosos’.⁵⁵ Kishinchand Tirathdas Khatri (d. 1947) spearheaded this movement and laid the foundations of the modern school of poetry. Shaikh Ayaz and several other important contemporary poets became members of this school. Their literary commitment was not confined to reviving the traditional Sindhi form. Even new forms, including free verse and the sonnet, were created. Some were modelled after European forms. Diwan Dayaram Gidumal’s (1857–1927) *Mana-ja-chahbooka* [Whips of the Mind], published in free verse, caused a ‘revolution in the taste of more thoughtful and aspiring Sindhi youth’.⁵⁶

European forms also provided a model for the creation of prose genres, which mostly focused on issues related to social reforms. Deeply influenced by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s

⁵¹ Allana, 1991, p. 28.

⁵² Schimmel, 1974, p. 29.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 30.

⁵⁴ Cited in ibid., p. 29.

⁵⁵ Asani, 2004, p. 629.

⁵⁶ Ajwani, 1959, p. 268.

ideas, Khan Bahadur Hassan 'Ali Effandi made enormous efforts to improve education in his country. He established the Sindh Muhammadan Association in Sind, which in 1858 founded the *Sindh Madrassatul – Islam*. This period influenced the literary, social and political activities in Sind, and is also referred to as the period of Sindhi prose. Four prominent figures of this period on which the edifice of Sindhi prose rests are Diwan Kauromal Chandanmal (1844–1916), Mirza Qaleech Beg, Rishi Dayaram Gidumal (1857–1927) and Diwan Parmanad Mewaram (1865–1938).

Pako Pah (1865) by Diwan Kauromal Chandanmal, reverentially called the father of Sindhi prose, deals with the issue of women's education. Chandanmal also wrote dramas and translated books for children. His diction of *Samia-ja-Sloka* (1885) is another valuable contribution to Sindhi literature. His style is, however, influenced by his cultural background. *Dilaram* and *Laila-Majnu* are respectively the first novel and the first drama written in Sindhi by Qaleech Beg. His zeal for the improvement of female education is also noteworthy. *Zinat*, written in 1890 in Sindhi, is an important representative of the prose genre dealing with issues of women's education. It contains some points which 'are far more modern than most of the modernist approaches made half a century later'.⁵⁷

The early decades of the twentieth century also inspired many Hindu and Muslim short-story writers, poets and novelists like Mirza Nadir Beg, 'Usman 'Ali Ansari, Amarlal Hingorani, Asanand Mamtara, etc. to break away from the earlier reformist school. Influenced by European literature, they began to experiment with new subjects and 'carried a new style of telling a story'.⁵⁸

The boost received by the Sindhi language and modern Sindhi literature in the last half of the nineteenth century continued until the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The tragedy of partition was a major setback as a considerable number of Sindhi writers who belonged to the Hindu middle class migrated to India in search of their new destiny. This state of literary atrophy did not, however, last very long. Thus, after the initial limbo, post-independence Sindhi literature soon recovered and re-established itself with added zeal and fervour. The theme of social reforms continued to engage the writers of the post-independence period.

The era of modernism gave birth to a new renaissance in 1946, with Shaikh Ayaz (1923–97) becoming its torch-bearer. He combined in himself all the varied trends of the day and contributed immensely towards the modern (progressive) school of poetry. In a graceful and polished style and powerful diction, he wrote of Sind's aspirations and predilections and soon emerged as the poetic conscience of his land. Well-versed in West-

⁵⁷ Schimmel, 1974, p. 30.

⁵⁸ Hiranandani, quoted in Allana, 1991, p. 66.

ern literature and equally at home in the Indo-Iranian ethos, prolific in output and with a variety of forms and themes at his command, Ayaz is the leading poet in the Sindhi language. His *Bhanvar bhoree akas* [Sky Humming with Black Bees] (1962) won him literary laurels, and to him also goes the credit of having rendered Shah Bhitai's *Risalo* into Urdu verse.⁵⁹

The Sindhi short story had entered a new phase of development in the 1940s, but suffered a setback with partition. The contemporary existential problems faced by Sind and Sindhis also attracted the interest of the modern Sindhi short-story writers. Together with Shaikh Ayaz, Jamal Abro, Ayaz Qadri and Ghulam Rabbani Agro marked a new turn in the short story with progressive and nationalistic trends, followed closely by Najam 'Abbasi, Hameed Sindhi and others. A fiery new generation appeared in the 1960s, taking the short story to a new and powerful phase of development.⁶⁰ It is around this period that resistance literatures were written: Amar Jaleel's *Sard Laash jo Safar* and Agha Salim's novelette *Oon dahi Dharti Roshan Hath* are two fine examples. Female Sindhi writers have also contributed much in this field, depicting the problems faced by the women of Sind.⁶¹ The scholar and critic Fahmida Husain has explored the relationship of literature with culture and society.

From the poet Narain Shyam (d. 1989) and the fiction writer Mohan Kalpana onwards, the development of Sindhi literature in India has followed a separate track. The romantic and progressive trends in Sindhi continued even after independence in India. Hence references to the human suffering that resulted from the uprooting of Sindhis from their soil can be seen in the Sindhi literature of post-independence India. Krishin Khatwani's novel *Yaad Hika Pyara ji* represents the romantic trend, and Narain Shyam is credited with having kept the trend of romantic poetry alive with collections like *Maak bhina raabela* [Jasmine Moist with Dew] and *Aachhinde laja maraan* [Sky of Offering]. Shyam has won considerable critical acclaim and he received the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1970 for his collection, *Vari-a bharyo palaand* [Skirtful of Sand].

Progressive literature was in full bloom and flourished in all genres. Sundri Uttamchandani, A. J. Uttam, Gobind Malhi and Kirat Babani are some pioneers of the progressive trend. The unequal distribution of wealth by the capitalist class, social inequalities, the

⁵⁹ Other prominent poets of the post-independence school are Anwar Pirzado, Fatah Malik, Tanveer 'Abbasi, Bardo Sindhi, Shamsheer-al-Hydari, Imdad Husain, Adal Soomro, Ayaz Gul, etc. Some well-known female poets of this school are Attiya Dawood, Roshan Mughal, Sultana Wakasi, Pushpa Walab, etc.

⁶⁰ With Amar Jaleel, Agha Salim, Nasim Kharal, Tariq Ashraf, 'Ali Baba, Siraj, Ghulam Nabi Mughal and others.

⁶¹ Some women short-story writers worthy of mention are Sameera Zareen, Iqbal Parveen Soomra, Rashida 'Hijab', Mahtab Mehboob, Tanveer Junejo and Noor-ul-Huda Shah.

exploitation of women, the injustice meted out to the working class, etc. are the dominant themes of Gobind Malhi's novels, *Zindagi-a ji Raah Te* and *Jeevan Saathi*. Uttamchandani has advocated the overthrow of age-old traditions and argued for Sindhi girls working side by side with their male counterparts in every walk of life in her novel *Kirandar Deewaroon*.

Around the late 1950s a neo-realist movement emerged, largely as a reaction against the progressives. Mohan Kalpana (a romantic and individualistic writer), Guno Samtaney (whose fiction comes under the neo-classical label) and Lal Pushp (whose fiction successfully depicts the 'stream of consciousness') spearheaded this movement. Many of Pushp's stories like *Hika sard diwar* [A Cold Wall] and *Time of Ennui*, and novels like *Huna je atam jo maut* [Death of His 'Self'] reflect the Freudian complex and a postmodern sensibility.

Anand Khemani, Ishwar Chander, Vishnu Bhatia, K. S. Balani, Harish Vaswani, Shyam Jaisinghani, Prem Akas, etc. are the 'new' writers of the postmodern period, representing both poetry and the novel. *November ji aakhrin raat*, a collection of short stories by Anand Khemani, turned him into a cult figure. His novel *Hika shakhsa ji vasna* [Lust of a Man] is a Gothic passion play with animastic overtones.

Several full-length and one-act plays have also been written in the post-independence period. Gobind Malhi and Prem Prakash have made an immense contribution to this genre.

The folk/bardic tradition, revolving around seven folk romances, has been the main source of inspiration for Sindhi poets and prose writers. Knowledge of these seven legends is an absolute necessity for an understanding of Sindhi literature. As Ajwani points out, 'the student of Sindhi literature will have an imperfect understanding of even twentieth-century Sindhi literature if he has no knowledge of these seven legends'.⁶² Akhund Lutufullah's (1842–1902) *Ghule-Khandan* and Diwan Sobhraj Daswani's *Sabha-jo-Singar* (1894) are prominent examples of the folk tradition.

Urdu

The period from 1857 to 1885 marks Urdu's transition from its medieval period to the modern. Politically, this period saw the gradual reconciliation of the Muslim community with a British education and culture. This was a time when the tensions between Indian languages occupied centre stage, the most prominent being the linguistic tension between Urdu and Hindi. The claim to occupy the space in Indian literary history has also been fraught with tension, struggle and politics (rather than academic studies), operating through the principle of exclusion. Urdu literary historiographers such as Azad and Hali largely excluded Hindu writers of Urdu from the Urdu canon despite the fact that a number of

⁶² Ajwani, 1970, pp. 40–1.

major Hindu literary figures writing in Urdu had existed in both the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus Daya Shankar Nasim, Ratan Nath Sarshar, Bishan Narain Abr, Jwala Prashad Barq, Lala Sri Ram, Brij Mohan Dattatrayah Kaifi, etc. are not names that the history of Urdu literature can afford to forget.⁶³

The novel had become the most popular literary genre in Urdu by 1885, when the Urdu-speaking community was faced with the challenge of adjusting to the mode of living introduced by the British. Ethics and morals became the natural concerns of the novelists of this period. Hence *Mirat-ul-uruus* [The Bride's Mirror] (1869),⁶⁴ an Urdu novel written by Nazir Ahmad (1836–1912), has an ethical component. It is didactic in nature and written with a definite purpose, primarily to rejuvenate the lapsed morals of the people. It portrays two female characters of opposite nature, one stupid and the other intelligent, each being punished or rewarded according to her deeds. Nazir Ahmad's *Banaat-un-nash* (1872) is the story of a Muslim girl, her initial failings and final transformation.

The year 1880 is memorable in the history of the Indian novel for introducing the tradition of the long novel. The year was marked by the publication of the first important Telugu novel by Viresalingam and *Fasana-e-Azad* [The Tale of Azad] by Pandit Ratan Nath Sarshar (1845–1903). Its publication represents the *daastaan* (historical narration) tradition in Urdu literature. It has been compared to *Don Quixote* (with some reservations) and the *Sir Roger de Coverly Papers*. The significant aspect of the structure of this novel is that it developed 'without the intervention of any European model'.⁶⁵

With the consolidation of the British position in India, a new search for identity gave birth to the historical novel. The new faces that emerged as powerful writers after 1885 were novelists such as 'Abdul Halim Sharar (1860–1926) and Mirza Muhammad Hadi 'Rusva' (1856–1931), and the poet Akbar Allahabadi (1846–1921). Sharar was one of the first novelists of his time; his *Firdaus-e-Barin* remains a delightful masterpiece. Rusva's writings were realistic portrayals of contemporary life, as is evident from his famous *Umrao Jan Ada* (1899), which depicts the life of a courtesan of Oudh before its annexation by the British.

Munshi Premchand (1880–1937) began his literary career as an Urdu novelist. He broadened the base and scope of the novel by introducing the peasantry as characters (*Gosha-e-aafiyat*, *Godaan*). Deeply rooted in the mores of rural life, Premchand's writings perfectly blended idealism and realism. Thus, instead of glorifying the past, he captured the reality of the present by portraying the existential problems and sufferings of the peasants,

⁶³ Faruqi, 2001.

⁶⁴ Tr. by G. E. Ward, 1903.

⁶⁵ Das, 1991, p. 212.

whom he could see as the future levers of power. With Premchand, ‘Urdu fiction became a product of the soil.’⁶⁶ Perhaps it is on account of this approach that Premchand differs from his contemporaries such as Sajjad Haider Yaldrum (1880–1943) and Niyaz Fatehpuri (1884–1969).

The romantic trend in the Urdu novel started with Niyaz Fatehpuri (*Shahaab kii sarguzesht*; *Shaaair kaa anjaam*). It was followed by Qazi ‘Abdul Ghafar (*Laila ke Khutoot*; *Majnu kii dairiy*), Hijab Imtiyaz ‘Ali, Majnoon Gorakhpuri, etc.

With the advent of the Progressive Writers Movement in 1936, a number of novelists emerged on the literary scene, the most prominent being Krishan Chander (*Shikast*), Rajinder Singh Bedi (*Ek chadar maili si*), Ismat Chughtai (*Terhi Lakeer*), Khwaja Ahmad Abbas (*Inqilab*), ‘Aziz Ahmad (*Aag*), Qurratulain Hyder (*Mere bhi sanamkhane*; *Aag ka dariya*), etc. *Aag ka dariya* [River of Fire], first published in Pakistan in 1960, is an enduring work of fiction presenting the entire panorama of Indian life in multiple scenes weaving past and present, which seem to flow seamlessly by.

Hayatullah Ansari’s five-volume *Lahu ke phool* occupies a significant position in Urdu literature. Not only does it stand outside the purview of the ‘progressives’, but it is also considered to be a work of a nationalistic tenor, narrating the story of the Indian freedom struggle from 1911 to 1947 and concluding with the first five-year-plan period (1951).⁶⁷

In Urdu, fictional writings, particularly prose romances and didactic narratives, have a long tradition. Translations from European languages provided an inspiration for the Urdu short story to emerge as a distinct literary form in the 1930s. The Urdu short story, in fact, was born with Premchand and in a very short time it grew to maturity, bringing into its ambit unexplored terrains of thought and sensibility. The short story received a tremendous boost from *Angarey* [Embers] (1932), an anthology of stories that included the writings of firebrand ‘progressives’ such as Sajjad Haider, Ahmad ‘Ali (of *Twilight in Delhi* fame), Rashid Jahan and Mahmuduzzafar. These stories amply demonstrated the power and potential of this genre to fight social evils and expose the decadent culture and hypocrisy of the society. They also prepared the ground for the emergence of other outstanding writers in Urdu.⁶⁸

Saadat Hasan Manto’s penetrating irony and poignant style have placed him at the forefront of literary realism. Rajinder Singh Bedi’s writings also reflect new trends.

⁶⁶ Kidwai, 1995, p. 152.

⁶⁷ Qazi ‘Abdus Sattar (*Shikast ki awaaz*), Jeelani Bano (*Aiwan-e-ghazal*), Alim Masrur (*Bahut der kar di*) and Wajida Tabassum (*Qisas*) are some other noteworthy novelists of the present time.

⁶⁸ Such as Rajinder Singh Bedi, Krishan Chander, Saadat Hassan Manto, Ismat Chughtai, Qurratulain Hyder, Intizar Husain, Upendra Nath Ashk, Sohail Azeemabadi, Akhtar Orainvi, Ram Lal, Surendra Prakash, etc.

His preoccupation with social-realist narrative ‘did not deter him from deviating from the traditional epistemological premises of cause and effect by bringing allegory, myths, archetypes and metaphors into play judiciously’.⁶⁹ Qurratulain Hyder’s writings opened new vistas for Urdu fiction. Her use of stream of consciousness facilitated the displacement of language, both in terms of time and space. Her epoch-making novel, *Aag ka dariya*, presents a cultural chronicle of the past with ‘imagistic perception’.

Urdu short stories in the mid-twentieth century emerged with a new commitment to modern sensibility and the Kafkaesque tradition. Surendra Prakash is the name associated with this change. He ‘fashioned a self-referential narrative which is the hallmark of post-modern fiction’⁷⁰ and was perhaps the first Urdu writer who sought to create ‘fiction upon fiction’ by recreating some of the famous characters of Premchand, Krishan Chander, etc. Abid Suhail is another prominent progressive short-story writer of this period. ‘Abdullah Husain’s literary craftsmanship introduced a completely new strategy of storytelling, which has a bearing on postmodern self-referential fiction. His novel *Udas naslen* has been a phenomenal success. Naiyer Masood falls into the same category. His writings, in line with the postmodern writers, offer an ‘apocryphal version of history’.⁷¹ So pervasive has been the impact of these authors that a large number of contemporary young short-story writers have retained the repute bestowed upon them by their predecessors.⁷²

The origins of modern Urdu prose can be found in the writings of Sir Syed. The prose literature of this period also displayed vigorous experimentation with form. Ghalib, who was one of the most distinguished prose writers of this period, wrote in both Persian and Urdu. His fame as a prose writer rests mainly on his letters, published in two separate books, *Uud-e-Hindi* (1868) and *Urdu-e-mualla* (1869).

Hali, Muhammad Husain Azad and Shibli Numani are the triad in Urdu literature who drew inspiration from Sir Syed. Hali’s most famous and popular work, *Musaddas-e-Hali*, was written in 1879. His *Munajat-e-Bewa* [A Widow’s Prayer] (1886), *Shakwa-e-Hind* [The Complaint to India] (1887) and *Chup ki daad* [In Praise of Silence] (1905) reflect his broad humanism and profound sympathy. He was the most respected poet and the foremost product of the Aligarh school. His *Hayat-e-Javed* [The Life of Sir Syed] was published in 1901.

⁶⁹ Kidwai, 1995, p. 153.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 154.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 155.

⁷² ‘Abdul Samad, Qamar Ahsan, Husain ul-Haq, Salahuddin Parwez, S. M. Ashraf, Paigham Afaqi, Ghazanfar, Tariq Chattari, etc. are among the noteworthy authors who frequently employed both traditional and modern story-telling techniques.

Munshi Durga Sahai Surur and Nadir 'Ali Khan (1912), who wrote patriotic poems, dominated the genre of Urdu poetry. According to Saksena, Muhammad Husain Azad 'is the founder of the new form of poetry which took the succeeding age by storm'.⁷³ After the advent of the British, a new style of poetry had emerged which had 'inwardness' as its distinctive feature. Modern poets of this period turned their gaze inwards and became more conscious of their egos, their own emotions. This inwardness introduced a rupture in literary activity and brought about innovations in literary traditions.

One such significant innovation within the Urdu literary tradition can be seen in the writings of Hali (1837–1914). With Hali, Urdu poetry emerged as an instrument of social reform and patriotism. *Madd-wa-jazr-e-Islam* [The Ebb and Flow of Islam], popularly known as *Musaddas-e-Halim*, was published in 1879. Considered to be Hali's masterpiece, it is acclaimed as a landmark in the history of Urdu literature. Hali's main contribution to Urdu literature was his exploitation of the poetic form, *musaddas*, and his predilection for social concerns.

Although at the beginning of the twentieth century Indian poetry was diverse in themes, attitudes and forms, patriotism was a dominant mood (as also in other literary genres). Syed Akbar Husain, better known as Akbar Allahabadi, was famous for his joviality and wit. He was critical of the Indian tendency to ape Western manners. His poetry discarded the 'shell of libertinism'⁷⁴ and acquired a new texture because of his humour and satire. He was a conservative, but not a religious bigot. He had no nostalgia for the distant past and did not sing of the glories of Islam. He used both humour and satire as his weapons to attack the trend of Westernization in Muslim society, the aping attitude of the young, and the hypocrisy of the politicians and theologians.

Akbar Allahabadi continued to dominate the Urdu literary scene until the emergence of Iqbal (1878–1938). *Bang-e-dira*, published in 1924, is the first collection of Iqbal's poems. His *Naya Shivala* and *Tarana-e-Hindi*, starting with the famous line:

Sare jahan se achha, Hindustan hamara.

The best in the world is our Hindustan.

are his famous nationalistic poems. Although the Swadeshi movement gave a tremendous boost to the growth of patriotism in literature, it had also sown discord between Hindus and Muslims. The question of Hindu–Muslim unity hence became more pronounced in literature. Iqbal was sensitive to this concern. His famous lines from *Tarana-e-Hindi* reflect his concern for nationalism and the aspiration for religious unity:

⁷³ Saksena, 1927, p. 222.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 229.

Mazhab nahin sikhata apas mein bair rakhna

Hindi hain ham watan hain Hindustan hamara.

Religion does not teach discord.

Indians are one; our country is India.

Though Iqbal wrote several nationalistic songs, his *Shikwaa* reflects his significant departure from the spirit of nationalism and provides a discordant note in the patriotic literature of twentieth-century India. In *Shikwaa*, Iqbal not only complains to God for His indifference to the Muslims, who the poet sees as the greatest sufferers at the present time despite their glorious past:

You tell us who were they who pulled down the gates of Khyber?

Who were they that reduced the city that was the pride of Caesar?

Fake gods that men had made, who did break and shatter?

Who routed infidels' armies and destroyed them with bloody slaughter?

Who put out and made cold the 'sacred' flame in Iran?

Who retold the story of the one God; Yazdan?

Shikwaa also reveals Iqbal's militant attitude towards Hindus:

Hind ke dair-nashino ko muslama kar de.

Convert to Islam India's millions who still in temples dwell.

In fact, *Shikwaa* has been regarded as the first manifesto of the two-nation theory.

In 1867, under the auspices of Anjuman-e-Punjab (in Lahore), Muhammad Husain Azad (1830–1910) and Altaf Husain Hali (1837–1914) founded the concept of the new Urdu poem and made a fervent plea for people to wean themselves away from Persian. They had seen that the West was having an inevitable impact on their society, and believed that poetry could no longer be written under the overwhelming influence of Persian. Their pleas, however, made little impact. It was only with the emergence of the Progressive Writers Movement in the 1930s that a new era in poetry was ushered in. Sajjad Zaheer, Mulk Raj Anand and Mohammad Deen Taseer – reflective youths of that generation – pondered over the role of literature in the changing world and prepared a manifesto for what came to be known as the Progressive Writers Movement. It was precisely at this moment of idealistic transition that Akhter Husain Raipuri published his book *Adab aur inquilab* (1934) in which he abandoned the classical tradition of Mir and Ghalib and made a passionate

case for Marxist thought in literature. Premchand's famous presidential address at the conference of the Progressive Writers Association in Lucknow (1936), during which he urged writers to 'change the standards of beauty', is a reminder of the overall plea for change.

Modernism continued to influence Urdu poetry in the 1930s. The 1940s and 1950s brought a new predicament for art and ideas. The 1960s sharpened the contours of modernism and the following decade saw it established firmly as a tradition. The establishment of modernism as a tradition in Urdu poetry may ideally be traced from N. M. Rashed, Miraji and Faiz Ahmad Faiz. The trio represents in the Urdu language what Eliot and the Symbolists do in English and French. They were poets of a high calibre whose language is startling, symbolic and original, and 'also cuts across all levels from street talk to academic discourse'.⁷⁵ Although Faiz believed in a progressive ideology, he was also aware of the exacting demands of art. He drew upon the Persian heritage, exploited the possibilities of Urdu and looked at the world around him with a rare sensitivity towards social responsibilities. Miraji drew upon oriental, American and French sources to give a metaphoric dimension to his eminently personal experiences.

Modernism in Urdu poetry was expressed in various ways, and after its introduction in the 1930s, it explored its own route. Majeed Amjad, Akhtarul Iman and Mukhtar Siddiqui treated their poems as delicate works of art. Their successors, Wazir Agha, Khalilur Rehman Azmi, Qazi Saleem, Ameer Hanfi, Balraj Komal and Mohammad Alvi, spoke in voices that were only remotely connected to progressive poetics. They harked back to the classical past, looked forward to English influences and carved out their own individual niche. The work of a number of other poets of high calibre⁷⁶ was similar to the stylistic and experiential variety of poets writing in English. While the poets from Pakistan drew upon the common sources of history and tradition, they reflected their own socio-political predicament, acquired their own terms of reference and spoke in new voices of anger and despair. The women poets of Pakistan, Kishwer Naheed, Fehmida Iyaz, Sara Shagufta and Azra 'Abbas, deserve special mention for their bold feminist stance.

The *ghazal* in Urdu has also undergone poetic innovations in both form and content. Cliché-ridden diction, hackneyed symbols, trite images and metaphysical and sentimental notions of love are giving way to new nuances of postmodern conviction. All kinds of contradictions, ambiguities and complexes are now absorbed in the *ghazal*. Shamsur Rahman Faruqi (1993), an eminent Urdu critic, has aptly captured this poetic innovation when he points out that:

⁷⁵ Kidwai, 1995, p. 158.

⁷⁶ Such as Kumar Pashi, Zubair Rizvi, Nida Fazli, Adil Mansoori, Shahryar and Waheed Akhtar in India, and Gilani Kamran, Abbas Ather, Saqi Farooqi, Iftexhar Jalib and Zahid Dar in Pakistan.

[The] modern Urdu *ghazal* has shown a much-needed irreverence towards traditional themes of *ghazal*. Now poets have also realized that both common and uncommon feelings can be lucidly expressed in a conversational style. The elasticity of *ghazal* has also been extended.⁷⁷

Postmodern traits can be discerned in the creations of a host of poets who are striving to create a 'semiotic space' in language. They are committed to a modern sensibility and have abandoned the worn-out themes and trite metaphors of the *ghazal*.⁷⁸ Their poetry is marked by the use of a 'conversational style with emphasis on displacement of signifiers'.⁷⁹

The mid-nineteenth century also saw the emergence of (rather weak) poet-playwrights in Urdu like Agha Hashr Kashmiri (1880–1935), Abid Husain, Mohammad Mujib, Imtiyaz 'Ali Taj (of *Anarkali* fame), etc.

After 1947, two events – partition and the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965 – had major consequences for Urdu language and literature. The literary consequences of partition had become evident by 1957 with the publication of N. M. Rashid's *Iran mein ajnabi* [A Stranger in Iran] and Faiz Ahmad Faiz's *Zindan nama* [Prison Chronicle]. These two publications in the first decade after independence are considered to be representative of modernity (*jadidiyat*) in Urdu, which had started to counter the hegemonic sway of the left-dominated Progressive Writers Association. A sense of exile and dislocation, bereavement and nostalgia, were the staple themes of the lyrical poetry produced during this period. (For example, *Subh-e-azadi* [The Dawn of Freedom] by Faiz, etc.)

On the other hand, in narrative literature – novels and short stories – there was an immense preoccupation with 'naturalistic documentation',⁸⁰ be it Kushwant Singh's English novel *Train to Pakistan* or the Urdu novels of Krishan Chander and Ramanand Sagar, namely *Ghaddar* [Traitor] and *Aur insan mar gaya* [And the Human Perished] or *Siyah hashye* [Black Margins] – the book of Manto's partition sketches. Even short stories by Bedi (*Lajwanti*) and Manto (*Toba Tek Singh*, *Khol do*) reveal a preoccupation with documenting the process of dislocation and visceral suffering. The post-independence society also witnessed a definite shaping of the genre of prose fiction within a broadened framework – 'not just the condensed moment of partition itself, but the larger processes of pre- and post-partition social configuration'.⁸¹ Hayatullah Ansari's five-volume novel *Lahoo ke phool* [Blood Blossoms], Shaukat Siddiqui's *Khuda ki basti* [God's Hamlet], Intizar

⁷⁷ Faruqi, 1993, p. 302.

⁷⁸ See, for example, the work of Shahryar, Irfan Siddiqui, Ishrat Zafar, Waali Asi, Amber Bahraichi, Farhat Ehsas, Manzoor Hashmi and Hehtab Haider Naqvi.

⁷⁹ Kidwai, 1995, p. 159.

⁸⁰ Ahmad, 1993, p. 4.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 5.

Husain's *Din aur dastan* and Qurratulain Hyder's *Housing Society* and *Chai ke bagh* [Tea Estates] are naturalistic and detailed depictions of the pre- and post-partition eras.

Amidst scores of novels produced during this decade, perhaps Qurratulain Hyder's *Aag ka dariya* [River of Fire], Khadeeja Mastoor's *Aangan* [Courtyard] and 'Abdullah Husain's *Udas naslein* [Generations of Grief] have been the most influential. Urdu writers, especially poets from both India and Pakistan, responded to the war. Special war numbers⁸² of a host of magazines from India and Pakistan can be seen as sources for examining these responses. However, qualitative differences can be discerned in the nature of the responses between the writers of the two countries.⁸³

⁸² For example, *Pairahan-e-Sharar* (Bombay, 1966) by 'Ali Sirdar Ja'fari; *Lahu-tarang* (Patiala, 1966) by Naubahar Sabir; and *Gulbaang-e-jihad* (Lahore, 1965).

⁸³ Naim, 2004.

31

LITERATURE IN TURKIC AND MONGOLIAN

R. Dor and G. Kara

Contents

LITERATURE IN TURKIC	888
Urban literature	889
The literature of the steppe and mountains	893
Conclusion	896
LITERATURE IN MONGOLIAN	897
Inner Mongolia and Dzungaria	907
Kalmukia	909
Buriatia	910

Part One

LITERATURE IN TURKIC

(R. Dor)

The Turkish word *literatür* has bureaucratic connotations. It conjures up an image of great heaps and drifts of paper, instructions, memoranda, working papers and much more

of the like, none of it of any conceivable relevance, none of it of any further use or any lasting interest. The purpose of this preliminary remark is to illustrate the vast conceptual distance separating us from anything that can reasonably be referred to as ‘the Turkic literature of Central Asia’. If, indeed, such a concept is graspable at all, for it seems highly unlikely that literature as such can ever be intuitively understood in its full extension, as it were encapsulated, at any particular moment.

In the geographic region that is the subject of our present concern, however, there is a word that summarizes and defines literature in the conventional sense, and that is *adabiyāt*. *Adabiyāt* originally denoted a practical standard of conduct, one that was doubly resonant in that it purported simultaneously to inculcate virtue and to have been handed down from previous generations. The Turkic literature of Central Asia is thus primarily a form of *humanitas*, i.e. a sum of knowledge that imparts urbanity and courteous behaviour to the individual. It is essential to realize that oral tradition and literature are organically related: the Word was nurtured in the virgin spaces of the steppe, but no sooner was it transplanted to an urban setting than it was caught in the trap of Letters.

In nineteenth-century Central Asia, literature as humanism gave way to literature as an academic pursuit. The boundless ocean of the great poetic tradition of preceding centuries ebbed away from the emergent strand of renewal. The Jadids (moderns) aspired to bring about the intellectual renovation of society by transforming educational structures. Literature was becoming less of an art of living and more of a necessary practical skill.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries foreshadow the great Soviet levelling process with its forced literacy: every language must have its own alphabet, every language must have its own literature. Alphabets were made as diverse as possible, in an effort to induce irremediable differentiation between languages. Literary themes, in contrast, were unified: we find the same subjects repeated *ad nauseam* in the literature of one ethnic group after another.

In the pages below, we shall seek to present a fragmentary overview of some aspects of the authors, works and literary trends that marked the literature of the cities, considered in their role as bastions of sedentary culture, as in Uzbekistan, and those that marked the literature of the steppe, shaped as it was by the traditional life of nomadic herdsmen, as in Kyrgyzstan.

Urban literature

As mentioned earlier, the torrent of classic Chaghatay poetry dwindled during the second half of the nineteenth century to a trickle that ultimately vanished among the sands of

modern civilization. Khiva, to begin with, could boast of Muhammad Riza Agahi (1809–74) and Kamil Khwarazmi (1825–99).¹ Khwarazmi celebrated Tashkent in a magnificent ode (*qasida*):

Rushan etkän dek sipihr ayvānini sham-i nujūm,

Shabni rūz äylär chiraghān u fanār-i Tashkand.

Just as the sun, blazing in the vault of heaven, illuminates the portals of the world,

The lights of Tashkent, its torches, lamps and lanterns, turn night into day.

This lyricism ultimately prevailed in the rival khanate of Kokand as well, where Muhammad Amin Mirza Khwaja (1851–1903), more familiar under his *nom de plume* of Muqimi,² wrote:

Navbahār achildi güllär, sabza boldi bāghlar,

Suhbat äyläylik kelinglär jūralar ortaqlar.

Spring is here, with its blooming roses and flowering gardens;

Friends and companions, come, let us talk and reflect together.

However, it was not long before literature descended into the political arena. The *qadims* (traditionalists; ancients), conservative clerics who were primarily to blame for the progressive ossification of Uzbek thought, were implacably hostile to the Jadids, with their advocacy of intellectual change.

‘Abdurrauf Fitrat (1886–1937) championed the cause of Jadid thought in a copious stream of poems, articles, essays and other works, including *The Discussion*, *Tales of an Indian Traveller*, *The Way to Salvation*, *Do Not Weep*, *O Islam*, *Snow* and *East*. Like all lettered men of that age, he had acquired a knowledge of Arabic and Persian in the course of his *madrasa* education. His eventful life coincided with the period of the great revolt against Russian oppression.³ At the height of his fame and fortune he was minister of education in the government of the short-lived People’s Republic of Bukhara, but he subsequently fell into disfavour and suffered an ignominious death in one of Stalin’s purges. In 1918 he founded the ‘Chaghatay circle’ (*Chaghatay gurungi*), which served as a vessel, a lighthouse and a haven for poets, writers, men of letters and intellectuals.

The following year was marked by the death of the great Mahmud Khoja Behbudi (1875–1919),⁴ who was buried alive on the orders of the emir of Bukhara because of the

¹ Yunusov, 1956, pp. 89–102.

² Muqimi, 1942.

³ Carrère d’Encausse, 1966, p. 168.

⁴ Cabbar, 2000, p. 152.

views he had expressed in the journal *Khurshid* [Sun], successor to the defunct *Taraqqi* [Progress], which had been suppressed in 1906. In having him put to death, the *qadims* had silenced an eloquent voice and muzzled the dissident press. They had hated Behbudi with particular rancour in that he had been the father of the modern Uzbek drama and was widely known throughout Central Asia for his numerous plays, notably *Padarkush* [The Patricide], which was first performed in 1913. Their hatred was unavailing, however, for young poets had been quietly honing their skills: Tavallo (1882–1939), Batu (1903–40), Elbek (1898–1939) and above all Cholpan (1895?–1938),⁵ the leading light of the ‘Young Uzbek Poets’ group.

If anyone can be termed the founder of Soviet Uzbek literature, it was Hamza Hakimzoda Niyazi (1889–1929).⁶ The question of whether he was primarily an essayist and dramatist or an educator is of no interest for our present purpose; the intellectuals of that age wrote to advance their cause, and we shall do well to adopt a holistic outlook. At all events, Niyazi was deeply interested in education and founded schools, which the authorities lost no time in closing. When he was sent into exile, he took advantage of the opportunity to travel throughout the Ottoman empire. The play that brought him success, *Yangi saodat* [New Happiness], was first performed in 1915. Niyazi himself summarized the plot in the following terms:

Alimjan [the hero] loves learning and studies with tireless dedication, thereby bringing new happiness to the lives of his parents, who had been languishing in poverty, humiliation and obscurity under the oppression of tyranny.⁷

Niyazi’s ideas on education were the underlying theme of the play, and in 1916 he founded the Society for the Development of Education among the Muslim Peoples of the Ferghana Region in an attempt to put them into practice. In the wake of the October revolution, he organized a troupe of actors and traveled all over Central Asia, presenting his plays. Some of those plays, such as *Who is Right?* and *Victims of Tyranny*, are rather bland by today’s standards; *Bay va batrak* [Master and Servant], in contrast, is a powerful work. It is a drama that is actually an extension of the lyrical tradition of songs about unhappily married women: a wealthy old man attempts to obtain a poor young girl in marriage by lavish outlays of money, which he uses to bribe officials and prominent members of the community. He himself cynically remarks:

⁵ Dudoignon, 2002, pp. 140 et seq.

⁶ Kedrina and Kasymov, 1967, pp. 29 et seq.; Mirbaliev, 1969, p. 87.

⁷ Tretiakoff, n.d. [1966], p. 38.

My gold is a spy of such cunning, a thief of such skill, a holy man of such power, a scholar of such learning, that if you were to sink into the ground, it would pull you out by the ears; if you were to rise up to heaven, it would pull you down by the feet.⁸

The play was performed at the front before an audience of Red Army soldiers and was an immediate success. Niyazi subsequently became a zealous propagandist for socialist ideas, especially after the establishment of the Uzbek SSR in 1924. He took to organizing meetings at which women publicly cast aside their veils, and after one such meeting he was assassinated by a fanatic.

The Uzbek novel was initially historical in nature, owing to the prominent figure of Sadriddin Aini (1878–1954), who denounced the emirate of Bukhara in a series of novels, notably *Bukhara jalladlari* [The Butchers of Bukhara] in 1922.⁹ Aini subsequently turned to scholarly historical research, publishing *Materials for the History of the Revolution in Bukhara* at Moscow in 1926.

That same year saw the advent of a new avant-garde that rejected Jadid thinking. This was the *Qizil Qalam* (Red Pen) group, led by H. Alimjan (1909–44), who was an apostle of Sovietization and a form of Russification. His complete works (Tashkent, 1971, five volumes) are a paean to collectivization, secularization, industrialization and the liberation of women. These themes were echoed in unison by the other writers of his generation. His narrative poem *Zaynab and Aman* (1938)¹⁰ deserves a closer look: two orphans working together in the fields fall in love, but the girl subsequently learns that she was betrothed in infancy (a common practice at the time, and one that has not entirely died out even now) to someone else, a man named Sobir. When this person returns home from his studies at the university and learns of the situation, he decides to set the girl free. The story as such is somewhat banal; the interesting feature of this work, which was regarded as impeccably orthodox, is that it is Uzbek to the core, containing not a single reference to the USSR, the Russians or Marxism-Leninism.

This was far from being the rule. As D. C. Montgomery has pointed out,¹¹ all the poets, novelists, playwrights, critic and essayists of that age were cast in a single mould, one that had been meticulously shaped by the Soviet Party-State. Most of them were orphans, and consequently had not been influenced by the bourgeois nationalism of their parents, whether the latter had been Jadids or *qadims*. They had grown up within the Soviet system of education; none of them knew a word of Arabic or Persian, never having so much as set foot in a *madrassa*, but they were all Slavophiles who spoke perfect Russian, and they had all

⁸ Tretiakoff, [n.d.](#) [1966], p. 80; see also Kedrina and Kasymov, [1967](#), pp. 32–3.

⁹ Mirbaliev, [1969](#), pp. 77 et seq.

¹⁰ Montgomery, [1987](#).

¹¹ Montgomery, [1986](#), pp. 205–20.

attended universities in Moscow or Leningrad on scholarships. Upon returning home, they paid their tribute to Soviet education by teaching for a short time, then turned to careers in journalism. There was an extraordinary proliferation of newspapers and magazines during those years: new titles included *Red Uzbekistan*, *Young Leninist*, *Construction*, *Soviet Literature* and many more. Thanks to their profession, these young writers were in close touch with the world of politics, and hence were able to keep up with its successive twists and turns, with the result that ideological changes of line were immediately reflected in their literary works. Uniformity is the mother of boredom, so it is said, and the literary production of the 1930s was uniform. What made it all the more off-putting was that mastery of style and depth of inspiration had been replaced by political opportunism and a cosy relationship with the bureaucracy. Conformity was enforced by the ever-alert censorship exercised by the Union of Writers, which was established in 1932.

In the event, their dutiful conformity did not save them from Stalin's purges, which swept away nearly all of them. H. Alimjan spent the remainder of his life struggling to put the shattered pieces of the Uzbek literary world back together. After his death in 1944, his work was continued by his half-brother, Sarvar Azimov, who took over as President of the Union of Writers in 1981.

The late 1940s and the 1950s were marked by the rise of Sharaf Rashidov. He won instant fame by publishing a short story consisting of undiluted socialist realism, *Pobediteli* [The Victors], which features Komsomols, careerists and Basmachi fighters. The work is one long harangue on behalf of the submission of the individual to the Party, and, indeed, this theme was the *leitmotiv* of all Rashidov's subsequent work. He avoided like the plague anything that might have been interpreted as a hint of Uzbek chauvinism, and openly advocated the use of Russian in preference to his native language, writing on one occasion, 'Some languages perform an international function, others do not.'¹² Such dutiful orthodoxy deserved its reward, and with the help of Nikita Khrushchev, Rashidov became a member of the Politburo and President of the Uzbek Republic. It was the culmination of a flawless career for the representative of an ideology that had annihilated any trace of freedom or spontaneity in literature.

The literature of the steppe and mountains¹³

We shall begin with *A Short Life* of Toktogul Satilganov (1864–1933), who is universally acknowledged to have been the first Kyrgyz writer. His father gave him an apotropaic

¹² *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, No. 5, 1969, p. 16.

¹³ See Joldosheva, 1977; Kerimjanova, 1951; Samaganov, 1976.

name, as was frequently done among the steppe-dwellers: *tokto* means ‘remain alive!’. Young Toktogul grew like a wild plant amid horses, yaks and sheep in the Ketmen-Töbö valley, in the mountainous heart of the Kyrgyz country. In childhood he was lulled to sleep by the songs and stories of his mother, who gave him his first *komuz*, the melodious lute of the steppe. Like a good many young children, he was hired out to a leading man of the community, Kazanbek, as a goatherd. Recalling that period of his life in his later work, the *Shepherd’s Song*, he says:

If I lie down to sleep outside the yurt, the goat steps on me; if I lie down to sleep inside the yurt, the *baybiche* [the *bay*’s senior wife] orders me out: the stick is incessantly falling on my shoulders.

As an adolescent, he pitted his talent against that of the bard Arzimat in a song contest and subjected him to public ridicule. Satılğanov had found his vocation: from that time onward he was a bard and poet. His specialty was the lampoon, *kordoo*, and this made him a number of implacable enemies, whose hostility led to his arrest on a charge of having taken part in the Ferghana insurrection of 1898. He was condemned to death, but the sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. However, he succeeded in escaping, and between 1910 and 1917 led a wandering life which he recounted in his songs and poems. Satılğanov was an ardent proponent of Marxist ideas, publishing volume after volume of poetry celebrating the Soviet Union and its rulers, until his death in 1933. In 1965 the Kyrgyz SSR instituted a Toktogul Prize (analogous to the *prix Goncourt*).

The following literary generation was led by the combative trio of Tokombaev, Elebaev and Tinīstanuulī, who advocated a type of reformism with a strong nationalistic tinge. They embraced the ideology of the Kazakh Alash-Orda movement, while rejecting Kazakh itself, and, indeed, Uzbek as well. A new Kyrgyz alphabet was therefore adopted (Judakhin and Tinīstanuulī had been working to develop one since early 1925, with varying success).

A small literary group calling itself the ‘Serial Writers’ (*Janıtma*) soon gathered around Aalī Tokombaev. The members were simultaneously journalists, writers and educators: it is noteworthy that Tinīstanuulī was People’s Commissar for Education.¹⁴ The first Kyrgyz novel (*Ajar*, by Kasymaly Bayalinov, 1902–79), which was published in 1926, described the hardships endured by a young girl during the turmoil of 1916.¹⁵ Later, in the 1930s, many writers (notably Ashubaev, Jantöshev and Sīdikbekov) abandoned journalism altogether, devoting themselves to literary composition exclusively.

But the Kyrgyz writers were becoming mired in the slough of nationalism, and on 6 June 1934, Moscow sent out a team of Russian literary men, Egart, Briskin and Nikulin,

¹⁴ On this period, see Erkebaev, 1999, pp. 177 et seq.

¹⁵ Concerning this revolt, see Altay, 2000, pp. 194–210.

with a mandate to rescue them willy-nilly from revisionist error; Tokombaev was subjected to violent attacks from which he was fortunate to escape with his skin. Kyrgyz literature therefore changed course, turning away from historical themes, which had become excessively dangerous, in favour of lyricism (a love story was less likely to earn its author a one-way ticket to Kolyma!). The resultant romantic novels were at any rate well crafted, displaying a mastery of technique, well-rounded characters and plausible situations.

Kyrgyz drama also flowered in the late 1930s: both *Ajal orduna*, by Jusup Turusbekov, and *Altın kiz*, by Joomart Bökönbaev, were performed in 1938. The literature of the war period (1941–5) was marked by an outburst of productivity:

Just as our valiant soldiers at the front use their rifles incessantly, let us here at home wield our pens indefatigably; let every word we write be a bullet that strikes the enemy!¹⁶

In accordance with this collectively worded promise, Kyrgyz writers churned out stories by the kilometre about the front, the rear, the restrictions, the pain of separation afflicting lovers, friends and families, and much more along similar lines.

In the immediate post-war period, the sixth Plenum of the Kyrgyz Communist Party seized upon Tokombaev's 1947 novel, *Tañ aldında* (Just Before Dawn), as a pretext for launching a virulent campaign of denigration against its author. The work in question, which, like many another before it, dealt with the 1916 revolt, was written in the spirit of the 'Situationist school' (*Faktografiyalik Maktab*) developed in Moscow. As such, it was ideologically quite inoffensive, but the authorities used it as a detonator none the less. Beginning in 1952, Kyrgyzstan, along with the rest of Central Asia, was swept by a tidal wave of anti-nationalism emanating from Moscow: all the national epics were suppressed, and the use of indigenous languages was stringently discouraged. The jewel of the Kyrgyz oral tradition, the epic poem *Manas*, was dragged through the mud by *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*.¹⁷ The entire Kyrgyz press reacted vigorously, coming to the defence of the epic or joining in the attack upon it. Intellectuals entered the fray, as did the University and the Academy of Sciences; no one could remain indifferent. Never in the history of the USSR had there been such a controversy. Disconcerted at having stirred up such a hornets' nest in the ranks of the Kyrgyz Communist Party, the Party-State retreated, but in retreating it crushed the unfortunate Tokombaev, who was stripped of all his titles, prosecuted and proscribed.

In this passionate, agitated context, a young journalist, Chingiz Törökülovitch Aytmatov (b. 12 December 1928), began to attract attention with his articles in *Kızıl Kirgizstan* [Red Kyrgyzstan] and *Literaturniy Kirgizstan*. His grandfather Aitmat was something of

¹⁶ *Sovetskii Kirgizstan*, No. 9, 1941.

¹⁷ Bennigsen, 1953.

an eccentric of catholic interests. He was known as 'the machine man' (*mashinechi*), from a sewing machine that he had brought back from a trip to the city, to the astonishment of his neighbours. In due course he became a railway worker and moved to Maymak, sending his son Törökül to the Russian school in Jambul. Törökül subsequently joined the Party, obtaining a salaried post within it and settling in Sheker. It was there that Chingiz Aitmatov, the leading literary light of Kyrgyzstan, was born.

He burst into prominence with *Jamiyla* (1959), which won him an international reputation, but *Ak keme* [The White Ship], a story published in *Noviy Mir* in 1970, revealed him as a consummate master of his art. The depth of its inspiration, the subtlety of its psychological portrayals and its admirable craftsmanship were unprecedented in Soviet Kyrgyz literature. The theme of *Ak keme* is the tragic impossibility of remaining faithful to a traditional culture in a changing world.

Aitmatov went on to win fame and recognition both in his own country and abroad. Although increasingly occupied with political duties, he continued to write, trying his hand at what was not merely a novel, but a science-fiction novel. Unfortunately, this form proved much less well suited to his talents. *The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years* (1980) is a blend of legend and science fiction, but the mixture never quite comes to the boil. In contrast, when he returned to his favourite theme of humanity contemptuous of nature (*Mechty volchitsy* [Dreams of the She-Wolf], *Noviy Mir*, 1986), Aitmatov showed that he had lost none of his power.

His most recent thematic work, *Tavro Kassandry* [The Cassandra Brand], which was published in 1994,¹⁸ is in the same 'biblical' vein that he had explored in *The Log* (*Noviy Mir*, 1986). It is clear that the figure of Christ fascinates Aitmatov, as he himself acknowledges in an interview printed in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (13 August 1986): 'Christianity presents us with an extraordinary example in the person of Jesus Christ. The religion in which I grew up, Islam, has no comparable figure.'

Conclusion

Perestroika and the dawn of independence for the Central Asian republics were accompanied by a sharp change of direction in the Turkic literature of the region. The historical novel made a triumphant return. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the works of authors who were banned during the Jadid and Alash-Orda periods are being reprinted. The complete works of Shakerim Qudayberdiev, a Naturalist poet who was arrested and shot in 1931 and had been utterly forgotten, were issued in a new edition at Alma-Ata in

¹⁸ *Znamya*, No. 12, pp. 9–109.

1986. Furthermore, there has been a tendency to bask in the reflected glory of heroes of world stature with Central Asian connections: the great Timur, Mahmud of Kashghar and Ibn Khaldun have appeared on the Tashkent stage in plays by B. Akmedov and G. Karim. Science-fiction novels and murder mysteries have proliferated: Khojiakbar Chaykhov and T. Malik are producing best-sellers in these genres. Esenberlin, with his novels describing present-day situations and contemporary characters, has become a household name.

The international literary scene, however, continues to pay homage to such Soviet establishment figures as Aitmatov in the case of Kyrgyzstan and Suleïmenov in the case of Kazakhstan. They write in Russian, needless to say, and that in itself is one of the major problems.

We may be confident, however, that there are still some hopeful dreamers in Tashkent, Almaty and Bishkek. A writer needs time to mature, as the twenty-first century will doubtless show.

Part Two

LITERATURE IN MONGOLIAN

(G. Kara)

The period from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1990s saw the enhancement of regional tendencies and national identity. It brought the development of separate literatures of the various Mongolic-speaking peoples. Rabjai (Dulduitu's son Dandzinrabjai, 1803–56), the greatest nineteenth-century poet of northern Mongolia and one of the last representatives of Buddhist monastic poetry, who continued the tradition of the eighteenth-century Urat Mergen Gegen

Lubsangdambijaltsan, belongs to the previous period. He wrote and composed many pious and less pious songs in Mongolian and Tibetan, and long didactic poems about the vicissitudes of the world, rewrote the Buddhist story of the Moon Cuckoo and arranged it for the stage in his East Gobi countryside. Some of his songs (or the songs ascribed to him) were popular even in the twentieth century. Sandag the Fabler (1825–60), his contemporary, is best known for his allegorical poems about life's transitoriness, the *Lament of the*

Melting Snow, What the Tumbleweed Blown by the Wind Said and other soliloquies (of the aged male camel, of a beaten guard-dog, of a captured wolf, and so on).

Four of the eight sons of Wangchingbala (1795–1847), an East Mongolian (Tümed) Chinggisid nobleman – Gungnechuke (1832–66), Gularansa (1820s–51), Sungweidanjung (1834–not before 1898) and Injannashi, the seventh son (1837–92) – left behind thoughtful lyric verses. Injannashi completed a Chinese-style historical novel, the *Blue Book of the Yuan Empire* (Köke Sudur), that was begun by his father. To it he wrote a long introduction (a philosophical essay) entitled the *Short Summary* [*Tobchitu Tolta*]. He also penned the melancholic saga of the *One-Storey Pavilion* and the *Red Tears' Chamber*. His prose is intertwined with fine verses like these quatrains:

Asking my brushes and inks about the cases and causes of a thousand years
 I discuss with the books and writs the deeds and events that gleam and glow.
 Would the future's fearless sages perceive
 why my body and tongue and heart are so tired, or won't they?
 If poetry that is full of desired novelty
 is unable to move the heart of man
 as the wind rolls the clouds of the blue,
 why should one lift the light brush to write?

Ishidandzinwangjil (1854–1907), a South Mongolian (Chahar) Buddhist priest, wrote his moralistic *Golden Teachings* in many richly flowing, isosyllabic and alliterative quatrains, uniting Mongolian and Tibetan traditions of versification. He also compiled a *Fire Ritual* in Tibetan. A didactic *Bright Crystal Rosary* in 108 quatrains is ascribed to another South Mongolian (Ujumchin) monk, the Mergen Güüshi Lubsangdanjin (1870–1907).

Lubsangdondub (1854–1909), also known as General Lu, who rose from poverty to the high rank of general in the Manchu administration of Mongolia, was a skilful Khalkha poet, a writer of songs rich in metaphors. He composed poems like *The Stag of the Lofty Khangai*, *The Pleasures of Moving with the Camp* and a eulogy of the Khan Köküi range in 400 alliterative lines.

Gamala (1871–1932), the eldest son of an East Mongolian (Ujumchin) herdsman but literate since his early childhood, became a clerk and a poet of songs, odes and conventional and ceremonial verses (for instance, a eulogy of his homeland, a praise of the soldiers, 40 quatrains about the feast of wrestlers and a poem on the *Twelve Years Cycle*). His *Summary of the Stories* chastised the minstrels of Chinese tales.

Keshigbatu of the Khatagin clan (1849–1916), a South Mongolian (Ordos) scribe and man of letters, was the author of love songs, odes glorifying the famous shrines in his homeland, songs mocking his enemies (for instance, the *Sixty Hee-Hows*, a sarcastic response to a hostile official), political verse, a moralistic poem in more than 300 stanzas, a versified enchiridion (*Mirror*) of a strong beat and a chronicle (the *Jewel Summary of the Past and Present*) in verse and prose. Loroisangbuu (1884–1939) was another Ordos author of moralistic verses.

With the fall of the Manchu empire in 1911, northern Mongolia struggled for independence under theocratic rule. Its constitution printed in many fascicles (but left unfinished because of the Chinese occupation in 1919) mirrors the country's first cautious steps from the still prevailing medieval world towards modernity. The first periodicals of Mongolia – the *Shine toli* [New Mirror] and the *Neyislel Kūriyen-ü sonin bichig* [Capital City News] – were printed in the Russo-Mongolian Printing Shop in the capital city and seat of the theocratic ruler. When Baron von Ungern-Sternberg's White Russian troops defeated the Chinese Republican forces in Mongolia, and when his troops as well as the rest of the Chinese forces were defeated in 1921 by the Red Army of the Far Eastern Republic and the soldiers of the Mongolian People's Party, a new era began in northern Mongolia.

After the death of the theocratic ruler, the Great Assembly led by the party, now the People's Revolutionary Party, proclaimed the People's Republic, and gradually this party and its government established a Soviet-type totalitarian regime. Nevertheless it was this rule, harsh as it was, that began the modernization of the country, and it was this period that saw the rise of modern literatures of the Mongolian nations.

Theatre was the first main forum of new literary activities. Enthusiastic young revolutionaries popularized the new order. Some of them also worked in the newly established Academy of Books and Letters (*Sudur Bichig-ün Kūriyeleng*). Its journal, *Mongghol kele bichig-i sayijiraghulqu bodorol* [Thoughts to Enhance the Mongolian Language and Writing], published essays and translations. Instead of xylographs and manuscripts of the old 'palm-leaf' format, modern typeset books were printed, among them such literary anthologies as the *Uran üsüg-ün chighulghan* [Assembly of Beautiful Words] (1929), edited by the Team of Writers (the beginning of the later Writers' League). The MARZ (1930; also MARP and MARL, abbreviations of the Russian names of the Revolutionary Writers' Association) published the journal *Kubiskaliin uran zokiol* [Revolutionary Literature] (1932). Classical and modern Russian literature was the main model and the Russian language served as the principal key to the treasures of world literature. Young Mongols were trained in Russia, Germany and France; later, for a long time, training abroad was restricted to educational institutes in the Soviet Union. Foreign poetry was usually

transplanted in Mongolian alliterative verse (see, for instance, Khödöögiin Perlee's version of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*).

New contents and new forms, and modern genres, appeared in a new literary language first in Mongolian script, then in Latin and finally in Cyrillic orthography. Plays, lyrics and short prose developed first; the modern novel only came in the second half of the twentieth century. The bimonthly *Tsog* [Ember], the journal of the Writers' League, was founded in 1944 and it is still an important periodical of new writing and literary criticism in Mongolia. A literary and cultural weekly under changing names, *Utga dzokhiol urlaga* [Literature and Arts], etc., has been published since 1955.

The ruling literary doctrine required 'socialist content in national form' and 'socialist realism'. Elements of folk poetry served to enhance the national form, and these often resulted in a folkloric style and schematic expression. In the service of politics, literature was a kind of applied art, under tight, but from time to time loosening, party control for more than 50 years, and so was the whole cultural life. Disobedience was labelled as nationalism, cosmopolitanism, reactionary or anti-party action, and used to be severely punished. Leftist deviations of the 1930s took the heaviest toll in Mongolia's intellectual history. Since the fall of totalitarian rule in 1990, the freedom of the press has brought a fertile chaos in the cultural life of the country but that is another story.

One of the first revolutionary writers was Buyannemekh, Sonombaljr's son (1902–37, executed). In didactic plays he popularized the 1921 revolution (*Summary of Recent Events*, the 1924 version of the 1922 play *Sandoo Amban*) and new morals (*Miss Deer and Miss Yellow*: two girls, one clever and decent, the other lazy and lewd; 1924/1928), celebrated Chinggis Khan's youth (*Brave Son Temüjin*, 1924/1928), blamed the sombre past (*Dark Rule*, 1932) and glorified the *Master of the Jewel-like Soyombo, the Martial General Sükhbaatar* (1934). Many of his verses written in refined form served political propaganda, for instance, the *Mongol Internationale*, but some dealt with more 'secular' themes (e.g. *Time and Life*; *Brandy*; *The Sun's Rotation*). His prose works include *Towuudai the Herdsman*, the story of an exemplary herder, a short story entitled *The Golden Fish Who Headed for the Ocean* and sophisticated essays on arts and versification.

Natsagdorj, Dashdorj's son (1906–37), another short-lived revolutionary but a versatile author and one of the founders of modern Mongolian literature, wrote several plays, including a tragedy in verse, the *Three Fateful Hills*, in which two lovers are separated by tyranny. He composed the musical drama *Ushaandar*, based on the Indian Buddhist story of the generous Prince Vessantara. A song from one of his lost dramas has become a part of folk poetry. He was also a poet of patriotic lyrics, the author of the solemn *My Homeland* and the proud *Poem on History*, merging the glory of the past and the revolution. He

popularized Western medicine and hygiene in a series of verses (*Health; The Old and the New Medicine; Infectious Disease*); wrote love poetry (*Desire; Secret Love*); composed a cycle of elegies of desperation when in prison (*Longing for Liberty*); published sketches and novellas (*White Moon and Black Tears* about social injustice; a story ridiculing *The Respected Lama's Tears* shed for the lost favours of a prostitute; *The Swift Grey Bird*, a lyric tale of a young man riding to his sweetheart; and *Dark Cliff*, a melancholic sketch about a lost love); and wrote a prose verse itinerary of his long travels from Mongolia to Germany.

Damdinsüren, Tsend's son (1908–86), a writer, literary historian and prominent public figure, was imprisoned in 1937, then became editor of the daily *Ünen* [Truth] and a member of parliament for several terms. He was the author of good novellas, more than one about the changing fate of Mongolian women (*The Despised Girl*, 1929; *How Mrs Change Was Changed; The Teacher and His Pupil*); wrote stories about horses and horsemen (*The Ambler; Two White Things*); composed poems (*My Grey-Haired Mother; Strolling Outdoors; Your Gentle Eyes*; also a folklore-style benediction for Marshal Choibalsan's birthday); rewrote Natsagdorj's tragedy to give it a revolutionary happy end (this is the text of the national opera, *Three Fateful Hills*); translated Pushkin's tale of *The Golden Fish*; and edited a rich anthology of Mongolian traditional literature (1959) and many important books on Mongolian literary history, among them the *Historical Roots of the Geser Cycle* (in Russian, Moscow, 1959), with which he broke a taboo in Soviet literary history. Damdinsüren also translated the thirteenth-century literary chronicle, the *Secret History of the Mongols*, into modern Mongolian and wrote the essay *Let's Defend Our Cultural Heritage* (1959). He is one of the fathers of the Cyrillic orthography of the modern Khalkha Mongolian written language.

Rinchen, Byamba's grandson, of the Yöngshöow clan (1905–77), was a writer and scholar. After five years spent in prison (1937–42) for being 'a Japanese agent and an enemy of the people', he became one of the editors of the daily *Ünen*, where he tried to improve its clumsy language, uprooting the alien clichés, and wrote fresh reports about countryside events. He wrote a film script (1944) on *Prince Tsogtu* (who fought for his nation's independence in the seventeenth century) and a historical novel (*Rays of Dawn*, in three volumes) depicting Mongolia's world under late Manchu rule, the theocracy, the revolution and the so-called socialist period through the life of the protagonist, an adopted son. Rinchen was also the author of a long Stone Age tale for young readers (*Dzaan Dzaluudai* and *The Great Migration*), short stories (*Lady Anu; The Princess; Bunia the Hang-Glider; The Last Dream of Monster Do*), lyric verses (*Maybe; The Grassland in the Autumn; Emperor Kubilai*, an allegory against the Cyrillic orthography) and a narrative

poem (*Scabiosa*). He translated Gorky's *Thunderbird*, Jack London's stories, the *Communist Manifesto*, Tolstoy's *Silver Prince*, Czech tales, Polish and Hungarian poetry, etc. His *Travels to the South* (1958) and *Travels to the West* (1959) were criticized as anti-party writings. He published several volumes of folklore and folk religious texts in the former Federal Republic of Germany and edited several great works of literature.

Nawaan-Yüندن, Nasan-Ochir's son (1908–85), was the author of songs (his *Rich Mongolia*, written during a 'rightist deviation', remained popular for a long time), a writer of short stories and a translator. He survived the Great Purge though he was one of the young Mongols who had studied in Weimar Germany.

Amar, Agdanbuu's son (1886–1941, died in a Soviet prison), was a politician and a high official under the theocracy and even after the revolution. He is the author of a *Short History of Mongolia* (1934).

Dambadorji, Tseren-Ochir's son (1899–1934; pen-name, Ulaan Otorch, or 'Red Cowboy'), was a leading revolutionary intellectual. He wrote a literary account of the battle with White Russian forces at *Lake Tolbo* (1924) only some years after the event (in which he had taken part).

Ayuush, Shirneng's son (1903–38), was a poet, writer and playwright. His most successful play is *Serf Damdin and Lady Dolgor* (1937), while his essay *The Art of Theatre* (1936) was a guide for his contemporaries.

Yadamsüren, Mördendew's son (1904–37, executed), was at one time president of the Revolutionary Writers' Association. He was the author of a play called *Behind the Locked Door* and several realistic novellas, among them *A Young Couple* and *Three Girls*.

The history of *How the Mongolian People's National Revolution Began* (a prose work with verses inserted) was compiled in 1934 by Choibalsan (1895–1952), Losol (1890–1940) and Demid (1900–37). It was abridged and altered several times after Losol and Demid perished.

Namdag, Donrow's son (1911–84), was a poet, writer and playwright. His play *The Three Sharaigol Khans* (1941), inspired by a chapter of the *Geser* Cycle, transformed the protagonists of the old story into heroes defending the homeland and struggling for the welfare of the people. In his novel *Turmoil of Time and Power* (1960), he offers a wide-screen picture about life in the theocratic period and in the revolution and gives a subtle portrayal of the psyche of his heroes.

Tsewegmid, Dondog's son (1915–91), was an educator and a writer of prose and verse. He wrote children's books and short stories, such as the life of *Naidan the Shepherd*, *Ganbat the Student* and a *Gobi Travelogue*. Later he became a high-ranking member of the establishment.

Sengge, Dashdzeweg's son (1916–59), was a teacher, security officer, party official and, for a time, secretary and president of the Writers' League. He was also a poet and the author of the story of the brave soldier *Ayuush* (1947).

Gaitaw, Tsegmid's son (1929–79), spent most of his undoubted talent in composing voluminous political poems about *Sükhbaatar*, *Choibalsan*, *Marx*, *Lenin*, *Engels* and *War and Peace*, mostly in Mayakovsky's style of broken lines.

Badarch, Luwsandash's son (1919–60), teacher, proofreader and journalist, faithfully followed the party line in prose and verse. His ingenious tale-within-a-tale, *The Flame of the Joss Stick* (1947), blames the monks' preference for the Tibetan alphabet and speaks out in favour of learning the new Cyrillic script. Bardach's satirical writings hold up a critical mirror to society.

The novella *In the Altay* (1949/1951) by Lodoidamba, Chadraawal's son (1917–69), a writer and playwright, is about the joint work of Mongolian and Russian geologists guided by a local hunter. Lodoidamba was one of the first to recall the memory of the victims of the Stalinist purges in his short story *Infrangible Backbone* (1959), while in another, *The Iron Pillar* (1965), he tells how a woman was murdered by the insurgents of 1932 for her loyalty to the new order. In his short story *Chuluun* (1965) he examines two love affairs of a woman journalist. His main work is *The Pure Water Tamir River*, a well-written novel with protagonists of flesh and blood who made Mongolian history in the first quarter of the twentieth century (*Tungalag Tamir*, 1962). In his play *Five Fingers* (1966) he scrutinizes the problem of divorce.

Oidow, Choijamts's son (1917–63), a soldier and reporter in the war against Japan of 1945, held that after so many sufferings his nation deserved the right to laugh. He is remembered for his short stories and particularly for his plays, such as *Mönkhöö Who Wished To Be Happy* and *The Hero of Seventy Cheats*, a good comedy based on a folklore character.

Numerous plays and comedies by Wangan, Lamjaw's son (1920–68), such as *The Physicians* (1952), *Tojoo the Driver* (1954), *Common People* (1965), etc., deal with contemporary topics in a vivid colloquial language. Wangan also wrote a folklore-based opera libretto about the legendary origin of the horse-head fiddle (*Cuckoo Namjil*, in co-authorship with Ch. Chimed).

Udwal, Sonom's daughter (1921–92), published prose writings. In her novella *Starlight* (Odgerel, 1957), a Gobi woman tells the story of her hard life. Udwal's historical novel *Great Destiny* (1973) celebrates Commander Khatanbaatar Magsarjab's way to the revolution. For many years, Udwal served as a leading official in various political and cultural organizations.

Baast, Bökhe's son (b. 1921), of Uriankhay descent, first published some verses (*Lake Tolbo*, 1947) and then became a popular writer of often humorous short stories about hunters and other people of his mountainous west Mongolian homeland (*On Altay Trails*, 1959; *Swan's Song*, 1970; *Two Stories*, 1981).

Tarwa, Dalantai's son (1923–93), a poet and prose writer, had his debut in 1940 and went on to edit more than 20 smaller and larger collections of poetry, songs, short stories and children's books. His *Damirang's Folks* (1951) is one of the overly idyllic stories of the time about the over-fulfilled industrial plan.

Chimid, Chojil's son (1927–80), an urban intellectual and a high official in various institutions, was a prolific writer of lyric and narrative poetry (*I am Mongolian*, 1959; *Verses and Poems*, 1969), plays (*By the Heart's Call*, 1964; *Top Secret*, 1978) and novels (*Spring and Fall*, 1962; *Where Did Magellan Go Through?*, 1975). In his mellifluous and lucid style, he translated Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*, Tolstoy's *War and Peace* and some of Shakespeare's works.

Erdene, Sengge's son (1929–2000), of Buriat descent, was trained as an army officer and studied medicine before starting as a lyric poet. He later became a noted author of many psychological and poetic, highly emotional (sometimes sentimental, sometimes overly loyal to the party) short stories (*Khongordzul*, 1960, about a woman's tragic fate before the revolution; *Solitude*, 1961, about an old man hesitating to enter the cooperative; *Just a Bit Away from the Horizon*, 1962, including the story of an old handyman who tries to make a *Machine to Go to Paradise*). He also wrote a romantic novel, *Dzanabadzar*, about the seventeenth-century Buddhist high priest and famous sculptor of the Northern Mongols (1989).

Battulga (1919–74), son of Dzong Pai-jing, a Chinese settler, worked for many years as a police officer before embarking on his literary career in 1954. He is the author of several novels (*Tövshintögs*, 1957; and *Blue Sky*, 1962, on the tragic love of a poor girl and the son of a rich man, and the struggle against Manchu rule; its language abounds in classical Mongolian elements).

Natsagdorj, Shagdarjav's son (1918–2004), was a noted historian, the biographer of the revolutionary leader Sükhbaatar and co-author of the three-volume official history of the Mongolian People's Republic. He also wrote a film script and a historical novel, *Empress Mandukhai Setsen* (1981), as well as short stories.

Pürew, Jamba's grandson (b. 1921), was a novice in a monastery as a child, a cobbler in a factory as a teenager, and then a soldier, party worker and agricultural administrator. He wrote more than 200 short stories and 14 voluminous novels on historical and

contemporary topics (*Lightning*, 1968; *Three Knots*, 1971; *Rainstorm*, 1977; *Fog*, 1989; *The Soul's Song*, 1991; etc.).

Yawuukhulan (1929–82), son of Begdz, a hunter, was the most fecund and versatile poet of modern Mongolia, its nature, its changing pastures and growing cities, his own and his country's place in the world. He was a great master of lyric verse (*To My Mother*, 1949; *Tinkle of Silver Stirrups*, 1961; *The Reed of the Black Lake*, 1965; *Midday's Sky*, 1973; *The Heart that Loves the Ladies*, 1982; *Poetry Is My Life*, 1983) and long narrative and philosophical poems (*I Was Born with a Purpose*, 1959; *The Stag's Trail*, 1959; *Where the Ibex Stands*, 1969; *The World*, 1977; *The Bavarian Hyena*, 1979). He experimented with writing alliterative 'sonnets' without the sonnet rhyme scheme. The strength of his poetical art is felt even in those poems he loyally contributed to the ruling ideology of his time and country.

Tsedendorj, Mishig's son (1932–82), was a poet of refined verses such as the *Nine Wishes* (1965) or the *Pleasure of the Living* (1969; including *Night Rain*, *Sixteen Girls*, *There Is No Impossible in the Universe*) and short stories (*A Lace of Pearls*, 1959, with the philosophical *Road* about human destiny; *Sixty Million Golden Jewels*, 1980). His bitter poem about his own funeral, entitled *Last Will*, was banned by the authorities.

Myagmar, Dembee's son (1933–97), was a sensitive author of fresh lyric and narrative poems, short stories (*History of a House*, 1964; *The Miller*; *The Miller's Daughter*, both in 1965; *Ten Lyric Stories*, 1972), novels (*Where the Roads Meet*, 1964; *The Hunter*, 1968) and plays (*Why Me?*, showing the negative sides of the planned economy in the 1970s; *The Mutton Rump on the Banquet Table*, 1980, a witty comedy).

Pürewdorj, Dendew's son (b. 1933), was a teacher before becoming one of the editors of the satirical weekly *Tonshuul* [Woodpecker]. Now a publisher and a celebrated poet, he has mastered a wide range of forms and genres and introduced many poetical innovations. His poetry (*My Name is Mongol*, 1961; *Long Autumn*, 1972; *To Ernest Hemingway*, 1963; *I'm a Citizen of Mongolia*, 1972; *Chinggis*, 1962; *Independence*, 1962/1989) has appeared in more than a dozen booklets and books (*Song of Springtime*, 1956; *Light in the Grassland*, 1960, a versified chronicle of the herders' uneasy introduction to cooperative farming; *Milk on the Stirrup*, 1987). Pürewdorj is also known for his long anti-religious poem *Buddhas and Humans* (1985) and his *Homage to Chinggis* (1991).

Dulmaa, Shagdar's daughter (b. 1934), is a noted poetess conscious of the power of femininity. The volume of her selected verse, *Fire God* (1989), includes sensitive love poetry and the patriotic *I Love My Land*.

Dashdoorow, Sormuunirsh's son (1935–99), published poetry (*Eulogy of the Gobi*, 1963; *The Plain and I*, 1978), novels (*The Height of the Gobi*, 1963–1971, tracing the

long way of a young man from the Gobi to urban life), short stories (*Aligermāa, the Girl in the Neighbourhood*, 1974) and film scripts.

Tüdeu, Lodong's son (b. 1935), is a journalist and politician, and also a successful writer of novels (*Mountain Flood*, 1960, describing the corruption of the Buddhist clergy and the theocracy; *Move and Settlement*, 1964, 1974, in 2 vols; *The First Year of the Republic*, 1981; etc.), short stories (for instance, *The Vulture*, on the dilemma of killing for food and killing for revenge) and essays on a wide range of social, cultural and even scientific issues.

Sürenjaw, Sharaw's son (b. 1938), is the poet who composed the patriotic ode *Mongolia, My Homeland* (1962). He is also the author of collections of verse, among them *The Flower That Grew in the Night* (1963) and the *Azure Mountains of My Native Land* (1967), of a garland of novellas from the life of Mongolia's East (*Finish on the Kherlen River*, 1991) and of film scripts. He became the first president of the Free National League of Writers (1990).

Lochin, Sonom's son (b. 1940), is a novelist (*The Colour of the Heart*, about the coal miners' life, 1971; *The Way of Life*, 1984; *Hearth*, 1989; etc.), author of short stories (*Springtime Birds*, 1980) and literary historian.

Galsan, Tangad's son (b. 1932), of Oelet origin, is a teacher, journalist, translator and a courageous poet. His collection of poems, *Fragrant Flower of the Lowland*, was banned in 1964 and he lived in the countryside in exile for years; a book of his verse received the D. Natsagdorj Award in 1984. He published several volumes in his native south-western province of Bayankhongor (*The Word of My Son*, 1962; *Songs of the Sons of the Native Land*, 1962; *The Camel Bull that Choked Down the Grass*, 1989; etc.). With his sharp four-line poems he won the Crystal Cup (*Bolor Tsom*) Competition of Poets (held annually since 1983) in 1988. The following example is from 1969:

It's more shameful to be butted by a goat than to be gored by a bull.

It's more irritating to be stung by a fly than to be bitten by a tiger.

It's more painful to be slandered by a notability than to be knifed by a butcher.

It's more distasteful to be accused when innocent than to face a gun.

Shirchinsüren, Mishig's son (1933–98), was a lyric poet who quickly found his own style and a new voice. His collections of verse include *Hearth* (1966), *The Steed of the Wish, the Wing of the Verse* (1984) and *Steep Road* (1990).

Choijsilsüren, Lhamsüren's son (b. 1932), poet and writer, became a celebrated novelist (*Dew on the Grass*, 1963; *Rain with Sunshine*, 1985).

Maam, Dügerjaw's son (1935–93), of Dariganga descent, worked as a teacher, diplomat and historian, and published verse and prose. His main work is the four-volume novel *Earth*

(1977–89) about all kinds of people who made the history of the Dariganga region under the Manchus.

Choinom, Renchin's son (1936–79), a typesetter, painter, and writer and poet of great individuality, rebelled against the established order and was imprisoned as a criminal and a dissident. He wrote poems on the most varied themes (*Mongolian Woman*; *Buriat*; *My Mongolia*; *Letter to the Future*; *My Youth Will End Tomorrow*) and left an unfinished saga, *Man* (1964–90), in 6,800 verses. Many of his works, among them some strong, bitter poems, were published posthumously:

Every space is bordered

Every step is ordered

This time is like a wrong music

There is no better joy than drunkenness.

Gal, Jargal's son (1937–2000), wrote science fiction, e.g. *Crystal Mirror's Secret* (1973), a novel about genetics, humans, extraterrestrials and androids; *Crystal Mirror* is the name of the protagonist.

Baramsai, Jargal's son (1950–97), penned witty satirical prose, sketches and plays about contemporary urban life. He was the first to reflect the modern slang of youngsters, one of the reasons that he was sharply criticized.

Dashbalbar, Ochirbat's son (1957–99), a lyric poet, journalist and politician, published *The Melody of the Stars* (1984), *Almanac of the Dariganga Land* (1986), *The Silvern Bird of Dream* (1990) and other books of poems and short stories.

Inner Mongolia and Dzungaria

In Inner Mongolia the Kharachin Prince Güngsangnorbu (1871–1931) was one of those leaders who realized the importance of modernization and a secular education. He founded schools in his region and encouraged young Mongols to study abroad. One of his protégés was Temgetu, or Wang Ruichang (1887–1939), the Kharachin printer, creator of a Mongolian font, who founded the Mongolian Publishing House in Beijing and edited numerous old and new books: monuments of traditional literature including parts of Injannashi's *Blue Book*, textbooks for the newly established Mongolian schools, bilingual and multilingual dictionaries, and translations. Their contemporaries were Keshingge (1888–1950), a Khorchin poet, who wrote lyric poems in the Chinese traditional style, and the much younger Humpback Gochoo (1908–64), a Sunit serf and folk poet, an improviser of tongue-in-cheek verses. Both belonged to the pre-modern world.

Poetry and short stories were the main forms of literary expression of the Mongols in twentieth-century China, and there too literature served primarily as a means of political indoctrination. Nevertheless after 1949 a great many Mongolian books and journals, and a number of important series of literary and folkloric great works and histories, were published in Mongolian script in Hôhhot, Hailar, Chifeng (Ulaankhada), Zhangjiakou (Chulalt Khaalga), Beijing, etc. The first full edition of Injannashi's works, a larger version of the *Geser* Cycle and Paajai's new *Geser* as well as the *Janggar* epic were printed then. Oirat Clear Script writings were printed in Urumqi for the Mongols of Dzungaria.

Choiwang (1856–1928), Muu-Okhin, Paajai, Ösökhübuyan and Norji were noted East Mongolian story-singers. Paajai (1907–60), one of the Jarut bards and Choiwang's disciple, used to sing ceremonial songs, versified stories of Chinese origin (among them those from the *Three Kingdoms*), a renewed oral alliterative version of the Mongolian *Geser* epic of the 1716 edition, benedictions and songs (mostly of the *kholboo* genre, which is a catalogue-like poetic list of features) in the service of ongoing campaigns, for instance, against fleas. He accompanied his words with the music of his four-stringed fiddle.

Rinchenkhorlo (1904–63), from the Khüriye banner, author of the *Tale of Him Who Struggles in Bitterness* (1940), was one of the first modern prose writers in Inner Mongolia.

Saichungga (1914–73), a bright Chahar poet and essayist, who studied in Japan and Mongolia, flourished under Prince Demchigdongrub's autonomous government and also after 1945. In 1947 he renounced his earlier works, his diary notes (1942) on his native sand-dunes, his poems, the *Rising Songs of Our Mongolia* (1945) and so on, and under the new name Na. (= Nasundelger's son) Sainchogtu, began to publish not only writings loyal to the Communist Party, but also genuine poetry, for instance, a pictorial poem inspired by the beauty of a Nepalese dancer. His poem *Blue Silk Gown* (1954) celebrated the emancipation of women. In a narrative (*Nandir and Sümbiür*, 1957, some 1,200 verses) he sang about the difficult love of a young couple during the harsh era of collectivization. He himself barely survived the darkest years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). After the Cultural Revolution, Bürinbeki (b. 1928), another poet, preferred to glorify Chou En-lai instead of praising Mao Tse-tung. Among the prose writers of Inner Mongolia, Batumöngke (b. 1951) was one of the first who dared to retrieve the grim memory of those tragic years in a novella (*Evening Warmth*, 1984).

History, social problems, human destiny and dignity, love and liberty were the main issues treated in the short stories published after 1976. The following are only a few examples. Choirawjaa's *Marble* is written in memory of a dear friend who was imprisoned. The humiliation of a Mongolian girl, her mother, a physician, and her husband, a university professor, is the theme of Jalafungga's short story *Family Breakup*. Badawaa's *The Yellow*

River that Never Dries Up has a similar tragic theme; his *Darkhan Dagaa* is about the natural beauty of his native land. In Sainjugaa's *Reconciliation* a mother who first lost her son and daughter-in-law, and was then separated from her grandsons by the Red Guards and herself treated as a 'devilish ghost', harbours the hope of joining her lost family in the next life.

Kalmukia

A group of the Oirats (Western Mongols) known as Kalmuks (see Volume V, Chapter 6) migrated at the beginning of the seventeenth century to what is now Kalmukia in the Russian Federation. They share a cultural heritage with the Oirats of Dzungaria and western Mongolia, the people of Zaya Pandita, creator of the Clear Script alphabet (1648), and with the other Mongolic-speaking nations. In the twentieth century they developed their new written language and their own literary identity.

Janggar, their great epic cycle, in the Kalmuk bard (*janggarchi*) Elaen Owla's version, was recorded in the Clear Script and lithographed in St Petersburg in 1910. After the Russian revolution of 1917, the Kalmuks received a number of experimental orthographies in the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets; the 1940 edition of the *Janggar* by the poet, playwright, writer and journalist Basangaa (Basangov) Baatar appeared in the last-but-one Cyrillic orthography. At present the Kalmuks use a Cyrillic orthography which has five additional letters but marks the short vowels in a first syllable only.

Narmin Liji (Lidzhi Narmaev), poet and writer, compiled a primer and reader (*Sarul mör* [Bright Path], 1925) in a Cyrillic orthography for Kalmuk schools. It also gives the outlines of the traditional Kalmuk way of life.

Erenjaenae (Erendzhenov) Konstantin (b. 1912), the lyric poet of the *Glowing Tulips*, published *The Ways of Joy* (1961, poetry), *Beginning* (1987, a booklet with the poems *My Felt Tent Home* and *The Heart of the Steppe*), short stories (*The Hunter's Son*), a novel (*Keep the Fire Alive*), a study of Kalmuk crafts and a little book of Kalmuk cuisine. He celebrated the homecoming of his nation after long years in exile with a moving poem.

Two promising poets, Dawaan Ghaerae (1913–36) and Erdniin Muutl (1914–42), both died young. The first wrote poems such as *Death in the Steppe*, *The Changing Steppe* and *The Future's Ballad* and translated Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*. The second, whose *Song of the Kalmyk Fighters* became the battle song of a division of his compatriots, died in combat on the Don.

Badmin Aleksei Balduevich (Badmaev, 1917–91) was a writer of prose; his novel *Dust Cannot Destroy Gold* (1964) tells of the Kalmuk tragedy and survival after the Second World War. In his novel *Zalturgan* (also in Russian translation, 1979) he reflects on the

events of the first third of his century. Twentieth-century Kalmuk history is the subject of *The Black-Tongued Crane* by another novelist, Narmin Markhaaj (Narmaev, 1915–93), and of the two-volume *Straight Road* (1963–4) by Dorjin Basng (Basan Dordzhiev).

Kögltin Dawaa (in Russian: David Kugul'tinov, b. 1921) is a poet who fought against Hitler's army in the Second World War; he was then sent to prison and labour camps as a member of a 'sinful' nation. This bitter experience transformed his poetry, giving it great depth and strength. Later, in the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, he fought for his nation's rights. His *oeuvre*, translated into Russian, was printed in three volumes in the polar city of Noril'sk where he had spent several years in forced labour. Dawaa also wrote short lyric songs (*Noril'sk, Noril'sk*), paid homage to Musa Jalil, a Tatar poet who died in Hitler's Berlin prison (*In the Moabit Prison*), and authored long meditative poems (*The Birth of Word; Revolt of Mind; Murder in the Church*) and two-line poems like the following:

Do not ask for awards because you did not do evil deeds
as you have not done any good that the world so badly needs.

In one of his long poems, *Poet, Love and God*, Dawaa summed up his 70 years.

Bosya Sangadzhievna Badmaeva is a poetess and writer; her novel *Storm*, about the rural life of young Kalmuks in the 1960s, has also been translated into Russian (Moscow, 1980).

Balykov Sandji Basanovich (1894–1943), a Buzaawa Kalmuk and an *émigré* after the Russian civil war, wrote abroad in Kalmuk and Russian (*Stronger than Power*, short stories, 1976; *A Maiden's Honour*, a historical novel, 1983, both published posthumously).

Buriatia

Buriat literature began with the chronicles compiled by Tugultur Toboev (Khorí, 1863), Ubashi Dambi-Jaltsan Lombo-Tserenov (Selenga, 1868), Vandan Yumsunov (Khorí, 1875) and Nikolai Tsyvanzhab Sakharov (Bargazhan, 1887). These are mostly genealogies with some narrative material, for instance, the myth of the Eleven Khorí Fathers, scions of the Swan Maiden.

Galsan Gomboev (nineteenth century), abbot of the Buddhists in Siberia, was the supervisor of block-printing in Buriat monasteries and a learned editor of traditional literature. Rinchen Nomtoev or Sumatiratna (1871–1909), another Buddhist scholar, compiled a large Tibetan-Mongolian dictionary and moralistic writings.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the still-living heritage of Buriat epics, also studied by Jeremiah Curtin (who met, for instance, the Western Buriat epic-singer

Manshuud Emegeev or Emegein), was explored by the Aga Buriat folklorist, scholar, editor, politician (one of the founders of the Mongolian People's Party) and writer Tsyben/Tseween Zhamtsarano (1881–1942, died in prison). He recorded the epic of *Alamzha Mergen the Son and Aguu the Beautiful His Younger Sister*, the longest Buriat epic *Abai Geser* (some 20,000 lines), *Yerensei* and many other gems of oral poetry. Between 1908 and 1913 Buriat rural theatres used to show such plays as *Death* by D. Abasheev, *Guilty Is the Wine* by I. Barlukov and *The Card Players* (1912) by Choizhil-Lhama Bazaron (1878–1940, executed), also a successful playwright in the 1920s.

Agvan Dorzhiev, alias Vagindra (1853–1938, died in prison), was a Buddhist monk, Tibetan diplomat, creator of a Buriat alphabet, and the founder of a Buddhist temple in St Petersburg. His versified *Account of Travelling around the World* relates his life and travels.

Apollon Andreevich Toroev (1893–1981), a Western Buriat farm labourer, lost his sight early and became a folk poet, singer of the *Geser* epic, keeper of the oral tradition, whose art was later used in the service of the new order. Sergei Petrovich Baldaev (pen-name, Abgain Türgen; 1893–1979), also a Western Buriat, trained as a teacher. He was not only a great connoisseur and explorer of his people's lore, but also a playwright (*The Feast of Truth*, 1925; *The Woman's Share*, 1933).

Bazar Baraadiin (Bazar Baradieievich Baradin, 1878–1937, executed), an Aga Buriat scholar, teacher, writer and playwright, studied in St Petersburg, travelled in Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Mongolia and Tibet and edited a selection of oral literature in Latin script in 1910 when he taught Mongolian at the University of St Petersburg. He became the first commissar of culture in the Buriat Republic (1923–6). His drama *Lady Choizhid* (1920) is about the loss of Buriat lands in the early twentieth century; his tragedy in verse, *The Great Shamaness Abazhaa*, dramatized the life of an eighteenth-century Buriat heroine who sacrificed herself for her nation (1921). Both plays adapted many elements of shamanist lore. His poem *Legend of the Origin of the Buriat People* is rooted in the oral tradition.

Zhigzhitzhab Batotsyrenov (1881–1938, executed) was the author of short stories about traditional life in the Buriat countryside (*Blizzard*, 1929; *Horse Breeder*, 1935; *Brisket*, 1936). In 1930 he was entrusted with the creation of the Latin-based 'new Buriat alphabet'.

Khotsa Namsaraevich Namsaraev (1889–1959) was a teacher, the 'founder of Soviet Buriat literature', a poet, playwright and writer, a member of the Supreme Council of the USSR and a great survivor. He was the author of the revolutionary plays *Darkness* (1919) and *The Prince's Whip* (1948) and a novella about the life of a poor labourer and his way to the revolution (*Tserempil*, 1935), a theme he later expanded into a novel (*Daybreak*, 1950). Namsaraev also published short stories, many poems, a long poem (*The Old Geleng's*

Words, 1926), a folkloric epic (*The Boy Sagaadai the Wise and the Girl Nogoodoi the Smart*) and children's books. His collected works appeared in five volumes (1957–9). One of his merits is that he kept alive and developed his native language and enriched his literary works with the traditions of folk poetry that he loved and knew well.

Ts. Don (Tsydenzhap Dondupovich Dondubon, 1905–38, executed) was a revolutionary, journalist, editor, poet of propagandistic songs, and author of the folk-style epic *The Wise Oldster Zhebzheenei* (1936, more than 2,400 alliterative lines). He also wrote short stories (*Blood Bath*, 1930, about the struggle of the Bolsheviks with the White Russians; *The Deal Is Done*, 1931, on the organization of communes), a long novella (*Eclipse of the Moon*, 1932) and novels (*Poisoned by Feta*, published also in the new, Latin-based Buriat orthography in 1935; *In the Pine Forest*, 1937, lost). He translated political literature and Raspe's *Adventures of Baron Münchhausen* into Mongolian.

Solbone Tuya ('Light of the Morning Star', pen-name of the Aga Buriat Petr Niki-forovich Damdinov, 1892–1937, executed) wrote in Russian (*Tsvetostep'* [The Steppe in Flowers], Chita, 1922) and in Buriat (*Oyuunbilig*, a play; *Tseren*, a short story; *Balto, a Prehistoric Boy*, a long poem).

Apollon Innokentievich Shadaev (1902–69), a Western Buriat writer and playwright, edited Buriat folk tales (1941, 1950) and authored *Mergen*, a comedy (1952), *Old Man Shampii*, a story of the first journey by air of an old hunter, collections of verses and legends (*Three Sages from Gurgaldai*, 1965; *A Golden Egg*, 1967).

Bavasan Dorzhievich Abiduev (1909–40) survived the Great Purge, was the author of political lyrics, folkloric writings, tales for children (*Shalai and Shanai*) and a celebrated poem about the *Airplane* (1934), and translated Mayakovsky's poetry.

Bato Bazarovich Bazarov (1907–87) taught Mongolian script to adults when only 11 years old, published collections of verse (*Flood of the Selenga*, 1934–57; *The Polar Star*, 1967), short stories and children's plays, and translated classical and modern Russian literature.

Zhamso Tumunovich Tumunov (1916–55) was an Aga Buriat writer of stories (*The Steppe Eagle*, 1942, about events during the war), plays (*Sesegma*, 1938, a young woman's revolt against forced marriage) and poems (*Morning over the Baikal*, 1949; *Sükhe Baatar*, 1950, a narrative about the Mongolian revolutionary leader). His *The Steppe Awakens* (1949) was the first post-war novel in Buriatia. Tumunov spent the war years at the front, where he was wounded.

Dolyoon (Il'ya Nikolaevich) Madason (1911–84), a Western Buriat lyric poet, writer, folklorist and teacher, established a literary club in 1935–7 that became famous throughout the country. He published collections of verse (*Light of Springtime*, 1932; *Lyrics*,

1941; *When the Cuckoos Sing*, 1958; etc.) and short stories, and recorded folk poetry, riddles, proverbs and a version of the epic *Abai Geser*. Madason fought in the Second World War and suffered contusions.

Dashirabdan Odboevich Batozhabai (1921–77), an Aga Buriat writer, and a pilot during the war, wrote stories (*Songs of the Horse Herders*, 1955; *Unopened Letters*, 1968), novels (*The Happiness Stolen*, 1958, a trilogy; *Mountain Eagles*, 1978), plays (*The Barometer Indicates Storm*, 1957; *Catastrophe*, 1980) and the autobiographical *Stories of Rabdan the Restless* (posthum., 1991).

Namzhil Garmaevich Baldano (1907–1984), an Eastern Buriat playwright, worked in the Buriat theatre of Ulan-Ude, wrote more than 40 plays on folkloric and contemporary themes, and also a ballet story (*The Beauty Angara*) and the libretto of the opera *Enkhe Bulad Baatar*.

Chimit Tsydendambaevich Tsydendambaev (1918–77) wrote poetry, stories and novels, among them an unfinished trilogy about the life of the nineteenth-century Buriat scholar *Banzar's Son Dorzho* (1952) and *Far Away from the Homeland* (1958). His satirical novel *Hunters for Blue Gees* was first published in Russian (Moscow, 1977), then in Buriat (1989). Tsydendambaev also translated classical and modern Russian poetry.

Tsyren-Dulma Dondogoi/Dondukova (1911–?) was a teacher in her mother tongue and a poetess. Her first collection, *Two Loves* (1946), received harsh criticism from the authorities, and her writings were not in print for many years. Later she published *Heart Beat* (1959) and *The Stones Sing* (1968, a narrative poem).

Nikolai Garmaevich Damdinov (b. 1932), a Barguzin Buriat poet, is the author of more than 50 collections of verse (including *Bargazhan*, 1955, and *Geser's Trail*, 1985), long poems such as *Father's Name*, the *Songs about Dorzhi Banzarov* and *Lenin Is My Teacher* (it was sweeter to praise him than Stalin) and a garland of Buriat sonnets. He also wrote plays, film scripts, short stories and essays. His love of his nation inspired his poem *Mother Tongue and Native Land*, similar to the beautiful lines of *My Buriat Language* by Dondok Aiusheevich Ulzytuev (1936–72) from southern Buriatia, a short-lived poet of great expressive powers and with a rich imagination (she was also a songster and journalist):

Pure and limpid
like the Baikal's water
Mild and warm
like a sweet girl's smile
Such is my Buriat language.

Both poets experimented with new forms, blank verse, and the combination of rhyme and alliteration.

CONCLUSION

Madhavan K. Palat

The sixth volume brings this UNESCO series to an end as it takes in the whole of the modern period from colonial conquest and domination to decolonization, the Cold War from start to finish, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and renewed instability in major parts of the region.

The colonial and semi-colonial experiences were in common as the region was subjected to the metropolitan controls of St Petersburg and London, but they generated their own set of differences that competed with the diversity that has been frequently noted earlier in the series. Colonialism introduced immensely variable patterns of development in the region. For example, parts of Russian Central Asia were settled by Russian and Ukrainian settlers, especially peasants, but also workers and even some intelligentsia, which lent their unique colour to the politics of the region during the revolution of 1917–21 and to the Soviet construction thereafter. On the other hand, there were no settlers anywhere in the British colonial empire in India, nor in Afghanistan or Iran, despite both being subject to colonial controls. Similarly, Punjab enjoyed higher levels of investment and development thanks to British recruitment of the army chiefly from that region; and the consequent prosperity was visible throughout the twentieth century.

None of these regions had ever been isolated from the rest of the world in pre-modern times, and new forms of integration with the rest of the world took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; but, exceptionally, Afghanistan became more isolated as a result of colonial domination – unlike neighbouring India and Pakistan, Russian Central Asia or Iran. This is of course explicable in terms of the Russian and British policies of maintaining Afghanistan as a ‘buffer state’ between the two empires and keeping it relatively insulated from modernizing initiatives, whether from either of the two empires, or from their European rivals like Germany, or from an anti-imperial nationalism. This form of seclusion has been proudly or self-servingly described as ‘independence’; but it was an independence like the Tibetan, leading to greater stagnation and incapacity as a modern state. Although

Afghanistan started out promisingly in the twentieth century, it was swept up in the maelstrom of international rivalries. It descended into an arena of tribal and warlord politics, and international proxy wars, recognizable features of a 'modern' 'failed' state. Modernity meant very different things in different parts of this world.

On the other hand, Soviet Central Asia, a region that was not independent – that is, it did not enjoy sovereign status in international politics – surpassed all others in levels of development as measured by the usual indicators of health, literacy and education, employment, urbanization and social infrastructure, law and order, and international security. During the post-war Soviet stability, it escaped underdevelopment, the morass from which the other states were struggling to extricate themselves. This was due not merely to membership of a strong state, but even more to a superpower that could afford the necessary investment to ensure regional development and security. The sovereign and independent Indian, Pakistani and Iranian states occupied an intermediary position between these two extremes. Thus the overall picture is of a single region, perhaps, but certainly one with many histories.

Not only did the colonial regimes lay a new patina over the region, but the many nationalisms remoulded all old identities into a series of new ones. That process of the twentieth century was perhaps the most transformative of all after the colonial subjugation of the nineteenth; and while it has been the basis of remarkable stability in vast stretches of the region, it has been a fertile source of tension and even wars in other parts.

Anti-colonial national movements germinated everywhere, but, typically, each of them related more to its specific metropolitan centre, St Petersburg or London, rather than to each other. Only the Iranian, belonging to a nominally independent country, was able to seek out sources of inspiration elsewhere in Europe. As with all nationalisms, new national territories were identified, new cultures were propagated, and new memories devised, to define the new nations; and, as everywhere, the greatest antiquity was claimed for each of them. Entirely new national leaderships now replaced the old ruling classes, even if many individual members of both were the same. Again, Afghanistan was exceptional rather than an extreme case, for it was not sufficiently galvanized by nationalism to sweep away older structures or to breathe new and modern energies into them. But each of these nationalisms had to contend, not only with competition between each other in contiguous territories, but as much with the receding colonial power (the British and the Russian) or the new supranational one (the Soviet). In each case, however, the British or the Soviets were able to put their own stamp on the eventual arrangement of territory.

Thus the Soviet Union substituted and promoted multiple nationalisms in lieu of the single Turkestani nationalism favoured by the Pan-Turkic Jadid intelligentsia; and in the course of the 1920s and 1930s, five new national republics were created, with two


autonomous republics within them, all as the territorial foundations for a new series of nationalisms. The five principal republics became national states and emerged from the Soviet Union as territorially stable independent entities.

The British empire toyed with more than one nationalism and eventually settled for the Pakistani and the Indian states in 1947 after hiving off the Burmese state in the 1930s and setting up Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) as an independent state. Afghanistan and Nepal remained independent, while Sikkim and Bhutan remained subordinate to the Indian Union by special treaty relations. The three nationalisms of Pakistan, India and Kashmir clashed in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the tension continues into the twenty-first century. The Pakistani national state collapsed under the challenge of Bengali nationalism, leading to the creation of an independent Bangladesh. While the Russian and British colonial empires both fell victim to nationalism, the Soviet Union successfully mobilized those energies to the point of stability in Central Asia. Unlike the Soviet ones, the British settlements were messy and pregnant with future conflicts. Curiously, however, the Soviet Union disintegrated under the pressure of the internal reformers of the Communist Party after losing in the Cold War and not as a result of nationalist revolt; consequently, the national states of the Soviet period survived the Soviet Union itself and they are now major players in international politics.


If the experience of the region over this century and a half is to be summed up, it is characterized by colonial domination, nationalist mobilization and modernization, with their implications in each walk of life; but the impact and the results of each of these were astonishingly variable despite the proximity of these states to each other and their being subject to or driven by virtually the same compulsions.

MAPS*


* The maps have been compiled on the basis of various sources and do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.



MAP 1. Tsarist Russia and Central Asia.



MAP 2. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Russian Federation and the republics of Central Asia.




MAP 3. Mongolia and western China (Xinjiang).




MAP 4. British India.



MAP 5. India and Pakistan.



MAP 6. Afghanistan and Iran.



MAP 7. The natural environment of Central and South Asia.

Types of landscape: a: taiga; b: subtaiga; c: forest-steppe; d: temperate steppe; e: temperate semidesert; f: temperate desert; g: subtropical desert-steppe and desert; h: sub-Mediterranean; i: tropical desert; k: tropical semidesert-savannah; l: sub-equatorial forest-savannah; m: sub-equatorial forest.

Borders: A: types of landscape; B: the physiographic countries; C: the physiographic countries: 1: the East Europe plains; 2: Urals; 3: West Siberian plains; 4: highland Altai-Sayan; 5: Middle-Siberian plateau; 6: the Kazakh hills; 7: Turan plain; 8: Tian Shan and Pamir-Alai; 9: Mongolia-Xinjiang; 10: Iranian plateau; 11: Tibet plateau and the Himalayas; 12: Indus-Ganges plain; 13: Hindustan; 14: Indochina.

(Source: on the basis of A. G. Isachenko, A. A. Shljapnikova's map, *Types of Landscapes and the Physiographic Countries of Eurasia*, 1989.) (Map: Courtesy of E. Shukurov.)



MAP 8. Present-day Central Asia.



MAP 8. (Continued.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

ABBREVIATIONS

El² = *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Leiden

Elr = *The Encyclopaedia Iranica*, London/Costa Mesa, Calif.

IJMES = *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Cambridge, Mass.

IVAN UZSSR = *Institut vostokovedenie Akademii Nauk Uzbekistana*, Tashkent

LOII = *Leningrad Department of the Historical Institute*

LOIV ANSSR = *Leningrad Department of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR*

MITT = *Materialy po istorii Turkmen i Turkmenii* [*Materials on the History of the Turkmens and Turkmenia*], Moscow/Leningrad

SVRAN UZSSR = *Sobranie Vostochnykh rukopisey Akademii Nauk Uzbekistana*, Tashkent

ZIRGO = *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo obshchestva* [*Transactions of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society*], St Petersburg

CHAPTER 1

AINI, S. 1971. *Sobranie sochineniy v shesti tomakh* [Collection of Works in Six Volumes]. Moscow. 6 vols.

ALLWORTH, E. 1990. *The Modern Uzbeks from the Fourteenth Century to the Present, a Cultural History*. Stanford, Calif.

BARATOVA, G. 2000. Formirovanie uygurskoy i dunganskoy diaspor [The Formation of the Uighur and Dungan Diasporas]. In: *Istoriya Kazakhstana. Narody i kul'tury*, pp. 219–29. Almaty.

BARTOL'D, V. V. 1963–1977. In: *Sochineniya* [Complete Works], Vol. 9. Moscow.

BECKER, S. 1968. *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*. Cambridge.

BENNIGSEN, A.; LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY, C. 1964. *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920*. Paris/The Hague.

BEYSEMBIEV, T. K. 1987. *Tarikh-i Shahruhi* [History of Shahruh]. Alma-Ata.

BOULGER, D. C. 1879. *England and Russia in Central Asia*. London. 2 vols.

BREGEL, Y. 1967. *Dokumenty arkhiva khivinskikh khanov po istorii i etnografii karakalpakov* [Documents from the Archives of the Khans of Khiva Concerning the History and Ethnography of the Karakalpaks]. Moscow.

- . 1982. Tribal Tradition and Dynastic History: The Early Rulers of the Qongrats According to Munis. *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 16, pp. 357–98.
- . 2003. *An Historical Atlas of Central Asia*. Leiden.
- CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE, H. 1981. *Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l'empire russe*. 2nd. ed. Paris.
- CURZON, G. N. 1889. *Russia in Central Asia in 1889*. N.p. Repr., London, 1967.
- . 1892. *Persia and the Persian Question*. London.
- Dictionnaire de l'Asie centrale*. 2001. Paris.
- EROFEEVA, I. V. 1999. *Khan Abul Khayr: polkovodets, pravitel' i politik* [Khan Abul Khayr: General, Ruler and Politician]. Almaty.
- . 2000. Krest'yanskies pereseleniya v XIX v. [Peasant Migrations in the Nineteenth Century]. *Istoriya Kazakhstana. Narody i kul'tury*, pp. 207–18. Almaty.
- . 2005. *Epistolyarnoe nasledie kazakhskoy pravyashchey elity XVIII–serediny XIX vv.* [The Epistolary Heritage of the Kazakh Ruling Elite, from the Eighteenth to the First Half of the Nineteenth Century]. Almaty.
- FERRO, M. 1994. *Histoire des colonisations – des conquêtes aux indépendances XIIIe–XXe siècle*. Paris.
- FOURNIAU, V. 2000. Le Semiretchie et la Transoxiane. Leurs liens dans l'histoire des turcisations et des sédentarisation en basse Asie centrale. *Hommes et terres d'Islam. Mélanges offerts à Xavier de Planhol* (IFRI), Vol. 2, pp. 229–42. Paris.
- GALKIN, M. N. 1865. *Kratkaya zapiska ob istoricheskikh pravakh Rossii na Kokandskie goroda Turkestan i Tashkent* [Brief Note on the Historic Rights of Russia over the Kokandi Towns of Turkestan and Tashkent]. *Russkiy Vestnik*, Vol. 58.
- GILBERT, M. 1993. *Atlas of Russian History*. New York.
- HOPKIRK, P. 1990. *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia*. London.
- IGNATIEV, S. D. 1992. *Rossiiskaya diplomatiya v portretakh* [Russian Diplomacy in Portraits]. Moscow.
- ISHJAMTS, N. 2003. The Mongols. In: *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. V, pp. 209–24. Paris.
- Istoriya Kazakhstana. Narody i kul'tury* [History of Kazakhstan. Peoples and Cultures]. 2000. Almaty.
- Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR* [History of the Uzbek SSR]. 1956. Tashkent. 2 vols.
- IVANOV, P. P. 1958. *Ocherki po istorii Sredney Azii* [About the History of Central Asia]. Moscow.
- KAZAKOV, B. 1999. Analyse structurelle des actes de waqf provenant d'Asie centrale, XIIIe–début du XXe s. *Les Cahiers d'Asie centrale*, No. 7. Aix-en-Provence.
- KOSTENKO, L. F. 1890. *Srednyaya Aziya i vodvorenie v ney russkoy grazhdanstvennosti* [Central Asia and the Establishment of Russian Citizenship There]. St Petersburg.
- KRAUSSE, A. 1973. *Russia and Asia, a Record and a Study, 1558–1899*. 3rd ed. London/ New York.
- LACOSTE, G. de. 1908. *Rossiya i Velikobritaniya v Tsentral'noy Azii* [Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia]. Tashkent.
- LARUELLE, M. 2004. *Le mythe aryen en Russie au XIXe siècle, la création d'une cosmogonie nationale entre science et idéologie*. Paris.
- LEBEDEV, V. T. 1900. *Russes et Anglais en Asie centrale, vers l'Inde, esquisse militaire, statistique stratégique, projet de campagne russe*. Paris.
- LUNIN, B. 1965. *Srednyaya Aziya v dorevolutsionnom i sovetskom vostokovedenii* [Central Asia in Pre-Revolutionary and Soviet Oriental Studies]. Tashkent.

- . 1979. *Srednyaya Aziya v nauchnom nasledii otechestvennogo vostokovedeniya* [Central Asia in the Scientific Heritage of Russian Oriental Studies]. Tashkent.
- LUZHETSKAYA, N. 1986. *Ocherki istorii Vostochnogo Gindukusha vo vtoroy polovine XIX v.* [Essays on the History of the Eastern Hindu Kush in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century]. Moscow.
- MA DAZHENG. 2003. The Tarim Basin. In: *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. V, pp. 181–208. Paris.
- MACKENZIE, D. 1988. The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860–1885. In: M. Rywkin (ed.), *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*, pp. 208–34. London/New York.
- MACKINDER, H. J. 1904. Le pivot géographique de l'histoire. *Stratégique*, No. 55, pp. 11–30. Repr. 1992.
- MAKSHEEV, A. I. 1890. *Istoricheskiy obzor Turkestana o nastupatel'nom dvizhenii v nego russkikh* [Overview of the History of Turkestan and of the Russian Offensive in that Region]. St Petersburg.
- MARKOV, E. 1891. *Rossiya v Sredney Azii* [Russia in Central Asia]. St Petersburg.
- MARTENS, F. F. 1880. *Rossiya i Angliya v Sredney Azii* [Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia]. St Petersburg.
- . 1892–98. *Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères, Traités avec l'Angleterre (1710–1895)*, Vols. 9–11. St Petersburg.
- MASAL'SKIY, V. I. 1913. *Turkestanskiy kray* [Turkistan Kray]. St Petersburg.
- MCCHESENEY, R. 1991. *Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889*. Princeton, N.J.
- MEYENDORFF, G. de. 1826. *Voyage à Boukhara fait en 1820*. Paris.
- MIYAWAKI, J. 2003. History of the Dzungars: Introductory Survey. In: *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. V, pp. 141–51. Paris.
- MORGAN, G. de. 1981. *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia 1810–1895*. London.
- MUKHTAROV. 1963. *Materialy po istorii Ura Tyube, sbornik aktov XVII–XIX vv.* [Material on the History of Ura Tepe. Collection of Documents, Seventeenth–Nineteenth Centuries]. Dushanbe.
- NALIVKIN, V. P. 1889. *Histoire du khanat de Kokand*. Paris.
- OLUFSEN, O. 1911. *The Emir of Bokhara and his Country*. London.
- POUJOL, C. 1985. Les voyageurs russes en Asie centrale: naissance et déclin de deux mythes, les réserves d'or et la voie vers l'Inde. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 4 (3), pp. 59–73. Oxford.
- QAYUMOV, A. 1961. *Qo'qon adabiy muhiti* [The Literary Circles of Kokand]. (In Uzbek.) Tashkent.
- QOSIMOV, B. 2002. *Milliy uyg'onish* [The National Awakening]. (In Uzbek.) Tashkent.
- RAWLINSON, H. C. 1875. *England and Russia in the East*. London.
- RECLUS, E. 1881. L'Asie russe. In: *Nouvelle géographie universelle*, Vol. 6. Paris.
- RIAZANOVSKY, N. V. 1972. Asia through Russian Eyes. In: W. S. Vucinich (ed.), *Russia and Asia. Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples*, pp. 3–29. Stanford, Calif.
- ROUIRE, A. M. F. 1908. *La rivalité anglo-russe aux XIXe siècle en Asie, Golfe persique, frontière de l'Inde*. Paris.
- RYWKIN, M. 1988. *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*. London/New York.
- SAHNI, K. 1997. *Crucifying the Orient. Russian Orientalism and the Colonization of Caucasus and Central Asia*. Oslo.
- SCHUYLER, E. 1876. *Turkistan. Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkestan, Khokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*. New York. 2 vols.

- SEREBRYANNIKOV, A. G. 1914. *Turkestanskiy Kray. Sbornik materialov dlya istorii ego zavoevaniya* [Turkistan Kray. Collection of Documents Concerning the History of its Conquest], Vol. 1. Tashkent.
- SKRINE, F. H.; ROSS, E. D. 1899. *The Heart of Asia. A History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times*. London.
- STEENSGAARD, N. 1973. *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*. Chicago, Ill.
- TERENZIO, P. C. 1947. *La rivalité anglo-russe en Perse et Afghanistan*. Paris.
- TROITSKAYA, A. L. 1968. *Katalog arkhiva kokandskikh khanov XIX veka* [Catalogue of the Archives of the Khans of Kokand in the Nineteenth Century]. Moscow.
- VAHIDOV, S.; ERKINOV, A. 1999. Le *fihrst* (catalogue) de la bibliothèque de Sadr-i Ziyâ: une image de la vie intellectuelle dans le Mavarannahr (fin XIXe–déb. XXe s.). *Les Cahiers d'Asie centrale*, No. 7. Aix-en-Provence.
- VÁMBÉRY, A. 1886. *La lutte future pour la possession de l'Inde: aperçu des progrès de la Russie dans l'Asie centrale*. Paris.
- VENZHUKOV, M. I. 1877. *Rossiia i vostok. Sobranie geograficheskikh i politicheskikh statey* [Russia and the East. Collection of Geographical and Political Articles]. St Petersburg.
- VYATKIN, M. 1947. *Batyr Srym*. Leningrad.
- . 2002. *Batyr Srym*. Almaty.
- WINNER, T. 1980. *The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia*. New York.
- YUSUPOV, S. 1986. *Ocherki istorii Kabadianskogo bekstva v kontse XIX–nachale XX veka* [History of the *Beylik* of Kabadian at the End of the Nineteenth and the Beginning of the Twentieth Century]. Dushanbe.

CHAPTER 2

Many works mentioned in the bibliography to Chapter 1 of the present volume are useful for this whole historical period, and also contain information on trade and the economy. They are not mentioned here again, except those that are cited in the text.

- AMITIN-SHAPIRO, Z. L. 1933. *Ocherki sotsial'nogo stroitel'sva, Sredneaziatkikh Evreyev*. Tashkent.
- AZADAEV, F. 1959. *Tashkent vo vtoroy polovine XIX veka* [Tashkent in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century]. Tashkent.
- Aziatskaya Rossiya*. 1914. St Petersburg.
- BARTOL'D, V. V. 1973. Otchot o komandirovke v Turkestan. In: *Sochineniya* [Complete Works], Vol. 8. Moscow.
- BROCKGAUZ, F. A. 1897. Neft' [Oil]. In: *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar'*, Vol. 40. St Petersburg.
- BURTON, A. 2003. Trade. In: *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. V, pp. 407–25. Paris.
- CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE, H. 1966. *Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l'empire russe*. Paris.
- DANILEVSKIY, G. I. 1851. Opisanie khivinskogo khanstva [Description of the Khanate of Khiva]. *ZIRGO*, pp. 62–159. St Petersburg.
- DAVIDOFF, N. 2002. *Journal de Nathan Davidoff*. Paris.
- DEMKO, G. 1969. *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896–1916*. Bloomington, Ind.
- DIL'MUKHAMEDOV, E.; MALIKOV, F. 1963. *Ocherki istorii rabochivo klassa do revolyutsionogo Kazakhstana*. Alma-Ata.
- DMITRIEV-MAMONOV, A. I. 1903. *Putevoditel' po Turkestanu i Sredne-Aziatskoy zheleznoy dorogi* [Guide to Turkistan and the Central Asian Railway]. St Petersburg.

- EPIFANOVA, L. M. 1965. *Rukopisnye istochniki Instituta vostokovedeniya AN UZSSR*. Tashkent. *Ezhegodnik Ferganskoy oblasti* [Yearbook of Ferghana Oblast'], Vol. 1. 1902. Novy Marghilan.
- FRIDMAN, Ts. 1960. *Inostranniy kapital v dorevolutsionnom Kazakhstane*. Alma-Ata. *Frunze. Entsiklopediya*. 1984. Frunze.
- GOLENDER, B. 2002. *Okno v proshloe, Turkestan na starinnykh pochtovykh otkrytkakh 1898–1917* [A Window on the Past. Turkistan through Postcards, 1898–1917]. Tashkent.
- GULYAMOV, I. G. 1957. *Istoriya orosheniya Khorezma s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney* [History of Irrigation in Khwarazm from Antiquity to the Present Day]. Tashkent.
- Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR* [History of the Uzbek SSR]. 1956. Tashkent.
- IVANOV, V. A. 1974. *Spiski rukopisey bukharskoy kolleksii*. In: *Pis'mennye pamyatniki vostoka*. Moscow.
- KAPPELER, A. 1994. *La Russie, empire multiethnique*. Paris.
- Katalog monet Kokanda XVIII–XIX vv.* [Catalogue of Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Coinage of Kokand]. 1994. Tashkent.
- KHANIKOFF, N. de. 1851. *Mémoire sur la partie méridionale de l'Asie. Recueil de voyages et de mémoires*, pp. 239–451. Paris.
- Khlopkovodstvo v Tajikistane* [Cotton Production in Tajikistan]. 1926. Tashkent.
- Kirgizkiy kray*. 1903. St Petersburg.
- KOECHLIN, R. 2002. *Voyage en Asie centrale, Paris–Samarkand*. Strasbourg. Repr. of 1888 ed.
- KOSTENKO, L. F. 1890. *Srednyaya Aziya i vodvorenje v ney russkoy grazhdanstvennosti* [Central Asia and the Establishment of Russian Citizenship There]. St Petersburg.
- LAVROV, M. V. 1916. *Turkestan. Geografiya i istoriya kraya* [Turkistan. Geography and History of this Region]. 2nd ed. Moscow/Petrograd.
- LOGOFET, D. N. 1911. *Bukharskoe khanstvo pod russkim protektoratom* [The Khanate of Bukhara under the Russian Protectorate]. St Petersburg.
- MASAL'SKIY, V. I. 1913. *Turkestanskiy kray*. St Petersburg.
- MASANOV, N. 1995. *Kochevaya tsivilizatsiya Kazakhov* [The Nomadic Civilization of the Kazakhs]. Moscow.
- Materialy po kirgizskomu zemlepol'zovaniyu, Ferganskaya oblast', Andizhanskiy uezd* [Materials on the Agrarian Economy of the Kazakhs, Ferghana Oblast', Andijan Uezd]. 1913. Tashkent.
- Materialy po kirgizskomu zemlepol'zovaniyu, Syr-Dar'inskaya oblast', Perovskiy uezd* [Materials on the Agrarian Economy of the Kazakhs, Syr Darya Oblast', Perovsk Uezd]. 1912. Tashkent.
- Materialy po obsledovaniyu tuzemnogo i russkogo starozhil'cheskogo khozyaystva i zemlepol'zovaniya v Semirechenskoy oblasti* [Materials on the Inspectorate of Agriculture and Water Use in Semirechye Oblast' by the Indigenous Population and the First Russian Inhabitants], Vol. 7: *Pishpekskiy uezd* [Pishpek Uezd]. 1916. Petrograd.
- MOSER, H. 1885. *A travers l'Asie centrale*. Paris.
- . 1894. *L'irrigation en Asie centrale, étude géographique et économique*. Paris.
- MUKHIDDINOV, I. 1975. *Zemledelie pamirskikh Tajikov Vakhana i Ishkashima v XIX–nachale XX vv, istoriko-etnograficheskiy ocherk* [The Agriculture of the Vakhani and Ishkashimi Tajiks in the Pamirs, Historic-Ethnographic Essay, Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries]. Moscow.
- Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1958 godu* [The Agriculture of the USSR in 1958]. 1959. Moscow.
- Obzor Ferganskoy oblasti za 1897* [Panorama of Ferghana Oblast' for the Year 1897]. 1899. Novy Marghilan.
- Obzor Syr-Dar'inskoy oblasti za 1904* [Panorama of Syr Darya Oblast' for the Year 1904]. 1906. Tashkent.

- Opisanie nizov'ev Syr-Dar'i* [Description of the Lower Course of the Syr Darya]. 1856. St Petersburg.
- PAHLEN, K. K. 1964. *Mission to Turkestan. Being the Memoirs of Count K. K. Pahlen, 1908–1909*. London.
- POUJOL, C. 1989. La construction du chemin de fer transcaspien au Turkestan de 1880 à 1917: reflet des mentalités et conséquences. *Innovations technologiques et mentalités*, pp. 187–206. Paris.
- . 1993. Approaches to the History of the Bukharan Jews' Settlement in the Fergana Valley, 1867–1917. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12 (4). Oxford.
- Pozemel'no-podatnoe delo* [Land-Tax Regulations]. 1910. St Petersburg.
- RAKHIMOV, M. 1984. *Istoriya Fergany* [History of Ferghana]. Tashkent.
- ROZHKOVA, M. K. 1963. *Ekonomicheskie svyazi Rossii so Sredney Aziei, 40–60-e gody XIX veka* [Russian Economic Links with Central Asia in the 1840s–1860s]. Moscow.
- RUSINOV, V. V. 1918. *Vodozemel'nye otnosheniya i obshchina u Turkmen* [Hydraulic Relations and Community Among the Turkmens]. Tashkent.
- Sbornik materialov dlya statistiki Syr-dar'inskoy oblasti* [Collection of Statistical Data on Syr Darya Oblast'], Vol. 13. 1907. Tashkent.
- SHKAPSKIY, O. 1900. *Amu-Dar'inskie ocherki, k agrarnomu voprosu na nizhney Amu Dar'e* [Essays on the Amu Darya, the Agrarian Question in the Lower Valley of the River]. Tashkent.
- SUVOROV, V. 1962. *Istoriko-ekonomicheskiy ocherk razvitiya Turkestana* [About the Historical and Economic Development of Turkistan]. Tashkent.
- TROITSKAYA, A. L. 1968. *Katalog arkhiva kokandskikh khanov XIX v* [Catalogue of the Archives of the Khans of Kokand in the Nineteenth Century]. Moscow.
- Trudy khlopkovago soveshaniya 27–29 dekabrya 1914 g. v gor. Tashkent* [Materials of the Assembly Devoted to Cotton of 27–29 December 1914 in the City of Tashkent]. 1915. Tashkent.
- UYFALVY DE MEZO-KOVESD, C. 1878–1880. *Expédition scientifique française en Russie, en Sibérie et dans le Turkestan*, Vols. 1–6. Paris.
- VITKIND, N. Ya. 1929. *Bibliografiya po Sredney Azii. Ukazatel' literatury po kolonyal'noy politike tsarizma v Sredney Azii* [Bibliography on Central Asia. A Bibliographical Index on Colonial Tsarist Policy in Central Asia]. Moscow.
- WOEIKOF, A. 1914. *Le Turkestan russe*. Paris.

CHAPTER 3

- ABRAMZON, S. M. 1990. *Kirgizy i ikh etnogeneticheskie i istoriko-kul'turnye svyazi*. Bishkek.
- ADAMEC, L. W. 1997. *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*. 2nd ed. Langham, Md./London.
- Afghanistan. A Country Study*. 1997. Ed. P. R. Blood. Washington, D.C. Website: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/aftoc.html>.
- AMREKULOV, N.; MASANOV, N. 1994. *Kazakhstan mejdu proshlym i budushchim*. Almaty.
- BACON, E. 1966. *Central Asians under Russian Rule. A Study in Culture Change*. New York.
- BARTOL'D, V. V. 1927. *Istoriya kul'turnoy zhizni Turkestana*. Leningrad.
- . 1963. *Istoriya kul'turnoy zhizni Turkestana*. Moscow.
- BEKMAKHANOVA, N. E. 1986. *Mnogonatsional'noe naselenie Kazakhstana i Kirghizii v epokhu kapitalizma (60-e gody XIX v.–1917)*. Moscow.
- BOTIAKOV, Yu. M. 1990. Nekotorye aspekty protsessa sedentarizatsii nomadizatsii u Turkmenov v seredine XIX veka. In: *Etnograficheskie aspekty traditsionnoy voennoy organizatsii narodov Kavkaza i Tsentral'noy Azii*, Vol. 1, pp. 70–89. Moscow.

- BREGEL', Yu. E. 1961. *Khorezmskie Turkomeny v XIX veke* [Khorezm Turkmens in the Nineteenth Century]. Moscow.
- BURKI, Sh. J. 1991. *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan*. Metuchen, N.J./London.
- Central Asia. 130 Years of Russian Dominance. A Historical Overview*. 1994. Ed. E. Allworth. 3rd ed. Durham/London.
- GAFUROV, B. 1964. *Istoriya Tajikov*, Vol. 2. Moscow.
- Iran. A Country Study*. 1987. Ed. H. Chapin Metz. Washington, D.C. Website: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html>.
- Istoriya Kazakhstana: Narody i kul'tury*. 2001. Eds. N. E. Masanov, Zh. B. Abylkhozhin, I. V. Erofeeva, A. N. Alekseenko and G. S. Baratova. Almaty.
- Istoriya Kirgizii*. 1956. Vol. 1. Eds. M. P. Viatkin, B. Jamgerchinov and A. P. Okladnikov. Frunze.
- Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*. 1947. Vol. 2. Eds. S. V. Bakhrushin, V. Ya. Nepomnina and V. A. Shishkina. Tashkent.
- KADYROV, Sh. 1955. *Otchoty i zapiski Chokana Valikhanova o puteshestviyah kak istochnik dlya istorii Kirgizii. Uchonye zapiski istoricheskogo fakulteta*, Vol. 4, pp. 3–27. Frunze.
- KHAZANOV, A. 1994. *Nomads and the Outside World*. 2nd ed. Madison, Wis.
- KRONGARDT, G. K. 1997. *Naselenie Kyrgyzstana vo vtoroy polovine XIX–nachale XX v. (Formirovanie, sostav, vzaimosvyazi i vzaimootnosheniya etnosov)* [Population of Kyrgyzstan in the Second Half of the Nineteenth–Early Twentieth Century (Formation, Structure, Interconnections and Interrelations of Ethnoses)]. Bishkek.
- LAZZERINI, E. 1992. Beyond Renewal: The *Jadid* Response to Pressure for Change in the Modern Age. In: J.-A. Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia, Expressions of Identity and Change*, pp. 151–66. Durham/London.
- LIPOVSKY, I. 1995. Central Asian Cotton Epic. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 529–42. London.
- LOMAKIN, A. 1993. *Obychnoe pravo Turkmen*. Ashgabat.
- MARKOV, G. E. 2001. The Social Structure of Nomads of Asia and Africa. In: *Studies on Central Asian History in Honor of Yuri Bregel*. Ed. D. DeWeese. Bloomington, Ind.
- Mongolia. A Country Study*. 1989. Ed. R. L. Worden and A. Matles Savada. Washington, D.C. Website: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/mntoc.html>.
- NALIVKIN, V. P. 1886. *Kratkaya istoriya Kokandskogo khanstva*. Kazan.
- Pakistan. A Country Study*. 1994. Ed. P. Blood. Washington, D.C.
- RASSUDOVA, R. Ya. 1990. Ocherki organizatsii voyska v Bukharskom i Kokandskom khanstvakh (XIX v.) In: *Etnograficheskie aspekty traditsionnoy voennoy organizatsii narodov Kavkaza i Tsentral'noy Azii*, Vol. 2, pp. 31–48. Moscow.
- ROY, O. 1992. Ethnic Identity and Political Expression in Northern Afghanistan. In: J.-A. Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia. Expressions of Identity and Change*. Durham/ London.
- SOUCEK, S. 2001. *A History of Inner Asia*. Cambridge.
- SUKHAREVA, O. A. 1996. *Bukhara. XIX–nachalo XX vv. (Pozdnefeodal'niy gorod i ego nasele-nie)*. Moscow.
- TURSUNBAEV, A. B. 1973. Perekhod k osedlosti kochevnikov i polukochevnikov Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana. In: *Ocherki po istorii khozyatsva narodov Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana*. Leningrad.

CHAPTER 5

- ABDULLAEV, R. M. 1992. Turkestanskies progressisty i natsional'noe dvizhenie [Turkistan Progressives and the National Movements]. *Zvezda Vostoka* [Star of the East], No. 1. Tashkent.

- . 1998. *Natsional'nye politicheskie organizatsii Turkestana v 1917–1918 gg. Avtoreferat* [National Political Organizations of Turkistan in 1917–1918. Summary]. Tashkent.
- ABDURAKHIMOVA, N. A.; RUSTAMOVA, G. 1999. *Kolonial'naya sistema vlasti v Turkestane vo vtoroy polovine XIX–pervoy chetverti XX vv.* [The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan from the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century to the First Quarter of the Twentieth]. Tashkent.
- ALIMOVA, D. A. 1996. Istoricheskoe mirovozzrenie jadidov i ikh proektsiya budushchego Turkestana [The Historical World Outlook of the Jadids and Their Projection of Turkistan's Future]. In: *Turkiston mustakilligi va birligi uchun kurash sakhifalaridan* [Pages from the Struggle for Turkistan's Independence and Unity]. Tashkent.
- BENDRIKOV, K. E. 1960. *Ocherki po istorii narodnogo obrazovaniya v Turkestane (1865–1924)* [Studies on the History of Education in Turkistan (1865–1924)]. Moscow.
- Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Tashkent.
- Central State Archives (TsGA), coll. I–3, inv. 2, file 60, fol. 219: *O polozhenii i nastroyenii umov mestnogo naseleniya* [On the Situation and Mood of the Local Population]. Tashkent.
- DMITRIEV, G. L. 1976. *Depesha E. Skailer i problemy srednaziatskoy politiki tsarizma 70-kh gg. XIX v.* [E. Skailer's Dispatch and the Problems of Tsarism's Central Asian Policy in the 1870s]. Collection of Scientific Works of Tashkent State University, No. 517. Tashkent.
- DOBROMYSLOV, A. I. 1912. *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoyashchem* [Tashkent Past and Present]. Tashkent.
- Donesenie Kryzhanovskogo – Milyutinu ot 31 dekabrya 1865 g.* [Report by Kryzhanovsky to Milyutin of 31 December 1865].
- GEIER, I. I. 1908. *Putevoditel' po Turkestanu* [Guidebook to Turkistan]. Tashkent.
- GIRS, F. K. 1888. *Otchot po revizii Turkestanskogo kraya* [Report on the Audit of Turkistan Kray]. St Petersburg.
- GUBAREVICH-RADOBYLSKY, A. F. 1912. *Znachenie Turkestana v torgovle s sopredel'nymi stranami Sredney Azii* [The Importance of Turkistan in Trade with Neighbouring Countries of Central Asia]. St Petersburg.
- IGNATYEV, N. P. 1897. *Missiya v Khivu i Bukharu v 1858 g.* [The Mission to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858]. St Petersburg.
- ILYASOV, S. I. 1963. *Zemel'nye otnosheniya v Kirgizii v kontse XIX–nach. XX vv.* [Land Relations in Kirghizia from the End of the Nineteenth Century to the Beginning of the Twentieth]. Frunze.
- Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii* [History of Kazakhstan and Central Asia]. 2001. Almaty.
- KASATKIN, A. O. 1907. O shelkovodstve v Fergane [On Silk Production in Ferghana]. *Turkestanskoe sel'skoe khozyaystvo* [Agriculture in Turkistan], No. 4.
- KRIVOSHEIN, A. V. 1912a. (Notes of the Chief Superintendent). *Prolozhenie k vsepoddayshemu dokladu* [Appendix to the Most Humble Report]. St Petersburg.
- . 1912b. *Zapiski glavnoupravlyayushchego zemleustroystvom i zemledeliem o poezdke v Turkestanskiy kray v 1912 g.* [Notes of the Chief Superintendent of Land Organization and Agriculture on a Visit to Turkistan Kray in 1912]. St Petersburg.
- LUNIN, B. V. 1962. *Nauchnye obshchestva Turkestana i ikh progressivnaya deyatel'nost' (konets XIX–nachalo XX vv.)* [Scientific Societies of Turkistan and Their Progressive Activities (End of the Nineteenth Century to the Beginning of the Twentieth)]. Tashkent.
- ORAZAEV, F. M. (compiler). 1995. *Tsarskaya kolonizatsiya v Kazakhstane (po materialam russkoy periodicheskoy pechati)* [The Tsarist Colonization of Kazakhstan (from Material in the Periodical Press)]. Almaty.
- PAHLEN, K. K. 1964. *Mission to Turkestan. Being the Memoirs of Count K. K. Pahlen, 1908–1909.* London.

- PALEN, K. K. 1910a. *Otchot po revizii Turkestanskogo kraya. Pozemel'no-podatnoe ustroystvo*. [Report on the Audit of Turkistan Kray. Organization of Land Taxation]. St Petersburg.
- . 1910b. *Sel'skoe upravlenie, russkoe i tuzemnoe* [Rural Government, Russian and Native]. St Petersburg.
- . 1910c. *Vsepoddaneyshaya zapiska, sodержashchaya glavnye vygody otchota* [Most Humble Notes Containing the Main Benefits of the Report]. St Petersburg.
- POTAPOVA, N. Yu. 2002. *Istoriya predprinimatel'stva v Turkestane (vtoraya polovina XIX–nachala XX vv.) Avtoreferat dissertatsii*. [History of Business in Turkistan (Second Half of the Nineteenth Century to the Beginning of the Twentieth)]. (Summary of a dissertation.) Tashkent.
- Russkie uchonye-issledovateli Sredney Azii – Sbornik dokumentov* [Russian Scientists and Researchers of Central Asia – Collection of Documents], Vol. 1, 1956; Vol. 2, 1958. Tashkent.
- SKOBELEV, M. D. 1909. *Statisticheskiy obzor Ferganskoy oblasti za 1907 g.* [Statistical Review of Ferghana Oblast' for 1907]. Tashkent.
- . 1912. *Statisticheskiy obzor Ferganskoy oblasti za 1910 g.* [Statistical Review of Ferghana Oblast' for 1910]. Tashkent.
- . 1924. *Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik TSSR 1917–1923* [Statistical Annual of the Turkmen SSR]. TP, Part 1. Tashkent.
- TATISHCHEV, S. S. 1911. *Imperator Aleksandr II, ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie* [Emperor Alexander II, His Life and Reign], Vol. 2. St Petersburg.
- Tsirkulyar K. P. Kaufman ot 21 dekabrya 1876 g. 'O rasshirenii vlasti uezdnykh nachal'nikov'* [K. P. Kaufman's Circular of 21 December 1876, 'On Extending the Powers of the Uezd Chiefs'].
Turkestanskiy kray. Sbornik materialov po istorii ego zavoevaniya. Sobral polkovnik A. G. Serebrennikov; Donesenie Kryzhanovskogo – milyutinu ot 31 dekabrya 1865 g. [Turkistan Kray. Collection of Material about the History of its Conquest. Collected by Colonel A. G. Serebrennikov]. 1865. Vol. 20, Part 2. Tashkent.
- VEKSELMAN, M. I. 1987. *Rossiyskiy monopolisticheskiy i innostranniy kapital v Sredney Azii* [Russian Monopoly and Foreign Capital in Central Asia]. Tashkent.

CHAPTER 6

- ABDULLAYEV, K. N. 1991. Bukharskaya poslerevoliutsionnaya emigratsiya [Emigration from Bukhara after the Revolution]. In: *Oktiabr'skaya revoliutsiya v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane: Teoriya, problemy, perspektivy izucheniya* [The October Revolution in Central Asia: Theory, Problems, Prospects for Research]. Tashkent.
- ALEKSEYENKOV, P. 1931. *Kokandskaya avtonomiya* [The Kokand Autonomous Government]. Tashkent.
- The Archives of the Apparatus of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (AAP RUz). Tashkent.
- Central State Archives (TsGA) of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Tashkent.
- CHOQAY OGHLI, M. 1992. *Istiqlāl jallādlari* [The Executioners of Our Independence]. (In Uzbek.) Tashkent.
- Dvenadsatiy syezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskiy otchot* [Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Records]. 1968. Moscow.
- El bairaq*. (Newspaper.) Kokand.
- M. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny. Sbornik dokumentov* [M. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts. Collection of Documents]. 1941. Moscow.

- Gosudarstvenniy arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii (GARF) [State Archives of the Russian Federation]. *Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii* [History of Kazakhstan and Central Asia]. 2001. Almaty.
- Istoriya Kazakhstana i Tsentral'noy Azii: Uchebnoe posobie* [History of Kazakhstan and Central Asia: Study Aid]. 2001. Almaty.
- Istoriya Khorezmskoy narodnoy sovetsoy respubliki. Sbornik dokumentov* [History of the Khwarazm People's Soviet Republic. Collection of Documents]. 1976. Tashkent.
- Istoriya kommunisticheskoy organizatsii Sredney Azii* [History of the Communist Organization of Central Asia]. 1967. Tashkent.
- Kengash*. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.
- Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana v rezoliutsiyakh syezdov i konferentsiy* [The Communist Party of Turkistan in the Resolutions of Congresses and Conferences]. 1987. Tashkent.
- MUNAWWAR QARI. 2001. *Jadidchilik tarikhidan lawhalar* [Pages from the History of Jadidism]. (In Uzbek.) Tashkent.
- Najāt*. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.
- Narodnoe khoziaystvo Sredney Azii*, No. 4. 1924. Tashkent.
- Nasha gazeta*. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.
- Pervaya konstitutsiya SSSR (konstitutsiya SSSR 1924 goda)* [The First Constitution of the USSR (the 1924 Constitution of the USSR)]. 1948. Moscow.
- Pobeda oktiabr'skoy revoliutsii v Uzbekistane* [The Victory of the October Revolution in Uzbekistan], *Sbornik dokumentov* [Collection of Documents], Vol. 1, 1963; Vol. 2, 1972. Tashkent.
- Pobeda sovetsoy vlasti v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane* [The Victory of Soviet Power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan]. 1967. Tashkent.
- Pobeda velikoy oktiabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revoliutsii v Turkestane* [The Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Turkistan], *Sbornik dokumentov* [Collection of Documents]. 1947. Tashkent.
- Programmnye dokumenty musul'manskikh politicheskikh partiy (1917–1920)* [Programme Documents of the Muslim Political Parties (1917–1920)]. 1985. Oxford.
- Protokoly syezda delegatov ispolnitel'nykh komitetov Turkestanskogo kraya* [Records of the Congress of Delegates of Executive Committees of Turkistan Kray]. 1917. Tashkent.
- Qazāq*. (Newspaper.) Orenburg.
- RAJABOV, K. K. 1995. *Istiklolchilik kharakati v Ferganskoy doline: sushchnost' i osnovnye etapy razvitiya (1918–1924 gg.)* [The *Istiqlālchilik Harakati* (Independence Movement) in the Fergana Valley: Basic Facts and Stages of Development (1918–1924)]. Ph.D. thesis. Tashkent.
- Russian Centre for the Conservation and Study of Documents concerning Recent History & RTsKhIDNI). Moscow.
- Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). Moscow.
- Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsii, zakliuchonnykh RSFSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami* [Collection of Treaties, Agreements and Conventions in Force Concluded by the RSFSR with Foreign States], Vol. 2. 1921. Moscow.
- Svobodniy Samarkand*. (Newspaper.) Samarkand.
- Syezdy sovetov RSFSR i avtonomnykh respublik RSFSR* [Congresses of Soviets of the RSFSR and Autonomous Republics of the RSFSR], *Sbornik dokumentov 1917–1922* [Collection of Documents 1917–1922], Vol. 1. 1959. Moscow.
- Tashkent State Archive. Tashkent.
- Turkestanskije vedomosti*. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.
- Turkestanskiy vestnik*. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.

Turkistan v nachale XX veka: K istorii istokov natsional'noy nezavisimosti [Turkistan at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: On the History of the Sources of National Independence]. 2000. Tashkent.

Ulūgh Turkistān. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.

ZEVELEV, A. I. 1972. *Iz istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane* [From the History of the Civil War in Uzbekistan]. 1972. Tashkent.

CHAPTER 7

AINI S. 1925. *Obraztsy tajikskoy literatury* [Models of Tajik Literature]. (In Tajik, Arabic script.) Moscow.

———. 1971. *Sobranie sochineniy v shesti tomakh* [Collection of Works in Six Volumes], Vol. 1. Moscow. 6 vols.

———. 1987. *Istoriya Bukharskoy revolyutsii* [History of the Bukharan Revolution]. (In Tajik.) Dushanbe.

ASIRI, T. Khoja. 1960. *Izbrannoe* [Selected Works]. (In Tajik.) Stalinabad.

BENNIGSEN, A. 1992. Ismail bey Gasprinsky i vozniknovenie jadidizma v Rossii [Gasprinsky and the Rise of Jadidism in Russia]. In: *Etnograficheskoe obozrenie* [Ethnographic Review], Vol. 6.

BERDYAEV, N. 1990. *Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma* [The Sources and Meaning of Russian Communism]. Moscow.

BERTELS, Ye. E. 1936. *Rukopisi proizvedeniy Akhmada Kalle* [Manuscripts of the Works of Ahmad Kalle]. In: *Trudy Tajikskoy bazy ANSSSR*, Vol. 3. Dushanbe.

BEYSEMBIEV, K. 1976. *Ocherki istorii obshchestvenno-politicheskoy mysli Kazakhstana (dorevolutsionniy period)* [Essays on the History of Socio-Political Thought in Kazakhstan (Pre-Revolutionary Period)]. Alma-Ata.

Chokan Valikhanov i sovremennost' [Chokan Valikhanov and His Contemporaries]. 1988. Alma-Ata.

Dialog. No. 7. 1991. Tashkent.

DONISH A. 1959a. *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* [Selected Works]. (In Tajik.) Stalinabad.

———. 1959b. *Kratkaya istoriya dinastii Mangytov* [Short History of the Manghit Dynasty]. (In Tajik.) Stalinabad.

———. 1960. *Puteshestvie iz Bukhary v Peterburg* [Journey from Bukhara to St Petersburg]. Dushanbe.

———. 1988. *Redchayshie proisshestiya* [The Rarest Occurrences]. Dushanbe. 2 vols.

DZHABAROV, Sh. 1929. Protiv izvrashcheniya natsionalnoy politiki [Against the Distortion of Nationalities Policy]. *Za Partiyu* [For the Party], Nos. 3–4. Moscow.

Ismail bey Gasprinsky. Mysli, zametki i nablyudeniya musul'manina [A Muslim's Thoughts, Notes and Observations]. 1881. Simferopol. Repr. Oxford, *Series*, No. 6.

Istoriya filosofii v SSSR [History of Philosophy in the USSR], Vol. 3, 1968; Vol. 4, 1971. Moscow.

Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR [History of the Uzbek SSR]. 1956. Vol. 1, Book 2. Tashkent.

KUNANBAEV, A. 1961. *Sobranie sochineniy v odnom tome* [Collected Works in One Volume]. Alma-Ata.

MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. 1961. *Sochineniya* [Works], Vol. 19. Moscow.

Materialy po istorii progressivnoy obshchestvenno-filosofskoy mysli v Uzbekistane [Material on the History of Progressive Socio-Philosophical Thought in Uzbekistan]. 1967. 2nd ed. Tashkent.

- MIRZA AZIMI SAMI. 1962. *Istoriya Mangytskoy dinasti. Predislovie, perevod i primechaniya L. M. Yepifanovoy* [History of the Manghit Dynasty. Foreword, tr. and notes by L. M. Epifanova]. Moscow.
- MIRZA SIRAJ HAKIM. 1992. *Podarok zhitelyam Bukhary* [A Gift to the Inhabitants of Bukhara]. Dushanbe.
- MUMINOV, I. 1957. *Iz istorii razvitiya obshchestvenno-filosofskoy mysli v Uzbekistane kontsa XIX–nachala XX v.* [From the History of the Development of Progressive Socio-Philosophical Thought in Uzbekistan from the End of the Nineteenth to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century]. Tashkent.
- NAZAROV, Kh. 1993. *Said Jamaladdin Afgani i ego obshchestvenno-politicheskaya shkola* [Afghani and his Socio-Political School]. Dushanbe.
- Ocherki istorii filosofskoy i obshchestvenno-politicheskoy mysli v Turkmenistane* [Essays on the History of Philosophical and Socio-Political Thought in Turkmenistan]. 1970. Ashkhabad.
- PLEKHANOV, G. V. 1925. *Istoriya russkoy obshchestvennoy mysli* [History of Russian Social Thought], Book 2. Moscow/Leningrad.
- . 1989. Otkrytoe pis'mo k Petrogradskim rabochim [Open Letter to the Workers of Petrograd]. *Voprosy istorii* [Questions of History], No. 12. Moscow.
- RADZHABOV, Z. 1957. *Iz istorii obshchestvenno-politicheskoy mysli tajikskogo naroda vo vtoroy polovine XIX i v nachale XX vv.* [From the History of Socio-Political Thought of the Tajik People in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century and at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century]. Stalinabad.
- Sadā-i sharq* [Voice of the Orient]. No. 1. 1989.
- SAFAROV, G. 1921. *Kolonial'naya revolyutsiya (opyt Turkestana)* [The Colonial Revolution (The Turkestan Experiment)]. Moscow.
- Sovremennaya filosofskaya i sotsiologicheskaya mysl' stran Vostoka* [Modern Philosophical and Sociological Thought in the Countries of the East]. 1965. Moscow.
- VALIKHANOV, Ch. *Sobranie sochineniy v pyati tomakh* [Collected Works in Five Volumes], Vol. 1, 1984; Vol. 4, 1985. Alma-Ata.
- VÁMBÉRY, A. 1886. *Arminius Vambéry: His Life and Adventures*. London.
- . 1912. *Kul'turnoe dvizhenie sredi russkikh* [The Cultural Movement among the Russians]. St Petersburg.

CHAPTER 9

- AKRAMOV, E. A.; TAIROV, E. A. 1998. *Ekonomicheskie reformy Respubliki Uzbekistan* [Economic Reform in the Republic of Uzbekistan]. Moscow.
- AMINOVA, R. K. 1995. *Vozvrashchayas' k istorii kollektivizatsii v Uzbekistane* [Returning to the History of Collectivization in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- Aral prosit pomoshchi* [The Aral Sea Requests Help]. 1987. Tashkent.
- Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Tashkent.
- Archives of the Apparatus of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Tashkent.
- Blagosostoyanie naroda – zabota gosudarstva* [The Wellbeing of the People Is the State's Concern], February 2002. Tashkent.
- Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Tashkent.
- Current Archive of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population. Report Current Archive of the *Oliy Majlis* of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 2001. *Spravka otdela organizatsionnoy raboty* [Information from the Organization Department]. Tashkent.

- Doklad o chelovecheskom razvitii Uzbekistana* [Report on Human Development in Uzbekistan]. 1999. Tashkent.
- Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie* [Economic Review], September 2001.
- Ekonomika i statistika* [Economics and Statistics]. No. 10. 1997. Tashkent.
- Ekonomiya i jizn'* [Economy and Life]. No. 5. 1990. Tashkent.
- GOLOVANOV, A. A.; INATOV, M. N. 1997. *Tragediya forsirovannoy kollektivizatsii v Uzbekistane* [The Tragedy of Forced Collectivization in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- GOLOVANOV, A.; TURSUNOV, S. 1993. *V plenu utopicheskogo myshleniya* [Prisoner of Utopian Thinking]. Tashkent.
- GULYAMOV, S.; SALIMOV, O.; USMANOV, K.; GANIYEV, D. 2001. *Asrlarga tenz yillar* [Years Equal to Centuries]. (In Uzbek.) Tashkent.
- ILYUKHIN, V. 1993. *Oborotni. Kak bylo nadumano 'Uzbekskoe delo'* [Werewolves. How the 'Uzbek Case' was Thought Up]. Tashkent.
- Istoriya Uzbekistana* [History of Uzbekistan]. 1995. Tashkent.
- Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnego plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyastva SSSR* [Results of the Fulfilment of the USSR's Second Five-Year Development Plan]. 1939. Moscow.
- KARIMOV, I. A. 1996. *Uzbekistan: natsional'naya nezavisimost', ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* [Uzbekistan: National Independence, Economy, Politics, Ideology]. Tashkent.
- . 1999. *Uzbekistan, ustremlyenniy v XXI vek* [Uzbekistan Looking Towards the Twenty-first Century]. Tashkent.
- Khalk Suzi* [People's Word]. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.
- KIM, P. 1993. *Koreytsi Respubliki Uzbekistan* [The Koreans of the Republic of Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- Konstitutsiya Uzbekskoy SSR* [Constitution of the Uzbek SSR]. 1937. Tashkent.
- MELNIKOVA, T. S. 1956. *Formirovanie promyshlennykh kadrov v Uzbekistane* [The Formation of Industrial Cadres in Uzbekistan]. 1956. Tashkent.
- MULLADZHANOV, I. 1989. *Naselenie Uzbekskoy SSR. Spravochnik* [Population of the Uzbek SSR. A Handbook]. Tashkent.
- Narodnoe khozyaystvo Respubliki Uzbekistan v 1993 godu. Spravochnik* [National Economy of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 1993. Statistical Collection]. 1994. Tashkent.
- Narodnoe khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR v 1980 g. Statezhagodnik* [National Economy of the Uzbek SSR in 1980. Statistical Yearbook]. 1981. Tashkent.
- Narodnoe khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR v 1985 g. Statezhagodnik* [National Economy of the Uzbek SSR in 1985. Statistical Yearbook]. 1986. Tashkent.
- Narodnoe khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR za 50 let. Sbornik statmaterialov* [National Economy of the Uzbek SSR over 50 Years. Collection of Statistical Material]. 1967. Tashkent.
- Narodnoe khozyaystvo Uzbekskoy SSR za 70 let sovietskoy vlasti Yubiley Statezhagodnik* [National Economy of the Uzbek SSR over 70 Years of Soviet Power. Jubilee Statistical Yearbook]. 1987. Tashkent.
- Narodnoe obrazovanie i kul'tura v SSSR. Statezhagodnik* [People's Education and Culture in the USSR. Statistical Yearbook]. 1989. Moscow.
- Narodnoe Slovo* [People's Word]. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.
- Pravda Vostoka* [Pravda of the East]. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.
- Press-byuleten' Apparata Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistana* [Press Bulletin of the Apparatus of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan], No. 3. 1992. Tashkent.

- Privatizatsiya v Uzbekistane. Po itogam 2000 goda (Ezhekvaral'niy otchot)* [Privatization in Uzbekistan. Results of 2000 (Quarterly Report)]. 2001. Tashkent, State Property Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
- RABICH, R. G. 1991. *Formirovanie i razvitie sotsial'no-klassovoy struktury Uzbekistana* [The Formation and Development of Uzbekistan's Social and Class Structure]. Tashkent.
- Sel'skoe khozyaystvo Uzbekistana* [Uzbekistan's Agriculture]. No. 6. 1995. Tashkent.
- Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khozyaystvo SSSR. Sbor statmaterialov* [Socialist Agriculture in the USSR. A Collection of Statistical Material]. 1937. Moscow.
- Soviet Uzbekistoni* [Soviet Uzbekistan]. (Newspaper.) Tashkent.
- Sovietskiy Uzbekistan za 40 let. Statsbornik* [Soviet Uzbekistan over 40 Years. Statistical Collection]. 1964. Tashkent.
- Sovietskoe stroitel'stvo i pravo* [Soviet Organization and Law]. Nos. 3–4. 1933.
- Tashkent Regional State Archives*. Tashkent.
- Uzbekistan v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny* [Uzbekistan in the Years of the Great Patriotic War]. 1966. Tashkent.
- Uzbekistan v tsifrah. 1999 g. Kratkiy statsbornik* [Uzbekistan in Figures. 1999. Short Statistical Collection]. 2000. Tashkent.
- Uzbekistan za gody nezavisimosti. Ekonomicheskii obzor za 1991–1996 gg.* [Uzbekistan in the Years of Independence. Economic Review of 1991–1996]. 1996. Tashkent.
- Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta UzSSR* [Gazette of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet], No. 4 (1180). 1991. Tashkent.
- Yestestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniya Respubliki Uzbekistan za 1999 god. Statezhgodnik* [Natural Movement of the Population of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 1999. Statistical Yearbook]. 2000. Tashkent.

CHAPTER 10

- MASANOV, N. E.; ABYLKHOZHIN, Zh. B.; EROFEEVA, I. V.; ALEKSEENKO, A. N.; BARATOVA, G. S. (eds.). 2001. *Istoriya Kazakhstana: Narody i kul'tury*. Almaty.

CHAPTER 11

- ABRAMZON, S. M. 1990. *Kirgizy i ikh etnogeneticheskie i istoriko-kul'turnye svyazi*. Bishkek.
- ASANKANOV, A.; OSMONOV, O. 2002. *Istoriya Kyrgyzstana s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney*. Bishkek.
- ASLUND, A. 2001. The Myth of Collapse after Communism. Working Papers. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, No. 18. Washington, D.C.
- BAKTYGULOV, J.; MOMBEKOVA, J. 1999. *Istoriya Kirgizov i Kyrgyzstana s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney*. Bishkek.
- BARTOL'D, V. V. 1927. *Istoriya kul'turnoy zhizni Turkestana*. Leningrad.
- CHOTONOV, U.; NUR UULU, D. (eds.). 1998. *Istoriya Kyrgyzstana: XX vek*. Bishkek.
- ISKAKOV, M.; TABYSHALIEVA, A. 2002. Cold Winters Upstream. Dry Summers Downstream in Central Asia. *Analyst Newsletter*. Central Asian Caucasus Institute. School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 30 January 2002. Washington, D.C. Website: http://cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=48.
- Istoriya Kirgizii*. 1956. Vol. 1. Eds. M. P. Viatkin, B. Jamgerchinov and A. P. Okladnikov. Frunze.
- Istoriya Kirgizskoy SSR*. 1968. Vol. 1. Eds. B. D. Jamgerchinov, M. P. Viatkin, V. M. Griaznov, S. Iliasov, P. N. Kojemaiko and K. Usenbaev. Frunze.

- Istoriya Kirgizskoy SSR*. 1967. Vol. 2, Part 1 (1917–1937). Eds. A. G. Zima, K. K. Karakeev (chief ed.), C. K. Kerimbaev, K. K. Orozaliev, S. T. Tabyshaliev and V. P. Sherstobitov. Frunze.
- Kirgiziya v tsifrakh*. 1963. Statisticheskiy sbornik. Frunze.
- KOYCHUEV, T. (ed.). 1995. *Istoriya Kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstana: Uchebnoe posobie dlya vuzov*. Bishkek.
- KOYCHUEV, T.; MOKRYNIN, V.; PLOSKIKH, V. 1999. *Kyrgyzy i ikh Predki*. Bishkek.
- KOZLOV, V. I. 1975. *Natsional'nosti SSSR. (Etnograficheskiy obzor)*. Moscow.
- Materialy po obsledovaniyu tuzemnogo i russkogo starozhilcheskogo khozyaystva i zemlepol'zovaniya Semirechenskoy oblasti*. Vol. 7. 1916. *Pishpekskiy uезд, Kirgizskie khozyaystva*. No. 2. Petrograd.
- ORLOWSKI, L. 1995. Direct Transfers in Trade among Former Soviet Union Central Budget and the Republics: Past Evidence and Current Implications. *Economics of Planning*, Vol. 28 (1). Dordrecht.
- Osnovnye itogi pervoy natsional'noy perepisi naseleniya Kirgizskoy Respubliki 1999 goda*. 2000. Bishkek.
- PLOSKIKH, V. (ed.). 1998. *Istoriya Kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstana*. Bishkek.
- RUMER, B. Z. 1989. *Soviet Central Asia: 'A Tragic Experiment'*. Winchester, Mass.
- SHIBAEVA, Yu. A. 1973. Zhivotnovodstvo u Kirgizov Vostochnogo Pamira. In: *Ocherki po istorii khozyatsva narodov Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana*, pp. 99–132. Leningrad.
- SHUKUROV, E.; TABYSHALIEVA, A. 1997. Kyrgyzstan: Factors in the Destabilization and Stabilization of Ethno-Confessional Peace. *Anthropology and Archaeology of Eurasia*, Vol. 36, No. 2. New York.
- SIMAKOV, G. N. 1980. Sovetskie prazdniki i Kirgizskie natsional'nye razvlechenia. In: *Etnograficheskie aspekty izucheniya sovremennosti*, pp. 109–118. Leningrad.
- SOKOL, E. D. 1953. The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia. *The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Series 71, No. 1. Baltimore, Md.
- SOUCEK, S. 2000. *A History of Inner Asia*. Cambridge.
- TABYSHALIEVA, A. 1993. *Vera v Turkestane*. Bishkek.
- . 1999. The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia. *Prevention of Ethnic Conflict in the Ferghana Valley*. Washington, D.C.
- . 2000. The Kyrgyz and Spiritual Dimensions of Daily Life. In: *Islam and Central Asia. An Enduring Legacy or an Evolving Threat?*, pp. 27–38. Eds. R. Sagdeev and S. Eisenhower. *The Center for Political and Strategic Studies*. Washington, D.C.
- . 2001a. Historical Studies in Kyrgyzstan, 1917–2000. In: *Asian Research Trends: A Humanities and Social Science Review*. Tokyo.
- . 2001b. *Kyrgyzstan: Common Country Assessment*. Bishkek.
- URSTANBEKOV, B.; TCHOROEVEV, T. 1990. Kyrgyz taryhy. In: *Kyskacha entsiklopediyalyk sözduk*. (In Kyrgyz.) Bishkek.
- YALCIN, R. 2002. *The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era*. New York.

CHAPTER 12

- FANYAN, D. 1940. *K istorii sovetskogo stroitel'stva v Tajikistane (1920–1929)*. *Sbornik Dokumentov* [A History of Soviet Construction in Tajikistan (1920–1929. Collected Documents], Part 1. Stalinabad.

- Istoriya Bukharskoy i Khorezmskoy Narodnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki* [History of the Bukhara and Khwarazm People's Soviet Republics]. 1971. Moscow.
- Istoriya Tajikskogo naroda* [History of the Tajik People], Vol. 1, Book 1, 1964; Vol. 3, Book 1, 1965. Dushanbe.
- KHAIDAROV, G. K. n.d. *Istoriya Tajikskogo naroda: XX vek* [History of the Tajik People: The Twentieth Century]. Dushanbe.
- Kommunist Tajikistana* [Communist of Tajikistan], 21 August 1933. (Newspaper.) Dushanbe.
- MARSAKOV, K. P. 1984. Tajikistan v period razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva [Tajikistan in the Period of Advanced Socialist Society]. In: *Tajikskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika*. Dushanbe.
- Narodnoe khozyaystvo Tajikskoy SSR. Stat. Sborn.* [The Economy of Tajikistan: A Statistical Compendium]. 1957. Stalinabad.
- Narodnoe khozyaystvo Tajikskoy SSR v 1989 g.* [The Economy of the Tajik SSR in 1989]. 1991. Dushanbe.
- SECHKINA, L. P. 1984. Tajikistan v gody velikoy otechestvennoy voyny (1941–1945) [Tajikistan during the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945)]. In: *Tajikskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika* [The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic]. Dushanbe.
- SHARIPOV, Ya. 1960. Iz istorii postroeniya fundamenta sotsializma v Tajikistane [A History of the Construction of the Foundations for Socialism in Tajikistan]. *Trudy Instituta istorii Akademii nauk*, Vol. 26. Dushanbe.
- Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo Soyuza SSR (1933–1938). Stat. sborn.* [Building Socialism in the USSR (1933–1938). A Statistical Compendium]. 1939. Moscow/Leningrad.
- SULTANOV, S.; AKHMEDOV, K. 1984. Tajikistan v gody poslevoennogo vosstanovleniya i dal'neyshego razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva [Tajikistan in the Years of Post-War Reconstruction and Further Economic Development]. In: *Tajikskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika*. Dushanbe.
- Tajikistan za 20 let* [Tajikistan over 20 Years]. 1949. Stalinabad.
- YAKHYAYEV, E. M. 1956. Kollektivizatsiya sel'skogo khozyaystva v Tajikskoy SSR (1930–1935) [The Collectivization of Agriculture in the Tajik SSR (1930–1935)]. In: *Uchonye zapiski Gospedinstituta im. T.G. Shevchenko. Seriya istoriko-pedagogicheskaya* [Learned Notes of the T. G. Shevchenko State Pedagogical Institute. History Teaching Series], Vol. 15, Issue 2. Dushanbe.

CHAPTER 13

- ALIKHANOV-AVARSKIY, M. 1883. *Mervskiy oazis i dorogi, vedushchie k nemu* [The Merv Oasis and the Roads Leading to It]. St Petersburg.
- ANNANEPESOV, M. 1972. *Khozyaystvo turkmen v XVIII–XIX vv.* [The Economy of the Turkmens in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries]. Ashkhabad.
- . 1989. Prisoedinenie Turkmenistana k Rossii. Pravda istorii [Turkmenistan's Annexation to Russia: History's Truth]. *Voprosy istorii* [Problems of History], Vol. 11. Moscow.
- Ashkhabad*, 28 March 1917. Ashkhabad.
- BARTOL'D, V. V. 1965. K istorii orosheniya Turkestana [On the History of Irrigation in Turkistan]. In: *Sochineniya* [Works], Vol. 3. Amanniyaz.
- BATSER, D. 1929. Ocherki ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Turkmenistana [Sketches on the Economic Development of Turkmenistan]. *Turkmenovedenie* [Turkmen Studies], Nos. 2–3.

- BAYANI. n.d. *Shajara-ye khorezmshahi*. Manuscript, Inv. No. 9596. Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR. Tashkent.
- BODE, K. 1856. Ocherki Turkenskoy zemli i yugo-vostochnogo pribrezh'ya Kaspiyskogo morya ot Astrabadskogo zaliva [Sketches of the Turkmen Land and South-Eastern Shore of the Caspian Sea from the Astrabad Bay]. *Otechestvennye zapiski* [Notes of the Fatherland], Vol. 8. St Petersburg.
- BREGEL, Yu. E. 1960. *Khorezmskie Turkmeny v XIX v.* [Khorezm Turkmens in the Nineteenth Century]. Moscow.
- COULIBOEUF DE BLOCQUEVILLE, Henri de. 1867. Chetyrnadtsati-mesyachniy plen u turkmentsev [Fourteen-Month Captivity with the Turkmens]. *Vsemirniy puteshestvennik* [World Traveller], Issues 31–3. St Petersburg.
- DURDYEV, M. 1989. Izgnanie baba-daikhana [The Peasant's Exile]. *Ashkhabad*, No. 3. Ashkhabad.
- FRUNZE, M. 1941. Na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny [On the Fronts of the Civil War]. In: *Sbornik dokumentov* [Collected Documents]. Moscow.
- GAFUROVA, K.; MUKHAMMEDBERDYEV, K.; NEPESOV, G. et al. 1971. *Istoriya Bukharskoy i Khorezmskoy narodnykh sovetskikh respublik* [History of Bukhara and Khwarazm People's Soviet Republics]. Moscow.
- GRODEKOV, N. I. 1883. *Voyna v Turkmenii* [War in Turkmenia]. St Petersburg. 4 vols.
- GULYAMOV, Ya. G. 1960. *Istoriya orosheniya Khorezma* [History of Irrigation in Khwarazm]. Tashkent.
- AL-HUSSEINI, Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali. 1990. *Jeng-e Merv*. Tr. and ed. M. Saparov. Ashgabat.
- IBRAGIMOV, I. 1874. Nekotorye zametki o khivinskikh turkmenakh i kirgizakh [A Few Remarks on the Khiva Turkmens and the Kyrgyz]. *Voenniy sbornik* [Military Collection], No. 9.
- ISHANOV, A. 1969. *Bukharskaya narodnaya sovetskaya respublika* [Bukhara People's Soviet Republic]. Tashkent.
- Istoriya Rossii* [History of Russia], Part 3: XX vek: vybor modeley obshchestvennogo razvitiya [The Twentieth Century: Choice of Models for Societal Development]. 1994. Moscow.
- Istoriya Sovetskogo Turkmenistana* [History of Soviet Turkmenistan], Part 1: (1917–1937), 1970; Part 2 (1938–1967), 1970. Ashkhabad.
- Istoriya Turkmenskoy SSR (1917–1957 gg.)* [History of the Turkmen SSR (1917–1957)]. 1957. Ashkhabad. 2 vols.
- KAZI, A. 1992. *Dzhenghama*. Ashgabat.
- Khatyra (Pamyat')* [Khatyra (Memory)]. 1999. Ashgabat. 5 vols.
- Kollektivizatsiya sel'skogo khozyaystva Turkmenskoy SSR* [Collectivization of Agriculture in the Turkmen SSR], Vol. 2. 1968. Ashkhabad.
- KOSTENKO, L. F. 1880. *Turkestanskiy kray*, Vol. 3. St Petersburg.
- KUROPATKIN, A. N. 1899. *Zavoevanie Turkmenii* [The Conquest of Turkmenia]. St Petersburg.
- LENIN, V. I. 1960. *O Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane* [On Central Asia and Kazakhstan]. Tashkent.
- MACGAHAN, J. A. 1875. *Voennye deystviya na Oksuse i padeniye Khivy* [Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva]. Moscow. English tr., *Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva*. London, 1876.
- MAKSHEEV, A. I. 1890. *Istoricheskiy obzor Turkestana i nastupatel'nogo dvizheniya v nego russkikh* [A Historical Survey of Turkistan and the Russians' Incursion]. St Petersburg.
- Materialy X s'ezda KP(b)T* [Materials from the Tenth Congress of the Turkmen Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]. 1950. Ashkhabad.

- MITT (Materialy po istorii turkmen i Turkmenii)* [Materials on the History of the Turkmens and Turkmenia], Vol. 2. 1938. Moscow/Leningrad.
- MOSHKOVA, V. G. 1946. Plemennye 'geli' v turkmenskikh kovrakh [Tribal 'Gols' in Turkmen Carpets]. *Sovetskaya etnografiya* [Soviet Ethnography], No. 1. Moscow.
- MUKHAMMEDBERDYEV, K. 1986. *Istoriya khorezmskoy revolyutsii* [History of the Khwarazm Revolution]. Tashkent.
- MUKHAMMEDBERDYEV, K.; ORAZGYLYZHOV, Ya. 1997. *Turkmenistanyn tarykhyndan materiallar. 1917–1994*. (In Turkmen.) Ashgabat.
- Neytral'nyy Turkmenistan* [Neutral Turkmenistan]. 5 May 2000.
- Obrazovanie Turkmenskoy SSR i sozдание Kompartii Turkmenistana (1924–1925)* [The Formation of the Turkmen SSR and the Creation of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan (1924–1925)]. 1966. In: *Sbornik dokumentov* [Collected Documents]. Ashkhabad.
- Ocherk doliny Amu-Dar'i. Rassprosy Kapitana Bykova* [A Sketch of the Amu Darya Valley: Surveys of Captain Bykov]. 1880. Tashkent.
- O'DONOVAN. 1883. *Oazis Merv* [The Merv Oasis]. St Petersburg.
- Prisoedineniye Turkmenii k Rossii. Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov* [The Annexation of Turkmenia to Russia: Collection of Archival Documents]. 1960. Ashkhabad.
- Revolutsionniy vostok* [The Revolutionary East]. 1927. Moscow.
- ROTKOVSKIY, I.; KHODYAKOV, M. 1999. *Istoriya Sovetskoy Rossii* [History of Soviet Russia]. St Petersburg.
- Rusko-turkmenskiye otnosheniya v XVIII–XIX vv. Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov* [Russo-Turkmen Relations in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Collection of Archival Documents]. 1963. Ashkhabad.
- TERENT'EV, M. A. 1906. *Istoriya zavoevaniya Sredney Azii* [History of the Conquest of Central Asia], Vols. 1–3. St Petersburg.
- TURKMENBASHI, S. 1999. Glavniy ekonomicheskiy shtab strany dolzhen real'no vliyat' na eyo ekonomiku [The Country's Main Economic Headquarters Must Have a Real Influence on Its Economy]. *Neytral'nyy Turkmenistan*, 4 May 1999. Ashgabat.
- Turkmenistan za 50 let*. [Turkmenistan over the Last 50 Years]. 1974; 1975. In: *Statisticheskiy sbornik* [Collected Statistics]. Ashkhabad.
- Turkmenistan*, 5 May 2000. Ashgabat.
- Turkmenskaya iskra* [Turkmen Spark], 26 March 1989. Ashkhabad.
- VÁMBÉRY, A. 1865. *Puteshestvie po Sredney Azii* [Journey Through Central Asia]. St Petersburg.
- . 1886. *Arminius Vambéry: His Life and Adventures*. London.
- VERT, N. 1992. *Istoriya sovetского gosudarstva. 1900–1991* [History of the Soviet State, 1900–1991]. Moscow.
- Voyna v peskakh* [War in the Sands]. 1935. Moscow.
- YAKOVLEV, A. 1993. Sravnitel'nye zametki o preobrazovaniyakh v Turkestane i Sovetskoy Sredney Azii [Comparative Remarks on the Transformations in Turkistan and Soviet Central Asia]. *Kentavr* [Centaur], No. 2. Moscow.
- ZHUKOVSKIY, V. A. 1894. *Drevnosti zakaspiyskogo kraya. Razvaliny Starogo Merva* [Antiquities of the Transcaspiian Kray: The Ruins of Old Merv]. St Petersburg.

CHAPTER 14

- ASOCHAKOV, V. A. 1974. K-50-letiyu obrazovaniya khakasskogo uezda [On the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of Khakass Uezd]. *Zapiski khakasskogo nauchnoissledovatel'skogo instituta yazyka, literatury i istorii* [Transactions of the Khakass Scientific Research Institute of Language, Literature and History], Vol. 19, No. 5, Historical Series. Abakan.
- . 1983. *Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo v Khakassii (1917–1937)* [Cultural Construction in Khakassia (1917–1937)]. Abakan.
- BIKONYA, G. F. 1981. *Zaselenie russkimi Prieniseyskogo kraya v 18 v.* [The Russian Settlement of the Yenisei Basin in the Eighteenth Century]. Novosibirsk.
- BUTANAYEV, V. J. 1987. *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaya istoriya khakasskogo aala (konets 19–nachalo 20 vv.)* [Socio-Economic History of the Khakass Aal (from the End of the Nineteenth Century to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century)]. Abakan.
- . 1990. *Etnicheskaya istoriya khakassov 17–19 vv.* [Ethnic History of the Khakass from the Seventeenth Century to the Nineteenth Century]. Material from the Series 'Peoples of the Soviet Union': The Khakass. Moscow.
- BUTANAYEV, V. J.; ABDIKALIKOV, A. 1995. Materialy po istorii Khakassii XVII–nachalo XVIII vv. [Material on the History of Khakassia from the Seventeenth Century to the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century]. *Ethnography Laboratory of the 'N. F. Katanov' Khakass State University*. Abakan.
- Istoriko-kul'turniy atlas Buryatii* [Historical-Cultural Atlas of Buriatia]. 2001. Moscow.
- Istoriya Sibiri*, Vols. 1–3. 1968. Leningrad.
- Istoriya Tuvy*, Vols. 1–2. 1964. Tuvan Scientific Research Institute of Language, Literature and History. Moscow.
- Istoriya Tuvy*, Vol. 1. 2001. 2nd ed., reworked, rev. by S. I. Veinshtein and M. H. Mannai-ool. Institute of Humanitarian Research of the Republic of Tuva. Novosibirsk.
- KARZOV, V. G. 1970. *Khakassiya v period razlozheniya feodalizma (XVIII–nachalo XIX vv.)* [Khakassia in the Period of Feudal Decay (from the Eighteenth Century to the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century)]. Abakan.
- KOZMIN, N. N. 1925. *Khakassy. Istoriko-etnograficheskiy i khozyaystvenniy ocherk Minusinskogo kraya* [The Khakass. An Historical, Ethnographical and Economic Sketch of the Minusinsk Kray]. Irkutsk.
- PATACHAKOV, K. M. 1982. *Ocherki materialnoy kul'tury khakassov* [Essays on the Material Culture of the Khakass]. Abakan.
- POTAPOV, L. P. 1948. *Ocherki po istorii altaytsev* [Essays on the History of the Altai People]. Novosibirsk.
- . 1952. *Kratkie ocherki istorii i etnografii khakassov (17–19 vv.)* [Short Essays on the History and Ethnography of the Khakass (from the Seventeenth Century to the Nineteenth Century)]. Abakan.
- RADLOV, V. V. 1982. *Iz Sibiri. Stranitsy dnevnika* [Out of Siberia, Pages of a Diary]. Abakan.
- SUNCHUGASHEV, J. I. n.d. *Kratkiye ocherki po istorii Khakassii* [Short Essays on the History of Khakassia]. Abakan.
- YAKOVLEV, E. K. 1900. *Etnograficheskiy obzor doliny Yuzhnogo Yeniseya i obyasnitel'niy katalog etnograficheskogo otdela muzeya* [Ethnographical Review of the Valley of the Southern Yenisei and Explanatory Catalogue of the Museum's Ethnographical Department]. Minusinsk.
- YARKHO, A. I. 1947. *Altae-Sayanskije turki. Antropologicheskii ocherk* [The Turks of the Altai and Sayan. Anthropological Essay]. Abakan.

CHAPTER 15

- BATBAYAR, Ts. 2002. *Modern Mongolia: A Concise History*. Ulaanbaatar.
- BAT-OCHIR, L. 1996. *Choibalsan*. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- BAWDEN, C. R. 1989. *The Modern History of Mongolia*. London/New York.
- ELBEGDORJ, Ts. n.d. [1999]. *U'neniy mo'r tsagaan* [Path of Truth]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- HAGIWARA, M. 1993. *Shinchô no Môko-rei* [Mongol Law during the Qing Dynasty]. In: Shiga (ed.), *Chûgoku hôsei shi* [Chinese Legal History]. (In Japanese.) Tokyo.
- JAGCHID, S.; HYER, P. 1979. *Mongolia's Culture and Society*. Boulder, Colo./Folkestone, Kent.
- KAPLONSKI, C. 2004. *Truth, History and Politics in Mongolia: The Memory of Heroes*. London/New York.
- Komintern ba Mongol* [The Comintern and Mongolia]. 1996. (In Mongolian.) Archive documents. Ulaanbaatar.
- LATTIMORE, O. 1940. *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. New York/London.
- LUZIANIN, S. G. 2000. *Rossia-Mongolia-Kitay v pervoy polovine XX veka*. Moscow.
- MAGSARJAV, N. 1994. *Mongol Ulus-iin Shine Tüükh* [New History of the Mongol State]. (In Mongolian.) Repr. Ulaanbaatar.
- MANCALL, M. 1968. The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay. In: J. K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order; Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Mongol Ulus-iin khu'n amyn dotood shiljikh kho'dolgoon*. 2001. Barimtat khuudasny tsomog [Atlas of Internal Population Migration]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- Mongol Ulus-iin Tüükh* [History of Mongolia], Vol. 5. 2003. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- Mongol Ulus-iin U'ndsen khuuli* [Constitution of Mongolia]. 1992. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- NAKAMI, T. 1984. Protest against the Concept of the 'Middle Kingdom': The Mongols and the 1911 Revolution. In: E. Shinkichi and H. Z. Schiffrin (eds.), *The 1911 Revolution in China, Interpretive Essays*. Tokyo.
- . 1999a. New Trends in the Study of Modern Mongolian History: What Effect Have Political and Social Changes Had on Historical Research? *Acta Asiatica*, Vol. 76. Tokyo.
- . 1999b. Babujab and His Uprising: Re-examining the Inner Mongol Struggle for Independence. *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko (the Oriental Library)*, Vol. 57. Tokyo.
- . 1999c. Russian Diplomats and Mongol Independence, 1911–1915. In: S. Kotkin and B. A. Elleman (eds.), *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century, Landlocked Cosmopolitan*. New York.
- Population Census of Mongolia* [1956]; [1979]; [1989] [J. Boldbaatar's estimation of figures].
- ROSHIN, S. K. 1999. *Politicheskaya Istoriya Mongolii (1921–1940)*. Moscow.
- SANJDORJ, M. (ed.). 1995. *Khoridugaar zuuny Mongol* [Twentieth-Century Mongolia]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- SHIMADA, M. 1982. *Shinchô Môko-rei no kenkyû* [Studies in Qing Mongol Laws]. (In Japanese.) Tokyo.
- . 1992. *Shinchô Môko-rei no jikkôsei no kenkyû* [Studies in the Effectiveness of Qing Mongol Laws]. (In Japanese.) Tokyo.
- TSEDENBAL, Yu. 1976. *Iltgel, o'guulel, khelsen u'g* [Selected Speeches and Articles]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.

CHAPTER 17

- AHMAD, Q. 1966. *The Wahabi Movement in India*. Calcutta.

- AHMAD, T. 1994. *Musalmanon ka Roshan Mustaqbil*. English tr. by Ali Ashraf, *Toward A Common Destiny: A Nationalist Manifesto*. New Delhi.
- ASHRAF, A. 1992. *Islam in the Subcontinent*. Patna.
- CHAND, T. 1961. *History of the Freedom Movement*, Vol. 1. Delhi.
- . 1990. *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Vol. 2, 1967. Repr. New Delhi.
- CHANDRA, B. 1993. *Essays on Contemporary India*. New Delhi.
- . *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*. 1990. Repr. of 1966 ed. New Delhi.
- DUTT, R. P. 1947. *India Today*. Bombay.
- ELLIOT, H. M. 1849. *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, Vol. 1. Ed. J. Dowson. Allahabad.
- GOPAL, S. (ed.). 1984. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*. 2nd series. New Delhi.
- HABIB, I. 1997. *Fifty Years of Independence – A Historical Survey*. (Mimeograph.) Paper presented at National Centre for the Performing Arts, 14–17 January 1997. New Delhi.
- . 1998a. The Coming of 1857. *Social Scientist*, Vol. 26, Nos.1–4, January–April 1998. New Delhi.
- . 1998b. The Coming of 1857. In: *Indian People in Struggle for Freedom: Five Essays*. New Delhi.
- IQBAL HUSAIN. 1988. The Rebel Administration of Delhi. *Social Scientist*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1–4, January–April 1998. New Delhi.
- KEITH, A. B. 1961. *A Constitutional History of India, 1600–1935*. 2nd ed., 1937, repr. 1961, Allahabad.
- KHAN, I. A. 1998. The Gwalior Contingent in 1857–58: A Study of the Organization and Ideology of Sepoy Rebels. *Social Scientist*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1–4, January–April 1998. New Delhi.
- . 2002. Anti-Colonial Resistance and the *Jihad* Movement of Nineteenth Century India. In: *War and Peace in Islam*. New Delhi.
- KHAN, S. A. 1986. *Asbab-i Baghawat-i Hindostan*. 2nd ed. Urdu Academy of Sindh, Karachi.
- MARX, K. 1857. The Revolt of Indian Army. *New York Daily Tribune*, 15 July 1857.
- NEHRU, J. 1960. *The Discovery of India*. London.
- NIRAN, T. N. 1985. The Zigzag March. In: Padmadhar Tripathi (ed.), *Hope Beyond Despair*. New Delhi.
- PAREL, A. J. (ed.). 1997. *Gandhi, Hindi Swaraj and Other Writings*. (Cambridge, 1997.) 1st South Asia ed., New Delhi.
- . *Political Resolution adopted by the Eighth Congress of the C.P.I.* 1968 (Patna, 7–15 February 1968). New Delhi.
- RIZVI, S. A. A. (ed.). 1957. *Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh*, Vol. 1. Lucknow.
- SARKAR, S. 1983. *Modern India, 1885–1947*. Madras.

CHAPTER 18

- AFZAL, M. R. 1998. *Political Parties in Pakistan, 1958–69*, Vol. 1. Islamabad. 3 vols.
- . 2002. *Pakistan: History & Politics, 1947–1971*. Karachi.
- ‘ALI SHAH, S. 2001. *Law Courts in a Glass House: An Autobiography*. Karachi.
- AMIN, T. 1994. Pakistan in 1993: Some Dramatic Changes. *Asian Survey*. Berkeley, Calif.
- AYUB KHAN, M. 1967. *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography*. Karachi.
- BAKHHTIAR, I. 2003. Puppets on a String. *Herald*. (Monthly.) Karachi.
- BURKI, S. J. 1980. *State and Society in Pakistan, 1971–77*. London.
- BURKI, S. J.; BAXTER, C. (eds.). 1991. *Pakistan under the Military*. Boulder, Colo.

- CALLARD, K. B. 1957. *Pakistan: A Political Study*. London.
- CHOUDHURY, G. W. 1969. *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*. London.
- KOCHANNEK, S. A. 1983. *Interest Groups and Development, Business and Politics in Pakistan*. Karachi.
- LAMB, A. 1991. *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990*. Karachi.
- MAHMOOD, S. (comp. and ed.). 1997. *Constitutional Foundations of Pakistan*. Lahore.
- MALIK, I. H. 2001. Pakistan in 2000: Starting Anew or Stalemate? *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 1. Berkeley, Calif.
- NEWBERG, P. R. 1995. *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan*. New Delhi.
- RIZVI, H.-A. 1986. *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947–86*. Lahore.
- SAYEED, K. B. 1967. *The Political System of Pakistan*. Boston, Mass.
- SISSON, R.; ROSE, L. E. 1990. *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh*. Berkeley, Calif.
- SYED, A. H. 1992. *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*. London.
- TALBOT, I. 1991. *Pakistan: A Political History*. Lahore.
- WILCOX, W. A. 1963. *Pakistan, the Consolidation of a Nation*. New York.
- WOLPERT, S. 1993. *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*. New York.
- ZIRING, L. 1997. *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, A Political History*. Karachi.

CHAPTER 19

- ADAMEC, L. W. 1974. *Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century*. Tucson, Ariz.
- ARNOLD, A. 1985. *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq*. Stanford, Calif.
- BALLAND, D. 1985. Afghanistan: x. Political History. In: *EIr*, Vol. 1, pp. 547–58.
- BOUKHARY, Mir A. K. 1970. *Histoire de l'Asie centrale*. Ed., tr. and commentary by Ch. Schefer. Repr. of 1876 ed. Amsterdam.
- BRADSHAW, H. S. 1985. *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*. Durham.
- DAVIES, C. 1960. 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. In: *EI²*, Vol. 1, pp. 87–8.
- DAVIS, A. 1998. How the Taliban Became a Military Force. In: W. Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*. London.
- DUPREE, L. 1980. *Afghanistan*. Princeton, N.J.
- EDWARDS, D. B. 1996. *Heroes of the Age. Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier*. Berkeley, Calif.
- ELPHINSTONE, M. 1992. *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*. Repr. of 1815 ed. Karachi.
- FLETCHER, A. 1965. *Afghanistan. Highway of Conquest*. Ithaca, N.Y.
- GANGULY, R. 1998. *Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts*. New Delhi.
- GHANI, A. 1978. Islam and Statebuilding in a Tribal Society. *Afghanistan: 1880–1901. Modern Asian Studies*, 12 (2), pp. 269–84. Cambridge.
- . 1985. Afghanistan: xi. Administration. In: *EIr*, Vol. 1, pp. 558–64.
- GHAUS, 'Abdul S. 1988. *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account*. McLean.
- GHUBAR, Mir Gh. M. 1980. *Afghanistan dar masir-i tarikh*. Repr. of 1967 Kabul ed. Qum.
- GRASSELLI, G. 1996. *British and American Responses to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*. Aldershot.
- GREGORIAN, V. 1969. *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization 1880–1946*. Stanford, Calif.
- JUDAH, T. 2002. The Taliban Papers. *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 1. London.

- KAKAR, H. K. 1979. *Government and Society in Afghanistan*. Austin, Tex.
- KHALILI, Kh. 1984. Ayari az Khorasan: Amir Habibullah, Khadim-e Din-e Rasulallah. *Tarikh-e Ramadan*. Peshawar.
- LONGWORTH DAMES, M.; GIBB, H. A. R. 1960. Afghanistan: v. History. In: *EP²*, Vol. 1, pp. 226–33.
- MALEY, W. 1989. The Geneva Accords of April 1988. In: A. Saikal and W. Maley (eds.), *The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan*. Cambridge.
- . 2002. *The Afghanistan Wars*. London.
- MCCHESENEY, R. D. (ed.). 1999. *Kabul under Siege: Fayz Muhammad's Account of the 1929 Uprising*. Princeton, N.J.
- NAWID, S. K. 1999. *Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan 1919–1929: King Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama*. Costa Mesa, Calif.
- NOELLE, C. 1997. *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan*. Richmond, Surrey.
- NOELLE-KARIMI, C. 2001. 'Amir Sher 'Ali Khan (1863–1878), Orientalischer Despot oder Vorreiter der Reform? In: S. Wild and H. Schild (eds.), *Akten des 27. Deutschen Orientalistentages*, pp. 819–30. Würzburg.
- NOELLE-KARIMI, C.; SCHETTER, C.; SCHLAGINTWEIT, R. (eds.). 2002. *Afghanistan – A Country without a State?* Frankfurt.
- POULLADA, L. B. 1973. *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*. Ithaca, N.Y.
- . 1981. Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years. *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 1. Washington, D.C.
- RUBIN, B. R. 1995. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven, Conn.
- SAIKAL, A. 2004. *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*. London.
- SAIKAL, A.; MALEY, W. 1991. *Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy*. Boulder, Colo.
- SEIDT, H. U. 2002. *Berlin–Kabul–Moskau. Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer und Deutschlands Geopolitik*. Munich.

CHAPTER 20

- ADAMIYAT, F. 1969. *Amir Kabir va Irān*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1972. *Andishe-ye taraqqi va hokumat-e qānun. 'Asr-e Sepahsālār*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1976. *Ideologi-ye nehzat-e mashrutiyyat-e Irān*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1981. *Shuresh bar emtiyāznāme-ye Regi*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- AFARY, J. 1996. *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911*. New York.
- AITCHISON, C. U. (ed.). 1933. *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*. Calcutta.
- ALGAR, H. 1969. *Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906*. Berkeley, Calif.
- . 1973. *Mirza Malkum Khan*. Berkeley/Los Angeles, Calif.
- AMANAT, A. 1991. The Downfall of Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir and the Problem of Ministerial Authority in Qajar Iran. *IJMES*, Vol. 23, pp. 577–99.
- . 1993. Nāsir al-Dīn Shāh. In: *EP²*, Vol. 7, pp. 1003–5.
- . 1997. *Pivot of the Universe*. London/New York.
- AMIR-KHIZI, E. 1960. *Qiyām-e Āzarbāyejān va Sattār Khān*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- ARFA' AL-DOWLE, R. 1999. *Khāterāt-e perans Arfa'*. (In Persian.) Tehran.

- AZIMI, F. 1989. *Iran. The Crisis of Democracy 1941–1953*. London.
- BALLAND, D. 1990. Boundaries: iii. Boundaries of Afghanistan. In: *EIr*, Vol. 4, pp. 406–15.
- BHARIER, J. 1971. *Economic Development in Iran 1900–1970*. London.
- BILL, J. A. 1988. *The Eagle and the Lion*. New York/London.
- BILL, J. A.; LOUIS, W. R. (eds.). 1988. *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*. London.
- BROWNE, E. G. (ed.). 1918. *Materials for the Study of the Bâbi Religion*. Cambridge.
- . 1966. *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*. 2nd ed. Cambridge.
- BURRELL, R. M. 1993. Muhammad ‘Alā Shāh Kādījār. In: *EI²*, Vol. 7, pp. 431–2.
- CALMARD, J. 1987. Anglo-Persian War (1856–57). In: *EIr*, Vol. 2, pp. 65–8.
- CHAQUERI, C. 1995. *The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–1921*. London.
- COLE, J. R. I. 1989. Bahā’-Allāh. In: *EIr*, Vol. 3, pp. 422–9.
- COTTAM, R. W. 1979. *Nationalism in Iran*. London.
- CRONIN, S. 1997. *The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran 1910–1926*. London.
- CURZON, G. N. 1892. *Persia and the Persian Question*. London. 2 vols.
- DENMAN, D. R. 1978. Land Reforms of Shah and People. In: G. Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, pp. 253–301. Stanford, Calif.
- DESTREÉ, A. 1976. *Les fonctionnaires belges au service de la Perse 1898–1915*. Leiden.
- DIGARD, J.-P.; HOURCADE, B.; RICHARD, Y. 1996. *L’Iran au XXe siècle*. Paris.
- EMADI, H. 1995. Exporting Iran’s Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan. *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 1–12.
- EQBAL ASHTIYANI, ‘A. 1984. *Mirā Taqi Khān Amir Kabir*. Ed. I. Afshar. (In Persian.) 3rd ed. Tehran.
- E‘TEMAD AL-SALTANE, M. H. 1885. *Matla‘ al-shams*, Vol. 2. (Lithograph.) (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1977. *Ruznāme-ye khāterāt*. Ed. I. Afshar. (In Persian.) 3rd ed. Tehran.
- . 1988. *Tārikh-e montazam-e Nāseri*. Ed. E. Rezvani. (In Persian.) Tehran. 3 vols.
- FAKHRA’I, E. 1964. *Sardār-e jangal*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- FERRIER, R. W. 1982. *The History of the British Petroleum Company. The Developing Years 1901–1932*, Vol. 1. Cambridge.
- FEUVRIER, J.-B. 1906. *Trois ans à la cour de Perse*. 2nd ed. Paris.
- FRYE, R. N. 1968. *Persia*. London.
- GHANI, C. 1998. *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*. London/New York.
- GIELING, S. 1999. *Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran*. London/New York.
- GILLE, é. 1984. L’accession au pouvoir des communistes pro-soviétiques. In: *Afghanistan, la colonisation impossible*, pp. 178–212. Paris.
- GOBINEAU, J. A., Comte de. 1928. *Les religions et les philosophies de l’Asie centrale*. Paris.
- GOLDSMID, F. J. (ed.). 1876. *Eastern Persia, an Account of the Journeys of the Persian Boundary Commission 1870–71–72*. London. 2 vols.
- GRAHAM, R. 1978. *Iran. The Illusion of Power*. London.
- GREAVES, R. L. 1986. Sistan in British Indian Frontier Policy. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS)*, Vol. 49/1, pp. 30–102. London.
- GRIFFITH, W. E. 1978. Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era. In: G. Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, pp. 365–88. Stanford, Calif.
- HA’ERI, ‘A. 1981. *Tashayyo‘ va mashrutiyat dar Irān*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- HAMBLY, G. R. G. 1991. The Pahlavî Autocracy: Rizâ Shâh, 1921–1941. In: G. Hambly, P. Avery and C. Melville (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. 7, pp. 213–43. Cambridge.
- . 1995. Ridâ Shâh. In: *EI²*, Vol. 8, pp. 511–14.

- HEDAYAT, R. Q. 1960. *Tārikh-e rowzat al-safā-ye Nāseri*, Vol. 10. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1977. *Sefāratnāme-ye Khārazm*. (In Persian.) Ed. 'A. Hasuri. Tehran.
- HOLDICH, T. 1897. The Perso-Baluch Boundary. *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 9, pp. 416–22. London.
- HUNT, G. H. 1858. *Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign*. London.
- IRONSIDE, E. 1972. *High Road to Command*. London.
- JALALI, A. A. 2000. A Historical Perspective on Iran-Afghan Relations. In: A. Mohammadi and A. Ehteshami (eds.), *Iran and Eurasia*, pp. 137–63. London.
- KASRAVI, A. 1970. *Tārikh-e mashrute-ye Irān*. (In Persian.) 8th ed. Tehran.
- . 1976. *Tārikh-e hijdah sāle-ye Āzarbāyejān*. (In Persian.) 7th ed. Tehran.
- KATOZIAN, H. 1990. *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*. London/New York.
- KAVUSI, M. H. (ed.). 1993. *Asnādi az ravābet-e Irān bā manāteqi az Āsiā-ye Markazi*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- KAZEMZADEH, F. 1956. The Origin and Early Development of the Persian Cossack Brigade. *The American Slavic and East European*, Vol. 15, pp. 351–63. Seattle, Wash.
- KEDDIE, N. R. 1966. *Religion and Rebellion in Iran. The Tobacco Protest of 1891–2*. London.
- . 1972. *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani'*. Berkeley, Calif.
- KEDDIE, N. R.; ZARRINKUB, A. H. 1965. Fidā'iyyān-i Islām. In: *EI²*, Vol. 2, pp. 882–3.
- KHURMUJI, M. J. 1965. *Haqāyeq al-akhbār-e Nāseri*. Ed. H. Khadiv Jam. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- LAMBTON, A. K. S. 1958. Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905–1906. *St. Antony's Papers*, Vol. 4, pp. 43–60. London.
- . 1965. The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution. *Studia Islamica*, Vol. 22, pp. 119–57; Vol. 23, pp. 71–90. Paris.
- . 1978. Kādjar. In: *EI²*, Vol. 4, pp. 387–99.
- LAPEYRE, J. 1998. *Le Chah d'Iran*. Paris.
- LASHKARNEVIS, M. 1977. *Safarnāme-ye Marv*. In: Q. Rowshani (ed.), *Se safarnāme*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- LUFT, P. 2002. British Policy in Eastern Iran during World War I. In: O. Bast (ed.), *La Perse et la Grande Guerre*, pp. 45–79. Tehran.
- MACEOIN, D. M. 1979. *From Shaykhism to Babism*. Ph.D. thesis. Cambridge.
- . 1983. From Babism to Baha'ism: Problems of Militancy, Quietism and Conflation in the Construction of a Religion. *Religion*, No. 13, pp. 219–55.
- . 1989. Bāb. In: *EIr*, Vol. 3, pp. 278–84.
- MAHBUBI ARDAKANI, H. 1978. *Tārikh-e mo'assesāt-e tamaddoni-ye jadid dar Irān*. (In Persian.) Tehran. 3 vols.
- MAHMUD, M. 1983. *Tārikh-e ravābet-e siyāsi-e Irān va Engelis dar qarn-e nuzdahom-e milādi*. (In Persian.) Tehran. 8 vols.
- MALEKZADE, M. 1984. *Tārikh-e enqelāb-e mashrutiyyat-e Irān*. (In Persian.) 2nd ed. Tehran. 3 vols.
- MALKAM KHAN, M. 1976. *Ruznāme-ye Qānān*. Ed. H. Nateq. Facsimile ed. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- MARVIN, C. 1883. *The Russians at Merv and Herat*. London.
- MCDANIEL, R. A. 1974. *The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution*. Minneapolis, Minn.
- MCMAHON, A. H. 1906. Recent Survey and Exploration in Seistan. *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 28, pp. 209–28, 333–52. Oxford.
- MO'AYYER AL-MAMALEK, D.-'A. 1993. *Yāddāshthā'i az zendegāni-ye khosusi-ye Nāser al-Din Shah*. (In Persian.) 3rd. ed. Tehran.

- MOBERLY, F. J. 1987. *Operations in Persia 1914–1919*. London.
- MOJTAHED-ZADEH, P. 1994. The Eastern Boundaries of Iran. In: K. McLachlan (ed.), *The Boundaries of Modern Iran*, pp. 128–39. London.
- MOKHBER AL-SALTANE, M. Q. 1965. *Khāterāt va khatarāt*. (In Persian.) 2nd ed. Tehran.
- MOMEN, M. 1981. *The Bābi and Bahā'i Religions (1844–1944): Some Contemporary Western Accounts*. Oxford.
- MOSTOWFI, 'A. 1981. *Sharh-e zendegāni-ye man*. (In Persian.) 3rd ed. Tehran. 3 vols.
- NASER AL-DIN SHAH. 1869. *Ruznāme-ye safar-e Khorāsān*. (Lithograph.) (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1874. *Ruznāme-ye safar-e Farangestān*. (Lithograph.) (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1879. *Ruznāme-ye safar-e duyom-e Farangestān*. (Lithograph.) (In Persian.) 2nd ed. Tehran.
- . 1885. *Safarnāme-ye Khorāsān*. (Lithograph.) (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . n.d. [1891]. *Ruznāme-ye safar-e seyyom-e Farangestān*. (Lithograph.) (In Persian.) Bombay.
- NASIRI-MOGHADDAM, M. N. 1995. *Gozide-ye asnād-e daryā-ye Khazar va manāteq-e shomālī-ye Irān dar jang-e jahāni-ye avval*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- NAZEM AL-ESLAM, M. M. 1970. *Tārikh-e bidāri-ye Irāniyān*. Sa'idi Sirjani. (In Persian.) Tehran. 3 vols.
- NICOLAS, A. L. M. 1905. *Seyyèd Ali Mohammed dit le Bâb*. Paris.
- OLSON, J. 1984. *Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I*. London.
- PAHLAVI, M. R. 1961. *Mission for My Country*. London.
- . 1980. *Answer to History*. New York.
- PAKDAMAN, H. 1969. *Djamal ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani*. Paris.
- PLANHOL, X. de. 1990. Boundaries: ii With Russia. In: *EIr*, Vol. 4, pp. 403–6.
- QAZIHA, F. (ed.). 2001. *Asnādi az ravābet-e Irān va Rusiye az dowre-ye Nāser al-Din Shāh tā soqut-e Qājāriye*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- RA'IN, E. 1971. *Mirzā Malkam Khan. Zendegi va kusheshhā-ye siyāsi-ye u*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- RAVASANI, S. 1973. *Sowjetrepublik Gilan*. Berlin.
- RAWLINSON, H. C. 1875. *England and Russia in the East*. London.
- RICHARD, Y. 1993. La prise du pouvoir par l'āyatollāh Khomeyni. *L'Histoire*, No. 163, pp. 28–42. Paris.
- RIYAZI HERAVI, M. Y. 1990. 'Eyn al-vaqāye'. Ed. M. A. Fekrat Heravi. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- ROOSEVELT, K. 1979. *Counter coup. The Struggle for the Control of Iran*. New York.
- . *Ruznāme-ye dowlāt-e 'alliye-ye Irān*. 1991. Facsimile ed. (In Persian.) Tehran. 2 vols.
- SADIQ AL-MAMALEK SHEYBANI, M. E. 1987. *Montakhab al-tavārikh*. Ed. I. Afshar. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- SALAR BEHZADI, 'A. R. 1993. *Baluchestān dar sāl hā-ye 1307 tā 1317 qamari*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- SALINGER, P. 1981. *America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations*. New York.
- SAVORY, R. M. 1978. Turkomans to Present Day. In: *EI²*, Vol. 4, pp. 33–43.
- . 1993. Muhammad Ridā Shāh Pahlawī. In: *EI²*, Vol. 7, pp. 446–51.
- SHAHIDI, Y. 1971. Tārikhche-ye jang-e Marv. *Barrasihā-ye tārikhi*, Vol. 6/1, pp. 35–64. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- SHEIKH-OL-ISLAMI, M. J. 1985. Ahmad Shah Qājār. In: *EIr*, Vol. 1, pp. 657–60.
- SHUSTER, W. M. 1912. *The Strangling of Persia*. New York.
- SIASSI, A. A. 1931. *La Perse au contact de l'Occident*. Paris.
- SICK, G. 1991. *October Surprise*. London/New York.
- STOBAUGH, R. B. 1978. The Evolution of Iranian Oil Policy, 1925–1975. In: G. Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, pp. 201–52. Stanford, Calif.

- SYKES, S. P. 1958. *A History of Persia*. 3rd ed. London. 2 vols.
- TAG, A.-R. 1942. *Le Babisme et l'Islam*. Paris.
- TAHERI, A. 1987. *Holy Terror*. London.
- TATE, G. P. 1909. *The Frontiers of Baluchistan. Travels on the Borders of Persia and Afghanistan*. London.
- TEYMURI, E. 2002. *'Asr-e bikhbari yā tārikh-e emtiyāzāt dar Irān*. (In Persian.) 5th ed. Tehran.
- ULIYA' BAFQI, H. 1979. Āshub-e ākhar al-zamān. *Vahid*, No. 256–7, pp. 51–63. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- VAHED, S. 1982. *Qiyām-e Gowharshād*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- VÁMBÉRY, A. 1873. *Voyages d'un faux derviche dans l'Asie centrale*. Paris.
- WILBER, D. N. 1975. *Riza Shah Pahlavi*. New York.
- WRIGHT, D. 2003. Goldsmid. In: *EIr*, Vol. 11, p. 76.
- YAQIKIYAN, G. 1984. *Showravi va jonbesh-e jangal*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- YATE, C. E. 1900. *Khurasan and Sistan*. London.
- ZAHIR AL-DOWLE, 'A. 1983. *Tārikh-e bidorugh: dar vaqāye'-e koshte shodan-e Nāser al-Din Shāh-e Qājār*. Ed. 'A. R. H. Khowsravi Khowsravani. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- ZAND, F. 1976. Mas'ale-ye āb-e Hirmand. *Vežārat-e omur-e khāreje*, 2nd series, Vol. 2, pp. 36–56. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- ZIRINSKY, M. 1992. Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah 1921–26. *IJMES*, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 639–63.
- . 2003. Riza Shah's Abrogation of Capitulations 1927–1928. In: S. Cronin (ed.), *The Making of Modern Iran*, pp. 81–98. London/New York.

CHAPTER 22

Part One: Northern Central Asia

- AMINOVA, R. Kh. 1975. *Oktyabr' i resheniye zhenskogo voprosa v Uzbekistane* [October and the Resolution of the Woman's Question in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- AVLANI, A. 1992. *Turky guliston ekud shakhlosh*. (In Uzbek.) Tashkent.
- BEHBUDI, M. 1914. Khifzi sikhati oila. *Oina*. Tashkent.
- CHORUBKASHOV, S. M. 1980. Sotsial'nye problemy privilecheniya zhenshchiny v obshchestvennoe proizvodstvo v usloviyakh Tajikskoy SSR [Social Problems of Bringing the Woman into Public Production in the Conditions of the Tajik SSR]. In: *Sotsial'nye problemy ratsional'nogo sootnosheniya professional'nykh i semeyno-bytovykh funktsiy zhenshchin* [Social Problems of the Rational Correlation between the Professional and Family-Domestic Functions of Women]. Moscow.
- DAVLETOVA, F. 1949. *Zhenshchiny-turkmenki v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny* [Turkmen Women During the Great Patriotic War]. Ashkhabad.
- DIMANSHTeyN, S. 1929. Protiv mull i ishanov [Against the Mullahs and Ishāns]. *Kommunistka*, Nos. 5–6. Moscow.
- FITRAT, A. 1998. *Oila eki oila bosharish tartiblari. Baku. 1915 i*. (In Uzbek.) Tashkent.
- IBRAGIMOVA, A. Y. 1987. *Zhenshchiny Uzbekistana v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny* [The Women of Uzbekistan During the Great Patriotic War]. Tashkent.
- KARIMOVA, S. 1976. Podgotovka kadrov zhenshchin-mekhanizatorov v Tajikistane (1959–1965) [Training of Women Machine Operators in Tajikistan (1959–1965)]. *Izvestia AN Taj. SSR* [Transactions of the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik SSR]. Dushanbe.
- Khujum-znachit nastuplenie* [Khujum Means Advance]. 1989. Tashkent.

- Kommunistka* [Communist Woman]. 1927. No. 8. Moscow.
- LYUBIMOVA, S. T. 1926. *Za noviy byt* [For the New Life]. Tashkent.
- MADZHIDOV, R. M. 1977. *Osobennosti formirovaniya ateisticheskogo mirovozreniya zhenshchiny: na materialakh Tajikskoy SSR* [Features of the Formation of a Woman's Atheistic Worldview: Based on Materials from the Tajik SSR]. Dushanbe.
- NABIEVA, R. 1973. *Zhenshchiny Tajikistana v borbe za sotsializma* [Women of Tajikistan in the Fight for Socialism]. Dushanbe.
- PALVANOVA, B. 1982. *Emansipatsiya musul'manki. Opyt raskrepostcheniya zhenshchin Sovetskogo Vostoka* [Emancipation of Muslim Women: The Experience of Emancipating the Women of the Soviet East]. Moscow.
- Partrabotnik* [Party Worker]. 1934. Nos. 3–4. Moscow.
- POLADOVA, O. 1972. Podgotovka kadrov zhenshchin-mekhanizatorov v Turkmenistane (1959–1965 gg.) [Training of Women Machine Operator Cadres in Turkmenistan (1959–1965)]. In: *Osvobozhdennaya zhenshchina Sovetskogo Vostoka*. Ashkhabad.
- POPOV, F. 1938. O rabote sredi zhenshchin v Uzbekistane [On Work Among Women in Uzbekistan]. *Antireligioznik* [Anti-Religionist], No. 12. Moscow.
- Pravda*. 8 March 1990. Moscow.
- Pravda Vostoka* [Pravda of the East]. 7 October 1927. Tashkent.
- RIZEL', F. 1932. Zhenshchina-natsional'ka v borbe za khlopkouborochnuyu [The Woman-Nationalist in the Battle for the Cotton Harvest]. *Revolutsiya i natsional'nosti* [Revolution and Nationalities], No. 9. Moscow.
- SHUKUROVA, K. S. 1970. *Sotsializm i zhenshchina Uzbekistana. Istoricheskiy opyt KPSS v raskrepostchenii zhenshchin Sovetskogo Vostoka na primere Uzbekistana: 1917–1937* [Socialism and the Woman of Uzbekistan: Historical Experience of the CPSU in Emancipating the Women of the Soviet East on the Example of Uzbekistan: 1917–1937]. Tashkent.
- TABYSHALIEVA, A. 1995. *Kul'turno-religioznye traditsii i polozhenie zhenshchin* [Cultural-Religious Traditions and the Status of Women]. Bishkek.
- . 1998. *Obrashchenie vo vremeni* [Transformation in Time]. Bishkek.
- Tashkentskaya Pravda* [Tashkent Pravda]. 24 December 1988. Tashkent.
- UBAYDULLAEVA, R. 1965. *Zhenskiy trud v sel'skom khozyaystve Uzbekistana* [Women's Labour in the Agriculture of Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- . 1980. K probleme povysheniya effektivnosti ispol'zovaniya zhenskogo truda v UzSSR [On the Problem of Improving the Efficiency of Use of Women's Labour in the UzSSR]. *Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane* [Social Sciences in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- Velikiy Oktyabr' i raskrepostcheniye zhenshchin Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana (1917–1936 gg.) [Great October and the Great Emancipation of the Women of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (1917–1936)]. 1917. In: *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Collection of Documents and Materials]. Moscow.
- VOLNY, A. 1931. Zhenskiy trud v promyshlennosti [Women's Labour in Industry]. *Chachvany goryat* [The Chachvans Burn]. Moscow/Tashkent.
- YAZYKOVA, M. 1972. Podgotovka zhenskikh rabochikh kadrov v Turkmenistane (1959–1965 gg.) [Training of the Female Workforce in Turkmenistan (1959–1965)]. In: *Osvobozhdennaya zhenshchina sovetskogo vostoka* [The Liberated Woman of the Soviet East]. Ashkhabad.
- Za partiya* [For the Party]. 1927. No. 3, supplement. Moscow.
- ZHIVOTOVSKAYA, N. P. 1963. *Trudovye podvigi zhenshchin Kirgizii v gody velikoy otechestvennoy voyny* [Feats of Labour by the Women of Kirghizia During the Great Patriotic War]. Frunze.

Part Two: Iran and Afghanistan

- AFARY, J. 1989. On the Origins of Feminism in Early Twentieth Century Iran. *Journal of Women's History*, Vol. 1, pp. 65–87. Bloomington, Ind.
- AFKHAMI, M.; FRIEDL, E. (eds.). 1994. *In the Eye of the Storm: Women in Post-Revolutionary Iran*. New York.
- BAYAT-PHILIPP, M. 1978. Women and Revolution in Iran, 1905–1911. In: L. Beck and N. R. Keddie (eds.), *Women in the Muslim World*. Cambridge, Mass.
- BLANC, J.-Ch. 1976. *L'Afghanistan et ses populations*. Brussels.
- DELLOYE, I. 2002. *Femmes d'Afghanistan*. Paris.
- DORRONSORO, G. 2000. *La révolution afghane*. Paris.
- DUPREE, L. 1973. *Afghanistan*. Princeton, N.J.
- FARHANG, M. S. 1995. *Afghānistān dar panj qarn-e akhir* [Afghanistan in the Last Five Decades]. Tehran.
- GHOBAR, G. M. 1967. *Afghānistān dar masir-e tārikh* [Afghanistan throughout History]. Kabul.
- GREGORIAN, V. 1969. *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1840–1946*. Palo Alto, Calif.
- HAIDAR, H. 2002. *Les régimes politiques et la situation des femmes en Afghanistan (1901–2001)*. Political science master's dissertation. University of Paris VIII.
- KHOMEYNI, R. *Tawzih ol-masā'el*. 1995/1996. (In Persian.) 2nd ed. Tehran.
- Khoshūnat va farhang. Asnād-e mahramāneh-ye kashf-e hejāb* [Violence and Culture. Secret Documents Concerning the Ban on the Wearing of the Veil]. 1992. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- KIAN-THIÉBAUT, A. 1997. Women and Politics in Post-Islamist Iran: The Gender Conscious Drive to Change. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 75–96. Oxford.
- . 2002. *Les femmes iraniennes entre islam, Etat et famille*. Paris.
- . 2004a. Women, Gender and Democracy Ideologies: Iran and Afghanistan. In: S. Joseph (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures*. Leiden.
- . 2004b. Women and Gender in Islamist Movements and Discourses: Iran and Afghanistan. In: S. Joseph (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures*. Leiden.
- . 2004c. Women, Gender and Jihad: Iran and Afghanistan. In: S. Joseph (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures*. Leiden.
- NAJMABADI, A. 1991. Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State, and Ideology in Contemporary Iran. In: D. Kandiyoti (ed.), *Women, Islam and the State*, pp. 48–76. London.
- PAIDAR, P. 1997. *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran*. Cambridge.
- PAZIRA, N. 2003. Hoqūq-e paymāl shodeh, hoviyyat-e bar bād rafteh: yek qarn mobārezeh-ye zan-e afghāni barāye dastyābi beh mosāvat [Trampled Rights, Crushed Identity: A Century of Struggle for Afghan Women Seeking Equality]. *Farzāneh*, Vol. 6, No. 11, pp. 53–80. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- POULLADA, L. B. 1973. *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929*. Ithaca, N.Y.
- RASHID, A. 2000. *Taliban*. New Haven, Conn./London.
- ROY, O. 1985. *L'Afghanistan: Islam et modernité politique*. Paris.
- Sahifeh-ye nūr*. 1989. Tehran. Several vols.
- UNESCO. 1998. *La femme afghane à travers l'histoire de l'Afghanistan*. Paris.
- Women's Situation in Afghanistan*. 1998. Published by women living under Muslim laws. France.

Part Three: India and Pakistan

- BASU, A. 1976. The Role of Women in Indian Struggle for Freedom. In: B. R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Women: From Purdah to Modernity*. Delhi.

- BASU, A.; RAY, B. 1990. *Women's Struggle: A History of the All India Women's Conference 1927–1990*. New Delhi.
- Census of India Report*. 1991. New Delhi.
- The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*. 1990. Repr. of 1966 ed. New Delhi.
- DAVIS, K. 1951. *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton, N.J.
- FORBES, G. 1996. *Women in Modern India*. Cambridge.
- HUSAIN, F. (ed.). 1984. *The Struggle of Women in the National Development of Pakistan. Muslim Women*. Karachi.
- INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO). 1958. *International Labour Review*.
- JHA, V. S.; PUJARI, P. (eds.). 1998. *Indian Women Today*. New Delhi. 3 vols.
- KAUR, K. 2004. *Higher Education in India, 1781–2003*. Delhi.
- KEITH, A. B. 1961. *A Constitutional History of India, 1600–1935*. Indian repr.
- KELEIN, H. G.; NESTVOGEL, R. 1986. *Women in Pakistan*. Eschborn.
- KYDD, J. C. n.d. *A History of Factory Legislation in India*. Calcutta.
- MATHUR, Y. B. 1923. *Women's Education in India 1813–1966*. Bombay.
- MINAULT, G. 1982. *Purdah Politics: The Role of Muslim Women in Indian Nationalism, 1911–24*. In: H. Papanek and G. Minault (eds.), *Separate Worlds*. Delhi.
- MOOSVI, S. 1993. De-industrialization, Population Change and Migration in Nineteenth Century India. *Indian Historical Review*, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 and 2. Delhi.
- . 1994. Work and Gender in Pre-Colonial India. In: Fauve-Chamoux and S. Sogner, *Socio-Economic Consequences of Sex-Ratios in Historical Perspective, 1500–1900*, being *Proceedings of the Eleventh International Economic History Congress*, (B5). Milan.
- MORRIS, M. D. 1965. *The Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in India*. Berkeley/Los Angeles, Calif.
- MUMTAZ, K.; SHAHEED, F. 1987. *Women in Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?* London.
- NANDA, B. R. (ed.). 1976. *Indian Women: From Purdah to Modernity*. Delhi.
- PAPANKE, H.; MINAULT, G. 1982. *Separate Worlds*. Delhi.
- SHAHAB, R. U. 1993. *Muslim Women in Political Power*. Lahore.
- SHARIFF, A. 1999. *India: Human Development Report in the 1990s*. New Delhi.
- SKINNER, J. 1825. *Tashrihul Aqwam* (MS British Library, Add. 27,255).

CHAPTER 23

- ABDUVAKHITOV, A. A. 1994. The Jadid Movement and its Impact on Contemporary Central Asia. In: H. Malik (ed.), *Central Asia*. New York.
- AGGARWAL, S. K. 1988. *Press at the Crossroads in India*. Delhi.
- AHANG, M. K. 1970. Foreign Intervention as an Obstacle to the Diffusion of Thought in 19th-Century Afghanistan. In: A. Guha (ed.), *Central Asia*. New Delhi.
- ALLWORTH, E. A. 1990. *The Modern Uzbeks*. Stanford, Calif.
- AMINOVA, R. Kh. 1985. *The October Revolution and Women's Liberation in Uzbekistan*. Moscow.
- ARASTEH, A. R. 1969. *Education and Social Awakening in Iran, 1850–1968*. Leiden.
- BENNIGSEN, A.; LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY, Ch. 1964. *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920*. Paris.
- BENSON, L. 1990. Uyghur Politicians of the 1940s. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 10, No. 4. London.

- BOND, A. R.; BELKINDAS, M. V.; TREYVISH, A. I. 1991. Economic Development Trends in the USSR, 1970–1988. Part II: *Soviet Geography*, Part 2 (Consumption, Investment and Income Distribution), Vol. 32, No. 1. Welwyn.
- CARLEY, P. M. 1989. The Price of the Plan: Perceptions of Cotton and Health in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 4. London.
- CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE, H. 1962. Tsarist Educational Policy in Turkestan, 1867–1917. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 4. London.
- CHATHLEY, Y. P. 1995. *Education, Population and Development – A Regional Perspective of North West India*. Chandigarh.
- CHEN, J. 1977. *The Sinkiang Story*. New York.
- CHRISTIE, E. R. 1925. *Through Khiva to Golden Samarkand*. London.
- DESAI, P. B. 1978. Studies in Social Dynamics of Primary Health Care. In: A. Bose and P. B. Desai (eds.), *Studies in Social Dynamics of Primary Health Care*. Delhi.
- EILER, W. 1978. Educational and Cultural Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era. In: G. Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under The Pahlavis*. Stanford, Calif.
- ERSANLI, B. 1999. Highlighting Traditional Manners: Edep/Adab Lessons and Political Culture in Central Asia. In: N. N. Vohra (ed.), *Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia and India*. Delhi.
- The Europa World Year Book 2003*. 2003. Vols. 1 and 2. London.
- GLANTZ, M. H.; RUBINSTEIN, A. Z.; ZONN, I. 1994. Tragedy in the Aral Sea Basin: Looking Back to Plan Ahead? In: H. Malik (ed.), *Central Asia*. New York.
- GLENN, J. 1999. *The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia*. Basingstoke, Hants.
- GROVER, A. N. 1990. *Press and the Law*. New Delhi.
- HAAS, W. S. 1946. *Iran*. New York.
- Health Services in the USSR*. 1960. Public Health Papers 3, World Health Organization. Geneva.
- History of the Mongolian People's Republic*. 1973. Moscow.
- Jadidism – A Current Soviet Assessment. 1964. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No.1. London.
- JONES, K. W. 1994. Socio-religious Reform Movement of British India. *The New Cambridge History of India*, Vol. 3/1. Cambridge.
- KAISER, R. A. 1992. Social Mobilisation in Soviet Central Asia. In: R. A. Lewis (ed.), *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia*. London.
- KHURSHID, A. S. 1954. Press in Pakistan. In: A. S. Khurshid (ed.), *Press in Muslim World*. Lahore.
- KUNITZ, J. 1943. *Dawn Over Samarkand*. Calcutta.
- MALIK, L.; HUSSAIN, N. 1994. Women in Higher Education in Pakistan: Separate but Equal. In: S. Lie, L. S. Malik and D. Harris (eds.), *The Gender Gap in Higher Education*. (World Yearbook of Education 1994.) London/Philadelphia.
- Medical Services in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. 1963. *Central Asian Survey*, Part 2, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp.125–7. London.
- MEDLIN, W. K.; CAVE, W. M.; CARPENTER, F. 1971. *Education and Development in Central Asia: A Case Study on Social Change in Uzbekistan*. Leiden.
- Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1987g*. 1988. Moscow.
- NASER, R. 1989. Reflections on the Aral Sea Tragedy in the National Literature of Turkistan. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 1. London.
- PATNAIK, A. 1989. *Perestroika and Women Labour Force in Soviet Central Asia, New Literature*. New Delhi.
- . 1996. *Central Asia. Between Modernity and Tradition*. New Delhi.

- PENAN, J.; BAKALO, I. I.; BEREDAY, G. Z. F. 1971. *Modernisation and Diversity in Soviet Education. With Special Reference to Nationality Groups*. New York.
- The Peoples of Central Asia: Social Customs. 1959. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 3. London.
- QURESHI, I. H. 1975. *Education in Pakistan, An Enquiry into Objectives and Achievements*. Karachi.
- ROTTIER, P. 2003. The Kazakhness of Sedentarisation: Promoting Progress as Tradition in Response to the Land Question. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 22, No. 1. London.
- SABOL, S. 2003. *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness*. Basingstoke, Hants.
- SHARIFF, A. 1990. A Few Cultural Concepts and Socio-Behavioural Aspects of Human Health in India. In: J. C. Caldwell et al. (eds.), *What We Know About Health Transition: The Cultural, Social and Behavioral Determinants of Health*, Series No. 2 (Vol. 2). Canberra.
- SINGH, M. 1998. Education in Afghanistan. In: *EIr*, Vol. 8 (available on website: http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/people/Shorish-Education_in_Afghanistan.htm).
- . 1999. *Companion to Adult Education*. New Delhi.
- Socialist Mongolia*. 1981. Ulaanbaatar.
- Trends in Education in Central Asia. 1959. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 1. London.
- UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1997*. 1999. Paris.
- World Health Organization (WHO). 1960. Geneva.
- YUAN QING-LI. 1990. Population Change in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 10, No. 4. London.
- YUAN XIN. 1996. Ethnic Uigurs. In: Zhang Tianlu and Huang Rongqing (eds), *China's Minority Population: Surveys and Research*, No. 8 in the series *China's Population in Transition and Development*. Beijing (available on website: <http://www.usembassy.china.org.cn/sandt/xjnotes.htm>).
- ZAIDI, A. 1988. *The Political Economy of Health Care in Pakistan*. Lahore.
- ZIMANOV, S. Z.; IDRISOV, K. Z. 1989. *Obshchestvenno-politicheskie vzgliady Mukhamedzhana Serelina*. Alma-Ata.

CHAPTER 24

- ABDULLAEV, Kh. M. 1958. *40 let Sovetskoy nauki v Uzbekistane*. Tashkent.
- ABDUR RAHMAN; QUERESHI, M. A. et al. (eds.). 1990. *Science and Technology in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka*. Harlow.
- AKAEV, A. A. (ed.). 1990. *Akademicheskaya nauka Kirgizstana: istoriya i problemy*. Frunze.
- Alma-Ata. Nauka Sovetskogo Kazakhstana, 1920–1960*. 1960. Eds. K. I. Satpaev, Sh. Ch. Chokin et al. Alma-Ata.
- AZIMOV, P. A. (ed.). 1971. *Razvitie nauki v Sovetskom Turkmenistane*. Ashkhabad.
- The Economist*. 2000. Vol. 15, No. 4.
- ERJANOV, B. A.; MOROZOV, V. P. 1996. Problems and Perspectives of the Creation of Information Infrastructure of the Bodies of State Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In: C. Corsi and S. Kudrya (eds.), *Globalization of Science and Technology: A Way for C.I.S. Countries to New Markets*. Dordrecht.
- FAZYLOV, Kh. F. 1959. *Razvitie nauki v Uzbekskoy SSR*. Tashkent.
- FLOOR, W. 2004. *Public Health in Qajar Iran*. Washington, D.C.
- FORBES, A. D. W. 1986. *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949*. Cambridge.

- GOPAL, D. 1987. *Science, Technology, and Development in Afghanistan*. New Delhi.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. 1999. *Finance & Development*, Vol. 36, No. 2.
- KUPPURAM, G.; KUMUDAMANI, K. (eds.). 1990. *History of Science and Technology in India*. New Delhi.
- MACLEOD, R.; KUMAR, D. (eds.). 1995. *Technology and the Raj: Western Technology and Technical Transfers to India, 1700–1947*. New Delhi.
- MELIKOV, G. G. 1992. *Mezhdunarodnye nauchnye svyazi Turkmenistana, 1924–1980 gg.* Ashgabat.
- MENASHRI, D. 1992. *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*. Ithaca, N.Y.
- RAHMAN, A. n.d. *Higher Education, Science and Technology in Pakistan: A Matter of National Survival*. n.p.
- RAJABOV, Z. 1968. *Science in Soviet Tajikistan*. Moscow.
- RINGER, M. M. 2001. *Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar Iran*. Costa Mesa, Calif.
- RISKIEV, T. 1996. State Support to Organization and Development of Innovation in the Republic of Uzbekistan. In: C. Corsi and S. Kudrya (eds.), *Globalization of Science and Technology: A Way for C.I.S. Countries to New Markets*. Dordrecht.
- Science and Technology Manpower Development in Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal*. 1985. Islamabad.
- SEDJAV, T.-U. 2000. *Die historische Entwicklung von Wissenschaft und Technik in der Mongolei*. Weiden.
- SIDDIQI, R. 1979. *History of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences, 1953 to 1978*. Islamabad.
- THORNTON, E.; THORNTON, A. 1910. *Leaves from an Afghan Scrapbook. The Experiences of an English Official and His Wife in Kabul*. London.
- TORBAT, A. 2002. The Brain Drain from Iran to the United States. *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 2. Washington, D.C.
- WILBER, D. 1962. *Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*. New Haven, Conn.

CHAPTER 25

- ABDULLAEV, K.; FAKHRETDINOVA, D.; KHAKIMOV, A. 1988. *Pesn' v metalle*. Tashkent.
- ANTIPINA, K. I. 1962. *Osobennosti material'noy kul'tury prikladnogo iskusstva yuzhnykh Kirgizov*. Frunze.
- Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, Vol. 1. 1999. International Institute for Central Asian Studies. Samarkand/Tashkent.
- Atlas of Central Asian Artistic Crafts and Trades*, Vol. 3. 2002. International Institute for Central Asian Studies. Samarkand/Bishkek.
- BELINSKAYA, N. A. 1965. *Dekorativnoe iskusstvo gornogo Tajikistana (Tekstil')*. Dushanbe.
- . 1981. *Po zakonam krasoty. Ocherki dekorativnogo iskusstva Tajikistana*. Dushanbe.
- CHEPELEVETSKAYA, G. L. 1961. *Suzani Uzbekistana*. Tashkent.
- Dekorativnoe-prikladnoe iskusstvo Turkmenii*. 1976. Leningrad.
- DZHANIBEKOV, U. D. 1982. *Kul'tura kazakhskogo remesla*, p. 144. Alma-Ata.
- FAKHRETDINOVA, D. A. 1972. *Dekorativno-prikladnoe iskusstvo Uzbekistana*. Tashkent.
- GAVRILOV, M. F. 1921. In: *Izvestiya Sredazkoma po delam kul'tury remeslennykh tsekhakh Sredney Azii*. Tashkent.
- ISAEVA-YUNUSOVA, N. 1979. *Tajikskaya vyshivka*. Moscow.
- Iskusstvo natsiy (1992–2002)*. 2002. Moscow.

- Iskusstvo Sovetskogo Uzbekistana 1917–1972 gg.* 1976. (Authors include: V. Dolinskaya, P. Zakhidov, G. Kadyrova, T. Silanteva, R. Taktash, A. Umarov, D. A. Fakhretdinova, et al.). *Sovetskiy Khudozhnik*. Moscow.
- Iskusstvo sovetskikh respublik Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana.* 1982. Moscow.
- Iskusstvo Sredney Azii.* 1988. Leningrad.
- Iskusstvo Uzbekistana (1991–2001).* 2001. Tashkent.
- Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo Kirgizstana.* 1987. Frunze.
- Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo Tajikskoy SSR.* 1990. Moscow.
- Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo Turkmenskoy SSR.* 1984. Moscow.
- KHAKIMOV, A. 1988. *Dekorativnoe iskusstvo respublik Sredney Azii.* Tashkent.
- . 1990. *Dekorativnaya plastika respublik Sredney Azii.* Tashkent.
- . 2002. 'Sad vostochnoy filosofii' ili zametki o sovremennom iskusstve Uzbekistana. *Iskusstvo natsiy (1992–2002)*, pp. 211–17. Moscow.
- Khudozhniki Sovetskoy Kirgizii.* 1982. Frunze.
- Khudozhniki Tajikistana.* 1983. Moscow.
- KOLBOSINOVA, R. 1972. *Molodye khudozhniki Kazakhstana.* Alma-Ata.
- KURAEVA, G.; YAGSHYMYRADOV, N. 2002. Stranniki vo vremeni. *Iskusstvo natsiy (1992–2002)*, pp. 199–203. Moscow.
- LI, K. 2002. Iskusstvo Kazakhstana: na putyakh k samoindentifikatsii. In: *Iskusstvo natsiy (1992–2002)*, pp. 71–7. Moscow.
- LUZANOVA, E. 2002. Kyrgyzstan v iskusstve nashikh dney. *Iskusstvo natsiy (1992–2002)*, pp. 85–91. Moscow.
- MARGULAN, A. Kh. 1986. *Kazakhskoe narodnoe prikladnoe iskusstvo*, Vol. 1. Alma-Ata.
- Mastera izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva Kazakhstana.* 1984, p. 109. Alma-Ata.
- MIROSHNIKOV, L. I. 1992. A Note on the Meaning of the Term 'Central Asia' as Used in this Book. In: *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. 1, pp. 477–80. Paris.
- MOROZOVA, A. S. 1960. *Mashinnaya vyshivka Uzbekistana.* Tashkent.
- . 1964. *Lokal'nye cherty v narodnom dekorativnom iskusstve Uzbekistana.* Moscow.
- MOSHKOVA, V. G. 1970. *Kovry narodov Sredney Azii kontsa 19–nachala 20 vv.* Tashkent.
- Narodnaya keramika Sredney Azii.* 1973. Moscow.
- Narodnoe dekorativno-prikladnoe iskusstvo Kirgizov.* 1968. Moscow.
- Narodnoe-prikladnoe iskusstvo Tajikov.* 1987. Dushanbe.
- Narodnye sokrovishcha Kirgizii.* 1974. Frunze.
- Narody mira. Etnograficheskiye ocherki.* 1962. Vol. 1: *Narody Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana.* Moscow.
- ORAZBAEV, N. A. 1970. *Narodnoe dekorativno-prikladnoe iskusstvo Kazakhov.* Leningrad.
- Peyzazh gornogo kraya.* 1986. Dushanbe.
- POZDNYAKOVA, G. R. 1976. *Kazakhskiy suvenir*, p. 183. Alma-Ata.
- RAKHIMOV, M. K. 1961. *Khudozhestvennaya keramika Uzbekistana.* Tashkent.
- ROSSABI, M. 1988. Central Asia. In: *Encyclopedia of Asian History*, Vol. 1, pp. 238–9. New York/London.
- SAUROVA, G. I. 1968. *Sovremenniy Turkmenskiy kover i ego traditsii.* Ashkhabad.
- . 1984. *Turkmenskoe monumental'noe iskusstvo (1917–1980 gg.).* Ashkhabad.
- SIDORENKO, A. I.; ARTYKOV, A. R.; RADZHABOV, R. R. 1981. *Zolotoe shit'yo.* Bukhara/Tashkent.
- SYCHEVA, N. S. 1980. *Narodnoe dekorativno-prikladnoe iskusstvo Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana*, p. 35. Moscow.

- TURSUNOV, N. O. 1974. *Iz istorii gorodskogo remesla Severnogo Tajikistana*. Dushanbe.
 UMETALIEVA, D. G. 1966. *Kirgizskiy vorsoviy kover*. Frunze.
 UNDEROVA, L. V. 1994. *Uzbekskaya narodnaya odezhda kontsa XIX–XX vv.* Tashkent.
Vystavka proizvedeniy khudozhnikov Kazakhstana. 1987. Moscow.
 ZALETAEV, V. S. 1979. *Drevnie novye dorogi Turkmenii*. Moscow.

CHAPTER 26

Part One: The art and architecture of Xinjiang

- LAI, T. C.; MOK, R. (eds.). 1985. *Jade Flute: The Story of Chinese Music*. New York.
Map of the People's Republic of China. 1994. Beijing.
 SPENCE, J. D. 1999. *The Search for Modern China*. New York.
The Times Comprehensive Atlas of the World. 2004. London.
 TREGGAR, M. 1980. *Chinese Art*. London.

Part Two: Uighur vernacular architecture

- AKINER, S. 1983. *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*. London.
 —. (ed.). 1991. *Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia*. London.
 ASLANAPA, O. 1971. *Turkish Art and Architecture*. London.
 CHEN, J. 1977. *The Sinkiang Story*. New York.
 KRADER, L. 1971. *Peoples of Central Asia*. Bloomington, Ind.
 LI. 1985. *Xinjiang Crafts Art*. Urumqi.
 MACKERRAS, C. 1973. *The Uighur Empire: According to T'ang Dynastic Histories*. Columbia, S.C.
 —. 1995. *China's Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration since 1912*. New York.
 ROZI, R. 1991. *Traditional Houses and the Communities in Kashghar*. Paper read at the Third Conference on Chinese Vernacular Architecture. Guilin.
 —. 1992a. The National Style in Built Environment. *Journal of Northwestern Institute of Architectural Engineering*, pp. 45–8. Xi'an.
 —. 1992b. *Creating Pleasant Living Environment from Interpreting Traditional Houses*. Paper read at the Fourth Conference on Chinese Vernacular Architecture. Jingdezhen.
 —. 1993. *Traditional Uyghur Houses in Xinjiang*. Paper read at the International Conference on Chinese Traditional Houses. Guangzhou.
 —. 1995. Traditional Houses in Khashghar and the Distinctive Features of the City. *History and Culture of Vernacular Architecture*. Guangzhou.
 —. 1997. The Vernacular Architecture in Urumchi. In: P. Oliver (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World*. Cambridge.
 —. 1998. *Uyghur Vernacular Architecture: Cultural Form and the Syntax of the Built Environment*. Master's thesis. Department of Architecture, University of Queensland, Brisbane.
 WANG, J. C.; YANG, G. S.; ROZI, R. 1997. The Vernacular Architecture of Uyghur. In: P. Oliver (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World*. Cambridge.
 YAN DA-CHUN (ed.). 1995. *Vernacular Architecture in Xinjiang*. Beijing.
 YANG, C. F. 1994. The Research on Chinese Traditional Decoration Colours. *Architectural Journal*. Beijing.

Part Three: The art and architecture of Mongolia

- ALTAN'ORGIL. 1981. *Köke Qota-yin süm-e keyid* [Temples and Monasteries of Höhhot]. (In Mongolian.) Höhhot.

- ANDREWS, P. A. 1999. *Felt Tents and Pavilions: The Nomadic Tradition and Its Interaction with Princely Tentage*. London. 2 vols.
- BARTHOLOMEW, T. T. 1995. An Introduction to the Art of Mongolia. In: P. Berger and T. T. Bartholomew (eds.), *Mongolia: The Legacy of Chinggis Khan*, pp. 76–87. San Francisco, Calif.
- BATYREVA, S. G. 1991. *Starokalmytskoe iskusstvo* [Old Kalmuk Art]. Elista.
- BERGER, P. 1995. Zanabazar (1635–1723). In: P. Berger and T. T. Bartholomew (eds.), *Mongolia: The Legacy of Chinggis Khan*, pp. 261–304. San Francisco, Calif.
- BERGER, P.; BARTHOLOMEW, T. T. 1995. *Mongolia: The Legacy of Chinggis Khan*. San Francisco, Calif.
- BORISENKO, I. 1994. *Khramy Kalmykii* [Temples of Kalmykia]. Elista.
- CHARLEUX, I. 1999. La peinture des donateurs du temple de Maitreya en Mongolie méridionale. *Arts Asiatiques*, Vol. 54, pp. 85–102.
- CHARLEUX, I.; LACAZE, G. 2004. L'intronisation du IXe Dalai lama vue par un prince mongol: un rouleau peint conservé à la bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises. *Arts Asiatiques*, Vol. 59, pp. 30–57.
- CHOINKHOR, J. 1995. *Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar/Undur Geghen Zanabazar*. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- DARIIMAA, G. 2003. *Dursagdakhyn buyantai burkhan zuraach* [A Buddhist Iconographic Painter Worthy of Memory]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- DASHNYAM, L.; OCHIR, A.; URTNASAN, N.; TSEWEENDORJ, D. 1999. *Mongol nutag dakhi tiiikh soyolyn dursgal: sedewchilsen lawlakh* [Historical and Cultural Monuments on the Territory of Mongolia: A Classified Reference]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- ELVERSKOG, J. 2003. *The Jewel Translucent Sūtra: Altan Khan and the Mongols in the Sixteenth Century*. Leiden.
- ERDENITOTAQU. 1958/1981. *Orcin üy-e-yin Monggol-un aldartu uran jokiyaalcid* [Famous Mongol Authors of the Recent Period]. 1958. Repr. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- GAUBATZ, P. R. 1996. *Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers*. Stanford, Calif.
- JACKSON, D. P.; JACKSON, J. A. 1984. *Tibetan Thangka Painting: Methods and Materials*. New York.
- LANG, M.-K.; KRIST, S. 2003. Surharban Depicted: An Analytic Double View. In: A. Sárközi and A. Rákos (eds.), *Altaica Budapestinensia MMII*, pp. 199–210. Budapest.
- LIU WENYAN; LAI BINGWEN. 1988. *Yinzhannaxi zhuan* [Biography of Injannashi]. Shenyang.
- LOMAKINA, I. I. 1974. *Marzan Sharav*. Moscow.
- MAIDAR, D. 1988. *Grafika Mongolii*. Moscow.
- MINERT, L. K. 1983. *Pamiatniki arkhitektury Buriatii* [Monuments of the Architecture of Buriatia]. Novosibirsk.
- NEI MENGGU BOWUGUAN. 1987. *Nei Menggu minzu wenwu* [Inner Mongolian Ethnic Artefacts]. Beijing.
- ÖLZII, J. 1992. *Mongolyn dursgalt uran barilgyn tiiikhees* [From the History of Mongolian Monumental Architecture]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- PUPYSHEV, V. N. 1995. *Budiyskaya zhivopis' Buriatii iz fondov Muzeia Istorii Buriatii im. M. N. Khangalova* [Buddhist Art of Buriatia from the Collections of the M. N. Khangalov Museum of the History of Buriatia]. Ulan-Ude.
- RHIE, M. M.; THURMAN, R. A. F. 1991. *Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet*. New York.

- SÉLHÉJAB; OYUNBILIG, L. 1991. *Badgar Süm-e*. (In Mongolian.) Chifeng.
- SHCHEPETIL'NIKOV, N. M. 1960. *Arkhitectura Mongolii* [Architecture of Mongolia]. Moscow.
- SONOMTSEREN, L. 1971. *Orchin üyeiin Mongolyn dürslekh urlag* [Modern Mongolian Fine Arts]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar/Leningrad.
- SONOMTSEREN, L.; BATCHULUUN, L. 1989. *Mongolyn dürslekh urlagiin towch tüükh* [A Brief History of Mongolian Fine Arts]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- STODDARD, H. 1995. The Tibetan Pantheon: Its Mongolian Form. In: P. Berger and T. T. Bartholomew (eds.), *Mongolia: The Legacy of Chinggis Khan*, pp. 206–60. San Francisco, Calif.
- TSEND, Sh.; JADAMBAA, T.; B. GARMAA, B., et al. (eds.). 1974. *Ulaanbaatar*. Ulaanbaatar.
- TSERENDULAM, Z. 1982. *Uran zuraach D. Choidog* [The Painter D. Choidog]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- TSULTEM, N.-O. 1982. *Vydayushchiysya mongol'skiy skul'ptor G. Dzanabadzar* [The Eminent Sculptor G. Zanabazar]. Ulaanbaatar.
- . 1986a. *Iskusstvo Mongolii s drevneyshikh vremen do nachala XX veka* [Art of Mongolia from Ancient Times to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century]. Moscow.
- . 1986b. *Mongol'skaya natsional'naya zhivopis' 'Mongol zurag'* [Development of the Mongolian National-Style Painting 'Mongol Zurag']. Ulaanbaatar.
- . 1988. *Arkhitectura Mongolii* [Mongolian Architecture]. Ulaanbaatar.
- . 1989. *Skul'ptura Mongolii* [Mongolian Sculpture]. Ulaanbaatar.
- UNION OF MONGOLIAN ARTISTS. 2002–2004. Website: <http://www.uma.mn/index.html>.
- VINKOVICS, J. 2003. Three Inner Mongolian Painted Scrolls in the Exhibition 'Collecting Oriental Art in Hungary'. In: A. Sárközi and A. Rákos (eds.), *Altaica Budapestinensia MMII*, pp. 384–8. Budapest.

CHAPTER 27

Part One: Iran and Afghanistan

General Bibliography

- ADLE, C. 2001. Acquaintance with Cinema and the First Steps of Filming and Filmmaking in Iran, 1899 to ca. 1907 A.D./1277 to ca. 1285 A.S. *Tavoos*, Vol. 2, Nos. 5 and 6 (autumn 2000 and winter 2001). English text, pp. 180–215; Persian text, pp. 58–90. 2nd ed. Tehran.
- ADLE, C.; ZOKA, Y. 1983. Notes et documents sur la photographie iranienne et son histoire; I: Les premiers daguerréotypistes, c. 1844–1845/1260–1270. *Studia Iranica*, Vol. 12, fasc. 2, pp. 249–280. Leiden.
- AFSHAR, I. 1371/1992. *A Treasure of Early Iranian Photographs*. Tehran.
- ALEXANDER, C. 1932. *A Modern Wayfarer in Persia*. London.
- BLÜCHER, Von, W. 1949. *Zeitwende in Iran: Erlebnisse und Beobachtungen*. Biberach an der Riss.
- BYRON, R. 1937. *The Road to Oxiana*. London.
- EMANUEL, W. V. 1939. *The Wild Asses, a Journey through Persia*. London.
- E'TEMAD AL-SALTANEH, M. H. K. 1306/1884. *Ketāb al-Athār va'l-Ma'āther*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- JAVADI, H. 1988. *Satire in Persian Literature*. Cranbury.
- MAGHSOUDLOU, B. 1987. *Iranian Cinema*. New York.
- MERRIT-HAWKES, O. A. 1935. *Persia. Romance and Reality*. London.
- MILLER, J. 1934. *Camel-Bells of Baghdad*. Boston, Mass./New York.

- NAFICY, H. 1981. Cinema as a Political Instrument. In: M. E. Bonine and N. Keddie (eds.), *Modern Iran. The Dialectics of Continuity and Change*. New York.
- POLAK, J. E. 1865. *Persien, das Land und seine Bewohner*, Vol. 1. Leipzig. 2 vols.
- REITLINGER, G. 1932. *A Tower of Skulls*. London.
- Rāznāmeḥ-ye Ettele'āt*. 1329/1950. Ettele'āt dar yek-rob'-e qarn. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- SULLIVAN, K. 2002. *Taliban Had it Wrong*. Washington Post Foreign Service (2 January 2002). Washington, D.C.
- VEZARAT-E ERSHAD-E MELLI. 1363/1984. *Sinemā-ye Irān va Sevvomīn Jashnvāreh-ye Film-e Fajr*. Tehran.
- Painting (Iran)**
- BALAGHI, S.; GUMPERT, L. (eds.). 2002. *Picturing Iran. Art, Society and Revolution*. London/New York.
- A Decade with Graphists of the Islamic Revolution, 1979–1989* [*Dah sāl bā tarrāhān-egrafik-e enghelāb-e eslāmi, 1979–1989*]. 1989. Comp. A. Aliy. Tehran.
- A Decade with Painters of the Islamic Revolution, 1979–1989* [*Dah sāl bā naqqāshān-e enghelāb-e eslāmi, 1979–1989*]. 1989. Comp. M. Gudarzi. Tehran.
- EMAMI, K. 1977. Modern Persian Artists. In: E. Yarshater (ed.), *Iran Faces the Seventies*. New York/Washington, D.C./London.
- . 1987. Art in Iran: xi. Post-Qajar (Painting). In: *EIr*, Vol. 2, pp. 640–6.
- ETTINGHAUSEN, R. 1977. An Introduction to Modern Persian Painting. In: E. Yarshater (ed.), *Iran Faces the Seventies*. New York/Washington, D.C./London.
- FLOOR, W. 1999. Art (Naqqashi) and Artists (Naqqashan) in Qajar Persia. *Muqarnas*, Vol. 16. Cambridge, Mass.
- GALLOWAY, D. (ed.). 2000. *Parviz Tanavoli: Sculptor, Writer and Collector*. Tehran.
- GOLESTAN, L. (ed.). 1359/1980. *Sohrab Sepehri: shā'er, naqqāsh, 1307–1359*. (Offset.) Tehran.
- PAKBAZ, R. 1974. *Contemporary Iranian Painting and Sculpture*. Tehran.
- PAKBAZ, R.; EMDADIYAN, Y. 1379/2001. *Pioneers of Iranian Modern Painting*. Tehran.
- Les peintures populaires de la légende persane*. 1979. Catalogue of an exhibition held at Maison de l'Iran in Paris in 1979 by Groupe 7/Animation. Texts in French and English. Paris.
- Religious Inspiration in Iranian Art* [*Honar-e irāni bā elhām as 'aqāyed-e dini va mazhabī*]. 1978. Tehran.
- A Selection of Works Exhibited at the First Biennale of Iranian Painters* [*Gozideh-i az āsār-e avvalin nemāyeshgāh-e do sālāneh-e naqqāshān-e Iran*]. 1991. Tehran.
- Tavoos* [magazine in both English and Persian; contains many articles on modern art]. Tehran.
- Theatre (Iran)**
- BEYZA'I, B. 1345/1966. *Namāyesh dar Irān*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- FLOOR, W. In press. *The History of Theater in Iran*. Washington, D.C.
- MALEKPUR, J. 1363/1984. *Adabiyāt-e Namāyeshi dar Irān*. (In Persian.) Tehran. 2 vols.
- REZVANI, M. 1962. *Le théâtre et la danse en Iran*. Paris.
- Cinema (Iran)**
- ADLE, C. 2001. Acquaintance with Cinema and the First Steps of Filming and Filmmaking in Iran, 1899 to ca. 1907 A.D./1277 to ca. 1285 A.S. *Tavoos*, Vol. 2, Nos. 5 and 6 (autumn 2000 and winter 2001). English text, pp. 180–215; Persian text, pp. 58–90. 2nd ed. Tehran.
- DABASHI, H. 2001. *Close Up: Iranian Cinema, Past, Present, and Future*. New York.
- ELENA, A. 2005. *The Cinema of Abbas Kiarostami*. London.
- HAGHIGHAT, M. 1999. *Histoire du cinéma Iranien: 1900–1999*. Paris.
- ISSA, R.; WHITAKER, S. (eds.). 1999. *Life and Art. The New Iranian Cinema*. London.

- KÉY, H. 1999. *Le cinéma iranien. L'image d'une société en bouillonnement*. Paris.
- MAGHSOUDLOU, B. 1987. *Iranian Cinema*. New York.
- NAFICY, H. 2001. *An Accented Cinema. Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking*. Princeton, N.J.
- OMID, J. 1372/1993. *Farhang-e filmhā-ye sinemā-ye Irān 1308–1350*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1377/1998. *Tārikh-e sinemā-ye Irān, 1297–1357* [The History of Iranian Cinema, 1900–1978]. (In Persian.) 2nd ed. Tehran.
- Photography (Iran)**
- ADLE, C. In press [2005]. Photography in Persia, The Daguerreotypists: c. 1842–1860. In: C. Adle and P. Luft (eds.), *The Qajar Epoch, Arts and Architecture*. London.
- ADLE, C.; ZOKA, Y. 1983. Notes et documents sur la photographie iranienne et son histoire; I: Les premiers daguerréotypistes, c. 1844–1845/1260–1270. *Studia Iranica*, Vol. 12, fasc. 2, pp. 249–280. Leiden.
- ADLE, K. 1977. *Gowzari be chārmahāl-e bakhtiyāri* [A Passage through Chārmahāl-e Bakhtiyāri]. Tehran.
- AFSHAR, I. 1983. Some Remarks on the Early History of Photography in Iran. In: E. Bosworth and C. Hillenbrand (eds.), *Qajar Iran*, pp. 214–82. Edinburgh.
- BAKHTYAR, R. N. 2001. *Kenār-e har rudi gām zadam ān rud Zāyendeh-rud shod* [Every River I Strolled Along Became the Zayendeh-rud]. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- BOHRER, F. 1999. *Sevruguine and the Persian Image, Photographs of Iran, 1870–1930*, Washington, D.C.
- FARIDANI, N. 1994. *Irān*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- Imposed War, Defence vs Aggression*. 1983–7. Published by War Information Headquarters, Supreme Defence Council. Tehran. 5 vols.
- KASRA'İYAN, N. 1990. *Sarzamin-e mā Irān* [Our Homeland Iran]. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- Nashriyeh-ye herfeh va honarmand*. 1381/2002. No 3, pp. 59–79. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- Panj negāh be khāk* [Five Glances at the Soil]. 1981. (Sixty-three photographs by five Iranian photographers: Karim Emāmi, Mahshid Farahmand, Yahyā Dehqānpur, Bahman Jalāli and Mehdi Khonsāri.) (In Persian.) Tehran.
- Sevruguin's Iran*. 1999. Eds. F. Barjesteh and collaborators. Tehran.
- SHAFAYEH, H. 1981. 'Akkāsi. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- . 1993. *Fann va honar-e 'akkāsi* [The Technique and the Art of Photography]. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- TAHMASPOUR, M. In press [2006]. Akkāsi [Photography]. In: *Dāneshnāme-ye Irān*. Tehran.
- ZOKA, Y. 1977. *Tārikh-e 'akkāsi va 'akkāsān-e pishgām* [The History of Photography and Pioneer Photographers in Iran]. Tehran.
- . In press [2006]. *Tārikh-e 'akkāsi* [The History of Photography]. Tehran.
- Cinema (Afghanistan)**
- Afghanistan Today (magazine). January–February 1988. No. 1. Website: <http://www.afghancommunicator.com/magazine/012/ae012.php>.
- SORUR, K. A. 1379/2001. *Teyātr dar Afghānistān: shāmel-e teyātr-e gunehhā, pishgāman va das-tandarkārān*. Peshawar.
- Part Two: India and Pakistan**
- AIJAZUDDIN, F. S. 1977. *Pahari Paintings and Sikh Portraits in the Lahore Museum*. London.
- ARCHER, M. 1947. *Patna Painting*, London.
- . 1972. *Company Drawings in the India Office Library*. London.
- . 1979. *India and British Portraiture: 1770–1825*. London.

- ARCHER, M.; ARCHER, W. G. 1955. *Indian Painting for the British, 1770–1880*. London.
- ARCHER, W. G. 1966. *Paintings of the Sikhs*. London.
- BHUVANENDRAN, N. 1991. *Interpretation of Indian Art*. New Delhi.
- BOURNE, S. 1975. A Fortune in Old Photographs (review article). *Times of India*. 20 April.
- BROWN, P. 1965. *The Heritage of India. Indian Painting*. New Delhi.
- CARVEN, Jr.; ROY, C. 1963. Contemporary Art in India. *Roopa-Lekha*, Vol. 34, Nos. 1 and 2. New Delhi.
- CROWTHER, B. 1979. Motion Pictures. In: M. G. Shapp (ed.), *The New Book of Knowledge*, Vol. 12, pp. 472–88. New York.
- GOETZ, H. 1959. India. In: *Five Thousand Years of Indian Art*. Bombay.
- GRIFFITHS, J. 1896. *The Paintings in the Buddhist Cave-temples of Ajanta, Khandesh (India)*. London. 2 vols.
- HAVELL, E. B. 1911. *The Ideals of Indian Art*. London.
- . 1964. *The Art Heritage of India*. 2nd ed. Bombay.
- HUGEL, B. C. 1972. *Kashmir and the Punjab*. Delhi.
- KAUL, M. 1961. *Trends in Indian Painting*. New Delhi.
- KHAN, S. 1988. Contemporary Paintings of Bangladesh. *Roopa-Lekha*, Vol. 60, Nos. 1 and 2. New Delhi.
- MITTER, P. 1992. Status and Patronage of Arts During British Rule in India (1850–1900). In: *The Powers of Art*. Delhi.
- PUROHIT, V. 1988a. *Arts of Transitional India, 20th Century*. Delhi. 2 vols.
- . 1988b. *Arts of Transitional India, 20th Century*. London. 2 vols.
- RAGHUVANSHI, V. P. S. 1969. *Indian Society in the Eighteenth Century*. New Delhi.
- RANGOONWALA, F. 1970. Phalke Centenary Celebration Souvenir. *The Phalke Centenary Celebration Committee*. Poona.
- RYDER, L. L. 1956. Motion Pictures. In: W. T. Couch (ed.), *Collier's Encyclopedia*, Vol. 14, pp. 196b–218. New York.
- SMITH, V. A. 1911. *A History of Fine Art in India & Ceylon*. Oxford.
- SRIVASTAVA, R. P. 1983. *Punjab Painting. Study in Art and Culture*. New Delhi.
- SUBRAMANYAM, K. G. 1978. *Moving Focus*. Delhi.
- SUNDAR, P. 1955. *Patrons and Philistines. Art and the State in British India, 1773–1947*. New Delhi.
- SWARUP, S. 1968. *5000 Years of Arts and Crafts in India and Pakistan*. Bombay.
- VERMA, S. P. 2002. Sikh Painting: An Appraisal. In: H. Banerjee (ed.), *The Khalsa & the Punjab. Studies in Sikh History, to the 19th Century*, pp. 160–83. New Delhi.

CHAPTER 28

- ABIKEYEVA, G. 2003. *The Heart of the World: Films from Central Asia*. Tr. D. Zhamanbalina-Mazur. Ed. J. Mazur. Almaty.
- The World Encyclopedia of Contemporary Theater*. 1998. Vol. 5: Asia/Pacific. Eds. D. Rubin, R. Chaturvedi, R. Majumdar, C. S. Pong and M. Tanokura. New York.

CHAPTER 29

- ALEXANDROVICH, A.; KALINOVSKAYA, T. 1968. Ob istoricheski slozhivchikhsya tsentrakh gorodov Samarkanda, Bukhara i Khiva [The Historic Centres of Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva]. In: *Stroitel'stvo i arkhitektura Uzbekistana*, No. 18. Tashkent.

- AZZOUT, M. 1999. The Soviet Interpretation and Preservation of the Ancient Heritage of Uzbekistan: The Example of Bukhara. In: A. Petruccioli (ed.), *Bukhara: The Myth and the Architecture*. Cambridge, Mass.
- . 2002. *The Cultural Heritage, the Museum and the Nation: The Construction of the National Identity in Central Asia in the 20's*. 7th Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN). Columbia.
- BEAUJEU-GARNIER, J. et al. 1995. Base économique et organisation spatiale des villes soviétiques. In: *Annales de Géographie*, XCIème année. Paris.
- BOEVA, I. N.; VLADIMIROV, E. I.; TUKCHAIDOVA, F. K. 1976. *Arkhitekturno-planirovochnaya organizatsiya zhilishcha v usloviyakh Uzbekistana* [Architecture and Housing Development in the Uzbek Context]. Tashkent.
- BULATOVA, V. A.; NOTKIN, I. I. 1963. *Khivaning arkhitektura jadgarliklari* [The Architectural Monuments of Khiva]. Tashkent.
- CHABROV, G. N. 1960. Russkaya arkhitektura dorevoliutsionnogo Turkestana (1865–1916 gg.) [Russian Architecture in Pre-Revolutionary Turkistan (1865–1916)]. In: *Arkhitekturnoe nasledie Uzbekistana* [The Architectural Heritage of Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- CHALINE, C. 1996. *Les villes du monde arabe*. Paris.
- DOBROMYSLOV, A. I. 1912. *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoyashchem* [Tashkent Past and Present]. Tashkent.
- European Historical Statistics*. 1975. Ed. B. R. Mitchell. New York.
- FITZPATRICK, S. 1999. *Everyday Stalinism, Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s*. Oxford.
- General'niy plan rekonstruktsii gorod Bukhary* [Urban Development Master Plan for the City of Bukhara]. 1940. Moscow.
- . 1970. Tashkent.
- . 1990. Tashkent.
- GINZBURG, M. Y. 1935. *Tvorcheskiy otchet. Arkhitektura SSSR*, No. 5. Moscow.
- HAMM, M. F. (ed.). 1986. *The City in Late Imperial Russia*. Bloomington, Ind.
- IKONNIKOV, A. 1990. *Arkhitektura Sovetskoy Rossii* [Russian Architecture of the Soviet Period]. Moscow.
- International Historical Statistics*. 1982. Ed. B. R. Mitchell. New York.
- KADYROVA, T. F. 1974. *Sovremennaya arkhitektura Uzbekistana* [The Modern Architecture of Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- . 1987. *Arkhitektura Sovetskogo Uzbekistana* [Architecture of Soviet Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- KOTKIN, S. 1995. *Magnetic Mountain. Stalinism as a Civilisation*. Los Angeles, Calif.
- LAVROV, V. A. 1950. *Gradostroitel'naya kul'tura Sredney Azii* [Urban Culture of Central Asia]. Moscow.
- LAZARENKO, P. I. 1951. *Arkhitektura Kirgizskoy SSR*. In: *Arkhitektura respublik Sredney Azii*. Moscow.
- LUNIN, B. V. 1958. *Iz istorii Russkogo vostokovedeniya i arkheologii v Turkestane, Turkestanskiy kruzhok lyubiteley arkheologii (1895–1917)* [History of Russian Orientalists and Archaeologists in Turkistan, the Amateur Archaeology Circle (1895–1917)]. Tashkent.
- MALLITSKOGO, N. G. 1927. *Tashkentskie mahalla i mauza* [Mahalla and Mauza of Tashkent]. In: V. V. Bartol'd (ed.), *Turkestanskies druzya i potchiteli*. Tashkent.
- MCCHESENEY, P. 1987. Economic and Social Aspect of the Public Architecture of Bukhara in the 1560s and 1570s. In: *Islamic Art*, Vol. 2. London.

- MENDIKULOV, M. 1959. *K kharakteristike arkhitektury Kazakhstana, XIX–nachalo XX vv.* [The Features of the Architecture of Kazakhstan, Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries] In: *Arkhitectura Kazakhstana*. Alma-Ata.
- MERLIN, P. 1975. Urbanisme et villes nouvelles en Union Soviétique. In: *Cahiers de l'IAURP (Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Région Île-de-France)*, Vol. 38. Paris.
- National Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (TsGA). Tashkent.
- NIL'SEN, V. A. 1988. *U istokov sovremennogo gradostroitel'stva Uzbekistana XIX–nachalo XX vekov* [The Origins of Modern Urbanization in Uzbekistan in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries]. Tashkent.
- PUGACHENKOVA, G. A. 1976. *Termez, Shahrisabz, Khiva*. Moscow.
- PUGACHENKOVA, G. A.; REMPEL', L. A. 1958. *Vydaiyushchiesia pamyatniki arkhitektury Uzbekistana* [The Most Noteworthy Architectural Monuments of Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- SADKULOV, T. C. 1973. *Samarkand vo vtoroy polovine XIX nachala XX vekov* [Samarkand in the Mid-Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries]. Samarkand.
- SHISHKIN, V. A. 1943. *Goroda Uzbekistana* [The Cities of Uzbekistan]. Tashkent.
- SPRAGUE, A. R. 1994. Modernizing Architecture, Art, and Town Plans. In: E. Allworth (ed.), *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, a Historical Overview*. 3rd ed. Durham/London.
- SUKHAREVA, O. A. 1958. *K istorii gorodov Bukharskogo khanstva* [The History of the Khanate of Bukhara]. Tashkent.
- . 1976a. *Kvartal'naya obshchina pozdnefeodal'nogo Bukhary*. Moscow.
- . 1976b. *Ocherki po istorii sredneaziatskikh gorodov* [Studies on the History of Central Asian Cities]. In: B. A. Litvinskiy (ed.), *Istoriya kul'tura narodov Sredney Azii drevnost' srednie veka*. Moscow.
- USSR Communist Party (KPSS) in the Resolution and the Congress*. 1972. Issue 8, Vol. 10. Moscow.
- VORONINA, V. L. 1951. *Narodnye traditsii arkhitektury Uzbekistana*. Moscow.
- The World Almanac & Book of Facts*. 1984. Ed. H. U. Lane. New York.
- YARLOV, Y. S. 1985. *Natsional'noe i internatsional'noe v sovetskoy arkhitekture*. Moscow.
- ZAHIDOV, P. 1965. *Samarkandskaya shkola zodchikh, XIX–nachalo XX veka* [The Architectural School of Samarkand, Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries]. Tashkent.

CHAPTER 30

Part One: Literature in Persian

- 'ABEDINI, H. 1990. *Sad sāl dāstān-nevisi dar Irān*, Vol. 2. (In Persian.) 2nd ed. Tehran.
- ARBERRY, A. J. 1954. *Persian Poems: An Anthology of Verse Translations*. London.
- ARIANPOUR, Y. 1971. *Az sabā tā nimā*. (In Persian.) Tehran.
- BEARD, M. 1990. *'The Blind Owl' as a Western Novel*. Princeton, N.J.
- BROWNE, E. G. 1914. *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia*. Cambridge.
- DANISHVAR, S. 1990. *Savushun: A Novel About Modern Iran*. Tr. M. Ganoonparvar. Washington, D.C.
- E'TESAMI, P. 1987. *Divān-e Parvin E'tesāmi*. Ed. H. Moayyed. Costa Mesa, Calif.
- FARROKHZAD, F. 1981. *Another Birth: Selected Poems*. Tr. H. Javadi and S. Sallée. Emeryville, Calif.
- HAKKAK, A. H. 1984a. A Well Amid the Waste: An Introduction to the Poetry of Ahmad Shamlu. In: T. Ricks (ed.), *Critical Perspectives on Modern Persian Literature*. Washington, D.C.

- . 1984b. Modern Persian Literature. In: T. M. Ricks (ed.), *Critical Perspectives on Modern Persian Literature*. Washington, D.C.
- JAVADI, H. 1985. *Satire in Persian Literature*. Teaneck, N.J.
- . 1995. *Marg-e sudkhur*. Bethesda, Md.
- KAMSHAD, H. 1996. *Modern Persian Prose Literature*. Washington, D.C.
- MAFI, M. 1989. *Danshervar's Playhouse*. Washington, D.C.
- MAKHALESKI, F. 1961. *La littérature de l'Iran contemporain*, Vol. 2. Warsaw.
- MOAYYED, H. 2001. *Stories from Iranian Anthology of Persian Short Fiction 1921–1991*. 5th ed. Washington, D.C.
- MORIER, J. 1925. *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan*. London.
- PEZESHKZAD, I. 1996. *My Uncle Napoleon*. Tr. D. Davis. Washington, D.C.
- RYPKA, J. 1968. *History of Iranian Literature*. Ed. K. Jahn. Dordrecht.
- SA'EDI, G.-H. 1980. *Dandil, Stories from Iranian Life*. Tr. H. Javadi, J. Meisami and R. Campell. New York.
- Sutra and Other Stories*. 1989. Tr. H. Javadi and A. Neshat. Washington, D.C.
- YUSHIJ, N. 1972. *Arzesh-e ehsāsāt va panj maqāleh dar she'r va nemāyesh*. (In Persian.) Tehran.

Part Two: Literature in Dari

- AHMADI, S. 1999. Fiction: ii (g). In Afghanistan. In: *Elr*, Vol. 9, pp. 603–6.
- BIZHAND, F. (ed.). 1988. *Nakhostin dāstān-hā-ye mo'aser-i Dari*. Kabul.
- FARHADI, R. 1985. Afghanistan: xii. Literature. In: *Elr*, Vol. 1, pp. 564–6.
- GHANI, A. 1988. The Persian Literature of Afghanistan, 1911–1978. In: E. Yarshater (ed.), *Persian Literature*, pp. 428–53. New York.
- HERAVI, N. M. 1996. Dāstān-nevisi dar Afghānistān. In: H. Anousheh (ed.), *Dāneshnāme-yi adab-i Fārsi dar Afghānistān*. Tehran.
- OHADI, 'A. 1992. *Major Trends in Modern Dari Literature (Afghanistan)*, in *Persian*. Copenhagen.
- POURHADI, E. 1976. Afghanistan's Press and its Literary Influence, 1897–1969. *Afghanistan Journal*, 3/1, pp. 28–35.
- POYA FARYABI, 'A. 1988. Nigārish-i bar moqadamāt-i adabiyāt mo'aser-i Fārsi-ye Afghānistān. In: *Sabk wa makāteb dar adabiyāt*, pp. 41–76. Kabul.
- RAHIMI, 'A. 1999. *Cendre et terre*. Paris.
- SHOJA'I, Seyyed I. 1998. Negāhi beh sair-i dāstān-nevisi dar Afghānistān. *Durr-e Dari*, Vol. 1, No. 1. Tehran.
- TARZI, M. 1977. *Maqālāt-i Mahmud Tarzi dar Serāj al-akhbār-i Afghāniyah*. R. Farhadi (ed.). Kabul.
- YAHAQQI, M. J. 1995. *Chun sabu'yi tashneh: Adabiyāt-e mo'āsir-i Fārsi*, pp. 297–319. Tehran.
- ZARIAB, R.; ZARIAB, S.; ZARIAB, A. R. 1997. *Barf wa naqsh-hā-ye rū-ye divār, Gozidah-ye dāstānhā-ye...* Tehran.
- ZARIAB, S. 2000. *Ces murs qui nous écoutent*. French tr. of *Divār-hā gūsh dāshtand* by D. Leroy. Paris.
- . 2001. *Dasht-i Qābel, la plaine de Cain*. Paris.

Part Three: Literature in Tajik

- AINI, S. 1954. *Mirza Abdulqādir-i Bedil*. Stalinabad.
- ASAZADA, H. 1996. *Adabiyāt-i sada-i XX-i fārsi-i tājiki* [Persian-Tajik Literature of the Twentieth Century]. Dushanbe.

HABIBOV, A. 1984a. *Dāyirahā-i adabi-i Bukhārā-i sharqi* [Literary Circles of Eastern Bukhara]. Dushanbe.

———. 1984b. *Ganj-i pareshān* [Scattered Treasure]. Dushanbe.

Tārikh-i adabiyāt-i soveti-i Tājik [History of Soviet Tajik Literature], Vol. 1, Nos. 1 (1974), 2 (1978), 4 (1982), 6 (1984). Dushanbe.

YAHAQQ, M. J. 1996. *Chun sabu-yi tishna (tārikh-i adabiyāt-i mo‘āsir-i fārsi)* [Like a Jar for the Thirsty (History of Contemporary Persian Literature)]. Mashhad.

Part Four: Literature in other Indo-Iranian languages

Kashmiri

BAMZAI, P. N. K. 1973. *A History of Kashmir*. New Delhi.

KACHRU, B. B. 1981. *History of Kashmiri Literature*. Weisbaden.

KAUL, J. L. 1957. Kashmiri Literature. In: V. K. Gokak (ed.), *Literatures in Modern Indian Languages*. Delhi.

———. 1968. *Studies in Kashmiri Literature*. Srinagar.

Punjabi

DAS, S. K. 1991. *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. 8: 1800–1910, *Western Impact: Indian Response*. New Delhi.

DIWANA, M. S. 1950. *A History of Punjabi Literature*. Lahore.

LAL, C. 1998. Dalit Trend in Punjabi Literature. *Indian Literature* (Sahitya Akademi's bimonthly journal), No. 185 (May–June, Vol. 42, No. 3).

SAKHON, S. S. 1993. *A History of Punjabi Literature*, Vol. 1. Patiala.

———. 1996. *A History of Punjabi Literature*, Vol. 2. Patiala.

TALIB, G. S. 1957. Punjabi Literature. In: V. K. Gokak (ed.), *Literatures in Modern Indian Languages*. Delhi.

Sindhi

ABICHANDANI, P. 1998. Sindhi Literature After Independence. *Indian Literature* (Sahitya Akademi's bi-monthly journal), No. 187 (September–October, Vol. 42, No. 5).

AJWANI, L. 1959. Sindhi Literature. In: *Contemporary Indian Literature*, pp. 253–68. New Delhi.

———. 1970. *History of Sindhi Literature*. New Delhi.

ALLANA, G. A. 1991. *An Introduction to Sindhi Literature*. Jamshoro Sindh.

ASANI, A. S. 2004. At the Crossroads of Indic and Iranian Civilizations: Sindhi Literary Culture. In: S. Pollock (ed.), *Literary Cultures in History: Reconstructions from South Asia*, pp. 612–46. New Delhi.

SCHIMMEL, A. 1974. Sindhi Literature. In: J. Gond (ed.), *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. 8. Wiesbaden.

Urdu

AHMAD, A. 1993. *In the Mirror of Urdu: Recompositions of Nation and Community 1947–65*. Shimla.

DAS, S. K. 1991. *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. 8: 1800–1910, *Western Impact: Indian Response*. New Delhi.

FARUQI, S. R. 1993. Ghazal ka naya manzarnama. In: *Saughat* (September). New Delhi.

———. 2001. *Early Urdu Literary Culture and History*. New Delhi.

KIDWAI, S. 1995. The Current Trends in Urdu Literature. *Indian Literature*, No. 170 (November–December).

- NAIM, C. M. 2004. The Consequences of Indo-Pakistan War for Urdu Language and Literature: A Parting of the Ways. In: *Urdu Texts and Contexts: The Selected Essays of C. M. Naim*. New Delhi.
- OESTERHELD, C. 2004. Entertainment and Reform: Urdu Narrative Genres in the Nineteenth Century. In: S. Blackburn and V. Dalmia (eds.), *India's Literary History: Essays on the Nineteenth Century*. Delhi.
- SADIQ, M. 1964. *History of Urdu Literature*. Delhi.
- SAKSENA, R. B. 1927. *A History of Urdu Literature*. Allahabad.
- ZAIDI, A. J. 1993. *A History of Urdu Literature*. New Delhi.

CHAPTER 31

Part One: Literature in Turkic

- ALTAY, A. 2000. 1916 jılkı kogoloñ. *Ala-Too*, No. 2. Bishkek.
- BENNIGSEN, A. 1953. Les peuples musulmans de l'URSS et les Soviets. *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, Vol. 22.
- CABBAR, S. 2000. *Kurtulush yolunda*. A work on Central Asian literature in a Turkish-Uzbek mixed language. Ed., tr. and linguistically revisited by A. S. özsoy, C. Schöning, E. Karabacak, with contribution from Ingeborg Baldauf. Istanbul.
- CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE, H. 1966. *Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l'empire russe*. Paris.
- DUDOIGNON, S. A. 2002. Islam et nationalités en Asie centrale au début de la période soviétique (1924–1937): L'exemple de l'Ouzbékistan à travers quelques sources littéraires. *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, Nos. 95–8. Aix-en-Provence.
- ERKEBAEV, A. 1999. *Maloizuchennye stranits istorii kirgizskoy literatury*. Bishkek.
- JOLDOSHEVA, C. 1977. *Kirgizskaya proza v russkikh perevodakh*. Frunze.
- KEDRINA, Z. S.; KASYMOV, S. S. 1967. *Istoriya Uzbekskoy Sovetskoy literatury*. Moscow.
- KERIMJANOVA, B. 1951. *Kirgiz sovet adabiyati*. Frunze.
- Kommunist Uzbekistana*. 1969. No. 5. Tashkent.
- MIRBALIEV, S. 1969. *O'zbek romani*. Tashkent.
- MONTGOMERY, D. C. 1986. Career Patterns of Sixteen Uzbek Writers. *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 5 (3–4). London.
- . 1987. Zaynab and Aman. *Second Seminar on Central Asian Studies*. London.
- MUQIMI. 1942. *Tanlangan esarlar*. Tashkent.
- SAMAGANOV, Z. 1976. *Sovettik Kirgizstan jazuuchulari*. Frunze.
- TRETIAKOFF, A. n.d. [1966]. *Maître et serviteur de Qh. Qh. Niëzij*. Doctoral dissertation, n.p. [Paris].
- YUNUSOV, Y. 1956. Kamil Khorazmiy. *Sharq Yulduzi*, Vol. 24 (11).

Part Two: Literature in Mongolian

- ATWOOD, C. P. 2004. *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire*. New York.
- BAWDEN, C. R. 2002. *Mongolian Traditional Literature. An Anthology*. London.
- BORMANSHINOV, A. 1989. Sandji Balykov. A Brief Sketch of His Life and Literary Work. In: S. B. Balykov (ed.). *Stronger than Power*, pp. 1–9. Bloomington, Ind.
- GERASIMOVICH, L. K. 1970. *History of Modern Mongolian Literature (1921–1964)*. Bloomington, Ind.
- HANGIN, J. G. 1973. *Köke Sudur (The Blue Chronicle), A Study of the East Mongolian Historical Novel by Injannasi*. Wiesbaden.

- SAMPILDENDEW, Kh.; BILIGSAIKHAN, S.; LOCHIN, S. 2001. *Mongolîn uran dzokhiolîn lawlakh toli* [A Reference Book of Mongolian Literature]. (In Mongolian.) Ulaanbaatar.
- SCHWARZ, H. (ed.). 1974. *Mongolian Short Stories*. Washington, D.C.
- SODNOMOV, A. A. 1994. *Pisateli Buryatii* [Writers of Buriatia]. Ulan-Ude.
- TSEDEW, D. 1989. *Modern Mongolian Poetry*. Ulaanbaatar.
- TULOKHONOV, M. I. (ed.). 1996. *Biobibliograficheskiy slovar' repressirovannykh pisateley Buriatii* [Bio-Bibliographical Dictionary of Buriat Writers who had been Subjected to Repression]. Ulan-Ude.
- TULOKHONOV, M. I., et al. 1995–7. *Istoriya buriatskoy literatury* [History of Buriat Literature], Vols. 2–3. Ulan-Ude.
- ULANOV, E. A. 1992. Development of Literary Studies in Buryatia. In: *Journal de la Société Finno-Ougrienne*, Vol. 84. Helsinki.

INDEX

- ‘Abbas Bolukifar, 747
 ‘Abbas Javanmard, 756, 757
 ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Breshna, 766, 768
 ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880–1901), 211, 766
 ‘Abdallah Avlani, 144, 150, 516
 ‘Abdol-Ghafur Bershna, 856
 ‘Abdol-Hakim Ziya’i, 853
 ‘Abdol-Hayy Habibi, 854
 ‘Abdol-Hoseyn Sepenta, 761
 ‘Abdol-Qadir Bedil, 851, 860
 ‘Abdol-Rahman Pazhvak, 855
 ‘Abdulhamid Cholpan, 221, 224, 238
 ‘Abdullah Khan, 304, 311
 ‘Abdullah Qadiri, 221, 224, 238
 ‘Abdullah Qahhar, 224, 230
 ‘Abdurrauf Fitrat, 144, 147, 154, 195, 209, 221, 224, 238, 516, 890
 ‘Alem Eftekhari, 855
 ‘Ali Akbar Dehkhoda, 841
 ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 476
 ‘Ali Akbar San‘ati, 750
 ‘Ali Fadai, 854
 ‘Ali Khan Vali, 764
 ‘Ali Nasiriyani, 757, 763
 ‘Ali Salim, 688
 ‘Aziz Ahmad, 881
 ‘Great Game’, 31, 32, 40, 50, 109
 ‘Ubaydullah Khojaev, 147
 ‘abdallah Avlani, 194
 A. A. Ahmelkar, 777
 A. A. Burmestera, 805
 A. Babajanov, 228
 A. Bukeykhanov, 195, 248
 A. E. Fersman, 294
 A. I. Dobromyslov, 246
 A. Khamrabayev, 230
 A. Khidoyatov, 230
 A. Kuznetsov, 809
 A. L. Benois, 803
 A. Muzafarov, 613
 A. Petelin, 807
 A. Rakhimbayev, 220
 A. S. Sadykov, 230
 A. Shchusev, 809, 823
 A. Yasnogorodsky, 823
 A‘zam Taleqani, 530
 Abanindra Nath Tagore, 775, 777, 780
 Abay Kunanbaev (Ibrahim Qunanbayuly), 183
 Abdukirim Nesirdin, 696, 698
 Abdul Halim Sharar, 880
 Abid Suhail, 882
 Abol-Hasan Sediqi, 750
 Abol-Hasan Yaghma, 836
 Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, 237
 Abu Nasr Fathollah Khan Sheybani, 836
 Abu Nasr Kursavi, 190
 Admiral Kolchak, 161, 323, 326
 AFGHANISTAN
 agriculture, 439, 496, 578
 Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman (1880–1901), 531, 575
 and Britain, 46, 49, 99, 100, 103, 111
 and Pakistan, 421, 473
 Dost Muhammad Khan (1826–63), 103, 211
 EDUCATION, 548
 Education, 558, 575, 578

- education, 211, 433, 531, 533, 534, 554, 555, 560, 569, 571, 573, 576
- Habibullah Khan (1901–19), 107, 211
- independence, 434, 435, 441, 455
- Islamic, 198, 217, 436, 445, 446, 477, 531, 532, 535
- Islamically, 446
- LITERATURE, 851, 859
- Literature, 854
- literature, 855–857
- Sher ‘Ali Khan (1863–4, 1869–78), 104, 211
- theatre and cinema, 769
- women increased, 534
- women intellectuals, 531
- Zahir Shah (1933–73), 117, 217, 533
- AFGHANISTAN, 38
- Afghanistan, 38, 75, 79, 113, 182, 297, 422, 459, 460
- AGBOR, 370
- Agbor, 371, 373, 676, 677
- Agdanbuugiin Amar, 358
- Agha Hashr Kashmiri, 886
- Agwangsharab, 715, 717
- Agzam Ayub, 221
- Ahad Zargar, 865
- Ahmad Donish, 144, 185, 859
- Ahmad Khan, 399, 539, 876
- Ahmad Mahmudi, 754
- AHMAD SHAH (1909–25), 464
- Ahmad Shamlu, 844
- Ahmad Yasawi, 237
- Akbar Allahabadi, 880, 883
- Akhtar Mohi-ud-Din, 866, 867
- Akmolinsk, 127
- Aksu, 371, 372, 375, 384, 693
- al Perovsky, 122
- al-Bukhari, 237, 238
- Al-elis, 301
- al-Qaida, 448
- al-Termezi, 237, 238
- Alai mountains, 266, 502
- Alash-Orda, 73, 154, 161, 162, 202, 249, 251, 894, 896
- Alfred Ya‘qubzadeh, 765
- Ali Khamraev, 790
- Aligarh, 208, 211, 399, 433, 539, 552, 882
- Alikhan Bokeykhanov, 73
- Alishir Navoi Theatre, 822, 823
- Almalyk, 829
- Altai, 41, 70, 134, 245, 252, 328–332, 385, 482, 497
- Altai , 249
- Altyaryk, 655
- Amanniyaz Sardar, 302, 304
- Amanullah (1919–29), 107, 116, 211, 575, 766
- Amar, 902
- Amar Jyoti, 870
- Amin Kamil, 865
- Amitab Bachchan, 784
- Amrita Pritam, 869, 871, 872
- Amrita Sher Gil, 777, 778
- Amritsar, 551, 773, 867
- Amu Darya, 53, 56, 57, 65, 123, 137, 171, 229, 232, 484, 502, 504, 566
- Amu Darya , 127
- an Bukeykhanov, 248
- Anahita Ratebzad, 534
- Andijan, 42, 47, 90, 137, 145, 150, 229, 261, 551, 636, 655, 799, 806, 818
- Aral Sea, 53, 57, 137, 232, 253, 484, 490, 523, 562, 566, 582, 603
- Aral seas, 76
- Archimandrite Makary, 329
- ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN PLANNING, 795
- Architecture and urban planning, 807
- Arjangi, 750
- Armenian, 110
- Arthur Nicolson, 101
- Arya Samaj, 208, 399, 551
- Asadollah Habib, 856
- Ashubaev, 894
- Assam, 407, 483, 489, 537
- Astrakhan, 110, 138, 147
- Atrek, 301, 302, 305, 457
- Atta-ur-Rahman, 596, 597
- Atul Bose, 779
- Auezov, 788
- Aurel Stein, 71
- Avalokiteshvara, 714, 719
- Avanas Ohaniyan, 761

- Awami National Party, 423
 Ayatollah Kashani, 471
 Ayub Khan, 414–416, 431, 546
 Ayuush, 902
 Azerbaijan, 110, 449, 451, 460, 464–466, 470, 471, 764
 Azerbaijani, 199, 835, 841, 842
 Azerbaijanis, 463
 Azeri, 115, 210, 217, 753
 Azimi Sami, 187, 859
- B. A. Fedchenko,, 294
 B. Awarzad, 727
 B. Daliev, 653
 B. Khudaydad-zoda,, 861
 B. N. Nasledov,, 294
 B. Usanov, 42
 B. Zakirov,, 230
 Baast, 904
 Babrak Arghand, 856
 Babrak Karmal, 446
 Babuujab, 352
 Badakhshan, 46, 49, 56, 104, 212, 279, 288, 428, 430, 501
 Badarch, 903
 Baha al-Din Majruh, 856
 Baha al-Din Naqshband, 237
 Baha'ism, 451
 Bahar and Parvin E'tesami, 842
 Bahman Jalali, 765
 Bakhtiari, 88
 Baku, 110, 111, 147, 199, 204
 Balkaretses, 252
 Balkhash, 252, 484
 Baluchistan, 413, 414, 419, 423, 459, 462, 545, 560
 Balwant Gargi, 873, 874
 Balykov, 910
 Bamiyan, 428
 Bangladesh, 216, 409, 418, 596
 Bankim Chandra, 400
 Baramsai, 907
 Bariq Shafi'i, 853
 Barkol, 378, 389
 Bashkirs, 209
 Basmachi, 117, 169, 266, 788, 893
 Basmachis, 266, 284, 862
 Battulga, 904
 Batu, 221, 224, 891
 Bayats, 499
 Bazar Baraadiin, 911
 Behruz Darash, 750
 Beijing, 49, 107, 341, 343, 344, 689, 693, 715
 Belorussia, 225, 227
 Benaras, 772, 774
 Benazir Bhutto, 422, 423, 547
 Bengal, 407, 537, 538, 776
 Bengali, 216, 400, 417, 418
 Bhabesh Sanyal, 778
 Bhai Vir Singh, 867, 868, 870
 Bharatiya Janata Party, 410
 Bihar, 215, 395, 397, 537, 544
 Bireswar Sen, 775, 778
 Bizhan Mofid, 757
 Bodhisattva Manjushri, 340
 Bogdo Khan, 348–353
 Bolsheviks, 110–114, 152, 161, 165–168, 170, 173, 174, 177, 179, 250, 311–313, 355, 465, 518
 Boxer Rebellion, 345
 Brahui, 495
 Brahuis, 496
 Briskin, 894
 Buddhism
 ART AND ARCHITECTURE, 676, 711
 Buddhism, 585
 Bukhara
 education, 190, 191, 200, 550, 598
 EDUCATIONAL, 551
 Literature, 893
 literature, 186, 189, 191, 860
 New Bukhara, 172
 Novy Bukhara, 798, 799
 Pan-Turkism, 199–202
 social structures, 185
 Bukhara, 37, 44, 46, 47, 49, 63, 67, 72, 82, 88, 90, 98, 112, 122–124, 133, 137, 138, 140, 207, 208, 212, 213, 307, 311, 457
 Bukhara Collection, 73
 Bukharan, 55
 Burhan al-Din al-Marginani, 237
 Buriatia

- arts and architecture, 711
 Buriatia, 332, 333, 335, 725, 910, 912, 913
 Burkhanism, 330, 331
 Busybody Sharab, 724, 728
 Buyannemekh, 900
- C. Actsaturov, 809
 C. S. MacLean,, 460
 C. V. Raman,, 589
 Caspian Sea, 53, 125, 307, 457, 458, 485, 582
 Caspian seas, 57
 Caucasus, 110, 114, 125, 126, 199, 222, 225, 314, 636
 Chaghatay, 37, 557, 889, 890
 Charan Singh Shaheed, 870
 Charju, 98, 137, 172
 Chatkal, 265, 505
 Chaturbhuj Doshi, 783
 Chaudur, 304
 Chaudurs, 301, 632
 Chechens, 252
 Chen Shou, 690
 Chhabi Biswas, 783
 Chimid, 904
 China
 and Mongolia, 344
 and Qing empires, 344
 Cultural Revolution, 390, 392
 Han Chinese, 337, 341, 344, 345, 605, 680
 migration, 272, 342
 migrations, 266
 Xinhai revolution, 376, 377
 China, 55, 65, 70, 108, 118, 126, 258, 325, 326, 328, 352, 376, 409, 415, 494
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 344, 351
 Chinggis Khan, 73, 337, 339, 340, 349, 733
 Chita, 334
 Choinom, 907
 Choiwang, 908
 Christianity
 Russian Orthodox Church, 132, 238
 Russian Orthodox churches, 717
 Christianity, 204, 322, 325
 CLIMATE, 480
 climate, 481, 484, 493–495, 497, 499, 501, 502, 505–507, 510, 512
 climates, 486
 Cold War, 111, 114, 116, 270, 413, 443, 472
 Colonel N. P. Ignatyev, 123
 Communist Party
 and women, 521
 China, 689
 of India, 405, 410
 Communist Party, 166, 168, 174, 175, 213, 220, 226, 234, 255, 267–269, 271, 279, 313, 383, 788, 791, 855
 Coomaraswamy, 775
 Cornelia Sorabji, 544
 Cossacks, 41, 129, 134, 135, 160, 334
 Crimea, 126, 147, 195, 199, 225, 359
 Crimean, 40, 54, 190, 191, 209, 344, 457
- D. A. Kunaev,, 256
 D. Amgalan, 726
 D. Chuvaev, 824
 D. I. Shcherbakov,, 294
 D. Losol,, 353
 D. Mamedov, 316
 D. Manibadar, 727
 Dadabhai Naoroji, 399
 Dadasaheb Phalke, 781
 Dalip Kaur Tiwana, 872
 Dalip Singh (1843–9), 773
 Damba, 724
 Dambadorj, 356, 357
 Dambadorji, 902
 Daoguang, 369
 Daoists, 685
 Dardic, 874
 Dards, 494, 501
 DARI, 851
 Dari, 555, 852, 854, 858
 dari, 855
 Darkhan, 363, 364
 Darwaz, 46, 49, 82, 315, 612
 Dashbalbar, 907
 Dashdoorow, 905
 Daud Khan, 119, 856
 Dayaram Gidumal, 876, 877
 Debendranath Tagore, 398
 Demchigdongrub, 908
 Deoband, 551

- Dev Anand, 784
 Dharmendra, 784
 Dhiren Ganguly, 782
 Dilip Kumar, 784
 Dinanath Kaul Nadim, 865
 Diwan Kauromal Chandanmal, 877
 Dmitriev-Mamonov, 69, 75
 Dogra, 556, 865
 Dolyoon, 912
 Dondugdulma, 724
 Dorji, 722
 Dr Muthulaxmi Reddi, 541
 Dugar Zaisang, 724
 Dulmaa, 905
 Durand Line, 106, 432, 441
 Durbets, 499
 Durranis, 430
 Dushanbe, 63, 284, 286–288, 290, 291, 505, 597, 671, 789, 821, 825
 Dzungaria, 33, 107, 332, 487, 907–909
 Dzungarian, 134, 324, 328

 E. N. Pavlovsky, 294
 E'temad al-Dowle, 451
 Ebrahim Partow, 765
 EDUCATION, 552
 education, 549, 553, 555, 557, 562
 Educational, 569
 educational, 559, 561
 Egart, 894
 Egypt, 116, 194, 198, 445
 Elbek, 221, 238, 891
 Elebaev, 894
 Emba, 70, 245, 252
 Emperor Guangxu, 371, 373–376
 Emperor Tongzhi, 370–372, 374
 Emperor Xianfeng, 372
 Empress Farah, 475, 747, 748
 Enver Pasha, 117, 173
 Erdene, 904
 Erdenet, 363, 364
 Erdeni Zuu, 712, 718
 Erenjaenae, 909
 Esenberlin, 897
 Esfandiyar Khan, 155
 Esma'il Ashtiyani, 739

 Esma'il Fasih, 850

 F. Dadamukhamedov, 619
 F. Smirnov, 820
 Faizullah Khojaev, 219, 221
 Faqir Nabi, 770
 Farhar, 286
 Ferdowsi, 184, 750, 835
 Fereydun Moshiri, 846
 Ferghana valley
 education, 891
 industrial growth, 138
 social structure, 154
 women in, 521
 Ferghana valley, 36, 37, 47, 54, 74, 86, 87, 94, 95, 146, 169, 170, 261, 263, 264
 Feroz Shah, 396
 First World War, 42, 76, 99, 109, 112, 116, 154, 200, 250, 261, 309, 353, 378, 401, 464
 Forugh Farrokhzad, 845
 Forughi of Bastam, 836
 Foteh Niyoz, 295
 France, 119, 356, 438, 455, 465, 475, 528, 544, 749
 Frenz Osten, 783

 G. Izmaylova, 230
 G. Kolbin, 256
 G. M. Svarichevsky, 807
 Gaitaw, 903
 Gal, 907
 Galsan, 906
 Galsan Gomboev, 910
 Gamala, 898
 Gandhi, 401–407, 540, 542
 Gansu, 371, 372, 374, 377, 379, 380
 Gelegdorjiin Demid, 359
 General Abramov, 45, 133
 General Annenkov, 65
 General Verevkin, 43
 General Zahedi, 472
 General Zhi Rui, 377
 Geok-tepe, 47, 65, 125, 307, 309, 457
 Georgia, 110, 147, 225, 838
 Gerhard Kozel, 732, 733
 Germany

- migration, 254, 275
 MIGRATIONS, 225
 Germany, 101, 109, 117–119, 252, 316, 356, 438, 475
 Ghalib, 882, 884
 Ghazi Emet, 696
 Ghulam Ahmed Mahjur, 865
 Ghulam Nabi Charki, 438
 Ghulam Rasool Santosh, 865
 Gijduvan, 610, 612, 617, 640
 Gilan, 114, 464, 466
 Gobi desert, 487, 718
 Gogol, 788
 Goklens, 301, 305
 Gombo-Gurgi, 718
 Gong Jianxin, 696
 Gopal Hari Deshmukh, 398
 Gouator, 459
 Grand Mullah Muhammad Imin, 384
 Great Patriotic War, 227, 288, 291, 316, 323, 861, 862
 Gularansa, 898
 Gungnechuke, 898
 Guomindang (Kuomintang), 690
 Gurdial Singh, 870, 873, 874
 Gurumukh Singh Musafir, 868
 Gwalior, 398

 H. A. Gade, 779
 H. Alimjan, 892, 893
 H. K. Bharati, 866
 Hafiz, 189, 851
 Hakim Karim, 295
 Hami (Kumul), 368
 Hamza Hakimzoda Niyazi, 192, 194, 201, 891
 Hamze Mirza, 306, 307, 456
 Hangayn Nuruu, 482, 497, 499
 Harbhajan Singh, 869, 870
 Hari Rud, 106, 458
 Haryana, 215, 564
 Hashim Khan, 117, 118
 Hashtadan, 460
 Havell, 774, 775
 Hayatullah Ansari, 881, 886
 Hazara, 437, 535
 Hazaras, 432, 496, 533

 Helmand River, 473
 Helmand river, 460, 462
 Hemat Misra, 779
 Herat, 39, 48, 104, 106, 122, 211, 301, 427, 429, 431, 454, 455, 767, 769, 851
 Himalayas, 481–483, 492–494, 512
 Hindu, 398, 406, 536, 538, 543, 551, 556
 Hindu Kush, 39, 48, 58, 120, 123, 126, 279, 482, 495, 501
 Hindus, 215, 399
 Hindustan, 396, 427
 Hindustani
 culture, 869, 878, 879, 881
 Hindustani, 215
 Hindutva, 409
 Hira Singh Dard, 868
 Hisar, 46, 459, 505
 Hitler, 118
 Hoseyn Agha Qollar Aghasi
 Agriculture, 484
 agriculture, 486, 489, 490, 514
 Hoseyn Agha Qollar Aghasi, 747
 Hoseyn Kazemi, 740
 Hoseyn Khosrowjerdi, 750
 Hoseyn Zendebrudi, 747, 748
 Huang Yuanyin, 690
 Huang Zhou, 697
 Hushang Golshiri, 850
 Hushang Pezeshkniya, 741

 I. A. Margulis, 805, 806
 I. Altynsarin, 246
 I. Kamilov, 612
 I. Koptelov, 823
 I. M. Muminov, 230
 I. Rachinskaya, 813
 I. Sultanov, 228
 I. V. Mushketov, 246
 Ili, 108, 135, 344, 370, 375, 379, 385, 392, 685, 691, 695
 ilitary, 368, 372, 374, 376, 384
 ilitation, 374
 Imam Hoseyn, 839
 INDIA, 214
 India
 agriculture, 590, 593

-
- and Kashmir, [412](#)
 - Arts, [780](#)
 - arts, [791](#)
 - British in, [109](#), [110](#), [207](#), [398](#), [551](#)
 - British India, [397](#), [427](#), [589](#), [774](#), [775](#)
 - British Indian, [210](#)
 - British inferred, [117](#)
 - British interests, [428](#), [458](#)
 - CINEMA, [781](#)
 - cinema, [782–784](#)
 - Education, [589](#)
 - education, [147](#), [538](#), [593](#)
 - educational, [543](#)
 - Independence, [411](#)
 - independence, [403](#), [404](#), [407](#), [409](#)
 - Indira Gandhi, [409](#), [544](#)
 - industry, [408](#), [537](#)
 - Jawaharlal Nehru, [120](#), [402–405](#), [407](#), [410](#), [541](#)
 - NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, [480](#)
 - revolt of, [395](#), [396](#)
 - WOMEN IN, [535](#)
 - women in, [537](#), [540](#), [542](#), [544](#), [546](#), [547](#)
 - India, [39](#), [100](#), [101](#), [106](#), [107](#), [109](#), [117](#), [118](#), [198](#), [215](#), [382](#), [387](#)
 - Indian, [431](#)
 - Indus, [123](#), [414](#), [484](#), [492](#), [494](#), [512](#)
 - Ingush, [252](#)
 - Injannashi, [723](#), [898](#)
 - Inogamov, [220](#)
 - Iqbal, [883](#)
 - Iraj Mirza Jalal al-Mamalek, [840](#)
 - Iraj Pezeshkzad, [850](#)
 - Iran, [297](#), [443](#), [447](#)
 - Iranian
 - agriculture, [469](#)
 - and Afghanistan, [460](#), [462](#), [469](#), [473](#)
 - and Britain, [102](#), [454](#), [463](#), [472](#), [559](#)
 - and Russia, [101](#)
 - and Russian, [208](#)
 - and Russians, [114](#)
 - ARTS IN, [735](#)
 - Ayatollah Khomeini, [116](#), [475–477](#), [527](#), [528](#)
 - Bazgasht* school, [835](#)
 - education, [468](#), [526](#), [531](#), [579](#)
 - Islamic Republic, [476](#), [477](#)
 - LITERATURE, [833](#), [873](#)
 - literature, [838](#), [841](#), [845–847](#), [849](#), [860](#), [862](#), [863](#), [867–869](#), [871](#), [874–877](#), [879–883](#), [886](#)
 - literatures, [864](#), [878](#)
 - MOHAMMAD ‘ALI SHAH (1907–9), [462](#)
 - MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH (1941–79), [470](#)
 - Mohammad Reza Shah (1941–79), [527](#), [756](#), [850](#)
 - MOZAFFAR AL-DIN SHAH (1896–1907), [460](#)
 - Mozaffar al-Din Shah (1896–1907), [761](#)
 - NASER AL-DIN SHAH (1848–96), [449](#)
 - Naser al-Din Shah (1848–96), [208](#), [301](#), [737](#), [834](#)
 - Naser
 - al-Din Shah (1848–96), [102](#)
 - nationalist movements, [212](#)
 - oil industry, [115](#)
 - Pahlavi dynasty (1925–79), [467](#)
 - QAJAR ERA, [736](#)
 - Qajar era, [737](#)
 - REZA SHAH (1925–41), [467](#)
 - Reza Shah (1925–41), [88](#), [526](#), [754](#), [839](#)
 - social structure, [468](#)
 - WOMEN IN, [525](#)
 - women in, [527](#)
 - women into, [528](#)
 - Iranian, [106](#), [309](#), [429](#)
 - Iraq, [113](#), [115](#), [469](#), [472](#)
 - Irkutsk, [34](#), [333](#), [334](#), [354](#), [356](#)
 - Irtysk, [41](#), [53](#), [65](#), [73](#), [245](#)
 - Isfahan, [450](#), [463](#), [754](#), [835](#), [836](#)
 - Ishidandzinwangjil, [898](#)
 - Ishkashimis, [503](#)
 - Ishwar Chand Nanda, [872](#)
 - Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar, [538](#)
 - Islam
 - Pan-Islamism, [198](#), [200](#), [202](#)
 - Islam, [32](#), [38](#), [50](#), [73](#), [126](#), [142](#), [144](#), [181](#), [184](#), [208](#)
 - Islam Karimov, [235](#)
 - Islam
 - Karimov, [237](#)
-

- Islamic, 50, 60, 82, 84, 96, 132, 133, 371
Islamic Council, 150
Islamic Democratic Front, 423
Islamism, 174
Ismat Chughtai, 881
Issyk-kul, 259, 261, 263, 484, 506, 507, 509
Italy, 117, 118, 139
- Jadidism
 and education, 191, 197
Jadidism, 73, 147, 149, 181, 182, 186, 189,
 191, 195, 197, 198
Jadids, 69
Jalal Ikromi, 295
Jalalabad, 266, 279, 428, 436, 555
Jalalabad , 159
Jalil Ziyapur, 743
Jamal Mir Sadeqi, 850
Jamini Roy, 776
JAMMU, 591
Jammu, 207, 215, 216, 412, 556, 563, 591, 864
Jamsrang, 715
Jan Sangh, 409, 410
Jangalis, 465
Japan
 Russo-Japanese war, 103, 330, 345, 350
 War of Resistance, 387, 690
Japan, 117, 331, 335, 341, 349, 360, 380, 461
Japanese, 118, 344, 352, 358, 359, 732, 776,
 777
Jarkent, 50
Jaswant Singh, 779, 869, 870, 872, 874
Jaya Appaswamy, 778
Jazeh Tabataba'i, 750, 752
Jews, 74, 75, 79, 214, 436
Jiang Jieshi, 383, 386
Jillikul, 286
Jimmy Carter, 475
Jizak, 44, 46, 125, 279
Joseph Gelet, 732
Junaid Khan, 171, 173, 311
Jusup Abdrakhmanov, 271
Jusup Turusbekov, 895
- K. Abdullayev, 228
K. Babievsky, 807, 809
K. Dikambaev, 268
K. I. Pomerantsev, 725
K. Nasyrova, 230
K. P. von Kaufman, 44, 105, 128, 307
K. Sreenivasulu, 777
K. Yarmatov, 230
K. Zarifov, 228
Ka Na Singh, 870
Kabul, 39, 104, 105, 427, 428, 431, 439, 447,
 448, 473, 501, 532, 533, 535, 555, 560
Kagan, 64, 191, 806, 860
Kalinin, 250
Kalmuk, 909
Kalmukia, 909
Kalmuks, 98, 261, 323, 711, 717
Kamal al-Vezareh, 754
Kamal Ikarsi, 870
Kamran Adle, 765
Kandahar, 38, 104, 427, 429–431, 434, 437,
 455, 769
Kanibadam, 290, 611
Kara Darya, 229, 510
Kara Kum, 299, 311, 314, 317, 487, 500
Karachays, 252
Karachi, 401, 404, 412, 414, 542, 560, 780
Karaganda, 70, 139, 252, 253
Karakalpak, 176, 177, 185, 212, 617, 634, 653
Karakalpaks, 36, 60, 303, 650, 651
Karakolsk, 518
Karakorams, 482, 512
Karategin, 46, 82, 280, 612
Karl Liebknecht, 724
Karshi, 64, 72, 98, 615, 638, 793
Kartar Singh Duggal, 871–874
Kashghar (Kashi), 369, 502, 678
Kashgharia, 100, 107, 108
KASHMIR, 591
Kashmir, 207, 215, 216, 409, 415, 418, 425,
 447, 492, 556, 563, 591
Kashmiri, 863–867, 874
Kattakurgan, 44, 59, 125, 133, 610, 612
Kaveh Golestan, 765
Kazakh
 AGRICULTURE, 254
 Agriculture, 580
 agriculture, 53, 60, 135, 246, 251

- All-Kazakh Congress, 154
 CULTURE, 254
 culture, 183, 245, 246, 252, 787
 Kazakh, 32–34, 40, 41, 51, 98, 381, 392
 Kazakhs, 37, 71, 373, 391
 Kazakhstan
 Administration, 243
 administration, 242
 Alash movement, 247–249, 251
 ECONOMY, 245, 252
 economy, 246, 253
 EDUCATION, 245, 254
 Education, 581
 education, 182, 183, 196, 582
 educational, 247
 Independence, 257
 industry, 245, 252
 intelligentsia, 246–248, 255
 nationalism, 248, 256
 Kazakhstan, 40, 56, 58, 60, 88, 93, 149, 153,
 164, 179, 181, 212, 213, 252, 253, 273
 Kazan, 147, 184, 195, 248, 330
 Kazem Akhavan, 765
 Kermanshah, 464, 754
 Keshigbatu, 899
 Keshingge, 907
 Keshub Chandra Sen, 398
 Khaisan, 347
 Khakassia, 319, 321–323, 332
 Khalilullah Khalili, 437
 Kharkov, 252
 Khiva
 political reforms, 155
 Khiva, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 46, 47, 54, 72, 88, 98,
 104, 112, 122–124, 297, 303, 307,
 311, 457
 Khorog, 284, 290, 597
 Khosravi, 847
 Khost, 117, 436
 Khotan (Hotan), 370, 677
 Khudayar Khan (1845–58; 1865–75), 37
 Khulm, 49, 103
 Khurasan, 38, 102, 110, 113, 427, 429, 450,
 455–458, 460, 464, 466, 555
 Khurasani, 851, 853
 Khuzestan, 114, 115, 455
 Khwaja Ahmad Abbas, 881
 Khwarazm
 art in, 634
 Khwarazm, 37, 46, 171, 173, 174, 179, 229,
 312, 456
 Khwarazm , 176, 311
 Khwarazmians, 282
 Kiakhta treaty, 338, 343
 Kishinchand Tirathdas Khatri, 876
 Kokand
 in Xinjiang, 369, 676
 Kokand, 33, 36, 37, 39, 41–44, 47, 63, 64, 69,
 82, 96, 122, 124, 125, 250, 258, 457
 Kokandi, 49
 Komsomol, 520, 790
 Komsomols, 893
 Kopet Dag, 482, 495, 500
 Korea, 340
 Korean, 337, 345, 412
 Koreans, 225, 252
 Koushut Khan, 303, 304, 306
 Krasnovodsk, 46, 48, 64, 110, 111, 125, 137,
 305, 307, 316, 457
 Krishan Chander, 881, 882, 886
 Kuchka, 48
 Kuhak, 459
 Kulab, 82, 286, 290, 612
 Kulab , 288
 Kunduz, 46, 49, 103, 280
 Kunlun Shan, 510, 511, 677
 Kuqa (Kucha), 679
 Kurdistan, 466, 470, 471
 Kurds, 98
 Kurgan-tepe, 82, 286, 290, 292
 Kutlumurad Khan, 304
 Kyrgyz
 Agriculture, 273
 agriculture, 56, 272
 and perestroika, 269
 Andijan revolt, 261
 art in, 671
 Askar Akaev, 270
 colonization, 258
 CULTURE, 277
 culture, 185, 275, 278
 economy, 271, 273

- education, 263, 276, 277, 584, 585
 HEALTH CARE, 276
 health care, 280, 568
 independence, 270
 industry, 262, 272
 literature, 264, 277, 893, 895, 896
 migration, 274, 584
 poetry, 185
 religion, 181, 279
 Socialist Turan Party, 267
 women in, 519
 Kyrgyz, 37, 41, 44, 47, 49, 88, 328, 370, 374
 Kyrgyz, 98
 Kyzyl Kum, 146, 487
 Kyzyl-Su, 502

 L. Fayziyev,, 230
 L. Sarymsakova,, 230
 L. Voronin, 819
 Lahore, 401, 407, 418, 420, 422, 560, 769, 773, 775, 780, 781
 Lal Chand, 774
 Lalit Mohan Sen, 777, 778
 Lamaism, 96, 279, 325, 585
 landscapes, 492, 499, 500, 502
 Latif Pedram, 854
 Layla Sarahat, 854
 Leonid Brezhnev, 228, 268, 445
 Leonid Sapovich, 824
 Li Lian, 696
 Lochin, 906
 Lodoidamba, 903
 Lord Montagu, 539
 Lord Ripon, 397
 Loroisangbuu, 899
 Lu Shaofei, 691
 Lucknow, 539, 772

 M. Boltabayev, 656
 M. Bulatov, 809, 810, 812, 828
 M. D. Skobelev, 47, 308
 M. Dulatov,, 195, 248
 M. Frinovskiy, 359
 M. Mirshakar,, 861
 M. Osim,, 228
 M. Shaykh-zade,, 228

 M.-S. Babazhanov, 246
 Ma Sihong, 690
 Ma Zhongying, 381, 382, 384
 Maam, 906
 Madali Khan (1831–9), 37
 Madamin (Muhammad Amin) Khan, 301
 Madan Mohan Malaviya, 406
 Madhya Pradesh, 215, 545
 Magnitogorsk, 824
 Mahakala, 715
 Mahatma Gandhi, 403, 406, 542
 Mahboob, 783
 Mahmud Dowlatabadi, 850
 Mahmud Farani, 853
 Mahmud Farshchiyan, 752
 Mahmud Javadipur, 742
 Mahmud Khan Saba, 737
 Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, 74, 144, 147, 151, 192, 209, 238, 516, 890
 Mahmud Tarzi, 434, 435, 531, 852
 Maidari Juu, 712, 717
 Maimaishli, 379
 Maimana, 428, 430
 Malek al-Sho‘ara Bahar, 839, 853
 Malek Siyah, 459
 Malik Meraj Khalid, 425
 Malkam Khan, 210, 453
 Mamalek Farahani, 837
 Manchuria, 335, 344, 345, 349
 Manchus, 33, 49, 337, 338, 340, 554
 Manghits, 36
 Manjit Tiwana, 870
 Mao Zhiyi, 690
 Maqbool Fida Husain, 777, 779
 Maqbool Shah Kraiwari, 864
 Marcos Grigorian, 744, 745
 Marghilan, 43, 47, 74, 96, 615, 617, 619, 638, 640, 642, 655
 Marxism, 201, 203, 204, 404, 586, 892
 Mas‘ud Kimiya’i, 763
 Mashhad, 110, 301, 306, 450, 456, 464, 552, 555, 559, 754, 759, 839, 857
 Mazandaran, 114, 450
 Mazar-i Sharif, 103, 431
 Mecca, 68, 683
 Mehdi Bazargan, 474, 476

- Mensheviks, 156, 311
- Merv, 33, 48, 51, 71, 74, 88, 106, 110, 111, 125, 137, 150, 297, 301, 302, 306, 309, 455, 456, 458
- Meskhetian Turks, 225, 252
- Migjid Janraisig, 719
- Mihr Chand, 772
- Mikhail Gorbachev, 234, 255, 269, 447, 523
- mineral resources, 482
- Ming dynasty, 37, 717
- Minusinsk, 319, 320, 322, 326, 329, 498
- Mir Hesam al-Din, 766
- Mir Mohammad 'Ali Azad Kaboli, 853
- Mir Zaman al-Din, 766
- Mirtemir, 224, 228, 230
- Mirza 'Abdollah Khan Qajar, 764
- Mirza Agha Khan of Kirman, 838
- Mirza Aqa Khan Nuri, 451, 454
- Mirza Barat Mully Kasymov, 146
- Mirza Ebrahim Khan Sani ' al-Saltaneh, 764
- Mirza Habib, 835
- Mirza Javad Adib Neyshapuri, 837
- Mirza Mohammad Khan Dibadin, 765
- Mirza Qaleech Beg, 876, 877
- Mirza Qodsi Herawi, 851
- Mirza Siraj Hakim, 187
- Miskinklych, 185
- Mo'tamen al-Molk, 458
- Mohammad 'Ali Jamalzadeh, 847
- Mohammad 'Aqel Birang Kuhdamani, 854
- Mohammad 'Aref Pazhman, 854
- Mohammad 'Osman Sidqi, 853
- Mohammad Agha Modabber, 747
- Mohammad Farrokhi, 840
- Mohammad Mosaddeq, 115, 471, 849
- Mohammad Shah (1834–48), 449, 736
- Mohan Singh, 868, 869
- Mohan Singh Vaid, 870
- Mohsen Vaziri-Moghaddam, 745
- Moin Qureshi, 424
- Moise Ginzburg, 817, 819
- Moldo Kylych, 264
- MONGOLIA
- agriculture, 587, 588
- and China, 350, 355
- and Russia, 344, 345, 349, 350
- Buddhism, 349, 355, 356, 711, 718
- collectivization, 361, 362, 364
- Education, 587
- education, 356, 587
- history, 337, 338
- Industry, 356
- industry, 364
- Inner, 337, 340–343, 346, 347, 349–353, 359, 711, 712, 714, 716, 717, 907, 908
- Literature, 900
- literature, 896, 901, 907, 910
- literatures, 899
- nationalism, 348, 353
- MONGOLIA, 39
- Mongolia, 65, 78, 87, 96, 323–325, 385
- Mongolian, 326, 327
- Mongolians, 510
- Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 401
- Moscow
- architecture, 816, 818–820, 822
- Moscow, 68, 140, 164, 167, 257, 732, 825
- Moshir al-Dowle, 210, 452
- Moshir al-Dowle Pirniya, 465
- Motilal Nehru Report, 542
- Mrs Annie Besant, 542
- Mughals, 210, 868
- Muhammad Amin Mirza Khwaja, 890
- Muhammad Hasan, 221
- Muhammad Riza Agahi, 890
- Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental (MAO), 399
- Muhammadzais, 211
- Munawwar Qari, 194, 201, 209, 220
- Munshi Premchand, 880
- Murat Monkeula, 247
- Murghab, 37, 48, 58, 110, 137, 307
- Musa Aybek, 228
- Musahiban, 433, 438, 440
- Muslims, 49, 89, 94, 96, 134, 151–153, 157, 159, 190, 192, 215
- Myagmar, 905
- N. A. Nazarbaev
- Soviet autonomy, 162–164
- Theatre and cinema, 791
- women in, 516, 522, 524
- N. A. Nazarbaev, 256

- N. I. Veselovsky,, 146
 N. M. Shchepetil'nikov, 732
 N. Tyurakulov,, 220
 Nader Ebrahimi, 850
 Nader Naderpur, 846
 Nadir Shah (1929–33), 117, 217, 576
 Namangan, 42, 47, 70, 90, 95, 150, 159, 617, 638, 640, 655
 Namangan , 142
 Nambudiripad, 408
 Namdag, 902
 Nanak Singh, 870, 872, 874
 Nandalal Bose, 775, 776
 Nandlal Kaul, 867
 Naqshbandis, 96
 Narendarpal Singh, 871
 Naryn (Atbashi), 272
 Naser al-Molk, 464
 Nasrollah Kasra'iyān, 765
 Nasser, 116
 Navoi, 825, 829
 Nazir Ahmad, 880
 Nepal, 338, 483, 494
 Nepalese, 713
 Nerchinsk treaty, 338, 343
 Neshat of Isfahan, 835
 Neyzar, 460
 Nicole Faridani, 765
 Nikolaev, A., 659
 Nikulin, 894
 Nima Yushij, 843, 853
 Nitin Bose, 783
 Norperforce, 113, 114, 464, 466
 North-West Provinces, 559
 Novy Marghilan (Skobelev), 799
 Nur Muhammad Taraki, 446
 Nurek, 292

 Ochiryn Tsewegjaw, 725
 Oidow, 903
 Oirats, 261, 909
 Omsk, 34, 64, 68, 182, 192, 243, 245
 omsk, 248
 Omsk , 40
 Opium War, 344, 348, 373
 Orenburg
 culture, 146
 Orenburg, 38, 42, 46, 53, 75, 88, 124, 192, 242, 245, 250
 Orissa, 537
 Osh, 90, 150, 266, 269, 275, 279, 505
 Osh , 264, 518
 Ottoman empire, 39, 70, 99, 199, 210, 402, 531
 Ottoman empires, 109
 Owen Lattimore, 363

 P. C. Barua,, 783
 P. Dubrovich, 803
 P. L. Narasimha Murthy, 777
 Pahari, 772, 773, 775, 780
 Pahdi Sanyal, 783
 Pakistan
 agriculture, 546
 and Afghanistan, 443
 Bhutto era, 418
 creation of, 407
 democratic era, 423
 education, 546, 596
 Educational, 547
 educational, 595
 women in, 546
 Yahya Khan, 416, 417
 Zia al-Haq, 420, 446
 Pakistan, 215, 217, 280, 412, 472
 Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 419
 Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), 416
 Pal Kaur, 870
 Pamirs
 art, 684
 articuliarities, 636
 Pamirs, 46, 48, 56, 71, 126, 266, 279, 280, 283, 286, 482, 502, 504
 Pan-Turkism, 196, 200, 283, 597
 Panj, 49, 56, 484, 502
 Panjdeh, 48, 106, 110, 432
 Panjikent, 74, 287
 Paramhans Mandal, 398
 Parmanad Mewaram, 877
 Parmanand, 865
 Partov Naderi, 854
 Parviz Tanavoli, 750, 751

- Pashtoon, 79, 106, 427, 430, 432, 437, 438, 440, 443, 532
 Pashtoonist, 441
 Pashtoonistan, 217, 441
 Pashtoons, 79, 211, 427, 432, 433, 448
 Pashtoonwali, 532
 Patna, 772, 773
 Peljidiin Genden, 358
 perestroika, 523
 Perovsk, 54, 122
 Perovsky, 43
 Persia, 39, 70, 75, 122, 431, 450
 Persian, 53, 306, 433
 Persians
 language, 212, 550
 languages, 147, 217
 LITERATURE IN, 834
 Tobacco Concession, 102
 Persians, 36, 496
 Peter the Great, 64, 121, 307
 Petrograd, 156, 310, 334
 Petropavlovsk, 38, 64, 68, 243, 245
 Poland, 118
 Prem Prakash, 870, 879
 Prince Su Shanqi, 346
 Princess Ashraf, 528
 Pritam Sandhu, 870
 Pulat Khan, 43
 PUNJAB, 592
 Punjab, 104, 207, 209, 402, 407, 408, 412, 417, 424, 425, 537, 551, 559, 564, 593, 773, 780
 Punjabi, 215, 216, 867, 868, 870–874
 Punjbiyat, 869
 Pushpa Sundar, 772

 Qajars
 Arts, 739
 arts, 766
 Qajars, 39, 207, 218, 306, 454
 Qamrul Hasan, 780
 Qaradashlis, 301
 Qari Rahmatullah Wazih, 859
 Qashqa'i, 88
 Qasim Sorokin, 221
 Qazvin, 103, 113, 754

 Qing, 33, 40, 41, 324, 325, 328, 337, 339–343, 348, 349, 351, 376
 Qom, 858
 Quamrul Hasan, 777
 Qum, 467
 Qurratulain Hyder, 881, 882, 887

 R. Batyrov, 230
 R. C. Boral, 783
 R. C. Dutt, 399
 R. P. Kamat, 779
 R. Pirmukhammedov, 230
 Rabjai, 897
 Rahim Jalil, 295
 Rahim Khan, 304
 Rahnavard Zariab, 855, 857
 Raj Kapoor, 783
 Raja Ram Mohan Roy, 398, 538
 Rajabov, 597
 Rajasthan, 215, 492, 545
 Rajasthani, 772, 774, 775
 Rajendra Nath Mukerjee, 589
 Rajesh Khanna, 784
 Rajinder Singh Bedi, 881
 Rajiv Gandhi, 410
 Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, 541
 Rakhimov, M., 611
 Rakhmankul Khan, 279, 280
 Ranjit Singh (1799–1839), 39, 773
 Rasht, 463, 552, 754
 Ratan Nath Sarshar, 880
 Ravi Varma, 776, 782
 Razia Sirajuddin, 780
 Red Army, 157, 266, 311, 314, 332, 354, 379, 465, 470, 471, 535
 Regar, 286, 292
 Rextiding Hoxho, 372
 Reza Deqqati, 765
 Rinchen, 901
 Rinchenkhorlo, 908
 River Chu, 124
 Roqqiya Abu Bakr, 856
 Roshan, 49
 Roshanis, 46, 503
 Rowlatt Act, 403
 Rowlatt Acts, 542

- Russia
 agriculture, 57, 76
 Anglo-Russian agreement, 104
 Banking and foreign capital, 140
 FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 70
 foreign investment, 71
 Infrastructure, 61
 infrastructure, 61
 Intellectuals, 182, 185
 IRRIGATION, 56
 irrigation, 57, 97
 Manufacturing and trade, 68
 population, 51, 52, 63, 64, 90
 populations, 54, 61
 revolution (1905–7), 199
 revolution (1917), 334
 SOCIAL STRUCTURES, 78
 Russia, 40, 96, 139, 227, 241, 249, 392
 Russian, 52, 70, 73, 74, 76, 94, 97, 145, 258
 Russians, 73, 108, 498, 510
 Russification, 124, 135, 251, 258, 268, 331, 600, 789, 892
 Ryukyus, 340
- S. Abassov,, 230
 S. Burkhanov,, 230
 S. Ishanturayeva,, 230
 S. Khojaev, 653
 S. M. Abramzon, 278
 S. Naqvi, 783
 S. Natsagdorj (b. 1928), 726
 S. Polupanov, 809, 818, 820
 S. Segizbayev,, 221
 Saba of Kashan, 835
 Sadeq Chubak, 848
 Sadeq Hedayat, 755, 847, 857
 Sadequain, 780
 Sadozai, 427–430, 455
 Sadriddin Aini, 43, 191, 224, 295, 860, 892
 Saichungga, 908
 Saifuding, 388, 390
 Sailoz Mookerjea, 777, 779
 Salar, 450, 454, 455
 Samad Mir, 865
 Samarkand
 archaeology, 146
 industry, 89, 138, 140
 population, 135, 798
 Samarkand, 42, 44, 59, 67, 72, 74, 93, 98, 125, 127, 137, 159, 160, 212, 243, 249, 457
 Samarkand , 135
 Samuel Hoare, 119
 Sandag the Fabler, 897
 Sani‘ al-Molk, 737
 Sanjeev Kumar, 784
 Sarai-Kamar, 286
 Sarakhs, 301–303, 306, 456, 458
 Sarda Act, 540
 Sarez, 502
 Sarladevi Maharani, 539
 Sarojini Naidu, 541, 542
 Sarvar Azimov, 893
 Saryk, 48, 302, 624, 634
 Saryks, 632
 Satish Gujral, 778
 Satwirdi, 688
 Satyajit Ray, 783
 Satyendranath Bose, 589
 Saudi Arabia, 447
 Saudi
 Arabia, 445
 Sayans, 482, 497, 498
 Sayyed Jamal, 453, 852
 Sayyed Kazem Rashti, 450
 Sayyid Muhammed ‘Ali al-Husseini, 306
 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 572
 Science and Technology, 591, 592, 595, 596, 598, 603
 Science and technology, 576
 Science and
 technology, 590
 science and technology, 573, 575, 577, 579, 581–584, 586–588, 590, 593, 594, 600, 601, 604, 606
 Second World War, 118, 120, 252, 272, 274, 439, 521, 537, 576, 585, 598, 602, 756, 788, 808, 909
 Semipalatinsk, 64, 127, 134, 243, 246, 250, 256
 Semipalatinsk , 73, 242, 245, 253
 Semirechye
 civil war, 164
 Front, 168, 169

- Semirechye, [43](#), [44](#), [53](#), [59](#), [108](#), [127](#), [137](#), [138](#), [243](#), [249](#)
 Semirechye , [50](#), [53](#), [127](#), [134](#), [162](#), [242](#), [250](#)
 Sengge, [903](#), [904](#)
 Sergei Soloviev, [791](#)
 Sha'anxi, [372](#), [374](#), [690](#)
 Shah Mahmud Khan, [439](#), [443](#)
 Shah Wali Khan, [433](#), [437](#), [439](#)
 Shah Zaman, [428](#)
 Shahin Sarkissian, [756](#)
 Shahr-i Sabz, [38](#), [45](#), [74](#), [610](#), [613](#), [615](#), [617](#), [634](#), [638](#)
 Shahrutuz, [286](#)
 Shaikh Ayaz, [876](#)–[878](#)
 Shaikh Khazal, [115](#)
 shamanism, [322](#), [325](#), [330](#), [686](#), [733](#)
 Shamo Xusut, [378](#), [380](#)
 Shams al-Din Shahin, [859](#)
 Shamsuddin 'Bulbul', [876](#)
 Shantaram, [783](#)
 Shapur Bakhtiyar, [476](#)
 Sharabpeljailing, [719](#)
 Sharof Rashidov, [228](#)
 Shaykh-zade, Mirmuhsin, [230](#)
 SHENG SHICAI (1933–44), [380](#)
 Sher Singh (1839–43), [773](#)
 Shir Dor, [133](#)
 Shirabad, [617](#)
 Shiraz, [103](#), [757](#), [836](#), [837](#)
 Shirazi, [450](#)
 Shiv Kumar Batalvi, [869](#), [870](#)
 Shohrat, [228](#), [230](#)
 Shortanbay Kanayula, [247](#)
 Shughnan, [49](#)
 Shughnanis, [46](#)
 Shukrullah, [228](#), [230](#)
 Shurabad, [287](#)
 Shurideh, [837](#)
 Si Tuqiao, [691](#)
 Siberia, [34](#), [42](#), [43](#), [55](#), [75](#), [88](#), [90](#), [113](#), [126](#), [242](#), [345](#)
 Siberian
 agriculture, [333](#)
 architecture, [716](#), [720](#), [732](#)
 education, [327](#), [330](#), [333](#)
 industry, [320](#), [321](#), [332](#), [334](#)
 religions, [322](#)
 Tuva, [323](#), [324](#), [326](#), [327](#)
 Tuvan, [325](#), [328](#)
 Siberian, [34](#), [124](#), [250](#)
 Sikhs, [39](#), [104](#), [215](#), [397](#), [410](#), [427](#), [551](#), [774](#), [867](#), [868](#), [875](#)
 Simin Behbahani, [845](#)
 Simin Daneshvar, [848](#)
 Simla, [104](#), [110](#), [418](#)
 Sind, [407](#), [412](#), [417](#), [421](#), [423](#), [424](#), [560](#)
 Sindhi, [422](#), [874](#)–[879](#)
 Sir Louis Cavagnari, [431](#)
 Sir Syed, [882](#)
 Sistan, [106](#), [431](#), [459](#), [460](#), [462](#), [469](#)
 Slavs, [93](#), [279](#)
 Sohan Singh Misha, [869](#)
 Sohrab Modi, [783](#)
 Sohrab Sepehri, [743](#), [844](#)
 Soleyman Laiq, [853](#)
 Soliin Danzan, [353](#)
 Sonomyn Choimbol, [726](#)
 Soyoltai, [725](#)
 Stalinabad
 in Mongolia, [360](#), [711](#)
 in Mongolian, [358](#)
 Stalinabad, [284](#), [288](#)–[290](#), [825](#)
 Starosselski, [114](#)
 Subhas Chandra Bose, [120](#), [404](#), [407](#)
 Sudhirranjan Khastgir, [778](#)
 Sufis, [785](#)
 Sufism, [873](#)
 Sughra Rababi, [780](#)
 Sultan Morad Mirza, [450](#), [455](#)
 Sun Yatsen, [376](#), [690](#)
 Sungweidanjung, [898](#)
 Surendra Prakash, [882](#)
 Surjit Singh Sethi, [871](#)
 Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), [252](#)
 Swadeshi, [400](#)
 Syed Haider Raza, [779](#)
 Syr Darya
 industry, [245](#)
 land use, [60](#)
 Syr Darya, [33](#), [38](#), [40](#), [43](#), [44](#), [53](#), [56](#), [58](#), [100](#), [122](#), [158](#), [232](#), [242](#), [249](#), [250](#), [273](#), [484](#)
 Syr Darya , [127](#), [243](#)

- T. Ryskulov,, 166, 220
 T. Tula,, 228
 Tabriz, 101, 103, 451, 462, 463, 470, 552, 754, 834, 838, 840, 842
 Tacheng (Qoqek), 374, 385
 Tagore, Rabindra Nath, 776
 Taherzadeh Sabir, 841
 Taj Begam, 866
 Tajiks, 49, 56, 78, 90, 176, 202, 209, 275, 503, 511
 Taklamakan, 487, 511, 701
 Talas, 279, 505
 Taliban, 217, 448, 577, 767, 769, 770, 854, 858
 Talibanization, 596
 Tara Singh, 870
 Taranchis, 49, 107, 134
 Tarbagatai, 134, 344, 482
 Tarim, 483, 484, 512, 685
 Tarwa, 904
 Tashkent
 administration, 151, 154
 Education, 239
 education, 238
 industry, 70, 76, 141
 railway, 63, 65, 67, 137
 railways, 65
 Theatre, 792, 793
 theatres, 789
 Tashkent, 37, 42–44, 55, 63, 64, 90, 97, 105, 107, 124, 127, 457, 602, 798
 Tashkent agreement, 416
 Tashkurgan, 685
 Tatars
 art, 680, 689, 786
 articular, 685
 articularly, 618
 Tatars, 93, 98, 182, 199, 209, 225, 275
 Tatarstan, 213
 Tavallo, 144, 147, 891
 Tchingiz Aytmatov, 277
 Tehran
 Arts, 746
 arts, 740, 756
 education in, 552, 554
 Tehran, 39, 101, 429, 463, 465, 466, 470, 471, 473, 474, 477
 Tejen, 37, 297, 301, 302, 458
 Teke, 303, 624, 634
 Tekes, 47, 65, 305, 308, 632
 Temgetu, 907
 Thakur Singh, 779
 Thomas Holdich, 459
 Tian Shan, 40, 126, 146, 482, 487, 502, 503, 505, 507, 510
 Tibet
 art in, 775
 art into, 713
 Tibet, 106, 338–341, 409
 Tibetan, 349
 Tibetans, 513
 Timurids, 35
 Tokombaev, 894, 895
 Toktogul Satylgan uulu, 264
 Tolomush Okeev, 790
 Toming, 372
 Torghay, 42, 242, 243, 249, 250
 Torghay , 245, 249
 Trans-Siberian Railway, 332, 334, 344
 Transbaikai, 333, 334
 Transbaikai , 334
 Transcaspia
 civil war, 310
 RAILWAY, 65
 Railway, 798
 railway, 61, 76, 110, 111, 136
 Transcaspia, 46, 59, 101, 106, 158
 Transcaspia , 58, 63
 Transcaspian, 47, 50, 457
 Transcaspian , 125, 127, 312
 Transoxania, 39, 48, 53, 56, 57, 74
 Ts. Jamsran, 727
 Tsagan Jamba, 724
 Tsendendorj, 905
 Tsewegmid, 902
 Tsydendambaevich, 913
 Tudeh Party, 115, 120, 470, 471
 Turdakun Usubaliyev (1961–85), 268
 Turfan (Turpan), 368
 Turkestan, 43, 124, 150, 495, 505
 Turkey, 114, 146, 149, 194, 195, 198–200, 204, 280, 436, 466, 469, 472, 532
 TURKIC, 888

- Turkic, 163, 174, 896
- Turkistan
- administration of, 151
 - British in, 106
 - British interest, 108
 - COLLAPSE, 384
 - East, 338, 344
 - eastern, 340
 - easternmost, 339
 - Education, 144
 - education, 143
 - infrastructure, 136, 139
 - Jadidism in, 147
 - Muslim Council, 151, 156, 159
 - population, 262
 - revolution, 200
 - revolutions, 200
 - WOMEN IN, 515
- Turkistan, 37, 39, 41–44, 49–52, 54, 56, 58, 61, 74, 75, 124, 209, 242, 243, 250, 267, 384, 392, 428, 432
- Turkistan Front, 266
- Turkmenistan
- Agriculture, 317
 - agriculture, 298, 300, 313, 315
 - artists, 663, 665, 667
 - Collectivization, 314
 - collectivization, 314, 315
 - culture, 318
 - Education, 603
 - education, 601
 - history, 297
 - Industry, 315
 - industry, 309, 317, 603
 - Political developments, 301
 - rebellion, 304
 - Saparmurat Niyazov, 601
- Turkmenistan, 63, 181, 212
- Turkmens, 37, 46, 47, 60, 98, 178, 455–458
- Tursun-zoda, 861, 862
- U. Arifov,, 230
- Udwal, 903
- Uighurs, 209, 261, 275, 368, 371, 372, 391, 510, 511, 554, 605
- Ukraine, 222, 225, 227, 789, 807, 809, 821
- Ulaanbaatar, 356, 357, 359, 364, 499, 554, 587, 713, 719, 721, 723, 725, 727, 731, 732
- Ulughzoda, 295
- United Nations, 237, 239, 296, 365, 367, 408, 412, 421, 440, 441, 528, 555, 577, 596
- Ura-tepe (Ura-tyube), 125
- Ural, 242, 249
- ural, 52, 244, 824
- Ural , 243, 250
- Urals, 42, 252
- Uralsk, 64, 68, 127, 243, 245
- Uralsk , 134
- Urdu, 215, 413, 560, 863, 879, 881–887
- Urgut, 610, 617, 619, 638, 640
- USA, 115, 116, 854
- usade, 113
- usal, 424
- usavi, 474
- Usman Nasir, 221, 224, 238
- USSR
- and women, 523
 - and Xinjiang, 378, 382
 - formation of, 175–177, 226
 - German invasion of, 118
 - Great Terror, 359
 - PERESTROIKA, 234
- USSR, 203, 523, 689
- Ust-Kamenogorsk, 64, 243, 253
- Uttar Pradesh, 215, 406, 410, 538, 543, 544, 551, 552, 556, 564, 772
- Uzbek
- culture, 188
 - poetry, 193
- Uzbek, 33, 36, 37, 52, 74, 176, 311, 428
- UZBEK KHANATES, 35
- Uzbekistan
- Agriculture, 222
 - agriculture, 222, 229
 - artists, 662, 663
 - CENTRALIZATION, 225
 - centralization, 220
 - COLLECTIVIZATION, 220
 - Collectivization, 222
 - collectivization, 221
 - Culture, 239
 - culture, 220, 223, 225, 226, 237, 238

- education, 224, 229, 603, 604
 Independence, 237, 239
 independence, 235, 236, 238, 240
 Industry, 223
 industry, 222, 232, 639
 intelligentsia, 221
 nationalism, 220
 religion, 224, 238
 women in, 554
 Uzbekistan, 63, 95, 181, 212, 213, 239, 273
 Uzbekistana, 82, 89, 90, 240
 Uzbeks, 36, 39, 49, 78, 178, 301, 303

 V. A. Zhukovsky,, 146
 V. Dimitriev, 809
 V. Jakhangarov, 809
 V. Lavrov, 809
 V. M. Molotov,, 119, 360
 V. M. Vernadsky,, 294
 V. Roschupkin,, 823
 V. S. Ge'ntsel'man, 803
 V. Spivak,, 822
 V. V. Bartol'd,, 146, 294
 V. V. Radlov, 246, 329
 Vajrapani, 714
 Vakhsh, 288, 292, 598
 Vanjis, 503
 Varzab, 287
 Verkhneudinsk, 334
 Victor von Grot, 720
 Vietnam, 340, 445, 446
 Vivekananda, 398
 Vladimir Motyl, 790
 Volga valley, 126, 199
 Vosuq al-Dowle, 465

 Wahhabis, 395, 396
 Wakhan, 49, 104, 106, 279, 432
 Wang Lebing, 699
 Wang Ruichang, 907
 Wang Yunzhu, 692
 Wangan, 903
 Wangchingbala, 898
 Waryam Singh Sandhu, 870
 White Guards
 STATUS OF, 515, 525
 status of, 516, 523, 530, 531, 533, 538, 543
 STATUS OF , 535
 White Guards, 164, 266, 332, 335
 Wu Qifeng, 696
 Wuchang, 347, 376

 Xibe (Sibo), 389
 Xie Jiadao, 696
 Xinhai, 376
 XINJIANG, 39, 49
 Xinjiang
 artists, 695, 696
 education, 605
 FEUDALISM, 372
 JIN SHUREN (1928–33), 380
 LIBERATION OF, 387
 modern period, 692
 PRODUCTIVITY, 393
 Qing period, 676
 Republican period, 689
 republican period, 376
 Xinjiang, 33, 41, 46, 279, 344, 390, 391
 Xu Shuzhi, 696

 Y. Agzamov,, 230
 Y. K. Shukla, 779
 Y. Masson,, 230
 Ya'qub Khan (1878–80), 105
 Yahya Dehqanpur, 765
 Yan Xin'an, 690
 Yangliuqing, 688
 Yarkand (Shache), 375
 Yawuukhulan, 905
 Yazgulamis, 503
 Yemrels, 301, 303
 Yengi Hisar (Yengisar), 679
 Yining, 385, 387, 391, 392, 682, 685, 695
 Yu Yixuan, 690
 Yuan Shikai, 352, 377, 379
 Yunnan, 377

 Zaher Shah (1933–73), 473
 Zain al Abidin, 777
 Zanabazar, 713, 715, 717, 720
 Zerafshan, 45, 53, 57, 133, 146, 505
 Zerafshan , 125, 127
 Zh. and Kh. Dosmuhamedov, 153

Zhao Wangyun, [690](#)

Zhaosu, [685](#), [695](#)

Zhou Enlai, [390](#)

Zhumabaev, M., [248](#)

Ziya Qarizadah, [853](#)

Ziya Said, [221](#)

Zubeida Aga, [780](#)

Zuo Zongtang, [371](#), [372](#), [374](#)

History of civilizations of Central Asia

Volume I

The dawn of civilization:
earliest times to 700 B. C.

Volume II

The development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations:
700 B. C. to A. D. 250

Volume III

The crossroads of civilizations:
A. D. 250 to 750

Volume IV

The age of achievement:
A. D. 750 to the end of the fifteenth century:

Part One

The historical, social and economic setting

Part Two

The achievements

Volume V

Development in contrast:
from the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century

Volume VI

Towards contemporary civilization:
from the mid-nineteenth century
to the present time

Cover: © A. Khakimov; G. Ratushenko; V. Terebenin